5 June 2002
Source: Wall Street Journal, 5 June 2002


Congressional Panel Faces Pressure
To Hold Tough Public Probe on 9/11

By DAVID S. CLOUD and DAVID ROGERS
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON -- Congressional hearings into pre-Sept. 11 intelligence lapses begin Wednesday behind closed doors, but already it is evident that the inquiry is spurring a bare-knuckle fight among agencies over who is to blame.

Beyond the fight lurks a bigger question: Is this probe going to focus on airing past intelligence mistakes, or lay the groundwork for changing the whole system by which the U.S. tries to protect itself from terrorist attack? Even the leaders of the joint House and Senate Intelligence Committee investigation don't all agree where they are headed, or how much of the inquiry will be held in public. They also begin knowing their efforts ultimately could be eclipsed by an independent commission, which some in Congress want to set up to investigate pre-Sept. 11 failures.

Revelations in recent weeks about what the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and others knew before Sept. 11 are likely to be followed with similar disclosures from the National Security Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration and others, lawmakers involved say. Agency leaks have served to turn up the pressure on Congress to conduct a tough public airing of the government's shortcomings.

"It's going to be a long hot summer and probably an interesting fall," says Sen. Richard Shelby of Alabama, the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence panel. Of the four leaders of the congressional committees, two Democrats and two Republicans, Sen. Shelby has been the most critical toward the intelligence community since Sept. 11. "If we don't do a thorough job, and follow the investigation wherever it goes, whatever it costs, then we'll be second-guessed," he says.

But others insist the summer hearings should be a forum for future-oriented reforms, not just backward-looking finger-pointing. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Porter Goss, a former CIA operative, says the annual bill re-authorizing intelligence programs could include changes aimed at improving accountability and coordination. Mr. Goss also says he would support a separate budget for intelligence -- it is now buried in the annual defense budget -- and declassify the total amount.

Separately, Mr. Goss says the committee might call as a witness Brent Scowcroft, former national security adviser to President Bush's father, and author of a still-unreleased report on reorganizing the intelligence community.

The investigation began in February -- the staff has gathered 30,000 documents and interviewed more than 175 witnesses -- but Tuesday was the first gathering of all committee members. Staff briefings to lawmakers of preliminary findings continue Wednesday. Thursday the committee will hear from Cofer Black, the CIA's former counterterrorism chief. FBI Director Robert Mueller and Coleen Rowley, the FBI lawyer who authored a 13-page complaint about pre-Sept. 11 disputes between her field office in Minneapolis and FBI headquarters here, will appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee, which is conducting its own parallel probe.

After Tuesday's private meeting, the committee released a two-page document [copy below] outlining its inquiry's scope. The panel, it said, will look at the evolution of the international terrorist threat to the U.S. and "what the intelligence community had, has or should have learned from all sources of information" about that threat.

The staff is divided into teams looking at the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency and other government offices. A fifth team is reviewing the government's counterterrorism efforts going back to 1986. The committee is scheduled to meet twice a week in June, July and September. Only one public session has been scheduled so far, for later this month, and it is unclear how many more will be added. Much of the work is expected to occur in closed session to protect classified information. A final report isn't likely until next year, though that doesn't preclude the inquiry from sparking changes before then.

In the last big investigation by the intelligence committees -- the Iran-Contra scandal at the end of the Reagan presidency -- the covert operation was essentially over when the hearings began. The committees could roll out material without serious harm to U.S. intelligence. The Sept. 11 inquiry presents much dicier issues, with continuing operations against al Qaeda and prosecutions of alleged plotters, such as Zaccarias Moussaoui, in their early stages.

Answering for 9-11 With congressional hearings underway on intelligence failures prior to Sept. 11's terrorist attacks, a number of top U.S. officials will be in the hot seat this summer.
Who What Since
George Tenet Director of Central Intelligence July 11, 1997
Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden Director of the National Security Agency March 26, 1999
Robert Mueller Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Sept. 4, 2001
John Ashcroft Attorney General Feb. 1, 2001
James Ziglar Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service Aug. 3, 2001
Source: WSJ research


"The leadership of these committees has to be extremely measured in how they proceed," says former Sen. Warren Rudman, who was a leader in the Iran-Contra investigation. "You don't want to do anything in a public way that demoralizes these agencies or hurts the effort against terrorism."

But others contend a public airing of pre-attack failures is exactly what is needed to restore public confidence, and to ensure the agencies' full disclosure. Loch Johnson, a former CIA employee who was a top staffer on the 1970s committee that probed CIA abuses, says, "In order to prevent another 9-11, maybe what they're going to have to do is dig deeper and come up with more thoughtful answers."

Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle plans to introduce legislation this month to create an independent commission. Mr. Goss worries such a panel will "dissipate" the administration's willingness to cooperate with the intelligence panels. "They will go back to the normal Washington stance -- why cooperate with you when you don't count," he says. Mr. Goss doesn't rule out an independent commission down the road.

Tuesday, President Bush reasserted his administration's resistance to another probe. "I want a committee to investigate, not multiple committees to investigate, because I don't want to tie up our team when we're trying to fight this war on terror," he told reporters.

"In terms of whether or not the FBI and the CIA were communicating properly, I think it is clear that they weren't," he went on. But now, he added, "there's better sharing of intelligence."

Many Republicans privately worry that the administration's opposition to further inquiries risks appearing as if it is hiding something -- and for naught. The White House may be dragged "kicking and screaming," says GOP Sen. John McCain of Arizona, "but there will be a commission sooner or later."

As for the congressional committee, tensions are as much driven by personalities as politics. Senate Chairman Bob Graham, a Florida Democrat, is known for a methodical approach, and his homestate Republican friend, Mr. Goss, frets about damaging the CIA he once served. Meeting the investigative staff in April, Mr. Goss left some in the room crestfallen when he expressed hope the inquiry would conclude that the intelligence agencies weren't as deficient before Sept. 11 as many believed, according to two witnesses.

Rep. Nancy Pelosi of California, the House Intelligence Committee's top Democrat, also is very careful to avoid overstatement about intelligence shortfalls.

That leaves Mr. Shelby, who has a history of tension with fellow Republican Goss, to effectively steer the panel's direction. He favors establishing a multi-agency clearinghouse for any threat information.

The committee also may consider giving the CIA director more authority to direct both the National Security Agency, which intercepts overseas telephone calls and other signals, and the National Reconnaissance Office, which handles satellite surveillance. Right now the Pentagon largely sets the two agencies' intelligence-gathering priorities; putting the CIA director in charge would centralize U.S. monitoring of terrorist threats.

Write to David S. Cloud at david.cloud@wsj.com and David Rogers at david.rogers@wsj.com

Updated June 5, 2002


Source: http://intelligence.house.gov/PDF/jointinquiryscope.pdf

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

PREAMBLE

To reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks; to honor the memories of the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks by conducting a thorough search for facts to answer the many questions that their families and many Americans have raised; and to lay a basis for assessing the accountability of institutions and officials of government:

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AND
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

ADOPT THIS

INITIAL SCOPE OF JOINT INQUIRY

Pursuant to section 5(a)(1) of Senate Resolution 400, 94h Congress, Rule 6 of th Rules of Procedure of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Rule XI(1)(b) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the two Committees have authorized an investigation, to be conducted as a Joint Inquiry, into the Intelligence Community's activities before and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. The Committees have undertaken this Joint Inquiry pursuant to their responsibility to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government and all other authority vested in the Committees.

The purpose of this Joint Inquiry is -

(a) to conduct an investigation into, and study of, all matters that may have any tendency to reveal the full facts about
(1) the evolution of the international terrorist threat to the United States, the response of the United States Government including that of the Intelligence Community to international terrorism, from the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence's Counterterrorist Center in 1986 to the present, and what the Intelligence Community had, has, or should have learned from all sources of information, including any terrorist attacks or attempted ones, about the international terrorist threat to the United States;

(2) what the Intelligence Community knew prior to September 11 about the scope and nature of any possible attacks against the United States or United States interests by international terrorists, including by any of the hijackers or their associates, and what was done with that information;

(3) what the Intelligence Community has learned since the events of Septemer 11 about the persons associated with those events, and whether any of that information suggests actions that could or should have been taken to learn of, or prevent those events;

(4) whether any information developed before or after September 11 indicates systemic problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community from learning of or preventing the attacks in advance, or that, if remedied, could help the Community identify and prevent such attacks in the future;

(5) how and to what degree the elements of the Intelligence Community have interacted with each other, as well as other parts of federal, state, and local governments with respect to identifying, tracking, assessing, and coping with international terrorist threats; as well as biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear threats, whatever their source (such as the Anthrax attack of 2001).

(6) the ways in which the Intelligence Community's responses to past intelligence problems and challenges, whether or not related to international terrorism, have affected its counterterrorism efforts; and

(7) any other information that would enable the Joint Inquiry, and the Committees in the performance of their continuing responsibilities, to make such recommendations, including recommendations for new or amended legislation and any administrative or structural changes, or other actions, as they determine to be necessary or deirable to improve the ability of the Intelligence Community to learn of, and prevent, future international terrorist attacks; and

(b) to fulfill the Constitutional oversight and informing functions of the Congress with regard to the matters examined in the Joint Inquiry.