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ITT: explain why dialectics isn't a pile of rubbish. Hard mode: no appeals to authority or ad hominems.
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>no appeals to authority or ad hominems
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Because it's bullshit and Hayek, Rand, Friedman etc. all say so, and you're a fag.
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>>2831651
>Rand
there are certain boundaries men ought not to cross.
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>>2831651

lol'd
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>>2831651
10/10 would read again
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>>2831651
>Hayek, Rand, Friedman

Hayek denounced all well fare programs specially health-care. Yet when asked to lecture in America by oil tycoons he declined because he was afraid he would lose his government subsidized Austrian social healthcare.

Rand was just a looney old racist selfish zionist.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7uPq9QsE0Eo&t=0m29s
>"arabs are primitive savages, who are racist and backwards..blablabla Israel is center of morality and science..blablalb"

Friedman like the others, subscribed to an ideology and didn't bother with empirical or statistical research. It's very easy to be an arm chair philosopher on matters of economics. This is what keeps Austrian economics from being taught anywhere in the world in any serious economics class--it's taught as a history lesson of what not to do.
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>>2831690

This is really typical of free-market fundamentalists. They trumpet their beliefs, but don't live by them. Andrew Coyne and Kevin O'Leary are all to happy to pontificate about the evils of government interference, all the while happily accepting cheques from a government-subsidized corporation. Hypocrites.
>>
My ideology is correct because I use an epistemology that says that you're racist for disagreeing with me, therefore the tools I use to support my ideology are good.

I get paid by a university to teach this holy truth to humanities students.
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>>2831698
They're also the first ones to cry ad hominem when you point out they don't live by the same values they espouse.
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>>2831690
Friedman isn't Austrian School.
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Dialectics in Hegel essentially refers only to the propensity for things to 'change.' it's pretty similar in marx. As fundamental metaphysics, I don't think you would try to dispute that...
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>>2831719
There are things outside of the dialectic. See 20th Century philosophy.
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>>2831723
I'm not sure where that my contention was at all otherwise. Since we're bandying fallacy terms around, that's a strawman suckah.
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>>2831730
The main problem with dialectics, and the reason why it's bullshit most of the time, is the setting up of false dichotomies. But in order to work out false dichotomies you need to be able to reason without dialectics.
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>>2831709

>Friedman isn't Austrian School.

He shared a lot of their principles and was greatly influenced by their thinking
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>>2831742
There are parallels because of influence both ways, but it seems to me the approaches are quite different: Austrian school seem to want to look at precedent and reason from that, whereas Chicagoans seem to want to make nice models and say everything is well defined.
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>>2831742
>English is heavily influenced by Latin
>German is Latin
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>>2831747
>English is heavily influenced by Latin
>English is Latin
is what I meant.
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>>2831739
Hegel would call the standard separation of subject and object in knowledge a false dichotomy. Something the likes of Adorno disputed.

In general, Hegelian dialectics don't work in dichotomies cause they work through progression rarely allowing elements to be dichotomous (i.e. contemporary and parallel within dialectical metaphysics).
>>
OP did you mean dialects or dialectics

they are very different things
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>>2831753
>Hegelian dialectics don't work in dichotomies
It might be better to say the contradictions that then lead to synthesis are false. See Derrida's work on deconstruction and his criticism of Hegel.
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>>2831771
I am actually at a loss here. What?
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I don't get it OP.

dialectic is a method of argumentation, what exactly is bullshit about having philosophical conversations via questions and answers?
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>>2831777
yeah use bullshit to argue against bullshit.
this is like watching creationists fight against astrologers.
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>>2831784
Hegelian dialectics were implied
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>>2831791
What an insightful comment.
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>>2831777

This is a simplified version of Hegel's dialectics, which is useful in some circumstances. But really the contradictions which are the fruit of history in whose two opposing terms is a germ of similitude, demanding recognition. Difference and identity depend upon each other for meaning as much as they cancel each other out.
>>
OP:

They were good enough for Socrates, why shouldn't they be good enough for you?
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>>2831796
This makes absolutely no difference. As for the relation of difference to identity, that is dealt with in the first few pages of Of Grammatology iirc. Definition is a limited paradigm for meaning.
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>>2831809
>derrida

shit storm a-brewin'
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>>2831816
The binary opposition of shitstorm to brewing deconstructs itself through its own internal contradictions.
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>>2831777
invoking Derrida is a generally complacent and apathetic move in metaphysics. As far as textual understanding is concerned, fine, his framework tends to be somewhat useful and productive in what it provides on occasion. Following too closely leads to some critics basically saying nothing (Kennedy's Art of Love was a recent example for me), but it can otherwise lead to a nuanced, multivalent understanding of a text (as is generally the case with the way certain bits of Deconstruction has been co-opted by the New Historicists).

Invoking him in a discussion of metaphysics where things are of necessity much more contingent on possibility and not grounded in a distinct text, is as good as saying 'things don't have to be seen this way, in terms of constant, subtle change brought about ontologically within a distinct thing, bringing about something else,' which as we all know is a pretty unmotivated move, because reality, in its fundamental qualities, is not a text open to standard textual hermeneutics or appropriation.
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>>2832046
It takes one to know one, Caracalla.
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>>2832046
Metaphysics as well as the rest of philosophy is already grounded in language. Trying to make out that it is otherwise and so Derrida does not apply is odd.
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>>2832074
Is the space-time world, the fundamental subject of metaphysics these days, constituted of language?
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>>2832106
Do you think mathematical constructions somehow aren't language?
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>>2832113
Do you think philosophy seeks to understand fundamental metaphysics like causality and time through mathematical construction?
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>>2832132
Do you think that they can "understand" it without grounding it in language?

Language games.
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>>2832106
>>2832113
>>2832132
>>2832144
"Without mathematics we cannot penetrate deeply into philosophy. Without philosophy we cannot penetrate deeply into mathematics. "
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>>2832164
And mathematic is language games.
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>>2832169
games have rules

checkmate, atheists
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>>2832144
The language game philosophers play is to pretty much reduce their language to transactions of logic.That is still a sort of discourse or rule-playing symbol proliferator, fine. A deconstruction of this would either lead to an attempt to discredit this language game it plays, the perspective it brings to bear on metaphysics (eg that things should have a logically consistent account) or the logic itself (which is of course, what logicians themselves can't make logically consistent). As I said, Derrida is completely insulated from the actual object of metaphysics (not that he would agree it existed outside a discourse), but could have a lot to say about its study.

What I would dispute is whether any critique along his lines could have anything to bear on contemporary metaphysics. The spirit of metaphysics that's been complained of since Nietszche and that Derrida has complained of himself, is not really an issue these days; the syncreticism and mysticism has been done away with and the focus is on insulated inquiries in areas like Free Will, Personal Identity, Time, Causality, etc. Satisfying responses can be developed in all these inquiries (unlike epistemology) but the spirit of inquiry is more to see where problems could lie rather than to completely solve a problem. Out of probably any developed metaphysical system in Modern philosophy, Hegel's is the most open-ended and hence avoids the sort of issues that problematize Kant's and Descartes'. It can hence be lumped in with the modern discourse.
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>>2832248
>The language game philosophers play is to pretty much reduce their language to transactions of logic.
That's arse about face.
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>>2832248
While in textually focused discourses, Deconstruction has real benefit. It leads to problems being developed (i.e Butler's deconstruction of feminist gender theories).

For contemporary metaphysics, Deconstruction basically offers a complete and unmotivated negation. Philosophy currently offers a developing description of how phenomena like time and causality could be, affected through logical transactions (which after all are basically what we sort of innately think in). A deconstruction of this would just deny these fundamentals with no positive development. If these fundamentals are so apparent, what's the worth in dismissing them completely or disallowing any development of their character?
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>>2832248
>The language game philosophers play is to pretty much reduce their language to transactions of logic.
Eh, that was probably true until the early 20th century with people like Russell and Frege, but developments, especially in pragmatics, since then has transformed many areas of philosophy from purely logical input/output toward a more... well, pragmatical interpretation
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>>2832263
So you're problem with Deconstruction is that it isn't constructive?
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>>2832255
It would be for Russell, but then again Russell was a charlatan, particularly for thinking this.
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>>2832271
>Russell was a charlatan

This. So much this.

He's so clever that, the first time you read his postulations you think, 'Oh, of course, it couldn't be any other way!'. But really, he relies on so many hidden presuppositions, alongside manipulations of language and logic that charlatan is really the best way to describe him.
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>>2832265
If you look at Wittgenstein's work, you can't reduce language games to logic transactions, as it's linked to the bound of reason that originally monolithic language had. You fall into the same problem Witty had in TLP, looking at the bounds of logic with logic.
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>>2832270
My problem with it in metaphysics is that it can't be constructive (it is constructive as I say often within 'Theory' or discourse studies). to completely dismantle a concept of time, as something you could describe, (as a deconstruction of metaphysics could do) would be fairly meretricious...particularly as things are done in the language of logic, which is surely as universalized/totalized a language as you can get, and hence one that admits of little prejudice (which tends to be what deconstruction unearths).
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>>2832285
You accuse Socrates of being a gadfly.
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>>2832284
Yeah, this can't be a perfect translation, but the way a philosophy essay is written versus, say, a lit crit one, shows that the language has to be a lot more mathematical in its precision and its adherence to logic.
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>>2832271
For Russell, you stated it the right way around. It's misunderstanding Wittgenstein.
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>>2832291
Again, >language games
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>>2832288
Well, he kinda was with his (or at least Plato's) penchant for totalitarian politics. The difference between Socrates and Derrida would be that Socrates would dispute a metaphysical account for the rules it pretends to adhere to, but Derrida would dispute its rules.
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>>2832300
>Well, he kinda was
Obv.
>The difference between Socrates and Derrida would be that Socrates would dispute a metaphysical account for the rules it pretends to adhere to, but Derrida would dispute its rules.
You're trying to see differences where no differences exist. Philosophy is about a love of wisdom, not about "constructive criticism".
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>>2832293
>>2832292
What I'm pointing to is that there's a spectrum between of precision and clarity between different discourses. Philosophical writing aims for quite bald precision and clarity and this, for philosophers, makes it more rigourous and makes its logic clearer. When I say it 'reduces language to transactions of logic,' what I mean is it communicates the logic of an argument through the separate and incompatible rules of language, in such a way as to leave the language fairly bald and unnuanced beyond this task. This is not a equation of language with logic nor does it pretend that there can be a direct translation between the rules of logic and the rules of language.
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>>2832315
Derrida's not a philosopher in the way Socrates is because he works through quasi-(i.e.post-)structuralist principles (quite different to logic) and is interested in discourse (while Socrates is interested in problems within a discourse). that's what i meant by my delineation of the differences between their approaches to a philosophical problem
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>>2832327
and yes, this makes it an important difference because they would approach a problem in a completely different way to each other, as again, I described in the example
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>>2832321
>it communicates the logic of an argument through the separate and incompatible rules of language
The rules of language are compatible with the rules of logic. Logic is abstracted from general language. The construction of a language game is to get away from this idea of monolithic language, and logic is a language game.

If you were familiar with Derrida, you'd realise that regardless of the "precision" you perceive, Deconstruction still applies. What you're doing is equivalent to logocentrism, saying that one particular use or variety of language is privileged above others.
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>>2832334
I never denied you could deconstruct analytically philosophical language like this. What I did deny was that it could be a worthwhile thing to do, particularly when logic is a fairly unfocalized language these days (i.e. without important prejudices). What I affirmed was that modern metaphysics is also compatible with Derrida's strictures against the fallacious underpinnings of past metaphysics, interested only in developing itself as a discourse without any firm teleology; its emphasis on precision of language does not insulate it from being a discourse, it insulates it from relative problems, like being unclear in its logic or inaccessible. As other discourses are less interested in providing a reader a clear logic to follow, this is less of an imperative for them.
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>>2832352
For a start, One cannot deconstruct something. The something will deconstruct itself. And so the question of whether it is a worthwhile thing to "do" is invalid or immaterial or whatever, it is simply an event that can happen.

The teleology of the something is also immaterial. Deconstruction looks at limits, not at ends.
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>>2831690
>>2831698
>failing to distinguish between a preference for a mode of goverment and a personal ethical code.
I'm not even an austrian- or chicago-schooler, but hey, no.

However, it may irritate some fans of Atlas Shrugged, and if they take that as a legitimate objection to her reputation so be it.
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>>2832400
>And so the question of whether it is a worthwhile thing to "do" is invalid or immaterial or whatever, it is simply an event that can happen.
Whether it's done by someone or just happens (this is just a bit of argumentative wrangling that allows Derrida to insulate deconstruction from the way discourse propogates, something i feel is vaguely justified), it still doesn't mean anything important to contemporary metaphysics. Metaphysics was perfectly happy to reform itself under Wittgenstein's aegis and become a discourse that propogates without any real end in sight or without any end as an aim, but just to simply develop. This avoids any charge of logocentrism or a sort sense of certainty or absolute telos underlining it as a discourse. What is not happy to change are its subjects, like Hegel's account for development and change.


>The teleology of the something is also immaterial.
The teleology is not relevant to deconstruction, its relevant to the metaphysical discourse prior to 1900, one of its espoused and totalizing aims, an end to metaphysical inconsistency and a key to all knowledge. Modern metaphysicists in recognizing the worth of just propogating a discourse with no real teleology (like modern metaphysics), are insulating anything that is said in modern metaphysics from an accusation of logocentrism, of their being a certainty, a logos, to which thing reach.
>>
Because it's produced no fruit.

Now, back to science :)
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>>2832485
>this is just a bit of argumentative wrangling that allows Derrida to insulate deconstruction from the way discourse propogates, something i feel is vaguely justified
It's a direct result of Heidegger's work in Being and Time.
>What is not happy to change are its subjects, like Hegel's account for development and change.
You mean where it deconstructs itself is when talking about its Hegelian aspects.
> This avoids any charge of logocentrism or a sort sense of certainty or absolute telos underlining it as a discourse.
>The teleology is not relevant to deconstruction, its relevant to the metaphysical discourse prior to 1900, one of its espoused and totalizing aims, an end to metaphysical inconsistency and a key to all knowledge. Modern metaphysicists in recognizing the worth of just propogating a discourse with no real teleology (like modern metaphysics), are insulating anything that is said in modern metaphysics from an accusation of logocentrism, of their being a certainty, a logos, to which thing reach.
Then stop trying to make out it has some kind of privileged position or language that makes it outside the reach of semiotics or language games or deconstruction.
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>>2832535

Science is dialectical, scrub. Ever heard of a null hypothesis?
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>>2831745
chicagoans also want to play games with the monetary supply because they think a central bank is a philosophers stone.
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>>2832594
Interesting...

The kinda shitty thing is, there's now a rather large number of people graduating from prestigious economics schools that heavily buy into one of these free-market ideologies (but without explicitly saying it), who do not subscribe to those ideologies. This is, I think, why economics has become so impenetrable: nobody can say their ideology, either due to ignorance or delusion, they only know how to perform a particular flavour of economics, which they then take to be the Economics.
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>>2832609
I think your post is what is impenetrable.
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>>2832623
Impenetrable or post-impenetrable?
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>>2832546
>It's a direct result of Heidegger's work in Being and Time.
The Heideggerian event has a completely different functional purpose within philosophical argument. To say, it inspired Derrida's argumentative move is to say little of real importance. Derrida's arguments are still completely different to Heidegger's.
>You mean where it deconstructs itself is when talking about its Hegelian aspects.
I think I'm clear when I mean the opposite to this. The perspective on Hegelian metaphysics argues from the perspective that things change, potentially in the way Hegel argues that they do. To say, otherwise, would be to argue that things do not change in some way (even Parmenides allows for this, monist substances changing not in essence but still changing), something that seems to be counter to all that reality, which does not have to be language constituted if perceived by one subject empirically in its fundamentals.
>Then stop trying to make out it has some kind of privileged position or language that makes it outside the reach of semiotics or language games or deconstruction.
Learn to read, then learn to stop spouting Derridean dogma.
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>>2833702
What kind of idiocy is this?

>Ok, Derrida followed Heidegger's work, but it has nothing to do with Heidegger!
>Don't criticise Hegel, he was just saying like things change man!
>Stop using Derrida's ideas, it's dogmatic!
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>>2833702
protip:
a) Caracalla generally doesn't know what Caracalla is talking about.
b) Dialectics are a lot more specific than 'things change'. The Hegelian version of dialectics is heavily idealistic, which is also why dialectics are one of the larger problem areas of Marxism. Trying to be 'materialists' but assuming that there is a fundamental dialectical movement at work in the world yields hilarious results, to be seen for example in Engels' Anti-Dühring.
c) From a position of speaking in a practical and sensible manner: Dialectics are mainly rubbish because Hegel (building on the work of Hölderlin and Schelling) framed his entire philosophy heavily in such a way that it appears in such as way that it pleases Hegel. As in other idealisms, the wish fathers the thought, if observation and argument come in it is always only to support the pre-existing result, and this purpose forcefully reigns in the possibile movement of thought. In this, it is similar to most theology and most Marxism, for example.

>>2832592
Only because there are hypothesis and counterhypothesis in science, this does not make it dialectical in the sense in which the term is used in philosophy (which is the context in which it is used most importantly). In science, you execute experiments and afterwards hopefully support either the hypothesis or the counter-hypothesis. This is not the case in philosophical dialectics at all.
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>>2832106
In metaphysics it is.
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>>2832248
>>What I would dispute is whether any critique along his lines could have anything to bear on contemporary metaphysics. The spirit of metaphysics that's been complained of since Nietszche and that Derrida has complained of himself, is not really an issue these days; the syncreticism and mysticism has been done away with and the focus is on insulated inquiries in areas like Free Will, Personal Identity, Time, Causality, etc. Satisfying responses can be developed in all these inquiries (unlike epistemology) but the spirit of inquiry is more to see where problems could lie rather than to completely solve a problem. Out of probably any developed metaphysical system in Modern philosophy, Hegel's is the most open-ended and hence avoids the sort of issues that problematize Kant's and Descartes'. It can hence be lumped in with the modern discourse.

>>Hegel
>>modern discourse
>>hence

I don't think you can even imagine how hard you done goofed.
>>
>>2833715
>Ok, Derrida followed Heidegger's work, but it has nothing to do with Heidegger!
Their arguments were completely different, they just used the same argumentative move...
>Don't criticise Hegel, he was just saying like things change man!
Well, he was. That's the general attitude for treating Hegel's dialectics, in modern philosophy. To translate his idealism into a principle of metaphysics. C.f. Robert Brandom.
>Stop using Derrida's ideas, it's dogmatic!
Well, it's unphilosophical to be non-critical and to treat Deconstruction as some, sort of secret, insular and necessary force, as Derrida does. Look at later Derrida and all the shit that leaves you embroiled in.
>>2833733
To treat Hegelian dialectics as Hegel treated them (which is going to be difficult, because there's a lot of contention as to how he treated them anyway), is kinda moot. To take his work as foundational and to expand on what he wrote, is more to the point. You could go in Marx's direction, or the British Hegelian's direction, or the Pittsburgh Hegelian's direction (which is the newest and potentially most unimpeachable direction).
>>
I enjoy this thread.
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>>2833748
Read Robert Brandom or John McDowell. I can't think of two more respected modern philosophers...
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>>2833757
>>I can't think of two more unheardof modern philosophers...

there, I fixed it for you.
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>>2833780
For you, maybe. But they're like the two big mainstays in contemporary philosophy. Burdom did 'Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment' which was just about the most important contribution to Logic/Language since Kripke, Logic/Language being pretty much a central field in philosophy.
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>>2833784
>>Logic/Language being pretty much a central field in philosophy

Oh shit, who would have guessed?
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>>2833790
If you don't have the knowledge, don't feel you have the right to comment...
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>>2833791
You should read some Stirner against your Hegel, see where that leaves you.
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>>2833796
No, I should not read any Stirner. I hate the direction the likes of him took Humanism in.
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>>2833798
>>implying Stirner took humanism anywhere
>>implying there are 'likes of him' who did

Also, from the wiki article on John McDowell:

>>McDowell has, throughout his career, understood philosophy to be "therapeutic" and thereby to "leave everything as it is", which he understands to be a form of philosophical quietism (although he does not consider himself to be a "quietist"). The philosophical quietist believes that philosophy cannot make any explanatory comment about how, for example, thought and talk relate to the world but can, by offering re-descriptions of philosophically problematic cases, return the confused philosopher to a state of intellectual quietude.

AHAHAHAHAHA.
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>>2833800
In fetishizing individualism as a sort of meek resistance to the pressure those grand 18th/19th Century totalizing systems put on general culture, Stirner, like Thoreau, has led us to Rand. It's a humanism ('a discourse on the best way to be 'human'') because I don't think it's rigorous enough to be philosophy.

Wittgenstein was a quietist in the exact same way, I think most academic philosophers are. C.f. my description of modern philosophy as a discourse throughout this thread.
>>
I do not understand this thread. I wonder why.
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>>2833809

3deep5u
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>>2833806
>>fetishizing individualism
he didn't
>>led us to Rand
he hasn't
>>It's a humanism
it's not
>>'a discourse on the best way to be 'human''
it is the opposite of this
>>I don't think
That's right, you don't
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>>2833812
Where's your argument?
>>
>>2833813
I'm not going to argue with you about Stirner if you have obviously not read any significant amount of his writing or the secondary literature.
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>>2833813
I just told you a few things about Stirner, since you don't seem to know anything about him, maybe you will learn something today. How nice of me!
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>>2833818
Then, you've lost the right to be taken seriously.
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>>2833820
Now, now. Don't be hasty.

It can be a very perilous thing not to take anonymous comments on 4chan seriously.
>>
>>2833822
Well, continue to jokily recommend Stirner to people, then, you silly goose...and, then, not try to defend him from criticism, because hey, it's all a joke...
>>
>>2833820
I lost the right? Fuck you Caracalla, seriously. How about you try to extract your head from your ass every once in a while? "'a discourse on the best way to be 'human''"... seriously, despite the fact that the reception of Stirner has always been fraught with misunderstandings, this is extraordinarily stupid and COMPLETELY DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO EVERYTHING STIRNER WROTE, EVER. You obviously didn't even read the wikipedia article on Stirner, a common courtesy that, e.g., I took when you mentioned those two neo-Hegelian Pittsburghians. I'm not going to explain to you why that is wrong when there is literally no possible scenario in which you would come up with such an opinion on Stirner except the one in which your only contact with Stirner is from a few threads on /lit/, no googling, no wikipedia, no primary or secondary print sources, no fucking nothing. I went into this 'discussion' very relaxed and you've done it again Caracalla, I am very mad. You have strenghthened my impression of you as someone who has firm opinions without any knowledge and no intention of ameliorating that situation.
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>>2833857
>The work states the individual is dominated by illusory concepts ('fixed ideas' or 'spooks'), which can be shaken and undermined by each individual in order for that person to act fully.
Well, this is the sort of stuff Heidegger would call 'Humanism,' being a sort of instrumental thinking, designed to lead a person, ego, thinking thing whatever in the supposedly 'best' direction. If it disputes a common grounds for a Humanism like the 14th Century Humanism, in its fetishizing of the individual, it's still a Humanism (perhaps, better called an anti-Humanism, in the sense of a similar discourse pattern with different aims) in the important senses; i.e. a self-instrumentalized discourse.

Don't cry bro
>>
>>2833870
>>being a sort of instrumental thinking, designed to lead a person, ego, thinking thing whatever in the supposedly 'best' direction

but that's fucking wrong. That's not what he does at all, and that is not even what your quote implies. Stirner objects to moral prescriptives and criticizes Humanism as a false emancipation because it places the individual (or particular) under the yoke of the ideal (or abstraction) that is 'human'. Stirner in no way advises people for or against a certain course, he explicitly states that he wrote his book only because it pleased him to write it and if people decide to wipe their ass with it instead of reading it that's okay for him. Not much of a prescriptive humanism in it at all.
>>
>>2833809
It's basically caracalla defending someone who had totally fucked up ideas about the world by taking a "modern reinterpretation" of him to fix the major errors of his thinking, in the hope that there's more to be learned from him in this way.

Yet as you can see by the irrelevance of both the original philosopher and the reinterpretation of him in modern culture, there's nothing to be gained from such action. And the ironic thing is that he downplays the usefulness of two philosophers that are slightly more relevant(although far from taken seriously by non-philosophers) at the same time.
>>
>>2833870
Okay, I guess in this case it's only partly your fault. The English wiki page for The Ego and Its Own is horrible, but I give you part of the blame because it is pretty obvious that it is horrible from the fact that it consists of very few assertions and they are not backed by citations, such as this: "Stirner asserted his own "doctrine" of self-interest to be a universal truth" that is completely untrue, Stirner answered to a similar misunderstanding of his book in the article "Rezensenten Stirners". It's also obvious from the talk page that the people who wrote the article don't know what is going on, their confusion on the question of Hegel's role in EE is just one of many indications.
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>>2833878
So now you can't see through Stirner's rhetoric? He's advocating the best way you can be a person or at least the wrong ways of trying to be such a person and using such sort of provisos as 'oh you can do what you want with this' so that no-one can accuse him of replacing one sort of totalizing thinking with another sort.

>>2833882
What are the two thinkers I've downplayed? Derrida and Heidegger? I haven't downplayed Heidegger, I don't think. The whole Wittgenstein malurcky was caused by the standard on this board of exploiting miscommunication for pointless scorched earth argumentative tactics, turning it all into a silly game of oneupmanship.

>Yet as you can see by the irrelevance of both the original philosopher and the reinterpretation of him in modern culture, there's nothing to be gained from such action.
What's his irrelevance? If you're just following the British Hegelians' verdict on Hegel, you're sorely wrong, considering how different the Young Hegelians took him and how different the Pittsburgh metaphyscists do.
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>>2833891
I think Stirner is a pretty obvious tier Young Hegelian though.
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>>2833894
>What's his irrelevance?
You're asking someone to prove a negative now?
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>>2833894
>What are the two thinkers I've downplayed?
By what you mean who, and by downplayed you mean misunderstood.

All that's happened is that someone correctly said that Derrida criticised the Hegelian dialectics, to which you mouthfarted back some crap about how Derrida doesn't even apply to Hegel because metaphysics.
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>>2833894
>>He's advocating the best way you can be a person or at least the wrong ways of trying to be such a person and using such sort of provisos as 'oh you can do what you want with this' so that no-one can accuse him of replacing one sort of totalizing thinking with another sort.

You HAVEN'T READ HIM, which is why you keep coming back to your inane misconceptions. The 'solution' that Stirner arrives at is exactly not a sort of 'totalizing thinking', where do you get such ideas? Stirner's criticism works on the level of language and representation in such a way that the criticims of his supposed 'individualism' misses the point because Stirner does not make a statement about whether or not an individual who owns themselves and their thoughts would live alone or in a group, precisely because he is opposed to any normative account of an abstract generality. Stirner does not tell you to live or think in a certain way that accords with his conception of human nature because he does not have one. Similarly, criticism that argues that his individualism is incompatible with the social nature of human beings completely misses the point (i.e. for example Marx) because if their own assertions about human nature were actually correct, someone who followed Stirner's method and stopped striving after goals and ideals that are presented by others would only end up realizing their human essence anyway, so there is in fact no contradiction. The problem arises because Stirner formulates his criticism of society from the position of the concrete individual for epistemological and existential reasons, not out of any normative judgement about social relations, but people don't understand this.
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>>2833733

Not seeing how the support/non support of null and alternative hypotheses is dialectical: how is this even possible? Are you even capable of independant thought?

And without a purpose for research, you get the most absurd, frivolous scientific studies whose import is nil.
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>>2833980
>>independant
What are you even trying to say? Have you ever heard of 'synthesis'? That thing which totally does not exist in our example of experimental hypotheses?
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>>2833900
That's perfectly okay, learn2logic
>>2833924
My point was actually that modern metaphysics as an open-ended discourse (which is how Pittsburghians interpret Hegel for what it's worth) recognizes itself as a discourse whose signified and signifier are non-dichotomous or logocentric. This leads to the sort of 'quietism' MacDowell advocates.
>>2833926
>someone who followed Stirner's method and stopped striving after goals and ideals that are presented by others would only end up realizing their human essence anyway
This is our problem
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>>2833926

>>>Stirner's method and stopped striving after goals and ideals that are presented by others would only end up realizing their human essence anyway

I have a friend who has not aspired to goals or ideals that others have until recently (wealth, fame, respect, esteem, etc.). He has spent most of his life, for all intents and purposes, as a slave. Unpaid labour here, unpaid labour there...he has a long history of being screwed over. So, by not cleaving to the goals and aspirations of others, he has his realized his human essence, as a slave?
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>>2833987

You're not even criticizing Hegel anymore; have fun with your strawmen. They are extremely flammable, and that's the best part about them.
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>>2833987
Yeah sorry mate, the synthesis has nothing to do with Hegel
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>>2833992
>>This is our problem

This isn't a problem, because this is a hypothetical scenario which addresses the position of an essentialist under the assumption that their ontological claims are valid. If they are, there are only the options of human essence being suppressed or realized, and thus any philosophy would be good if it achieves the latter and bad if it engages in the former. If a certain positive view of human essence holds true, the removal of any extrinsic determination should result in the individual's realization of its human essence.

This argument only works for those political philosophies that assume that humanity is inherently good and corrupted by some outside influence (the state, the relations of production, etc.), if you assume that mankind is inherently evil, a whole different line of argumentation opens up for you which is also quite compatible with Stirner.

>>recognizes itself as a discourse whose signified and signifier are non-dichotomous or logocentric

A discourse that recognizes itself? Is it a self-aware entity? Why does this discourse only have one signified and signifier? Doesn't a conversation involving only one sign get boring rather quickly? Why did you criticize someone else for using Derrida if you are now going to present us with vision of some non-logocentric metaphysical wonderland? If the result is quietism, why not practice origami or raking sand instead?
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>>2833999
There is a difference between adhering to ideals and not pursuing your own interests. At what point did I or Stirner advise someone to not pursue their interests? If your friend would like to have a well-paid steady job, he should have pursued one. However, there is a difference between striving for a life you enjoy most or striving for a life you think your parents and peers would approve of.
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>>2833992
It's not okay. You ask someone to prove someone is relevant, not the opposite.
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>>2834005
Yeah, shit gets dreifach aufgehoben, I know. It doesn't matter a lot whether we call it synthesis or not, though.
>>2834002
At what point did I claim to be criticizing Hegel? Someone said that experimental hypotheses are dialectical and I said that they aren't.
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>>2834009

Thanks for the irrelevant response that shows you have the reading comprehension skills of a grade 8 student.
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>>2834009
It's rarely that simple, not that this matters in the slightest.

>>2834006
>If a certain positive view of human essence holds true, the removal of any extrinsic determination should result in the individual's realization of its human essence.
So basically, babby's first Phenomenology of Spirit without the interesting metaphysics (i.e. left a pretty dry husk).
>A discourse that recognizes itself? Is it a self-aware entity? Why does this discourse only have one signified and signifier? Doesn't a conversation involving only one sign get boring rather quickly? Why did you criticize someone else for using Derrida if you are now going to present us with vision of some non-logocentric metaphysical wonderland? If the result is quietism, why not practice origami or raking sand instead?

These are just convenient short-hands for what it was obvious was meant. You seriously lack the ability to think independently of what's shoved under your nose. I criticized the use of Derrida within a healthy metaphysical discourse, not on an unhealthy logocentric one; it would be like invoking Wittgenstein to complain about Kellogg Lewis. Quietism is one result, a rigorous, informative discourse is another, constantly changing our understanding of the fundamentals of reality.
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>>2833999
I wonder, are you calling voluntary work slaving? If he wanted to do unpaid work and did so then that's hardly slaving. Slave work is work against your own will.

I have a feeling you're projecting your own very personal values onto others lives because they don't care for the same worthless things you do.
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post more caracalla, you second-rate deep&edgy
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>>2834036
hope that's not butthurt
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>>2834021
I don't really understand your problem. By not striving after fame and esteem, your friend should have had a lot of time and energy left over for doing what he wants. What was that? Nowhere does anyone advocate letting other people screw you over.


>>2834025
>>a healthy metaphysical discourse, not on an unhealthy logocentric one

enjoy your faux-naturalistic normativity.
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>>2834064
There's nothing normative about a discourse free to go in any direction
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>>2834076
The normative part was the one where you asserted that some discourses are healthy and others are unhealthy.
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>>2834108
Well some discourses, like dogmatic deconstructionism, tend to be quite resistant to self-criticism and development. Others are not so bad. It's not so much a set of two or more norms, as a spectrum of possibility.


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