THE ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY

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To
Professor Hans J. Eysenck

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FOREWORD

I will put the matter of why I have written a book on the anti-authoritarian personality quite simply. For nearly a century, it has been the fashion of the social sciences, particularly in my native America, to be enamored of a kind of environmentalistic dynamicism which has restricted the consideration of static elements within the human polity.

It is not necessary to accept the brutal competitivism of what the American purist Oliver Wendell Holmes called "Mr. Spencer's social statics" to recognize that in an effort to reform and modify the harshness of the modern industrial society, the social scientist has fallen perilously behind in his awareness of those universals which give permanence to the human society.

I cannot help but think that even the original purpose which wedded the social scientist to his committment to dynamicism, a committment unquestionably born of human compassion, has now reached its own margin of utility. Is it not more clear than ever now that the burden of improving our societies needs a renewed recognition of the truly varied nature of different personalities and a reinforcement of those static human relationships which support and maintain the structure of a viable human system? Perhaps we are near a turning point, when to argue in favor of statics and in favor of the recognition of differentiated contribution does better even for the political Left than does either environmental dynamicism or inspired manipulation.

At the least, let us recognize that the very argument over intellectual emphasis itself has its origins within the misunderstanding of those who would think of social and political permanence as only stemming from the resolution of the political debate between ideologies. The irony lies in the existence of an inverse rather than a direct relationship between recognizing the permanence of the debate between political antagonists and the instability of the polity. It is almost as if we have foreclosed ourselves from understanding the dialectic except at the point of its infrequent and very temporary resolution.

In fact, the essence of relativism is the recognition of the inevitability of social conflict and as the intellectual wishes to aid his citizenry by alleviating the greater damages of that conflict, he may do better by explaining the innate differences among peoples, resolving that his own contribution will be to build the harmonies among highly variant and oftentimes conflicting segments of the social puzzle.

With deepest respect for the contributions of the American dynamicists, and particularly Ms. Jeanne Knutson, I cannot help but conclude that the work in psychology and politics of people such as Professor Hans Eysenck represents the more lasting contribution, for it is Eysenck who tells us the harder truths about our innate differences and it is Eysenck who reminds us that no degree of personal welfare or improvement should distract the social scientist from acknowledging and explaining the political ramifications of one now misplaced concept: social statics. Indeed, if we are truly able to

understand the anti-authoritarian personality, we may be able not only to
define the outlines of twenty-first century statics, but we may also begin to
account for and appreciate the contribution of the political and social Left
and still keep Mr. Spencer out of our business in the bargain.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CHAPTER 1

THE NEED TO COMPLETE A THEORY

During the awakening of our political consciousness, we each must spend considerable time watching and listening to those radio and television programs which bring together spokesmen of various political views, who then argue about everything from inflation to world politics to corruption in government. These debates are of interest to us not only because they increase our awareness of public issues, but also because they frequently present an opportunity to recognize that a verbal confrontation between two adversaries usually presents the listener with a little more of the truth than one is likely to learn from the political advocate who was speaking alone. But before long in listening to these debates, one's interests may well be extended beyond the immediate issues being debated toward an interest in both the debaters themselves and the kinds of contrasts which they themselves represent in style and argument.

Of course the most obvious distinctions concerning the advocates would include such attributes as their occupational, social and racial backgrounds, but often more fascinating are the more subtle differences in the advocates' personal values. It becomes apparent that in the discussion of those issues which we usually include within the context of political conservatism and liberalism, differences in basic personal values are of significant importance. It also becomes clear that it is far easier to detect these kinds of personal values in advocates whose positions are somewhat more removed from the ideological center than it is for those who are near the center. Clearly, at least as regards those of a deeper ideological bent, what one often sees is more than simple politics. It becomes increasingly evident that individual personalities constitute independent variables that are at least partially explanatory of the difference in individual political ideologies.

Early works, such as those by Lasswell, Bogardus, and Wallas[1] explored the relationship between personality and politics, but the most significant work, published in 1950, was written by T. W. Adorno and three of his colleagues working at the University of California at Berkeley. The Authoritarian Personality,[2] which became an almost instantaneous classic in the

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(1) Laswell, Harold, Power and Personality, New York: Viking Press, 1948. Lasswell, Harold, Psychopathology and Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930.
Bogardus, Emory, Leaders and Leadership, New York: Appleton Century, 1934.
Wallas, Graham, The Great Society, New York: Macmillan, 1914.
Wallas, Graham, Human Nature in Politics, London: Constable, 1908.

(2) Adorno, T. W.; Frenkel-Brunswik, Else; Levinson, Daniel J.; Sanford, R. Nevitt, The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Norton, 1969 (orig. Harper, 1950).

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field, had as its original charge to determine the root psychological causes
of anti-semitism. It was a lengthy document, running nearly a thousand pages,
and its primary conclusions suggested that anti-semitism was not an isolated
personality variable, but was in fact an integral part of a personality syn-
drome which evidenced a kind of predisposition toward an unquestioning respect
for authority.

Elements of this personality type were illustrated by a number of tests
such as the A-S Scale, which measured anti-semitic feeling, the E Scale,
which measured ethnocentrism, the PEC Scale, which measured political and
economic conservatism, and most importantly, the F Scale, which purported to
measure fascism. The F Scale, whose full title was the Implicit Anti-demo-
cratic Trends or Potentiality for Fascism Scale, has become the best known
and most widely used of any scale in the study. It delineated nine specific
personality variables, all of which the authors considered necessary to an
understanding of an authoritarian fascist personality, and we shall examine
these variables more closely near the beginning of the following chapter.

Though The Authoritarian Personality was well received and has led to a
large amount of subsequent scholarship, it was not without its methodological
criticisms, the more important of which were compiled by Richard Christie
and Marie Jahoda (eds.) in their work, Studies in the Scope and Method of
"The Authoritarian Personality".[3] Sampling errors, with the respondents
selected out of designated groups rather than the population as a whole,
response set difficulties, where all of the items were scored so that agree-
ment equalled Fascist potential, and the fact in-depth interviewers were
aware of the questionnaire responses at the time of the personal interviews,
all marred the reliability of the study. Yet, even with these difficulties,
the book has still been recognized as a great contribution. As Roger Brown,
the Harvard psychologist asks, "Do you know him - the Authoritarian, the
Anti-democrat, the Pre-Fascist? It seems to me that I do."[4]

One more criticism of The Authoritarian Personality must be mentioned.
Hyman and Sheatsley asked whether authoritarianism is solely a measure of
proclivity towards Fascism, a political phenomenon of the extreme Right, or
whether authoritarianism is a psychological syndrome which may exist through-
out the political spectrum, while evidencing particular strength at both
extremes? What they were really asking was whether there exists an authori-
tarianism of the Left as well as the Right, a syndrome which may contain
many of the same authoritarian personality characteristics, but which instead
of coinciding with pre-fascist variables would be coupled with an opposing
set of variables which would predispose an individual towards the holding
of Left-wing political views. This was probably the most damaging argument
among the Christie and Jahoda criticisms of the Berkeley study[5], and it is
this criticism which has inspired the present work. What we would like to
find out here is whether the authoritarian psychological model may not indeed

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(3) Christie, Richard and Jahoda, Marie, eds., Studies in the Scope and
Method of "The Authoritarian Personality," New York: Free Press, 1965.

(4) Brown, Roger, Social Psychology, New York: Free Press, 1965, p. 489.

(5) Hyman, H. H. and Sheatsley, P. B., "The Authoritarian Personality,"
in Christie and Jahoda, pp. 50-122.

be a vehicle by which, if we use the authoritarian variables in a kind of
reverse way, would enable us to know what the psychological component of
an individual's politics really is. If this can be done, we could even sug-
gest that we have found the basic structure of what may be the first general
theory of Left-wing to Right-wing ideological political psychology.

Thus we will conduct our examination within the authoritarian model,
suggesting that it is the most promising model for a full description of
the political continuum. But before we do so, let us engage in a short re-
view of the literature of that difficult academic area known as political
psychology. It is a gnarled field, one about which Fred Greenstein, a con-
temporary writer in the area himself, once felt the need to write an article
which had as part of its title "An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush."[6]

If there is underbrush, perhaps it is because the attempts at determining
what relationships are between personal psychology and political belief have
not been very systematic. Early writers suspected the existence of a psycho-
political relationship, but they began to inquire into the nature of that
relationship only in a general way. Graham Wallas, for example, wrote an
excellent early work in which he questioned the "intellectual" view of life
where each political actor supposedly planned his political behavior in a
highly rationalistic manner.[7] While warning that his attack on a false
human intellectuality did not imply a plea for viewing man as a completely
instinctual being, Wallas nonetheless admonished his readers to consider
the full range of a man's emotions as well as his nationality when con-
sidering human actions. In an argument similar to that of his contemporary
social psychologist Emory Bogardus, Wallas urged the student of psychology
to examine those personality elements which were closest to the psyche of
the individual. For example, in the context of political oratory, we may
find that a good political persuader will use appropriate symbolic language
to conjure up a favorable imagery in the minds of his audience. In short,
in early writing on political psychology, Graham Wallas doubted the ability
of the greater public to understand the complexities of politics. He was
aware of how the passions of a political meeting could be stirred, and he
applauded the election laws of his native England which forbade tavern
meetings, bands, and other excitements during election times.[8] Thus Wallas'
work stands as that of an early social psychologist who was aware of the
involvement of the psyche in human attitudes about politics and political
orientations. Although he was not aware of the systematic relationship
between certain needs and certain political beliefs, he was willing to posit
that a set of psychic considerations were at least equal to, and, in the
case of the greater populace, probably greater than the supposedly intellec-
tual reasons for a person's political views.

It was not long after Wallas, however, that this lack of systematic ex-
ploration into the links between psychology and politics (which Wallas'
early work suffered from) began to be compensated for within the work of one

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(6) Greenstein, Fred I., "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An
Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," APSR, 1967, Vol. 61, pp. 629-641.

(7) Wallas, 1914, p. 223.

(8) Wallas, 1908, p. 212.

of the leading political scientists of the modern era. Harold Lasswell's
two books, Psychopathology and Politics and Power and Personality, each fo-
cused on the psychological reasons for an individual's participation in poli-
tics. Although flavored somewhat by an almost exclusive concern with people
in positions of leadership, both works amply demonstrated the relationship
between deep-seated psychological needs and the need for political power.

Relying on the then-novel idea that man often rationalized his own actions
and hid from his true motivations, Lasswell began the search for the deeper
psychological meanings in political identification. Like Wallas, Lasswell
warned against an excessive reliance upon intellectualism in political pref-
erences, arguing both that even when an artist paints a free sketch "the
starting point is often subject to many shifts," and that the "judge who
starts in pursuit of consistency-with-precedent characteristically must add
conformity-to-principles-of-policy. A plurality of ends is always involved,
and usually appears."[9] Beyond this recognition, Lasswell was also both
creative and perceptive in his understanding of not only the distinctiveness
of certain political types, but also in his understanding of how these poli-
tical types were related to the category of Jung's extroverted thinkers.[10]
Remember that Lasswell was primarily concerned with political leaders, and
he therefore saw within the Jung model a potential for explaining the manipu-
lative nature of many political authorities. Yet it wasn't until his sub-
sequent work in 1948, Power and Personality, that Lasswell was willing to be
as harsh with political leadership as he earlier had indicated he might be-
come. By then, Lasswell was willing to conclude that the so-called "politi-
cal type" was one for which ". . . the basic characteristic will be the ac-
centuation of power in relation to the values within the personality . . ."[11]
In accentuating this power, the leader will, according to Lasswell, depend
upon many attributes, mere size and strength not being totally relevant
within a so-called civilized setting. Wealth is also helpful; knowledge is
important as well, and skill, respect, and a reputation for rectitude were
held to be potential underpinnings for a sound power base. But the key to
the understanding of Lasswell's work comes from the analysis of why power is
important to the individual psyche of the leader. In a strikingly unfavor-
able commentary on political leadership, Lasswell claims that essentially
"power is expected to overcome low estimates of the self."[12] In addition,
the politician's drive for power is seen as being accompanied by considera-
ble extremes of both indulgence and deprivation. In short, there is often
an inordinate frustration within the individual psyche, some tension which
encourages the subject to seek release in a search for power over other
people.

All of the above commentary on leadership, as well as other less than
complimentary research about leadership types, represented excellent path-
breaking work in the area of political psychology. Yet at this stage there
was still a considerable degree of incompleteness in this area, for Lasswell

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(9)   Lasswell, 1930, p. 30.

(10) Ibid., p. 62.

(11) Lasswell, 1948, p. 22.

(12) Ibid., p. 39.

was speaking largely of political leaders rather than the greater populace, and virtually all of the writers of that time were avoiding the crucial problems of differences between individual personalities and the projections to political attitudes which personality differences may reflect.

Although Lasswell was able to recognize that political liberals and conservatives were relatively more contented people whereas radicals and reactionaries were more discontented, and that liberals and radicals tended to be sanguine while conservatives and reactionaries were not; he did not seem to wish to push his analysis into a study of which individual psychological traits would account for the classic political spectrum of radical through reactionary views.[13] His solution to the real-life problem of dealing with the power-oriented leader, moreover, was to develop a genre of leaders who would possess a "democratic" personality, arguing that the chief difference between the 'basic' citizen and the democratic leader is mainly a difference of skill and not one of values."[14]

Thus did Harold Lasswell contribute markedly, if somewhat incompletely, to our understanding of the role of psychology within politics. Yet at the same time, his concern with leadership did in some way restrict subsequent research because, for some time, it was the prevailing opinion among researchers that only the leadership of a society was capable of possessing an ideological understanding of political issues. Even a major work within the voting literature, The American Voter,[15] insisted as late as 1960 that only a small elite was capable of an ideological understanding of politics.

More recently, we have begun to see research which argues that non-leadership citizens do in fact also posses political ideologies, such work of course permitting us to investigate the psycho-political relationship which exists throughout the range of the entire populace. One such work was done by Robert Lane, whose Political Ideology[16] was an in-depth study of fifteen rather ordinary citizens who, although not always able to eloquently describe their beliefs in the richness of what political scientists call ideology, were nonetheless able to relate the essence of both their dependence upon and their frustration with the American political system. Although often unhappy with his lot in life, each of the fifteen demonstrated a distinct psychological orientation toward wrestling with his daily problems in a clearly non-radical manner. In their own way, therefore, the subjects of Lane's Political Ideology were found to have a knowledge of what they themselves truly believed, and their belief patterns demonstrated the kind of stability and internal consistency which would argue for a definite link between the personalities of each individual with his political views.

Another study using some of the data from Lane's Political Ideology went

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(13) Ibid., p. 60.

(14) Ibid., p. 152.

(15) Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W., and Stokes, D., The American Voter, New York: Wiley, 1960.

(16) Lane, Robert, Political Ideology, New York: Free Press, 1962.

on to confirm in a somewhat more systematic way that persons of less than
sophistocated political understandings were more than capable of holding to
ideological consistency. Steven R. Brown, in an article which experimentally
tested the consistency of ideology, located a population made up of both
articulate and inarticulate political spectors.[17] Each member of each group
was asked to rate his agreement or disagreement with various statements of
political viewpoint. The responses were sorted and a retest was performed
at a later time. The results showed that the reliability coefficients were,
if anything, slightly higher for the inarticulate group, telling us that
even those citizens of less astute political background and articulation are
nonetheless at least as capable as others of maintaining consistency in what
their basic ideological orientation truly is. Interestingly, the argument
which Brown was attempting to refute in doing his research was based upon
the thinking of people such as Converse, who had argued in works like The
American Voter that the essence of consistency in political ideology was
essentially cognitive. That is, for Converse the anti-ideological view
seemed to be based upon a notion which had been contested long ago by the
acute observations of people like Graham Wallas and Harold Lasswell. For
those who argued as did Robert Lane, as well as for those who did experiments
like the ones performed by Steven Brown, the essence of ideology was found to
be essentially affective, that is psychological, and cognitive questions were
therefore really never near the heart of the issue.

   Thus, if we can at least tentatively conclude that the research of politi-
cal psychology has demonstrated the existence of personality underpinnings
for political attitudes and beliefs, and if, along with that finding, we can
also argue that recent evidence has shown the existence of some basic ideolo-
gy existing within all the members of the society, even if it is not always
well articulated, then it would seem that we have begun to come at least a
part of the way down the road towards understanding the relationship between
specific ideologies and specific personalities. We are not yet at the point
of understanding either what these particular personality traits may be or
where they may have come from, nor are we yet able to say exactly how we
shall define the ideology of which we will speak. But where we now are in
our research would at least tell us that there is probably some pattern,
hidden within the depth of each of our personalities which, if properly
understood, should be able to tell us which kind of specific personality
predisposition will account for certain political ideologies.

   As we leave the introductory material, with its attempt to demonstrate
that personality makes a difference in political orientation, let us next see
where we might profitably go to further define the involvement of personality
within politics. Fred Greenstein, one of the finest current researchers in
the field, suggests that there are three basic ways by which the study of
politics can draw on personality theory. The first is through the study of
single political actors; the second involves the study of typologies; and the
third involves certain aggregative accounts, by which Greenstein means a mix-
ture of certain personality patterns with their unique exterior environ-
ments.[18]

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   (17) Brown, Steven R., "Consistency and the Persistence of Ideology: Some
Experimental Results," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 34(1970), pp. 60-68.

   (18) Greenstein, Fred I., Personality and Politics, Chicago: Markham,
1969.

Single Actor Analysis

The first of these types of studies, single actor analysis, has included a wide variety of investigations into the lives of famous and non-famous people alike. A book such as Smith, Bruner and White's Opinions and Personality demonstrated the worth of finding out a great deal about a single individual's life history and emotional conflicts as well as his political beliefs.[19] Interestingly, the Opinions and Personality work, without attempting to systematically explain the personality correlates in an ideological manner, did in fact make some contribution to an understanding of the relationship between personality and ideology in part because of the care in which the three authors selected the specific people whom they interviewed. The three major subjects, along with seven more briefly investigated personalities, demonstrated considerable variance in personality traits and they each demonstrated the political views which would seem to logically follow from those personalities. All in all, the Smith, Bruner and White work still stands as a very useful example of single actor analysis properly mixed, albeit somewhat unsystematically, with relevant political ideology.

Most of the significant single actor analysis, however, has involved the study of particular, usually prominent, political figures. One of the first major studies, Alexander and Juliette George's work on Woodrow Wilson, put particular emphasis upon the psychological effect of President Wilson's rigid and often punitive childhood upbringing.[20] The compulsive behavior which Wilson later demonstrated in his final political battles over the League of Nations can be well understood within a psychological context which has already shown Wilson to be a man overwhelmed with concern for a puritanistic "state of grace."

Another major psycho-biography deals with the life of the first American Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal.[21] The career of Forrestal, a compulsive, driven man, who was increasingly obsessed by paranoic fantasies, is followed through his rise to power in Washington and into his decline as he increasingly feared not only the Soviet threat, but what he was increasingly perceiving to be the disloyal actions of his own friends and colleagues.

There have been a number of other significant single actor analyses, including Betty Glad's work on Charles Evans Hughes[22] and one of the most remarkable, although it did not involve a political figure: Erik Erickson's

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(19)   Smith, M. B., Burner, J., and White, R., Opinions and Personality, New York: Wiley, 1956.

(20)   George, A. L., and George, J. L., Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study, New York: Davis, 1956.

(21)   Rogow, A. A., James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics and Policy, New York: Macmillan, 1963.

(22)   Glad, Betty, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966.

work on Martin Luther.[23]

The Psycho-Political Classification

Thus, in one way or another, the single actor kind of analysis has made
its contribution to the field of political science, seeming to prove the ad-
age given to us by Harold Lasswell that "political science without biography
is a form of taxidermy."[24] Yet single actor analysis cannot stand alone as a
vehicle for the understanding of the relationship between psychology and pol-
itics. Even writers who have been interested in the individual political
figure have often found it necessary to drape their personal analysis in the
rough clothing of some kind of classification. James Barber, for example,
who has been concerned with the behavior of both congressmen and presidents,
has contributed two significant works which, although they are somewhat shy
of a deeply psychologica₁ theoretical basis, nonetheless illustrate the acute
differences in role function which different personalities play within a
governmental unit. The Lawmakers,[25] Barber's earlier work, describes four
basic legislative types and demonstrates how each performs a different task
within the legislative framework. The Presidential Character,[26] Barber's
recent contribution, deals with Presidents of the United States in what is
again a four-way classification scheme. In this work, Barber is willing to
be somewhat more psychologically oriented, as he suggests that the Presidents
of this century can be understood as falling into one of the four categories
which grow out of the two dimensions of an a) active vs. passive orientation
and a b) negative vs. positive orientation. Active Presidents are defined
simply as those actively engaging in an attempt to accomplish certain tasks
which they perceive to be necessary. The passive President, quite naturally,
is content with steering an even course, maintaining a status quo with which
he appears to be content to live.

The negative-positive dimension is the other divider among Presidents, its
concern being with the question of whether or not the Chief Executive seems
to be personally satisfied with the political tasks which he has let himself
in for. This latter classification is particularly revealing since Barber is
able to reflect cleverly the almost incredible reluctance with which some of
America's highest office holders actually seemed to relate to their office.
The individuals in the negative classifications, Barber argues, are people
who were subject to childhood experiences which made them willing to accept,
but not enjoy, a kind of dutiful, punishing experience as political leaders.
What is significant about this research is that, like so many of the single
actor analyses, Barber demonstrates that even with people who possessed the
ability and stature to become a President of the United States, the psychic
difficulties of their youth are still being played out within their profes-
sional careers. For Barber, it is clear that the younger years are terribly

(23) Erikson, Eric H., Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and
History, New York: Norton, 1958.

(24) Lasswell, 1930, p. 1.

(25) Barber, James D., The Lawmakers, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1965.

(26) Barber, James D., The Presidential Character, Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1972.

important for a man's political future. As he put it, "at least by the time
the man emerges as an adult, he has displayed a stance toward his experience,
a proto-political orientation."[27]

The need for a discussion of political types, whether or not one is con-
sidering the Presidents of the United States as Barber has, is amply demon-
strated by an entire range of literature which has begun to blossom in the
last twenty-five years. Still the most important of all typologies is the
major contribution, The Authoritarian Personality, a study which the present
work will hopefully add to in its attempt to build a full typology relevant
to political ideology. For now, let us leave that work aside and briefly
glance at some of the other significant typological pieces of research which
have contributed to our understanding of more non-ideological questions. The
same year that The Authoritarian Personality was published another book, en-
titled The Lonely Crowd,[28] was written by a sociologist named David Riesman.
Riesman was concerned primarily with the difficult question of finding a per-
sonal identity within what was becoming an overwhelming urbanized and imper-
sonal post-World War II American society. Riesman developed a designation
for two human types, which he defined as inner-directed and other-directed,
and then he argued that these two types dealt with the question of relating
to a society in two fundamentally different ways. The inner-directed charac-
ter, Riesman argued, flourished in a society which "cannot be satisfied with
behavioral conformity alone."[29] That is, the inner-directed personality ar-
guably does well within a system which is throwing off its conventional be-
havior norms and which therefore must rely on individuality of character to
maintain appropriate social conduct.

The other-directed character, a character which Riesman saw emerging
within the upper middle class of America's larger cities, is the shallow,
almost valueless character who is now finding himself working in the new
giant bureaucracies of modern industrialism. Riesman believes, as he argues
that de Toqueville also perceived in different times, that the inordinate in-
fluence of the other-directed type is capable of causing great harm to a cul-
ture which may already be suffering from a lack of internalized personal
social norms.[30] For Riesman, the other-directed personality could ultimately
represent an unvalued and disruptive force within the society.

But Riesman wasn't the only writer who was concerned with identifying a
personality type who may be harmful to both the culture and the stability of
the political system. In chapter two we will discuss the political impact of
the Rokeach work, The Open and Closed Mind,[31] but for now let us simply point
out that Rokeach was dealing with the psychological quality of a rigidity and

(27) Ibid., p. 445.

(28) Riesman, David, The Lonely Crowd, New Haven: Yale University Press,
1950.

(29) Ibid., pp. 14-15.

(30) Ibid., p. 30.

(31) Rokeach, Milton, The Open and Closed Mind, New York: Basic Books,
1968.

an intolerance of ambiguity within an individual's political opinion. The
dogmatic personality is one who is both less capable of perceiving shades of
differences and less able to tolerate the clear differences in the opinions
which are contrary to his own. Rokeach demonstrated that it is possible to
systematically rank this personality, both on dogmatism scales and on opin-
ionation scales, to see how rigid and inflexible this kind of personality can
be.

In point of fact, however, the dogmatism which Rokeach talked about was
more popularly if less systematically discussed in the work of the former
longshoreman-turned-philosopher Eric Hoffer. Hoffer's book, The True Believ-
er,32 was a short, not terribly scholarly, but nonetheless very readable por-
trait of the psychology behind the fanatical political activist who has wed-
ded his entire personality to a cause.

As important as works such as Rokeach's and Hoffer's were to our under-
standing of personality types, neither of these works, nor indeed any others
(except perhaps The Authoritarian Personality) drew upon established person-
ality theory as heavily as did a recent work by Jeanne Knutson entitled The
Human Basis of the Polity.33 In an attempt to give the literature of politi-
cal psychology its first full-scale psycho-political model, Professor Knutson
adapted the Abraham Maslow notions of self-actualization to the feelings of
efficacy which individual people possess concerning their own political par-
ticipation. It is the Knutson thesis that better adjusted, more fulfilled
personalities are better able to be effective in political activity, and
conversely it is those whose upbringing and early peer contacts led to anxie-
ty and other tension producing disabilities who are less efficacious in
their political activities. Just as Maslow had prescribed that those person-
alities who were still concerned with need for security, self-esteem or other
less than self-actualization needs were therefore less than efficacious in
their personal goals, so too political personalities who were deprived of
full development in early life were shown by the Knutson data to be less than
effective in their political life.

The Knutson work is a significant contribution, largely because it begins
to demonstrate in a highly systematic way how political actors of any ideo-
logical stripe may be affected by their earlier life. Yet, important as the
work is, it does not address itself to the Left-wing versus Right-wing ideo-
logical tenor of the political actors.

Knutson, using the model of a psychologist who was primarily concerned
with a kind of mental vitality which the ideal of self-actualization repre-
sented, was not truly concerned with whether or not a mature mental state
would best manifest itself in either liberal or conservative political views.
For the answer to that central question, let us submit that the authoritarian
model may still be the most useful.

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(32) Hoffer, Eric, The True Believer, New York: Harper and Row, 1951.

(33) Knutson, Jeanne, The Human Basis of the Polity: A Psychological
Study of Political Men, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972.

The Personality-Politics Interface

The third and final category of psycho-political analysis which Fred Greenstein outlined concerned the question of the aggregative effects of personality within an entire political and social system. This third category is the most difficult one for researchers, since it represents the process by which individual psychologies are held to be a part of some aggregative political policy result. Naturally, the problems of causation alone are difficult within such frameworks of analysis, and the problems of separating and understanding the relative significance of different variables make the task more difficult still.

Nonetheless, Greenstein considers it an important category, and he does so in great part because it deals with the important micro-macro question as well as with actual political behavior which of course is ultimately more important to the scholar than simply an understanding of mental attitudes.

Interestingly, there are no major theoretical works which have fully integrated the micro and macro concerns of psycho-political phenomena. Greenstein recognizes this, and in his frustration with the micro-macro leap, he turns to a quote from Neil J. Smelser who says simply "we do not at the present have the methodological capacity to argue causally from a mixture of aggregated states of individual members of a system to a global characteristic of a system."[34] Greenstein goes on to cite the "reductionist excesses" of the earlier psycho-political works as the chief villain in the micro-macro failure, and he hopes that a balance in understanding of both personal and social factors will help in allowing us to see the fully aggregative picture. Greenstein, although a researcher who has placed a great deal of emphasis throughout his own career on the singularity of personality and the importance of individual traits, nonetheless is more than ready to concede that political behavior is still very much a product of the situation in which the actors find themselves. The political results which are manifested from these situations are, of course, not always highly reflective of the psychological predispositions of particular individuals.

Let us pause a moment and look at the question of the relative importance of personality versus social factors in the determination of actual behavior. As we do this, let us try to understand how the question of personality versus social determination within a single circumstance is a question which is very much a first cousin to the ancient question of determining to what degree the individual personality of a political character is a result of inherited traits, and how much it is a result of childhood socialization. Just as an individual political event is a mixture of some fairly static personalities who are the actors, along with some more or less unique yet often times malleable social constructs, so too each human personality is in some way a mixture of certain inherited personality characteristics as well as the result of that developing personality's early environment.

(34) Smelser, Neil J., "Personality and the Explanation of Political Phenomena of the Social-System Level: A Methodological Statement," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 24:3 (1968), p. 123.

Early psychologists such as Gordon Allport[35] were very much concerned with personality trait analysis, and they tended to view traits as existing, at least by the time adulthood was reached, within a more or less static fashion, thus minimizing the importance of surrounding environment. Other writers, particularly someone like Erich Fromm[36] who was very concerned with reforming the overall morality of a society, were very much concerned with how appropriate social systems shaped the developing personality into something which, if properly carried out, could be more amenable to social responsibility and civil values.

One might ask why, at this point of our discussion, we would add the ancient considerations of the effect of heredity and environment upon personality into our analysis of the literature in psychology and politics. The reason is simply the following: this work purports to make a contribution towards the understanding of what are the personality attributes which are most relevant for the discovery of an individual's political ideology. We are suggesting that it is the authoritarian model which, when properly completed, will give us our best answer to this psychological-ideological link. We are also looking to see if the link between personality and political ideology is more significant near the extremes of the psycho-political continuum. But truly the full picture of what is going on in a political society necessitates not just an examination into the way something presently is, but it also requires an examination into how it got that way. There is, resting on the fringes of the literature on psychology and politics, an impressive array of research on the topic of what we generally call political socialization.[37] Clearly, this is not an irrelevant literature but, before we have completed this work's descriptions of which personality traits are relevant for political ideology, we hope to aid the reader in his understanding of how open these ideologically related traits are to the influence of inherited or non-inherited kinds of variables.

In other words, in this work we will not only explore ideologically relevant psycho-political relationships but, having done that, we shall also attempt to make some appraisal of the relative stability over time of these personality traits and their corresponding attitudes. It could be that we will find that political socialization is a very important factor in political attitudes. It could be that we will find that it is not. Or, alternatively, we may find that childhood socialization is a more important variable in the formation of certain traits and that inheritance is more important to others.

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(35) Allport, Gordon W., Personality: A Psychological Interpretation, New York: Holt, 1937.

(36) Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society, Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, 1955.

(37) See Hyman, H. H., Political Socialization, New York: Free Press, 1959; Langton, Kenneth, Political Socialization, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969; Sigel, Roberta, Learning About Politics, New York: Random House, 1970; Hess, R. and Torney, J., The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, Chicago: Aldine, 1967; Easton, David and Hess, R. D., Children in the Political System, New York: McGraw Hill, 1969.

But our major purpose, as we have outlined in this chapter, is to see if we can identify those psychological traits which are relevant for the Left vs. Right political spectrum. We have selected the authoritarian model for these explorations, and in the next chapter we will discuss the promises and problems of that approach. Hopefully if we can establish a solid linkage between certain personality traits and certain political views, our knowledge of political advocacy and political conflict will be greatly enhanced.

In concluding this chapter, let us remember that we have set as the immediate goal of this book a testing of whether the authoritarian model, if it is properly perceived throughout the full psychological spectrum, may not be the best model for the finding of an ideologically relevant psycho-political continuum. We have set as a tangential third task the duty of attempting to determine whether or not certain kinds of politically relevant psychological traits are the result of a) inherited or of b) socially determined influences. If we find that inheritance is important to the politically relevant personality variables, or that it is relevant to some portion of the politically relevant personality traits, then we may be able to argue that to at least some degree, there may be a static distribution of political attitudes which would exist through time and through the working out of different kinds of political confrontations. As we turn now to a study of the authoritarian model, let us remember that our major task is to search for the psychological origins of those differences in political attitudes which are relevant to the Left wing versus Right wing political ideological continuum. If we can learn to understand the origins of this political continuum, a continuum which clearly represents one of the most recurring and most bitter of all political conflicts, then perhaps we have been justified in looking so carefully at the psychological dispositions of those who hold these views.

CHAPTER 2

THE AUTHORITARIAN MODEL

Let us now return to the authoritarian model, remembering that it is the
model which we are going to use to attempt to find a full range of psycho-
political identification. Conceding that the original work, The Authoritar-
ian Personality, was marred by some substantial methodological errors, we
should remember that it continues to stand as possibly the greatest single
work of theoretical linkage within the area of political psychology. It was
a work which attempted to isolate particular psychological traits, and it de-
monstrated how the possession of those traits was linked with particular po-
litical views.

Perhaps all of its biases were not methodological, as some rather Left-
leaning descriptions of normal and acceptable behavior do often-times over-
shadow the seemingly half-hearted descriptions of what is sometimes grudg-
ingly called "normal" conservatism. But then, in the aftermath of a savage
war, fought against the regimes of a Hitler and a Mussolini, perhaps these
biases, if not intellectually justified, can be at least emotionally under-
stood. It was this war and the bitterly ethnocentric philosophies which un-
derlay the ideology of the fascist regimes that in great part inspired the
interest which eventually led to the work of The Authoritarian Personality.
Even before the war itself, people like Max Horkheimer of the Institute for
Social Research, who had escaped to Switzerland from Nazi Germany, had begun
the study of the fascist mentality. Others such as Erich Fromm also wrote
about the psychological attractiveness of authoritarianism in works such as
Escape From Freedom.[1] But the war itself and the horrors of the Hitler re-
gime were the real impetus for the Berkeley study and although many of the
causes of authoritarianism were already understood in a general way, The
Authoritarian Personality was the first truly systematic attempt to find the.
root causes of something like anti-semitism. The immediate post-war impetus
towards finding a cause of anti-semitism was soon encompassed in the larger
realization that the personality traits responsible for anti-semitic atti-
tudes were really part of a total personality which had an unusual proclivity
both for an orthodoxy in social and ethical attitudes as well as a need for
clearly defined and authoritative personal directives. Some combination of
traits, some syndrome which links together the deeper tendencies of one's
personality, seems to be the key to the authoritarian personality. The ques-
tion which we are asking here is whether or not these traits, even in an al-
tered or reversed form, are significant throughout the continuum of political
ideology.

Let us emphasize again at this point, as we begin to describe the anti-
authoritarian complement to The Authoritarian Personality, that what we are
attempting to find here, just as with the political continuum, is best des-
cribed as a continuum of psychological variables, not a dichotomy of two

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(1) Fromm, Erich, Escape From Freedom, New York: Holt, 1947.

distinct types. This point can hardly be overstressed, for it would be an
unfortunate result of research on the authoritarian model if the impression
were left that a populace was made up of two very distinct personality types,
incontrovertibly opposed to each other in all matters either political or
non-political. On the contrary, previous evidence on political psychology as
well as the evidence that this research hopes to bring to bear, will demon-
strate that in fact a full-range continuum of politically relevant psycholo-
gical traits does exist.

    It is also very possible that we may find the greatest variances among
those political points of view which are the result of personality difference
only at the very extremes of the political continuum. Near the political
poles, personality may be a very significant variable, a phenomenon which may
account, among other things, for why much of the ideological literature of
the Left and Right may be found to contain a great deal of psychologically-
oriented doctrine. But if we understand that the ideological political spec-
trum is not only a continuum which more than likely places its principal dis-
tribution near the political center, then we may understand why the political
population may be capable of being its own moderating element. Remember
again that although we are suggesting in this work that psychology is a sig-
nificant independent variable, we may find that to the great mass of those
with a more or less centrist orientation, psychology is less of a reason for
political orientation than some other variables may be. The contributions to
dialogue and doctrine which are made by more vociferous political activists
are often pleasantly tempered by those near the political center, for whom
the urgency of psychological need is not so great. Their ability to not be-
come enraptured by the strident appeals of the far Left and of the far Right
is very real and very comforting. Let us keep in mind as we begin to look
more closely at the authoritarian model, that relative authoritarianism or
anti-authoritarianism is best defined as a continuum and not as a dichotomy,
and, hopefully, it is a continuum with a rather broad and moderate center.

The Authoritarian Personality

    With this understanding, let us now turn to the authoritarian model itself,
reviewing the essential elements of The Authoritarian Personality study and
trying to place the authoritarian model within its proper context as a pos-
sible underpinning for the study of the personality correlates of political
ideology. In order to understand fully what the authoritarian model is all
about, it may be best to review briefly the now-famous F scale and see what
the Berkeley authors were attempting to find. The authors listed nine basic
variables which they claimed were tested by the F scale and which they also
claimed represented the crucial elements of the fascist personality, a per-
sonality syndrome which would supposedly coincide with Right-wing political
views. The variables included:

    1. Conventionalism. Rigid adherence to conventional, middle class values.
    2. Authoritarian submission. Submissive, uncritical attitude toward ide-
alized moral authorities of the ingroup.
    3. Authoritarian aggression. Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to
reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.
    4. Anti-intraception. Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative,
the tender-minded.
    5. Superstition and Stereotype. The belief in mystical determinants of
the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories.

6. Power and "toughness." Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertation of strength and toughness.

7. Destructiveness and cynicism. Generalized hostility, vilification of the human.

8. Projectivity. The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.

9. Sex. Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on."[2]

Construct Variables

One of the principal doubts which has haunted the F scale has centered around the notion, which may be gleaned from an acute reading of the listed items themselves, that actually two different kinds of psychological variables were inadvertently being combined. The charge was that the scale tested not only for variables helpful in the understanding of political ideology, but in the understanding of something else as well. The first kind of personality variable might well include those characteristics which would differentiate Right-wing political views from political views which are either more centrist or are outright Left-wing. These variables could be considered fascist, or, perhaps more accurately, pre-fascist in their orientation, and we could say that knowing about these psychological traits would be helpful in determining the relative location of a person's politics on a continuum of Left to Right political ideology.

Style Variables

The second grouping of variables would be those which subsequent authors have often also designated as authoritarian, including those variables which may be found throughout the Right vs. Left political continuum. Although described in different ways, these variables are more properly known as "general authoritarian" variables, psychological characteristics which may foster certain political attitudes, but which are not exclusive to either Right or Left political ideology.

Put another way, the dimension of general authoritarianism is simply one which suggests that certain kinds of political attitudes may exist not only on the Right but also on the Left, and therefore one of the psychological dimensions which has been called authoritarianism may be a dimension which does not run parallel to the Left-Right continuum, but which instead runs along some dimension which is more or less perpendicular to the ideological continuum. Let us let Figure 1 represent what we are talking about in terms of the two different types of psycho-political variables.

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(2) Adorno, T. W. et al., The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Norton, 1969 (orig. Harper, 1950), p. 228.

Stylistic or
general
authoritarianism

Construct or | Construct or
ideologically-related | ideologically-related
authoritarianism | authoritarianism
Left | Right

Stylistic or
general
non-authoritarianism

Fig. 1.

A hint that this kind of two dimensional set of variables was included, if inadvertently, within the F scale, can be found in a number of studies. In one such work, Robert E. Krug used the form 40-45 F scale and factor analyzed twenty-nine items, finding six factors which he entitled 1) Conventionalism, 2) Cynicism, 3) Aggression, 4) Superstition and Stereotypy, 5) Projectivity and 6) Good People versus Bad People.[3] Krug suggested, as we might well expect, that if two dimensions are truly at work, it would be possible to score high on some of these six factors and not on others. Conceivably, of course, some of these factors may be linked to Right-of-center political views, but, just as clearly, some others may appear within persons who have a Left-of-center political orientation.

The Eysenck U Configuration

The first researcher to use a two-dimensional technique in exploring the relationship of personality to political ideology was Hans Eysenck who, in The Psychology of Politics,[4] talked not only of the Radical-Conservative continuum, but also of what he labelled the Tough-minded and Tender-minded dimension. This dimension was borrowed from William James' Pragmatism,[5] a book in which James delineated two different kinds of human temperament. James argued that the tender-minded individual possessed such traits as intellectualism and idealism, and was partial to the philosophy of free will. The tough-minded person, on the other hand, was to be more of an empiricist and a materialist, and was to be more inclined toward a fatalistic philosophical outlook.

(3) Krug, Robert E., "An Analysis of the F Scale: I. Item Factor Analysis," Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 53 (1961), pp. 285-291.

(4) Eysenck, Hans, The Psychology of Politics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.

(5) James, William, Pragmatism, New York: Longmans, Green, 1921.

What is significant about Eysenck's introduction of his own revised psy-
cho-political dimension is his realization that the quality of tough-minded-
ness versus tender-mindedness would run perpendicular to the ideological
political dimension rather than running parallel to it. In other words, ac-
cording to Eysenck, there are both tough-minded and tender-minded types on
the political Left as well as on the political Right.

Eysenck was also the first to engage in extended research which showed
that the F scale, the heart of the data on the authoritarian personality, was
not testing solely for the kind of thing which would differentiate among
traits relevant to an understanding of Left versus Right political views, but
was in fact a scale which inadvertently tested for both those psychological
variables which were ideologically relevant and those that would test for
something like general or stylistic authoritarianism.[6] This charge, of
course, was a serious one, because if the F scale did not in fact differen-
tiate between these two very different kinds of variables, then not only
might there be a type of general authoritarianism on the Left, as well as on
the Right, but as Christie and Jahoda had suggested, the F scale would not be
a scale which would be able to identify such Left-wing related general au-
thoritarianism.

It is interesting to point out that Roger Brown in his major textbook,
Social Psychology,[7] has also described authoritarianism by use of a two-
dimensional approach. Brown differentiated between the "construction of the
personality" and the "cognitive style" of the authoritarian, terms which are
most convenient to differentiate between these two apparently perpendicular
continuums.

As examples of "construct" variables of the authoritarian, Brown refers
to "self-glorification" as opposed to "objective self-appraisal" and glorifi-
cation of the parents rather than objective appraisal.[8] These are the kinds
of psychological variables which he suggests would be helpful in the deter-
mination of Left-wing versus Right-wing political views. On the other hand,
his examples of cognitive style variables include such things as personality
rigidity versus flexibility, and personal intolerance of ambiguity versus
tolerance of ambiguity.[9] These are the kinds of variables which we must now
hypothesize are not helpful in the determination of the Left-wing versus
Right-wing nature of political views, but are in fact only helpful in deter-
mining the existence of general or stylistic authoritarianism. Put another
way, the "construct" variables are those which are crucial to the determina-
tion of what the individual believes politically. The "style" variables
would be crucial to the question of how one holds his political attitudes,
presumably with or without general authoritarian traits such as rigidity and
intolerance.

Returning to the Eysenck analysis, we can see that he was also interested
in attempting to determine the inter-relationship between the two different

(6) Eysenck, p. 132.

(7) Brown, Roger, Social Psychology, New York: Longmans, Green, 1921.

(8) Ibid., pp. 497-498.

(9) Ibid., p. 505.

types of variables and attempting to suggest a rough distribution of the au-
thoritarianism existing within a given population. Eysenck argued that a U
type configuration was the most valid, with general authoritarianism, or
stylistic authoritarianism, rising at both extremes of the ideological politi-
cal continuum.[10] Let us be clear what the U configuration means. It not
only indicates that there are two, not one, relevant authoritarian charac-
teristics, as we mentioned before, but that the construct variable, which is
relevant for ideological questions, is a variable which runs perpendicular to
the stylistic authoritarianism variable. What the U configuration specifi-
cally hypothesizes about a psycho-political distribution in a society is that
those people of more extreme construct-ideological attributes tend to have a
higher stylistic authoritarianism associated with the tone of their views.
Figure 2 represents the Eysenck U configuration.

Communist   Fascist

Socialist | Conservative
                    Liberal
    _____

                                            Fig. 2.

    In bolstering his argument for the U configuration, Eysenck cited two
major studies, both performed by a psychologist named Coulter. The first
study consisted of testing 169 subjects on the F scale. Eighty-three of the
respondents were soldiers who had neither fascist or communist affiliations.
Forty-three were self-described communists, and the other forty-three were
fascists. The average scores for the three groups were as follows: for the
soldier group, 75; for the communist, 94; and for the fascists, 159.[11] The
interpretations which different writers have put on these scores are quite
varied.

    Roger Brown took the figures at face value and argued that they demon-
strated a considerably higher general or stylistic authoritarian rating for
fascists than for communists;[12] in other words a kind of J configuration of
construct and style variables. Christie also argued that the simple reading
of the scores illustrated a lower level of stylistic authoritarianism for
communism, the political ideology of the Left.[13] Brown's statement on the

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    (10) Eysenck, p. 111.

    (11) Ibid., p. 152.

    (12) Brown, p. 528.

    (13) Christie, Richard, "Eysenck's Treatment of the Personality of Com-
munists," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. LIII, No. 6 (1956), p. 430.

nature of the F scale, however, suggests an interpretation of the Coulter
data upholding Eysenck's U configuration, for if the F scale, even as des-
cribed by its designers, is a measure only of Right-wing political attitudes
and, as Brown concedes, it is also a test of cognitive style components, that
is of those traits which lead to general or stylistic authoritarianism such
as rigidity and intolerance, then our attention must be directed to the man-
ner in which the F scale was actually scored.[14]

The Scoring of the Coulter Data

   What is clear from the discussion of the F scale is the fact that its
method of scoring was such that the scale's Right versus Left "construct"
attitude questions and its cognitive style attitude questions were both
scored in the same direction. That is, questions that would call for Right-
wing responses from those of the political Right and questions that would
have called for what Eysenck labelled "tough-minded" style responses, regard-
less of whether the respondent was on the political Right or the political
Left, were scored in the same direction. For example, from the Power scale,
the item "any red-blooded American will fight to defend his property," is
clearly a Right-of-center question when answered in the affirmative and there-
fore a Right-winger is scored as supporting it while a Left-winger would not
be expected to answer positively. But an item such as "(n)o weakness or dif-
ficulty can hold us back if we have enough will power," is an item which
might be agreed to be persons of either Left-wing or Right-wing political
orientation. Left-wingers who answered such a question positively were
scored positively, as were political Right-wingers.

   The analysis of such a scoring of the three political groups would thus
necessarily have to be as follows: if the communists were scored positively
on only the Left-versus-Right "construct" items, their scores for the con-
struct Right-wing versus Left-wing authoritarian element would be very low,
in fact their score would be lower than what the neutrals scored because
their ideological views are substantially to the Left of the neutrals. But
in fact, the communists' scores were above the scores of the neutrals, neces-
sitating the conclusion that insofar as the scale was testing for "tough-
minded" or cognitive style characteristics, the stylistic score for the com-
munists would have to have been quite high, high enough to compensate for the
lowest "construct" score which the communists would have received if only
construct, or ideologically relevant attitudes were being tested. In other
words, the responses to questions on the Left-Right continuum that would have
put the communists well below the score of the neutrals was more than offset
by high scores on the style questions, ultimately putting them well ahead of
the neutrals. This exercise, the recognition of what is really being done in
the scoring of the Coulter F scale data, would seem to argue strongly for the
U configuration, demonstrating that an approximately equal amount of stylis-
tic or general authoritarianism exists on both sides of the political con-
tinuum and that the weighted scoring of a test which was not recognized as
being a test of two instead of one variable would account for the J rather
than the U configuration in the raw results.

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(14) Brown, p. 528.

The Rokeach Contribution

But let us look at another major study, for perhaps the most significant
work which specifically explored the existence of cognitive style variables
across the political continuum was Milton Rokeach's The Open and Closed Mind,
a work which we have already mentioned in the first chapter.[15] Rokeach con-
structed two scales of his own, one of which would tap qualities of belief
systems which he felt were not relevant to the substance of ideological con-
tent. His Dogmatism scale depicted the kinds of style variables which Ro-
keach also believed might be prevalent within a wide range of political be-
lief systems, but which he predicted would be present more particularly at
the political extremes. The other measure, an Opinionation scale, included
a series of rather strongly worded statements, half of which expressed clear-
ly Left-of-center and half of which expressed clearly Right-of-center politi-
cal views.[16]

The Dogmatism scale contained no politically ideological statements, but
instead merely attempted to delineate open and closed-minded approaches to
one's belief system, or as we have said before, styles of belief. Dogmatism,
in other words, was defined and was tested as being a relatively fierce ad-
herence to a particular political viewpoint, regardless of the ideological
nature of the views themselves. For example, the psychic structure of the
dogmatic character, assuming a continuum of belief or disbelief in specific
information, is tested as a character in which, according to Rokeach, "the
magnitude of rejection of disbelief subsystems is relatively high at each
point." Also "there is relatively great discrepancy in the degree of dif-
ferentiation between belief and disbelief systems."[17] What this means is
that there is, within stylistically dogmatic belief systems, a deeper antip-
athy to contrary views and a greater distinction between what is "right" and
what is "wrong" than you would find among less dogmatic belief systems.

Finally, Rokeach approaches the question of whether a person's belief sys-
tem is open or closed by testing for what he called "the extent to which the
person can perceive, evaluate, and act on relevant information received from
the outside on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors
in the situation arising from within the person or from the outside."[18] In
short, a key component of the stylistically dogmatic personality would be
something which we could identify by the ability of the personality to eval-
uate objectively the world around him.

The analysis of the Opinionation and Dogmatism scales are revealing. On
the Opinionation scale, which is the political ideology scale, the groups

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(15) Rokeach, Milton, The Open and Closed Mind, New York: Basic Books,
1960, p. 56.

(16) Ibid., p. 55.

(17) Ibid., p. 57.

(18) Ibid., p. 117.

tested scored along the same continuum which their political group identifi-
cations would suggest that they should. In other words, the five groups used
in the study, the English Conservatives, Liberals, Atleeites, Bevanites and
Communists, scored in their appropriate Right to Left formation in accordance
with their political opinions.

But the more important finding is the one which showed the Communists to
be highest on dogmatism, while the Conservatives were running a very close
second, a finding which would very much seem to confirm the existence of the
U psycho-political configureation. From this result, Rokeach concludes that
"no relation is apparent between radicalism-conservatism on the one hand and
dogmatism and opinionation on the other." "These findings," he says, "pro-
vide the strongest evidence we have been able to obtain thus far indicating
that the Dogmatism and Opinionation scales are measuring something relatively
independent of ideological content."[19]

But if this is not sufficient evidence to support the argument for the
U configuration and for the perpendicular relationship of the style and con-
struct variables, we find that among his other calculations Rokeach took each
respondent's Right Opinionation score and, subtracting the Left Opinionation
score (thus giving an aggregate rating for the respondent's ideology), he
correlated that score with both the F scale and the PEC scale scores. As
might be expected, he found that high F scale and high PEC scores correlated
positively with high conservatism on his own scales, showing us once again
that the F scale was testing for both Right-wing political authoritarianism
as well as general or stylistic authoritarianism.[20]

If this is so, and if we can take Rokeach's evidence showing the Commu-
nists and the Conservatives as the two highest scorers on the Dogmatic scale,
and if we consider this information in the context of the rationale for the
U configuration explained earlier in the Eysenck and Coulter data, then it
would seem that Rokeach's data only lends further credence to the reasonabi-
lity of asserting that the U configuration of stylistic authoritarianism and
ideological political attitude is the most valid configuration.

                          More Recent Considerations

But before we look into the differentiation of those personality charac-
teristics which would help us in determining an individual's proclivity for
Left-of-center or Right-of-center political attitudes, let us look at the
work of a number of other researchers who have noted that the F scale, the
heart of The Authoritarian Personality studies, did not fully differentiate
between ideologically-related variables and the so-called style variables.
Kirshct and Dillehay,[21] whose review of the entire authoritarian personality

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(19) Ibid., p. 131.

(20) Ibid., p. 73.

(21) Kirscht, J. P., and Dillehay, R. C., Dimensions of Authoritarianism:
A Review Of Research and Theory, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
1967.

literature also concluded that the F scale was a clouded testing mechanism, lend further support to the arguments for the U configuration. Citing Shils, who had criticized the brunt of the Berkeley authors' work because of its virtual ignoring of the possibility of authoritarianism of the Left, Kirscht and Dillehay argue that the F scale was simply designed to test for the attitudes of anti-semitism and other fascist attitudes, and that therefore it was designed without cognizance of the construct versus style variable considerations. Other scales have been designed to test the relationship between anti-democratic political attitudes and some have, in turn, been tested against the F scale. Christie and Geis,[22] for example, reviewed the testing of a Machiavellianism scale against the F scale and found that in early tests, there was little or no correlation, but that in more recent studies, when perhaps the F scale items were falling a bit out of date, a slight negative correlation was appearing. Christie and Geis also found that there was no correlation between Republican and Democratic party allegiance and scores on the Machiavelli scale. This finding would seem to tell us that Machiavellianism is predominantly a mixed scale as well and that the quest for truly pure style or construct scales has been a fairly illusive one.

Admittedly, it is difficult to devise a scale which is completely pure, that is, free of any quality of one or the other commodities. Even the Dogmatism scale of Rokeach, which was found by its author as well as by others who worked with it to be a relatively pure stylistic scale, has been accused of having impurities which could lead to an ideological bias. Parrot and Brown,[23] for example, argued that there may be some conservative bias to this measure, but Jeanne Knutson has responded to this by demonstrating that substantial correlations also exist between dogmatism and extreme Left-wing political ideology.[24] Let us keep in mind that in her study Knutson was specifically studying political extremists, for it is significant to reflect that, as we have suggested with the U configuration of the construct and style variables, her work also tends to tell us that at least within the aggregate population, the more ideologically extreme the political belief is, the more likely it is that there will be stylistic psychological components involved within it.

A most interesting study, one which concerned itself with just such matters as the stylistic component of rather extreme political views, is a study which separated holders of extreme views from those who had less extreme views. Putnam, in an American Political Science Review article,[25] isolated the political creeds of both British and Italian political leaders,

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(22) Christie, R. and Geis, F. L., Eds. Studies in Machiavellianism, New York: Academic Press, 1970.

(23) Parrott, Guy and Brown, L., "Political Bias in the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale," Psychological Reports, Vol. 30 (1972), pp. 805-8-6.

(24) Knutson, Jeanne, "Personality Correlates of Political Belief: Left, Right and Center," American Political Science Association paper, Chicago, 1973.

(25) Putnam, R., Studying Elite Culture: The Case for Ideology," APSR, Vol. 65 (1961), pp. 651-681.

and then found that those who held rather clearly defined ideological views
did indeed come out at a more extreme point on the political continuum. The
same study also found that those who were out near the poles of the political
continuum were, in the aggregate, most subject to holding hostile attitudes
towards their political opponents. The most interesting finding, however,
was that although both the qualities of ideological orientation and hostility
correlated with extreme political views, the two prior variables did not cor-
relate with each other. This is both a reassuring and disturbing finding be-
cause it indicates that of those persons who were farther out towards the two
ideological poles, there were at least two quite separate types of persons
who held such positions. For some, it was a matter of ideological conviction,
but for others it was a matter of hostility towards those of a different view,
a psychological alloy which clearly contains a good mixture of a stylistic
component. When it is understood that we are dealing in the Putnam study
with persons of a leadership position in two major national parliaments, it
seems clear that at least some members who hold relatively extreme political
views are suffering from the stylistic psychological problems which hostility
seems to evidence. We can only speculate, but if we see this study as a fur-
ther confirmation of a U configuration among even a leadership sample, it
would be a reasonable hypothesis that stylistic qualities such as hostility
and rigidity would exist at the extremes even more significantly than within
the general population.

   Without belaboring the point, if we can take these recent studies as fur-
ther confirmation not only of the mixed construct and style nature of the F
scale, but also of the existence of both construct and style traits existing
within the population in a manner which is best represented by the Eysenck
U configuration, we are then ready to begin our investigation of the pure
construct psychological traits, those which may be responsible for the dif-
ferences in Left-of-center versus Right-of-center ideological views.

                   <u>Can We Differentiate Right from Left?</u>

   If we can take the evidence of the U configuration as being conclusive,
and if we can thus more easily understand the higher incidence of stylistic
authoritarianism within those who possess more politically extreme ideologies,
we can next turn our attention to the central purpose of the present study,
which is an attempt to differentiate those personality variables which would
predispose their possessor, regardless of the existence or non-existence of
stylistically authoritarian inclinations, toward holding Left-wing, rather
than Right-wing political views. It must be remembered once again that we
are speaking here about the aggregate population and that clearly not all
persons who hold Left-of-center political views will be found to be stylis-
tically authoritarian, just as not all conservative believers would be found
to be stylistically authoritarian either. Even the writers of <u>The Authori-
tarian Personality</u> were careful to point out that not all conservatives were
necessarily guilty of what we have now called stylistic or general authori-
tarianism.

   As Berkeley authors put it, "one can be politically conservative, just as
one can be patriotic (in the sense of firm attachment to American culture and
tradition) without being ethnocentric. We should like to use the term 'gen-
uine conservative' to refer to the individual with this broad pattern of
thought. He is 'genuine' because, whatever the merits of his political
views, he is seriously concerned with fostering what is most vital in the

American tradition."[26] On the contrary, "the ethnocentric conservative is
the pseudo-conservative, for he betrays in his ethnocentrism a tendency anti-
thetical to democratic values and traditions."[27]

Where Is the Left Authoritarian?

   Then how shall we define the Left authoritarian? Probably the best at-
tempts at theoretical definition and explanation come from Christian Bay who,
in The Structure of Freedom, originally coined the term anti-authoritarian.
"Let me define anti-authoritarianism," he says, "as a defensive predisposi-
tion to oppose uncritically standards and commands supported by authori-
ties....The extreme anti-authoritarian exists as a rigid, ego-defensive per-
sonality type, not just as a conformist in extremist milieus or a severe but
rational social critic."[28] Notice how Bay uses adjectives such as "rigid"
in order to be sure to include the stylistic features within his definition
of anti-authoritarianism. For purposes of our own study, we should recognize
that it is not necessary to include such stylistic adjectives. We are con-
cerned with the construct variable and we will refer to a respondent as anti-
authoritarian if he uncritically opposes "standards of commands" whether or
not he does so in concert with rigidity or other evidence of stylistic in-
tolerance.

   In continuing his exploration, Bay attempts to account for the formation
of anti-authoritarian attitudes by dichotomizing a basic resolution of con-
flict within the childhood development period. As Bay sees it, the authori-
tarian personality "represses awareness of conflict with authority figures"
and therefore "channels all his aggression toward outgroups," so, it is ar-
gued, the anti-authoritarian "represses awareness of his own weakness and
dependency needs. He sees all authorities as bad and wicked, and all weak
people as exploited and persecuted."[29]

   In fact, we have had some early hint that all Left-oriented thinkers would
not necessarily fall into a stylistically anti-authoritarian classification.
In the descriptions of those persons who scored at the other end of the au-
thoritarian scales in The Authoritarian Personality itself, we see that the
authors take great pains to differentiate "The Genuine Liberal" from four
other types of "low scorers" whose ideologies obviously stem from some sty-
listic psychological characteristics. To the Berkeley authors, the "rigid"
low scorer is someone whose lack of something like anti-semitic prejudice is
neither "based on concrete experience" nor "integrated within the personali-
ty." Instead, it "is derived from some general, external, ideological pat-
tern." The "protesting" low scorer is one in whom "the super-ego is so
strong that it turns against its own 'model,' the father, and all external
authorities." The "impulsive" low scorers are those who "have an extremely
strong id, but are relatively free of destructive impulses...." Finally, the
"easy going" low scorer "is characterized by a marked tendency to 'let things
go'" and "by an extreme reluctance to make decisions," a reluctance which

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(26) Adorno, p. 182.

(27) Ibid., p. 182.

(28) Bay, Christian, The Structure of Freedom, New York: Athenium, 1968, p. 206.

(29) Ibid., p. 206.

"even affects their language: they may be recognized by the frequency of un-
finished sentences, as if they would not like to commit themselves...."[30]

In contrast, the genuine liberal, as the Berkeley authors want to call one
set of their low scorers, possesses a "strong sense of personal autonomy and
independence." "His ego is quite developed but not libidinized - he is rarely
narcissistic," and, "just as he is strongly 'individualized' himself, he sees
the others, above all, as individuals, not as specimens of a general con-
cept."[31]

There are clearly those on the political Left, as well as those on the
political Right, who do not possess the general stylistic authoritarian syn-
drome.

What we will try to do here is to complete the puzzle of the authoritarian
model and demonstrate the relationship of that model to political ideology.
We shall do this by identifying those construct personality variables which
are relevant to the understanding of Left-of-center political attitudes as
opposed to Right-of-center attitudes without regard to whether these person-
ality traits may or may not be linked with stylistically authoritarian vari-
ables, and we shall call these traits anti-authoritarian. Basically, this
attempt will revolve around much the same kind of "construct" variables which,
in one sense, could be found within the F scale, but they can only be found
in the F scale when we have excluded from that scale those variables which we
have now come to know as cognitive style variables. Figure 3 will represent
the full configuration of the different kinds of authoritarianism and their
relationship to political attitudes.

Left construct with stylistic authoritarianism	Right construct with stylistic authoritarianism
Construct Variables Anti-Authoritarianism	Construct Variables Authoritarianism

Fig. 3.

The Essence of Our Study

Although we will talk more of our research later on, let us simply state
here that what we have done in this study is to attempt to develop some ori-
ginal personality trait questionnaire items which may demonstrate a correla-
tion between some construct personality variables and some Left-wing politi-
cal variables. The personality questions that are used here are original to

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(30) Adorno, pp. 771-778.

(31) Ibid., p. 781.

this study, but for the political questions, we have borrowed from Richard
Christie's New Left political scale of 1969.[32] The personality items, de-
signed so as to represent the other half of the Right-wing construct authori-
tarian model, purport to determine relationships toward four fundamental psy-
chological variables. These relationships, we are hypothesizing, are general-
ly the exact reverse of the relationships of the original construct variables
of the authoritarian personality, again remembering that we are looking at
the authoritarian personality without its stylistic element included. We
shall label the essential construct variables as follows: 1) Anti-order,
2) Anti-power, 3) Impulsiveness, and 4) Introspection, and we will hypothe-
size that 1) those persons who have a psychological predisposition against
personal order, 2) a psychological predisposition against the relationship of
power, 3) those who are impulsive in nature, and 4) those who are highly in-
trospective, are those persons who will tend towards an acceptance of Left-
wing political views. As we begin to develop a rationale for examining these
particular traits, let us look back at the original work, The Authoritarian
Personality, and see how these four construct components were theoretically
derived from the ideologically relevant portions of the Berkeley research it-
self.

Anti-Order

   The Anti-Order test items, which again are all original to this research,
are questions which have their genesis in the description of either some of
the F scale test characteristics or the discussions of some of the low F
scale scorers. We will recall that the first listed characteristic of the
F scale was Conventionalism, which was described as an adherence to orthodox,
middle class values. The items listed in the F scale of Conventionalism were
such as to measure values regarding "good hard work," "efficiency, practical-
ity, and thrift," along with such attributes as physical "neatness and good
manners." The authors point out that adherence to the conventional norms and
orders of the society is not of itself a symptom of authoritarianism, but "if
it is based upon the individual's adherence to the standards of the collec-
tive powers with which he, for the time being is identified," then his ad-
herence would seem to demonstrate a deep psychological need for order.[33]

   There are also hints of need for order within that portion of the F scale
which tests destructiveness and cynicism. We witness the authoritarian's
fear of disorder when he answers positively to statements like: "Today every-
thing is unstable; we should be prepared for a period of constant change,
conflict and upheaval," or "after the war, we may expect a crime wave; the
control of gangsters and ruffians will become a major social problem."[34]

   Responses of high scorers to statements such as these were found to cor-
relate strongly with the results of extended personal interviews. The

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   (32) Christie, R., Freedman, L., and Ross, A., "The New Left and Its Ideo-
logy," Unpublished Paper - Department of Social Psychology, Columbia Univer-
sity, New York, 1969.

   (33) Adorno, p. 229.

   (34) Ibid., p. 238.

Berkeley authors noticed a different kind of dependency within the high and low scorers, the high scorers showing a dependence on supportive kinds of structural orders, as for example the kinds of support given by formal relig-ion during times of personal difficulty, while the dependence of low scorers is labelled by the Berkeley authors as "love-oriented succorance-nurturance" or essentially a "dependence on people."[35] (We should note, incidentally, the similarity between this designation and Bay's people-dependent terminol-ogy in his description of the anti-authoritarian personality.)

Also apparent in the personality of high scorers is a willingness to ac-cept the restrictions of parents or other authority figures in morally dif-ficult situations. In the summary of their interview results, the Berkeley authors reported that "high scorers seem to need external support - whether this be offered by authorities or by public opinion in order to find some assurance concerning what is right and what is wrong."[36] Thus, there is a greater willingness among the high F scale scorers to conform to the values of the society.

This trait of need for psychological orderliness is in interesting con-trast to what was found among low F scale scorers, presumably those being the people who would hold Left-of-center political views. The low scorer, for example, may also be a personality much guided by personal conscience. But the low scorer's conscience is a different kind of ethical factor, the sig-nificant difference being that his conscience is, as the Berkeley people put it, "quite autonomous and independent of outside codes."[37] It is, in fact, a personalized conscience, not subject to the orders and demands of the greater society. Interestingly, it was also noted that such low scorers are often "constricted" in their thinking "as if the internalization of conscience has succeeded so well that they are severely paralyzed."[38]

In the construction of our Anti-Order items, therefore, what we are looking for is at the other side of the continuum from the authoritarian's reliance on the orders and structures which are surrounding his existence. Just as the authoritarian tends to find these orders supportive of his personality, we would hypothesize that the anti-authoritarian would tend to find them to be repressive and would therefore have a predisposition toward opposing con-ventional standards, norms, values, or other cues which seem to burden his anti-authoritarian psyche.

Anti-Power
    Again, the Anti-Power items of our own scale are in part a product of a reverse reading of Right-wing construct F scale characteristics. Most rele-vant in the case of Anti-Power are the F scale categories of Authoritarian Submission, Authoritarian Aggression, and "Power and Toughness." Test items

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(35) Ibid., p. 449.

(36) Ibid., p. 476.

(37) Ibid., p. 774.

(38) Ibid., p. 774.

such as the following illustrate the kind of hierarchical power relationships
which an authoritarian seems to enjoy: "What this country needs is fewer
laws and agencies, and more courageous, tireless, devoted leaders whom the
people can put their faith in." Also, authoritarians are prone to believe
that "obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues
children should learn."[39]

As the Berkeley authors describe Authoritarian Submission, it is a "very
general attitude that would be evoked in relation to a variety of authority
figures - parents, older people, leaders, supernatural powers, and so forth."[40]
Interestingly, it is suggested as one hypothesis for the development of such
a trait that the submission to authority is one way of resolving the child's
ambivalent feeling toward authority figures. The hostility and rebellious-
ness all children have within them is unduly restrained, more than likely be-
cause of a fear of the authority itself, and the child allegedly overcompen-
sates for this fear with an overweaning respect for the authority of the fig-
ure. Remember, Christian Bay has suggested that the anti-authoritarian is
one who, contrary to the Right-wing authoritarian, gives easy vent to his
hostilities, openly challenging the authority at an early time, and therefore
suppressing his dependency upon parents and other authority figures.[41]

Authoritarian aggression is another category which has overtones of power
needs. The aggression spoken of is often associated with the dealing out of
punishment for the breaking of norms and standards already spoken of in the
Order context. Concepts such as displacement and projection play an impor-
tant role here, the Berkeley authors arguing that "the authoritarian, con-
tinuing the suppression of hostility which he learned early in his socializa-
tion, is incapable of directing punitive feelings inward or toward familiar
ingroup objects. He must, therefore, seek release of these hostilities by
the use of outgroups."[42] The internal guilt is thus displaced, and as it is
subsequently projected onto outgroup kinds of figures, the authority figure
is still ready to be defended by the authoritarian personality.

The low F scale scorer, on the contrary, is reported to possess attitudes
which are not at all disposed toward those in possession of power. He engages
in what the Berkeley authors suggest is a "conscientious rejection of hetero-
nomous authority instead of its acceptance. The decisive feature is opposi-
tion to whatever appears to be tyranny."[43]

Power and toughness is another element of the F scale which The Authori-
tarian Personality authors stressed. There is an exaggerated concern with
toughness in the authoritarian and there is also a tendency to view human

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(39) Ibid., p. 774.

(40) Ibid., p. 231.

(41) Bay, p. 206.

(42) Adorno, p. 233.

(43) Ibid., p. 771.

relationships as being within vertical categories such as "strong-weak,
dominant-submissive, leader-follower, hammer-anvil."[44]   The authors go on to
argue that both leaders and followers would be expected to score high on
this dimension, implying that it is the relationship of rank itself, a power-
oriented relationship, which is the significant element, not the individual
rank which the subject perceives for himself.[45] This is a particularly sig-
nificant depiction of the power variable, because it may well be argued that
this fondness for the concept of rank results from a personality variable not
terribly distant from the variable of order.

    In any case, the variable of Anti-Power seems to be one which demonstrates
a kind of personal repugnance for all stratified, hierarchical authority re-
lationships. It is manifested as an antipathy for what conceptually could be
seen as a vertical phenomenon, an evidencing of an extreme disinclination to
engage in an authority relationship either in a superior or an inferior role.
Such a disinclination, incidentally, will also evidence a corresponding in-
ability to identify with those persons who do possess authoritative positions.

Impulsiveness
    The impulsiveness of the anti-authoritarian is something which should be
contrasted with the excessive restraint of impulse found within the authori-
tarian personality. The Berkeley authors found this personality to be under
pressure to restrain himself from "getting out of control."[46] The subject's
sexual drive in particular must be suppressed, again so that it will not get
out of hand. The authoritarian's fear of one's own impulses is related to
both the authoritarian's aggressiveness and the authoritarian's use of pro-
jectivity as a method of disguising aggressiveness.[47] The need to engage in
projectivity, of course, is a direct result of the suppression of those ag-
gressive impulses within the subject. As the Berkeley authors put it, "the
individual who has been forced to give up basic pleasures and to live under
a system of rigid restraints, and who therefore feels put upon, is likely not
only to seek an object upon which he can 'take it out' but also to be par-
ticularly annoyed at the idea that another person is 'getting away with some-
thing'."[48] It is this kind of thinking which makes basic impulses alien to
the ego and thus not properly internalized.

    The extended interviews which the Berkeley authors held with the authori-
tarian subjects tend to confirm the attitudes toward impulse which the ques-
tionnaire data discovered. In their discussions of morality with the inter-
viewers, the authoritarians tended to speak of their own high moral character,
but they always gave as examples of such morality their ability to control
their "evil" urges by a stern exercise of self control.[49]

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(44) Ibid., p. 237.

(45) Ibid., p. 238.

(46) Ibid., p. 235.

(47) Ibid., p. 240.

(48) Ibid., p. 232.

(49) Ibid., p. 429.

The low scoring subjects on the F scale test, on the other hand, were those who appeared unable or unwilling to limit their impulses, or, as the Berkeley authors put it, they were never able to integrate their id with their ego and superego, and thus they were "threatened with overpowering libidinous energy."[50] In discussing these subjects, the authors concluded that they responded "so strongly to all kind of stimuli that the ingroup-outgroup relation has no meaning to them - rather, they are attracted by everything that is 'different' and promises some new kind of gratification."[51]

Finally, in attempting to summarize the results of the personal in-depth interviews, the Berkeley authors contrasted the two groups, high and low scorers, on several bases. The relevant dichotomy for the discussion of impulsiveness was subtitled Repression vs. Awareness.[52] The major difference between the two interview groups on this dimension was the authoritarian's inability either to face up to his own impulses, or to integrate them successfully into his own personality. The low scoring individual, on the other hand, was able to recognize these impulses and to subsequently integrate them into his personality. One of the issues which the present study hopes to resolve is whether, at the other end of the continuum from the authoritarian, there exists an impulsive personality, one who either chooses not to or is unable to exercise restraint over his own impulses and who resents all agents of the society which would exercise such restraint upon him. If there is such a set of traits, we would suggest that they would correlate with Left-of-center political views.

One final note should be made of how the term impulse is used in a different body of literature. Within the crime and personality research field, the term impulse has taken on a meaning which links it to the release of aggressive or violent behavior. Eysenck's work in this field is theoretically derivative of earlier thinking by such people as Wundt, Kant, and particularly Galen.[53] In the Galen configuration of traits, the impulsive trait is represented as being near the aggression-prone extraverted personality and nearest after that to the unstable side of a stable-unstable dimension.

The Eysenck definition for this kind of impulsiveness is clearly an aggressive impulsiveness as contrasted with the kind of impulsiveness which we are defining here as being more sensate or emotional in its tone. A similar kind of cross-meaning in terms happens with the dichotomy of over-control versus under-control where Megargee, a major writer in the crime and personality field, defines and empirically tests over-control to be the successful restraint of aggressive impulses and under-control to be the unsuccessful restraint of aggression, while St. Angelo and Dyson, two political science researchers, define and justify their brand of over-control as being the

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(50) Ibid., p. 771.

(51) Ibid., p. 777.

(52) Ibid., p. 474.

(53) Eysenck, Hans J., Crime and Personality, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1964, p. 37.

restricted personality trait that goes with political conservatism and under-
control as being the less structured personality trait that correlates with
political liberalism.[54]

Introspection

The fourth personality variable which we will be dealing with is the vari-
able of introspection, and we should look again to the work of Eysenck in
this context, in part to differentiate how the English author drew his com-
parison, and also to see what he subsequently talked about in his discussion
of what was labelled as introversion. Eysenck was impressed with the impor-
tance of this variable, and he described the difference between introverts
and extroverts as deriving "from the fundamental fact that the extrovert has
turned his interests and his instinctual energies outwards, i.e. toward the
world of objective reality, while the introvert has turned his interests and
his instinctual energies inwards, i.e. towards himself."[55] Referring direct-
ly to a kind of density of the internal screening device, Eysenck writes,
"quite generally, one might characterize the introvert point of view by
pointing to the constant subjection of the object and objective reality to
the ego and subjective psychological process," while on the other hand, he
argued that "according to the extroverted point of view the subject is con-
sidered as inferior to the (external) object...."[56]

The kinds of things which The Authoritarian Personality talked about when
it discussed this variable is really very close to Eysenck's theoretical no-
tions. The Berkeley authors described what they labelled as "introception"
as "the dominance of feelings, fantasies, speculations, aspirations---an im-
aginative, subjective, human outlook," a concept which they contrasted with
extroception, which describes a "tendency to be determined by concrete,
clearly observable, physical conditions (tangible, objective facts)."[57] The
authors are therefore defining the anti-introspective personality as one who
is almost afraid of what he thinks or feels, the personality engaging in a
"devaluation" of human existence for its own sake, and stressing the impor-
tance of the individual as an external referrant in much the same way that
Jung talked about the way in which the external object was more important to
this personality than was his own subjective self.

The same kind of thinking obviously went into the F scale classification
of Superstition and Sterotypy. The superstitious personality is one who has
an inordinate belief in the power of externals over the self. Corresponding-
ly, there is a shift of responsibility from within the psyche to outside the
psyche, due in part to the fact that the extraceptive individual is not

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(54) St. Angelo, Douglas, and Dyson, James W., "Personality and Politi-
cal Orientation," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 12 (1968),
pp. 202-224.

(55) Eysenck, p. 175.

(56) Ibid., p. 175.

(57) Adorno, p. 235.

always convinced of his ability to control his own life. In the discussion
of what they called the genuine liberal, the Berkeley authors describe a per-
son who "has a strong sense of personal autonomy and independence."[58] He is
prone to develop his personal philosophy internally, rather than to be depen-
dent upon the belief of others. As he requires such autonomy for himself, he
is willing to grant it to others as well. His is a strong personality, with
a well-integrated ego, and although he may occasionally have difficulty con-
trolling a bit of individualized rebellion against external intrusions, these
are tempered outbursts, and they are invariably well directed.

     Yet in this discussion of the genuine liberal, the authors take some pains
to point out that their subjects are not narcissistic and that although their
usual identifications are with the underdog, they are not compulsive about it
nor are they guilty of "overcompensation." Perhaps within these qualifica-
tions, we are receiving some idea of what an introspective personality would
consist of when that person is also stylystically hostile and intolerant
toward those externals which intrude upon his self-referrant being.[59]

     A final point should be mentioned within an explanation of the introspec-
tive versus anti-introspective dimension. In one of his more recent works,
The Biological Basis of Personality, Hans Eysenck comments extensively on
this introspection-anti-introspection dichotomy and uses a number of psycho-
logical variables.[60] After describing a number of physiological tests that
he has used as evidence, Eysenck hypothesizes that a basic relationship
exists between extrovertive and introvertive individuals and the relative
desire between these personalities for external stimuli. "We postulate," he
says, "a certain degree of stimulus hunger (sensation seeking, arousal
seeking) in the extrovert, and a certain degree of stimulus aversion in the
introvert."[61] Although we must remember that Eysenck is discussing physio-
logical factors such as tolerance of pain and sensory deprivation, nonethe-
less, in this more recent work, his suggestions about the kind of fundamental
differences which exist between the two types of physiological types is most
interesting because of the close parallel to the introversion-extroversion
psychological variable under discussion here. If psychological and physio-
logical phenomena of this type are consistent within individuals, then the
Eysenck physiological data would seem to only further confirm that the anti-
authoritarian personality has a predisposition against the reception of
psychological external stimuli, while the authoritarian seems to have a great
need for such stimuli.

     Thus, in a brief review, we have attempted to highlight what seem to be
the four principal psychological traits which are important in the determina-
tion of an individual's political orientation. Let us remember that we are
dealing here with an attempt to complete the authoritarian model by isolating

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     (58) Ibid., p. 781.

     (59) Ibid., p. 475.

     (60) Eysenck, Hans, The Biological Basis of Personality, Springfield:
Charles C. Thomas, 1967, p. 110.

     (61) Ibid., p. 110.

the construct personality traits from the stylistic personality traits, and
then we are attempting to discover if indeed the reverse of certain Right-
wing related psychological construct traits are related to the holding of
Left-wing political views.

What we are dealing with in our attempt to understand the non-stylistic
anti-authoritarian personality are four basic personality traits which we are
hypothesizing are each highly relevant to the psychological predisposition
toward Left-of-center to Left-wing political attitudes. We are suggesting
that those persons who 1) have a psychological antipathy for order, and who
2) tend to rebel against authority and other vestiges of power, and who 3) are
more prone to approve of sensate impulse and give vent to their own impulses
and who 4) are highly introspective, or self-referrant in their search for
norms and standards, will be those who will tend to be attracted to Left-wing
views.

Let it be clear again that in reality we are talking about a full psycho-
logical-political continuum, and the use of the term Left-wing is a conven-
ient term which delineates the left half of that continuum, a term which in
normal usage we usually reserve for a relatively extreme political radical-
ism. As we have said, in delineating the relevant personality traits we have
selected eight questions from the Christie New Left scale of 1969.[62] These
Christie items deal with both the defects of the American political system
and with the need for fundamental political change. The items will be pre-
sented in a subsequent chapter, but as we have now seen from our review here,
each of these personality variables has grown out of the original work, The
Authoritarian Personality.

Such a search within The Authoritarian Personality was necessary to find
the basic elements of what we are hypothesizing are the psychological cor-
relates of the Left-wing political view. It would be unfortunate, however,
to stop at that point, for altough principal work on authoritarianism is rich
indeed, it is not only somewhat dated, it is also lacking in direct refer-
ences or reflections on Left-wing political thought, as well as its possible
psychological correlates. The literature of the political Left is a plenti-
ful literature, and particularly in the 1960's there was a great deal of out-
spoken, plainly normative political rhetoric which argued the causes of Viet
Nam, civil rights, and government repression in ways which may permit our
insights into the psychological variable to be greatly improved. Therefore,
the examples which we will discuss in the following chapters define a politi-
cal Left which referred to itself as the "New Left" and which, indeed, did
contrast with the old, often-times Marxist Left of previous years. In many
ways, this more recent burst of Left-wing ideology gives us a better oppor-
tunity to study the psychological component of political belief. For exam-
ple, although some early Marxist writings such as The Economic and Philoso-
phical Manuscripts may have been tangentially concerned with the psychologi-
cal qualities of life, the principal Marxist and Leftist concerns have gen-
erally dealt almost exclusively with economic concerns and have argued for a
solution to society's woes through an economic redistribution of the common
wealth. The more psychological Left, and we will discuss the relationship

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(62) Christie, 1969.

of the emergence of the psychological variable with economic well-being in a
later chapter, is concerned with a kind of style of living, or, if you will,
a kind of posture which an individual psyche takes toward the political and
social world around it. Generally, we are hypothesizing that the psychologi-
cally-related Left desires a very unconstricted and unauthoritative kind of
relationship with the political state. At the extreme, this view may even
reflect itself in a kind of anarchism, but short of that, it should manifest
a reasonably predictable set of responses toward governmental authority
which, curiously enough, may even be found within Left-of-center or even Com-
munist states. This phenomenon of Left-wing activity within a Communist
state, which is seemingly so inconsistent with classical understanding,
nevertheless seems to reflect the conflict between what may be authoritarian
governmental policy which, even if providing economic redistribution, would
rankle the psyche of the unordered personality. Unfortunately, the econom-
ically-oriented political ideology which we have dealt with in the past
simply does not account for this kind of anti-authoritarian, psychologically-
related set of attitudes. Reviewing the more conventional political litera-
ture of the Left, therefore, is probably not going to be very helpful in the
determination of psychologically-related political attitudes, and thus, in
the following four chapters, we will review some of the literature of the
more recent or "New Left." We will hope to see if we can indeed find within
this newer radical literature some of the strains of psychological assump-
tions and underpinnings which would properly fit within their predicted poli-
tical mold.

   For contrast, we will compare some recent and even some vintage literature
of the Political Right, but again, we will examine this literature with a
view toward finding the seemingly authoritarian psychological strains which
run within it. We look at this additional literature, of course, to see if
our testing for the psychological-political linkage we are seeking is justi-
fied beyond a kind of reverse reading of The Authoritarian Personality. We
do it as well to demonstrate that even some of the most vigorous and emphatic
of political rhetoric cannot seem to escape the expression of the psychologi-
cal underpinnings which we are suggesting is so often a great catalyst to
these views.

CHAPTER 3

ORDER

In this chapter, we shall discuss the personality trait of the need for order, and our first hypothesis suggests that those personalities which possess a predisposition against psychological order will be more likely to accept Left-wing political views. The origins of the psychological concept, the rejection of order, are not derived solely from a kind of counter-reading of The Authoritarian Personality or from similar works on the psychological underpinnings of Right-wing beliefs. Much of the feel for this trait, and for the other traits which we have hypothesized are relevant to Left-wing political views, can be obtained by a reading of the works of major Left-wing thinkers. In this chapter, as well as in the three subsequent chapters, we shall attempt to review the works of a few of the major Left-oriented political writers, highlighting the psychological assumptions which these authors reveal to be significant for their thinking. A note of caution is necessary to warn any reader who may mistake a discussion of the psychological assumptions of any writer as an exercise intended to minimize the intellectual value of that individual's work. Too often, the political debate of the present day has succumbed to a form of cheap argument whereby a critic of a writer's point of view isolates an assumption or a set of assumptions and thereby feels that he has responded to the arguments of his adversary. The purposes herein are quite different, for the excerpts from works which follow are presented as being representative of major points of view in a political dialogue, and not as critiques of the ideas expressed. It would be out of character with the purpose of this work were we to comment on the merits of these authors, since it is our task solely to review their thinking and thereby honestly appraise the psychological dispositions which they appear to contain. After a discussion of the Left-wing authors, we shall also mention some prominent Right-wing thinkers, highlighting the contrast in psychological dispositions which the two poles seem to possess. It is hoped that this kind of analysis will be helpful to a better understanding of the psychological contributions to the political dialogue.

Anti-Order on the Left

One of the most influential spokesmen of the New Left was Herbert Marcuse who, in his Eros and Civilization,[1] unites political thought with a psychology which he argues is free from the industrially-structured conservative influences. For Marcuse, the concept of order has a repressive connotation[2]

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(1) Marcuse, Herbert, Eros and Civilization, New York: Vintage Books, 1955.

(2) Ibid., p. 149.

and he finds that the new order of an industrial society has made the forced activities of average lives more structured and repressive than ever before. Some psychologists had argued that the industrial state required the constraining of the natural instincts of man, and that, therefore, a more natural and less-ordered pattern of life would inevitably be subordinated by conflict with the demands of modern economic reality. Yet Marcuse, in an optimistic tone, also argued both that the very achievements of our advanced society might now make the repressive psychologies of economic reality archaic and that if the world were ever fully free of the constraints of a work ethic, man could exist without the inhibiting orders which are now thrust upon him. Without "the repressive utilization of instinctual energy" man would naturally "exist without work and without order; he would fall back into nature...."[3]

For Marcuse there would be a kind of free synthesis, based upon a universal recognition of the beauty of life and nature. In a better world there would be a kind of "purposiveness without purpose," and a "lawfulness without law."[4] The order of beauty would result from no order placed on it by the society, but would instead stem from the order which allegedly guides the human imagination.[5] Marcuse, addressing himself to a basic conflict within the human psyche, sees the new aesthetic credo as installing the order of sensuousness in the place of the old order of reason. He agrees that these two grand themes have always opposed each other, but he argues that when a nation's economic needs have been largely taken care of the "constraint of need" becomes a "constraint of superfluity."[6] The doctrines of form, which served us when we needed them, will now fall to a new set of doctrines founded upon an absense of restraint upon the imagination. Marcuse argues "imagination comes into accord with the cognitive notions of understanding, and this accord establishes a harmony of the mental faculties....The order of beauty results from the order which governs the play of imagination."[7]

The argument for the rejection of constraints placed upon the human psyche by the industrial society, and the corresponding argument that these constraints are either no longer needed, or have become too severe in recent years, is presented again in Jacques Ellul's The Technological Society.[8] Ellul's indictment extends beyond the industrial society itself into an indictment of the ethic of "technique." The machines themselves were danger enough to the increasingly dehumanized man, but Ellul argues that the concept of "technique" has even brought an end to the mutual relationship between man

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(3) Ibid., p. 160.

(4) Ibid., p. 162.

(5) Ibid., p. 163.

(6) Ibid., p. 172.

(7) Ibid., p. 163.

(8) Ellul, Jacques, The Technological Society, New York: Vintage Books, 1964.

and machine. Because of this new ethic, the machine has "progressively absorbed"[9] the worker, and this is all because of the fact that technique has been allowed to become an autonomous force.

The greatest constraint which has resulted from the ethic is the removal of the value of human decision through the automation of technical choice. There is now, within the myriad decisions of modern employment, "the one best way,"[10] the only method permitted from a purely rational point of view. This situation has created what Ellul calls "automatism," the end of personal preference in daily decision-making. "Choice between methods is no longer made according to human measure, but occurs as a mechanical process which nothing can prevent."[11] This juxtaposition inevitably leaves man as a junior partner, both to the machines with which he works and the work situation in which he finds himself. Rather than have the work be designed to accomodate the nature of man, it is man who "is adopted and made to harmonize with what is to be."[12]

But Ellul is not only concerned with the constraints of the work experience. He is concerned as well with the simple question of the constricting space in which man lives. For Ellul, the physical crowding of man has left him with bounded horizons, little space to walk in and little to see within the walls of the towering city.[13] Time as well has grown to constrain him, Ellul seconding Lewis Mumford's naming of the clock as the most important machine of our culture. In short, Ellul argues that the technological society with its size and its increasing complexity poses a major threat to the psychological freedom of all those who work within it.

Erich Fromm, a prominent Marxian psychologist, says much the same thing about modern man's involvement with his industrialized society, but he is particularly critical of the peculiarities of the capitalist work ethic. He is concerned with more than the daily capitalist work experience itself and he asks us to think of the effects which this work may have upon the life of the worker, as well as upon the justifications which the political system may give for such effects. Fromm charges that the basic purpose of capitalistic life is "to mold and channel human energy within a given society for the purpose of the continued functioning of this society."[14] He finds that the justification for such values as were necessary to continue the ethic could not be found in conventional psychological literature and therefore "the necessity for work, for punctuality and orderliness had to be transformed into an inner drive for these aims."[15] Fromm, of course, is arguing that

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(9)   Ibid., p. 6.

(10) Ibid., p. 79.

(11) Ibid., p. 82.

(12) Ibid., p. 218.

(13) Ibid., p. 325.

(14) Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society, New York: Rinehart, 1955, p. 79.

(15) Ibid., p. 80.

such drives do not naturally exist and that the society and particularly the worker are merely being deceived into believing that these are inborn personality traits.

Fromm also decries the nature of the concept of personal identity which he argues is a necessary element of the capitalistic society. Rather than possess a personal identity based upon intrinsic merit or accomplishment, identity is based upon the kinds of order and standards thrust upon the citizens by concepts of nation, religion, class and occupation.[16] The identity thus achieved is what Fromm calls a herd identity, not an identity of individuality.

The worker, seeing himself merely as existing in reference to these herd identities, becomes "enmeshed," being forced to engage in "time and energy consuming tasks" which only serve him as "he builds a social order, conventions, habits and ideas...."[17] The final strategy which the capitalistic society maintains to ensure the captivation of its workers is, of course, the uses of psychology and psychiatry themselves, Fromm asserting that it is the sole purpose of such disciplines within the United States to help the worker conform, to help him adjust, and to ultimately condition him to his work and to his station.[18]

Another of the leading writers of the Left is Jean-Paul Sartre, probably the most significant of atheistic existentialist philosophers. Existentialism, though difficult to define, is a philsophy which views man as being in a highly transcendental relationship to his world. Clearly, it is a philosophy which places its burden of moral judgment solely upon the individual without the aid of external standards and codes. In his 1947 article "Existentialism," Sartre speaks of his argument with Zola, who had contended that man is the way he is because of things like his environment and his heredity, and that man is thus not fully responsible for his nature and his actions.[19] Sartre disagrees sharply, arguing that a coward is always responsible for his cowardice and that he cannot blame such things as environment or heredity for what are his own moral choices. Man, to Sartre, is free. Indeed, man is "condemned to be free," without even a concept of human nature to depend upon for moral choice.[20] Furthermore, his freedom is not one which leads him toward some established end or certain identity. "The existentialist," he argues, "will never consider man as an end because he is always in the making. Nor should we believe that there is a mankind to which we might set up a cult in the manner of Auguste Comte."[21] Sartre's concept of mankind is

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(16) Ibid., p. 62.

(17) Ibid., p. 144.

(18) Ibid., p. 167.

(19) Sartre, Jean-Paul, "Existentialism," Philosophical Library, 1947, reprinted in Hamalian, Leo and Karl, Frederick, eds., The Radical Vision, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1970, p. 287.

(20) Ibid., p. 282.

(21) Ibid., pp. 296-297.

very different indeed.

> Fundamentally it is this: man is constantly outside himself; in projec-
> ting himself, in losing himself outside to himself, he makes for man's
> existing; and, on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent goals
> that he is able to exist; man, being this state of passing-beyond, and
> seizing upon things only as they bear upon this passing-beyond, is at the
> heart, at the center of this passing-beyond.[22]

In completing the brief review of Left-oriented political thought and its
relationship to the subject of psychological order, it may be appropriate to
look at some of the commentary of those who wrote in consonance with their
more immediate personal involvement in politics. Sheldon Wolin and John
Schaar, while teaching Political Science at the University of California,
Berkeley, wrote profoundly not only about things like the experience of the
University of California conflicts themselves, but also about what they felt
that these incidents and others revealed about the true nature of modern-day
bureaucracies. In speaking of one particular confrontation, they write, "it
was this 'bureaucratic epistemology' which largely determined how the univer-
sity responded to the People's Park. Bureaucracy is both an expression of
the drive for rationality and predictability, and one of the chief agencies
in making the world ever more rational and predictable...."[23]

After describing the techniques of the new bureaucratic ethic, and des-
cribing its now all-too-pervasive role in American life, Wolin and Schaar
make a most revealing prediction as to what would be the course of human re-
sponse to what Blake called "the mind-forged manacles" of bureaucratic men-
tality. There are only two responses, they argued, both driven and both
equally sad.

> On the one side, we see the march toward uniformity, predictability, and
> the attempt to define all variety as dissent and then to force dissent
> into the 'regular channels.' On the other side we see assertion of spon-
> taneity, self-realization, and do-your-own-thing as the sum and substance
> of life and liberty. And this assertion, in its extreme form, does ap-
> proach either madness or infantilism....[24]

The Free Speech Movement spawned other similar outspoken social criti-
cisms, one of the more openly revolutionary being Brad Cleaveland's "Letter
to Undergraduates." "How did you get to be such puppets?" he asks. "You
perform, but when do you think? Dutifully and obediently you follow, as a
herd of grade-worshipping sheep...."[25] Again, "BUT WHETHER YOU ARE STRONG OR

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(22) _Ibid._, p. 297.

(23) Wolin, Sheldon and Schaar, John, "Berkeley, The Battle of People's
Park," _New York Review of Books_, New York: 1969, reprinted in Hamalian and
Karl, p. 234.

(24) _Ibid._, p. 235.

(25) Cleaveland, Brad, "A Letter to Undergraduates," reprinted in Jacobs,
Paul and Landau, Saul, _The New Radicals_, New York: Vintage Books, 1966,
p. 218.

WEAK, YOU PERFORM LIKE TRAINED SEALS, AND LIKE SHEEP YOU FOLLOW...WITH THE
THOROUGHBRED PHI BETA KAPPA SHEEP LEADING YOU."[26] And for what are you being
trained? To Cleaveland you are

TRAINING IN THE CAPACITY FOR UNQUESTIONING OBEDIENCE TO A COMPLEX FLOOD
OF TRIVIAL BUREAUCRATIC RULE, IN THE NAME OF HUMAN LEARNING, YOU ACQUIRE
THE CAPACITY TO BE DOCILE IN THE FACE OF RULES. WHILE YOU ARE TRAINING,
THE RULES WHICH TELL YOU HOW TO GO ABOUT YOUR TRAINING ARE DISPLACING
YOUR FREEDOM TO THINK.[27]

The same kind of viewpoint is reflected in the speeches of Mario Savio,
probably the most visible of the Berkeley rebels of the time. Savio saw the
multiuniversity as "a factory that turns out a certain product needed by in-
dustry or government."[28] And according to Savio, "America is becoming ever
more the utopia of sterilized, automated contentment....This chrome-plated
consumer's paradise would have us grow up to be well-behaved children."[29]

The Ordered Right

Of course, further examples of Left-wing thought are available but we have
at least reviewed here the work of some of the more prominent and more recent
Left-wing political thinkers. Additionally, it may be helpful to reflect
upon the concepts of psychological order as they compare with conservative
political and social thought. Obviously, contexts of various works differ
both in time and in subject matter. But let it be suggested that if there
are common psychological themes running through political thought, we ought
to be able to identify the similarity of their occurence, even within these
varied contexts.

One of the most significant classical statements of conservative thought
is Edmund Burke's "Reflections on the French Revolution." In this work Burke,
responding to those who had defended the Revolution, nonetheless discussed
much more than the troubled situation in France. "I flatter myself," he said,
"that I love a manly, moral, regulated liberty."[30] The emphasis should be
placed on the word "regulated," for in speaking of the English Revolution,
he said, "(i)ll would our ancestors at the Revolution have deserved their
fame for wisdom if they had found no security for their freedom but in ren-
dering their government feeble in its operations, and precarious in its
tenure; if they had been able to contrive no better remedy against arbitrary

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(26) Ibid., p. 218.

(27) Ibid., p. 219.

(28) Savio, Mario, "An End to History," reprinted in Jacobs and Landau,
p. 233.

(29) Ibid., p. 234.

(30) Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolution in France. New York:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1955, p. 8.

power than civil confusion."[31] Burke saw the English Revolution, as opposed
to the French Revolution, as essentially preservative, describing it as "our
ancient, indisputable laws and liberties and that ancient constitution of
government which is our only security for law and liberty."[32]

And certainly he believed that the English system was something more than
accident; but note the standard by which he attests to its greatness. "Our
political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the
order of the world and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body
composed of transitory parts...."[33] His views of those who would tamper with
this relationship were not charitable, Burke saying that "(a) spirit of inno-
vation is generally the result of a selfish temper and confined views."[34] As
to the economic levelers, another troublesome group, for Burke they "only
change and pervert the natural order of things; they load the edifice of so-
ciety by setting up in the air what the solidity of the structure requires to
be on the ground."[35] The remainder of Burke's "Reflections" devotes much of
its time to a discussion of such things as the necessity for religion as the
basis of civil society, the need to cling to ancient establishments, the in-
separability of Church and State, and the necessity for traditional education
which would instill the ancient values in its students.[36] Beneath all these
ideals we can begin to see the psychological Burke, a man much concerned with
the proper order of the world and the proper order of man.

One of the leading spokesmen for modern-day conservatism is Russell Kirk,
whose Enemies of the Permanent Things defends the very concept of lasting
norms and values. "Norms cannot be invented," he argues, "they are already
in existence and man must reawaken consciousness to the existency of norms,
to confess that there are enduring standards superior to our petty private
stock of rationality."[37]

As a good conservative, he approved of a kind of individualism, but not
the kind of "individualism without norms, a passion for being different
merely for the sake of differing, and in discriminating defiance of authority,
convention, and conformity for the sake of being 'autonomous.'"[38] As for
society as a whole, the same prescription held. "Genuinely ordered freedom,"
he argued, "is the only sort of liberty worth having; freedom made possible

(31) Ibid., p. 34.

(32) Ibid., p. 35.

(33) Ibid., p. 38.

(34) Ibid., pp. 37-38.

(35) Ibid., pp. 55-56.

(36) Ibid., pp. 10-12, 102-104.

(37) Kirk, Russell, Enemies of the Permanent Things, New Rochelle:
Arlington House, 1969, p. 17.

(38) Ibid., p. 23.

by order within the soul and order within the state."[39]

Finally, Kirk speaks more clearly of personal order in the context of the relationship between personal anxiety and the social situation. He argues,

anxiety is produced by disorder; disorder in private existence and disorder in social existence....If the disorder, internal and external, which the anxious man experiences is the product of a real moral and social confusion in his time, then the cure for anxiety lies not in psyciatric and physiological treatment, but in a stern endeavor to lessen this real disorder....[40]

Kirk's earlier work, The Conservative Mind,[41] is very similar in argument. Reviewing the work of major conservative writers, Kirk singles out the thought of John Adams for particular praise. Adams is applauded for his insistence on the need for organized religion in a stable society, a need which Kirk found particularly enviable since Adams' own religious views were Unitarian, a generally unorthodox creed. It was clear that for Adams, the key variable was stability, almost as if he were not arguing for religion itself, but for what religion does for the society of which it is a part. "Social order," Kirk argues, "like human sanity, is dependent upon the preservation of a delicate balance; and precisely like men who, abandoning that balance, destroy themselves, so any society which tosses away the weights at one end of the scale must end in a condition broken and desolate."[42]

One more conservative thinker who should be mentioned in discussing the trait of psychological order is the social psychologist, E. L. Thorndike. In his Human Nature and the Social Order,[43] published in 1940, Thorndike was very explicit in his references to the underlying concepts of conservative thought. The whole tone of the book is in glaring contrast to the thinking of a man like Fromm, Thorndike stressing the paramount importance of such things as human adjustment to the social system.

With psychological arguments, Thorndike responded to some of the more cherished notions of Left-wing writers. "Repetitive work in factories is commonly supposed by writers about labor and welfare to have very bad consequences for body, mind and morals. This may be partly a specious conclusion due to the dislike of such writers for everything about factories from their appearance to their owners."[44] Thorndike felt that "(r)epetitive

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(39) Ibid., p. 283.

(40) Ibid., p. 24.

(41) Kirk, Russell, The Conservative Mind, Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953.

(42) Ibid., p. 79.

(43) Thorndike, E. L., Human Nature and the Social Order, New York: Macmillan Co., 1940.

(44) Ibid., p. 385.

activity which does not require close attention and permits a person to look,
listen or think if he chooses may 'deaden initiative' but it does not 'lower
the tone of the whole organism.' On the contrary, it is rather restful....'[45]

Thus Thorndike argued that routine work is not truly upsetting to most
people. "Changing activities with their emergencies, new difficulties and
risks of failure are more annoying, fatiguing and nerve-wracking for most
persons than repetitive activities where one has mastery."[46]

And so attitudinal and workaday habit is also endorsed by conservative
thought, instilling a prejudice toward habit which helps one with the com-
plexities of life, but also instilling a prejudice which maintains the uni-
versal recognition of the proper place of people and things within the human
order. This kind of thinking is so well stated by Thorndike, who demonstra-
ted his allegiance to the ordered statuses of social rank and privilege,
chastising most vigorously those who championed the abolition of status
within a social system.

"There is no evidence," he says, "that the genes of man give him either a
desire for, or an enjoyment of this sort of equality."[47] To Thorndike, the
positions taken by those who espouse such views are not only not the result
of any natural need for equality, but in fact stem, "in superior persons from
pity, kindness and certain intellectual processes, and, in inferior persons,
from envy, self-esteem, (and) the desire to be equal to somebody else...."[48]

<u>Summary</u>

In this brief chapter, we have tried to review some of both the theoreti-
cally representative literature of the political Left and, in contrast, some
of the literature of the political Right for the purposes of illustrating the
concept of a psychological rejection of, or alternatively, a need for order.
It seems clear that to writers of a Left-wing political persuasion, the struc-
ture of the society and the norms and standards which often surround these
structures, are viewed as constricted and restraining. There is a belief
among these thinkers that a better society lies with the kinds of changes
which loosen norms, permitting a freer range of activity and thought. To the
ordered writers, a need for order seems to be one of their paramount require-
ments for what they would call a free society.

Conceptually, it is almost as if the two positions visualized different
grids of reference. For the ordered mentality, the lines symbolizing bounda-
ries and restraints are closer together, more available to those who look to
them for psychological support. These people have a preference for these
lines; they are necessary referrents to a personality which needs the gui-
dance of closely defined norms and standards. For the unordered, the lines

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(45) <u>Ibid</u>., p. 385.

(46) <u>Ibid</u>., p. 386.

(47) <u>Ibid</u>., p. 415.

(48) <u>Ibid</u>., p. 416.

of the grid are farther apart, and the restraints which they represent are
ones which are looked upon as inhibiting and repressive. Rather than being
referrents, they are warnings, an uncomfortable bumping into either other
people or their institutions and regulations.

   We should remember that the singling out of the thinking of these writers
was based upon the illustrative nature of their work. Although we have hypo-
thesized that the personality traits which we consider to be relevant to
Left-wing political attitudes become more prominent toward the extremes of
the political spectrum, it has not been our purpose to identify any of these
writers of either the Left or Right as necessarily extremist in their politi-
cal outlook.

   Again let us realize that the reading of significant political works for
the purpose of obtaining glimpses of what is argued to be the psychological
assumptions which underlie their thinking is at best a tenuous exercise. On
the one hand, persons who would attempt such a reading must be careful not to
be casual in their treatment of such works by reading easy meanings into the
complex arguments of astute thinkers. On the other hand, if the political
dialogue is going to be better understood than it is today, even the most
sophisticated works of political debate must undergo the analysis of those
basic psychological assumptions which underlie a writer's thinking. Such
studies, objectively undertaken, do not deprecate the work of the writer any
more than the study of the form of an athlete or an artist deprecates the sum
of his achievements. We should not argue that this kind of reading of polit-
ical works conclusively demonstrates the existence of certain personality
traits. What we are trying to do is merely raise the question of whether
something of a psychological nature exists within the political thinking of
all persons, even major political writers.

CHAPTER 4

POWER

Our second hypothesis suggests that those persons whose personalities possess a psychological predisposition opposed to power relationships will be more inclined to accept Left-wing political values. Just as the Right-wing personality has shown a special liking for the concept of power, we may hypothesize that the Left-wing personality has a particular dislike for any relationship in which a person or an institution dominates the opinions or actions of another. This is conceptually a vertical concept, clearly different, although perhaps related, to the concept of boundaries and standards which typified the Anti-order dimension.

Anti-Power on the Left

Within the literature of the political Left, there is ample evidence of an aversion to the paternalistic and authoritarian relationships which exist among men and institutions. Kingsley Widmer, describing what he argues to be the authoritarian nature of American education, mirrors this kind of thinking. "There is nothing mysterious about it," he writes, "academicians are the victims of one of the most elaborate processes for inculcating subservient responses: it takes about thirty years of formalized indenture, from nursery school through assistant professorship, to become a full member."[1]

Widmer, who sees the educational hierarchies as not so terribly different from military rankings, sees such status as a vehicle for guaranteeing submission according to the prerogatives for each office. Sympathizing with students and young faculty who rebel against this kind of subordination, Widmer argues that the modern university is engaged principally in an exploitive enterprise.

> From their captive clientele (students) through their indentured servants (teaching assistants) into their dubious packaging ("Sciences" and "liberal" education), the universities illustrate, as much as American advertising and foreign policy illustrate, grievous mishandling of an ideology of competitive aggrandizement.[2]

He asserts that student protests, although often allegedly planned for the stated purposes of exposing "racism" and "militarism," are really demanding

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(1) Widmer, Kingsley, "Rebellion as Education," The Nation, April 28, 1969, reprinted in Hamalian, Leo and Karl, Frederick J., eds., The Radical Vision, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1970, p. 175.

(2) Ibid., p. 176.

an end to "faculty subservience to such order."[3] Socially, Widmer argues
that the role played by the universities is one of indoctrination, developing
techniques and attitudes necessary for "submissive service" in the corporate
and public domain.[4] To Widmer, rebellion from this combination of "busy
work," "arbitrary requirements," "competitive procedures," "specialist propa-
ganda," and "punitive grading," is a justified expression of contempt for the
excess of power relationships.[5]

   Theodore Roszak, in his writing about the counter-culture of new American
youth, finds among the literature of the Left a "total rejection" of the cur-
rent mode of an authoritarian society. For Roszak, the young generation
"readily recognized that authoritarianism in our society operates overtly or
subtly at every level of life, from comic strip imagery to Christian theol-
ogy...."[6] He quotes the words of Bobby Seale, who while speaking after a
Cal-Berkeley refusal to permit a Black Panther to speak on the campus, con-
demned the abuse of authority throughout all of history, asserting that even
"Adam should have defended the Garden of Eden against the Omnipotent Adminis-
trator."[7]

   The "total rejection" has gone as far as to create the institution of the
free university, one of which, the Anti-university of London, included within
its prospectus the courses of "anti-cultures," "anti-environments," "anti-
poetry," "anti-theatre," "anti-families," and "counter institutions."[8] In
this university, even the vertical relationship between teacher and student
was abandoned on grounds of its being a vestige of an authoritarian power
relationship.[9]

   In the literature of the Left, the rejection of power relationships has a
rich beginning. Although Karl Marx is considered to be predominantly an eco-
nomic thinker, the New Left has focused attention on those early Marxian
writings which discussed the relationship of worker and employer in more per-
sonal terms. Much of this discussion concerned what the particular kind of
work relationship made of the employee. Some of this analysis is better left
to the chapter on introspection; but the derogation of the self which Marx
was so concerned with in his discussion of alienation, was fundamentally
caused by the subservient relationship in which the industrial worker found
himself.

   According to Marx, "the worker becomes a slave of the object;" and he does

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(3) Ibid., p. 176.

(4) Ibid., p. 176.

(5) Ibid., p. 178.

(6) Roszak, Theodore, The Making of a Counter Culture, New York: Double-
day & Co., 1968, p. 45.

(7) Ibid., p. 45.

(8) Ibid., p. 45.

(9) Ibid., p. 46.

so in two separate ways, "first, in that he receives an object of work, i.e.,
receives work, and secondly, in that he receives means of subsistence."[10] In
both situations, the worker is a receiver of an object and is placed in a
subordinate relationship. Marx goes on to say that, "the culmination of this
enslavement is that he can only maintain himself as a physical subject so far
as he is a worker, and that it is only as a physical subject that he is a
worker."[11]

    For Marx, the power relationship from which he rebelled was more fundamen-
tal even than the inequality of wealth. He chides Proudhon, who had advo-
cated an equality of incomes, saying that this idea would only make society
as a whole an abstract capitalist, maintaining the relationship of men to
their work. The crucial issue for Marx was not only the relative reward for
which the worker toiled, but the emancipation of the worker from his condi-
tion of servitude. This emancipation could only come through the "emancipa-
tion of society from private property, from servitude, because all human
servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production, and all
types of servitude are only modificatons or consequences of this relation."[12]

    The attitudes of the early Marx as stated within the context of the work
relationship are mirrored by the Marxist psychologist Erich Fromm, who sees
the same kind of personal dominance as being prevalent in many of man's mod-
ern relationships. Fromm is concerned about an individual's spiritual union
with his fellow man, a union which he argues is fundamental to man's nature
and is thus a prerequisite to psychological health. He sees the modern capi-
talist society as betraying this fundamental need for spiritual union by pro-
viding only those alternate forms of human relationship which inevitably re-
sult in the submission of man. Whether it be submission to other persons,
submission to groups (even those voluntarily joined), submission to institu-
tions, or ultimately submission to a supernatural being, man will be forced
to play a role which will exploit him and frustrate him in his search for a
true union with his fellow man.[13] To Fromm, the only justifiable authority
is one which eventually dissolves itself, as he suggests the proper teacher-
student relationship will dissolve itself as both participants mutually at-
tempt to further their knowledge. Too many authority relationships are per-
manent and intensify over time, giving the American society a patriarchal
flavor.[14] Furthermore, Fromm charges that these relationships are less vis-
ible and thus more difficult to attack in the current society. In previous
centuries, the authority of the king, the role of an autocratic parent, or an
autocratic relationship between worker and employer were more personal, and
if the authority was more harsh than today, it was at least not the kind of
anonymous, invisible, and ultimately alienated authority which we often have

    (10) Bottomore, T. B. (ed.), Karl Marx, Early Writings, New York: McGraw
Hill, 1963, p. 123.

    (11) Ibid., p. 123.

    (12) Ibid., p. 123.

    (13) Fromm, Erich, Escape From Freedom, New York: Holt, 1947, p. 30.

    (14) Ibid., p. 95.

in an industrial society and which is so frustratingly difficult to rebel
against.[15]

Jacobs and Landau, writing in The New Radicals,[16] discuss the attempts of
contemporary Left-wing organizations to avoid duplicating the hierarchical
structures of traditional institutions. Writers like Tom Hayden stressed the
importance of having decentralized participatory decision-making in a group
such as Students for a Democratic Society. As Jacobs and Landau point out in
their work on the new student Left, the old feelings about vertical structure
are so severe that "leadership 'per se' is viewed with apprehension."[17]
"True leadership, in the SDS ethos, must avoid imposing ideas and values on
people."[18] Again, "leaders mean organization, organization means hierarchy,
and hierarchy is undemocratic."[19] Probably the most publicized of all the
statements which demonstrated such a hostility to the authority of the machine
was made by Berkeley's Mario Savio:

> There is a time when the operations of the machine become so odious, make
> you so sick at heart; that you can't take part, you can't even faintly
> take part. And you've got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon
> the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus and you've got to
> make it stop. And you'be got to indicate to the people who run it, to
> the people who own it, that unless you're free the machine will be pre-
> vented from working at all.[20]

Power and the Right

Again, the contrast between the writings of the political Left and the
political Right is significant for what it reveals about the assumptions of
the authors. Where the Left writers seem to abhor the consequences of vert:
cal power relationships, people like Thorndike and Kirk see these kinds of
relationships as perfectly natural. Thorndike says, "co-operation has his-
torically meant co-working with not too great a difference in power, dignit;
or reward....A human organization usually requires defined leadership and
assumes either the older hierarchical type, or the newer functional type."[2']

Thorndike believed in natural pecking orders within the congregations of

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(15) Ibid., p. 152.

(16) Jacobs, Paul and Landau, Saul, The New Radicals, New York: Vintage
Books, 1966, p. 61.

(17) Ibid., p. 31.

(18) Ibid., p. 31.

(19) Ibid., p. 31.

(20) Ibid., p. 61.

(21) Thorndike, E. L., Human Nature & the Social Order, New York: Mac-
millan Co., 1940, pp. 702-703.

the human animal, and cited studies of dominance done on everything from
nursery schools to primitive tribes in illustrating his argument. Such domi-
nations of one man by another are natural, according to Thorndike, for at
least two reasons.[22] First, the masses generally trust in persons whom they
perceive to be superior in intellect and leadership ability and second, as
Thorndike himself put it, "the powerful commonly use their power."[23]

   Thorndike goes on to argue that such power relationships are not only nor-
mal and beneficial for the society, but are beneficial as well for both the
dominant and the subordinate party. It seems only proper to him that those
of ability shall be the most highly placed. "The best function of exception-
ally high abilities is to perform valuable services which no lesser ability
can perform at all as in...reconciling and otherwise managing individuals and
groups."[24] As we might have guessed, Thorndike was not an economic egalitar-
ian either, arguing that the contributors of true ability are, if anything,
underpaid for the contributions which they make to the society.[25]

   As for the other end of the "excellence" polarity, Thorndike is consistent
in his prescriptions for them. "Some dull persons, young and old, should be
directed and supervised in their thinking, any truly free thought on their
part being valueless to them and others, vagrant like the free thoughts of
dreams and delusions."[26]

   And what of the method for assuring that the dull and excellent are in
their proper relationship? Thorndike does not equivocate.

   Some coercion there must be. Parts of an individual are again and again
   coercing other parts of him; and until the breed of man is very radically
   changed, it will be for the common good that some individuals should co-
   erce others. Coercion by nature is unavoidable, and coercion by the truth
   is highly beneficial. Liberty is not a panacea, and should not be a
   fetish.[27]

   So as the Right of Center thinker seems to believe in a natural order of
authority within a society as well as the benefits of such an order for all
its members regardless of their rank, conservatives also seem to believe in
the exercise of that power necessary to maintain the proper relationship among
the great and the not so great. Their position, in short, is one of generous
approval of both the concept and use of authority, and such a position, of
course, merges well into the typical Right-wing political point of view.
Such a feeling toward authority is perhaps best summarized by Kirk, who argues

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(22) Ibid., pp. 728-730.

(23) Ibid., p. 734.

(24) Ibid., p. 71.

(25) Ibid., p. 92.

(26) Ibid., p. 381.

(27) Ibid., p. 413.

that, "civilized man lives by authority; without some reference to authority, indeed, no form of truly human existence is possible."[28]

And from where does such authority originate? It is not unexpected to find that the allegiance to the already discussed concepts of rank and status within the human society are seen as those which are ordained by a superior supernatural force. "The authentic voice of America speaks in these words. And it is a testimony to the enduring vitality of this first principle - the sovereignty of God over society as well as over individual men - " is the way conservative author John Courtney Murray put it.[29] For those who share Murray's orientation toward power, the extension of rank and status beyond the earth and into the Cosmos is not surprising. As the political state needs authority, so does the universe - and the necessity for a Supreme Being is therefore evident to all who are of that temperament. As Murray put it, the only "free relationship between governors and governed - is under God...."[30]

In turn, the necessity of recognizing a Supreme Being in the universe is helpful not only in establishing authority, but also in justifying the in-equalities within the social system. As Harry V. Joffa puts it, "man is not free to disregard the hierarchy of souls in nature. The equality of man flows from and corresponds to the inequality of the human and the subhuman as it corresponds also to the inequality of the human and the superhuman."[31] Later, the same thought is expressed when Joffa says "all our liberties rest upon the objective fact of the specific difference of the human soul from subhuman souls...."[32]

Of course, the power-oriented personality can appeal to much classical political literature in his defense of certain authoritative statuses. The distributive justice which Aristotle argued for is referred to by Russell Kirk, for example, as an appropriate justification for the maintenance of those of ability to be in positions of command. "Now the rewards of Ability," Kirk says, "are obvious. The society which desires its own survival will do everything in its power to increase these rewards...for Ability, given its head, pulls the whole of society upward, intellectually and materially." For Kirk, all societies "need to recognize that reward which consists of public honor, and we need to appreciate fairly that reward which consists of just power."[33]

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(28) Kirk, Russell, Enemies of the Permanent Things, New Rochelle: Ar-lington, 1969, p. 282.

(29) Murray, John Courtney, "E Pluribus Unum: The American Consensus," in Buckley, William F., Did You Ever See a Dream Walking? New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970, p. 50.

(30) Ibid., p. 51.

(31) Joffa, Harry V. "Civil and Religious Liberty," in Buckley, p. 228.

(32) Ibid., p. 229.

(33) Kirk, Russell, "The Problem of the New Order," in Buckley, p. 372.

Summary

So as with the psychological quality of order, we find that major politi-
cal and social thinkers differ widely on their prescriptions for the need of
power relationships within the society. As expected, the Left-wing thinkers
are repelled by such authority relationships, but Right-wing thinkers accept
and even applaud what they claim to be the "natural" dominances of strong
over weak, smart over dull, and able over incapable. The debate over the
institutionalization of power and the exercise of power seems to be an inte-
gral part of the classical division between Left-wing and Right-wing politi-
cal thinking.

CHAPTER 5

IMPULSE

Our third hypothesis suggests that those who carry a psychological predisposition in favor of the expression of sensate human impulse are inclined toward the holding of Left-wing political views. The element of unrestrained impulse is found almost universally within New Left writings, but almost more than any other work, it is Marcuse's Eros and Civilization which argues most strongly for the fundamentally sensual nature of man and then goes on to equate the future of man's happiness with the ability of a political system to permit the full expression of basic sensual impulses.[1] As we've noted before, Marcuse argued that the modern industrial state, through which our society has enslaved us and suppressed the joys of the pleasure principle, has changed the values of man from "immediate satisfaction" to "delayed satisfaction," from "pleasure" to "restraint of pleasure," from "joy to toil," from "receptiveness" to "productiveness" and from "absense of repression" to "security."[2]

Throughout the contemporary literature of the cultural avant-garde, it is the human impulse which is the revered portion of the psyche. In almost all such writing, even that which is not specifically political, there is a reverence for human expressiveness as well as an advocacy of the end of those inhibitions which prevent man from the full release of his impulses. Allen Ginsberg, a favorite poet of the New Left, writes, "language is a vehicle for feeling. Language itself doesn't mean anything - Wittgenstein and the Diamond Sutra agree on that. I agree with Olson that poetry is an extension of physiology. Like Tibetan Mantras, poems are an exploration of the depth of breath."[3] In speaking of what he is doing when he creates, Ginsberg says, "In writing a poem, I'm composing a momento during the time of ecstasy....In our society, ecstasy is considered 'immoral.' The highly organized conditions of modern civilization preclude certain free sexual and emotional responses basic to human psychology, basic to human desire."[4] And Ginsberg's poetry seems to fulfill his own prescription. A portion of "Be Kind to Yourself" reads,

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(1) Marcuse, Herbert, Eros & Civilization, New York: Vintage Books, 1955.

(2) Ibid., p. 12.

(3) Lucie-Smith, Edward, Mystery in the Universe - notes on an interview with Allen Ginsberg, London: Turret Books, 1965.

(4) Ibid., p. 5.

A dream! A dream! I don't want to be alone!
    I want to know that I am loved!
I want the orgy of our flesh, orgy
    of all eyes happy, orgy of the soul
    kissing and blessing its mortal grown
    body....5

Sex

Lewis Yablonski, a sociologist who lived among various counter-culture
groups on the Eastern and Western coasts of the United States, observed many
of the cultural norms of these groups and paid particular attention to the
attitudes of these new communities toward sex. He reports that, "with ego
boundaries at almost the zero level from drug use and with American middle-
class values slashed from 'the life...'"[6] sex is very open, yet not promis-
cuous as that word is usually understood. There is not a "free love" condi-
tion because with a youth commune, sex plays the dual role of both communica-
tion between persons and the expression of the self. As Yablonski puts it,
"(s)ex is not free - one must be resonant to the feelings of the potential
sex mate."[7] This is the basic concept, the free expression of the self, the
repression of which in matters of sex or other forms of expression, have been
made into political issues by the Left.

The Los Angeles Free Press,[8] in an interview with Dr. Albert Ellis in 1965
predicted a revolution in the areas of women's rights and sexual liberty.
Ellis said, "most people live lives that do not tap one-tenth of their psy-
chological and sexual capacities for life enhoyment and fulfillment on earth,
yet we are reaching for the moon."[9] Ellis argued that,

Present morality...serves to produce mental and sexual disturbances in
male and female alike as a result of great guilt feelings and self in-
crimination about sinfulness and wrongdoing when, in fact, the sex drive
itself, the desire and not the indulgence, is not really immoral at all
so long as no one is being harmed or bilked and undesirable pregnancy is
being avoided.[10]

In another article from the underground press, The Berkeley Barb[11] claims

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(5) Ginsberg, Allen, Be Kind to Yourself, San Francisco: Publishers
Cranium Press, 1965.

(6) Yablonski, Lewis, The Hippie Trip, New York: Pegasus Press, 1968, p. 23.

(7) Ibid., p. 23.

(8) Hope, David, "Sexual Liberty Movement to Follow Civil Rights," Los
Angeles Press, Los Angeles, 1965.

(9) Ibid., p. 2.

(10) Ibid., p. 2.

(11) "A Step Toward Sexual Freedom in Berkeley," The Berkeley Barb,
Berkeley, 1965.

that "Berkeley is fast becoming the great experimental 'freedom lab' for the whole country and the world."[12] Within the Berkeley community, "among all other forms of rebellion afoot, there is very much a sexual rebellion in the making also."[13] But this sexual revolution, the Barb is quick to point out, is very different from the middle-class type of "shacking," which is viewed as being a hypocritical act, guilt-ridden and purely physical in its nature, not truly expressing the participant's inner psyche. What the Barb claims is beginning to exist in Berkeley "...is the incidental use of sheer, undiluted orgyism." This stage of sexual adventurism is seen as "the first positive step in unrepressing our repressions."[14]

<div align="center">Drugs</div>

Of course, such "unrepressing of our repressions" is not all accomplished by participation in sex. Drugs have now become another important ingredient for the new life-style, and although some of the most militant of the Left-wing political groups began to renounce the use of drugs, when the dulling effect dampened revolutionary fervor, the drug scene is still firmly en-trenched within the American counter-culture. Much of the appeal is based upon the impetus to impulse which drugs give to the user. Quoting one new convert to drugs, an observer writes, "Acid is like being let out of a cage. STP is like being shot out of a gun. There's no slowing down or backing up. You feel like your brakes have given out.'"[15]

The same kind of almost wild expression through drugs is also reported by Yablonski in his travels among the youth cultures. For these groups, drugs are seen not only as an aid in the expression of impulse, but also as a gate-way to a heightened personal experience. Quoting one young man who described what drugs did for him, Yablonski writes, "'most of the time I feel the way I felt when I first started taking 250 micrograms of acid. That's the way I feel ALL THE TIME! How did I feel? Describe an orgasm to a virgin!'"[16]

Drugs are also useful as enhancers of the sensation of other expressive experiences, particularly sex. Yablonski reports that many young men and women were relieved of their sexual inhibitions after experiences with drugs. One advocate is quoted as having said that during sex, "the elimination of the up-tight ego by acid puts you into a clearer state of enormous pleas-ure."[17] Although Yablonski does not advocate the use of drugs, his experi-ences did lead him to report that "...not even the most severe medical or

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(12) Ibid., p. 5.

(13) Ibid., p. 5.

(14) Ibid., p. 5.

(15) McNeill, Don, Moving Through Here, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1970, p. 73.

(16) Yablonski, p. 56.

(17) Ibid., p. 268.

square critics of LSD use can totally ignore the positive loving personality
and intellectual gains by some users of psychedelic drugs."[18]

Music

Another of the expressive elements of the avant-garde culture is music,
particularly the music of the young. It is a new sound, free of inhibitions
and also full of the kind of expression which has made the rock concert a
part of the regular scene for a portion of America's young. The Rag, an
underground paper of the University of Texas, prints a story describing the
intensity of a Rolling Stone's concert. Quoting Mick Jagger, the article
reads, "...i know how to get it all on, and i do, yes i do, but why don't we
do this thing all together...."[19] But the music is not the only message.
It is tied into politics by Jagger who is described by Rag reporter, "preacher
boy": "mick puts on his red, white and blue uncle sam hat and asks us to bow
our heads out of the struggle and become one in our revolution thru the wild
universe."[20] At the end of the article, "preacher boy" says "...i hope they
remember, i hope it took roots, and i hope it never lets go. never lets go.
until the rollin' stones come rollin' on in again and just to play us some
good ole rock 'n roll music, cuz we all gotta keep on rollin' on forever."[21]

Argus, another of the underground papers, cheered the intensity of the
listener's involvement in the rock music of the new culture. Defining the
difference between acid rock and old fashioned jazz, Argus says, "While a
performance by the Buddy Rich orchestra might bring a crowd to its feet in
response to the music...it is much more of a casual relationship....The rock
groups (Led Zepplin is a good example) require audience participation as part
of their performance."[22]

So it is that Argus reports that much anti-establishment feeling among the
young has stemmed from the exploitation of their music by highly paid pro-
moters who charged young people high fees in order to hear what the listeners
considered to be their own music. Describing an incident which occurred
during a rock concert given by Jimmy Hendrix, an Argus writer tells about a
number of young people who would not pay the $6.00 to get in to see Hendrix
and who thus chose to sit out on the grass of a hill across the street. When
the police turned on the sprinklers to get them off, the young people threw
stones at the police and were subsequently charged by the law officers who
were trying to clear the area. During the melee, Hendrix, who was still on
stage, just kept on playing, yelling out to the young people, "we saw some
tear gas. That's a sign of the third world war. Just make sure you pick

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(18) Ibid., p. 269.

(19) "Preacher Boy," The Rag, Austin, November 24, 1969, p. 3.

(20) Ibid., p. 3.

(21) Ibid., p. 3.

(22) O'Donohue, Pat, "But is it Jazz?", Argus, July 29-Aug. 15, p. 19.

your side now."[23]

Consciousness

And so there is among both the cultural and political New Left a strong sense of the need to express their feelings, whether through sex, drugs, music or any other vehicle which the human id may use to express itself. The response to all of these needs brings a kind of consciousness to their holders, a consciousness most prevalent today among the Left. Conscious responses to these needs brings to each of them a feeling that the intentional expression of their impulses is the key to the kind of true consciousness which man must achieve. Ginsberg says it so well in one of his poems:

                    That which pushes upward
                         does not come back
                    He led me in his garden
                         tinkle of 20 year phonograph
                    Death is accomin in
                         and mocks my loss of liberty
                    One must see the Great Man
                         Fear not it brings blessing
                                        No harm
                              from the invisible world
                    Preserverence
                         Realms beyond
                                        Stoned
                              in
                    The deserted city
                              which lies below consciousness.[24]

Yet the code of consciousness, at least in its best state, is an honest one. It expresses hatred as well as love. As one young man said to Yablonski in explaining why he objected to being called a flower child and a part of the love generation:

It's a refuge in another fantasy. There never has been a man who didn't have hostile feelings....Hate is righteous, if you can accept it, and if you express it....But if it's repressed because you "OUGHT" to repress it, and you HAVE TO, and it's NOT NICE to express feelings unless they're acceptable to somebody else, then it builds up....[25]

But of course, the expressing of love is better than that of hate, and it's Ginsberg again who says it so well in his peom, "the Heart is a clock."

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(23) Ibid., p. 20.

(24) Ginsberg, Allen, "Consciousness," from limited edition poster, Indiana University Library, Bloomington.

(25) Yablonski, p. 54.

> The Heart is a clock
> around which clusters
> or which draws to itself
> all which is the same
> as itself in anything
> or anyone else the
> power of itself lies
> all about itself in
> a mathematic of feeling
> which we call love....[26]

The Restraint of the Right

In contrast to the expressive mode of the impulsive personality, the other end of the psychological spectrum predictably holds a markedly different view about the impulses of man and how a civilized society and its government should treat them. Edmund Burke said that "government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants."[27] Yet the wants which Burke was talking about were not quite the ones which Marcuse spoke of.

To Burke, the passions of man are the source of the real vice in the society, not the injustice of a social system or the government.[28] Like many conservative writers, he argues that the restraint of these passions is really the best way of insuring proper government, in fact the task is so important that it will not even be entrusted to the individual man himself. The restraint of man's impulse, he argues, can "only be done by a power out of themselves, and not in the exercise of its function, subject to that will and to those passions which it is its office to bridle and subdue. In this sense the restraints on men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among their rights."[29]

A contemporary of Burke's, John Adams, held very similar views on the question of the restraint of man's passions. To Adams, if man would ever,

> surrender the guidance for any course of time to any one passion, they may depend upon finding it, in the end, a usurping, domineering, cruel tyrant. They were intended by nature to live together in society, and in this way to restrain one another....[30]

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(26) Ginsberg, Allen, "The Heart Is a Clock," from limited edition poster, Indiana University Library, Bloomington.

(27) Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolution in France, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1955, p. 68.

(28) Ibid., p. 162.

(29) Ibid., p. 69.

(30) Adams, John, cited in Kirk, The Conservative Mind, Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953, pp. 402-403.

Current conservative writers mirror this theme in their thinking about the
role of the instincts of man. Russell Kirk finds it necessary to chide his
conservative compatriot Peter Viereck who had commended such personality
traits as spontaneity, originality and eccentricity as virtues of men. Kirk
is able to go only as far as to admit that these traits "have their proper
part in life and letters, but when they are cut adrift from norms...sponta-
neity becomes deliberate bad taste."[31]

Speaking of those who would be nonconformists in the society, he is even
less kind:

> From this vice, this hankering for abnormality, comes the corrupting in-
> fluence of total power upon the best of natures. The rebellion of Lucifer
> is the symbol of this ancient anarchic impulse, the passion for over-
> throwing the authority of God, that upon the vacant throne of authority
> the rebel may make himself absolute.[32]

Interestingly, Kirk speaks almost as if he were writing in response to
Marcuse, for he argues that a new anti-authoritarian ethic has equated all
authority, just or unjust, with "cultural lag and superstition."[33] He argues
that the new anti-authoritarian and impulse-relieving ethic has betrayed us,
for now we must deal with "(a) generation of young people reared according to
'permissive' tenets (who have) grown up bored, sullen and in revolt against
the very lack of order which was supposed to ensure the full development of
their potentialities."[34]

Indeed, most of the conservative thinkers have been opposed to an expres-
sive, impulsive view of man and the world. As Wills put it after reviewing
the contributions of conservatives like "Ruskin, Randolph and Calhoun, Adams
and Newman," these conservatives were "almost all of them, the foes of cur-
rent fads or enthusiasms that commanded the power centers of their day...."[35]
Michael Oakeshott, writing about the dangers of the masses in a political
democracy, argues that the "mass man is a creature of impulses...."[36] Thus
in psychological bearing, as well as in political orientation, we see within
the conservative side of the spectrum, a distaste for the element of impulse.
The anti-impulsive trait we will hypothesize is therefore another of the
construct variables which we suggest will correlate with conservative politi-
cal attitudes.

(31) Kirk, 1953, p. 23.

(32) Ibid., p. 283.

(33) Ibid., p. 282.

(34) Ibid., p. 282.

(35) Wills, Garry, "The Convenient State," in Buckley, Wm. F., Did You
Ever See a Dream Walking? New York: Bobbs Merrill Co., 1970, p. 36.

(36) Oakeshott, Michael, "The Masses in Representative Democracy," in
Buckley, p. 120.

Summary

    Again, a kind of continuum running between Right-wing and Left-wing polit-
ical thinkers is formed, this time around the issue of human sensate impulse
and its expression. Both in their attitudes and in their actions, the impul-
sive personality yearns for a more sensuous style of living, a willingness to
permit the human impulse to find its avenues of expression and enjoy the
pleasures which the impulses have sought. The political Right has classical-
ly opposed the expression of such impulses, and has looked for both personal
restraint and the restraint of both social and political norms when personal
restraint has not been effective. We shall test to see of the acceptance of
impulses and the rejection of impulse are in fact psychological traits which
correlate with the classical ideological continuum.

CHAPTER 6

INTROSPECTION

The final personality trait which we will test as an anti-authoritarian trait and thus as a trait which would hypothetically indicate a predisposition towards a belief in Left-wing political attitudes, is the trait of introspection. The writings of the Left are probably their most profound and heartfelt when they discuss both the importance of the intrinsic nature of man, and the warm feelings of which the introspective mind is capable. Tom Hayden, in writing "The Port Huron Statement," discussed those basic values which for Hayden were very much a confirmation of the ideal reflective man. "We regard men," he said, "as infinitely precious and possessed of unfulfilled capacities for reason, freedom, and love."[1] To Hayden, the concern of man should be "a concern not with (the) image of popularity but with finding a meaning in life that is personally authentic...."[2]

This introspective search for the meaning of their lives is a characteristic of the current political Left. Roszak, speaking of his own experiences with New Left students, writes "it can become nearly intolerable to sit through the soul-searching sessions of these young people, waiting in attendance upon their lint-picking analyses of motivation, their dogged pursuit of directness and immediacy free of organization-hierarchical distinctions."[3] Roszak finds that though the young Left of today concerns itself with political doctrine to some degree, the ultimate appeal is to the inner conscience, rather than to a doctrine of political or economic identification outside of the human context.[4] With the New Left, the more traditional Left doctrine of class consciousness has, at least partially, given way to the tremendously important concept of inner consciousness itself. Roszak claims that it is through this most fundamental of beliefs that the "beat-hip bohemianism" of the cultural Left joins with the radicalism of the political Left. As Roszak puts it, this kind of bohemianism "may be too withdrawn from social action to suit New Left radicalism; but the withdrawal is in a direction the activist can understand. The 'trip' is inward, toward deeper levels of self examination."[5]

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(1) Jacobs, Paul and Landau, Saul, The New Radicals, New York: Vintage Books, 1966, p. 154.

(2) Ibid., p. 154.

(3) Roszak, Theodore, The Making of a Counter Culture, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1968, p. 62.

(4) Ibid., p. 154.

(5) Ibid., p. 63.

Writing a few years earlier Fromm, in The Sane Society,[6] had expressed a
concern that the modern American society was demanding a false gregariousness,
a kind of outward happiness which obscured the values of an introspective
view of life. Fromm agreed with William Whyte's depiction of the kind of
friendships which existed within a new housing development such as Park
Forest, where Whyte found personal relationships to be based on few ideas
and a highly superficial knowledge of your "friends."[7] To the people of Park
Forest, the introspective personality is one viewed with suspicion and often
labelled moodiness. For Fromm, this malady in America is present even with-
out the existence of the more direct and pervasive authority which other Left
authors write about. He argues, "we do not submit to anyone personally; we
do not go through conflicts with authority, but we have also no convictions
of our own, almost no individuality, almost no sense of self...."[8]

Earlier, Fromm had argued in a similar vein, minimizing the necessary con-
nection between an authoritarian relationship and the deprivation of self-
awareness:

> The concept of use of man by man has nothing to do even with the question
> whether one man uses another, or uses himself. The fact remains the same,
> that a man, a living human being, ceases to be an end in himself, and be-
> comes the means for the economic interests of another man or an impersonal
> giant, the economic machine.[9]

The machine puts man in the predicament of being out of touch with him-
self.[10] "He must," according to Fromm, "lose all sense of self, of himself
as a unique and induplicable entity."[11] To the introspective personality,
this is a grievous loss. If "existence precedes essence," as Sartre has
claimed,[12] then the lack of introspective work, or work which provokes or at
least permits the inward contemplation necessary to that kind of personality,
can be crucial.

Ultimately, the question asked is whether or not a man's work is to have
significant meaning. Jacques Ellul, in his own way, is discussing this same
problem when he speaks of the consequences of the inhibitive orders of the
work day. He speaks sadly of the "...dehumanized factories, our unsatisfied

(6) Fromm, Erich, Escape From Freedom, New York: Holt, 1947, p. 158.

(7) Whyte, William H., The Organization Man, Garden City: Doubleday
& Co., 1956, as cited in Fromm, 1947, p. 158.

(8) Fromm, 1947, p. 102.

(9) Ibid., p. 93.

(10) Ibid., p. 120.

(11) Ibid., p. 143.

(12) Sartre, Jean-Paul, "Existentialism," Philosophical Library, 1947,
reprinted in Hamalian, Leo and Karl, Frederick, eds., The Radical Vision,
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1970, pp. 276-277.

senses, our workingwomen, our estrangement from nature." For Ellul, "life in such an environment has no meaning."[13] And it does no good to say that the work that man is being asked to do is of shorter duration, or of a less physical nature. Even with these palliatives, the task of the modern man is seen as an "aimless, useless, and callous business...an absurdity, profoundly felt and resented by the worker whose labor no longer has anything in common with what was traditionally called work."[14] To Ellul, the industrial world is one made up of a new set of structures, and the norms which have built themselves up around these structures are norms which were never human in their intentions.[15]

Of course, the meaninglessness of work cannot be discussed without including the thinking of Marx and his concept of alienation. For Marx, there were four central types of alienation: 1) alienation of the worker from the object of his labor or his work product; 2) alienation from work which was external to the worker, or not a part of his human nature to perform; 3) alienation from his species life, or from the general humanity; and 4) alienation from other individuals, men with whom he would have to compete or otherwise deal with in a manner not consumate with Marx's concepts of human dignity and justice.[16] Such a reflective and introspective standard of man's relationship to his society prompted Marx's understandable contempt for the institution of private property. To Marx, "private property is therefore the product, the necessary result, of alienated labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself."[17]

Fromm, writing in Marx's Concept of Man,[18] refers to the Marxian concept of false consciousness and its roots deep within the capitalistic society. According to Fromm, Marx saw his system of communism as responding to the true nature of man and granting "the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature and between man and man."[19] Moreover, Marx's writings, according to Fromm, indicate a crucial distinction in the thinking of the introspective personality as opposed to the extrospective personality. Fromm argues that what Marx was really saying was that there is almost an inverse relationship between having and being.[20] The less of a person you are, intrinsically, according to Fromm's interpretation, the more you need to have, physically, as a compensation for your internal hollowness. The more you need to have, the more you are alienated, and thus the more you are in fact a

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(13) Ellul, Jacques, The Technological Society, New York: Vintage Books, 1964, pp. 4-5.

(14) Ibid., p. 320.

(15) Ibid., p. 332.

(16) Bottomore, T. B., ed., Karl Marx, Early Writings, New York: McGraw Hill, 1963, p. 124.

(17) Ibid., p. 320.

(18) Fromm, Erich, Marx's Concept of Man, New York: Unger, 1961.

(19) Ibid., p. 34.

(20) Ibid., p. 132.

dependent being, living only on your external possessions.

Fromm's thinking presents an interesting distinction for two reasons; the
first because of the clear contrast between intrinsic value and material re-
ward; and the second because of the parallel between this line of reasoning
and that of the works of a Marxist writer like C. B. MacPherson. Within
Left-wing political writing there has for a long time been a derogation of
what Fromm had chosen to call the "hoarding orientation" of capitalist soci-
ety.[21] MacPherson, writing in his critique of Locke and the theory that he
called "possessive individualism,"[22] begins by applauding Locke, and saying
that if it were not for Locke's view on property, he would almost consider
Locke to be a collectivist.

Yet the property fault is too serious for MacPherson to accept, particu-
larly as Locke went on to extend the concept of property beyond those enti-
ties which were needed for existence. On the one hand, Locke had spoken out
clearly that man should not hoard property or the fruits of his labor to the
point where property was wasted. But Locke did not extend that kind of pro-
hibition to those fruits of man's labor that were converted into exchange.[23]
MacPherson argues that Locke is condoning a concept of bourgeois property, a
property which goes beyond what is rightfully achieved, and which is "not
only a right to enjoy or use; it is a right to dispose of, to exchange, to
alienate."[24]

Whether the criticism of Locke is valid or not, it does seem clear that
Locke valued not only those things which man acquired by his labor, but also
those things which his money, working by itself, could earn for him. Though
Locke argued that the origin of the value of land was the labor that had been
performed upon it, he came to realize that it was possible, indeed permis-
sible, to accumulate not only the rewards of your own labor, but to accumu-
late as well the rewards of that capital which was the result of either labor
performed much earlier in your own life or even labor which had been per-
formed by laborers other than those receiving the present reward. Locke says,

> It is plain that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal pos-
> session of the earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found
> out a way how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use
> the product of, by receiving in exchange for the oversurplus gold and sil-
> ver which may be hoarded up without injury to any one.[25]

It seems clear that Locke considered property as a proper extension of the

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(21) Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society, New York: Rinehart, 1955, p. 91.

(22) MacPherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism,
Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1962, p. 200.

(23) Ibid., p. 206.

(24) Ibid., p. 215.

(25) Locke, John, The Second Treatise of Government, New York: Bobbs
Merrill, 1952, p. 29.

personality, including even that property which was not the result of direct labor. It is generally recognized that Locke had a great affection for the concept of property; indeed he argued vigorously that the "chief end" of civil society was the preservation of property.[26] Yet the question may have never been considered in the light of psychological considerations, that is, whether or not Locke saw property as a true extension of the self. Locke argues, "from all which it is evident that, though the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by being master of himself and proprietor of his own person and the actions of labor of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property."[27] Contrast this thinking with Fromm's argument that the more you identify with your possessions, and the more possessions you have and cherish, the lesser person you are intrinsically. Or, as MacPherson put it, freedom under such standards of possessive individualism is merely freedom to engage in "self-interested relations,"[28] and within a market society, freedom thus becomes a necessary function of possession and not of intrinsic worth.[29]

The Extrinsic Right

Although it is difficult to come to definitive conclusions when psychological traits are being gleaned from political writings, there does seem, within the literature of the Left, to be a rather consistent respect for intrinsic values and a corresponding deprecation of the inherent worth of external material possessions. It is reasonable to argue that those political writers who have a Left-wing orientation are those persons who, within their own personalities, do not value extrinsic objects. They do not, it seems, have the same psychological need for extrinsic objects which persons of a conservative orientation appear to have. In place of these objects, introspective personalities place a high value upon intrinsic rewards and they seem to be less interested in working within an occupational framework or existing in their personal lives without the deep searching self-analyses which the anti-introspective personality seems to be able to do without. Perhaps this analysis is a logical extension of the Order Chapter, the authoritarian personality being one of regularity, welcoming the orders of the society which are external, yet nonetheless supportive. Some interesting things have been said by conservative writers which seem to lend some support to the lack of need for introspection within those persons of an authoritarian personality.

Among these writers, there is a concern for economic productivity, and there is much less of a concern for either the intrinsic worth of man or for the question of whether the work in which man engages is meaningful to him. There seems instead to be more concern with whether the activities of the individual are approved by the society or some other external ratifier.

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(26) Ibid., p. 48.

(27) Ibid., p. 27.

(28) MacPherson, p. 263.

(29) Ibid., p. 266.

Thorndike writes, "a person cannot easily lead the life which would be best for him and for the rest of the world as a whole unless the opinions of the public and of the various social groups of which he is a member approve it as a life for him."[30] The same reasoning seems to apply for non-occupational pursuits as well, with a healthy dash of keep-yourself-occupied philosophy thrown in for good measure. Thorndike, writing about one of his favorite institutions, says, "the church provides for women as well as men membership in an organized group of supreme dignity, with a routine of appropriate activities and ceremonies."[31]

It is almost as if the worth of the man is to be decided solely by those things that he does rather than who he is. If he does something of a productive and "worthwhile" nature, then he has merited the respect which a conservative personality would reward him. As Thorndike says,

> the possession of capital, a form of power, both directly by the mere knowledge that one has the power and the habit of using it, and indirectly by the treatment accorded to one who has such power by other men, gives man a sense of worth, dignity, self-confidence, independence and right to command.[32]

Further evidence of Thorndike's concern with extrinsic rather than intrinsic values can be found in his views about the proper system of economic rewards. Persons of exceptional abilities were held in high regard by Thorndike, and he argued that the very rarity of such persons necessitated their receiving extraordinary rewards from the system for which they worked. Similarly, he argued that such abilities would only be brought out in environments which were rewarding such telent, and he thus argued strongly that the reward system must provide incentives to maintain the services of such persons.[33]

Thorndike's thinking is closely mirrored by Kirk who, also speaking of reward systems, opposes any policy which as he put it, "pulls down the energetic natures to gratify the unaspiring natures."[34] To Kirk, any government which follows an egalitarian economic policy creates a kind of degradation which "frustrates the natural longing of talented men to realize their abilities...leaves the abler men dissatisfied with themselves and their nation, and (lets them) sink into boredom...."[35]

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(30) Thorndike, E. L., Human Nature and the Social Order, New York: Macmillan Co., 1940, p. 422.

(31) Ibid., p. 418.

(32) Ibid., p. 576.

(33) Ibid., p. 63.

(34) Kirk, Enemies of the Permanent Things, New Rochelle: Arlington, 1969, p. 289.

(35) Ibid., p. 289.

What is particularly interesting about this kind of thinking is the defi-
nitions given those who are thought to be men deserving of such rewards.
Thorndike labelled such people as "men of affairs" and described their tem-
peraments as specifically neither contemplative nor selective. In short,
"they do not think for thought's sake, nor do they strain for originality.
They are not fascinated by ideas...."[36] Neither are they intellectuals in
the usual sense. "They learn from persons rather than books. They are better
practical psychologists than the teachers of psychology...."[37]

But probably the best revelation of Thorndike's biases is contained in the
following statement, a laudatory comment about the qualities of the type of
men whom he perceives as so often being disliked by the intellectuals.
"Scholars, men of science, and engineers are, as a rule, somewhat puzzled by
the power and esteem given in the United States to men of affairs, commonly
lawyers, politicians, or businessmen who, on the surface at least, do not
seem to have corresponding knowledge, intelligence, and skill." Generally,
"technical men in a business consider themselves abler than the high execu-
tives, that the professors in a university consider themselves abler than the
men of affairs who own the newspapers."[38] It is almost as though Thorndike
approved of or even prescribed a kind of elite corps of leaders best capable
of handling the business of society, a corps which would typify the "men of
affairs" which Thorndike loved so well.

Contrast these thoughts with those of C. Wright Mills who was not im-
pressed either with the proper origins or the productivity of a leadership
corps made up of men of affairs.

It is not only the similarities of social origin, religious affiliation,
nativity, and education that are important to the psychological and social
affiliation of the members of the power elite. For the most important
set of facts about a circle of men is the criteria of admission, of
praise, of honor, or promotion that prevails among them; if they are
similar within a circle, then they will tend as personalities to become
similar. The circles that compose the power elite do tend to have such
codes and criteria in common.[39]

Mills thus argued that "there is a kind of reciprocal attraction among the
fraternity of the successful...."[40]

Returning to Thorndike, if final proof is needed of his preference for
what he considered to be the personality type most beneficial to society, the
type which would be capable of manipulation and success through an

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(36) Thorndike, p. 784.

(37) Ibid., p. 785.

(38) Ibid., pp. 783-784.

(39) Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1956, p. 281.

(40) Ibid., p. 281.

organizational system, let us look at his argument on the value of the con-
tinuation of life itself. Surely, Thorndike argues, there is no purpose for
a life which is no longer productive and therefore, "perhaps the possibility
of euthanasia versus a miserable life, suggested by the desire of some defec-
tives for death and by the dubious value of the kind of life that can be pro-
vided for others..."[41] is a possibility which should be seriously enter-
tained. Can his views on the intrinsic value of life be made any clearer?

In place of any belief in the overriding importance of either intrinsic
worth, or an introspective view of life, the anti-introspective personality
is thus one who transfers his concerns to something external. The result is
that for the anti-introspective personality, the expressions of the essence
of human character rely on some kind of external, rather than internal cue.
As Wills, another conservative, put it, "for the realist...the state, by
disciplining a particular society, expresses the character of that sc-
ciety...."[42] And so too with human conduct, where it is the pattern of the
anti-introspective personality to search for objective rather than subjective
standards. As Meyer explains, "...the conservative looks at political and
social questions with the assumption that there are objective standards for
human conduct...which it is the duty of human beings to understand as thor-
oughly as they are able and to which it is their duty to approximate their
actions."[43]

Thus with political standards, as well as with psychological predisposi-
tions, the anti-introspective personality is one which would prefer not to
look within, to the subjective and personal kinds of signals, preferring
instead to respond to the external and objective standards which the society
provides.

Summary

It would seem by the literature we have examined that the standards of
human worth for introspective and anti-introspective thinkers are almost com-
pletely the reverse of each other. Whereas intrinsic worth is paramount for
the introspective temperament, extrinsic standards of productivity reign for
the anti-introspective. This kind of dichotomy may give us some clue, for
example, to such things as the classical battle between the political Left
and Right over industrial wages and salaries and the relative economic value
of particular work. The literature of both camps is filled with either egal-
itarian or stratified thinking on economic worth, the Left-of-center position
recognizing the effort and subjective worth of an individual's labor, while
the Right-of-center position is more willing to recognize only the end-prod-
uct or manifest worth of the productivity. Students of such arguments have
not considered that a debate such as this economic valuation does not exist

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(41) Thorndike, p. 475.

(42) Wills, Garry, "The Convenient State," in Buckley, Wm. F., Did You
Ever See a Dream Walking? New York: Bobbs Merrill Co., 1970, p. 24.

(43) Meyer, Frank S., "The Recrudescent American Conservatism," in
Buckley, p. 80.

along a single continuum, with each side simply disagreeing on relative merit.
When one considers the psychological element in something like economic valu-
ation, it is really understandable that the two sides may well be using dif-
ferent standards of personal worth altogether. For the anti-introspective
personality, it is no great jump in logic to say that since all men are in-
herently equal they must be rewarded equally for their labors. The standard
of what labor is, the society of persons capable of performing it, and the
effect of that labor upon the society may simply not be a legitimate inquiry
for a personality concerned with intrinsic worth. Similarly, for one who is
anti-introspective, as the authoritarian personality surely seems to be, the
question of the worker being a man equal in his simple humanity is a question
not likely to be discussed. Maybe it is difficult or nearly impossible for
these kinds of personalities even to recognize how different the psychologi-
cal assumptions of their own thought really are. But in so many matters of
both economic valuation and valuations of political contribution and worth,
the differences between those who value the extrinsic or the intrinsic seem
to be crucial in the determination of Left-wing versus Right-wing political
thought.

CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS OF DATA

This study has been centered around an attempt to identify the personality traits which would be instrumental in the holding of Left-wing political views. It was intended that the psychological scales that were used in this study would be made up of pure construct traits, that is traits which are free of the style components which were described by people like Eysenck and Rokeach. Let us recall again at this point that we are in agreement with, and are basically adopting the Eysenck-originated U configuration of construct and stylistic personality traits. We are suggesting that it is the construct traits which are those we should examine closely to see if they are related to political attitudes which we will label as being Left-wing versus Right-wing in their ideological character.

At the beginning of the study, pre-tests were taken on each of the thirty-two psychological items, and an item analysis was subsequently performed on each of the items to determine its ability to distinguish differences in psychological attitudes. During the interview. each item was presented to the interviewee in the usual five-stage Likert form, allowing for the responses of Disagree Strongly, Disagree, No Opinion, Agree, and Agree Strongly. The raw data derived from the responses to these items was converted to factor scores for each respondent, and further analysis was performed using these factor scores. Incidentally, the result of the factor analysis is particularly encouraging here since none of the psychological factors seemed to have a distinctive "stylistic" element to it. In factor analyzing the eight items of the dependent political variable, as we shall see later, two of the items factor analyzed into a variable which seemed to lack a decidedly Left versus Right ideological flavor. This political variable might better be called a · "process variable," one which is fundamentally different from the ideological variable we are using as a dependent variable. Since none of the nine psychological factors has a stylistic ring to it, we can confirm that both the face validity of the items taken as a whole and the theoretical validity which stems from a kind of reverse reading of the construct variables of The Authoritarian Personality as well as from recent Left-wing writings, has theoretically confirmed the sorting out of the two factor analyses and we can now suggest strongly that the psychological variables are in fact representative of the "construct" psychological traits which we have talked about.

To control for response bias, which some respondents inevitably demonstrate in questionnaires of this kind, the items were placed in alternating order. Although all psychological items were of the author's creation, the political scale, as we have mentioned, was made up of eight items selected from the New Left scale developed in 1969 by Christie, Friedman and Ross.[1] On the Christie

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(1) Christie, R., Friedman, L., and Ross, A., "The New Left and Its Ideology," Unpublished Paper - Department of Social Psychology, Columbia Univ., New York, 1969.

scale, items were not reworded, thus leaving seven reading in a Left of center direction, a positive answer indicating a Left preference, and only one in a Right of center direction.

Interviewers were trained on the main campus and four of the regional campuses, and each interviewer was given a list of respondents to contact and interview. Each interview packet contained two copies of the questionnaire, one to be read by the interviewer and the other to be marked by the respondent. The respondent's completed interview sheet was returned to the folder without the inspection of the interviewer. All interviewing was performed during the last two weeks of April and the entire month of May, 1970.

The Sample

A simple random sample was drawn from the enrollments (full-time students only) of the Bloomington campus of Indiana University and four of the five regional campuses: South Bend, Gary, Kokomo, and Fort Wayne. The sample drawn for each campus, with the number of respondents and the response percentages are listed in Appendix A.

Return percentages differed somewhat because of the varying availability of interviewers at the selected regional campuses, but two other factors also contributed to a relatively low return percentage (30.9%) on the main Bloomington campus and perhaps to a lesser degree on the regional campuses.

One factor was that the academic year was coming to an end, a matter which interfered with time availability both for the interviewers as well as for the designated interviewee. The second factor, and one probably more important than the lateness of the school year, was that the American invasion of Cambodia at the end of April, 1970, created a real reluctance on the part of some students, particularly on the main campus at Bloomington, to be interviewed about their political attitudes. Thirdly, these items were piggybacked with interview items which were concerned with some socio-political variables, and which, unfortunately in hindsight, included two drug-related questions. A few potential respondents were scared off by these drug-use items.

Yet, even though return percentages were somewhat uneven, the total number of responses was very high, and beyond that, the representativeness of the sample was also quite acceptable. What we mean by representativeness in a sample is that the responses that did come back were not peculiar to a particular demographic set of persons within the original sample. Appendices B and C illustrate the representativeness of both the Sex and Class standing of the respondents.

The representativeness tables show only a slightly biased return pattern in favor of. a) female respondents over male respondents and b) underclass students over upperclass students. With the political nature of the interview schedule, and with the coinciding occurrence of the Cambodian invasion, it could well be that men, who are somewhat more active politically than women, and upperclass students, who tended to be more politically active than underclassmen, were more sensitive to political questioning, and thus, in the aggregate, were slightly more reluctant to submit to the questionnaire.

One further point should be made regarding the question of sampling.

According to Herbert McCloskey, a respected methodologist, the requirements
for sampling and for return percentages are fundamentally different depending
upon the purposes of the inquiry. Discussing some basic tenets of survey
research in political science, McCloskey says, "in general, a sample must
more perfectly reflect the characteristics of the universe being studied if
the investigator wishes to describe that universe than if his main concern is
to discover or test relationships among variables."[2] In discussing an exam-
ple in which a researcher was attempting to find the difference between the
job of predicting the particular Democratic vote within an electoral unit and
predicting the correlation between a belief in democracy and personality char-
acteristics, McCloskey says that in the latter situation a researcher "...may
be able to get by with a less perfect sample, for the correlation between
these variables is not likely to be severely altered by the overrepresenta-
tion of certain groups - providing of course their errors are not extremely
large."[3] In other words, the rules of sampling are more important when you
are trying to say something about the whole population you are studying, as
for example all Indiana students, and it is not so important when you are
trying to simply use a group of people to test the relationship between two
variables. Thus, in view of the representativeness of the sample and the
overriding research motive of attempting to test the relationship between a
political and a psychological set of variables, it is probably fair to say
that the sample was more than adequate for a fair testing of the hypotheses.

Item Analysis

After the completion of the interviews, each of the psychological test
items and each of the political items was item-analyzed to determine the ques-
tion significantly differentiated between high and low scorers. Item analy-
sis is nothing more than a device by which researchers test their questions
to see if what they have asked evoked different responses from persons of
different views. For example, if a researcher asks a question and all, or
virtually all the persons who took the survey answered the same way, the
question would simply not have done anything for his study. Also, if people
who otherwise would be responding, say, in a liberal direction on a series of
questions, answer one question in a way contrary to what you define as a lib-
eral response, your best judgment tells you that the question is not tapping
what you think it is.

The item analysis used here was of the kind prescribed by Alan Edwards, a
technique in which an aggregate raw score was computed for each respondent
and first and fourth quartiles were isolated based upon this aggregate score.
A mean and a variance were then computed for each item within its quartile
and a t-score, a statistic of differentiation, was calculated to test for
significant differences between each item. The results of the psychological
item analysis are presented in Appendix D.

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(2) McCloskey, Herbert, "Survey Research in Political Science," in Survey
Research in the Social Sciences, G. Y. Glolk (ed.), New York: Russel Sage
Foundation, 1967, p. 68.

(3) Ibid., p. 68.

The item analyses for the psychological items tell us that thirty-one of the thirty-two items not only were scoring in the predicted direction but were able to reach a t-score level of significance which is above the required 1.65 score for a .05 significance.

The t-score of 1.65 is a figure based upon a statistical calculation which tells you that if this level of significance is reached, you are at least ninety-five percent certain that the relationship you have described, in this case a real difference between responses to the questions, is not present as a result of chance. In this study, one question out of the thirty-two (#3) did not item-analyze in the expected direction. It was decided to leave this question in the final calculations, however, because of its high positive factor loading on the one factor which will be used in the correlations and because of its low loadings on the other factors. It was felt that with the computed assignment of factor scores, with which the correlations ultimately were performed, this item's factor loading would make a real contribution to the study.

Item Analysis - Political Items

Appendix E gives the results of the item analysis of the eight political questions. All items in the political scale were shown to be well above the required significance level and they thus demonstrated the efficacy of the Christie New Left questions for testing political attitudes. In other words, the questions that we have used to test for the political variable do appropriately differentiate between Left versus Right political attitudes.

Factor Analysis - Psychological Factors

A principal component factor analysis was run with an oblique rotation, and an oblomin solution. This kind of rotation allows the factors of this psychological variable to intercorrelate and to find their best fit without being forced into an orthogonal configuration. This factor analysis, the one for the thirty-two psychological items, was run separately from the eight political items.

The results give a greater breakdown of psychological variables than the theoretical frame-work originally called for, as the factor analysis yielded nine psychological factors. Yet, the constellation of questions is very representative of the four basic psychological variables which we have theoretically outlined. Let us look at the psychological factors first, presenting the scales which are given us by the factor loadings, and then let us discuss both the theoretical linkages with the various factors, as well as the possible explanation for the few questions which loaded on unexpected factors.

The following sections of this chapter will present the factor clusters of questions along with a key to the understanding of both how they were coded and of which scale they were originally predicted to be a part. The first letter in the brackets following the question gives the direction of the coding, an A signifying an authoritarian coding to the question and an AA signifying an anti-authoritarian coding. Remember, these questions were alternated in the questionnaire, but were of course scored in the appropriate direction. The second letter designates what the original psychological scale was predicted to be, O standing for Anti-Order, P for Anti-Power, IM for

Impulse, and IN for Introspection.

Personal Order

The first factor which we will label Personal Order is a factor which describes a general orientation toward having a rather clearly and unmistakably defined set of guidelines by which one can adequately live his or her life. Let us look at the five items which were sorted into this category.

2. Morality is an issue which requires that people consult some higher source of authority. (A,P)

4. In order to lead a worthwhile life, a person must organize his career very carefully. (A,O)

8. Some people today are spending too much time in philosophizing and not enough in doing something worthwhile. (A,IN)

12. Homosexuality is contrary to the natural order of life. (A,O)

32. Deep introspection is not a particularly enviable personality trait. (A,IN)

This Personal Order psychological factor tests for the kind of order which signifies a personal psychological orientation toward confining, regulating or organizing different kinds of procedures. This is the kind of order which we have discussed before.

When we look at the questions which fall within this particular factor in the factor analysis we find that two of the five questions (#4 & 12) were originally predicted to fall within the kind of Order factor which had to do with the organizing of one's life or with the natural order of life.

A third question (#27) concerning sex not being restricted between consenting adults, came within .01 (see Appendix E) of being included within this factor in its loading and thus also expressed a very real order component within it. Of the three questions which were not derived from the predicted order questions, the two which were predicted to be Introspective questions (#8 & 32) were both concerned with philosophizing and deep introspectiveness, which perhaps were conceived of as being contrary to an orderly existence. The other question, a Power question (#2), mixes the order of life which morality brings with some higher authority. All of these items, in one sense or another, therefore, do seem to deal with some notion of personal order.

Introspection questions had to do with either achieving something worthwhile or with whether or not one would actually be introspective. These questions which might have been perceived as disturbing a belief in an orderly world, were both certainly not unusual for a consideration of personal order. The question which we had thought might be construed as being on a Power Scale (#2), deals with a higher source of authority, yet does so with the purpose of determining the appropriate standards by which one should live. It would seem, therefore, that the Personal Order factor is in fact reasonably well grounded in the ideas of routine, self-discipline and regulation which had been the intended thrust of the order variable.

Power

Let us look next at Factor #2 which has four items within it and which generally represents the element of power which we talked about earlier. The items are as follows:

10. An employer will get better work from his employees when he organizes their work for them. (A,P)

15. Idealism is a greater moral value than hard work. (AA,IN)

17. Being a member of a group does not necessarily give that group the right to require certain things of you. (AA,P)

19. The man who works in a routine type of job cannot lead a particularly rewarding life. (AA,O)

Two of the four questions (#10 & 17) were originally predicted to be on a power scale and they both directly concern themselves with authority relationships where an individual, such as an employer or a group, is prescribing conduct for somebody else. The other questions (#15 & 19) would seem not to be descriptions of a power relationship, yet they do nonetheless refer either to some higher values and principles or to being enslaved in a routine, which is often the burden of a subordinate kind of job. Clearly, the respondents identified the authoritative nature of such idealism with the authoritative nature of receiving personal direction.

Impulse

The third factor contains six items and it seems to respond quite well to its predicted category of the psychological trait of impulse expression. The items are as follows:

5. I like to do things which make my life more enjoyable now even if there may be some consequences later. (AA,IM)

13. I have often had the urge to do something which I hope will shock someone. (AA,IM)

21. I like to do things which are risky just for the fun of it. (AA,IM)

25. In times of moral crisis, conscience is a better guide to behavior than the advice from a parent, cleric, or other person in a position to help. (AA,P)

27. Sex should not be restricted in any way if it exists between consenting adults. (AA,O)

29. Restraint of your sexual impulses is probably dangerous to your overall psychological health. (AA,IM)

As we can see, four of the six items (#5, 13, 21, & 29) were all predicted to be impulse items and they run the full gamut from permitting current enjoyment to shocking someone else to engaging in risky acts or unrestrained sex. Two of the items were not originally predicted as impulse items, and

yet each, upon reflection, seems to have an element of impulse restraint or permissiveness involved within it. Question #25 deals with the role of conscience, which is often seen as a restrainer of impulse and question #27 is another sex-related question, and in this case it has to do with a preference for restrictions upon sexual activity. This seems to be one of our surer factors, and the element of impulse comes through quite clearly, thus permitting us to test its impact upon political attitudes.

Impulse Attitude

The fourth factor includes only one item on its scale and it seems to be an item which is quite close to the impulse notion. We call it Impulse Attitude because it seems to be a more remote observation of other people's actions rather than a consideration of your own.

The item is as follows:

6. I don't think much of people who always act on the spur of the moment. (A,IM)

Introspective Values

The fifth factor once again has only one item in it, and although factor six will more prominently represent the variable of introspection, this factor apparently represents a more directed kind of view about introspection, in this case concerning some kind of search for life's values.

The item is as follows:

7. I prefer a good discussion on life's values to just about any other kind of discussion. (AA,IN)

Introspection

This sixth factor is a more clear delineation of the psychological variable of introspection.

The questions are as follows:

23. Our culture does not leave enough time for leisurely pondering of the meaning of life. (AA,IN)

31. Education today is not concerned enough with teaching man how to look into himself. (AA,IN)

Both of these questions were originally predicted to be introspection questions and they come together very nicely on this factor. Along with Factor #5 and Factor #6 we now should feel that we can test well for the relationship of the trait of introspection to ideologically-related political attitudes.

General Anti-Authoritarianism

This seventh factor is the most perplexing of all the factors, for it seems to be a kind of residual factor not only because it includes a great number of questions, but also because the questions themselves seem to be items which do not naturally fall together very well.

The items are as follows:

14. Generally, a person should try to control his impulses. (A,IN)

16. I would rather be a businessman than a writer. (A,IN)

18. A national culture should not merely protect its citizens but should also help set a particular life style for them. (A,P)

20. The man who works in a routine type of job cannot lead a particularly rewarding life. (A,O)

22. A person who is angry should try not to reveal his anger to someone he's with. (A,IM)

24. I would rather be an architect than a professor. (A,IN)

26. A parent who permits his children to make mistakes which may seriously affect his future life is being too permissive. (A,P)

30. People who don't postpone present enjoyments for future rewards can't expect to get as much out of life in the long run. (A,IM)

As we can see, the above items come from all four of the predicted scales and clearly they represent a kind of residual collection of questions which do not expand the range of what other questions have already covered.

Imposed Order

This factor is a very important factor, for it not only is responsible for the best percentage of the variance, as we shall see when we look at our correlations, but it is also a kind of summated factor which combines both the important qualities of order and power, both of which we have already spoken about. There are four items in the factor.

The items are as follows:

1. Parents serve their children best when they let them investigate problems for themselves without prior instruction on how to deal with them. (AA,P)

3. Laws are mostly for the benefit of those who wish to maintain a certain way of life. (AA,O)

9. I would not like working for an employer who would frequently check me out on my work. (AA,P)

11. The values of efficiency and order are overstressed in our culture today. (AA,O)

Let us look at these four questions carefully. As we can see, two of the questions (#3 & 11) were designed to be order questions with Questions #1 and 9 being designed as power questions. But a closer inspection may also tell us not only that these questions come together well, but that in fact each of the items has some element of both power and order within it. Laws, although ordering, certainly exercise a kind of power over people, and efficiency and order, if overstressed within a culture, will certainly be enforced in some relatively powerful way. On the other hand, the question concerning parents letting their children investigate problems for themselves although original-ly appearing to be a power question, may also be seen as an order question in that it clearly seems to permit a more unordered kind of existence for the children. Also, the employer-check question is closely associated with the kinds of routines and contructed work relationship of unordered occupations. In a very important sense, therefore, it may well be as we saw both here and in Factor #2, that order and power are somewhat naturally tied together, as power creates order and order usually results from the successful use of power. In any case, whether or not we have shown some kind of innately in-terlocking relationship between these two psychological variables, it seems to be appropriate to label the factor with a title like Imposed Order.

Resultant Order

This final psychological factor carries only one question.

The item is as follows:

28. For any society to survive, most of its people must be trained to perform a productive task in a competent manner. (A,O)

Although this variable is clearly going to signify an agreement to a kind of order for those who respond to it positively, it is apparently different enough in its recognition of a moral or psychic order to be a different fac-tor from that which accents an on-the-job kind of routine which is taught by somebody else. We therefore call this factor Resultant Order.

Psychological Factors - Summary

The theoretical foundation for this work originally suggested the exis-tence of four psychological factors which it was hypothesized would correlate with a political attitude factor to demonstrate a key psycho-political Left-wing to Right-wing attitude linkage. One of the principal purposes of such an extension was to demonstrate the viability of the authoritarian model, not just within the conservative portion of the political spectrum, but through-out the spectrum as a whole. It was not too much of a surprise when the fac-tor breakdown presented by the oblique rotation spewed out nine rather than four factors, yet the predominant difference between the actual factor anal-ysis and the forecasted analysis was little more than a further breakdown of the four hypothesized factors into nine factors. Most of the psychological items appeared within the larger factor area which was predicted for them. Of those items which did not factor as predicted, nearly all were, at least

on their face, lodged into an alternatively reasonable factor. On the whole, it is probably fair to say that the psychological factor breakdown was not terribly different from the predicted distribution. The results which will come from the use of these factor scores with the political scores should yield the kinds of conclusions which can reasonably be defended as testing the hypotheses we have made about the relationship of the psychological variables to the politically-ideological variable.

Factor Analysis - Political Factors

An oblique factor analysis was also performed on the eight selected political items from the Christie scale. The political factor tables present the results of the political factor analysis which gave us a two-factor loading pattern. The grouping of the questions below includes the direction of the question in the parentheses following each question, R indicating Right and L being Left. Remember that these questions were presented in the original direction as they were written by Christie, and thus, as we mentioned, seven of the questions are stated in a Left direction, a positive answer indicating a Left-wing political attitude, and only one question is in a Right-wing direction.

I. Ideological Political Attitudes

1. The "Establishment" unfairly controls every aspect of our lives; we can never be free until we are rid of it. (L)

3. The United States needs a complete restructuring of its basic institutions. (L)

4. Authorities must be put in an intolerable position so they will be forced to respond with repression and thus show their illegitimacy. (L)

5. Even though institutions have worked well in the past, they must be destroyed if they are not effective now. (L)

6. A problem with most older people is that they have learned to accept society as it is, not as it should be. (L)

8. Real participatory democracy should be the basis for a new society. (L)

This factor, which will be the factor used in the subsequent correlations, not only factored out with substantially stronger factor loadings than the second factor, but it is also a more clearly substantive political factor than the second factor. As we will recall from the first chapter's discussion of construct and style variables, we are testing only for the psychological determinant of _what_ the political advocate believes, not _how_ he believes it. In order to test our hypotheses, therefore, we need to have only those political variables which test the ideological substance, or Left versus Right nature of political belief. The six questions of this first factor all seem to be relatively "clean" in that they are each making the kind of substantive political statement which would be exclusive to Left-wing political thought, while they would at the same time be something which Right-wing political advocates would not seem to be able to agree with.

For the record, the second political factor was made up of the following two questions:

II. Extra-Legal Political Processes

   2. There are legitimate channels for reform which must be exhausted before attempting disruption. (R)

   7. The streets are a more appropriate medium for change in our society than printing presses. (L)

This factor seems to be much better interpreted as a "political process" kind of factor, seeming to evidence a disposition toward extra-legal political procedures. Responses to these two questions would help us to determine how a person felt about how political change ought to come about, and therefore they do not represent the same factor as the substantive or ideological political factor. They are, in other words, not conceptually analogous to the construct psychological variables, and neither question necessarily indicates a Left-wing or Right-wing predisposition in its political direction. We will therefore call this factor Extra-Legal Political Process, and we will not include these two items in our correlations.

In summary, then, we have factored out a political test factor of six ideological items, a scale which we believe to be very usable for our psycho-political analysis. It does seem to hang together well as a factor representing substantive political ideology with positive responses signifying a preference for a Left-of-center political viewpoint. What we have now done is to let the computer give to us the best sorting of both the psychological and the political factors into the kinds of patterns which will not only best reflect our respondent's answers, but will also permit us to best test our principal hypotheses. We are now prepared to test these hypotheses and to see if the anti-authoritarian psychological construct variables which we have enumerated do in fact correlate with Left-wing political attitudes.

Results

Let us now test our nine psychological factors as independent variables to see how well they each contribute to the holding of ideologically Left-wing political attitudes. First, let us remember that we are using an oblique rotation, and that with the factors not being separated to impose a factor structure which gives no correlations between them, it is more likely that one, or something less than all of the factors may in fact dominate the factor structure. In fact we found this to be true in this data, for one factor, Factor #8 (Imposed Order), is clearly the most important factor in the correlation. Other factors, however, do make contributions to the variance and they are worth considering in the regression. Incidentally, this entire analysis was performed using an orthogonal varimax rotation and for a review of those results, please see footnote 4.

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   (4) This same analysis was also run using an orthogonal varimax rotation and the results accounted for 35.4% of the political variance. The factors broke down in a somewhat different way from the oblique rotation, but there still was a good representation of the four principal psychological variables. Of the 35.4% of the variance, a Contemplative Introspection variable accounted for 8.9% of the variance, a Moral Order variable accounted for 9.1% of the variance and two Power factors combined to account for 6.0% of the variance.

Let us look now to the results of the correlations, and let us highlight the five psychological variables which were statistically significant at the .001 level and which accounted, altogether, for 37.0 percent of the variance in political attitudes.

TABLE 1

Psycho-Political Correlations

	Unique Variance Explained
Factor #8 Imposed Order	.138 or 13.8% of the variance
Factor #3 Impulse	.070 or 7.0% of the variance
Factor #6 Introspection	.067 or 6.7% of the variance
Factor #5 Introspective Values	.051 or 5.1% of the variance
Factor #1 Personal Order	.044 or 4.4% of the variance
	.370 or 37% of the variance

NOTE: The other four factors accounted for a total of less than 2.0% of the variance and did not achieve acceptable levels of statistical significance.

As we mentioned, Factor #8 (Imposed Order) was the most significant factor. Clearly, its ability to explain 13.8% of the total variance, and over one third of all the psychological variance, mark it as a variable which stands well above the others. However, let us remember one thing about this variable, and that is that the factor scale is primarily made up of four questions, and the two which dealt with parents' relationships to their children and an employee relationship were originally intended as a question to test attitudes toward a power relationship. Another question originally intended as an order question dealt with the purpose of the laws, and it seems to import both a kind of power as well as an order quality to the variable. It would seem that we are receiving increasing evidence that power and order are in fact two closely-tied variables as well as representing something which has an important effect on political attitudes.

The other variables are clearly less capable of contributing to the political variance, yet it is interesting to note that they do represent the other two psychological variables of introspection and impulse expression reasonably well. Factor #3 is the impulse factor and Factors #5 and #6 each deal with an aspect of personal introspection. The second factor, Factor #1, if we look at the primary items that were included in the scale, deals with morality and self-regulation and is thus probably a representation of a somewhat more pure order factor than is Factor #8.

The Anti-Authoritarian Syndrome

Thus, as we have reported, we have been able to account for 37% of the variance of political attitudes within a population by testing for a general set of psychological traits which we have labelled under the umbrella of anti-authoritarianism. Let us remember again that this research is largely an attempt to single out what the construct psychological variables are which would be helpful in telling us about a person's political attitudes. But let us remember also that, as we have been suggesting, the anti-authoritarian traits which we have looked at are more accurately seen as being a part of an overall personality syndrome. The traits of anti-order, anti-power, impulse expression and introspectiveness may well be very closely tied to one another. We should note that most of our factors did include questions which, at face value, may have included a mixture of more than one basic personality trait. But beyond the suggestion of a kind of alloy nature of some of the factors, or even a suggestion that the two traits are themselves very close to each other, let us look at some evidence which would tend to show us that we may be dealing with at least a partially integrated personality syndrome.

First, let us look at the simple correlations between the significant factors. In the table which follows, we can see that there is an interesting set of combinations within the factor structure of the five significant factors.

TABLE 2

Psychological Factor Correlations

	Factor 1 Personal Order	Factor 3 Impulse	Factor 5 Introspective Values	Factor 6 Introspection	Factor 8 Imposed Order
Factor 1	1.000	.615	.130	.180	.547
3	.615	1.000	.285	.277	.508
5	.130	.285	1.000	.001	.135
6	.180	.277	.001	1.000	.288
8	.547	.508	.135	.288	1.000

As we can see from these figures, Factors #1, 3, & 8 seem to have at least a reasonably strong correlation. The two order factors, which we might have expected, are correlated at .547 and the Impulse factor correlates with Personal Order at .615 and with Imposed Order at .508. This is not an unreasonable finding, since we could theoretically expect that a positive orientation toward order factors, particularly as one of the factors appears to be deeply mixed with a power factor, would coincide with a positive view toward the expression of impulse.

Somewhat surprisingly, however, we find that the two introspective factors, remembering that one was made up of only one item, do not correlate at all with each other, nor with the Order factors, and they correlate only very weakly with the Impulse Factor (.285 and .277). Clearly, the suggestion of this data would not distract us from the general conclusion that there is a set of personality traits, which we have characterized as "construct" traits, that are significant in the determination of Left-wing political attitudes. But, having said this, it may also be necessary to consider that whereas the qualities of rejection of power relationships and a rejection of a need for order are perhaps so close to each other that they are really almost indistinguishable, the quality of introspectiveness, though also important as a political correlate, may lie well outside a syndrome which is made up of the anti-order, anti-power factor and the impulse factor. We are undoubtedly dealing with some rather subtle variables here, and we should of course be somewhat tentative in our certainty about what the relationship of each of them is to the other.

Though our inter-factorial correlations are not overwhelming, we can look at another statistic, factorial eigenvalues, and notice that there is still a fair degree of unidimensionality in the authoritarian syndrome (see Appendix F). Wilson, in The Conservative Mind,[5] noted a "natural break" between the eigenvalues of his personality factors. So too with our factors, we note that the pre-rotation eigenvalues drop from 4.26 for the first factor to 1.82 for the next factor. Clearly, there is at least some degree of correlation between these factors, and thus, even with some weak inter-factor correlations, we can safely say that there is at least some patterning to the variables which make up the anti-authoritarian personality.

In summary, it does seem to be clear that we have been able to identify and test those personality traits which are significant for the holding of ideologically differentiated political attitudes. If we are correct in assuming that these variables are in fact the very construct variables, stated in reverse, which make up the essence of the authoritarian personality, then perhaps we have begun to decipher the rough outlines of what the completed authoritarian model truly is. Before we leave this chapter, however, let us examine one more important question concerning our psycho-political model.

The Analysis of Extremes

As the reader will recall, we asked ourselves early in this work not only what the relationship of psychological and political variables might be, but also whether or not there may be some differences in the relationship of these variables at the poles of the psycho-political continuum. To do this, our data makes available to us a test which may help us to understand the full authoritarian psycho-political model better. We have already stated that throughout the political literature, both from the Right and from the Left, there has been a seemingly greater incidence of the importance of

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(5) Wilson, Glenn D., ed., The Psychology of Conservatism, New York: Academic Press, 1973.
NOTE: Thanks are owed to the Indiana University Office of Regional Campuses who assisted in the preparation of the interview schedule and with the actual interviewing at the regional campuses.

certain personal values when one's ideology is farther out toward the poles
of the political spectrum. Without getting into the difficult question of
where political extremism can be said to begin on any political spectrum, we
can note that the literature we have looked at seems to suggest that at the
more extreme ends of the continuum, the psychological variable may account
for more of the variance than it does at the middle of the continuum. What
we are suggesting in terms of our political understanding is that people who
are moderate in their politics, that is those near the center of the politi-
cal spectrum, may have their political attitudes shaped by more immediate
demographic or objective variables such as their economic condition, politi-
cal socialization, region, religion, etc. But those persons who identify
with more significantly Right-wing or Left-wing ideological philosophies may
be much more likely to hold these views because of some very fundamental
personality traits which they possess.

Certainly, the Eysenck U configuration of construct and style variables,
along with the Coulter data which showed us a similar kind of increase in the
psychological style variable at the political extremes, would lead us to be-
lieve that the psychological intensity of political thought at the extremes
is substantially greater. There has always been something of an old saw that
political ideology was more prevalent and more clearly stated at the ex-
tremes. If this is so, then perhaps an increased relationship between the
psychological and the political variable should permit us to not only be able
to understand the considerable emphasis which such persons place upon their
political views, but also permit us to be better able to understand the na-
ture of political movements of the more extreme Right and of the more extreme
Left.

In order to test for whether there was a substantial difference in the
amount of the political variance which could be accounted for by psychologi-
cal variables at the extremes of the political continuum, the respondents
were rank-ordered according to the factor scores which they received on the
psychological scales. Remember that the factor score which each subject re-
ceived on his psychological items has placed him in a relative authoritarian
to anti-authoritarian order with the other respondents. This psychological
ranking now permits us to isolate the respondents who demonstrated the most
authoritarian and the most anti-authoritarian psychological traits and then
run simple correlations to test whether these people did in fact demonstrate
a stronger correlation between their psychological and political variables
than did the group as a whole.

The result of this "isolated extremes" test was truly remarkable. Incred-
ibly, when the extreme 3% was taken from each of the authoritarian and the
anti-authoritarian scorers, thus giving us an N of 66 in the regression, the
percentage of the variance accounted for by the psychological variable rose
dramatically from 37.0% to 73.9%! This means that for those in our popula-
tion who are among the 3% most authoritarian psychologically, along with
those who are the 3% most anti-authoritarian psychologically, approximately
three-fourths of the reason for their political views can be explained by the
psychological factors which we have studied. Let it be suggested that this
is a substantial finding, and let us recognize that if in fact there is a
kind of weighted political influence coming from the extremes, which has an
impact on the essence of political ideology, this finding concerning the ex-
tremes would further tend to demonstrate the necessity for exploring psycho-
logical phenomena as they relate to political views as well as to explore
such phenomena within those political movements which adopt an ideology

farthest from the center of the political spectrum.

Summary

This chapter has presented the data from the personal interview survey of 1,101 students from the main Bloomington campus and from four regional campuses of Indiana University. This data was used to test the relationship of the psychological theory of construct anti-authoritarianism to the political philosophy of Left-wing thought. As we have seen, the sample of students was a representative one as each respondent was asked to give five-stage Likert responses to thirty-two psychological questions of the author's creation and eight political questions taken from Christie's New Left Scale. The results of these interviews were factor analyzed, a process which yielded five significant psychological factors and two political factors. The significant political factor, which is the substantive, or ideological political factor, was then correlated with the five psychological factors in a way which tended to show that a significant relationship did in fact exist between anti-authoritarian psychological traits, that is those which we hypothesized as being the reverse of authoritarian psychological traits, and Left-wing political views.

The combined psychological factors accounted for 37.0% of the political variance when computed in a simple regression. Incidentally, a number of major demographic variables, such as income, sex, social affiliations and the like, were run as partial correlations, and these intermediate variables were found not to reduce the strength of these correlations.

A significant additional finding which the data produced involved an analysis of the extremes of the political continuum. A correlation on the two most extreme 3% political poles, a total of 6% of the subject population, accounted for 73.9% of the total political variance. It would be fair to say that our original hypotheses seem to have been well tested and reasonably well confirmed. It would seem that a kind of anti-authoritarian personality, as so many have expected, does in fact exist, and it would appear that that variable can be understood along the same psycho-political construct variable continuum as was used, although in a way which was commingled with style variables, in The Authoritarian Personality. Now that we are beginning to see the freeing of scales such as the F scale from the contamination of the style variable characteristics, we apparently are finding that indeed the construct variables do seem to exert their influence in predictably positive or negative directions throughout the entire political ideological continuum.

Let it be suggested that what we have found here is a potentially important finding; important not so much for its own sake, but important in that if in fact such a reasonably concurrent psycho-political continuum does exist, significant theoretical propositions may now be more readily apparent.

In this final chapter, a few very tentative but perhaps worthwhile considerations are offered in the spirit of setting our sights on just what we should be thinking about if this full-range psycho-political phenomenon does in fact exist within a population. We will spend a moment looking at some evidence which we asked ourselves about at the beginning of this work and we will attempt to consider the relative permanence or transitory nature of these psycho-political distinctions. Beyond that, however, we will attempt to look forward to some of the normative kinds of considerations which a

better understanding of the linkage between psychology and politics may well include. Let us turn to these considerations now.

CHAPTER 8

THE AUTHORITARIAN MODEL
IN POLITICS

What we originally set out to do in this study was to see if the authoritarian psycho-political model would be relevant to the study of political ideology across the entire political spectrum. Let it be immodestly suggested that if we have established that certain personality traits are now capable, in one form or another, of possessing universal political referrents, a significant new tool for the understanding of politics may now be available to us. It is becoming increasingly clear that an understanding of the modern political dialogue cannot be complete without the inclusion of the psychological variable within the political equation. It is our hope that this study, which attempts to explain the psychological underpinnings of the ideological, or Left versus Right, political continuum will assist our understanding of one of the deepest of political conflicts. Though we have given our effort to the defining and discussing of psychological traits, let us not forget that we are ultimately concerned with the question of understanding at least part of the reason behind a basic political conflict. In this final chapter, let us suggest what may be some of the theoretical implications of knowing that at least part of our ideological political conflict is a result of differences in human personality.

The New Importance of Psychology

Whether or not the discovery of a full-range psychological variable with its demonstrated relationship to ideological attitudes is a discovery of such a moment as to be called a general theory of political psychology is a matter we need not decide here, but it may be fair to suggest that, at the least, we can decide that it is now no longer proper to discuss the authoritarian model without fulfilling at least the following two conditions. First, we should no longer fail to differentiate between the construct and the style authoritarian variables, remembering that we do this so as to be clear whether we are discussing a) what is best described as general or stylistic authoritarianism, or b) what are simply the ideological differences between politically Left-wing or politically Right-wing authoritarianism. Second, we must not fail hereafter to use a trichotomized construct authoritarian psycho-political model, including the classifications of something like Authoritarianism, Non-Authoritarianism and, now, Anti-Authoritarianism. Virtually all of the vast research which uses the authoritarian model in studies of political phenomena has used a simple dichotomized model of authoritarian versus what are often called "democratic" traits. Not only the study of political views, but the study of such things as the relationship of authoritarianism to game theory strategies and human ability in perceptual tasks such as the embedded figure test, are all in need of improved research using the trichotomized variable. It may very well be that in a number of areas where personality is relevant, the full-range trichotomized authoritarian model will be useful in understanding personal behavior.

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But within the political context alone, we now believe that if it is safe
to say that different personalities have psychological predispositions toward
differing political attitudes, we must next ask ourselves what kinds of un-
derstandings we might now be able to achieve within the body politic and
within the political dialogue. On the one hand, we cannot permit ourselves
to engage in a pure psychological reductionism, seeing psychological varia-
bles as the only framework for political analysis. Clearly for the world as
a whole, and to a still important extent the United States, other variables,
particularly economic distribution variables, will continue to have impor-
tance for political analysis. But on the other hand we may well find that
within the political dialogue, even such fundamental questions as economic
distribution, civil liberties and international conflict will be better un-
derstood when we use the psychological variable effectively. Even more sig-
nificant, perhaps, is the waning personal importance of economic variables
themselves once a relative degree of financial security is obtained by either
a whole society or by some significant portion of that society. Let us not
forget the opening declaration of Tom Hayden's Port Huron Statement: "We are
the people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in
universities...."[1] Hayden is very pointedly not making an economic indict-
ment of society. He speaks instead of those things which have "rankled our
consciences," about "human degradation," "disturbing paradoxes," and "racial
bigotry" in the "wealthiest and strongest country in the world...."[2] Though
Hayden gives some slight attention to the economic distribution question, it
is difficult to read the Port Huron Statement and think of it purely in the
context of the classical Left literature. It is at least partially an ex-
pression of a new phenomenon, where the problems are internalized and where
they then become more matters of the conscience than of the purse.

Theodore Roszak speaks of this same phenomenon in his work, The Making of a
Counter Culture. When speaking of the young and their Movement, he sees the
Old Left economic arguments as playing only a secondary role.

One can discern...a continuum of thought and experience among the young
which links together the New Left sociology of Mills, the Freudian Marxism
of Herbert Marcuse, the Gestalt-therapy anarchism of Paul Goodman, the
Apocalyptic body mysticism of Norman Brown....[3]

He says, "As we move along the continuum, we find sociology giving way to
psychology, political collectivities yielding to the person, conscious and
articulate behavior falling away before the forces of the non-intellective
deep."[4]

Roszak believes so strongly that the New Left is fundamentally new that he
goes out of his way to chide those who attempt to read Marx into the modern

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(1) Hayden, Thomas, "The Port Huron Statement," reprinted in Theodori
Massimo, ed., The New Left: A Documentary History, New York: Bobbs-Merrill,
1969, p. 163.

(2) Ibid., p. 164.

(3) Roszak, Theodore, The Making of a Counter Culture, New York: Double-
day & Co., 1968, p. 64.

(4) Ibid., p. 64.

humanistic tradition. The material for such an argument comes, of course, from the early Marxian manuscripts. But Roszak says that these early writings provide no more of an intellectual service than that of "watering the imagination" of New Left thinkers. He argues that "in placing so high an evaluation upon the early manuscripts, the Marxist Humanists may be attributing to Marx qualities of mind and heart they ought properly to claim for themselves. In the case of Marcuse, this is certainly so."[5]

Roszak goes on to claim that Marx's use of the term "alienation" was merely fortuitous and subsequently Roszak even wonders if Marx would have any credence with present-day Western intellectuals at all if he had not chosen to use what he calls "this now modish word."[6] Whether the Roszak argument about Marx can be accepted, and it is vigorously opposed by both Marcuse and Fromm, both of whom argue for a merging of the economic and psychological themes, there does not seem to be much question that within the modern industrialized nations, the arena of struggle has shifted increasingly from the economic to the psychological battlefield. More than ever, the issues of the day do not concern bread and butter, but they are instead best understood as issues of the mind and of the heart. In discussing those who quest for liberation, Roszak ventures that, "...it is not Marxian class conflict alone - which answers their quest; it is, instead, the human body, seen as that perennial battlefield where the war of the instincts is waged."[7]

The very first line of the preface to Marcuse's Eros and Civilization suggests the same kind of thing very clearly. "This essay employs psychological categories because they have become political categories." Marcuse argues that "the traditional borderlines between psychology on the one side and political and social philosophy on the other have been made obsolete by the condition of man in the present era...."[9] Again, "psychological problems therefore turn into political problems...."[10]

One is reminded of the statements of the late C. Wright Mills, who considered it the mark of a sophisticated political observer when he could discern what it was in the society, not within himself, that was causing the personal maladies which were confronting him. For Mills, "men in masses are gripped by personal troubles, but they are not aware of their true meaning and source...."[11] A knowledgeable man is the man who is "...able to turn his personal troubles into social issues...."[12]

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(5) Ibid., p. 91.

(6) Ibid., p. 93.

(7) Ibid., p. 93.

(8) Marcuse, Herbert, Eros and Civilization, New York: Vintage Books, 1955, p. xvii.

(9) Ibid., p. xvii.

(10) Ibid., p. xvii.

(11) Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite, New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 318.

(12) Ibid, p. 318.

As to the reflections on the possible diminution of economic considerations, what Marcuse is saying is really not so different from what has been said by more conventional psychologists and other scholars. When Marcuse cites Freud's "primordial struggle for existence" with its accompanying belief that such a struggle is eternal, the New Left writer disagrees with Freud strongly, arguing that in fact Freud's own work demonstrates that such a conclusion is not necessarily true. He feels that Freud's work can just as easily be read to mean that when the economic necessities are dispensed with, the erotic character of man or, as it is sometimes known, the "pleasure principle" will then take over.[13]

Without disagreeing or agreeing with Marcuse, at least over the question of whether or not the removal of economic considerations will bring about only a release of repression of the eros and not also a restraining side of man's nature (which Marcuse may want to argue really doesn's exist), it still is clear that Marcuse feels that a rather different set of political and psychological considerations are becoming relevant in a society which has lived amid the new American opulence.

The terminology which Marcuse has used makes this psychological argument sound new and revolutionary, but let us see if it really is. The economist John Kenneth Galbraith discussed this same question some time ago in The Affluent Society,[14] when he suggested that a kind of personal marginality of selection would seriously alter the consumption patterns of prosperous Americans once they had attained a certain level of affluence. Curiously Galbraith, although not utilizing a psychological terminology, was directing his attention to the work ethic of the American society, and he was among the first to question whether, beyond a certain level of development, such an ethic was beneficial either for the society or for the individual.

Back within the psychological literature itself, many writers have already written about what is labeled a hierarchy of needs, probably the most famous being Maslow's five-stage hierarchy including 1) physiological needs, 2) safety needs, 3) need for belongingness and love, 4) need for esteem, and 5) self-fulfillment. Other author's classifications differ but, like Maslow's, most psychologists who have done this kind of thing present a rather clear hierarchy which begins with the physiological needs, presumably met by economic return, and then they proceed to the psychological needs, which are by definition largely divorced from economic considerations.

Within the political literature as well, it is generally agreed that significant political and social movements are not engendered in societies which are saddled with the lowest levels of poverty. Whether speaking of revolutionary movements of the Left, or of reactionary movements such as the German experience with Hitler's Nazis, it seems generally agreed that a certain level of economic development is a prerequisite for popular acceptance of ideological political movements.

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(13) Marcuse, pp. 16-17.

(14) Galbraith, John Kenneth, The Affluent Society, New York: New American Library, 1958.

In one way or another, therefore, major authors from varying fields have
concluded that the lessening importance of economic considerations means new
politically relevant considerations will take their place, and many have sug-
gested that inevitably these new conflicts will contain a psychological di-
mension. This news may of course be disconcerting to the members of those
societies which have attained a certain level of wealth and would like now to
think that it can enjoy the fruits of its economic achievement with a reduc-
tion in the level of its internal conflict. Yet, it would seem inevitable
that entire nations made up of a population which has climbed into the upper
levels of Maslow's individual hierarchy would only naturally reflect the
kinds of political conflicts corresponding to these "higher" kinds of issues.
Let us therefore offer as a first hypothesis for future study that political
conflict will continue within an economically prosperous political system,
and that increasingly that conflict will be a product of issues which are es-
sentially psychological in their basic nature.

Role Selection and Reinforcement

This present work, of course, was directed toward the study of the impor-
tance of personality in political attitudes, and, although it is clear that
other matters, even in addition to economic questions, enter into such polit-
ical conflict, we should be prepared to recognize that the structure of an
advanced industrial society, along with the structuring of the kinds of roles
which people play within such a society, oftentimes prolongs and reinforces
the importance of personality within the political dialogue. Essentially,
this reinforcement occurs through three rather well understood processes of
selection and reinforcement. These processes include a) the selection of an
individual's occupation, b) the reinforcement of his role within the occupa-
tion, and c) the reinforcement of information sources by persons of particu-
lar political views.

First, the process by which an individual selects his occupation is hardly
a random process in its psychological dimension. Countless studies have been
made on this subject, not only involving employed persons, but also using
student populations who were in the process of preparing themselves for par-
ticular careers. One of the best summaries of the results of such studies
can be found in Anne Roe's work, The Psychology of Occupations.[15] Roe devel-
ops a typology for the classification of different occupations as well as for
the psychological types which seek out these particular jobs. The findings
tell us that working within those occupations which require high verbal,
social, and aesthetic skills tends to attract persons who rank low in a qual-
ity such as masculinity. On the other hand, occupations which are high in
numerical, spatial, physical and leadership ratings tend to be filled with
persons who score highly in a quality like masculinity. As Roe puts it,
"physical science and engineering groups tend to disinterest (sic) in or
withdrawal from other persons and show somewhat compulsive, rigid and anxious
pictures."[16] Service oriented people, as might be expected, dealing in gui-
dance, social and welfare occupations, rated higher on such things as verbal,

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(15)   Roe, Ann, The Psychology of Occupations, New York: Wiley, 1966.

(16)   Ibid., p. 160.

social and aesthetic relationships.

Other studies also demonstrate the selective processes of occupation orien-
tation and the importance of personality in such selections. Somewhat less
well documented, but nonetheless argued for by respected sociologists and
social psychologists, is the importance of the role reinforcement which goes
on within the work which is being performed by the individual worker. This
concept is really nothing more than the other side of the coin of the occupa-
tion selection concept for when working within an occupational framework, it
seems that the individual is placed in a situation where both his psychologi-
cal and his political orientations are influenced by the work itself and by
his fellow workers.

Masow and Form talk about this concept when they argue for a need to
understand "the socio-psychological outcomes of occupational role perform-
ance."[17] They suggest that factors such as isolation versus interaction, or
structured versus unstructured occupational role are all relevant to the
kinds of feedback which a worker receives from his job. Robert K. Merton,
in speaking of bureaucratic kinds of employment, argues that such work both
attracts and reinforces a personality which is "methodical, prudent, (and)
disciplined," thus requiring a "high degree of reliability of behavior, and
an unusual degree of conformity."[18] The pervasiveness of such values upon the
personality of the bureaucrat is significant, Merton claiming that "disci-
pline, readily interpreted as conformance with regulations whatever the situ-
ation, is seen not as a measure designed for specific purposes, but becomes
an immediate value in the life-organization of a bureaucrat."[19]

To the sociologist who studies this kind of phenomenon, different occupa-
tions develop that are sometimes labeled as occupational ideologies, these
ideologies being used not to describe the work, but to refer instead to the
credos which grow up about the particular work, its norms and habits. Miller
Lee Taylor, in his work, Occupational Sociology,[20] goes even further, sug-
gesting that these occupational ideologies, beyond referring to work norms
themselves, also "have vast consequences for political behavior, (and) social
creeds."[21]

All of these findings would seem to be a confirmation of what political
scientists have discovered in their own survey research studies (particularly
those dealing with voting) which have concentrated not so much on reinforce-
ment of psychological attitudes but on the direct effect of occupational
relationships on a political act such as voting. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and
McPhee found that the kinds of associations which persons maintained were
very important in voting behavior, and also that the impact of these associa-
tions increased over time. They suggested that as people grow older, they

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(17) Masow, Sigmund and Form, William, Man, Work and Society, New York:
Basic Books, 1962, p. 441.

(18) Ibid., p. 457.

(19) Ibid., p. 459.

(20) Taylor, Miller Lee, Occupational Sociology, New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1956, p. 318.

(21) Ibid., p. 431.

"come to fall into agreeable associations through the very process of living in jobs, communities (and) organizations."[22] The political impact of these associations was demonstrated by their data which showed that those who voted for the first time were in agreement in their vote with their three closest friends only half of the time, yet, by the time the same subjects had reached the age of thirty-five, this agreement percentage had climbed to 75%.

A further finding of the Berelson study was that among union members studied, those who had more social interaction with other members of the union and thus a more intense interpersonal relationship, voted more consistently with those close members than with those with whom they did not enjoy such a high level of interaction. Thus we are beginning to see that there is at least some evidence for the notion that there exists a kind of occupational reinforcement of both psychological traits and political opinions stemming from the occupational roles and associations which come through the occupational experience itself. We may consider it normal, then, for the businessman or for the public bureaucrat, to hold certain fundamental work norms and corresponding political norm attitudes. These views, which may already be present at the time of the selection of the occupation, are more than likely solidified over a period of time as a result of the selective associations and roles which have become central to the individual's occupational life. In short, we seem to have a significant reinforcing mechanism which is the exact other side of the coin from the occupational selection mechanism. The job is selected in part for its role attractiveness and then, once selected, it returns a kind of role feedback which enhances the original confluence of personality and occupation.

One more phenomenon must be reviewed to fully understand the cumulative nature of personality and politics. This phenomenon, usually referred to as selective perception, describes the psychological techniques with which people prefer to receive those items of information which confirm what they already believe to be true. It is a simple concept, and although it is difficult to test empirically without confusing selective perception with selective retention (that is what people subconsciously choose to remember), it is nonetheless quite clear that the human mind engages in a kind of selective filtration system which is related to what the psychologists Jones and Gerard call the "congeniality" of the subject matter.[23] Levine and Murphy's study of this concept, using groups of pro-communists and anti-communists, shows that both the learning period and the memory period of controversial political matter were altered by the biased perceptions of the groups involved.[24] Taft reports that the recall of an uncomplimentary poem about a Black baseball player was, as should be expected, significantly different for a group of Blacks than it was for a group of young prejudiced Whites.[25]

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(22) Berelson, Bernard R; Lazarsfeld, Paul F.; and McPhee, William, Voting, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, p. 97.

(23) Jones, Edward E. and Gerard, Harold B., Foundations of Social Psychology, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967.

(24) Levine, J. M., Murphy, G., "The Learning and Forgetting of Controversial Material," Journal of Abnormal Soc., Vol. 38 (1943), pp. 507-517.

(25) Taft, R., "Selective Recall and Memory Distortion of Favorable and Unfavorable Materia," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Vol. 49 (1954), pp. 23-29.

   Such selectivity is not only operative in the fields of social and psycho-
logical attitudes, but it is also well documented within the political liter-
ature. Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Faudet, writing in The People's Choice,[26]
another of the leading voting studies, demonstrate that people regulate their
intake of political material according to their political prejudices.
Lazarsfeld et al. report that in a pre-election period "people selected po-
litical material in accord with their own taste and bias. Even those who had
not yet made a decision exposed themselves to propaganda which fit their not-
yet-conscious political predispositions."[27] Again, "...the voter's attention
is steered by his predisposition, i.e. he discovers mainly what he will find
acceptable."[28] For the committed voter, therefore, his political preferences
"...served the important purpose of preserving prior decisions instead of
initiating new decisions."[29] So it seems that within the realm of basic at-
titudes, whether they be of an express political nature or not, there exists
some very clear selection techniques which fortify and aid in the retention
of previously held views.

   Let it be suggested that our evidence on a) occupational choice, b) occu-
pational role reinforcements and c) selective political exposure would thus
lead us to a second general hypothesis about the political dialogue, that
being that the basic psychological and social psychological schisms which
exist in a society are reinforced by a number of selection processes which
are made more available in an economically developed and occupationally atom-
ized society, thus maintaining and solidifying the role of the personality
variable in political analysis.

                               A Classical Debate

   It should be clear, although we have talked almost exclusively of the
rather static concepts of personality, that we are not arguing over whether
the role of personality is such that significant political change is not pos-
sible within a society; significant, that is, even without either totalitari-
an revolutionary or reactionary activity. The important distinction to make
is between change on individual issues germaine to a political system, and
significant alteration of a fundamental psychological distribution over the
entire spectrum of a nation's political attitudes. The old arguments about
whether stateways can or cannot make folkways seems to be pretty well decided,
even if it is not accepted in the minds of those who oppose change on certain
political issues. Some social change can take place within almost any but
the most reactionary of systems. Controlled experiments tend to substantiate
the conclusion that purposefully altered stateways can be used to change
folkways. For example, Morton Deutsch and Mary Evans Colls tested the effects
of attitudes towards Blacks among a) those Whites who were fully integrated
into a housing project as opposed to b) those Whites who were moved into sub-
sections which still maintained segregation within the project. As expected,

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   (26) Lazarsfeld, Paul F.; Berelson, Bernard R.; and Faudet, Hazel, The
People's Choice, New York: Columbia University Press, 1944.

   (27) Ibid., p. 80.

   (28) Ibid., p. 83.

   (29) Ibid., p. 87.

the effects upon interracial attitudes were significantly different for the
two developments, those Whites who were fully integrated changing their atti-
tudes towards Blacks much more substantially than those who were not.[30]

More directly within the field of psychology, the data on attitude change
has increased substantially in volume and persuasiveness over the last few
years. We will not attempt here to describe the studies on balance, congruity
and dissonance theory which have demonstrated the techniques of such attitude
change.[31] But suffice it to say at this stage that it is well agreed among
psychologists, even if there is not agreement on detail, that specific atti-
tudes, even significant attitudes, are capable of being changed by a variety
of persuasion techniques.

What seems to be equally clear, however, is that change to the degree that
someone could accurately label it a change of the basic personality does not
seem to be a possibility without radical environment or physiological altera-
tions. There are, of course, those extremists of the Right and Left who
would champion such full personality change, applauding activities which they
recognize as being principally behavioral in their technique. The concept of
psychological alteration is hardly a new idea, but among the modern propo-
nents of these changes are people like Donald Fleming who foresees a wide
range of possible uses for the alteration of the biological makeup of man.[32]
Fleming is primarily concerned with the removal of genetic defects, but he is
also talking about "custom-made people" as well as the acceptance of the
ethic of being willing to cooperate with the biological engineers.

Of course, there are many difficulties with such proposals, difficulties
of which writers like Fleming must surely be aware. Probably most signifi-
cant are the political and ethical issues which such designs surely raise,
for even if a political society could happen to agree to perform the kind of
biological engineering which would prevent conditions like sickle cell anemia,
or muscular dystrophy, or if it could even agree to the eradication of schizo-
phrenia or the manic-depressive syndrome, or even, perhaps, after considera-
bly more debate, there might be an agreement on the restriction of the right
of propagation of those carrying the XYY chromosome, which some evidence dem-
onstrates is linked with criminal behavior,[33] these issues are really quite
mild compared to the alterations of the kinds of personality traits which
the politically explosive authoritarian research is dealing with. One of the
problems which advocates like Professor Fleming must deal with is that a con-
servative such as E. L. Thorndike also believed in biological engineering,
but of course the product which Thorndike would have engineered would have

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(30) Deutsch, Morton and Collins, Mary Evans, "The Effect of Public Policy
in Housing Projects Upon Interracial Attitudes," in Sigel, Roberta, Learning
About Politics, New York: Random House, 1970, pp. 514-524.

(31) See Keisler, Charles A.; Collins, Barry E. and Miller, Norman, Atti-
tude Change, New York: Wiley, 1969.

(32) Fleming, Donald, "On Living in a Biological Revolution," Atlantic
Monthly, March 1969, pp. 64-70.

(33) Amir, Menachum and Berman, Yitzchak, "Chromosomal Deviation and
Crime," Federal Probation, June 1970, p. 55.

been an altogether different creature than what Fleming is envisioning.

There is, of course, a degree of personality change, or managed develop-
ment, which can be brought about through an intensive early socialization of
the coming generations. There is no question that environment plays a sig-
nificant role in the personality of the developing child. Experimental free
schools such as A. S. Neill's Summerhill are proposed by some who assert that
the universalization of such training would develop a personality which will
better serve the modern world. Yet even conceding that environment may be
having an effect in places such as Summerhill, does not answer at least two
important questions. The first is the question raised earlier: the resolu-
tion of the issue of whose educational ideas the society will politically
decide to choose. The John Birch Society's interest in the Parent Teachers
Associations around the country is something which the Summerhill advocates
will have to consider when they argue for the use of selective personality
development within the schools in the United States.

Further, the political argument is not the only obstacle standing in the
way of those who would advocate consciously biased childhood socialization.
A more important question to be answered, as we have suggested in the first
chapter, is the ancient question of just how far environment is able to alter
personality, a question which inevitably leads back to the ancient questions
of environment versus heredity. You will recall that we proposed, as the
third of the three basic inquiries of this work, to look into the questions
of environment and heredity and examine whether new evidence may throw light
onto the politically relevant aspects of this question. We are aware, as
surely as anyone who is a student of politics must be, that the political im-
plications of the definitive answer to this classical question are enormous.

The whole issue has been surrounded in a storm of advocacy, and in the
past those of a "liberal" persuasion have generally argued for an environ-
mental position, thus hoping for a kind of continued improvement of man, and
those of a "conservative" view have usually argued that man's nature is basi-
cally competitive and stands more or less immune to the appeal of such im-
provements.

With the old arguments growing stale, there is some hope for better an-
swers now that the issue is receiving the benefit of some long overdue empir-
ical study. Although it is not our purpose here to review that evidence in
great detail, it may be appropriate to point out that some of the recent
findings have tended to argue that some traits may be more subject to heredi-
tary influence than others.

Michael Lerner, writing in his textbook, Heredity, Evolution and Society,[34]
begins his discussion of the heredity question by chiding social scientists,
saying that "although there are still psychologists who deny genetic influ-
ences on the development of personality and on behavioral characters, the ac-
cumulation of vast amounts of data in recent years leaves no doubt that they
exist."[35]

(34) Lerner, I. Michael, Heredity, Evolution and Society, San Francisco:
W. H. Freeman & Co., 1968.

(35) Ibid., p. 165.

Lerner cites two studies by I. I. Gottesman, a psychologist, the first of which is based on thirty-four pairs of one-egg and thirty-four pairs of two-egg twins who took the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. Gottesman found substantial differences in the correlations between the two sets of pairs. Using a Hereditability index (h^2), to indicate the genetic variation when all environment is held constant, Gottesman found that certain specific traits had a hereditability index of near zero but that some other traits had a hereditability rating as high as .71. Interestingly, the trait which Gottesman found to be the most influenced by heredity was the trait of social introversion, a trait which we have found to be relevant to the construct political variable.

One footnote should be made to the Lerner material, and it concerns a matter which some authors have apparently anticipated. Darlington, cited by Eysenck in The Biological Basis of the Personality,[36] suggested as early as 1963 that there may be some prejudice in the studies which attempted to delineate between environmental and heredity influences. Noting that the primary method of study for this question had been the observance of identical twins, Darlington argued that there are several ways in which the division of the single ovum into two eggs may bring about an inexact measure of some quality, thus leaving the supposedly identical twins less than truly identical. Such a division would, of course, prejudice the degree of hereditary influence, because it did not account for an additional variance between the "identical" twins which could also be the result of inheritance.

More recently, an impressive piece of new evidence derived from a completely different methodology, has added to our notion that some personality variables are more susceptible to hereditary influences than others. Let us review the work of Raymond Cattell, a psychologist whose personal interviews give us another clue that it is the construct, or ideologically-related variables that are most susceptible to heredity.[37]

Using factor analysis on the results of his one hundred test responses, Cattell found that many of the classical theoretical notions about personality types were in fact being confirmed. For example, Jung's classical notion of the importance of introversion/extraversion was found to be very closely approximated by a Cattell-discovered factor which was also reflective of the extraversion/introversion trait. This finding squares with the earlier discoveries of McLeod who, in working with the introversion/extraversion dichotomy, found that between seventy and eighty percent of the total variance was caused by hereditary factors.[38]

The McLeod study, cited by Eysenck in 1954, was one of the first which dealt with the hereditary nature of politically relevant variables. Interestingly, it was Eysenck again who, in 1974, performed a much more sophisti-

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(36) Eysenck, Hans, The Biological Basis of Personality, Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1967.

(37) Cattell, Raymond, "Personality Pinned Down," Psychology Today, Vol. 7, No. 2, July 1973, pp. 40-46.

(38) McLeod, H., "An Experimental Study of the Inheritance of Introversion-Extraversion," Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1953.

cated study, using identical and non-identical twins to show that approxi-
mately 65% of radicalism was accounted for by heredity and that about 48% of
extraversion was accounted for by heredity.[39] Earlier studies, including
Karson and Pool's 1957 testing of the construct validity of the MMPI scales[40]
and Eysenck's 1956 study on the inheritance of the extraversion/introversion
traits also pointed to heavy genetic involvement.[41]

    In summary then, the traits which these respective researchers in their
own work have found to be subject to heredity influences, particularly the
traits of extraversion/introversion, are those very traits which we have
found to be relevant to the construct authoritarian variables. This impor-
tant linkage can only lead us to a recognition of the patterned confluence of
1) inherited personality traits, 2) construct authoritarian variables and
3) Left-wing versus Right-wing political attitudes. It is now a very reason-
able hypothesis, at the least, that the traits most subject to heredity tend
to be the very traits which we have shown to be important for the determina-
tion of political ideology. The coincidence of the results of these studies
with the theoretical notions of not only Jung but of others who have stressed
the coincidence of the syndrome of the variables tested here, are all of such
a character that we can no longer ignore the possibility of inheritable per-
sonality traits being in at least some part responsible for the timeless
ideological political division of Right versus Left.

    All of this is not to say that environment does not play a considerable
role in personality development or the development of political attitudes.
Obviously, within the ranges provided, a substantial attitudinal variance may
still be caused by contemporary environmental influences. Nonetheless, it is
becoming increasingly clear that the limits of environmental influence are
real, and the recognition of the inherent nature of a political distribution
as well as a recognition of those political devices which will accomodate the
more permanent differences between the different physiologies and political
beliefs which exist within the society, will become a necessary condition for
those who seek to ameliorate political conflict.

    It is interesting to note that Howard Zinn, writing of the recent New Left
movement of which he was so much a part, has said that "the New Left is anti-
authoritarian, it would - I expect - burn draft cards in any society."[42]
Rudi Dutschke, the noted German radical, when speaking of the alliance he
foresees between the children of the industrialized or exploitive countries,
argues that an alliance of that kind is looking ahead to "an anti-authoritar-
ian struggle, more Marcusean than Marxist in many of its features...."
Dutschke goes on to say, "the strength of the anti-authoritarian movement

    (39) Eaves, Lindon and Eysenck, Hans J., "Genetics and the Development of
Social Attitudes," Nature, Vol. 249, May 17, 1974, pp. 288-289.

    (40) Karson, S. and Pool, K. B., "The Construct Validity of the Sixteen
Personality Factors Test," J. Clin. Psychol., Vol. 13 (1957), pp. 245-252.

    (41) Eysenck, Hans J., "The Inheritance of Extraversion-Introversion,"
Acta Psychologica, Amsterdam, Vol. 12 (1956), pp. 95-110.

    (42) Zinn, Howard, Marxism and the New Left, Boston: Porter Sargent, 1969.

lies precisely in the fact that the practical-critical activity of the anti-
authoritarian is the real...expression of their own needs and of the inter-
ests of individuals."[43]

Statements such as these are important, of course, to an understanding of
the depth of the psychological variable within the political context. But
they are important as well to an understanding of the full psycho-political
spectrum, for all of these indications of the importance of the personality
variable, and particularly the importance of the hereditary role in the area
of the construct variables, would seem to confirm what some of the better
writers in the field of political psychology have been saying for some time
about the importance of a concrete notion of the role of personality in poli-
tics.

Probably the best defense for such an understanding of the personality and
politics linkage came originally from Fred Greenstein, who as we recall ad-
mitted that the previous literature which attempted such a linkage "is formi-
dably gnarled - empirically, methodologically, conceptually, and even in the
degree to which there is agreement that such a literature ought to exist."[44]

Yet, even after these admissions, Greenstein has always argued that be-
havior, political as well as any other behavior, is a function of not only
environmental situations but of relatively permanent psychological predispo-
sitions as well. Greenstein has responded to a number of objections about
the use of personality in politics by arguing among other things that per-
sonality is 1) not randomly distributed throughout different social groupings;
2) that social characteristics are a separate, albeit important area of con-
cern different from personality, and 3) that particular situations do not im-
pose uniform political behavior on all who would find themselves within the
same situation.[45]

Greenstein's arguments have been seconded by another political scientist
concerned with the impact of personality on political behavior. Robert Lane,
who has already told us about the existence of political ideology at all
levels of the society, has long stressed the importance of "the striving,
need-fulfilling character of social thought" in people's attitudes. Lane
argued that "if one knows what ideas will be useful to a man in his time and
situation, with his goals and needs, one knows how he will select from among
the available alternatives, and in what position he will strain them."[46]
Thus, in formulating our third hypothesis about personality and politics, let
us put the statements of Greenstein and Lane alongside the recent scientific
understandings of the inherited nature of certain personality traits, and let
us for our final hypothesis suggest that the fundamental differences between

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(43) Dutschke, Rudi, "On Anti-Authoritarianism," cited in The New Left
Reader, Carl Oglesby, ed., New York: Garden Press, 1969, pp. 243-250.

(44) Greenstein, Fred I., Personality and Politics, Chicago: Markham, 1969.

(45) Ibid., pp. 33-62.

(46) Lane, Robert, Political Thinking and Consciousness, Chicago:
Markham, 1969, p. 2.

the politics of the Right personality and the politics of the Left personali-
ty are inherent in the population at least to some degree, and although the
occurence of the psychological factor in political advocacy will take dif-
ferent forms, the nature of this factor will insure that psychological con-
siderations based upon the classical Left-Right psychological division will
continue to exist, if not increase in importance, within the political dia-
logue of the future.

Toward A Psychological Peace

If the three hypotheses concerning the relationship between psychology and
politics which we have posited in this chapter are reasonable, and if the
immediate conflict of any period can be seen, at least in part, as the con-
temporary replaying of an old and often repeated struggle, then perhaps an
educated society and a society truly concerned with the attainment of politi-
cal peace, can better understand its basic conflicts and proceed to amelio-
rate the harshness of its political debate. If our goal is a society which
is at the same time both just and peaceful, then we can begin to help our-
selves immeasurably by learning to recognize those issues which have a psy-
chological component within them, as we begin to attempt to develop those
political norms which are sufficiently flexible to accomodate themselves to
the struggles over values of this kind. As a primary requirement, it would
seem essential that the psycho-political norms of the society as a whole be
maintained reasonably well near the center or the mean of the psychological
authoritarian syndrome. Whenever a society becomes so structured and rigid
that those citizens of an anti-authoritarian disposition feel themselves to
be under an undue psychological repression, it should be interpreted as per-
fectly normal if some segments of that society rebel against these orders and
structures in their reach for freer psycho-political norms. Similarly, when
a society either undergoes periods of excessive change, or noticeable disin-
tegration of its previously accepted norms and values, thus removing the psy-
chological supports from those on the authoritarian side of the spectrum who
perceive such standards as necessary, it will be reasonable to expect con-
siderable conservative to Right-wing political activity which will lobby for
a return to more predictable and structured psycho-political norms.

Nonetheless, it is still probably too optimistic to expect that a society
which merely attempts to consciously fluctuate around a psychological mean
can ever attain a satisfactory psycho-political balance for all of its citi-
zens. The increasingly complex and interrelated nature of the present study
will bring continued frustration to some members of the population, particu-
larly those members near the poles, or extremes of the spectrum. What will
also be needed in the kind of political society which includes the psycho-
logical variable within its public considerations, will be the existence of a
reasonably high variance or tolerance around the psychological mean. Perhaps
this variance can be achieved by a political society which recognizes sub-
societies made up of persons who are located on only one end of this spec-
trum, or perhaps a truly tolerant society can find a way to accomodate the
entire psycho-political spectrum in resolving its disputes on major political
issues.

We have already mentioned, for example, the conflict between the recogni-
tion of intrinsic value versus extrinsic value in the determination of eco-
nomic worth for individuals employed in various occupations. This is the
kind of issue which has been a recurring conflict in political economy and we

may now be able to understand it better because we recognize the psychological
component within it. There are also questions about the relative competi-
tiveness of the soceity, and the conflict over whether those who engage in
more competitive activities will dominate, or whether those who choose not to
be so competitive shall also be given consideration, is one which we can now
understand better within a psychological context. There is the issue of
those persons who are independent of other persons, but are dependent on in-
stitutions as these people politically oppose those who are dependent on the
support of other persons in their opposition to institutions and who argue
for the development of a more human society which would rebel from what these
advocates perceive as the impersonal structures of our day.

     There are also the classical conflicts over such matters as social strati-
fication, a question which asks us if social hierarchies should be respected
as almost a human analog to the pecking orders which Roger Brown discusses in
the opening of his text, and there are probably many more such basic politi-
cal questions which, upon reflection, we could see as deeply ingrained with a
psychological element. Each of these questions will continue to fill the po-
litical dialogue, and we should now begin to learn to recognize what are the
predicted political perceptions of those on the two sides of the psycho-po-
litical spectrum. On the question of political change, we can expect that to
the ordered personality, the changes in the modern world will always seem to
come too fast; the old norms will seem too tenuous and insecure. The conser-
vative will attack those who promote such changes and he will look forward to
a time when a stability will be reached which will permit him the psychologi-
cal comfort of familiar supports. On the other hand, the unordered personal-
ity will typically chafe at the repressive nature of those standards which
the society expects him to obey. We can expect these persons to be psycho-
logically disposed to identify with those causes and groups which strike out
against the rigidities of existing doctrines and governments.

     Let it be clear that our purpose here has not been to comment on the rela-
tive merits of the claims of the two ideological sides. We have merely
sought to bring about the recognition of what the basic psychological com-
ponent is within the determination of those ethical questions which are im-
portant within the political thinking of each individual. The great moral
questions, we may find, should first be examined as part of the larger ques-
tions of which standards are to be used in our search for some degree of po-
litical justice.

A Standard of Justice

     If we can now understand this new psychological concept of balance, and if
we have sufficiently discussed the need for a recognition of both some kind
of psycho-political mean and some kind of ample psycho-political variance,
let it be suggested also that in our search for a kind of psycho-political
peace, we must learn to recognize the roots of the classical political argu-
ments as these arguments relate to psychological variables. But what we must
also come to recognize are the signals which would begin to tell us when our
modern society is straying from its true psycho-political mean. How do we
know, for example, whether we are becoming a society so structured and con-
fining that the actions of the anti-authoritarian personality, acting in re-
bellion against that society, are not a reasonable psychological response to
the political condition?

In at least this snese of restoring balances, the political extremes of
any society may provide a most useful service, for their protestations about
either constricted freedoms, or disintegrating supports, will usually be
heard first and loudest.

For just a moment, let us investigate the arguments of those who contend
that the political equilibrium has moved too far toward an overly constrained
and structured political existence. The most prominent argument, of course,
is that the efficiency-oriented, and technology-oriented society has placed
an overpowering burden on the psyche of those who are simply not of the or-
dered personality. Perhaps this argument can no longer be lightly dismissed.
There are substantial numbers of the population of industrial nations today,
and these are not only among the younger members of the community, who are
questioning the psychological costs of an ordered, bureaucratic, post-indus-
trial society. The substantial use of alcohol and the now prevalent use of
drugs, including everything from sleeping capsules to heroin, is pervading
all strata and ages of the often-frenzied industrial societies. Can an ob-
jective viewer fail to overlook the possibility that a kind of psychological
limit of order and constraint has been reached for at least some percentage
of the American population?

This is an argument which the political Left has made rather frequently
lately, and it is accompanied by another argument which the Left has not used
as often, but which may have equal validity. Is it not conceivable, particu-
larly since the time of the industrial revolution, that there have been many
more anti-authoritarian personalities in the population than the orthodox
political-economic constraints of an industrial society has honestly recog-
nized? Until the very recent period of material abundance, the economically
productive individual has been the revered member of the society. Since the
coming of the industrial age, the ordered, dutiful, and ever more atomized
worker has been praised more substantially than he was in perhaps any of the
more undeveloped economic periods before industrialism.

Under the new industrial political economy, it has become more likely that
it is the ordered personality who has prospered both because he has been able
to profitably work under these norms and because it was his style of achieve-
ment that was held out to his fellow worker as a model for all to follow.
But what we have never seemd to consider is that those who were not of this
temperament may well have existed all along, never having been recognized be-
cause their contribution to the society was somehow less visible. Now, for
the first time in history, in spite of recent energy and commodity shortages,
a significant part of the world lives in a condition of relative economic
well-being. The unordered personality presently may be able to not only ex-
press his own true personality, but also have his contribution recognized
without having to compete psychologically with those personality types who
have dominated the political world so regularly in the past two hundred
years.

The Peace of Tolerance

So let it be argued that what remains to be asked after a study of this
kind has been undertaken is whether or not a true rapprochement between dif-
ferent personality types is in fact possible within an industrialized socie-
ty. It has already been suggested that any just society must learn to recog-
nize the signs which tell it whether it is either straying too far from a

psycho-political mean or permitting too small a variance from that mean.
These mean and variance solutions may help to ameliorate a degree of the po-
litical conflict, but they are probably not sufficient to bring about the
kind of real peace which a human society, whether it be a nation or a world
society, would like to enjoy.

Perhaps it is too idealistic to ever expect a major reconciliation between
those who are on opposite sides of so basic a psycho-political division. Yet,
it could be argued that something like a full understanding of the importance
of the psychological variable may be the cost we shall have to pay in order
to prevent increasing ideological tension in the coming generations. Within
those societies which have sustained economic development to the degree in
which political confrontation is now at least in part waged on a "higher"
psychological level of conflict, the possibilities for deep psychologically-
motivated conflict within a society are, of course, increasing. Stepping
across international boundaries, we can even see that such conflicts may
exist within a single society but at the same time present the societies
which observe them with the sad opportunities for a relatively easy involve-
ment in the ideological warfare of another country. Perhaps we have already
witnessed the first struggle of that nature in the Spanish Civil War, a war
in which economic considerations were not of primary importance but in which
the emotions surrounding the struggle were powerful enough to bring individ-
uals into armed combat from all over the world.

Today, in a period of desparate need for new political institutions, the
current proposals for a peaceful society are not only devoid of this critical
psychological component, but they still smack too heavily of the ideologies
of only their own advocates, people who are usually unable to see a peaceful
society in anything more than the terms which represent peace to their own
ideologies.

Religious evangelists talk of peace, but it always seems to be necessary
to join their religion and accept their view of an authoritarian world before
peace with them can be enjoyed. Radicals talk of peace as well, yet are we
sure that all the faculties of at least some human personalities would re-
ceive proper consideration under the sometimes formless world which the radi-
cal usually prescribes? In fact, few of the current spokesmen for a peaceful
world would seem to be able to propose a peace which includes the necessary
provisions for all of a citizenry which possesses such differing personali-
ties.

But not all the responsibility for peace can rest with the spokesman of a
society. In order to maintain a rapprochement between differing peoples, it
will first be necessary for the citizens of that society to recognize the
existence and the contributions of differing personalities. It will be nec-
essary in a better world for both educators and politicians to teach a level
of personal tolerance that specifically incorporates a deep understanding of
human personality and political difference. Let it be argued that even this
tolerance will be infinitely more possible once there has been an acceptance
by the citizenry of the concept of a truly varied and counter-balanced psy-
chological world.

Ultimately, on those moral questions which have always been in the center
of public debate, we should remember the admonitions of the relativist philo-
sopher Edward Westermarck who warned us against the practice of accusing
those who disagreed with us of being either uneducated or morally

defective.[47] We should remember as well the simple evidence presented by
Roger Brown, who, as we might have expected, found no differences in intelli-
gence between those who scored on both ends of the political spectrum. Fi-
nally, we should be prepared to use our increasing knowledge of the relation-
ship between psychology and politics to understand political philosophies,
such as political value relativism, and expand that concept of relativism be-
yond the cultural relativism discussed by people like Herskovits[48] into the
kind of neutral value relativism which the political theorist Brecht has
talked about so well.[49] In short, we as citizens must become capable of
nothing less than a simple human tolerance, a tolerance which recognizes the
psychological needs of all of those who will relate to a world which we now
know each views in fundamentally different ways. The economic producers and
the bureaucrats must no longer consider the artist and intellectual as less
productive for his unwillingness to grapple with those tasks which the bureau-
crat enjoys. Similarly, the intellectual must attempt to rid himself of the
often-expressed feeling that the non-introspective personality, one who finds
his enjoyment in producing a product or working within a functional hierar-
chy, is somehow less morally committed to humanity and its betterment.

And so too with politics, we must learn to accept the existence, if not
the merits, of those views which we may intensely dislike; and we must learn
to accept this because we now recognize the legitimate roots of these beliefs
within a relativistic notion of man's basic psychology. Perhaps in a society
which seeks peace so sincerely that its citizens make psychological sacri-
fices which may well prove to be more difficult than all but the most severe
economic sacrifices, we can achieve peace through a level of deep under-
standing of citizens on the other side of the psychological spectrum. Hope-
fully, the delineation of the nature of the anti-authoritarian personality
has advanced that understanding in a small way. But more than academic
studies, our task will require a new tolerance, a tolerance not necessarily
of all political ideas, but a tolerance of all men; and of all men as they
are, and not as we would have them.

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(47) Westermarck, Edward, Ethical Relativity, Patterson: Littlefield,
Adams and Co., 1960.

(48) Herskovits, Melville J., "Some Further Comments on Cultural Rela-
tivism," American Anthropologist, Vol. 60 (1958), pp. 266-273.

(49) Brecht, Arnold, Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1959, p. 134.

APPENDIX A

Return Percentages

	Sample	Return	%
Bloomington	556	172	30.9
Fort Wayne	498	336	67.5
South Bend	496	212	42.8
Kokomo	436	177	40.6
Gary	507	204	40.2
Total	2493	1101	44.5

Note: Eight of the original 1109 responses were discarded because of missing data.

APPENDIX B

Return Percentages by Sex

Campus	Male		Female	
	Pop.	Sample	Pop.	Sample
Bloomington	55.8	50.9	44.2	49.1
Fort Wayne	50.7	51.4	49.3	48.6
South Bend	52.8	50.8	47.2	49.2
Kokomo	48.2	42.4	51.8	57.6
Gary	48.0	44.5	52.0	55.5
Total	54.3	47.5	45.7	52.5

APPENDIX C

Return Percentages by Class

Campus	Freshman		Sophomore		Junior		Senior		Graduate	
	Pop.	Sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Pop.	Sam.
Bloom.	22.1	19.3	17.3	28.1	16.6	18.1	19.2	19.9	24.8	14.6
F. W.	30.3	31.0	19.0	20.2	14.9	18.2	13.7	11.9	22.1	18.7
S. B.	33.6	26.1	20.1	23.6	15.2	16.7	13.1	15.8	18.0	17.7
Kok.	48.4	34.2	19.7	25.6	11.7	12.3	5.4	8.2	14.8	15.2
Gary	37.6	33.5	14.7	22.6	15.0	10.4	11.2	12.3	21.5	21.2
Total	26.5	30.0	17.6	23.3	15.9	15.5	16.6	13.3	23.2	17.8

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Campus	Male		Female	
	Pop.	Sample	Pop.	Sample
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Fort Wayne	50.7	51.4	49.3	48.6
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Bloom.	22.1	19.3	17.3	28.1	16.6	18.1	19.2	19.9	24.8	14.6
F. W.	30.3	31.0	19.0	20.2	14.9	18.2	13.7	11.9	22.1	18.7
S. B.	33.6	26.1	20.1	23.6	15.2	16.7	13.1	15.8	18.0	17.7
Kok.	48.4	34.2	19.7	25.6	11.7	12.3	5.4	8.2	14.8	15.2
Gary	37.6	33.5	14.7	22.6	15.0	10.4	11.2	12.3	21.5	21.2
Total	26.5	30.0	17.6	23.3	15.9	15.5	16.6	13.3	23.2	17.8

APPENDIX D

Item Analysis - Psychological Items

Item	1st Quartile Mean	Variance	4th Quartile Mean	Variance	T-scores
1	3.69	1.04	2.74	1.26	10.39
2	3.34	1.35	2.01	0.90	14.71
3	2.83	1.84	3.04	1.52	-
4	3.83	1.06	2.37	1.13	16.25
5	3.76	0.85	2.63	1.09	12.26
6	3.29	0.96	2.27	0.87	12.52
7	2.81	0.97	2.48	1.03	3.87
8	4.12	0.61	3.10	1.53	11.56
9	3.36	1.09	2.68	1.36	7.20
10	2.99	1.20	2.27	0.84	8.36
11	3.67	0.72	2.31	1.19	16.71
12	4.13	0.78	2.69	1.01	17.84
13	3.63	1.04	2.26	1.00	15.91
14	4.00	0.42	3.08	0.99	13.33
15	3.61	0.80	2.85	0.94	9.56
16	3.48	1.23	1.90	1.13	17.06
17	3.08	1.30	2.38	1.24	7.28
18	3.20	1.04	1.98	0.82	14.84
19	3.84	0.76	3.67	1.16	2.04
20	3.58	0.99	2.37	0.98	14.30
21	3.79	0.81	2.87	1.09	11.07
22	3.07	1.04	2.23	0.71	10.54
23	3.12	1.25	2.54	1.25	6.09
24	2.92	1.25	2.41	1.10	5.52
25	3.30	1.11	1.95	0.72	16.56
26	4.05	0.80	2.98	1.19	12.57
27	3.66	1.27	1.76	0.75	22.17
28	3.88	0.58	2.97	1.30	11.02
29	3.80	0.85	2.60	1.06	14.41
30	3.32	0.97	2.36	0.81	11.94
31	2.97	0.90	1.99	0.65	13.05
32	3.03	0.71	2.38	0.82	8.71

APPENDIX E

Item Analysis - Political Items

Item	1st Quartile		4th Quartile		T-scores
	Mean	Variance	Mean	Variance	
1	4.57	0.38	2.91	0.95	36.81
2	4.38	0.74	3.69	0.87	8.99
3	4.08	0.65	2.27	0.71	25.75
4	4.57	0.30	3.04	0.72	25.12
5	4.31	0.72	2.56	0.93	22.58
6	3.75	0.99	1.84	0.43	22.60
7	4.25	0.54	3.02	0.95	16.71
8	3.00	1.03	2.06	0.54	12.43

All items in the political scale are well above the acceptable 12.43 significance levels.

APPENDIX F

Rotated Factor Analysis

Item	Factor #1	Factor #2	Factor #3	Factor #4	Factor #5	Factor #6	Factor #7	Factor #8	Factor #9
1	.10523	.07125	.46322	.10366	.07085	.10477	.04625	.05404	-.12594
2	.37198	.21991	.00024	.07147	.13226	.29589	.00959	-.01235	-.08786
3	-.06415	.14668	.41401	.03771	-.01014	.05870	.06764	.04416	.07638
4	.57426	-.02606	.02466	.07172	.14080	.11784	.14139	-.08409	-.02303
5	.10712	.19387	.32053	-.11210	.07079	.05834	.48601	.06567	-.01948
6	.22286	.10419	.09426	-.04970	.45022	.16649	.28704	.06082	-.11187
7	-.18231	.00434	.10097	.17137	-.08038	.44169	.13304	.00368	.18995
8	.25882	.03141	.18227	-.08314	.09334	.42814	-.03402	.06672	-.04039
9	.05204	-.01872	.36133	.09069	-.06843	.03193	.11137	.09157	.00127
10	.32763	-.04656	.04619	.12799	.11798	.01656	.00969	-.18724	-.07856
11	.23564	.06187	.35324	.24533	.05834	.13677	.24982	.12094	.01301
12	.37721	.20322	.22255	.04156	.15882	.21791	.10069	-.04681	.04996
13	.11002	.12736	.13741	.22144	.14987	.13937	.53572	-.02469	.01457
14	.27074	.16115	.01576	.01447	.40662	.01714	.10392	.01404	.08077
15	-.04433	.19110	.19360	.06741	.13179	.07796	.05472	.33208	.10018
16	.32972	.14520	.07159	.25820	.18703	.06172	.04774	.01611	.31116
17	.07397	.06559	.04649	.10513	-.08864	-.02494	.04092	.36238	.01328
18	.52479	.11235	-.02068	.13320	.04264	.02842	-.01539	.05601	.13149
19	-.30012	.06363	.19753	.10049	.10574	.00875	.02686	.38160	-.02057
20	.45163	.11680	.07296	.01433	.06890	.01215	.05509	-.00170	.07500
21	.07748	.25507	.07119	.00834	.05591	-.08289	.42013	.09918	-.10232
22	.20547	.13485	-.09911	.06296	.34596	-.06273	.04359	-.10839	.17656
23	-.02326	.07220	.06595	.44577	-.03246	-.02104	-.02752	.21396	.03434
24	.11868	-.01070	-.01154	.01978	.04501	.06015	-.06512	.04644	.41409
25	.13708	.34357	.08219	.24336	.08886	.02092	.13589	.23849	-.04670
26	.28951	.07476	.31321	-.08808	.28625	-.00528	.00893	.03469	.13047
27	.27920	.64353	.10136	.00576	-.02235	.17616	.20975	.11362	.10320
28	.45058	-.04055	.10159	-.06818	.05817	-.07253	.09492	.18666	.10794
29	.00009	.52066	.18972	.11988	.11152	-.05906	.18902	.11977	-.00887
30	.37591	.08721	.00988	-.21084	.15238	-.05544	.19026	.05583	.08928
31	.16360	.07884	.22068	.44885	.02219	.10640	.11618	.02446	.05267
32	.24544	.01610	.15623	.02784	.04717	.25859	.01644	-.14969	.12944

Factor 1: Personal Order
Factor 2: Power
Factor 3: Impulse
Factor 4: Impulse Attitude
Factor 5: Introspective Values
Factor 6: Introspection
Factor 7: General Anti-authoritarianism
Factor 8: Imposed Order
Factor 9: Resultant Order

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