


PALGRAVE
HANDBOOKS



THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, REVOLUTION, AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

Edited by
Berch Berberoglu



The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements,
Revolution, and Social Transformation

Berch Berberoglu
Editor

The Palgrave
Handbook of Social
Movements,
Revolution, and Social
Transformation

palgrave
macmillan

Editor

Berch Berberoglu
Department of Sociology
University of Nevada, Reno
Reno, NV, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-92353-6 ISBN 978-3-319-92354-3 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018954416

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover image © manopjk

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG

The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This Handbook addresses some of the key issues related to the nature and dynamics of social movements and revolutions as the basis for the transformation of society. The project that we have undertaken here with colleagues who are experts in their areas of study provide the latest research and analysis on a variety of social movements on a global scale, with focus on major social movements and revolutions of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Moreover, the social movements selected for study in this Handbook are for their historical significance and impact on struggles around the world. Thus, this work is an inquiry into the *nature and dynamics* of social movements, revolutions, and social transformations that have had a major impact on society and social structure, so we can better understand the sources of political power and the process of social transformations to affect change.

The thread that runs through each of the contributions that make up this Handbook, especially in the analysis of the major social movements that are taken up for study, is the *class nature of the state* and *the class forces involved in the various social movements confronting the state*. Applying class analysis to the study of social movements and revolutions provides us with a clear understanding of *the nature and dynamics of the process* that has been unfolding in societies experiencing conditions that lead to social change. Here of special importance is the *class basis* of the various social movements and the class identity and ideology of the organizations and leadership of these movements, as well as the *level of class consciousness and political awareness* of the social forces that have been mobilizing and fighting for their liberation.

Social movements cannot succeed merely through their mobilization against the forces that keep them down. In assessing the balance of class forces in the class struggle, one needs to know the nature and degree of cohesion and dissension among the dominant classes, the state's response to the deteriorating social and economic conditions, and the political options the ruling class is prepared to exercise through the state to control the unfolding revolutionary situation. These factors are extremely important in understanding the nature

and direction of social movements and revolutions in the making, and also in discerning the nature and complexities of the new post-revolutionary order after the taking of state power. This is especially important for working-class movements fighting for socialist revolution.

After an introductory essay providing the context and background to the formation and dynamics of social movements and revolutions in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the Handbook provides a critical analysis of major classical and contemporary theories of social movements and revolutions, counterposing the Marxist perspective to mainstream conventional theories on these topics. Against this theoretical background, the Handbook provides a methodological approach to the study of movement waves in the making of history and a set of historical case studies on social movements, rebellions, and revolutions from the turn of the twentieth to the early twenty-first centuries, focusing on varieties of social movements and revolutions that have had and continue to have a major impact on societies across the world. The Handbook concludes by providing competing trajectories on the future course of development of social movements and revolutions in the twenty-first century, assessing the contradictory dynamics of social movements, revolutions, and counterrevolutions that we will be confronting in the future.

Organizing and carrying out a project of this nature involves the cooperation of many people who are passionately dedicated to it and want it to succeed. While I have assumed primary responsibility to lead the effort as editor of this important Handbook to guide it toward its completion, the project would not have succeeded without the seminal contributions of experts who have provided an impressive set of articles that comprise the various chapters of this important Handbook. I would like to thank all the contributors to this volume for their participation in this project by providing cutting-edge research and scholarship in their respective areas of study.

I would also like to thank my former editor Alexis Nelson for commissioning this project to me as editor of my Palgrave Series on Social Movements and Transformation, and my current editor Mary Al-Sayed for her confidence in me to complete the project in a timely manner. It is through the wisdom and persistence of both of my editors at Palgrave that I embraced this project and carried it through to its successful completion.

Finally, this Handbook is dedicated to all revolutionary social movements that have struggled and continue to struggle together with and on behalf of the great masses of the people the world over to bring about a just and equitable society free of oppression and exploitation. It is thanks to their selfless struggles throughout history that humanity has a chance to free itself from all forms of domination and injustice. The future belongs to all those who have engaged in these protracted struggles for human liberation, so that in the end people shall be free!

CONTENTS

1	Introduction: Dynamics of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation	1
	Berch Berberoglu	
	<i>Historical Background</i>	2
	<i>Factors Leading to the Emergence of Social Movements</i>	3
	<i>Movement Organization, Strategy, and Tactics</i>	6
	<i>Social Movements in the Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries</i>	7
	<i>Conclusion</i>	11
	<i>References</i>	13
Part I	Theoretical, Methodological, and Historical Approaches to Social Movements, Revolutions, and Social Transformation	15
2	Classical and Contemporary Conventional Theories of Social Movements	17
	Clayton D. Peoples	
	<i>Classical Conventional Theories of Social Movements</i>	18
	<i>Contemporary Conventional Theories of Social Movements</i>	22
	<i>Conclusion</i>	30
	<i>References</i>	33
3	Methodological Approaches to Movement Waves and the Making of History	35
	Ben Manski	
	<i>Conceptualizing Movement Building in Dimensions of Struggle</i>	37
	<i>How to Conduct a Movement Building Analysis</i>	46
	<i>The Method in Action: The Wisconsin Uprising and Beyond</i>	48
	<i>Conclusions</i>	52
	<i>References</i>	58

4	The Marxist Theory of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation	65
	Berch Berberoglu	
	<i>Social Movements, the State, and Class Struggle</i>	66
	<i>The Capitalist State and Class Struggle</i>	70
	<i>The State, Class Struggle, and Revolution</i>	72
	<i>Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation</i>	74
	<i>Globalization and the Future of Social Movements and Revolution</i>	76
	<i>Conclusion</i>	79
	<i>References</i>	82
5	Twentieth-Century Socialist Revolutions and Their Class Components: Russia, China, Cuba, and Vietnam	85
	James F. Petras	
	<i>The Origins of Revolutionary Organization</i>	86
	<i>Periodization and Ideology</i>	87
	<i>Class Participants in Socialist Revolution</i>	90
	<i>The Social Identity of the Intellectuals</i>	91
	<i>Rural Labor and Socialist Revolution</i>	91
	<i>Rural Labor and Political Organization</i>	94
	<i>The Role of Urban Workers</i>	97
	<i>The Myth of Working-Class Privilege</i>	99
	<i>The Revolutionary Alliance</i>	101
	<i>The Revolutionary Party and the Working Class</i>	103
	<i>The Primacy of Politics</i>	106
	<i>Conclusion</i>	108
	<i>References</i>	112
Part II	Social Movements and Social Change: Varieties of Social Movements in the Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Century	115
6	Repression, Resistance, and Development of the Labor Movement in the United States	117
	Andrew Kolin	
	<i>Institutional Exclusion and Labor's Response to Repression</i>	121
	<i>Social Divisions and the Role of Labor Anti-Communism</i>	129
	<i>The Decline of Organized Labor and the Rise of Finance Capital</i>	135
	<i>The Future of Organized Labor</i>	137
	<i>References</i>	146

7	Decade of Turbulence: Social Movements and Rebellion in the 1960s	151
	Alan J. Spector	
	<i>Background to the Social Movements of the 1960s</i>	152
	<i>The Civil Rights/Black Liberation Movement</i>	153
	<i>The Urban Rebellions</i>	155
	<i>The Campus Anti-War Movement</i>	160
	<i>Students for a Democratic Society</i>	161
	<i>The Women's Rights Movement</i>	167
	<i>Labor Insurgency</i>	168
	<i>The Counter Cultural Movement</i>	170
	<i>Conclusion</i>	171
	<i>References</i>	176
8	Neoliberalism and Social Movements in Latin America: Mobilizing the Resistance	177
	James F. Petras and Henry Veltmeyer	
	<i>Historical Background</i>	178
	<i>The Resurgence of the Latin American Left</i>	179
	<i>The Political Left in the Neoliberal World Order</i>	180
	<i>The Political Context for the Resurgence of Popular Movements</i>	183
	<i>The Left Social Movements: Mobilizing the Anti-Neoliberal Resistance and Social Revolution</i>	184
	<i>A Third Wave of Anti-Neoliberal Social Movements: The Rural Landless Workers of Brazil Take Center Stage</i>	186
	<i>Regime Change and Capitalist Development in the New Millennium</i>	189
	<i>The Resistance, Class Struggle, and Social Movements on the Expanding Frontier of Extractive Capital</i>	191
	<i>The Class Struggle and Social Movement Dynamics of the Resistance</i>	193
	<i>Social Movement Dynamics in the Post-Neoliberal Era</i>	199
	<i>Conclusion</i>	202
	<i>References</i>	208
9	Neoliberalism, State Repression and the Rise of Social Protest in Africa	213
	Patrick Bond	
	<i>Bottom-Up Resistance Rises</i>	216
	<i>Protest, Repression, and Resistance in South Africa</i>	220
	<i>Continental Bottom-Up Protests in Search of an Overarching Ideology</i>	224
	<i>References</i>	229

10	The Naxalite Movement, the Oppressive State, and the Revolutionary Struggle in India	233
	Ashok Kumbamu	
	<i>The Adivasis and the Naxalite Movement</i>	235
	<i>Neoliberalism, Extractive Capital, and the Oppressive State</i>	238
	<i>Conclusion</i>	242
	<i>References</i>	246
11	Neoliberalism, Contentious Politics, and the Rise of Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia	249
	Walden Bello	
	<i>Cambodia: Toward a Personalist Dictatorship</i>	250
	<i>Thailand: Revolution and Counterrevolution</i>	253
	<i>Duterte and the Revolt Against Liberal Democracy in the Philippines</i>	258
	<i>Conclusion</i>	262
	<i>References</i>	266
12	Nationalism and Nationalist Movements in the Age of Neoliberal Globalization	269
	Berch Berberoglu	
	<i>The Class Nature of Nationalism and Nationalist Movements</i>	270
	<i>Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict on a World Scale</i>	274
	<i>The Rise of Right-Wing Ultranationalist Movements in the Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Century</i>	282
	<i>Conclusion</i>	291
	<i>References</i>	298
Part III	Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation in the Twenty-First Century	299
13	Global Justice Movements: Past, Present, and Future	301
	Lauren Langman and Tova Benski	
	<i>Globalization and Neoliberalism</i>	306
	<i>Mobilizations from Below</i>	307
	<i>Global Justice Movements</i>	310
	<i>Social Movements in the New Millennium</i>	312
	<i>The Prospects for Change</i>	318
	<i>References</i>	323

14	Neoliberalism, the Global Capitalist Crisis, and the Occupy Wall Street Movement	325
	Levin Welch	
	<i>Structural Context</i>	325
	<i>Social Movements, Ideology, and Web 2.0</i>	327
	<i>Methods and Data</i>	329
	<i>A Brief History of Occupy Wall Street</i>	330
	<i>Analysis of Occupy Wall Street Online Discourse</i>	332
	<i>The Shortcomings of the Movement: Occupy Wall Street and Its Insensitivity to Color-Blind Racism</i>	338
	<i>Conclusion</i>	341
	<i>References</i>	347
15	Neoliberal Globalization and Transnational Women's Movements in the Early Twenty-First Century	353
	Ligaya Lindio-McGovern	
	<i>The Context of the Neoliberal Nation-State and Beyond National Borders: The Philippine Case</i>	355
	<i>Social Reproduction as a Context of Struggle: Transnational Movements of Migrant Domestic Workers</i>	362
	<i>Indigenous Women's Transnational Resistance and Global Women's Solidarity</i>	365
	<i>Conclusion</i>	367
	<i>References</i>	371
16	Social Movements and New Technology: The Dynamics of Cyber Activism in the Digital Age	373
	Victoria Carty and Francisco G. Reynoso Barron	
	<i>New Technology Platforms and Social Movement Organizing</i>	374
	<i>The Use of ICTs to Support Social Justice Issues</i>	376
	<i>Hactivism and Other Forms of Electronic Activism</i>	387
	<i>Conclusion</i>	390
	<i>References</i>	395
17	System Change, Not Climate Change: Radical Social Transformation in the Twenty-First Century	399
	John Foran	
	<i>Naming the Enemy</i>	400
	<i>Political Cultures of Opposition: A Brief History of the Twentieth Century</i>	400
	<i>Political Cultures of Creation: A Brief Survey of the Present</i>	401

<i>The Great Movements for Radical Social Change in the Early Twenty-First Century</i>	403
<i>What We Might Try: A Proposal</i>	409
<i>Linking Arms: A US Scenario</i>	413
<i>Concluding Thoughts</i>	416
<i>References</i>	421
18 Global Social Movements and World Revolutions in the Twenty-First Century	427
Christopher Chase-Dunn and Sandor Nagy	
<i>Social Movements and Revolutions in World-Historical Perspective</i>	427
<i>The Multicentric Network of Leftist Movements</i>	433
<i>Global North/South Challenges</i>	434
<i>A Global United Front?</i>	436
<i>References</i>	441
19 Conclusion: Socialism in Our Time? The Prospects for Socialism in the Twenty-First Century	447
Berch Berberoglu	
Select Bibliography	453
Index	473

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

EDITOR

Berch Berberoglu is Foundation Professor of Sociology and Director of the Ozmen Institute for Global Studies at the University of Nevada, Reno. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Oregon in 1977. He has been teaching and conducting research at the University of Nevada, Reno, for the past 40 years. Dr. Berberoglu has written and edited 32 books and many articles. His most recent books include *The State and Revolution in the Twentieth Century: Major Social Transformations of Our Time*; *Globalization in the 21st Century: Labor, Capital, and the State on a World Scale*; *Class and Class Conflict in the Age of Globalization*; *Beyond the Global Capitalist Crisis: The World Economy in Transition*; *Political Sociology in a Global Era*; and *The Global Capitalist Crisis and Its Aftermath*. His areas of specialization include globalization, international political economy, development, class structure, political sociology, social movements, and revolution. He is currently working on a new book titled *America After Empire: The Promise and the Vision for a New America in the 21st Century*, which will be published by Routledge in 2019.

CONTRIBUTORS

Walden Bello is currently International Adjunct Professor of Sociology at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He was Professor of Sociology at the University of the Philippines from 1994 to 2009. He is the author or co-author of 21 books and many articles. His latest books include *Paradigm Trap* and *Capitalism's Last Stand: Deglobalization in the Age of Austerity*. As an activist, he is engaged in human rights, environmental, political, and economic issues. As an associate of the Transnational Institute and a board member of Focus on the Global South, he received the Right Livelihood Award (also known as the Alternative Nobel Prize) in 2003 and was named Outstanding Public Scholar by the International Studies Association in 2008.

Tova Benski is a Senior Lecturer Emerita at the School of Social Sciences, The College of Management—Academic Studies, in Rishon Leziyon, Israel. Her fields of interest include gender, social movements, peace studies, and the sociology of emotions. Dr. Benski has been engaged in research on the Israeli women's peace mobilizations since the late 1980s and has published extensively on this and related topics. She is the co-author of the book *Internet and Emotions* and co-editor of a Special Issue of *Current Sociology* "From Indignation to Occupation: A New Wave of Global Mobilization." Her co-authored book *Iraqi Jews in Israel* won a prestigious academic prize in Israel. Currently she is the President of RC 48 of the International Sociological Association.

Patrick Bond is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Witwatersrand, Wits School of Governance in Johannesburg, South Africa. He received his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University. He was formerly associated with the University of KwaZulu-Natal, where he directed the Center for Civil Society from 2004 to 2016. His research interests include political economy, environment, social policy, and geopolitics focused on Africa. He has published numerous books, including *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism*; *Against Global Apartheid*; *Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation*; and *Politics of Climate Justice*.

Victoria Carty is Associate Professor of Sociology at Chapman University in Orange County, California. She received her Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of New Mexico. Dr. Carty has written extensively on ways in which digital technology and social media are changing the nature of contentious politics and social movement organizing both in the United States and internationally. She is the author of numerous books and journal articles. Her latest books are *Social Movements and New Technology* and *Mobilizing Public Sociology: Scholars, Activists, and Latin@ Migrants Converse on Common Ground*.

Christopher Chase-Dunn is a Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of California, Riverside. Dr. Chase-Dunn is the author of *Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems* (with Thomas D. Hall), *The Wintu and Their Neighbors* (with Kelly Mann), and *The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism* (with Terry Boswell). He is the founder and former editor of the *Journal of World-Systems Research*. Chase-Dunn is currently doing research on transnational social movements. He also studies the rise and fall of settlements and polities since the Stone Age and global state formation.

John Foran is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California, Berkeley. Dr. Foran has published numerous books on social movements, revolution, and social change. He works passionately as a scholar-activist on and within the global climate justice movement, which he sees as at the center of the struggle for any prospect of achieving social justice and radical social change. Much of his work is published at www.resilience.org.

Andrew Kolin is Professor of Political Science at Hilbert College in Hamburg (near Buffalo), New York, where he has been teaching for the past 17 years. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from City University of New York Graduate Center in 1991. His areas of research and teaching interests include how the state uses force and violence, in particular, the state and genocidal practices, the ideology of state power and its cultural reproduction, as well as state repression and the concept of a police state. He is the author of several books and many articles, including *Political Economy of Labor Repression in the United States* and *State Power and Democracy*.

Ashok Kumbamu is an Assistant Professor of Biomedical Ethics at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Alberta, Canada. His research and teaching interests are in the areas of critical development studies, agrarian studies, and social movements, among others. He has published numerous papers in international journals, such as *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, *Current Anthropology*, and *Community Development*. He is currently completing a book manuscript, *Seeds of Dispossession: A Global Ethnography of the "Gene Revolution."*

Lauren Langman is Professor of Sociology at Loyola University of Chicago. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Chicago. His work is in the tradition of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, especially on relationships between culture, identity, politics, and social movements. Dr. Langman is the past President of Alienation Research and Theory Committee of the International Sociological Association and past President of the Marxist section of the American Sociological Association, where he recently received the Lifetime Achievement Award. His most recent publications include *God, Guns, Gold and Glory* (with George Lundskow) and *Inequality in the 21st Century: Marx, Piketty and Beyond*.

Ligaya Lindio-McGovern is a Professor of Sociology and Co-founder of the Office for Sustainability at Indiana University Kokomo. She received her Ph.D. in Sociology from Loyola University of Chicago. A recipient of a Fulbright Research Award in 2017, she conducted research on the impact of extractive corporate mining on indigenous communities in the Philippines. Dr. McGovern's research and teaching interests include gender and globalization, social movements, and social change. She is the author of *Globalization, Labor Export and Resistance* and *Filipino Peasant Women: Exploitation and Resistance*. A former Director of Women's Studies, she is co-editor of *Globalization and Third World Women* and *Gender and Globalization*. Her activism centers on Philippine national liberation, human rights, and women's movements.

Ben Manski is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is also a Fellow with the Liberty Tree Foundation, Associate Fellow with the Institute for Policy Studies, Research Fellow with the Next System Project, Research Assistant with the Earth Research Institute, and an Associated Fellow with the Critical Realism Network. He has practiced pub-

lic interest law for eight years and managed national non-profit organizations, political campaigns, political parties, and direct-action campaigns for over 20 years. He studies social movements, law, political sociology, and environmental sociology with a focus on democratization and constitutionalism. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on these themes.

Sandor Nagy is an independent researcher and a Global Studies scholar affiliated with the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of California, Riverside. His research interests focus on the study of political and social movements in the global context, with emphasis on the study of the intersection between current forces of globalization and equally powerful movements of anti-globalization. He is currently working on a book, *Global Swings of the Political Spectrum: Cyclically Delayed Mirror Waves of Revolutions and Counterrevolutions*.

Clayton D. Peoples is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Nevada, Reno, where he also serves as the Director of the School of Social Research and Justice Studies. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from Ohio State University in 2005. Dr. Peoples' research and teaching interests span social stratification, political sociology, social movements, social justice, peace/war/conflict, and comparative cross-national sociology. He has published a number of scholarly articles in peer-reviewed journals, including *The Sociological Quarterly* and *Sociological Forum*.

James F. Petras is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Binghamton University in New York. He is the author of 70 books in 29 languages. He has published over 500 articles in academic journals on a variety of topics related to Latin American politics and society, as well as social movements and revolution. His latest book (with Henry Veltmeyer), *The Class Struggle in Latin America*, was published by Routledge in 2017. Dr. Petras was a member of the jury of the Bertrand Russell Tribunal against repression in Latin America and has been active with the landless rural workers' movement in Brazil for nearly two decades.

Francisco G. Reynoso Barron is a graduate student in the International Studies Program at Chapman University in Orange County, California. His research interests focus on the use of technology in education in the context of social class and ethnic relations. Currently, his graduate research is focused on the role of education as a tool for restorative justice and the study of social movements through an international lens.

Alan J. Spector is Professor of Sociology at Purdue University Northwest. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from Northwestern University. He served as Chair of the Marxist Section of the American Sociological Association, as Chair of the Division on Poverty, Class, and Inequality of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, and as President of the Association for Humanist Sociology. His co-authored book, with Peter Knapp, *Crisis and Change Today: Basic*

Questions of Marxist Sociology received the Outstanding Book Award from the ASA Section on Marxist Sociology. He has been active in anti-war and anti-racist organizations for the past 50 years.

Henry Veltmeyer is Research Professor of Development Studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas in Mexico and Professor Emeritus of Development Studies at Saint Mary's University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. He has authored and edited over 40 books on Latin American and world development, including *Poverty and Development in Latin America*, *Social Movements in Latin America*, and *Human Development: Lessons from the Cuban Revolution*. His latest edited book (with Paul Bowles) *The Essential Guide to Critical Development Studies* was published by Routledge in 2018.

Levin Welch is a doctoral student pursuing the Ph.D. degree in Sociology at the University of California, Riverside. He has taught sociology at community colleges across Los Angeles County. He has published articles on the global capitalist crisis focused on the great recession and its impact on workers in the United States. He is currently engaged in research on how indigenous survivance, resistance, and self-determination affect the political economy of the United States, global capitalism, and potential trajectories of Western hegemony.

LIST OF CHARTS AND FIGURES

Chart 1.1	Emergence of class-based social movements in class-divided societies arising from the exploitation of labor	4
Chart 1.2	Emergence of social movements arising from racial and gender oppression	4
Fig. 2.1	Relationship between resources and movement emergence. Source: Adapted from Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," <i>American Political Science Review</i> 67 (1973), pp. 11–28	25
Fig. 2.2	Relationship between political opportunity and movement emergence. Source: Adapted from Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," <i>American Political Science Review</i> 67 (1973), pp. 11–28	26
Fig. 9.1	African riots, protests, and state violence against civilians across time and space. Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (2018). <i>Conflict Trends</i> . http://www.acleddata.com	214
Fig. 9.2	Environmental justice conflicts in Africa. Source: Environmental Justice Atlas: http://ejatlas.org	219
Fig. 14.1	Occupy targets. "This is an Occupation, Not a Permitted Picnic" (<i>OT, FB: 10.13.11</i>)	333
Fig. 14.2	<i>OT, FB: 07.11.12</i>	335
Fig. 14.3	<i>OT, FB: 06.21.12</i>	336
Fig. 14.4	<i>OWS_06.21.12</i>	337
Fig. 17.1	The making of political cultures of opposition in twentieth century revolutions	402
Fig. 17.2	The emergence of "new" political cultures of opposition and creation in the twenty-first century. Notes: Dotted lines indicate relationships that are more loosely connected. The Zapatistas, Occupy, the Arab Spring, and the Global Justice Movement are bolded so as to stand out from the italicized Pink Tide of elected left governments in Latin America and elsewhere, with commonalities in plain text	404

LIST OF DIAGRAMS

Diagram 3.1	Waves within periods struggle	41
Diagram 3.2	Periods of struggle over terrains of struggle	42
Diagram 3.3	Activist consciousness of dimensions of struggle	43
Diagram 3.4	Period of struggle, Wisconsin, 1994–2011, over four terrains	49

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1	Matrix of social movement elements for identification and analysis	38
Table 3.2	Elements produced in the Wisconsin struggle, 1994–2010	47



Introduction: Dynamics of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation

Berch Berberoglu

Social movements have been struggling against repressive states advancing the interests of dominant classes for many centuries. Over time, millions of people have organized and become empowered to bring about social change and transformations in numerous societies across the globe. This opening introductory chapter provides an analysis of the conditions that lead to the emergence and development of social movements struggling to bring about transformation of society. It examines the origins, nature, dynamics, and mobilization of social movements as they struggle to transform the prevailing dominant social, economic, and political order. After a brief historical background and an examination of objective and subjective conditions leading to the development of social movements, the chapter explores the dynamics of movement organization and mobilization with reference to concrete cases of social movements that have succeeded in rising up and transforming societies across the globe in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.¹

Recent mobilization, protests, and political responses by various social movements around the world are leading to protracted struggles that threaten entrenched dominant class interests that have held on to power for decades. The significance of the success of the Arab Spring of 2011 is more for its inspirational value to social movements across the globe than simply replacing authoritarian regimes to secure civilian multi-party rule. It is for this reason that the rebellions across North Africa and the Middle East have had a ripple

B. Berberoglu (✉)

Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, NV, USA

e-mail: berchb@unr.edu

© The Author(s) 2019

B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_1

effect in triggering similar uprisings in other countries when millions across the globe have shed their fears and found their way to express their will through collective political action.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Many diverse social movements have emerged and developed in different societies throughout history. Some of these movements have developed spontaneously and without any prior preparation in terms of organization, strategy, and tactics, such as slave rebellions in Ancient Rome and peasant revolts in medieval Germany. Uprisings have occurred in oppressive systems such as old despotic empires, just as they have under slavery, feudalism, and capitalism, where states ruled by despots, slave masters, landlords, and capitalists have often repressed attempts to alter the existing order to prevent the people from coming to power. But they have not always succeeded in keeping the people down. There have been instances when the oppressed have risen and put up a determined fight and won, through a series of rebellions and revolutions that have brought about social transformations across the globe.²

In the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe and elsewhere, a variety of social movements have come to challenge existing states and have transformed them to serve the interests of the victorious classes that have succeeded in taking state power. Among these we find the great bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth century, when the nascent national bourgeoisies of Europe rose up in arms to smash the old (feudal) system to rule society under the banner of “freedom” across the continent for “free trade,” investment, and economic activity that later facilitated the accumulation of private capital through the exploitation of wage-labor. This victory assured the domination of capital that came to assume state power to advance its own interests against that of the landlords. Thus, the rule of the capitalists over the state was established in Europe, and later in North America, where slavery and the rule of the slave-owners were replaced by that of capitalists after the victory of the latter in the Civil War that brought them to power in the United States in the late nineteenth century.³

The domination of society by the new ruling classes in Europe and North America, which facilitated the development of capitalism in these regions of the world, thus led to the development of a labor movement through the formation of trade unions that came to organize workers to wage a determined struggle against the new oppressive system.⁴

Many of the benefits that organized labor has secured for itself over the past century have been the result of such struggles. While the balance of class forces under capitalism in Europe and the United States came close to (but did not quite result in) workers taking state power to transform society during the Great Depression in the early twentieth century, social movements in other parts of the world did succeed to effect change that led to the construction of new societies across the globe.⁵

Some of these movements succeeded in taking state power despite the unrelenting onslaught by the dominant forces to crush them, while others failed, facing the counterrevolutionary machinations of foreign and domestic subversion. Ironically, a few decades later, a number of these failed movements were able to regroup and retake state power and survive attempts to derail their efforts to rebuild their societies (as in Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, and El Salvador). Others, such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and several other Latin American countries, as well as Brazil, led by grassroots people's movements, have taken a critical path and turned to the left, adopting policies that are against neoliberalism and in favor of the interests of the great majority of the people in these countries. We will have more to say about some of these movements later in this chapter, but first we must examine the factors contributing to the formation and success of social movements in transforming contemporary capitalist society.

FACTORS LEADING TO THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social movements have emerged throughout history for a variety of reasons, including racial and gender oppression, religious persecution, human rights abuses, environmental degradation, war, and other societal conditions that have affected populations in detrimental ways. But the central reasons that large number of masses have historically come together to express their outrage against the dominant classes and powers have been *exploitation* and *oppression*. These include the exploitation and oppression of slaves under the slave system, of serfs and the peasantry under the feudal system, and of wage-labor under capitalism.

The slave rebellions in Africa, the Caribbean, and the US South, the peasant uprisings in Medieval Europe, Asia, and other parts of the world, and proletarian uprisings and revolutions across Europe and the less developed periphery of the global capitalist system are a testament to the resilience of oppressed and exploited people that have rebelled to overthrow established regimes and systems of oppression that live off the exploitation of the masses across the globe.

Whereas social movements have arisen in response to a multitude of oppressive conditions in society, none have been as potent and widespread as the exploitation and oppression of labor in modern times. Cutting across racial and gender lines, the toxic effects of labor's predicament under capitalist production have affected billions of working people across the globe who live under oppressive conditions. The brutality of the global capitalist system has unfolded by perpetrating the exploitation of labor in its industrial base at home and in various production sites that it has developed in distant lands abroad, where workers have taken the lead to become a powerful force to confront capital and its repressive force, the capitalist state. Thus, it is in response to such conditions that working people have been subjected to that give rise to the formation of social movements.

The conditions leading to the rise of social movements that challenge the established order are both objective and subjective. The objective conditions include the prevailing class structure of society (the prevalence of dominant and

oppressed classes), the political structure and the nature of the state, and existing social and economic conditions. The subjective conditions include the level of class consciousness among the oppressed classes; the emergence of leading figures, organizations, and political parties of the oppressed; the response of the government and the dominant classes; and the balance of class forces and mass mobilization. In considering the opposing classes engaged in struggle, it is important to know the nature and composition of the dominant class, including its various fractions, who (i.e., which fraction of the dominant class) the state represents, who the oppressed classes are that want to replace the established order, and what the class alliances are in the social movement in question.⁶

Charts 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the dynamics of social movement organization and mobilization, taking into consideration the objective and subjective conditions that lead to the formation and development of social movements. Whether this is based on class domination or racial and gender oppression, the objective conditions that set the stage for social inequalities must ultimately confront, mass movements are thus able to coordinate their efforts and develop strategy and tactics to succeed in their struggle for power. Such political mobilization requires determination on the part of the leadership and social base of movements, which may tip the balance of forces in their favor that may culminate in their eventual success.




Chart 1.1 Emergence of class-based social movements in class-divided societies arising from the exploitation of labor




Chart 1.2 Emergence of social movements arising from racial and gender oppression

Howard J. Sherman and James Wood provide a list that specifies the conditions that are required before a social movement can emerge⁷:

1. *Social structural conditions* must lead to certain stresses and strains between classes or other groups in society. This can occur as a result of economic and political crises in society, or as an outcome of general decline and decay of society and societal institutions that affect various classes, leading to conflict between them.
2. Objective economic, political, or social *deprivation*, resulting from the above structural conditions, must occur. This means that the unfolding crises in society are affecting an important segment of society in a negative way, leading to a decline in their standard of living.
3. These objective deprivations must lead to *conscious feelings of deprivation*, which will crystallize into an ideology. Here, the increasing awareness of one's condition conveyed by the gravity of the situation transformed into consciousness leads to the formation of an ideology that shows the way out of the crisis.
4. This ideology must lead to the *organization* and *mobilization* of the discontented group to become a powerful political force that can bring about change. As such, the mobilization necessary to take political action becomes a critical component of the struggle being waged to transform society.
5. The structural conditions must also include *weakened social control* by the dominant class. Here, the depth of the societal crisis weakens the ability and the will of those in power to effectively control society.
6. Given these five conditions, many kinds of *precipitating events* can lead to the emergence of a social movement. Such events can trigger mass protests and demonstrations that quickly translate into action and serve as a catalyst to bring about change.⁸

Sherman and Wood go on to argue that the above conditions for social movements to develop flow from the prevailing social structure: society is built on a certain economic base on which arises social and political institutions—such as the state—as well as ideologies, and that these institutions and ideologies play a vital role in supporting and justifying the present societal arrangements.⁹

Albert J. Szymanski in his book *The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class*¹⁰ provides additional insight into this process and argues that the material conditions necessary for the emergence of social movements in contemporary society must include the following:

1. *Felt oppression*: The economic oppression and political repression of large segments of society are increasingly felt to be unnecessary and intolerable (as the possibilities of living differently become more apparent).
2. *Decline of the dominant class's ideological hegemony*: The ideological hegemony of the dominant class spontaneously breaks down, as the

masses become increasingly bitter and disillusioned with their present existence. The dominant class itself becomes cynical about its ability and right to rule. It increasingly resorts to manipulation and repression to preserve its rule. Internally, it becomes increasingly divided and demoralized, and hence incapable of adequately dealing with the social movements.

3. *The failure of non-revolutionary solutions to a social crisis:* The various alternative solutions being offered as solutions to the oppression of the masses (such as nationalism, fascism, liberal reformism, and social democracy) lose credibility among the oppressed as these solutions reveal themselves to be incapable of actually relieving the oppression of the people.
4. *Decline of the dominant class's ability to solve social, economic, and political crises and counter the growth of social movements:* The ability of the dominant class to handle both a social crisis and a rising social movement is a product of its internal cohesion, the intensity of its belief in the legitimacy of its rule, and its willingness to use force when necessary. When a ruling class cannot unify around and implement a rational program to handle the crisis or the social movement, it is likely to be driven from power.¹¹
5. *Efficient organization and adoption of scientific strategy and theory by social movements:* In order to succeed, social movements create organizations that can mobilize the masses into a common united front, provide them with a realistic analysis of the causes of their oppression, a proposal about the historical alternatives, and a program to realize an alternative—that is, an organizational form, a strategy, and a set of tactics to bring about social change and transformation.¹²

These five important conditions set the stage for the emergence and development of social movements in contemporary capitalist society and facilitate the process that leads to social transformation, according to Szymanski.¹³

MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION, STRATEGY, AND TACTICS

Following on the last, *central* point emphasized by Szymanski, the decisive element that determines the success or failure of social movements is *organization* articulated through a viable strategy and tactics. Organization is the *sin qua none* of social revolution and transformation that provides the material basis (infrastructure) and the political instrument (ideology) that feed into the strategy and tactics adopted to assure the success of a social movement. Thus, for a social movement to succeed, two things are of decisive importance: motivation and resources. While it is through a clear ideology and leadership that the masses become motivated to join a movement and take political action, it is equally important to secure the resources that are necessary to sustain a movement through its various stages of development.

The success or failure of a social movement also depends on the degree of internal cohesion and support in developing the strategy and tactics that a movement must adopt to realize its political objectives. It is at this point in its development that the movement begins to take on its political character. While it may be clear as to what the movement is against and where it wants to go in its struggle to effect change, it must also decide how it wants to get there. It is at this stage—when the movement adopts its strategy and tactics—that the movement becomes identified as reformist or revolutionary.¹⁴

While reformist movements prefer to work within the system for piecemeal changes that may bring about reforms to improve conditions in the short run that would in time lead to long-term social improvements in people's lives, revolutionary movements struggle for large-scale structural changes that challenge the power of established social, economic, and political forces that are linked to the dominant classes—a situation that fosters class conflict and class struggle that may open up possibilities for social change and transformation, if the revolutionary movements that are struggling against them succeed in their bid to capture state power. This has occurred in numerous instances throughout recent history with varying degrees of success, depending on the balance of forces in the class struggle, which has come to define the parameters of social change and transformation.¹⁵

Finally, it is important to understand that social movements do not develop in a vacuum, but are the outcome of social problems generated in the context of existing societies that are class based, hence divided along class lines. While ultimately every social movement and countermovement carries within it a class character, some social movements may be based—at least for the moment—around issues that are broader and cut across class lines. Struggles of people against racial and ethnic oppression, patriarchy, dictatorship, and human rights abuses, for example, could lead a movement to mobilize broad segments of society for social justice. And in the age of globalization and imperialism, which has affected the lives of millions of people around the world and led to the domination of sovereign nations through colonial and imperial rule, nationalism and nationalist movements have emerged to become an important social force for national self-determination.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE TWENTIETH AND EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES

The twentieth century has seen the emergence and development of numerous social movements, and many of these movements have turned into full-blown social revolutions—ranging from radical labor unions at the turn of the twentieth century, like the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), to popular mass movements at century's end and the turn of the twenty-first century, like the civil rights, anti-war, and peace movements and later the Occupy Wall Street movement, while major social revolutions, like the Mexican and the Russian

revolutions in the early twentieth century, resurfaced in the form of the Chinese, Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Iranian revolutions of the mid to late twentieth century, leading to the Arab Spring of the early twenty-first century. Thus, mass mobilization, protests, uprisings, and revolutions have been the mainstay of social rebellion over the course of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

Historical Cases from the Early to the Mid Twentieth Century

A great example of a radical social movement in US labor history at the turn of the twentieth century is the IWW, led by legendary labor leaders like William “Big Bill” Haywood, Joe Hill, Mother Jones, and other labor radicals who went as far as advocating the abolition of money and transformation of the global capitalist system.¹⁶ Through agitation and propaganda, they were able to mobilize tens of thousands of workers across the United States to challenge the very basis of capitalism through “One Big Union” that went beyond basic trade union struggles to greater political struggles aiming at the overthrow of the exploitative and oppressive capitalist system and its political component the capitalist state.¹⁷

While its conservative labor counterparts, such as the American Federation of Labor (AFL), concentrated on short-term trade union gains, the radical IWW (influenced by both Marxist and anarcho-syndicalist ideology and politics) aimed at political power through a workers’ revolution. This was too much, of course, for the powers that be; the IWW were violently repressed by the police, including the execution of their top leaders, such as Joe Hill.¹⁸ The case of the IWW at the turn of the twentieth century thus clearly illustrates one such example of the determination of working people in US history to struggle against exploitation and oppression.

Other examples of early twentieth century radical movement mobilization include the Mexican and Russian Revolutions. The Mexican Revolution of 1910, as the first great peasant revolution of the twentieth century, had a major impact on all other subsequent rebellions and revolutions, as the peasants with the support of labor rose up to rid the feudal oligarchy that enslaved and oppressed them. The Russian Revolution of 1917—the first workers’ revolution of the twentieth century—was not far behind, while Europe itself was embroiled in revolutionary fervor following the First World War.

Whereas movements on the left came close to toppling some of the major capitalist states (e.g., Germany), the ruling classes were quick to respond with their own fascist regimes in Italy, Germany, and Spain, where civil wars across the continent divided states into rival forces that fought to impose their rule while crushing their enemies. This momentum of uprisings in various countries continued during the Great Depression and its aftermath, when dominant classes everywhere were challenged through the Second World War and in the postwar period to the century’s end—which included the Chinese, Vietnamese, Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Iranian revolutions, to name the most prominent.¹⁹

Mid to Late Twentieth Century Movement Mobilization

The emergence of the people's movements during the 1960s—when the civil rights, women's, anti-war, peace, student, environmental, and other related progressive movements coalesced—led to the many gains that these movements were able to secure through collective political action. The lull of the 1970s and 1980s reversed these trends, and a period of resignation set in under the right-wing, conservative forces in power led by Reaganism in the United States and Thatcherism in the United Kingdom, as well as right-wing military and civilian dictatorships that came to power elsewhere during this period (e.g., in Chile and Argentina in the mid-1970s; in Egypt, Iran, Turkey, the Philippines, and others in the late 1970s or early 1980s; and across Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s, when anti-communist counterrevolutions in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, and later in the Soviet Union in the early 1990s shifted power away from communism and toward the capitalist West), which seemed to bring an end to the radical social movements of the previous periods.

Merely three years after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, the first “postmodern rebellion”²⁰ erupted in Chiapas, in the hinterland of Mexico, led by the Zapatista National Liberation Army and its leader Commandante Marcos, in response to the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which they argued would devastate the small impoverished peasantry.²¹ This unexpected people's rebellion signaled the rise of the first organized mass struggle against neoliberal globalization in Latin America, across the border from the United States. This was followed by a series of protests and demonstrations against neoliberal globalization that had by then come to dominate the policies and practices of many states in Latin America and around the world.²² Inspired by these movements struggling against neoliberal capitalist globalization, social movements across the global south took the lead to confront global capital in every corner of the world.²³

The World Social Forum (WSF) and other similar organizations led efforts to build global solidarity focused on issues related to the effects of neoliberal globalization on a world scale. The first meeting of the WSF took place in 2001 in Porto Alegre, Brazil, with some 15,000 participants from 117 countries; by the 2005 meetings of the WSF, there were 155,000 participants from 135 countries. Since then, the WSF has met at various venues each year and engaged in movement activities that involve tens of thousands of activists at hundreds of grassroots organizations that are part of a global political network operating across the world.²⁴

People's movements around the world—from Seattle to Prague, Quebec City, Genoa, Barcelona, Washington, DC, and other cities around the globe—have gone into action to protest against neoliberal globalization to counter the economic domination of the world by a handful of transnational corporations and their supportive institutions—above all the political and military machinery of their respective states.²⁵ These protests, which were quite successful in

disrupting the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle in 1999, and derailing corporate efforts to impose their policies on the people, reached new heights when over 15 million people across the globe protested against US intervention in Iraq in 2003.

Recent Movement Mobilization Across the Globe

The global economic crisis of 2008–2009, which entered its seventh year in 2014, has devastated the economies and societies of many countries across the globe. While those most severely affected by the crisis are countries of the periphery, established regions that have experienced a sovereign debt crisis as those in Europe (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy) have also had their share of economic collapse and political unrest leading to the mobilization of social movements in these regions as well.

As in Latin America, Asia, North Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, the deepening recession in the European Union and the depression in Greece, Spain, and other countries in Europe's periphery have led to the mobilization of millions of working people who are fighting back against the austerity measures that are being imposed on them. And the expanding mass protests and struggles of working people in these regions and countries are galvanizing the popular social movements to wage battle against the state—a development that has immense political implications for the situation in these countries.²⁶

Elsewhere across the globe, most notably in North Africa and the Middle East, the people have been fighting back and are determined to take back their countries from the dominant classes that have used despots to maintain their power and to keep the people in check. The Arab Spring of 2011 has ushered in a period of mass rebellion and revolution across this region: In Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria, the people have risen up and toppled, or are in the process of toppling, regimes and rulers that were considered untouchable only a few years before.²⁷ This is an unprecedented development in the history of the Middle East and will have a great impact on many other regions of the world in coming years.

In North America, the anti-WTO and anti-corporate globalization demonstrations in Seattle in 1999 and Toronto in 2010 became the training grounds for the Occupy Wall Street movement of 2011, which mobilized hundreds of thousands of people across 20 states and many cities throughout the United States and in 80 countries around the world.²⁸

The biggest and most vocal protest movement of recent times, the Occupy Wall Street movement, was no doubt inspired by the Arab Spring and the people's struggles across the globe and became a symbol of the struggle against the big banks, corporations, and the dominant class (the top 1 percent of the population) who made billions of dollars in profits, while a large segment of the 99 percent has struggled to survive in the midst of an economic crisis that has

devastated the lives of millions of people across the globe. Clearly, the millionaires and billionaires have seen their wealth and income grow and expand during these depression-ridden times, while millions of working people have lost their jobs, been foreclosed and thrown out of their homes, are without health care, and are in a desperate condition.²⁹

It is this dire situation that working people have been facing in the United States and elsewhere around the world that has finally forced people to the streets to fight back and reclaim their communities, their government, and their nation. And it is through such political expression that working people the world over have been pressing forward with their demands for social change and social transformation throughout US history and the history of the world.

CONCLUSION

As social movements emerge, develop, and expand, the necessity for organized collective political action to succeed becomes more and more evident. And as the material conditions of life under the present economic, political, and social system deteriorate and the situation becomes unbearable, more and more people are bound to come together to express their frustration and anger to force the state to meet their demands—demands that the state cannot meet as long as it remains dominated and controlled by powerful class forces that benefit from its policies.

Therein one faces both the problem *and* the solution to the crisis of contemporary society and the state: The exploitation and oppression that working people have suffered throughout US history, compounded by the recent economic crisis that has affected millions of working people in the United States and the rest of the world, cannot be resolved without a thorough transformation of our capitalist society. And this transformation requires the full participation of the people who must gain control of their government so that it can become a truly democratic people's government to meet their needs. Such participation for collective social action is the basis for organization and mobilization of social movements to succeed.

As the condition of working people further deteriorates in the United States and around the world, and as state repression becomes intensified in response to that mobilization, one can see the possibility for the coalescence of diverse groups to address major social inequalities in society and take the necessary steps to eradicate them. That is the hope and the promise that social movements offer in the popular struggles for social change and transformations that are yet to come in the twenty-first century. It is also hoped that the contributions made to this Handbook by a committed group of scholars chronicling the struggles of many progressive social movements during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries will make an important contribution to our understanding and appreciation of social movements, revolutions, and social transformations that are yet to come in this turbulent twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. This opening introductory chapter is based on my article "Social Movements and Transformation in the Age of Globalization: Origins, Dynamics, and Mobilization," *International Review of Modern Sociology*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Spring 2015), reprinted here with permission of the publisher.
2. Kenneth Neill Cameron, *Humanity and Society: A World History* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977). Rodney Hilton, *The Transition From Feudalism to Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1976).
3. Herbert Aptheker, *The Unfolding Drama: Studies in US History* (New York: International Publishers, 1978). See also Charles Beard and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization* (New York: Macmillan, 1930).
4. Richard Boyer and Herbert Morais, *Labor's Untold Story*, 3rd ed. (New York: United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, 1980).
5. These include the numerous revolutions in the periphery of the global capitalist system that took place during the course of the twentieth century (such as Russia, China, Cuba, and Nicaragua, to name a few). See Jack Goldstone, *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*. Third Ed. (New York: Cengage, 2002); Stephen K. Sanderson, *Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to Social and Political Contention*. Second Ed. (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010); and James Defronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*. Fourth Ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011).
6. Albert J. Szymanski, *Class Structure: A Critical Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1983).
7. Howard Sherman and James Wood, *Sociology* (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), Chap. 18.
8. Sherman and Wood, *Sociology*, Chap. 18.
9. Sherman and Wood, *Sociology*, Chap. 18.
10. Albert J. Szymanski, *The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1978), pp. 293–318.
11. This could occur because of a loss at war, the disaffection of many upper-class youth and their rejection of upper-class traditions, widespread corruption, encroaching decadence and loss of will, or demoralizing internal antagonisms that cannot be contained by a strong sense of class solidarity.
12. Szymanski, *The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class*, pp. 293–318.
13. Szymanski, *The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class*, p. 294.
14. Ted Goertzel, "Social Movements and Social Change: The Dynamics of Social Transformation," in Berch Berberoglu (ed.), *Critical Perspectives in Sociology*, Second Edition (Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt, 1993), pp. 281–290.
15. Goertzel, "Social Movements and Social Change," pp. 281–290.
16. Philip Foner, *History of the Labor Movement in the United States: Industrial Workers of the World*, Vol. 4. New York: International Publishers. See also Joseph Robert Conlin, *Big Bill Haywood and the Radical Union Movement*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1969).
17. Foner, *History of the Labor Movement in the United States*.
18. Philip Foner, *The Case of Joe Hill*. New York, NY: International Publishers.
19. Jack Goldstone, *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*. Third Ed. (New York: Cengage, 2002); Stephen K. Sanderson, *Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to Social and Political Contention*. Second Ed. (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010); and James Defronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*. Fourth Ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011).

20. R. Burbach, "Roots of the Postmodern Rebellion in Chiapas," *New Left Review* 1, no. 205 (May–June 1994).
21. Neil Harvey, *The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).
22. James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Social Movements in Latin America* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
23. Francois Polet (ed.), *The State of Resistance: Popular Struggles in the Global South* (London: Zed Books, 2007); Valentine M. Moghadam, *Globalization and Social Movements* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).
24. See Jackie Smith, et al., *Global Democracy and the World Social Forums* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2008), xi–xii, 3–4; and Val Moghadam, *Globalization and Social Movements*, 106.
25. Martin Orr, "The Struggle Against Capitalist Globalization: The Worldwide Protests Against the WTO" in Berch Berberoglu (ed.), *Globalization and Change: The Transformation of Global Capitalism* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005). See also Jackie Smith, "Globalizing Resistance: The Battle of Seattle and the Future of Social Movements," in *Globalizing Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements*, eds. Jackie Smith and H. Johnston (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
26. Mike-Frank Eptiropoulos, "The Global Capitalist Crisis and the European Union, with Focus on Greece," in Berch Berberoglu (ed.), *Beyond the Global Capitalist Crisis: The World Economy in Transition* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 83–101.
27. Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch (eds.), *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012). See also James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Beyond Neoliberalism: A World to Win* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 175–197.
28. Todd Gitlin, *Occupy Nation: The Roots, the Spirit, and the Promise of Occupy Wall Street* (New York: It Books, Harper Collins, 2012).
29. Howard Sherman, *The Roller Coaster Economy: Financial Crisis, Great Recession, and the Public Option* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2010).

REFERENCES

- Aptheker, Herbert. 1978. *The Unfolding Drama: Studies in U.S. History*. New York: International Publishers.
- Beard, Charles, and Mary Beard. 1930. *The Rise of American Civilization*. New York: Macmillan.
- Berberoglu, Berch. 2003. *Globalization of Capital and the Nation State*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- . 2007. *The State and Revolution in the Twentieth Century: Major Social Transformations of Our Time*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- . 2013. *Political Sociology in a Global Era: An Introduction to the State and Society*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- . 2014. *The Global Capitalist Crisis and Its Aftermath*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Boyer, Richard, and Herbert Morais. 1980. *Labor's Untold Story*. 3rd ed. New York: United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America.
- Burbach, R. 1994. Roots of the Postmodern Rebellion in Chiapas. *New Left Review* 1, no. 205 (May–June).

- Cameron, Kenneth Neill. 1977. *Humanity and Society: A World History*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Conlin, Joseph Robert. 1969. *Big Bill Haywood and the Radical Union Movement*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Defronzo, James. 2011. *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*. 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Epitropoulos, Mike-Frank. 2012. The Global Capitalist Crisis and the European Union, with Focus on Greece. In *Beyond the Global Capitalist Crisis: The World Economy in Transition*, ed. Berch Berberoglu. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.
- Foner, Philip S. 1965a. *History of the Labor Movement in the United States: Industrial Workers of the World, vol. 4*. New York, NY: International Publishers.
- . 1965b. *The Case of Joe Hill*. New York, NY: International Publishers.
- . ed. 1983. *Mother Jones Speaks: Speeches and Writings of a Working Class Fighter*. New York, NY: International Publishers.
- Gitlin, Todd. 2012. *Occupy Nation: The Roots, the Spirit, and the Promise of Occupy Wall Street*. New York: It Books, HarperCollins.
- Goertzel, Ted. 1993. Social Movements and Social Change: The Dynamics of Social Transformation. In *Critical Perspectives in Sociology*, ed. Berch Berberoglu, 2nd ed. Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt Publishing Co.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 2002. *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*. 3rd ed. New York: Cengage.
- Haas, Mark L., and David W. Lesch, eds. 2012. *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Harvey, Neil. 1998. *The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Hilton, Rodney. 1976. *The Transition From Feudalism to Capitalism*. London: New Left Books.
- Moghadam, Valentine M. 2009. *Globalization and Social Movements*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Orr, Martin. 2005. The Struggle Against Capitalist Globalization: The Worldwide Protests Against the WTO. In *Globalization and Change: The Transformation of Global Capitalism*, ed. Berch Berberoglu. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Parenti, Michael. 2002. *To Kill A Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia*. London: Verso.
- Petras, James, and Henry Veltmeyer. 2011a. *Beyond Neoliberalism: A World to Win*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- . 2011b. *Social Movements in Latin America*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Polet, Francois, ed. 2007. *The State of Resistance: Popular Struggles in the Global South*. London: Zed Books.
- Sanderson, Stephen K. 2010. *Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to Social and Political Contention. Second Ed.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Sherman, Howard. 2010. *The Roller Coaster Economy: Financial Crisis, Great Recession, and the Public Option*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Sherman, Howard, and James Wood. 1989. *Sociology*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Smith, Jackie, and H. Johnston, eds. 2002. *Globalizing Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Smith, Jackie, et al. 2008. *Global Democracy and the World Social Forums*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- Szymanski, Albert J. 1978. *The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class*. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop.
- . 1983. *Class Structure: A Critical Perspective*. New York: Praeger.

PART I

Theoretical, Methodological, and
Historical Approaches to Social
Movements, Revolutions, and Social
Transformation



Classical and Contemporary Conventional Theories of Social Movements

Clayton D. Peoples

Social movements are groups of people organizing to bring about—or resist—social change, using, at least in part, non-institutional strategy and tactics (also known as “unconventional politics”).¹ Most social movements have social inequality and injustice as core concerns and mobilize around these issues. Social movements received scant scholarly attention in the United States prior to the 1960s, aside from dismissive, passing treatments. But with the rise in social activism in the 1960s and the resurgence of the conflict perspective, scholars began to give social movements more serious consideration.

As scholars began to pay more attention to social movements, they developed theories to help explain movement emergence, organization, and structure. Theories such as relative deprivation, resource mobilization, political opportunity, new social movements, and framing were forwarded. Although these theories are sometimes viewed as competing explanations for the emergence and development of social movements, it may be best to treat them as offering their own unique insights into social movements, that is, they may be best applied to discrete social movements or distinct phases of movement development.

This chapter provides a general overview of the major classical and contemporary conventional theories of social movements. Each of these theories is discussed in chronological order. After a brief survey of classical theories of social movements on the origins and development of social movements prior

C. D. Peoples (✉)

Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, NV, USA

e-mail: peoplesc@unr.edu

to the twentieth century, several contemporary conventional theories of social movements that address the emergence, structure, functions, and evolution of social movements are taken up for discussion.

CLASSICAL CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Before discussing classical conventional theories of social movements in some detail, it is important to acknowledge the importance of major historical events and their influence on scholarly thinking around social movements. Probably the most important historical event, in this respect, was the French Revolution.

The French Revolution had a number of ideological precursors. Perhaps the greatest influence on the ideologies that ultimately led to the Revolution was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau was a well-known European philosopher, author, composer, and political theorist in the mid-1700s. He was a key figure in developing Enlightenment ideals, and was a proponent of democratic governance (as opposed to monarchies). For instance, in his *Social Contract*, Rousseau contends that the people should establish a government and make key policy decisions, not kings or queens.²

Building off of the Enlightenment ideals advanced by thinkers such as Rousseau, the French Revolution erupted in the late 1700s and led to seismic social changes that rippled from France outward to the rest of Europe and beyond. The French Revolution began with commoners rising up against the prevailing social order and fighting for freedom, equality, and representation. They succeeded in altering the existing power structure in France and elsewhere. The French Revolution did away with the French monarchy, which led to the demise of other monarchies in the region; it also ended feudalism. In place of monarchies and feudalism, Enlightenment ideals and liberalism were brought to the fore. Toward the end of the French Revolution, however, Napoleon staged a coup and became dictator. Although he carried forward some of the ideals of the French Revolution, he also undermined others and engaged in conquest and empire-building. After staging numerous successful military campaigns, Napoleon was eventually defeated by a coalition of regional powers and was exiled to an island.

In the years and decades following the French Revolution and subsequent authoritarian rule by Napoleon, scholarly thinkers took up different views of social movements and change. While some viewed grassroots mobilization as essential to building a better society, others were skeptical of bottom-up approaches and instead preferred a top-down hierarchy. The clearest example of this contrast in theoretical approaches can be seen when comparing utopian socialism with elite theory.

Utopian Socialism Versus Elite Theory

Utopian socialism was a movement in the 1800s that advocated for the creation of communities built around socialist principles. Although it eschewed revolu-

tionary approaches—instead favoring small-scale, voluntary initiatives—it supported grassroots mobilization and pushed a number of progressive social reforms. Its early proponents included a number of French scholars whose ideas were likely influenced by the French Revolution, such as Charles Fourier, Etienne Cabet, and Henri de Saint-Simon.³

Charles Fourier was perhaps the most influential utopian socialist thinker with respect to the development of actual socialist communities.⁴ He envisioned small-scale communities within which cooperation and socialist principles would prevail. Based on his ideas, a number of such communities were formed, particularly in the United States. Fourier was also a significant influence on early feminism, and was an early proponent of women's rights.

Like Fourier, Etienne Cabet was also influential in the formation of socialist communities—many of which, again, took root in the United States.⁵ Cabet also focused on labor issues and was a champion of worker's cooperatives—"co-ops"—and felt that this was a way in which workers could take control of their work. Cabet's ideas have carried forward even into the present, as there are a number of co-ops in existence today that reflect Cabet's thinking and influence.

Perhaps the best-known figure associated with utopian socialism was Henri de Saint-Simon.⁶ Saint-Simon was a very influential French thinker whose ideas led to both academic movements and social advances. He advocated for the very principles upon which utopian socialism was built—freedom, equality, and justice—but his ideas also led to the small-scale approach of utopian socialism. For instance, he rejected the idea that class conflict was central to the formation of socialist communities; he also felt that participation should be voluntary (as opposed to, for instance, radical social change via revolution). In this sense, his ideas were at odds with those of Marx, who would later advocate for radical social transformation via revolution. Nonetheless, Saint-Simon was very influential, and his grassroots approach differed greatly from the ideas of classical elite theorists.

Classical elite theory was a scholarly perspective in the late 1800s and early 1900s that argued that most societies are—and should be—run by a small group of elites. Its proponents included the Italian theorists Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels.⁷

Although there are some important differences between Pareto, Mosca, and Michels in how they view and analyze elite rule, the overarching theme that sets elite theory apart from utopian socialism is its skepticism of grassroots mobilization—or movements of the masses, in general. Elite theory effectively argues that there are certain people whose skills and position in society—whether hereditary or otherwise—make them uniquely suited to lead society politically. The rest of society should simply fall in line and follow the orders of these leaders rather than challenge the system.⁸

Elite theory had substantial influence in both academic circles and in politics. In academia, it bears a striking resemblance to the functionalist paradigm in sociology, which rose to prominence in American sociology in the early

1900s (to be discussed shortly). In politics, it was, sadly, the ideological foundation of the totalitarian fascist regimes of the mid-1900s that spread death and destruction leading up to and during World War II.

The comparison of utopian socialism and elite theory provides an interesting contrast in perspectives concerning social movements. Utopian socialism was largely in favor of social movements—albeit small-scale efforts—and felt that grassroots mobilization was a key component of advancement toward a more fair and equitable society. Elite theory, on the other hand, was critical of social movements, and instead argued that the masses should conform to the rules and social order imposed by supposedly superior elite leaders.

We see a similar divide among early sociological theorists concerning social movements. Some theorists—and their associated perspectives—were in favor of mobilization; others, however, were either against social movements or did not even address social movements in their writings. The following section will delve more deeply into the thoughts of early sociological thinkers concerning social movements.

Early Sociological Views of Social Movements

Views of social movements varied considerably among the major early social theorists—Karl Marx, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and Emile Durkheim. Marx was the founding figure of the conflict paradigm, and he had a positive view of social movements. Although Chap. 4 in this handbook will address Marx's perspective in greater detail, it is worth noting here that Marx was a strong proponent of working class mobilization. For instance, Marx and Engels argued in favor of a worker-led revolution in their *Communist Manifesto*, penning the now famous call to action, "Workers of the world, unite!"⁹

Max Weber was a social theorist who did much of his writing mere decades after Marx. Unlike Marx, though, Weber had little to say about social movements—at least not directly. Nonetheless, Weber offered clues to his perspective on mobilization and change in a number of his works. For instance, in his well-known analysis of bureaucracy, Weber acknowledged that bureaucratic structures can leave people feeling disconnected—but he discouraged people from trying to change the system.¹⁰ Weber contended that seeking change would be futile. In his view, the bureaucratic system would continue to alienate people regardless of who is in power. People are mere "cogs in the wheel" in bureaucracies; they are dispensable elements.

In Weber's work on social science methods, he offered additional clues to his perspective on mobilization. In that writing, Weber made the case that social science is subjective given that (a) researchers choose topics based on their own point of view and (b) our concepts in the social sciences are "ideal types"—imaginary representations rather than concrete, tangible objects.¹¹ Despite his argument that social science is subjective, Weber nonetheless encouraged social scientists to be as objective as possible in their work. Importantly, he also argued strongly against attempts to influence policy. In his

view, policy—and change, more generally—should be up to policymakers; social scientists should simply conduct research and abstain from any form of social activism or policy work.¹²

Weber's ideas eventually gave rise to the exchange perspective in sociology, which came into its own in the mid-1900s. Like Weber, theorists working in the exchange paradigm largely eschewed the scholarly study of social movements. For instance, George Homans borrowed heavily from behavioral psychology in his work, and focused primarily on individual decision making rather than collective action. Even Peter Blau, who connected the micro to the macro and emphasized power in his work, tended to ignore social movements. The closest he came to acknowledging social movements was in his work on *Exchange and Power in Social Life*,¹³ within which he notes that unequal exchange relationships may be challenged if people do not view the inequality as legitimate. Still, though, Blau scarcely mentioned social movements as a mechanism of change, instead simply noting that change *might* occur under such circumstances, without mentioning the source of said change.

Georg Simmel was another classical conventional theorist who addressed, in a broader sense, the dynamics of social relations between competing groups (e.g. labor versus capital) and developed an understanding of the underlying conditions that may lead to the emergence of social movements within the context of prevailing social conditions. In *The Web of Group Affiliations*, Simmel discussed a variety of groups and the micro social processes underlying group formation, such as an awareness of similarities in economic position and interests.¹⁴

In terms of class and group affiliations, Simmel wrote about position in relation to capital and how this can be a basis for the formation of class-based groups. For instance, in discussing the working class, he wrote: "The [working class] exemplifies a group-formation based on a pervasive social awareness.... No matter what the job of the individual worker may be ... the very fact that he is working for wages makes him join the group of those who are paid the same way."¹⁵ He went on to describe how those in the working class can form groups (e.g. labor unions) to defend their interests, and noted that "workers have joined associations according to logical or formal criteria of like interests"¹⁶ and that such groups (i.e. labor unions) can help workers "obtain more favorable working conditions not for the individual worker but for labor as a whole."¹⁷

Although Simmel did not tie the formation of these groups directly to social movements, he acknowledged that it is nonetheless critical for mobilization against management and the capitalist class: "The purpose of forming such a syndicate was ... that in this way the individual occupation could put pressure on the management, for which the isolated strength of each group would not have sufficed."¹⁸ He argued that "only this made a 'general strike' possible, since such a strike would not serve the purpose of a single occupation, but would be initiated to lobby for the political rights of labor, more generally...."¹⁹

In sum, Simmel provided keen insights into the micro-level processes that underlie group formation and solidarity. Additionally, he forwarded an analysis that properly identifies the interests of various groups and classes, examining

the potential for class mobilization and conflict. However, as his analysis remained at the micro level, he failed to address the larger structural conditions that lead to class formation, solidarity, and mobilization by social movements to transform the larger system. Moreover, he did not discuss social movements directly.

Durkheim was essentially the polar opposite of Marx on his views of social movements—and social change, more generally. Writing and theorizing in France just a few generations removed from the French Revolution, Durkheim was averse to change—especially the potentially rapid change that would come from a social movement. Instead, for Durkheim, preserving society and its structures was paramount. He insisted that individuals must conform to social norms, and was against any kind of deviation from the established norms, much less supporting a movement to change them.

Durkheim acknowledged that different social classes and class inequalities exist. That said, though, he was largely uncritical of the class system; instead, he contended that structures of inequality should be left alone. Even for the poor, Durkheim suggested that they should simply be content with their lot in life rather than desire something more.

Durkheim's ideas formed the foundation of the functionalist paradigm. Functionalism was the preeminent paradigm in American sociology during the mid-1900s. Functionalism posited that society worked well for the majority of its people. From a functionalist perspective, maintaining the status quo was supremely important. Social inequality was downplayed, and efforts to change the system (e.g. via a social movement) were treated as dysfunctional in an otherwise functional society. Not surprisingly, most scholars in the United States paid little attention to social movements prior to the 1960s. In the rare instances in which social movements were the subject of scholarly inquiry, they were treated as a form of “crowd behavior” and their participants were viewed as irrational actors.²⁰ A few decades later, however, the tide began to turn.

In the turbulent 1960s, it was becoming nearly impossible to pretend that American society was functioning in the interests of everyone, given the inequalities that were laid bare for all to see. Social movements, such as the civil rights movement, were critical in shedding light on the vast disparities in American society, and the social upheavals associated with the movements of the 1960s provided the impetus for a paradigm shift in sociology. Functionalism rapidly fell out of favor, and the conflict paradigm reentered academic discourse.

CONTEMPORARY CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

With the resurgence of the conflict paradigm in sociology, social problems were no longer ignored or “swept under the rug.” Instead, there was a growing acknowledgment that American society was rife with inequality and injustice. By extension, efforts to change the system through social movements became a major concern of progressive scholars. A new generation of sociolo-

gists began to view social movements as a legitimate form of political action and saw movement participants as rational actors. This led to the first of many theories to explain movement emergence, organization, and structure: relative deprivation theory.

Relative Deprivation, Strain Theory

At its most basic level, relative deprivation theory makes a straightforward argument: Social inequality is a primary cause of social movements.²¹ Although this argument may seem obvious to contemporary sociologists, it was a significant breakthrough compared with the “head in the sand” approach to movements that was dominant prior to the 1960s.

Moving beyond the basics, relative deprivation theory makes a number of claims that are worth considering. First, it borrows from the strain theory of Robert K. Merton and contends that structural strain can lead people to “think outside the box” about solutions to social problems.²² By extension, social movements and their associated unconventional politics become seen by people as one possible avenue of addressing grievances.²³

Another claim of relative deprivation theory is that it is not merely inequality that leads to movement emergence, but subjective perceptions of inequality. People must recognize that there is inequality—and feel that they are unjustly on the wrong end of the inequality distribution—to mobilize. This harkens back to the insights of Karl Marx that the working class needs to overcome false consciousness before worker mobilization is possible.

Despite relative deprivation theory’s importance in early considerations of social movements, it began to be criticized when examining the prominent social movements of the 1960s—particularly the civil rights movement. Although no one would argue that subjective perceptions of inequality and injustice were not at least part of the reason for black insurgency in the United States in the 1960s, there was no new inequality in the 1950s and 1960s that made that period particularly ripe for mobilization. Indeed, one can make the case that there was actually *less* inequality and mistreatment toward blacks then compared with previous decades. So why did the civil rights movement not occur earlier?

Two theories emerged to help address this question: resource mobilization theory and political opportunity/process theory. These theories will each be addressed in subsequent sections. It is important to note, however, that the rise of these new theories does not minimize the importance of relative deprivation theory. It should be obvious that social inequality is a primary cause of social movements—it may simply be insufficient, by itself, to bring about mobilization. In other words, this may be a case of “necessary versus sufficient” conditions: Some form of inequality or injustice is arguably necessary for a social movement to form. (After all, why mobilize if there is no grievance to address?). But inequality itself may not be sufficient to bring about insurgency; other conditions must also be present.

Resource Mobilization Theory

Resource mobilization theory argues that resources are important for the emergence and maintenance of social movements.²⁴ “Resources” in this context can include a number of things, but the most frequently cited resources include people (activists, leaders, etc.) and economic resources (connections, monetary support, etc.).

People are arguably the most critical resource for social movements. This is true at all levels of a movement. Having adequate numbers of people involved in the movement is important; having the “right people” as leaders in the movement is also essential.

Although there is no scholarly consensus on how many people should be actively involved in a movement to ensure its vitality, it is widely agreed that more is generally better. Having a large number of activists in a movement will help ensure its continued progress in the face of attrition and other challenges; it can also signal to outsiders (e.g. policymakers, the general public) that the movement shares broad support. Additionally, having an adequate number of core activists can help a movement in establishing a consistent leadership group.

Leaders have an important place in social movements. Although many movements eschew a top-down hierarchical structure, movements nonetheless benefit from having steady, charismatic spokespersons at the top who can help choose and maintain particular trajectories. Some of the most high-profile examples include Martin Luther King, Jr., a famous leader in the civil rights movement; Cesar Chavez, a central groundbreaker in the farmworkers’ movement; and Nelson Mandela, the inspirational leader of the anti-Apartheid movement. All three of these leaders helped decide the direction(s) of their respective movements and led them toward success.

Economic resources are also important for social movements. This may seem paradoxical at first glance. Social movements typically involve groups of people who have few resources, which is why they are involved in the unconventional politics of a movement as opposed to hiring lobbyists or contacting their lawmakers directly. Additionally, as relative deprivation theory points out, being on the wrong end of social inequality is a primary motivator for movement participation. But having some resources is still important.

One way of thinking about the paradox described above is to think of resources as having an “inverse-U” relationship with movement emergence (see Fig. 2.1). With few or no resources, a movement will have great difficulty taking off. With at least some resources, the movement will have a greater likelihood of forming. With a large amount of resources, however—admittedly a rare place for movements to find themselves—engaging in unconventional politics would no longer be necessary.

With the “inverse-U” pattern described above, there may be a “sweet spot,” so to speak—something akin to a “Goldilocks Zone”—where movements are most likely to form and be successful. Too few resources, a movement will not form; too many resources, a movement has no reason to form; having at least




Fig. 2.1 Relationship between resources and movement emergence. Source: Adapted from Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” *American Political Science Review* 67 (1973), pp. 11–28

some resources would be best, and would be just right for movement development. This is akin to a model of political opportunities and movement development,²⁵ which will be discussed later.

Why are economic resources important for social movements? Part of it has to do with the fact that social movements are, at their most basic level, made up of organizations. Scholars aptly refer to these groups as social movement organizations—or SMOs, for short. SMOs may be different groups on the same side of an issue (e.g. different labor unions involved in the larger labor movement); SMOs may alternatively be collectivities on opposite sides (e.g. pro- and anti-immigration groups).

To exist, organizations—SMOs included—need resources. They need connections to established entities to secure meeting spaces, technology (e.g. microphones, speakers), media coverage, and so on. They also need economic resources to help with the purchase of basic supplies (e.g. printers, paper, and ink for fliers, and petitions) and potentially more costly items (e.g. transportation to events).

Returning to the questions surrounding the civil rights movement, research suggests that the movement benefitted from resources.²⁶ It was certainly helped by its people-resources. The civil rights movement drew a large number of participants and supporters; it also had some of the most historically significant leaders of any recent movement (e.g. Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X). In terms of economic resources, its connection to organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) helped the movement tap into resources. The movement also received donations and financial assistance from supporters. But having access to resources was not the only factor that led to the emergence and success of the civil rights movement—political opportunity was also likely critical.

Political Opportunity/Process Theory

Political opportunity theory makes a rather simple argument about social movements that draws on social-structural insights: movements are most likely to form and be successful when the political climate offers a window of opportunity. It is, in essence, an argument that “context matters.”²⁷

Again, as with resource mobilization theory, there seems to be a possible contradiction between the ideas of political opportunity and the definition of a social movement. People engage in the unconventional politics of social movements precisely because they lack access to the institutions and inner workings of government; they do not have the political opportunities that are afforded to the wealthy and the well-connected, and must therefore seek change via non-institutional means—for example, via a social movement. But here, as with resource mobilization, an “inverse-U” may be the best way to describe the relationship between opportunity and movement emergence/success (see Fig. 2.2).²⁸

When there is too little political opportunity, a movement will have little chance of forming, much less finding success. Given that the government has access to the tools of repression (e.g. weapons) and hires/pays those who wield these tools (e.g. the military, law enforcement), it can squash mobilization with state-sanctioned violence. Perhaps the most vivid example of this in recent history was the Chinese government’s response to pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square, 1989. As one now-famous image shows, the government brought in military personnel and tanks to halt the uprising (despite the resistance of a few brave individuals who stood in their way).




Fig. 2.2 Relationship between political opportunity and movement emergence. Source: Adapted from Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” *American Political Science Review* 67 (1973), pp. 11–28

When there is an abundance of political opportunity, the necessity of a social movement is diminished. Again, thinking of social movements as unconventional politics, a great amount of political openness/access would enable actors to engage in more institutional tactics (e.g. contacting their lawmakers directly) rather than start a movement.

It is in the middle realm—some political opportunity, but not unfettered access—in which social movements are most likely to form and have success. With some opportunity, movements can take off and reach goals. This was true of the civil rights movement.²⁹

The 1960s provided the kind of political opportunity that the civil rights movement needed to get off the ground. The *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in 1954 helped lay the political groundwork. In that decision, the Supreme Court declared school segregation to be unconstitutional. This signaled a shift in politics.

Perhaps even more significant than the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision was the action of the Kennedy administration in response to the noncompliance of some states. In Mississippi and Alabama, there was resistance to integrating schools despite the aforementioned Supreme Court decision. In both states, the Kennedy administration defied the resistance of recalcitrant governors and used US Marshalls and the National Guard to ensure the enrollment of African American students.³⁰ This, too, represented a shift in governmental policy. Rather than continue to repress African Americans, governmental entities would be used to enforce rulings such as *Brown v. Board of Education* and resist segregationists.

The changing stance around segregation provided an opening for the civil rights movement to take off and gain steam.³¹ Eventually, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, which outlawed discrimination based on race/ethnicity (and other factors). The fight was certainly not over with the passage of the Act—there was more work to do around issues of inequality and injustice—but the Act was a major milestone for the movement, and likely would not have been possible without the political opportunity presented by the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision and subsequent governmental actions.

“New Social Movements,” Collective Identity Theory

Scholarship on social movements in the 1960s and 1970s acknowledged, at least implicitly, that inequality was part of why social movements develop. This was central to relative deprivation theory; it was implied—although seen as “necessary but not sufficient”—by both resource mobilization and political opportunity theories. The movements that were studied in this era were good examples of this principle.

The most-studied movement of that time, the civil rights movement, certainly had a lot to do with inequality. Resources and opportunity were also important, but at the heart of the movement was the lingering racial inequality

in the United States. Other movements also exhibited a similar foundation of fighting against inequality: the labor movement, the American Indian movement (AIM), the women's movement, and others fought against structural inequality and the continued oppression of their respective groups based on class, race, or gender, respectively. Other emerging movements, however, did not necessarily have this same emphasis on inequality.

One could argue that the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) movement has less to do with inequality, *per se*, and more to do with societal and legal recognition of particular identities. In other words, the LGBT movement is less about pay disparities between groups as it is about issues such as same-sex marriage, gay/lesbian adoption, and so on. Likewise, similar arguments have been made about "new religious movements."³² New religions that are not yet part of the mainstream often face challenges establishing legal recognition and avoiding accusations of being "cults." Here, too, the emphasis is not so much on structural inequality; instead, the focus is on recognition of a particular identity.

Given that the emphasis on identity appears to be prevalent among "newer" movements, some scholars began to formulate a "new social movements" theory (or theories) around them.³³ New social movements theory borrows from collective identity theory to describe how social movements today negotiate issues of identity and incorporate identity recognition into their initiatives.

Identity has arguably always been important to social movements.³⁴ Many movements have a cohesive, collective identity around which mobilization occurs. Central to this is the question, "who does the movement represent?" In some cases, the answer is straightforward. For instance, for the labor movement, the answer is labor and the working class. For other movements, however, the answer has not been so simple, as in the case of the movements that coalesced around the Arab Spring uprisings across North Africa and the Middle East.

Take the women's movement, as another example. Although it may seem at first glance that the movement represents all women, some would argue that the movement has not always been effective in representing *all* women—particularly working women, poor women, or women of color. This is due, in part, to the fact that many of the leaders of the women's movement have historically been affluent white women. This realization that the women's movement has inadvertently excluded some segments of its target population has led to important changes in the movement. It has also fueled an intellectual movement around "intersectionality"—the notion that our life experiences are shaped by the intersections of class, race, gender, and other factors—in the feminist paradigm, some of which has spilled into the political realm.³⁵

There is another related challenge that movements face with regard to identity: what about supporters of a movement who are not among the demographics whom the movement represents—in other words, people who are

“outsiders?” From the perspective of resource mobilization theory, outsiders ought to be welcomed, as they increase the numbers in a movement. But from a collective identity perspective, there is also risk that outsiders may inadvertently undermine a movement, especially if they take on leadership roles.

If outsiders are too involved in decision-making in a movement, they may steer the movement away from its original goals and intentions; they may also shift its focus away from its originally intended demographic. The civil rights movement was careful to avoid this. The movement had numerous white supporters who it welcomed into its ranks. But there was resistance to allowing whites into leadership positions, which reduced the risk that blacks would lose “ownership” of the movement. In the case of the Arab Spring, the mass democratic movement that succeeded in toppling the Mubarak dictatorship in Egypt was effectively usurped, first by the Moslem Brotherhood and subsequently by the military, to prevent the transformation of Egyptian society.

As can be seen from the above discussion, movements need to strike a balance between ensuring that their collective identity is cohesive and inclusive while at the same time reducing the risk that the movement will be usurped by outsiders. The women’s movement faced challenges with respect to the first issue, but eventually became more inclusive in their leadership. The civil rights movement did well at negotiating the second issue, in that it allowed for outside support while still preserving the primary goals of the movement. In the case of the Arab Spring, however, the mass movement in Egypt failed to articulate and safeguard its leadership, and thus was unable to prevent its suppression.

Although it is clear that identity is important to social movements, it would be a stretch to claim that movements have completely abandoned concerns about inequality. True, some social movements—such as the LGBT movement and new religious movements—focus primarily on gaining recognition for their respective identities. But most movements today continue to fight for equality and justice (e.g. the Occupy Wall Street Movement, the Black Lives Matter movement, and the Global Justice Movement). As such, it would be a mistake to take the tenets of new social movements too far and assume that movements today have little to do with inequality. Of course, some of this is connected to how movements frame themselves and their issues.

Framing Theory

Scholars of social movements have come to recognize that framing is an important task for movements. Accordingly, academics have developed framing theory to better address this. Drawing on Erving Goffman’s “frame analysis,”³⁶ researchers have identified at least three frames that help shape movement direction and success: diagnostic frames, prognostic frames, and motivational frames.³⁷

As the name implies, diagnostic frames help a movement identify the issues or problems it seeks to address. Diagnostic frames not only allow movements to shed light on the “what” (the issue/problem), but, also, things like who is responsible. Diagnostic frames help set up the next type of frame, prognostic frames.

Social movements use prognostic frames to come up with solutions to the issues identified in diagnostic frames. It is in prognostic framing that movements decide on larger goals as well as the specific strategies and tactics that will be used to reach those goals. For instance, it may be that a policy change is identified as one goal of the movement. As part of prognostic framing, the movement may also decide on the tactics that would be most feasible and effective in reaching that goal (e.g. protests).

Motivational frames assist a movement in keeping members engaged in the movement. They may also help in attracting new participants. Motivational frames mobilize people around the core themes of the movement. They help keep current activists excited about the movement and its issues. Part of this may involve “claiming credit” for accomplishments to ensure that people feel that the movement is making a difference.³⁸ A good example of this would be the World Social Forum, which is a movement of social justice activists across the world who have come together to effect change on a global level.

Motivational frames can also be used to explain what the movement is about—sometimes in catchy slogans or phrases. These slogans can then be used in the public sphere—for instance, in signs or vocalized at protests—which may draw new participants. Given the importance of membership to movements, attracting new participants can be an especially critical function of motivational frames.

CONCLUSION

Although social movements received little serious scholarly consideration prior to the 1960s, scholars have paid more attention to movements since then. Rather than dismiss movements as the collective behavior of irrational actors, scholars today acknowledge social movements as a legitimate form of (unconventional) politics and view their participants as rational actors who are seeking to address grievances through the means that are available to them (e.g. via social movements and their associated activities). This growing attention to social movements as a justifiable form of mobilization has led to a blossoming of theories explaining movement emergence and success.

The first theory, relative deprivation theory, was criticized because movements, such as the civil rights movement, emerged when inequality had actually lessened relative to the past. Inequality may be necessary, but not sufficient, to bring about a social movement. Resource mobilization and political opportunity theories were developed to provide more insight into when and why

movements emerge. As movements emerged that appeared to have little to do with social inequality, scholars developed theories to address these movements under the rubric, “new social movements” theory.

The theories covered in this chapter are sometimes treated as mutually exclusive—or even competing. In fact, some theories have been largely abandoned in favor of newer theories—despite the fact that these earlier theories still have much to offer. These are serious mistakes that can hinder the advancement of scholarship on social movements. Indeed, one might argue that it already has.

As relative deprivation theory was pushed aside in favor of newer theories—and as the emphasis of movements was perceived to have shifted toward identity—the connection between movements and inequality was forgotten by some scholars. Yet the majority of social movements have issues of social inequality as a central concern. Labor movements certainly do, as do contemporary manifestations of the civil rights movement (e.g. the Black Lives Matter movement) and the Occupy Wall Street Movement, to name a few. Granted, there are possibly a few exceptions, as noted by new social movements theory; but even those movements that are purportedly more interested in identity still address, on some level, issues of inequality. The only true “exceptions” may be conservative/right-wing movements that seek to maintain the status quo; but these movements are frequently countermobilization against movements that are addressing inequality head-on and trying to change the power structure.³⁹

Given the above, it would be a mistake to assume that inequality no longer matters in social movements. By extension, it makes little sense to discard theories such as relative deprivation theory—even if they seem to contradict other theories. In essence, there is no inherent contradiction between the different theories of movement development/success. Instead, these theories may simply address different aspects or phases of movement development.

As movements progress, developing a cohesive collective identity is important to ensure movement solidarity, as argued by new social movements theory. Collective identity can be important to ensure that the movement represents all of its constituents; it can also be critical in establishing boundaries in terms of core leadership. Also important for movements are various framing tasks. As movements engage in political action, they need to engage in social framing to identify their issues of interest, how to solve them, and inspire their members.

Social movements are worthy of scholarly attention given their importance as a means of social/political change in society. Although they were once ignored, scholars now give social movements considerable attention. A number of theories have developed over the years to explain movement emergence, structure, and organization. Although some of these theories have fallen out of favor, social movement scholars should recognize that these various theories may apply differently depending on the movement studied and the phase/stage of movement development. Moreover, those studying social movements should not lose sight of the fact that most social movements seek to address social inequality and injustice in contemporary society.

NOTES

1. Social movements are defined here as distinct from revolutions, which typically involve entire shifts in social, political, and/or economic systems. Although this chapter will briefly discuss some classical conventional theories of social movements and revolution, including the French Revolution, it will largely focus on contemporary conventional theories and social movements, especially those in the United States. Other chapters in this handbook provide closer attention to Marxist theories of social movements and revolutions in a broader global context. For a more comprehensive coverage and analysis of historical and contemporary social movements and revolutions, see the following works: Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991); Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Stephen K. Sanderson, *Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to Social and Political Contention*, Second Edition (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010); and Francois Polet (ed.), *The State of Resistance: Popular Struggles in the Global South* (London: Zed Books, 2007).
2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. *The Social Contract* (1762).
3. David W. Lovell. "Socialism, Utopianism, and the 'Utopian Socialists.'" *History of European Ideas* 14 (1992), pp. 185–201.
4. Lovell. "Socialism, Utopianism, and the 'Utopian Socialists'." pp. 185–201.
5. Lovell, "Socialism, Utopianism, and the 'Utopian Socialists.'"
6. Lovell, "Socialism, Utopianism and the 'Utopian Socialists.'"
7. Berch Berberoglu. *Social Theory: Classical and Contemporary: A Critical Perspective* (New York: Routledge, 2017), Chap. 5.
8. Berberoglu. *Social Theory: Classical and Contemporary*, Chap. 5.
9. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. *The Communist Manifesto* (1848).
10. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*.
11. Max Weber, *The Objectivity of the Sociological and Social-Political Knowledge*. (1904).
12. Weber, *The Objectivity of the Sociological and Social-Political Knowledge*.
13. Peter Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1964).
14. Georg Simmel. "The Web of Group Affiliations," in *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations* (New York: The Free Press, 1955).
15. Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, 172.
16. Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, 175.
17. Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, 174–75.
18. Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, 174–75
19. Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, 174–75
20. See, for instance, Robert Park, "Collective Behavior." *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1934).
21. Joan Neff Gurney and Kathleen J. Tierney, "Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research." *The Sociological Quarterly* 23 (1982):33–47.
22. Merton, Robert K. "Social Structure and Anomie." *American Sociological Review* 3 (1938), pp. 672–82.

23. Neil Smelser, *The Theory of Collective Behavior* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1962).
24. John McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977): 1212–41.
25. See, for instance, Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities." *American Political Science Review* 67 (1973), pp. 11–28.
26. Aldon Morris, "A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks." *Annual Review of Sociology* 25 (1999), pp. 517–39.
27. David S. Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunity." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004), pp. 125–45.
28. Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities." *American Political Science Review* 67 (1973), pp. 11–28.
29. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
30. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*.
31. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*.
32. James T. Richardson, "Legal Status of Minority Religions in the United States." *Social Compass* 42 (1995), pp. 249–64.
33. For a good assessment of "new social movements theory"—or theories—see Stephen M. Buechler, "New Social Movement Theories." *The Sociological Quarterly* 36 (1995), pp. 441–64.
34. Francesca Polletta, and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (2001), pp. 283–305.
35. Nira Yuval-Davis, "Intersectionality and Feminist Politics." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13 (2006):193–209.
36. Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974).
37. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000), pp. 611–39.
38. David S. Meyer, "Claiming Credit: Stories of Movement Influence as Outcomes," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 11 (2006), pp. 201–18.
39. David S. Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg. "Movements, Counter-Movements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity." *American Journal of Sociology* 100 (1996), pp. 1628–60.

REFERENCES

- Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 611–639.
- Berberoglu, Berch. 2017. *Social Theory: Classical and Contemporary: A Critical Perspective*. New York: Routledge.
- Blau, Peter M. 1964. *Exchange and Power in Social Life*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Buechler, Stephen M. 1995. New Social Movement Theories. *The Sociological Quarterly* 36: 441–464.

- Domhoff, G. William. 1967. *Who Rules America?* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Eisinger, Peter K. 1973. The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities. *American Political Science Review* 67: 11–28.
- Goffman, Erving. 1974. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 1991. *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gurney, Joan Neff, and Kathleen J. Tierney. 1982. Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research. *The Sociological Quarterly* 23: 33–47.
- Lovell, David W. 1992. Socialism, Utopianism, and the ‘Utopian Socialists’. *History of European Ideas* 14: 185–201.
- Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1848. *The Communist Manifesto*.
- McAdam, Doug. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McCarthy, John, and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 82: 1212–1241.
- Merton, Robert K. 1938. Social Structure and Anomie. *American Sociological Review* 3: 672–682.
- Meyer, David S. 2004. Protest and Political Opportunity. *Annual Review of Sociology* 30: 125–145.
- . 2006. Claiming Credit: Stories of Movement Influence as Outcomes. *Mobilization: An International Journal* 11: 201–218.
- Meyer, David S., and Suzanne Staggenborg. 1996. Movements, Counter-Movements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity. *American Journal of Sociology* 100: 1628–1660.
- Mills, C. Wright. 1956. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Morris, Aldon. 1999. A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks. *Annual Review of Sociology* 25: 517–539.
- Park, Robert. 1934. Collective Behavior. In *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. New York: Macmillan.
- Polletta, Francesca, and James M. Jasper. 2001. Collective Identity and Social Movements. *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 283–305.
- Richardson, James T. 1995. Legal Status of Minority Religions in the United States. *Social Compass* 42: 249–264.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1762. *The Social Contract*.
- Simmel, Georg. 1955. The Web of Group Affiliations. In *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, ed. Georg Simmel. New York: The Free Press.
- Smelser, Neil J. 1962. *The Theory of Collective Behavior*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Weber, Max. 1904. *The Objectivity of the Sociological and Social-Political Knowledge*.
- . 1922. *Economy and Society*.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira. 2006. Intersectionality and Feminist Politics. *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13: 193–209.



Methodological Approaches to Movement Waves and the Making of History

Ben Manski

Why is it much more common to run across the phrase “spontaneous uprising” and not “planned uprising?” Activism is usually predicated on a belief that the strategic choices of activists matter.¹ Yet the ways in which uprisings, revolutions, and other major waves of social movement action are often described suggests that many observers of social movements disagree.² As Cristina Flesher Fominaya has critically noted, “Episodes of intense visible protest are often characterized by observers, journalists, scholars and even participants as spontaneous, unprecedented and unexpected.”³ Given the complexities of history, scholars may be correct to caution against activist hubris and research that attends only to movements and not to the contexts in which movements move.⁴ At the same time, such caution can go too far, tending toward scholarship that appears to assume that if an event could not possibly have been planned ahead in every detail it must have been “spontaneous.” Other approaches propose mechanistic responses to political opportunities or perceived threats as explanations for the emergence of protest waves.⁵

How useful have these approaches been in predicting and explaining the revolutions, mass uprisings, and other manifestations of systemic movements of the past decade? In 2012, in his outgoing remarks as chair of the American Sociological Association’s Collective Behavior and Social Movements section, Jeff Goodwin pointed to the Wisconsin Uprising and asked those gathered, “where did capitalism go?” by which he also meant to ask where capitalism and anti-capitalism went in social movement studies? Goodwin continued:

B. Manski (✉)

Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

© The Author(s) 2019

B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_3

Too much of the recent scholarship ... treats movements as if they were hermetically sealed off from broader historical processes and social forces ... neglect[ing] the broader sweep of politics, but it is capitalism that is especially conspicuous for its absence in the recent literature....⁶

At that same meeting, Juhi Tyagi and Michael Schwartz reviewed recently published articles from the social movements journal *Mobilization*, finding only three that dealt significantly with the contextual “broader sweep” identified by Goodwin. This may help to explain the relative absence from the social movement literature of Wisconsin and other uprisings notable for their anti-capitalist politics, and in turn gives gravity to what Richard Flacks has called, “The Question of Relevance in Social Movement Studies.”⁷ Class-based popular movements having been “parceled out” to labor studies and industrial relations, the field of social movement studies has struggled to account for some of the most significant social movement activity of our time.⁸

Such an account should be possible. It may simply be a matter of getting inside the heads of those who have made it their business to make history. As John Krinsky points out:

Activists in Egypt and Wisconsin recognized, in 2011, that their struggles were, at least in some ways, linked by their resistance to neoliberal capitalism.... Perhaps analysts of social movements should entertain their insight as serious enough to bear critical inquiry and action.⁹

Taking activist insights seriously is central to the approach I elaborate here, one that treats activists as conscious producers both of movements and of knowledge about the movements they produce. Building from recent publications that argue for a scholarship of movements that at once assumes social complexity and valorizes agency,¹⁰ I show how bringing the various mainstream approaches to social movement studies of the past 40 years into constructive engagement with a longstanding scholarship of revolutions and praxis allows us to better explain where movement waves come from and what they may produce. In accounting for the exercise of collective agency over time, such an approach avoids the three scalar fallacies that prevent scholars from “seeing” cognition (too small), systemic movements (too big), and historical processes (too long).

In the following pages, I describe a theory of movement building across dimensions of struggle. To do this, I specify the concepts of movement elements, movement waves, periods and terrains of struggle, and movement building in struggle. I articulate a method for using these concepts in a movement building analysis and, as a demonstration, share findings from a case study of the Wisconsin Uprising. I conclude with proposals for a series of methods made possible by the theory elaborated here and argue for a wider engagement by social movement scholars with an ontology of praxis.

CONCEPTUALIZING MOVEMENT BUILDING IN DIMENSIONS OF STRUGGLE

As should be becoming clear, central to the general approach described here is a recognition that activists build movements over historical time and across particular terrains. They assess past histories, current conditions, and possible futures in attempting to build successful movements.¹¹ Social movement scholarship suffers when it fails to account for this reality.¹²

Veteran activists are sometimes surprised to learn that the study of movement building has yet to become a central concern of social movement scholars. Activists engage in highly visible movement building activities all the time, devoting resources and time to the convening of movement schools, organizing conferences, mass teach-ins, and small group skill-shares. In noting, “promising trends—greater attention to political education, leadership development, coalition building, and infrastructure—that we see manifest in renewed efforts to become more strategic,” the activist intellectuals Richard Healey and Sandra Hinson have pointed to the increasing centrality of movement building in activist practice and theory.¹³

In response, social movement researchers have called for greater attention to movement building processes.¹⁴ Aldon Morris provided a beginning in his lifting up of the role of the Highlander Folk School, Fellowship of Reconciliation, and Southern Conference Education Fund as “movement halfway houses.”¹⁵ Kenneth Andrews developed an account of movement impacts and the building of “movement infrastructure” in the Mississippi civil rights movement of the 1970s–1980s.¹⁶ And a recent analysis of the U.S. Social Forum of 2010 theorizes the Forum process as a “movement building machine” producing new organizational resources.¹⁷ These and other particularistic studies suggest the possibility of developing a more systematic method for analyzing how movements are built.

In this section, I draw from a wide range of theories to develop concepts useful to such a systematic analysis. I start with the identification of the elements that movement building produces. I then situate the movement building process across waves of contention and within periods of struggle. Next I complement the historical dimension of periods of struggle with the spatial-structural dimension of terrains of struggle and end by drawing attention to the praxis of activists in conceptualizing and manifesting both.

Movement Elements

Let us begin with a utilitarian assessment that gathers and organizes elements drawn from the major contemporary approaches in social movement theory, asking how these theories help us identify and explain the production of movements. As shown in Table 3.1, I re-categorize the elemental resources, continuity structures, cultural repertoires, and leadership properties that we know matter in what activists and movements do, and use these to specify the particular elements that movements produce.

Table 3.1 Matrix of social movement elements for identification and analysis

<i>Object type</i>	<i>Movement element</i>	<i>Analytical question</i>
Resources	Material resources	<i>What material resources are produced/reduced?</i>
	Organization	<i>What organizational capacity is produced?</i>
	Strategic capacity	<i>What resources are identified, created, deployable?</i>
Continuity	Submerged networks	<i>What informal networks are created/persist?</i>
	Continuity structures, communities, movement scenes	<i>What collective identities are maintained or built in particular places and communities?</i>
Culture	Frames	<i>What frames have been produced through which activists, adherents, publics, and opponents interpret contention?</i>
	Repertoires, toolkits, packages	<i>What tactics, artifacts, postures and other cultural artifacts have been produced?</i>
	Spillover and diffusion	<i>What cultural elements have been adopted or passed on between movements?</i>
	Institutional schemas	<i>What cultural elements are embedded in the structures of institutions?</i>
	Cultures of resistance and transformation	<i>What are the cultural idioms and ideological frameworks activists have developed as strategies of action?</i>
Leadership	Development	<i>What are the ways in which activists learned, and what did they learn?</i>
	Biography	<i>Who are the individuals involved, what are their histories, and what do they bring to their movement work?</i>
	Cohorts	<i>What are the collective experiences generated in past waves of contention?</i>

From the 1970s to the 1990s, the study of social movements was dominated by a resource mobilization approach that emphasized the importance of the accumulation and deployment of material, organizational, moral, and human resources.¹⁸ The resource capacity of organizations and movements was treated as a predictor of success. Recent scholarship has turned the resource mobilization model on its head, asking how activists deploy resources and how organizations build activists. Here, resourcefulness has been recognized as a resource in its own right—a strategic capacity of organization.¹⁹ These approaches allow the researcher to specify the material resources and organizational and strategic capacities available to activists at a particular moment in time.

The narrower resource mobilization approach can lead to explanations that assume that social movements are unimportant in periods of less externally visible activity. Yet movement continuity between protest waves is a common fact. Verta Taylor, Leila Rupp, and others have brought to light the importance of structures of abeyance—institutions, organizations, networks, and communities—in retaining critical ideological and other cultural resources through relatively low periods of mobilization.²⁰ More recent research has identified the importance of informal place-based movement scenes as abeyance structures.²¹

And a wide variety of scholars have considered the role of collective identity in maintaining submerged networks of activists through periods of lesser activity,²² building collective consciousness and solidarity,²³ and shaping the long-term strategic orientations of movement participants.²⁴ Thus, attention to continuity structures allows the researcher to specify the organizations, network structures, and collective identities that activists have built, maintained, or recreated over time.

A closely related body of work is concerned with the importance of movement culture as both a product and a producer of social movements. Waves of contention produce cultural currents which in turn can rebound to impact the very movements that helped produce them as well as other social movements and the wider society.²⁵ Waves also contribute to the construction and distribution of cultural bundles of tactics, symbols, and practices described as collective action repertoires, toolkits, and charismatic packages.²⁶ These become available for future use both locally and elsewhere as they are taken up by other activists, appearing to “spillover” or “diffuse” into other movements.²⁷ Some researchers have looked beyond these mostly discrete sets of cultural artifacts to examine the ways in which cultural structures can become embedded in institutions as roadmaps, or institutional schemas for action.²⁸ And still others have developed the analytical framework of political cultures of opposition, resistance, and transformation. There, ideology and cultural idioms are understood to mediate between individuals’ subjective experiences and the objective structural and organizational forces they face.²⁹ Such political cultures have been found to be especially important in maintaining the kind of horizontalist, decentralized, and anti-authoritarian movements that have arisen since the 1990s, the very kinds of movements and community-based uprisings sometimes described as “spontaneous” or encouraging spontaneity.³⁰ Thus, a movement building analysis of movement culture may seek after the specific frames, tactics, postures, idioms, ideological frameworks, strategies of action, and other cultural artifacts have been produced and embedded or otherwise passed on over time.

Movement know-how is visibly transmitted in symbols and other forms of material culture, yet the accumulation of knowledge and experience within individual activists may be even more critical to movement success. Movement leaders play key roles in sustaining movements, in creating new opportunities, and for this reason, social movement organizations often devote significant attention to leadership development.³¹ Along these lines, Antonio Gramsci recognized the importance of organic intellectuals, who, having arisen out of conditions of social struggle, provide movement leadership at the ground level.³² More recent scholarship in this tradition calls them movement intellectuals or simply activists.³³ Activist biographies reveal that once activated, individuals tend to remain engaged in social change work and to pursue a more deliberate life course.³⁴ John Krinsky and Colin Barker have taken this further, attending to the importance of the “collective biographies” produced in the course of social struggle.³⁵

In bringing together the usually discrete, conceptually bounded theorizations of movement resources, continuity structures, culture, and leadership into one analytic matrix, I have created an instrument useful to a movement building analysis. We can use the matrix to identify specific elements that activists construct in the course of building their movements. However, on its own, this instrument has very limited utility: We can use it to identify elements that appear to be important at a particular time, but in so doing, we are likely to mistake or simply miss a great deal of actual or potential import. To move beyond episodic observation requires gathering up data produced across historical and spatial dimensions. I do this with an approach that situates movement waves within the context of larger periods of struggle.

Movement Waves

Social movements are definitionally inconstant; they tend to rise and fall. For this reason, when social movements swell, they are often described in terms of protest waves or waves of contention. These concepts can be generally useful in understanding the trajectories of social movement action, and there is a significant body of research that has been constructed around the emergence of protest waves, their resolution and subsidence, and the cultural, political, and social structural artifacts they produce.³⁶

Unclear, however, is the temporal duration of such waves. When speaking of a wave of contention, is our object to be found in the months or years of heightened visibility, or are such waves generally of greater duration, and inclusive of the many years of less intensive activity that precede the surfacing of a social movement? Were the years 1968–1973 the period of a protest wave, or is it more useful to think of that wave as having started earlier and ended later? Similarly, is it still useful to speak of the “Protest Wave of 2011,” as many scholars have, or will we later look back to an earlier year as the start of a protest wave that continued on past 2011?

A few have taken stabs at clarifying what defines the temporal limits of a rise in contention; Sidney Tarrow made a passing reference to a typology of “moments, cycles, ages of contention.”³⁷ One approach among contention theorists has described waves of contention as occurring in response to perceived threats and according to the relative structure of political opportunity available to activists at a particular time. Analyses of both opportunity and threats are presented as useful in predicting when contention will escalate.³⁸ Yet these approaches that tend to characterize uprisings in “volcanic” terms fail to provide useful explanations of what meaningful activity occurs between observed waves and of the role of activists in building social movements in such periods of lesser visibility.³⁹ Particularly missing from these approaches is an effective means of predicting what activists will do in the course of contention. For these reasons and others, concerns have been raised about the use of the term “wave” to describe social movement action as potentially reifying something merely metaphorical and rendering the conscientious agency of activists as passive vessels riding a metaphysical phenomenon.⁴⁰

My use of the term “movement wave” is not metaphorical. I suggest that waves are an ordinary property of social movements. A wave is commonly understood as a movement of force through a medium, agitating and sometimes altering that medium. As people act collectively, their actions bring force through society, agitating and sometimes altering social relations. Irregularities in movement waves are normal because of social complexity; the fact that social movements do not generally rise and fall in regular oscillation should not lead one to miss the underlying transfer of force that *is* the social movement. Such a material understanding of social movements and of movement waves is not entirely original to my approach, though others have tended to more emphasize the importance of ideological transformation and identity construction in wave formation and reformation.⁴¹

Dimensions of Struggle: Periods and Terrains

It is absurd to think of the mass strike as one act, one isolated action. The mass strike is rather the indication, the rallying idea, of a whole period of class struggle lasting for years, perhaps decades. (Rosa Luxemburg, *The Mass Strike*⁴²)

Waves of contention—what Rosa Luxemburg a century ago described as *mass strikes*—are usually of shorter duration than the lifespans of the people who make them. Many activists live through multiple protest waves, immersed all the while in “the great underground work of the revolution [which is] in reality being carried on without cessation, day by day and hour by hour, in the very heart of the empire.”⁴³ This underground work—which activists today call “movement building”—is not only uninterrupted, it is of duration, carried on not only hour-by-hour but also year-by-year and sometimes decade-by-decade. The work takes place within the context of a period Gramsci saw as defined by a long-lasting crisis in which “the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself” engage in an “incessant and persistent” struggle against movements from below⁴⁴; he called such periods “conjunctural.” For our purposes, I use Luxemburg’s phrase “periods of struggle,” situating movement waves within periods of struggle (See Diagram 3.1). Thus, a series of cresting waves, corresponding to some degree with Gramsci’s “wars of maneuver,” arise from wave troughs defined by what he called “wars of position.”




Diagram 3.1 Waves within periods struggle

Struggle occurs not only over time, but also in geographic areas, under conditions, and within a set of social relations particular and meaningful to the actors involved, or what Gramsci termed “terrains of struggle,” others have called “contested terrain,” and still others have re-theorized as “strategic action fields.”⁴⁵ James Jasper proffers “arenas” over “fields” out of a concern that field theory tends to collapse actors and field together, as well as to leave out any external audience.⁴⁶ What seems most important here is to use a term that describes the cognitive practice of activists as they engage in struggle. Just as land terrains involve multiple types of features—geological, climactic, biological, and so on—social terrains can be understood as meta-structures emergent from sets of organizations, institutions, geographies, and so on. With Diagram 3.2, I provide a conceptual visualization of how waves of contention might vary across related terrains constituting a common period of struggle.

What defines a period or terrain of struggle? In part, “what” defines these is determined by “who” defines them: Who is struggling, what are they struggling with, and how do they understand their struggle? In recognizing that the dimensions of struggle operate at the intersections of the objective and subjective, the phenomenological and the cognitive, and the structural and the cultural, we gain capacity to make empirically available an actual force involved in movement building: The activists’ own conceptions of the dimensions of their struggles.




Diagram 3.2 Periods of struggle over terrains of struggle

Activists sometimes go to great effort to declare the times and the scope of the struggles in which they are engaged. Almost every movement declaration, from Chiapas' Lacandon Jungle in 1994 to Seneca Falls in 1848, and from U.S. Independence in 1776 to Port Huron in 1963, to name a few famous documents from American histories, involves a clear statement explaining and framing the period, the terrain, the actors, and the stakes. But even in the many cases in which such a world historic declaration is unavailable, it is my contention that activists, over time, develop a consciousness of the dimensions of struggle in which they operate and that these dimensions become forces of their own in shaping the trajectories of movements and history.

As in Diagram 3.3, I conceptualize an activist's consciousness of the dimensions of struggle as both internally constructed and externally shaped. The "internal" involves the exercise of individual cognition, both rational and affective,⁴⁷ mediated through both identity and culture, engaging "externally" in relation to the real structural conditions, other actors, and the historical processes of the period. Thus, this conceptualization centers what Margaret Archer has described as "the inner conversation," involving an individual's personal and social identities in the reflexive "mental process of projecting and evaluating future possibilities and then using these projections for the guidance of thought and action" that Peter Railton, Martin Seligman, Roy Baumeister, and Chandra Sripada have called "prosppection."⁴⁸




Diagram 3.3 Activist consciousness of dimensions of struggle

This process is further mediated through both internalized cultural knowledge and the nearby external cultural world in which an activist lives.⁴⁹ The development of activist consciousness of the dimensions of struggle is thus similar to what Lev Vygotsky described as “a complex dialectical process characterized by periodicity, unevenness in the development of different functions, metamorphosis or qualitative transformation of one form into another, intertwining of internal and external factors, and an adaptive process...” in his studies of childhood development.⁵⁰ To the activist, the “external factors”—structures, actors, and processes—matter both objectively and relationally, defining their capacity to exercise structural power and providing a standpoint from which they may construct personal knowledge about their world.⁵¹ As Marx famously observed, people “make their own history ... but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”⁵²

Thus, an activist’s consciousness of the dimensions of struggle are neither entirely of their own making nor entirely inculcated by their habitus or structural position.⁵³ Nor should activist agency and social structure be conflated, as humans are not merely social beings; we are also biological and perhaps more.⁵⁴ Instead, “most of our actions are co-determined by *both* our habitus and our reflexive deliberations,”⁵⁵ and thus, “to say a person has certain powers by virtue of her position in a structure is to say nothing about how she will exercise these powers.”⁵⁶ This is important for two reasons of immediate methodological concern. First, because agency is real and matters, activists themselves are vital sources of both theory and data for social movement scholars. Second, because structure is real and matters, personal troubles are often shared to a greater or lesser degree, and periods and terrains of struggle come to possess an emergent power that operates externally to individual conceptions of the times and terrains in which we live. Dimensions of struggle might be understood, therefore, as a type of activist master frame.⁵⁷

Movement Building in Struggle: Praxis

The most precious, because lasting, thing in this rapid ebb and flow of the wave is its mental sediment: the intellectual, cultural growth of the proletariat, which proceeds by fits and starts, and which offers an inviolable guarantee of their further irresistible progress in the economic as in the political struggle. —Rosa Luxemburg⁵⁸

Social movement scholars are not the only ones who know that movement continuity, culture, leadership, and resource mobilization are critical elements in the building of social movements. Sometimes missing is an explicit recognition that all of these together are produced, reproduced, and synthesized through the conscious action of activists in a movement building process oriented toward long-term strategic gains in the course of social struggle. For activists engaged in struggle, such elements often are not just the building blocks of movements, but the elements of life itself, determining whether or

not essential needs are met and modulating the degree of risk and exposure to personal harm the activist experiences. Struggles, after all, involve more than one participant; social movements from below engaged with *social movements from above*.⁵⁹ Thus, as Colin Barker tells us:

“Class struggle” is inherently a process involving (at least) two sides. One side involves multifarious forms of resistance to exploitation and oppression; the other includes the equally varied means by which ruling groups work to maintain their positions and to contain such resistance.⁶⁰

In the course of struggle, activists teach themselves and others lessons about how to build lasting, effective, well-resourced movements for the road ahead, and it matters to activists whether those lessons prove correct.⁶¹ If they are correct, activist efforts escalate over time from particularized local conflicts to generalized campaigns to large scale and potentially revolutionary social movement projects.⁶² This reflexive building process is essential to the larger social change process that Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison named “cognitive praxis” and Richard Flacks called “making history.”⁶³ And if, as Colin Barker has put it, social “movements are mediated expressions of class struggle,”⁶⁴ activists and their antagonists are the prime mediators in a dialectical process.⁶⁵

The building of social movements is never unilateral and it does not occur in a vacuum. Most activists engage in movement building conscious of their immediate antagonists and other actors, as well as with some sense of the need for, as John Peck notes, “strategies and analysis that carry through beyond your immediate crisis or battle or target that you are focused on, and that is more broad based.”⁶⁶ Just as struggle is both interactive (between movement actors and others) and intra-active (among movement actors), so too is the process of movement building. Even processes that might seem purely internal to particular movements—trainings, skill shares, caucuses, or conference—are undertaken by activists conscious of a larger struggle. As Lenin points out, “sporadic outbreaks and skirmishes” that might seem external to the process of movement building are in actuality “giving the people a lesson” through which, as Marx puts it, “all the elements necessary for a coming battle unite and develop.”⁶⁷

Altogether, we can define the movement building process as the purposive production of the elements of social movements for use in future struggle. The process is purposive in that it involves the deliberate action of movement participants toward a future goal. The process produces social movement elements to the extent that it builds continuity structures, culture, leaders, and resource capacity. And the process occurs within the context and consciousness of present and future social struggle. As Eyerman and Jamison and others have recognized, the word that contemporary activists commonly use to refer to this approach is “praxis,” by which they commonly mean the putting of theory into practice and in turn, of the lessons of practice into theory.

HOW TO CONDUCT A MOVEMENT BUILDING ANALYSIS

The method outlined here is one among a series of approaches made possible using the concepts developed above. Research methods are often iterative, moving between data, theory, and analysis in one order or another depending on a particular (and ideally, chosen) logic of inquiry. I have named the approach described here a “movement building analysis” not only to use a term familiar to activists (and thereby facilitate exchanges among scholars and practitioners) but additionally out of the recognition that because activists are the primary builders of movements, they are also the primary constructors of parametric knowledge about the conditions under which movements are built. This necessitates an iterative research process that moves from empirical data collection and analysis to theoretical re-description and re-theorization (abduction and retrodution), and then back to empirical analysis (See Box 3.1).⁶⁸

In practice, this method begins with exploratory research intended to provide a description of the research object. Secondary sources as well as quantitative data, when available, are useful, but the focus here will be initial interviews with activists and other primary subjects, archival and other documentary analysis, and where appropriate, participant and other forms of field observation. From these, the researcher makes a first pass at identifying the operative dimensions of struggle, that is, the period and the terrains of struggle as understood at the time by the activists involved. This initial identification then allows for more in-depth and directed data acquisition, including inquiries posed to activists and other primary subjects and applied to further field observation and documentary analysis. The goal of these directed inquiries is twofold: first, to calibrate the operative period and terrains of struggle, to identify the rising and falling of movement waves across these, and second, to apply these parameters toward the identification of specific elemental resources, continuity structures, movement culture, and leadership elements produced.

Box 3.1 Steps in a movement building analysis

1. Exploratory research
2. Initial identification of dimensions of struggle
3. Data acquisition
4. Calibration of period and terrains of struggle
5. Identification of rising waves (Diagram 3.2) and movement elements produced (as shown in Table 3.1, Table 3.2, Diagram 3.4)
6. Repeat steps C and D as needed

If research is of past history and not a contemporaneous process, and if desired:

7. Compare findings from A-E with analysis of end-condition (uprising, revolution, etc.) to be explained

Table 3.2 Elements produced in the Wisconsin struggle, 1994–2010

Terrain A: Biennial state budget battles	Master frame	WI manufacturers and commerce, chamber of commerce as target, “class enemy”
	Repertoire, continuity structure, leadership cohorts, submerged networks	Regular statewide coalition work around state budget processes. <i>“This was very important because, growing out of that May Day budget protest and for all the years since, has been the Earth Day to May Day Coalition.”</i> (Stockwell 2016).
Terrain B: Sectoral and institutional conflicts over corporatization and corporate power	Frame, repertoire	Identification of mainstream social movement organizations with the radical heritage of May Day and the May Day sing-along tradition
	Repertoire, master frame	Statewide multiracial coalition building against a common corporate target (and often on the basis of working class solidarity). <i>“[S]tatewide organizing is right out of the progressive playbook; Fighting Bob La Follette took rural farmers and urban factory workers and aligned them, and we know and have to show that rural families have been left out in the cold and abandoned in same way that urban families have been.”</i> (Epps-Addison 2016)
	Repertoire	Sophisticated direct action organizing, including capitol occupations.
Terrain C: Participation of Wisconsinites in regional, national, global conflicts vs. corporations	Culture of resistance	Demands for democratic structural reforms.
	Submerged networks	Personal friendship and ally networks. <i>“The same people at that table were the same people in all of those fights, so being an activist at that time you had to know that all these battles were going to come together in one grand fight.”</i> (Nayak 2016)
	Master frame	Identification of Wisconsin struggles with global movement: <i>“An injury to one is an injury to all” was a slogan that the leadership took to heart. So when there was a struggle elsewhere, be that elsewhere in the United States or elsewhere internationally, they would open the doors and have people come in and talk about that. I think that what that did was it raised the consciousness of the local labor movement that labor struggles are not just what’s happening in your shop, it’s what’s happening in all the shops around you, all the shops in the country, and in fact all the shops in the world.”</i> (Stockwell 2016).
	Submerged networks, organizational resources	Transnational friendship networks as well as formal organizational ties through maintained networks and organizations.

(continued)

Table 3.2 (continued)

Terrain D: Wisconsin's progressive movement and its institutions	Resource capacity, strategic capacity, organization	Reduced traditional resource capacity (student associations, labor unions, community organizations), increased strategic capacity through new social movement forms (democracy movement organizations, independent parties, independent media, expanded cooperative and independent business sector). <i>"[As neoliberal austerity and global trade policies] hit town after town where militant trade unionism was practiced, it became clear to us that this wasn't just about seeking cheaper labor—that was a part of it—it was about eradicating any semblance of democracy in the economy"</i> (Sadlowski 2016) and yet <i>"They just were not ready. AFSCME and WEAC tried to move away from a confrontational aspect of bargaining.... They wanted to be known as organizations that politicians could get along with."</i> (Matthews 2016) versus <i>"We were setting up an infrastructure to shift power at the school for the long haul"</i> (Epps-Addison 2016)
--	---	---

If the object in question is in the past, it may be that the researcher will wish to add a further step and to compare their findings with an analysis of the qualities of something they regard as an end-condition. For instance, in studying the origins of an uprising or a revolution, a comparison may be made between the finding of a movement building analysis and the actual event(s) that movement is thought to have produced. I provide a summary of one such analysis and comparison in the next section.

THE METHOD IN ACTION: THE WISCONSIN UPRISING
AND BEYOND

The general praxis-centered approach elaborated in this essay results from engagements with a series of case studies, social movement theory, and critical realist epistemology. Cases included the 1990s–2000s “democratic turn” of the U.S. left, the uses of constitutional politics by democracy movements, possible futures for blockchain technology and popular sovereignty, and the Wisconsin Uprising of 2011.⁶⁹ It was with the later studies that I articulated the idea of movement building analysis. Here I draw from my analysis of the Wisconsin Uprising to provide an example of the method. I also address how the method could be used to study other movement waves, both emergent and historical.

The Wisconsin Uprising

In November 2010, in the days after Scott Walker was elected governor of Wisconsin, a network of veteran progressive activists throughout that state began to organize what they expected to be the largest protest wave in decades.




Diagram 3.4 Period of struggle, Wisconsin, 1994–2011, over four terrains

They did this in part because unions and community organizations had a history of mobilization against Walker’s policies in Milwaukee County, where he had been county executive. They were also inspired by the anti-austerity movements that were roiling the UK, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Chile at the time. And their organizing was spurred on by the early capitulation of outgoing governor James Doyle to Walker in his demands that Doyle cancel Wisconsin’s acceptance of nearly \$1 billion in federal funding for the expansion of Amtrak rail services. The plan for a “Wisconsin Wave of Resistance” involved the formation of a popular coalition against Walker’s state budget and escalating protests leading to the mustering of at least 50,000 at the State Capitol by May 1.

On February 11, 2011, Walker altered the timeline and set off the powder keg by introducing special legislation in the form of Act 10, which he called a

“Budget Repair Bill.” Act 10 included provisions intended to effectively end collective bargaining for public workers, cut funding to public schools and libraries and other institutions, expand public funding of private education through voucher and charter school programs, eliminate food and health assistance to hundreds of thousands of Wisconsinites, sell off public lands and other ecological assets, break up the University of Wisconsin System, effectively privatize the UW-Madison, and, among other regulations of small businesses, end the onsite sale of beer by Wisconsin microbreweries.

Protests of Act 10 began immediately at the Capitol and the Governor’s Mansion. On Monday, February 14, over 1000 students, faculty, and staff from area colleges marched on the Capitol. The next day, education and public employee unions and others swelled the protests to over 10,000 and began the long-term occupation of the Capitol Building. Over the following months, the protests escalated further, with crowds of 40,000, 50,000, 75,000, and 150,000 gathering on the Capital Square. Demonstrations and direct actions involving thousands and tens of thousands took place elsewhere throughout the state and workers organized industrial strikes in education and other parts of the public sector. Activists targeted specific politicians for recall, engaged in targeted direct actions against the Chamber of Commerce and the Koch brothers, and provided national leadership in the U.S. Uncut anti-bank campaign as well as the constitutional amendment campaign against *Citizens United v. FEC*. Major sympathy protests and copycat actions took place in other states and around the world, among these the Albany, New York, tent city protests that led directly to Occupy Wall Street.

The Wisconsin Uprising continued with intensity through the summer, and at a still significant level through 2012, and the resulting politics are still in play today. Among the victories of the Wisconsin movement was the renewal of class-based direct-action politics and of anti-capitalism on a truly massive scale in the United States. At the same time, the immediate outcome of 2011 was the defeat of the movement on most core policy issues. In my study of the Wisconsin Uprising, I address all of this in a depth unaffordable here.⁷⁰ Instead, I provide a summary that speaks to the utility of a movement building analysis for answering the most interesting questions raised by what started in Wisconsin.

It is not hard to understand why many Wisconsinites felt threatened by policy proposals that negatively impacted them personally; asking why Wisconsinites protested in 2011 is not a particularly interesting question. A more productive question is why so many Wisconsinites rose up in such a militant spirit and took the particular actions they did. This latter question suggests the possibility of not only explaining and predicting when we might see a rising wave, but more importantly, of what the formative characteristics of that wave are likely to be.

To begin to answer this question, I interviewed a variety of activists who were centrally involved throughout the Wisconsin Uprising and in various movements of the decades prior. These exploratory interviews, together with examinations of archival documents and records from my own participant

observation, allowed me to sketch out the dimensions of the Wisconsin struggle as it was understood at the time by the activists involved. I determined that the 1986 election of Governor Tommy Thompson set much of what mattered to Wisconsin's (self-identified) progressive activists in motion, but that it was not until 1993–1994—and most notably the trilateral resistance to NAFTA—that the sense of a new period with new challenges and new logics really took hold in activist consciousness and began to structure Wisconsin activism.

Having made an initial identification of the period of struggle, as well as of some of the major features of that period, I returned to a more intensive interview and archival research regime. My purpose here was twofold. First, I sought to calibrate the operative period and terrains of struggle and to identify the rising and falling of movement waves across these. Second, having identified four principle terrains and the period of 1994–2010 as most relevant to the activists who launched the Wisconsin Uprising, I applied these dimensions of struggle as parameters for the identification of the elemental resources, structures, cultures, and leaders on the scene in Wisconsin in 2010–2011. Some of my findings from this analysis are displayed above in Table 3.2 as well as below in Diagram 3.4.

This identification of the elements produced out of the period of struggle leading up to the 2011 uprising goes a long way to explaining why hundreds of thousands of Wisconsinites did the particular and sometimes peculiar things they did—occupying the Capitol Building, engaging in mass direct actions across the state, building a popular coalition ranging from farmers and business owners to anti-poverty activists and environmentalists, enlisting national and international support, targeting the banks and the Chamber of Commerce, returning the slogan “This is What Democracy Looks Like!” to the social movement repertoire, mainstreaming working-class anti-capitalist politics in the United States, and participating in the daily ritual of the Solidarity Sing Along of revolutionary and subversive music.

In my movement building analysis of the Wisconsin Uprising, I detail all this as well as the specific ways in which the presence of these elements—together with the absence of others—were involved in the uprising and in the downfall of the Wisconsin movement. I have also made use of some of these findings to suggest lessons for workers and unions facing a potentially adverse decision in *Janus v. AFSCME*.⁷¹ To date, the academy has not produced any other thoroughgoing analysis of the causes of the Wisconsin Uprising.⁷² Methods that can only provide what are effectively snapshots of particular movement moments will not offer the same explanatory power as methods designed to make empirically available the full stream of movement waves. I credit the methods developed in my study with making such an analysis possible.

The Uses of Movement Building Analysis

I have argued that movement building occurs in the course of struggle—that it is an interactive and intra-active process undertaken on particular terrains of

struggle in the light and under the shadow of other actors. Activists engaged in struggle produce identifiable social movement elements that in turn make possible and shape the conflicts of the future. The timing and the outcomes of those conflicts are, like movement building, codetermined by the developing conditions of particular terrains of struggle and the actions of other actors, including especially movements from above.

Theoretically, an activist with perfect information about the period and terrains on which they were operating and about the culture, continuity structures, leadership, and resource capacity of other actors in struggle could more often make decisions that result in greater movement success. In practice, activists never have perfect information, they never are capable of considering all the angles, and they operate with many motivations and understandings that are not instrumentally tied to movement success. Yet most social movement activists “try to get it right” by developing strategies for success, and in their strategic praxis, they engage in movement building.

Activists are not the only actors who engage in such prospective praxis, of course, but they are especially interesting because they so clearly and consciously act in response to other actors, structures, and processes. Using this method of movement building analysis, scholars might use digital technologies to engage in contemporaneous research oriented toward social movement forecasting. While activists frequently engage in their own forms of movement building analysis, they usually lack the resources and rigor available to social movement researchers in the academy. Thus, greater investment in movement relevant research should prove fruitful not only to movements but also to academics looking for answers to difficult questions such as how seemingly spontaneous uprisings rise up.

CONCLUSIONS

The method of movement building analysis advocated here is made possible by an emergent approach to social movement theory that understands movements as a form of historical praxis. Scholars have a great deal to gain from the engagement of praxis theories with the two contemporary approaches widely in use in social movement studies: theories of contention (resource mobilization, political opportunity, political process, dynamics of contention, new institutionalism) and theories of identity (biography, collective identity, continuity, diffusion, submerged networks, social movement communities). Elsewhere I deal in greater depth with the movement ontologies of praxis, identity, and contention theories.⁷³ Here I simply submit that there are different sets of operative assumptions that make various aspects of movements more or less visible, and that the advance of praxis-centered scholarship is helpful in making movement building and other processes visible for empirical research.

What are some of those other processes? Any process involving ordinary people engaged in the deliberate constitution of their societies—that involves direct micro (individual) and sub-micro (cognitive) engagements with macro

(societal) and supra-macro (world historic) changes—can be explained at least in part by a praxis-centered approach. Such processes include popular constitutionalism, revolutionary movements and revolutions, democracy movements, and other so-called anti-systemic (and systemic) movements.

Furthermore, a wider selection of cases is not the only gain to be had from the praxis-based concepts elaborated here. These concepts and the movement building analytical approach suggest other practical methods that rely on “what activists know” to test activist predictions about the current and future historical period, to engage in real-time analysis of movements in the streets, and to involve activists outside of the academy in the ongoing design of social movement research. Certainly, some caution about the strategic capabilities of activists is warranted. But an overabundance of such caution should also be avoided. After all, there remains a world to win.

NOTES

1. Richard Flacks, “Envisioning Another World: Port Huron’s Continuing Relevance,” in Draft for Forthcoming Book, 2013.
2. “Spontaneous uprising” appeared at least three times as often as “planned uprising” in English language books, 1960–2008; source: Google NGram, accessed April 15, 2018. Archival searches of the social movements journal *Social Movement Studies* (156 vs. 37) and ProQuest’s Social Sciences database (681 vs. 204) show similar results.
3. Cristina Flesher Fominaya, “Debunking Spontaneity: Spain’s 15-M/Indignados as Autonomous Movement,” *Social Movement Studies* 14, no. 2 (March 4, 2015), pp. 142–163.
4. Nancy Whitter, “Message from the Chair,” *Critical Mass Bulletin* (Fall 2013). <http://cbsm-asa.org/2013/11/message-from-the-chair-fall-2013/>.
5. Debra C. Minkoff, “The Sequencing of Social Movements,” *American Sociological Review* 62, no. 5 (October 1997); David S. Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, “Movements, Countermovements and the Structure of Political Opportunity,” *American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 6 (May 1996), pp. 1628–1660.
6. Michelle Smirnova and Melissa Wooten, “Take 2: Where Did Capitalism Go?,” *Critical Mass Bulletin* 37, no. 2 (Fall 2012), pp. 2–5.
7. Richard Flacks, “The Question of Relevance in Social Movement Studies,” in David Croteau, William Hoynes, and Charlotte Ryan (eds.), *Rhyming Hope and History: Activists, Academics, and Social Movement Scholarship* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), pp. 3–19; Steven Buechler, *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural Construction of Social Activism* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000); Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory,” in *Sociological Forum*, vol. 14 (Springer, 1999), pp. 27–54.
8. Colin Barker et al. (eds.), *Marxism and Social Movements* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014).
9. John Krinsky, “Marxism and the Politics of Possibility: Beyond Academic Boundaries,” in *Marxism and Social Movements* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014).

10. Edwin Amenta and Drew Halfmann, "Opportunity Knocks: The Trouble with Political Opportunity and What You Can Do about It," in Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper (eds.), *Contention in Context: Political Opportunities and the Emergence of Protest* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 227–239; Jeff Goodwin, "Are Protestors Opportunists? Fifty Tests," in Goodwin and Jasper, *Contention in Context*, pp. 277–302; James Jasper, "From Political Opportunity to Strategic Interaction," in Goodwin and Jasper, *Contention in Context*, pp. 1–36; Verta Taylor, "Oppositional Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of Social Protest," *American Journal of Sociology* 107, no. 6 (May 2002), pp. 1619–21.
11. Colin Barker, *Revolutionary Rehearsals* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2008); Alex Callinicos, *Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Richard Flacks, *Making History: The American Left and the American Mind* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1988).
12. Douglas Bevington and Chris Dixon, "Movement-Relevant Theory: Rethinking Social Movement Scholarship and Activism," *Social Movement Studies* 4, no. 3 (December 2005), pp. 185–208.; Laurence Cox, "Movements Making Knowledge: A New Wave of Inspiration for Sociology?" *Sociology* 48, no. 5 (October 2014), pp. 954–971.
13. Richard Healey and Sandra Hinson, "Movement Strategy for Organizers," in Croteau, Hoynes, and Ryan, *Rhyming Hope and History*, pp. 57–78.
14. Ana Avendaño and Jonathan Hiatt, "Worker Self-Organization in the New Economy: The AFL-CIO's Experience in Movement Building with Community-Labour Partnerships," *Labour, Capital and Society/Travail, Capital et Société* (2012), pp. 66–95; Tamara Kay, "Legal Transnationalism: The Relationship between Transnational Social Movement Building and International Law," *Law & Social Inquiry* 36, no. 2 (2011), pp. 419–454; Charlotte Ryan and William A. Gamson, "The Art of Reframing Political Debates," *Contexts* 5, no. 1 (2006), pp. 13–18.
15. Aldon D. Morris, *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1984).
16. Kenneth Andrews, *Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and Its Legacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
17. Jeffrey S. Juris et al., "Movement Building and the United States Social Forum," *Social Movement Studies* 13, no. 3 (July 3, 2014), pp. 328–348.
18. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977), pp. 1212–41; Mayer N. Zald, "Looking Backward to Look Forward: Reflections on the Past, Present and Future of the Resource Mobilization Research Program," in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds.), *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 326–348.
19. Marshall Ganz, "Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture, 1959–1966," *American Journal of Sociology* (2000), pp. 1003–1062; Hahrie Han, *How Organizations Develop Activists: Civic Associations & Leadership in the 21st Century* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014).

20. Leila J. Rupp and Verta Taylor, *Survival in the Doldrums: The American Women's Rights Movement, 1945–1960s* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987); Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier, "Analytical Approaches to Social Movement Culture: The Culture of the Women's Movement," in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (eds.), *Social Movements and Culture* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 163–87; Verta Taylor, "Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement in Abeyance," *American Sociological Review* 54, no. 5 (October 1989), p. 761.
21. Sebastian Haunss and Darcy K. Leach, "5 Social Movement Scenes," *Civil Societies and Social Movements* (2007), p. 71.
22. Alberto Melucci, *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
23. Scott A. Hunt and Robert D. Benford, "Collective Identity, Solidarity, and Commitment," in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 433–548; Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier, "Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization," in Morris and McClurg Mueller, *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, pp. 104–29.
24. Cristina Flesher Fominaya, "Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates: Collective Identity in Social Movements," *Sociology Compass* 4, no. 6 (June 4, 2010), pp. 393–404; Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* (2001), pp. 283–305.
25. Jennifer Earl, "The Cultural Consequences of Social Movements," in Snow, Soule, and Kriesi, *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, pp. 508–530; David A. Snow, Anna E. Tan, and Peter B. Owens, "Social Movements, Framing Processes, and Cultural Revitalization and Fabrication," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 18, no. 3 (2013), pp. 225–242.
26. Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Ann Swidley, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 2 (April 1986), pp. 273–286; Charles Tilly, "Repertoires of Contention in America and Britain, 1750–1830," Center for Research on Social Organization Working Papers, no. 151 (1977).
27. Nancy Whittier, "The Consequences of Social Movements for Each Other," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 531–552; Sarah A Soule, "Diffusion Processes within and across Movements," in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 294–310.
28. Francesca Polletta, "Culture and Movements," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 619, no. 1 (September 1, 2008), pp. 78–96, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208320042>.
29. John Foran, "Beyond Insurgency to Radical Social Change: The New Situation," *Studies in Social Justice* 8, no. 1 (2014), p. 5; Aldon Morris and Naomi Braine, "Social Movements and Oppositional Consciousness," in Jane Mansbridge and Aldon Morris (eds.), *Oppositional Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of Social Protest* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 20–37.

30. David A. Snow and Dana M. Moss, "Protest on the Fly: Toward a Theory of Spontaneity in the Dynamics of Protest and Social Movements," *American Sociological Review* (2014); Jaime Kucinkas, "Spontaneity: An Important and Neglected Topic in Social Movements," *Mobilizing Ideas* (February 5, 2015); Darcy K. Leach, "Culture and the Structure of Tyrannilessness," *The Sociological Quarterly* 54, no. 2 (Spring 2013), pp. 181–91.
31. Hahrie Han, *How Organizations Develop Activists: Civic Associations & Leadership in the 21st Century* (Oxford University Press, 2014).
32. Antonio Gramsci, *The Antonio Gramsci Reader—Selected Writings, 1916–1935* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2000).
33. Laurence Cox and Alf Gunvald Nilsen, *We Make Our Own History: Marxism and Social Movements in the Twilight of Neoliberalism* (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2014); Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991).
34. Doug McAdam, "The Biographical Consequences of Activism," *American Sociological Review* 54, no. 5 (October 1989), p. 744; Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930–1970* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Jack Whalen and Richard Flacks, *Beyond the Barricades: The Sixties Generation Grows Up* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1989).
35. Colin Barker and John Krinsky, "Theorising Movement Waves and the Making of Collective Subjects" (Alternative Futures and Popular Protest Conference, Manchester, UK, 2016).
36. Ruud Koopmans, "Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention," in Snow and Soule, *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, pp. 19–46; Doug McAdam et al., "Dynamics of Contention," *Mobilization* 8, no. 1 (February 2003), pp. 109–141; David S. Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements and the Structure of Political Opportunity," *American Journal of Sociology* 101, no. 6 (May 1996), pp. 1628–160; David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in Morris and Mueller, *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, pp. 133–155; Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Collective Action, Social Movements and Politics*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
37. Sidney Tarrow, "Cycles of Contention: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of Contention," *Social Science History* 17, no. 2 (1993).
38. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*.
39. Hank Johnston, Enrique Laraña, and Joseph Gusfield, "Identities, Grievances and New Social Movement," in Johnston, Laraña, and Gusfield, *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1994), pp. 3–35; Verta Taylor, "Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement in Abeyance."
40. Barker and Krinsky, "Theorising Movement Waves and the Making of Collective Subjects."
41. Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver, "Collective Action Theory in Social Movements Research," *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 7, no. 27 (1984), p. 1988; Pamela E. Oliver, "Bringing the Crowd Back in: The Nonorganizational Elements of Social Movements," *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 11, no. 1989 (1989), pp. 1–30; Pamela Oliver and Hank Johnston, "What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social

- Movement Research,” *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (2000), pp. 37–54.
42. Rosa Luxemburg, *The Essential Rosa Luxemburg: Reform or Revolution and The Mass Strike* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2008), p. 141.
 43. Luxemburg, *The Essential Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 133.
 44. Gramsci, *Antonio Gramsci Reader*, p. 201.
 45. Richard Edwards, *Contested Terrain* (New York: Basic Books, 1979); Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam, “Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action Fields,” *Sociological Theory* 29, no. 1 (2011), pp. 1–26.
 46. Jasper, “From Political Opportunity to Strategic Interaction,” in Goodwin and Jasper, *Contention in Context*.
 47. Birgitta Nedelmann, “Individuals and Parties—Changes in Processes of Political Mobilization,” *European Sociological Review* 3, no. 3 (December 1987); Desmond C. Ong, Jamil Zaki, and Noah D. Goodman, “Affective Cognition: Exploring Lay Theories of Emotion,” *Cognition* 143 (October 2015).
 48. Margaret Archer, “Realism and the Problem of Agency,” *Alethia* 5, no. 1 (July 15, 2002), pp. 11–20; Margaret Archer, *Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Martin E. P. Seligman et al., *Homo Prospectus* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2016).
 49. Thomas R. Rochon, *Culture Moves: Ideas, Activism, and Changing Values* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
 50. Lev Semyonovitch Vygotsky, *Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes*, p. 73 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978).
 51. Steven Buechler, *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism*; Sandra Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is ‘Strong Objectivity?’” *The Centennial Review* 36, no. 3 (1992), pp. 437–470; Sandra Harding, “A Socially Relevant Philosophy of Science? Resources from Standpoint Theory’s Controversiality,” *Hypatia* 19, no. 1 (2004), pp. 25–47; Michael Schwartz, *Radical Protest and Social Structure* (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1976).
 52. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1963), p.15. The full sentence is, of course, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” Here I choose to place a different emphasis on this passage than is commonly applied; sometimes the first clauses are cited on their own in ways that seem oblivious to historical class agency.
 53. Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1979); Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1984).
 54. Margaret Archer, *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
 55. Dave Elder-Vass, *The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 108.
 56. Alex Callinicos, *The Resources of Critique* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006), p. 189.

57. Christopher Hardnack, "Framing Neoliberalism: The Counter-Hegemonic Framing of the Global Justice, Antiwar, and Immigrant Rights Movements" (University of Oregon, 2015).
58. Luxemburg, *The Essential Rosa Luxemburg*, p. 134.
59. Cox and Nilsen, *We Make Our Own History*.
60. Colin Barker, "Class Struggle and Social Movements," in *Marxism and Social Movements* (New York, NY: Haymarket Books, 2014), p. 43.
61. Laurence Cox, "Movements Making Knowledge: A New Wave of Inspiration for Sociology?"; Geoffrey Pleyers, "From Local Ethnographies to Global Movement," in *Insurgent Encounters: Transnational Activism, Ethnography and the Political*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013).
62. Cox and Nilsen, *We Make Our Own History*.
63. Eyerman and Jamison, *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach*; Flacks, *Making History*.
64. Barker, "Class Struggle and Social Movements."
65. Paul Y. Chang, *Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1970–1979* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015).
66. John E. Peck, Interview with John E. Peck, Jr., executive director of Family Farm Defenders, interview by Ben Manski, May 2016.
67. V. I. Lenin, "The Struggle of the Proletariat and the Servility of the Bourgeoisie," trans. R. Cymbala, *Proletary*, no. 6 (July 3, 1905); Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, trans. Matthew Carmody (Marx/Engels Internet Archive, 1847).
68. For those wishing to explore the underlying logics of such an approach I recommend a critical realist epistemology. Berth Danermark et al., *Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences* (New York: Routledge, 2002); Alf Gunvald Nilsen, "Exploring the Relevance of Critical Realism for Social Movement Research" (Working Paper, 2004); Douglas V. Porpora, *Reconstructing Sociology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
69. These have appeared in various journals, book chapters, and conference papers. See www.BenManski.com for a full list of publications.
70. I have presented my Wisconsin analysis in various stages at different conferences. As per above, see www.BenManski.com to contact me or to see recent publications.
71. Ben Manski and Sarah Manski, "It Started in Wisconsin," *Jacobin*, March 2018.
72. As this book went to press, Matthew Kearney published two serious academic analyses of the escalation of the Wisconsin Uprising; neither of these deals with its origins however (Kearney 2018a, b).
73. Ben Manski, "What We Gain by Centering Agency in Social Movement Epistemology" (World Congress of Sociology, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 2018).

REFERENCES

- Amenta, Edwin, and Drew Halfmann. 2012. Opportunity Knocks: The Trouble with Political Opportunity and What You Can Do about It. In *Contention in Context: Political Opportunities and the Emergence of Protest*, ed. J. Goodwin and J. Jasper, 227–239. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Andrews, Kenneth. 2004. *Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and Its Legacy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Archer, Margaret. 1995. *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2002. Realism and the Problem of Agency. *Alethia* 5 (1): 11–20.
- . 2003. *Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Avendaño, Ana, and Jonathan Hiatt. 2012. Worker Self-Organization in the New Economy: The AFL-CIO's Experience in Movement Building with Community-Labour Partnerships. *Labour, Capital and Society/Travail, Capital et Société* 45 (1): 66–95.
- Barker, Colin. 2008. *Revolutionary Rehearsals*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- . 2014. Class Struggle and Social Movements. In *in Marxism and Social Movements*, ed. C. Barker, L. Cox, J. Krinsky, and A. Gunvald Nilsen, 41–62. New York, NY: Haymarket Books.
- Barker, Colin, and John Krinsky. 2016. *Theorising Movement Waves and the Making of Collective Subjects*. Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University.
- Barker, Colin, Laurence Cox, John Krinsky, and Alf Gunvald Nilsen, eds. 2014. *Marxism and Social Movements*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Bevington, Douglas, and Chris Dixon. 2005. Movement-Relevant Theory: Rethinking Social Movement Scholarship and Activism. *Social Movement Studies* 4 (3): 185–208.
- Buechler, Steven. 2000. *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural Construction of Social Activism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Callinicos, Alex. 1988. *Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- . 2006. *The Resources of Critique*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Chang, Paul Y. 2015. *Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea's Democracy Movement*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Cox, Laurence. 2014. Movements Making Knowledge: A New Wave of Inspiration for Sociology? *Sociology* 48 (5): 954–971.
- Cox, Laurence, and Alf Gunvald Nilsen. 2014. *We Make Our Own History: Marxism and Social Movements in the Twilight of Neoliberalism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Danermark, Berth, Mats Ekström, Lisolette Jakobsen, and Jan Ch. Karlsson. 2002. *Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Earl, Jennifer. 2007. The Cultural Consequences of Social Movements. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 508–530. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Edwards, Richard. 1979. *Contested Terrain*. New York: Basic Books.
- Elder-Vass, Dave. 2010. *The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Eyerman, Ron, and Andrew Jamison. 1991. *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Flacks, Richard. 1988. *Making History: The American Left and the American Mind*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- . 2005. The Question of Relevance in Social Movement Studies. In *Rhyming Hope and History: Activists, Academics, and Social Movement Scholarship*, ed. D. Croteau, W. Hoynes, and C. Ryan, 3–19. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

- Flesher Fominaya, Cristina. 2010. Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates: Collective Identity in Social Movements. *Sociology Compass* 4 (6): 393–404.
- . 2015. Debunking Spontaneity: Spain's 15-M/Indignados as Autonomous Movement. *Social Movement Studies* 14 (2): 142–163.
- Fligstein, Neil, and Doug McAdam. 2011. Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action Fields. *Sociological Theory* 29 (1): 1–26.
- Foran, John. 2014. Beyond Insurgency to Radical Social Change: The New Situation. *Studies in Social Justice* 8 (1): 5.
- Ganz, Marshall. 2000. Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture, 1959–1966. *American Journal of Sociology*: 1003–1062.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1979. *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- . 1984. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Goodwin, Jeff. 2012. Are Protestors Opportunists? Fifty Tests. In *Contention in Context: Political Opportunities and the Emergence of Protest*, ed. J. Goodwin and J. Jasper, 277–302. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Goodwin, Jeff, and James M. Jasper. 1999. Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory. *Sociological Forum* 14, 27–54. <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1021684610881>. Accessed 14 Mar 2016.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 2000. *The Antonio Gramsci Reader—Selected Writings, 1916–1935*. Ed. D. Forgacs. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Han, Hahrie. 2014. *How Organizations Develop Activists: Civic Associations & Leadership in the 21st Century*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Harding, Sandra. 1992. Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is 'Strong Objectivity?'. *The Centennial Review* 36 (3): 437–470.
- . 2004. A Socially Relevant Philosophy of Science? Resources from Standpoint Theory's Controversiality. *Hypatia* 19 (1): 25–47.
- Hardnack, Christopher. 2015. *Framing Neoliberalism: The Counter-Hegemonic Framing of the Global Justice, Antiwar, and Immigrant Rights Movements*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oregon.
- Haunss, Sebastian and Darcy K. Leach. 2007. 5 Social Movement Scenes. *Civil Societies and Social Movements* 71.
- Healey, Richard, and Sandra Hinson. 2005. Movement Strategy for Organizers. In *Rhyming Hope and History: Activists, Academics, and Social Movement Scholarship*, ed. D. Croteau, W. Hoynes, and C. Ryan, 57–78. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Hunt, Scott A., and Robert D. Benford. 2007. Collective Identity, Solidarity, and Commitment. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 433–548. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Jasper, James. 2012. From Political Opportunity to Strategic Interaction. In *Contention in Context: Political Opportunities and the Emergence of Protest*, ed. J. Goodwin and J. Jasper, 1–36. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Johnston, Hank, Enrique Laraña, and Joseph Gusfield. 1994. Identities, Grievances and New Social Movements. In *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*, ed. E. Laraña, H. Johnston, and J. Gusfield, 3–35. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

- Juris, Jeffrey S. 2014. Movement Building and the United States Social Forum. *Social Movement Studies* 13 (3): 328–348.
- Kay, Tamara. 2011. Legal Transnationalism: The Relationship between Transnational Social Movement Building and International Law. *Law & Social Inquiry* 36 (2): 419–454.
- Kearney, Matthew. 2018a. Escalating Moral Obligation in the Wisconsin Uprising of 2011. *Social Forces* 96 (4): 1569–1592.
- . 2018b. Totally Alive: The Wisconsin Uprising and the Source of Collective Effervescence. *Theory and Society* 47 (2): 233–254.
- Koopmans, Ruud. 2007. Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. S.A. Snow, D.A. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 19–46. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Krinsky, John. 2014. Marxism and the Politics of Possibility: Beyond Academic Boundaries. In *Marxism and Social Movements*, ed. C. Barker, L. Cox, J. Krinsky, and A. Gunvald Nilsen. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Kucinkas, Jaime. 2015. Spontaneity: An Important and Neglected Topic in Social Movements. *Mobilizing Ideas*. <https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2015/02/05/spontaneity-an-important-and-neglected-topic-in-socialmovements/>. Accessed 5 Feb 2015.
- Leach, Darcy K. 2013. Culture and the Structure of Tyrannylessness. *The Sociological Quarterly* 54 (2): 181–191.
- Lenin, V.I. 1905. The Struggle of the Proletariat and the Servility of the Bourgeoisie. *Proletary* (6). <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1905/jul/03.htm>. Accessed 21 May 2016.
- Lowenhaupt Tsing, Anna. 2005. *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Luxemburg, Rosa. 2008. In *The Essential Rosa Luxemburg: Reform or Revolution and The Mass Strike*, ed. H. Scott. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Manski, Ben. 2018. What We Gain by Centering Agency in Social Movement Epistemology. Toronto, ON.
- Manski, Ben, and Sarah Manski. 2018. It Started in Wisconsin. *Jacobin*.
- Marwell, Gerald, and Pamela Oliver. 1984. Collective Action Theory in Social Movements Research. *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 7 (27): 1988.
- Marx, Karl. 1847. *The Poverty of Philosophy*. Marx/Engels Internet Archive. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ch02e.htm>. Accessed 20 May 2016.
- . 1963. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. New York: International Publishers.
- McAdam, Doug. 2003. Dynamics of Contention. *Mobilization* 8 (1): 109–141.
- McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 82: 1212–1241.
- Melucci, Alberto. 1996. *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meyer, David S., and Suzanne Staggenborg. 1996. Movements, Countermovements and the Structure of Political Opportunity. *American Journal of Sociology* 101 (6): 1628–1660.
- Minkoff, Debra C. 1997. The Sequencing of Social Movements. *American Sociological Review* 62 (5).

- Morris, Aldon, and Naomi Braine. 2001. Social Movements and Oppositional Consciousness. In *Oppositional Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of Social Protest*, ed. J. Mansbridge and A. Morris, 20–37. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Nedelmann, Birgitta. 1987. Individuals and Parties—Changes in Processes of Political Mobilization. *European Sociological Review* 3 (3): 181–2002.
- Oliver, Pamela E. 1989. Bringing the Crowd Back in: The Nonorganizational Elements of Social Movements. *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 11: 1–30.
- Oliver, Pamela, and Hank Johnston. 2000. What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 5 (1): 37–54.
- Ong, Desmond C., Jamil Zaki, and Noah D. Goodman. 2015. Affective Cognition: Exploring Lay Theories of Emotion. *Cognition* 143: 141–162.
- Pleyers, Geoffrey. 2013. From Local Ethnographies to Global Movement. In *Insurgent Encounters: Transnational Activism, Ethnography and the Political*, ed. J.S. Juris and A. Khasnabish, 108–128. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Polletta, Francesca. 2008. Culture and Movements. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 619 (1): 78–96.
- Polletta, Francesca, and James M. Jasper. 2001. Collective Identity and Social Movements. *Annual Review of Sociology*: 283–305.
- Porpora, Douglas V. 2015. *Reconstructing Sociology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rochon, Thomas R. 1998. *Culture Moves: Ideas, Activism, and Changing Values*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rupp, Leila J., and Verta Taylor. 1987. *Survival in the Doldrums: The American Women's Rights Movement, 1945–1960s*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Ryan, Charlotte, and William A. Gamson. 2006. The Art of Reframing Political Debates. *Contexts* 5 (1): 13–18.
- Schwartz, Michael. 1976. *Radical Protest and Social Structure*. New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Seligman, Martin E.P., Peter Railton, Roy F. Baumeister, and Chandra Sripada. 2016. *Homo Prospectus*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smirnova, Michelle, and Melissa Wooten. 2012. Take 2: Where Did Capitalism Go? *Critical Mass Bulletin* 37 (2): 2–5.
- Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1992. Master Frames and Cycles of Protest. In *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. A.D. Morris and C.M. Mueller, 133–155. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Snow, David A., and Dana M. Moss. 2014. Protest on the Fly: Toward a Theory of Spontaneity in the Dynamics of Protest and Social Movements. *American Sociological Review*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122414554081>.
- Snow, David A., Anna E. Tan, and Peter B. Owens. 2013. Social Movements, Framing Processes, and Cultural Revitalization and Fabrication. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 18 (3): 225–242.
- Soule, Sarah A. 2007. Diffusion Processes within and across Movements. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 294–310. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Swidley, Ann. 1986. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review* 51 (2): 273–286.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1993. Cycles of Contention: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of Contention. *Social Science History* 17 (2).

- . 2011. *Power in Movement: Collective Action, Social Movements and Politics*. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Verta. 1989. Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement in Abeyance. *American Sociological Review* 54 (5): 761.
- . 2002. Oppositional Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of Social Protest. *American Journal of Sociology* 107 (6): 1619–1621.
- Taylor, Verta, and Nancy Whittier. 1992. Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization. In *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. A.D. Morris and C.M. Mueller, 104–129. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- . 1995. Analytical Approaches to Social Movement Culture: The Culture of the Women's Movement. In *Social Movements and Culture*, 163–187. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/60035285?accountid=14522>.
- Tilly, Charles. 1977. Repertoires of Contention in America and Britain, 1750–1830. *Center for Research on Social Organization Working Papers* 151. <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/50926>. Accessed 11 Mar 2016.
- Vygotsky, Lev Semyonovitch. 1978. *Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Whitter, Nancy. 2013. Message from the Chair. *Critical Mass Bulletin*. <http://cbsm-asa.org/2013/11/message-from-the-chair-fall-2013/>.
- Whittier, Nancy. 2007. The Consequences of Social Movements for Each Other. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 531–552. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Zald, Mayer N. 1992. Looking Backward to Look Forward: Reflections on the Past, Present and Future of the Resource Mobilization Research Program. In *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. A.D. Morris and C.M. Mueller, 326–348. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.



The Marxist Theory of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation

Berch Berberoglu

In contrast to mainstream classical and contemporary conventional theories of social movements discussed in previous chapters, this chapter presents an alternative, Marxist perspective that differs from its conventional counterparts in some very important ways. The central component of this divergence is an analysis of the class nature of social movements, the state, and politics, and the class character of revolutionary movements vying for state power, as well as the nature and role of the state that assumes power following a social revolution.¹

Situating the problem in class terms, I argue in this chapter that class-based social movements are products of social forces that struggle to maintain or transform class relations. Class relations are thus a product of the balance of class forces that are anchored in class struggles in which social movements emerge and develop. In these struggles, the dominant ruling class strives to maintain law and order in order to prolong its rule over society, whereas the oppressed class(es) attempt(s) through such movements to rise up and take state power and establish its rule over society.

Providing an analysis of the dynamics of this process, this chapter addresses the central problem within the conceptual and analytical framework of classical Marxist theory. Thus, the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and other Marxist theorists, play a prominent role in the analysis of the theoretical issues that define the parameters of the Marxist theory of social movements, the state, and revolution in the twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries.

B. Berberoglu (✉)

Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, NV, USA

e-mail: berchb@unr.edu

© The Author(s) 2019

B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_4

According to Marxism, the only social movements that bring about fundamental social change and social transformation are class-based social movements. All other social movements, whether nationalist, anti-imperialist, anti-racist, anti-patriarchal, or against other forms of oppression, are movements that advocate changes within the class system and attempt to bring about changes *within the framework of the class-based social order* aimed at ameliorating the oppression that particular groups experience. Class-based social movements, on the other hand, aim at changing the fundamental structures of society for the abolition of all class divisions to end the exploitation and oppression of one class by another. While in this political struggle the dominant ruling class controls and uses the state as an instrument to advance its class interests, rival classes attempt to overthrow the state to wrest power from the ruling class that controls the state.

The legitimacy of the state's rule is seldom questioned, and the powers that control the state are much less scrutinized, under ordinary course of events, except when the state's authority is called into question during crisis periods when the state fails to resolve the fundamental social, political, and economic problems of society. When this occurs, it is followed by a period of decline in legitimacy of the state, and of the ruling class that controls it—a period of great turmoil that leads to the emergence of class-based social movements that can instigate social rebellions and revolutions. Such upheavals have occurred in the past, and will continue to occur in the future, in direct relation to the state's failure to meet the needs of the people and to express their will. It is in this sense that the state has become the scene of class struggle where rival class forces and their movements have fought over control of this vital political institution.

The great social revolutions of the twentieth century, and of previous centuries, have always been led by class forces organized into social and political movements that have fought for the overthrow of the dominant ruling class and the prevailing social order by taking state power to effect change in a new direction in line with the interests of the victorious forces that have succeeded in coming to power.

The rise to power of the despotic rulers of past empires, the emergence of a slave-owning class and its reign over the state and the people under the slave system, the rule of the landed nobility over the serfs under feudalism, and the triumph of the capitalist class over the landlords and its subsequent reign over wage labor, as well as the victory of the proletariat against the landlords and the capitalists, have all occurred under the leadership of class-based social movements that have waged a protracted struggle against the dominant classes and the state and have succeeded in taking state power through social revolution throughout the course of human history.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, THE STATE, AND CLASS STRUGGLE

The classical Marxist theory of social movements, the state, and class struggle focuses on the class basis of exploitation and oppression as the major determinant of social change and transformation. It explains the nature of political

power (including, first and foremost, the state) as a reflection of the *mode of production*, which embodies in it social *relations of production* (or property-based class relations). Once fully developed and matured, these class relations result in open class struggles and struggles for *state power* in which class-based social movements play a central role.

In all class-divided societies throughout history, write Marx and Engels, “political power is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another.”² Political power, Marx and Engels point out, grows out of economic (class) power driven by money and wealth, but to maintain and secure their wealth, dominant classes of society establish and control political institutions to hold down the masses to assure their continued domination. The supreme superstructural institution that historically has emerged to carry out this task is the state.

In class society, writes Lenin, the state has always been “an organ or instrument of violence exercised by one class against another.”³ Thus, as Engels has also pointed out, “the more it [the state] becomes the organ of a particular class, the more it directly enforces the supremacy of that class,”⁴ such that “the fight of the oppressed class against the ruling class becomes necessarily a political fight, a fight first of all against the political dominance of this class.”⁵

The centrality of the state as an instrument of *class rule*, then, takes on an added importance in the analysis of social class and class struggles, for political power contested by the warring classes takes on its real meaning in securing the rule of the victorious class when that power is ultimately exercised through the instrumentality of the state. It is here that social movements that have formed to advance the interests of a particular oppressed and exploited class come into direct clash with the powers of the state.

Throughout history, class divisions and class struggles have shaped the structure of society and social relations. And the struggle between rival class forces to take state power through the overthrow of the state has been the central driving *motive force* of social change and transformation in history. It is in this context that Marx and Engels have pointed out that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.”⁶ And it is through class-based social movements (e.g., the labor movement) that these class struggles have become articulated in struggles for taking state power that successful revolutions have come to secure to transform society.

The Class Basis of Social Movements and Social Transformation

The central point stressed by Marx and Engels in explaining the transformation of class society is the *class basis* of social relations and social movements that emerge and develop through class conflict and class struggles, which are the manifestations of property-based unequal social relations prevalent in the organization of material production in class society. This is the key to an understanding of the nature of a particular social order and the social movements that it generates for the transformation of society. The position of people in the production process, situated according to their relation to the ownership/

control of the means of production, is viewed by Marx and Engels as the decisive element defining class relations. It is precisely from these historically specific social relations of production that inequalities arise and lead to class conflict and class struggles—that is, struggles by class-based social movements to attain political power.

In capitalist society, according to Marx and Engels, there are two main classes that relate to one another in the production sphere: capitalists (owners of capital) and workers (wage labor). The capitalist class owns the means of production and accumulates capital through the exploitation of labor. The working class does not own the means of production but instead uses its labor power to generate value for the capitalists as a condition for its survival. Thus, as Marx and Engels put it, capitalist society is mainly divided into these two groups:

the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage-labor ... [and] the class of modern wage-laborers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor-power in order to live.⁷

Under capitalist production, while a portion of the value generated by labor is returned to it for subsistence (wages), a much greater portion goes to the capitalist in the form of surplus value (profits), which, accumulated over time, enhances the wealth and fortunes of the capitalist class vis-à-vis all other classes in society, especially the working class, in both relative and absolute terms.⁸

The accumulation of capital through this process of exploitation under capitalism thus results in disparities in wealth and income between labor and capital and eventually leads to conflict and struggle between the two classes, extending to realms beyond the production sphere itself. Hence, in this class struggle, write Marx and Engels,

oppressor and oppressed stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.⁹

Marx and Engels conceptualized class at three different yet related levels: economic, social, and political. The first of these is identified as the foundation of class analysis, class-in-itself (*Klasse-an-sich*). This refers to groups of people who relate to production in the same way, that is, those who have the same property relationships in the productive process (e.g., workers, peasants, landlords, and capitalists). Structurally, then, *class-in-itself* is the logical outcome of the mode of production in all class societies.

At the next, sociological, level is what can be referred to as *social class*. A class-in-itself becomes a *social class* only when there is a close relationship between the members of a particular class. In this sense, industrial workers (the

classic proletariat) constitute a social class in that not only do the members of this class interact in the productive process (in factories, under socialized conditions of production) but they also have a distinct community, culture, lifestyle, and habits—in short, a cohesive intraclass association, including intermarriage between members of the same class.

Finally, the third and highest level of class is referred to by Marx as that of class-for-itself (*Klasse-für-sich*). This means that a class-in-itself (*Klasse-an-sich*) that has become a social class has attained full consciousness of its interests and goals and engages in common political activity in pursuit of its class interests.

Thus, in capitalist society, the dominant capitalist class, through its control of the major superstructural institutions, obtains political control and disseminates ruling-class ideology, hence assuring its ideological hegemony in society. At the same time, to prevent the development of class-consciousness among the masses and to neutralize and divert frustration and anger against the system, the dominant class facilitates the development of “false consciousness” among the working class. This, in turn, serves to block the development of class-consciousness among workers and thus prevents, to the extent it is successful, the potential for social revolution and social transformation. It is through capitalist ideological hegemony, then, the capitalist class is able to propagate capitalist ideas and capitalist consciousness to prevent or contain the development of working-class consciousness.

Capitalist Ideological Hegemony

In explaining the process by which the capitalist class disseminates its ideology through control of the state and major superstructural institutions of society, hence assuring its dominance over society, Antonio Gramsci, a prominent Marxist of the early twentieth century, drew attention to the ideological apparatuses of the capitalist state and introduced the concept of bourgeois cultural and *ideological hegemony*.¹⁰ Gramsci stressed that it is not enough for the capitalist class simply to take control of the state machine and rule society directly through force and coercion; it must also convince the oppressed classes of the legitimacy of its rule: “The state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules.”¹¹ Through its dominance of the superstructural organs of the state, the ruling class controls and shapes the ideas, hence consciousness, of the masses. With the acceptance of its ideas and the legitimization of its rule, the capitalist class is able to exercise control and domination of society through its ideological hegemony at the level of the superstructure with the aid and instrumentality of the state.

Although the dialectics of the accumulation process, which involves first and foremost the exploitation of labor, but ultimately results in class struggle, civil war, and revolution to seize state power, the *ideological hegemony* of the ruling class, operating through the state itself, prolongs bourgeois class rule and

institutionalizes and legitimizes exploitation. The increasing awareness of the working class of this process, hence the development of working-class consciousness, stresses Gramsci, helps expand the emerging class struggle from the economic and social spheres into the sphere of politics and ideology, so the struggle against capitalist ideology promoted by the bourgeois state and other ruling-class institutions becomes just as important, perhaps more so, as the struggle against capital develops and matures in other spheres of society. Countering the ideological hegemony of the capitalist class through the active participation of workers in their own collective organizations, the class-conscious organs of workers' power—militant trade unions, workers' political parties, and so forth—come to play a decisive role in gaining the political support of the laboring masses. In turn, through their newly gained awareness of their own class interests, the workers transcend the bounds of bourgeois ideological hegemony and develop their own counter (proletarian) political outlook—a process that accelerates with the further development of proletarian class consciousness. Thus, as the struggle against the state becomes an important part of the class struggle in general, the struggle against capitalism takes on a truly *political* and *ideological* content.

The material conditions of life under capitalism eventually incite workers to organize and rise up against the system. As the working class becomes class-conscious and discovers that its social condition is the result of its exploitation by the capitalists, it invariably begins to organize and fight back to secure for itself economic benefits and political rights denied in capitalist society—a society wherein the exploitation of labor through the extraction of surplus value is legally assured by the capitalist state.

This exploitation, hence domination, of the working class by capital, Marx points out, would, sooner or later, lead to the struggle for political power: "The conflict between proletariat and bourgeoisie is a struggle of one class against another, a struggle that means in its highest expression a total revolution."¹² "Is there any reason to be surprised," Marx asks, "that a society based on class conflict leads to brutal opposition, and in the last resort to a clash between individuals?"¹³ "An oppressed class," he maintains, "is the condition of existence of every society based on class conflict. Thus, the liberation of the oppressed class necessarily involves the creation of a new society," adding "only in an order of things in which there are no class conflicts will social evolutions cease to be political revolutions."¹⁴

THE CAPITALIST STATE AND CLASS STRUGGLE

Historically, a number of conditions have set the stage and led to the emergence of capitalism and the capitalist state in Western Europe and elsewhere. Capitalism established itself as a mode of production based on the exploitation of wage labor by capitalists. The contradictions imbedded in such antagonistic social relations in time led to the radicalization of workers and the formation of

trade unions and other labor organizations that played an important role in the struggle between labor and capital. The history of the labor movement in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere in the world is replete with bloody confrontations between labor and capital and the latter's repressive arm, the capitalist state. From the early battles of workers in Britain and on the Continent in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to the decisive role played by French workers in the uprising of 1848–1851 to the Paris Commune in 1871 to the Haymarket massacre and the heroic struggles of the “Wobblies” in the United States in the early twentieth century, the working class has waged a determined struggle in its fight against capital on both sides of the Atlantic—a struggle spanning more than two centuries.

The central task of the early capitalist state in Europe and the United States was that of disciplining the labor force. Union activity, strikes, demonstrations, agitation, and propaganda initiated by workers against the employers and the capitalist system were systematically repressed.

The capitalist state became heavily involved in the conflict between labor and capital on behalf of the capitalist class, bringing to bear its repressive apparatus on labor and its allies who threatened the capitalist order. Law and order enforced by the capitalist state served to protect and preserve the capitalist system and prevent its transformation. In this sense, the state came to see itself as a legitimizing political organ of the new social order and identified its survival directly with the capitalists who controlled it.

Established to protect and advance the interests of the capitalist class, the early capitalist state thus assumed a pivotal role that assured the class rule of the capitalists over society and thus became an institution of legitimization and brute force to maintain law and order in favor of capitalism. Sanctioning and enforcing laws to protect the rights of the new property owners and disciplining labor to maintain a wage system that generated profits for the wealthy few, the capitalist state became the instrument of capital and its political rule over society. This led Marx and Engels to observe that the state in capitalist society serves as a political tool of the bourgeoisie for the “guarantee of their property and interests.”¹⁵ Hence, “the bourgeoisie,” they argued, “has ... conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.”¹⁶

In our epoch, writes Lenin, “every state in which private ownership of the land and means of production exists, in which capital dominates, however democratic it may be, is a capitalist state, a machine used by the capitalists to keep the working class and the poor peasants in subjection.”¹⁷

Democracy in capitalist society, Lenin points out, is always bound by “the narrow limits set by capitalist exploitation, and consequently always remains, in effect, a democracy for the minority, only for the propertied classes, only for the rich.”¹⁸ In this sense, “Freedom in capitalist society always remains about the same as it was in the ancient Greek republics: freedom for the slave-owners.”¹⁹

Owing to the conditions of capitalist exploitation, the modern wage slaves are so crushed by want and poverty that “they cannot be bothered with democracy,” “cannot be bothered with politics”; in the ordinary, peaceful course of events, the majority of the population is debarred from participation in public and political life....

Democracy for an insignificant minority, democracy for the rich—that is the democracy of capitalist society....²⁰

“Marx grasped this *essence* of capitalist democracy splendidly,” Lenin continues, “when, in analyzing the experience of the Commune, he said that the oppressed are allowed once every few years to decide which particular representatives of the oppressing class shall represent and repress them in parliament!”²¹

“People always have been the foolish victims of deception and self-deception in politics,” Lenin writes elsewhere, “and they always will be until they have learnt to seek out the *interests* of some class or other behind all moral, religious, political and social phrases, declarations and promises.”²²

In an important passage in *The State and Revolution*, Lenin points out that the state in capitalist society is not only the political organ of the capitalist class; it is structured in such a way that it guarantees the class rule of the capitalists and, short of a revolutionary rupture, its entrenched power is practically unshakable: “A democratic republic is the best possible political shell for capitalism,” Lenin writes, “and, therefore, once capital has gained possession of this very best shell ... it establishes its power so securely, so firmly, that *no* change of persons, institutions or parties in the bourgeois-democratic republic can shake it.”²³ But the dialectics of this process is such that the contradictions and conflicts imbedded in capitalist society propel the workers into action against the capitalists and the capitalist state. Such a move on the part of the workers culminates, in its highest political expression, in an anti-capitalist, socialist revolution.

THE STATE, CLASS STRUGGLE, AND REVOLUTION

Writing in August 1917, on the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, Lenin pointed out in his book *The State and Revolution* both the class nature of the state *and*, more importantly, the necessity of its revolutionary overthrow. “If the state is the product of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms,” writes Lenin, and “if it is a power standing *above* society and ‘alienating itself *more and more* from it’,”

it is clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, *but also without the destruction* of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class and which is the embodiment of this ‘alienation’.²⁴

Thus, the transformation of capitalist society, Lenin points out, involves a revolutionary process in which a class-conscious working class, led by a disciplined workers' party, comes to adopt a radical solution to its continued exploitation and oppression under the yoke of capital and exerts its organized political force in a revolutionary rupture to take state power.

The victory of the working class through a socialist revolution leads to the establishment of a socialist (workers') state. The socialist state constitutes a new kind of state ruled by the working class and the laboring masses. The cornerstone of a socialist state, emerging out of capitalism, is the abolition of private property in the major means of production and an end to the exploitation of labor for private profit.

"The theory of the class struggle, applied by Marx to the question of the state and the socialist revolution," writes Lenin,

leads as a matter of course to the recognition of the *political rule* of the proletariat, of its dictatorship, i.e., of undivided power directly backed by the armed force of the people. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie can be achieved only by the proletariat becoming the *ruling class*, capable of crushing the inevitable and desperate resistance of the bourgeoisie, and of organizing *all* the working and exploited people for the new economic system.²⁵

The establishment of a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat (as against the dictatorship of capital) is what distinguishes the socialist state from its capitalist counterpart. Marx pointed out in *Critique of the Gotha Program* that the dictatorship of the proletariat (i.e., the class rule of the working class) is a transitional phase between capitalism and communism. "Between capitalist and communist society," Marx wrote, "lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*."²⁶

During this period, the state represents and defends the interests of the working class against capital and all other vestiges of reactionary exploiting classes, which, overthrown and dislodged from power, attempt in a multitude of ways to recapture the state through a counterrevolution. Thus, once in power, the proletarian state has a dual role to play: to break the resistance of its class enemies (the exploiting classes); and to protect the revolution and begin the process of socialist construction.

The class character of the new state under the leadership of the proletariat takes on a new form and content, according to Lenin: "During this period the state must inevitably be a state that is democratic *in a new way* (for the proletariat and the propertyless in general) and dictatorial *in a new way* (against the bourgeoisie)."²⁷ Thus, "*simultaneously* with an immense expansion of democracy, which *for the first time* becomes democracy for the poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the money-bags," Lenin continues, "the dictatorship of the proletariat imposes a series of restrictions on the freedom

of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists.”²⁸ Here, Lenin stresses the necessity of suppressing the capitalist class and its allies to deny them the freedom to foment a counterrevolution, barring them from politics and isolating and defeating efforts to undermine the new worker’s state. Clearly, the victory of the working class in this struggle in capturing and maintaining state power and imposing its rule over society signifies the success of the revolution and the ability of the revolutionary leadership to safeguard the interests of the working class through its decisive control of the commanding heights of society articulated by the workers’ state.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, REVOLUTION, AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

The twentieth century has been a century of social movements, revolution, and social transformation. The major social revolutions of our time—the Mexican, Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cuban, Nicaraguan, Iranian, and East European, among others—all occurred during the twentieth century. An analysis of the history of *socialist revolutions* of the past century, examined at length by James Petras in Chap. 3 of this *Handbook*, reveals the inner workings and complexities of the revolutionary process: the *class nature* of social movements (their class base, leadership, and political objectives), the mass mobilization of the people for revolutionary action, the protracted class struggles laying the basis for political power, and the strategy and tactics that define the balance of class forces in revolutionary situations, as well as the role and response of the state, the reaction of the dominant classes, and the measures taken by the repressive institutions of society to maintain the prevailing social-political order. Taken together, these and related factors determine the nature and prospects of social movements and revolution, and if a revolutionary situation will develop into a full-fledged revolution that brings about a complete transformation of society.²⁹

In this context, it is important to differentiate a political revolution from a social revolution, for while the former may bring about change in government and political structure of society, it is only the latter that brings about a complete transformation of society and its social (class) structure. The transformation of the class structure of society thus requires a *social* revolution that involves the overthrow of one class by another and the transfer of power to the new victorious class that has succeeded in taking state power.³⁰

Thus, while the 1905 and February 1917 revolutions in Russia were *political* revolutions, the Great Proletarian Socialist Revolution of October 1917 was a *social* revolution that completely transformed the class structure in Russia, replacing the Tsarist semi-feudal/semi-capitalist system with a proletarian socialist one.³¹

The same can be said of the two Chinese revolutions of the twentieth century: the revolution of 1911 was a *political* revolution with a bourgeois orientation that was unable to transform the old despotic semi-feudal/semi-capitalist

state into a fully capitalist one, whereas the October 1949 revolution, led by Mao Zedong and the Communists, was a *social* revolution that transformed a semi-feudal/semi-capitalist society into a socialist one.³²

Among the other cases of socialist revolutions in the twentieth century, the Vietnamese and Cuban revolutions were eventually able to achieve similar ends, while the Nicaraguan revolution remained incomplete and was forced to retreat due to the U.S.-backed Contra War that paralyzed the revolution's prospects for social transformation.³³

In examining the experience of the major socialist revolutions of the twentieth century and the subsequent evolution of the new post-revolutionary states over the course of their development along the socialist path, as would be the case with social movements that are mobilized to transform capitalist society, one observes a number of features that are of decisive importance for the future success of socialist revolutions that are yet to come. The first among these is *the centrality of proletarian leadership*. The working-class movement (and its leading organ, the communist party) has always maintained that the struggle against capitalism and the capitalist state must be based on the broad participation of the laboring masses led by a workers' party that will guide the process of transition from capitalism to socialism. On this score, most major socialist revolutions of the twentieth century were quite successful, especially the Russian, Chinese, and Vietnamese revolutions, and to a great extent the Cuban and Nicaraguan as well.³⁴

The second, and equally important, is the level of commitment and support of the laboring masses for the workers' organization and its leadership that is at the helm of the revolutionary movement. This implies the existence of a high level of class-consciousness and ideological clarity, accompanied by democratic practices among members of the movement at its social base, and between the base and the leadership of the organization.³⁵ This is of crucial importance because the structure and practices of a revolutionary organization in the pre-revolutionary period determine to a great extent the nature of leadership and forms of governance in the post-revolutionary period after the revolutionary organization has assumed power and governs on behalf of the people. The experience of Russia and China, as well as Vietnam, and especially Cuba and Nicaragua, shows how important this is for the future prospects of a socialist revolution. Thus, without the commitment and support of the masses, there would be no revolution, nor a revolutionary movement to lay claim to a successful socialist revolution.

The third, and perhaps the most decisive for the success of a revolution, is the nature of the post-revolutionary state and society and its relationship to the people. In the case of a socialist revolution, this involves the adoption and application of proletarian principles to the cultivation of socialist (people's) democracy—a process that requires the ongoing ideological vigilance of both the proletarian state and the working class.³⁶ The viability of a socialist revolution in the post-revolutionary period thus depends on the extent to which a

genuine socialist democracy is cultivated and maintained. The failure of a socialist state to actively engage the masses in this process of socialist construction may well lead to the demise of the socialist order.

Whereas the revolutions in China and Cuba, and to a great extent in Vietnam and Nicaragua, succeeded in this regard through continued ideological struggle and renewal, this was not the case in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe where the socialist state failed to provide the necessary stimuli for mass participation in ideological education—to understand, to protect, and to preserve the socialist order and to build the basis of a future communist society. It is this grand failure of the Soviet state to energize the masses and enlist their will in defense of socialism and communism that finally led to its collapse in the face of internal and external reaction to crush the socialist state in the final decade of the twentieth century.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND REVOLUTION

Today, in the early decades of the twenty-first century, while the future course of development of social movements, revolution, and social transformation seems uncertain, Marxist theory continues to guide us through this process in articulating the dynamics of social development in the age of capitalist imperialism that the globalization of capital has facilitated across the world. The capitalist globalization process has in this way heightened the contradictions of capitalism on a world scale, thus preparing the conditions for the emergence of social movements and revolutionary transformations that are yet to come in the twenty-first century.

The development of capitalism over the past 100 years formed and transformed capitalist society on a global scale. This transformation came about through the restructuring of the international division of labor prompted by the export of capital and transfer of production to cheap labor areas abroad. This, in turn, led to the intensification of the exploitation of labor through expanded production and reproduction of surplus value and profits by further accumulation of capital and the reproduction of capitalist relations of production on a world scale.

A major consequence of this process is the increased polarization of wealth and income between labor and capital at the national and global levels, and growth in numbers of the poor and marginalized segments of the population throughout the world. These and other related contradictions of global capitalism define the parameters of modern, capitalist globalization and provide us the framework for understanding the future course of development of social movements and revolution in the twenty-first century.

The global expansion of capital, while beneficial to a handful of global monopolies and the capitalist class in general, has resulted in an overall economic decline within the advanced capitalist centers, bringing about a severe drop in the standard of living of the working class in the United States and

other advanced capitalist countries.³⁷ The widening gap between the accumulated wealth of the capitalist class and the declining incomes of workers in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere has sharpened class struggle in a new political direction, which has brought the advanced capitalist state to the center stage of the conflict between labor and capital. This has undermined the legitimacy of the capitalist state, such that the struggles of the working class and the masses in general are becoming directed not merely against capital, but against the state itself.³⁸ This transformation of the workers' struggle from the economic to the political sphere is bound to set the stage for protracted struggles in the period ahead—struggles that would facilitate the development of a much more politicized international labor movement. The globalization of capital is thus bound to accelerate the radicalization of the working class and lead to the building of a solid foundation for international solidarity of workers on a world scale that is directed against global capitalism and the advanced capitalist state on a world scale.³⁹

The globalization of capital and imperialist domination of the world have thus led to the intensification of the global contradictions of capital, which continues to have a great impact on class relations throughout the world. The central contradiction of this global expansionary process and the spread of capitalist relations of production throughout the world is the exploitation of wage labor on a global scale. And this, in turn, has led to the intensification of class conflict and class struggles led by social movements based on the working class in many countries around the world.⁴⁰ Thus, in the era of global capitalism, class conflict and class struggles have become more pronounced, and their prevalence everywhere around the world has made them a visible feature of the global capitalist system.

Today, as class divisions widen and as classes become increasingly polarized and in continual conflict, class struggles are becoming more and more part of the social landscape of capitalist society across the globe. As a result, the struggle between labor and capital is becoming more and more politicized, and workers across the world are beginning to recognize the importance of social movements led by labor as a decisive tool to effect change and transform the global capitalist system. Understanding the role of organized labor and the importance of labor's political leadership in this struggle, radical labor organizations have in fact taken steps emphasizing the necessity for the working class to mobilize its ranks and take united action to wage battle against global capital and the entire capitalist/imperialist system.⁴¹ In this context, it is important to note that the critical factor that tips the balance of class forces in favor of the working class to win state power is political organization, the building of class alliances among the oppressed and exploited classes, the development of strong and theoretically well-informed revolutionary leadership that is organically linked to the working class, and a clear understanding of the forces at work in the class struggle, including especially the role of the state and its military and police apparatus—the focal point of the struggle for state power.⁴²

During the course of the twentieth century, especially during the Great Depression and the subsequent postwar period through the 1960s, the protracted struggles of the working class against capital and the capitalist state continued with great success, as the capitalist globalization process unfolded on a global scale in the latter half of the twentieth century. The labor movement, the anti-imperialist national liberation movements, and the civil rights, women's, student, environmental, anti-war, and peace movements all contributed to the development of the emerging anti-globalization movement in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. These and related contradictions of late-twentieth-century capitalist globalization led to the crisis of the imperial state and the entire globalization project which increasingly came under attack by the mass social movements of the global era that came to challenge the rule of capital and the capitalist state throughout the world.

The global expansion of capital and transnational capitalist domination of the world has led to the growth of anti-imperialist/anti-globalization movements which have come to challenge the global capitalist system through revolutions across the world.⁴³ These movements have often become part of the worldwide struggle against capitalist globalization and imperialism led by the working class through cross-border labor organizing and worldwide labor solidarity through labor internationalism.⁴⁴ This, in turn, has led to the development of broader international alliances made up of a multitude of movement organizations that bring together various oppressed peoples to wage a wider struggle against global capitalism through transnational activism.⁴⁵

The political mobilization of oppressed groups that have come together to effect change has often succeeded in bringing about new non-exploitative social relations. The degree of success in constructing a new society along egalitarian lines has been an outcome of a variety of factors, above all the degree to which these experiments have been successful in thwarting capitalist/imperialist attempts to undermine such efforts. Regardless of the varied experiences of one or another society or social movement to secure such change, however, social revolution and the revolutionary transformation of society in the epoch of global capitalism has increasingly become the only viable option available to oppressed groups and classes to bring about fundamental social change. And this will be the case in the future as global capitalism continues its unbridled exploitation and oppression of working people of the world to advance the interests of capital until its rule comes to an end through popular revolutions across the globe.

In considering the impending revolutions throughout the globe that will become the mainstay of the twenty-first century, the question that revolutionary movements will come to confront is a *political* one. Given what we know of capitalist globalization and its class contradictions on a world scale, how will revolutionary social movements respond to it *politically* worldwide? What *strategy and tactics* will these movements adopt to confront this colossal force? Given the enormity of the tasks that they will need to undertake, it is important

to think about these questions concretely, in a practical way—one that involves a concrete scientific analysis of the emerging revolutionary situation that will inevitably lead to organized political action.

Strikes, demonstrations, and mass protests initiated by workers and other oppressed groups have become frequent in a growing number of countries controlled by the transnationals in recent years. Working people are rising up against the local ruling classes, the state, and the transnational monopolies that have together affected the super-exploitation of labor for decades. Various forms of struggle are now underway in many countries under the grip of transnational capital. The working class has been at the forefront of these struggles. Armed insurrection, civil war, and revolutionary upheavals are all a response to the repression imposed on working people by global capitalism and its client states throughout the world. Together, these struggles have been effective in frustrating the efforts of global capital to expand and dominate the world, while at the same time building the basis of an international working-class movement that finally overcomes national, ethnic, cultural, and linguistic boundaries that artificially separate the workers in their fight against global capitalism. The solidarity achieved through this process has helped expand the strength of the international working class and increased its determination to defeat all vestiges of global capitalism throughout the world, and build a new egalitarian social order that advances the interests of working people and ultimately all of humanity.

CONCLUSION

The analysis provided in this chapter for the study of social movements, class struggles, the state, and revolutions leading to the transformation of global capitalism is hoped will contribute to a broader understanding of the twists and turns of the revolutionary process and give us a deeper and more profound awareness of the dynamics of social revolutions that are yet to come in the twenty-first century. This is especially important today, given the changing nature of the class struggle, as social movements and revolutions are occurring on a global scale, and as the prospects for future revolutions are becoming global in scope in response to the capitalist globalization process. It is in this context of global capitalist expansion and exploitation of labor that we increasingly hear calls for the international solidarity of labor that could potentially bring together the working classes of the world to become organized into a formidable force to take on the global capitalist system and win.

The Marxist theory of social movements, revolution, and social transformation has provided us the tools of analysis to understand the logic of global capitalism in the twenty-first century. While the globalization of capital has meant greater capital accumulation through worldwide exploitation of wage labor that has deepened the contradictions of global capitalism, hence exacerbated its crisis-ridden features, it has at the same time accelerated the process that pro-

motes the international solidarity of labor that will play a critical role in the struggle against capital and the capitalist state on a global scale. It is this dynamic that will eventually compel social movements led by labor and its allies to come together and meet head on the great challenges of the twenty-first century in rising up in a revolutionary rupture to confront capital and the capitalist state and take power to put an end to global capitalism through socialist revolution across the world.

NOTES

1. This chapter consists of sections of my book *The State and Revolution in the Twentieth Century* published by Rowman and Littlefield, which are included here with permission of the publisher.
2. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1972), p. 53.
3. V.I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 374.
4. Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, p. 627.
5. Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, p. 627.
6. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," p. 35.
7. Marx and Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," p. 35.
8. Surplus value (or gross profits) is that part of the total value created by labor which workers surrender to the owners of the means of production after receiving only a small portion of the total value in the form of wages. Although the end result is the same, the extraction of surplus value from the producers takes on different forms in social formations dominated by different, historically specific mode(s) of production.
9. Marx and Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," p. 36.
10. By *ideological hegemony* Gramsci meant the ideological predominance of the dominant ruling class(es) over the subordinate classes (mainly the working class). At the same time, and in response to this, he introduced the concept of counter-hegemony, which occurs when the proletariat, with the aid of "organic" intellectuals, exerts hegemony and exercises its superiority over society through the establishment of a proletarian socialist state following a socialist revolution.
11. Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 244.
12. Marx quoted in Ralph Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 18.
13. Marx quoted in Ralph Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, p. 18.
14. Marx quoted in Ralph Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, p. 18.
15. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 59.
16. Marx and Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," p. 37.
17. V.I. Lenin, *The State*, in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, and V.I. Lenin, *On Historical Materialism* (New York: International Publishers, 1974), p. 641.

18. V.I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, in V.I. Lenin, *Selected Works in Three Volumes* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), Vol. 2, p. 301.
19. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 301.
20. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 301.
21. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, pp. 301–302.
22. V.I. Lenin, “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism,” in V.I. Lenin, *Selected Works in One Volume* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 24.
23. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 247.
24. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 242; emphasis in the original.
25. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 255; emphasis in the original.
26. Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1972), p. 331; emphasis in the original. For an extended discussion on the concept of the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” see Etienne Balibar, *On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (London: NLB, 1977).
27. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 262; emphasis in the original.
28. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 302; emphasis in the original.
29. Berch Berberoglu, *The State and Revolution in the Twentieth Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007).
30. Berberoglu, *The State and Revolution in the Twentieth Century*.
31. V.I. Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977 [1899]).
32. Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
33. Tomas Borge and Daniel Ortega, *Nicaragua: The Sandinista People’s Revolution* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1985).
34. See an assessment of these revolutions by James Petras in Chap. 3 in this *Handbook*, where he examines the various aspects of these revolutions.
35. Albert J. Szymanski, *The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1978).
36. Szymanski, *The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class*.
37. See Berch Berberoglu, *Globalization of Capital and the Nation State* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). See also Berch Berberoglu (ed.), *Beyond the Global Capitalist Crisis: The World Economy in Transition* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012) and Berch Berberoglu (ed.), *The Global Capitalist Crisis and Its Aftermath* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014).
38. Nick Beams, *The Significance and Implications of Globalization: A Marxist Assessment* (Southfield, MI: Mehring Books, 1998); James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Beyond Neoliberalism: A World to Win* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015). See also Lucia Pradella, *Globalization and Critique of Political Economy* (New York: Routledge, 2016).
39. Dimitris Stevis and Terry Boswell, *Globalization and Labor: Democratizing Global Governance* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); Cyrus Bina and Chuck Davis, “Dynamics of Globalization: Transnational Capital and the International Labor Movement” in Berch Berberoglu (ed.), *Labor and Capital in the Age of Globalization* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002); Alejandro Reuss, *Labor and the Global Economy* (Boston: Economic Affairs Bureau, 2013).

40. Henry Veltmeyer (ed.), *Imperialism, Crisis, and Class Struggle: The Enduring Verities and Contemporary Face of Capitalism* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2012).
41. Beams, *The Significance and Implications of Globalization*.
42. Albert J. Szymanski, *The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1978); Berch Berberoglu, *Political Sociology in a Global Era* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2013); Peter Knapp and Alan J. Spector, *Crisis and Change Today: Basic Questions of Marxist Sociology* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011).
43. Stephen K. Sanderson, *Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to Political and Social Change* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2005).
44. Andrew Howard, "Global Capital and Labor Internationalism: Workers' Response to Global Capitalism," in Berch Berberoglu (ed.), *Globalization and Change: The Transformation of Global Capitalism* (Lenham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2005); Kim Moody, *Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy* (London: Verso, 1997).
45. Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow (eds.), *Transnational Protest and Global Activism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello, and Brendan Smith, *Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000); William K. Tabb, "Neoliberalism and Anticorporate Globalization as Class Struggle," in Michael Zweig (ed.), *What's Class Got to Do With It? American Society in the Twenty-first Century* (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2004); Christina Flesher Fominaya, *Social Movements and Globalization: How Protests, Occupations, and Uprisings Are Changing the World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

REFERENCES

- Balibar, Etienne. 1977. *On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. London: NLB.
- Berberoglu, Berch. 2003. *Globalization of Capital and the Nation State*. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield.
- . 2007. *The State and Revolution in the Twentieth Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- , ed. 2012. *Beyond the Global Capitalist Crisis: The World Economy in Transition*. New York: Routledge.
- . 2013. *Political Sociology in a Global Era*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- , ed. 2014. *The Global Capitalist Crisis and Its Aftermath*. New York: Routledge.
- Beams, Nick. 1998. *The Significance and Implications of Globalization: A Marxist Assessment*. Southfield, MI: Mehring Books.
- Cyrus, Bina, and Chuck Davis. 2002. Dynamics of Globalization: Transnational Capital and the International Labor Movement. In *Labor and Capital in the Age of Globalization*, ed. Berch Berberoglu. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Borge, Tomas, and Daniel Ortega. 1985. *Nicaragua: The Sandinista People's Revolution*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Brecher, Jeremy, Tim Costello, and Brendan Smith. 2000. *Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
- Della Porta, Donatella, and Sidney Tarrow, eds. 2005. *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

- Engels, Frederick. 1972. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. In *Selected Works*, ed. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. New York: International Publishers.
- Fominaya, Christina Flesher. 2014. *Social Movements and Globalization: How Protests, Occupations, and Uprisings Are Changing the World*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers.
- Howard, Andrew. 2005. Global Capital and Labor Internationalism: Workers' Response to Global Capitalism. In *Globalization and Change: The Transformation of Global Capitalism*, ed. Berch Berberoglu. Lenham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Knapp, Peter, and Alan J. Spector. 2011. *Crisis and Change Today: Basic Questions of Marxist Sociology*. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Lenin, V.I. 1971a. The State and Revolution. In *Selected Works*, ed. V.I. Lenin. New York: International Publishers.
- . 1971b. The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism. In *Selected Works in One Volume*, ed. V.I. Lenin. New York: International Publishers.
- . 1974. The State. In *On Historical Materialism*, ed. Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, and V.I. Lenin. New York: International Publishers.
- . 1975. The State and Revolution. In *Selected Works in Three Volumes*, ed. V.I. Lenin, vol. 2. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- . 1977 [1899]. *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Marx, Karl. 1972. Critique of the Gotha Programme. In *Selected Works*, ed. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. 1972. Manifesto of the Communist Party. In *Selected Works*, ed. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. New York: International Publishers.
- Moody, Kim. 1977. *Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy*. London: Verso.
- Petras, James, and Henry Veltmeyer. 2015. *Beyond Neoliberalism: A World to Win*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Pradella, Lucia. 2016. *Globalization and Critique of Political Economy*. New York: Routledge.
- Reuss, Alejandro. 2013. *Labor and the Global Economy*. Boston: Economic Affairs Bureau.
- Stavis, Dimitris, and Terry Boswell. 2008. *Globalization and Labor: Democratizing Global Governance*. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Sanderson, Stephen K. 2005. *Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to Political and Social Change*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- Schurmann, Franz. 1973. *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Szymanski, Albert J. 1978. *The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class*. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop.
- Tabb, William K. 2004. Neoliberalism and Anticorporate Globalization as Class Struggle. In *What's Class Got to Do With It? American Society in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Michael Zweig. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
- Veltmeyer, Henry, ed. 2012. *Imperialism, Crisis, and Class Struggle: The Enduring Verities and Contemporary Face of Capitalism*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.



Twentieth-Century Socialist Revolutions and Their Class Components: Russia, China, Cuba, and Vietnam

James F. Petras

Any attempt to theorize socialist revolution must start at the point where conditions of exploitation are converted into the practice of class struggle. Socialist revolutions in the twentieth century have unfolded as complex processes decisively dependent on the emergence and growth of a revolutionary political organization. The central political organization (party or movement) passes through several crucial interrelated phases, *each* of which provides a unique contribution to the ultimate success of the whole enterprise. The sequence leading to the revolutionary transformation begins with the formative period, involving the organization and ideology of the party. This is followed by class and political struggles, in which forces are accumulated, roots are put down among the masses, a mass membership is won, and, finally, power is seized. Subsequently, the socialist revolutionary process includes the establishment of a government, reorganization of the state, and efforts to transform social relations.

This chapter is a reprint of the author's earlier essay, which appeared in Berch Berberoglu, *The State and Revolution in the Twentieth Century* published by Rowman and Littlefield. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

J. F. Petras (✉)

Department of Sociology, SUNY Binghamton, Binghamton, NY, USA

e-mail: jpetras@binghamton.edu

© The Author(s) 2019

B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_5

THE ORIGINS OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION

While later influences play an important part in shaping the form and content of the revolutionary process, the origins and initial organization of the revolutionary party play perhaps the key role. Critical to an understanding of the embryonic revolutionary organization is the political culture in which it is embedded—the degree to which class struggle and social mobilization have occurred. The insertion of the embryonic revolutionary party into an ascending mass movement or within a politicized population is crucial in the creation of the collective experiences within which the cadres will frame their revolutionary programs. The cadres are the distillation of class struggles and the bridges between past struggles and the future revolution. As carriers of the early formative class experiences, they play a decisive role in determining the ultimate direction of the revolutionary process and in weaving its specific organizational forms, leadership, and ideology. But the cadres themselves, and the struggles they lead, are reflections of broader historic conflicts that provide the parameters within which particular actions and movements occur.

In Russia the events of 1905—the uprising of the working class and the formation of Soviets—propelled the Bolshevik Party forward, strengthening the socialist component in its ideological armory, creating cadres, and providing a historical reference for the social transformation in October 1917. In China, the early workers' struggle provided the organizational and ideological direction that sustained the Communist Party on a socialist path, despite the shift of activity toward rural petty-commodity producers. The continuity of the revolutionary movement in China must be stressed against all those who attempt to submerge China's socialist revolution in a host of special features and events related to China's rebellious peasantry, the strategic wisdom of Mao, the nature of guerrilla war, the Japanese invasion (peasant nationalism)—all of which fail to explain the particular moment of revolutionary mobilization, or the substantive changes that took place after the revolution. China's socialist revolution did not take place during centuries of rebellious peasant movements; nor did it occur during more than a half century of imperialist invasions and guerrilla warfare; nor was the socialist orientation a product of Mao Tse-tung alone. The peasantry moved toward socialist revolution only after the worker-based Communist Party inserted itself in the country and after the peasants uprooted by Japanese imperial capital found an ideological and organizational expression in the Communist Party—and in no other party or army. Finally, Mao's own strategic orientation toward the class-struggle road to socialism, and even his fundamental tactical commitment toward maintaining an autonomous army/party, were products of the experiences of the 1921–1927 period (although drawing lessons from the negative experiences of subordination to the Kuo Ming Tang).

If we conceptualize the revolution as a protracted and complex process, we capture the historical importance of the formative period: the qualitative ideological and organizational factors that enabled the party to gain the allegiance of the great mass of exploited Chinese and ultimately to succeed in revolution-

ary combat. Any periodization of the revolution that focuses exclusively on the “Yenan period” (Mark Selden), the Japanese invasion (Chalmers Johnson), or the postwar disintegration of the KMT (the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party of China) fails to explain the politics of each period.¹ For each account presents particular features of an environmental setting (rural areas, peasantry, war-induced conditions, nationalism) as the basic determinants of the policy and direction of the revolutionary struggle. Yet these features affected all tendencies and political groupings within the political system, while only one—the Communist Party—was able to fashion a program and accumulate forces capable of taking it to ultimate success. The basis of this success was not conjunctural, but the result of a painstaking and continuous effort to create the human political resources needed to formulate tactics, strategies, and organizational structures through each conjuncture.

The central notions of class struggle, combining social and democratic revolution, derived from Marx and Lenin and embodied in the Chinese Communist cadre, contributed immensely to establishing a revolutionary strategic direction. The adaptations and nuances of application in the surrounding agrarian areas by Mao and his colleagues were innovations at the level of applied theory. The particular forms that armed struggle took—efforts to destroy the state—were based on classical Marxist-Leninist notions of the class character of the state. The same can be said concerning the politics of the revolutionary forces vis-a-vis the national bourgeoisie, although here Mao’s analysis at times ran counter to his organizational practice: While arguing that such classes existed, he never allowed the party to become enmeshed in a subordinated alliance.

The party, founded on the principles of class struggle, baptized in the fire of mass urban struggles, proceeded to the countryside and reeducated a whole generation of rural laborers, petty-commodity producers, and their uprooted brethren in the ideology of class struggle and class politics. The fundamental politics of Yen’an originated in the 1920s, as did the anti-imperialism that brought forth the anti-Japanese alliance. Without the basic cadre formed in the earlier phase, the mighty waves of peasant masses might have broken before the onslaught of the organized Japanese or KMT forces, leaving little long-term, large-scale change in the society. Thus, the study of revolution as a process requires that the continuity and interrelatedness of each period be emphasized. Particular events mark historical moments, with particular configurations of forces. But without an understanding of the preceding sequence, the molecular processes of accumulation of forces, the end product of successful revolution, cannot be grasped. Each differential moment in the revolutionary process contributes to the understanding of the whole. The issue, in determining the final outcome, is to understand the relationship between each sequence.

PERIODIZATION AND IDEOLOGY

The second basic requirement for a theory of socialist revolution is to differentiate correctly the periods in which different classes enter the revolutionary process. In periods of profound societal crises, classes enter into political and

social combat unevenly, and in many cases political parties are not present to provide the organizational mechanisms through which they can act. Moreover, the moment of entry of a class—especially during a massive and tumultuous eruption—can bend the direction and orientation of the revolutionary movement. For example, in the case of the Cuban revolution the petite bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie entered the revolutionary movement in the late 1950s: that is, after the early founders of the 26 July Movement, but before the mass of workers and peasants who joined early in 1959. Thus, these bourgeois, anti-socialist forces neither held the organizational leadership nor had ties with newly awakened rural and urban workers. The prior presence of the Castro leadership—shaped ideologically by the earlier workers' struggles of the 1930s—ensured that the key posts and measures would not be controlled by bourgeois forces. The subsequent entry of the working class into the revolutionary movement, facilitating (and reflecting) the transformation in state power, undermined the position of bourgeois representatives in the government. The urban/rural workers became the dominant force in the revolutionary process after the uprising that overthrew Batista. The latter was merely one moment in the revolutionary struggle, whose crucial significance was that it facilitated the massive *arming of the working class*, and this in turn was the critical factor permitting the overthrow of class relations.

The importance of periodizing the entry of different classes into the revolutionary process is highlighted by the fact that many writers, in seeking to identify the class character of a party, adopt an excessively numerical approach, which downplays the determination by specific social forces. In the case of China, for example, many scholars write off the relative importance of the working class because of the rural setting of much of the fighting and the fact that the revolutionary movement was predominantly composed of peasants. In the case of Cuba, the same writers emphasize the presence of middle-class participants in the mid to late 1950s as the central characteristic in defining the nature of the revolution, but they overlook both the earlier working-class struggles, which established a popular, anti-capitalist political culture, and the later massive entry of rural and urban workers into the political movement.

While the revolutionary process encompasses a variety of social forces—and the timing of entry of these forces varies from situation to situation—it is important not only to count heads but to identify the qualitative position (power) of each social force within the movement. Early or late entry of the working class can be the decisive factor in propelling a revolutionary party or movement toward overthrowing capitalism and collectivizing the means of production. In Russia, the working class was the central force initiating and sustaining the revolution; in China it initiated the struggle and the organization of the party; in Vietnam it initiated the struggle and sustained activity on a secondary plane; in Cuba it created a revolutionary culture that was vital for the formation of the Castro leadership and subsequently played a central role in the

decisive social struggles after the political regime was transformed. In all cases, the revolution had a socialist character because working-class struggles profoundly influenced the ideas and practices of the revolutionary organization.

The third necessary element in theorizing socialist revolution is a differentiation of the levels at which various social forces participate in the revolutionary process. We can note six levels of organization: leaders, cadres, militants, fighters, sympathizers, and supporters. The ideology and formative experience of participants at each level reflect the particular moment in which they entered the struggle. This qualitative distinction is crucial, insofar as revolutions in the course of their successful trajectory attract a variety of social forces and thus may appear to be polyclass in character, or in some cases they may appear to have no working-class content. This was especially the case in China, where the great mass of militants and fighters were uprooted peasants and largely grounded in rural struggles. That the leaders and many of the cadres were directly or indirectly influenced by the workers' struggle and its ideology has been obscured in many accounts, which have focused on one level of the party organization and its "empirical" rather than its "historical" base. The long-term direction of the revolutionary process was primarily influenced by the historic base in the working class, not in the peasantry: The seizure of power led to the collectivization of production, not to the proliferation of petty-commodity production.

In the case of Cuba, the bulk of the leaders and cadres were increasingly committed to building a mass party centered in the working class, even though a substantial number of sympathizers and supporters and even fighters came from bourgeois and petit-bourgeois strata. Because socialist leaders controlled key posts, despite a substantial number of anti-socialist supporters at one (the preinsurrectional) phase, the revolutionary movement could shift gears and expand support among rural and urban workers, creating a mass base of militants and fighters among them. Because the central core of the organization was composed of committed socialist revolutionary forces, the accumulation of petit-bourgeois support did not adversely affect the revolutionary trajectory of the movement. Located primarily in the subcadre levels of the revolutionary movement, the nonrevolutionary forces provided fighters or economic support but were not decisive for the historical content of the revolutionary struggle.

The fourth element in the theorization of socialist revolution concerns the central concepts and ideas that influence and shape the ideology of the revolutionary movement. The ideas are of two types: (1) the core notions that express the motivating forces and historic goals and methods of the revolution; and (2) the tactical/strategic ideas that express the conjunctural struggles and immediate needs of particular strata and organizations and reflect efforts to accumulate forces around the central party cadre. The key notions of twentieth-century revolutionary socialist movements revolve around class struggle, imperialism, the class nature of the state, and the collectivization of the means of production. The tactical-strategic ideas vary from conjuncture to conjuncture,

from one class and stratum to another. Tactical-strategic ideas are essentially directed toward a discrete problem area; for instance, a reform or set of reforms as a means of creating political alliances or fronts. Thus, the tactics of a revolutionary socialist party may, at a certain moment, give the appearance of an agrarian-peasant movement, as in China during the 1930s, or of a democratic populism, as in Cuba in the 1950s, or of a nationalist movement, as in Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s. The shifting terrain of revolutionary struggle requires tactical shifts and an accompanying ideological flexibility. Nevertheless, these changes are informed by core ideas that are largely the product of the historic forces of socialist transformation embodied in the working class and distilled in its organizational expression.

CLASS PARTICIPANTS IN SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

Three social forces have played a decisive role in twentieth-century socialist revolutions: the intellectuals, rural labor, and the urban working class. Each has contributed to the organizational, ideological, and military efforts necessary for a successful transformation. Yet the social characteristics that enabled them to take an active and specific part in the revolutionary process, which fundamentally remade their societies, have rarely been adequately identified. These basic characteristics have instead been obscured by an emphasis on social psychological and/or vulgar economic attributes. However, the long-term commitments and large-scale presence of these social forces, through the worst adversities and changing circumstances, cannot be explained in terms of simple individual experience or immediate economic interest. The great personal sacrifices and social suffering that have accompanied the prolonged revolutionary struggles of a country require structural explanations and a broader grasp of the societal crises which engendered the historic alliance that has and continues to transform society.

Most efforts to characterize revolutionary processes have nevertheless relied, in one form or another, on identifying the social characteristics of political participants. One of the most commonplace notions is that these have a class identity that can be readily deduced by noting the family background of individuals. The experiences of class and class struggle, however, are transmitted from one generation to another directly through the family only if parents and offspring continue to inhabit the same situation, affected by the same sets of operative forces. But in the twentieth century, forces of world-historical proportions have intervened in social processes, disrupting the regular reproduction of classes: Imperial wars, colonial conquests, and massive flows of capital have produced severe disjunctions between family and class and the position of individuals within the class structure. The role of imperial force in jarring individuals loose from their class matrix has been a recurrent phenomenon in both European and Third World countries. Visibility in social background may even become a hindrance to understanding the dynamic interplay between political

commitment and class position, when class position itself is subject to sudden and massive disruption. The impact of historical forces on the class structure thus has decisive importance in determining whether individuals will conform to the class practices of their forebearers.²

THE SOCIAL IDENTITY OF THE INTELLECTUALS

Intellectual strata are, of course, particularly affected by the tremors that are set off when war, capitalist crisis, or class struggle upsets the equilibrium of exploitative society. Hence, although many revolutionary intellectuals have middle-class backgrounds, this has less significance in determining their social orientation than the worldwide struggles that impinge upon a social formation.

The growth of a revolutionary socialist intelligentsia in Russia and China occurred during a prolonged period of class conflict, in which the economic position of the intellectuals was less important in shaping a political vocation than the class struggles emerging in the society as a whole. The problematic of the revolutionary socialist intellectual cannot be reduced to a determination by declassed forces on the fringes of society. This is because lack of anchorage, resulting from large-scale disruptions, is not the main element in determining his or her specific ideological commitments. Rather, for us, the primary force providing a social identity for such intellectuals is their political membership in the working-class movement. Their social identity is a product of the influence, ideas, and activities of an ascending class—which even before it transforms society modifies the conditions in which society produces and reproduces itself. Their incorporation into the mass movement and the process through which this is achieved—class struggle, national wars—provide the basic ingredients for determining the class loyalty of the intellectuals. Insofar as their class situation is in flux, the primary determinants are not to be found in their economic roles, but in the political role they play in the class struggle.

RURAL LABOR AND SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

The relationship of landlord and peasant has been characterized by relatively long periods of stability, punctuated by periods of rebellion and protest. In the classic cases of peasant revolt, the land-hungry peasants attack the symbols and substance of landlord domination but are incapable of reordering society in their own image. The twentieth century has witnessed the rise of imperial capital, which appropriates means of production and surplus from the peasantry, but accumulates outside the particular social economy. The separation of the process of exploitation from the locus of accumulation has led to profound dislocation of the rural laborforce. This is because massive numbers of peasants are stripped of their means of production while being divorced geographically from employment in the locus of accumulation, in centers of industrial production. Rural labor that has been drawn into twentieth-century socialist

revolutions is not the same peasantry exploited for centuries by landlords. On the contrary, the features of rural existence and the forces acting upon it, leading to socialist revolution, are unique to the twentieth century and account for the distinct path that "peasant" revolts have taken.

The crucial elements in the internal development of the countryside are found in the uprooting of the peasantry, the proletarianization of the laborforce, and the incorporation of part of this displaced and proletarianized rural laborforce in forms of disciplined revolutionary organization. The immediate effect of imperial domination has been to accentuate the uprootedness of the rural laborforce: The decomposition of the village through force, commercial relations, and/or corporate expansion has been a central feature of prerevolutionary societies. The process of differentiation that capitalism has fomented through the extension of investment from centers of capital to the countryside has been accompanied by large-scale military-political movements, which have dominated and blocked the emergence of indigenous capitalist forces capable of exercising hegemony. The rural laborforce, concerned with the occupation of the countryside, is no longer the peasant oppressed by the landlord. The impersonal forces of imperial capital penetration obliterate traces of particularistic domination and establish conditions of generalized exploitation and uprootedness.

Socialist revolution has nowhere been based on an undifferentiated mass peasantry. Rather, it is the dispossessed former peasant, uprooted by the combined politico-military-economic efforts of imperial powers, who has set in motion the movement of peasants toward political action. The dissolution of local ties to the land facilitates participation in revolutionary socialist activity. As the revolution enters into conflict with capitalist or precapitalist relations of production, its reliance on rural labor (which approximates the conditions of the classical proletariat) increases. And although smallholders—or even kulaks—may enter into the revolutionary struggle under conditions of imperial appropriation, despite the cost of dispossession, it nevertheless remains the case that as the revolutionary movement takes on more clearly socialist objectives, landless laborers and uprooted former peasants increasingly become the fulcrum for political action. It is neither middle peasants nor undifferentiated oppressed peasants that are the instruments of a socialist transformation, but the depeasantized rural laborforce caught in the maelstrom of urban-led mass struggles.

In addition, as imperialist forces (capital and military) have acted on the countryside, the massive transformations evidenced throughout rural society have provided fertile ground for rural revolutionary movements. The efforts of imperial capital to transform society in accordance with its needs have led to the large-scale intrusion of military technology, without any accompanying alternative form of socioeconomic organization capable of massive integration of the laborforce in productive labor. The intervention of imperialist forces on a scale commensurate with the subjugation of whole populations has homogenized or leveled opposition and has provided a common target for quite

disparate class forces. The clue to the massive nature of rural participation in twentieth-century revolutions is to be found in common collective experiences resulting from the pervasive impact of imperialism on the countryside. Furthermore, the specific changes wrought in the laborforce by the impact of world capitalism—in the form both of colonial and imperial wars and of market investment forces—undermine the notion that “the peasantry” as such has been a revolutionary force. It is rather the case that this peasantry has been transformed and its class situation altered—and that any turn toward socialist solutions is thus a direct response to the new forces impinging upon society, the modern organizational forms of imperial armies and capital. Indeed, this transformation of the peasantry is clearly the reason that rural labor has been so prominent in all successful socialist revolutions to date.

The critical issue, however, is not simply to recognize the immense revolutionary possibilities inherent in rural labor, but to locate precisely the latter's role in the revolutionary process. Specifically, has the mass character of rural labor's participation enabled it to *direct* the process of transformation? Given what has already been said about the vital part played by uprooted former peasants incorporated into the revolutionary organization, is it not possible to view them as the directing force in the confrontation with imperialism, in much the same way as earlier Marxists conceived of the proletariat as the hegemonic class in the revolutionary bloc of forces?³ The problem with this conception is that it drastically exaggerates the degree to which *socioeconomic changes* and *military experience* are in themselves *sufficient* to shape and create a new socialist consciousness among former peasants.

Close to the recent past, in which petty-commodity relations predominated, ever embedded in a rural matrix containing peasants anchored in productive relations, the rural laborforce has never completely severed its ties with the society out of which it emerged. The struggle against the uprootedness generated by imperialism *weakens* these ties; but the ex-peasant never loses sight of the past. There is a continuing tension within the mass consciousness of the revolutionary rural laborforce between, on the one hand, a break with the past (incorporation in a socialist movement) and, on the other, a continuity with that past expressed in the tendency, if left to their own devices, to return to petty-commodity production. It is this tension, this ambiguity, and the lack of a formulated collectivist conception that the rural laborforce can execute *on its own* that limits the latter's role to that of an *influential base*—and *not a revolutionary vanguard*.

Thus, to envision the involvement of rural labor en masse in revolutionary activity as a self-generating process is to overlook the centuries of ties and relationships engendered within the countryside. It was rather the degree to which rural labor was uprooted by imperialism that determined its extent of participation in a collectivist enterprise oriented and organized by the worker-rooted central party cadre. In the USSR, where peasant revolts were directed essentially against the landlords, the peasants remained wedded to petty-commodity production and showed few inclinations toward collectivist agriculture.

Even the millions of uprooted peasants—conscripted for the army or victims of Western military occupation—remained under the hegemony of the core of peasants who remained in petty-commodity production, in the absence of any mass Bolshevik political organization capable of reorganizing production on the land.

In China, by contrast, the revolutionary armies were recruited mainly from the uprooted rural masses and, in turn, provided a discipline and social organization within which peasant agriculture could develop; they thus came to represent an alternative source of hegemony over those displaced and uprooted by wars and class conflict. In Vietnam, the process was similar: Collectivism was implanted through the mass integration of uprooted peasants into socialist revolutionary organizations; US bombers, in addition to murdering millions, cleared the fields of centuries of precapitalist or decades of capitalist social relations, providing a *carte blanche* for the wholesale restructuring of the countryside under the undisputed hegemony of the worker-rooted Communist Party. The case of Cuba reflects a different set of imperialist forces: largely, massive flows of imperial capital into agriculture, which had the equivalent effect of uprooting the peasantry. Moreover, the transformation of the peasantry reached the most advanced state, going beyond uprootedness and actually creating a substantial rural proletariat in factories and in the fields. The more thorough change effected by the impersonal economic forms of imperialism—in contrast with more blatant military-cum-economic depredations—accounts for the more rapid collectivization of agriculture in Cuba than in Russia, China, or Vietnam.

While Cuban rural labor was in a more advanced socioeconomic position to initiate the process of collectivization, the leadership of the revolution did not possess, at least initially, the same direct ties to the rural workers' struggle as the Chinese or Vietnamese Communists. For the degree, extent, and duration of the rural class struggle, independent of the level of the productive forces, can be viewed as a crucial variable in shaping the organization of postrevolutionary social and political institutions in the countryside. In China and Vietnam (unlike in Russia or Cuba), the uprooted rural masses achieved strategic positions at middle-cadre levels as a result of the prolonged and mass rural character of the war; this presence gave them influence over the top leadership and shaped the particular collectivist measures that were instituted. The influence of rural labor in both cases, however, was not a function of its mere numerical strength, but of its position in the party organization.

RURAL LABOR AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The position of rural labor within the revolutionary movement varied from one revolutionary experience to another. In the USSR, it was always a marginal force, largely an unintegrated mass operating outside the organized movement—although acting on the latter and in turn being acted upon. In Cuba, rural labor was incorporated into the mass movement, especially the people's militias

and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comites de defensa de la revolucion). These bodies played a decisive role in carrying out the struggles that culminated in collectivization of the economy. Nevertheless, because they were not essentially and directly political organs that made decisions within productive units, these mass-based organizations did not become organs of political rule. At best, they served as a reminder to the leadership of the specific social and economic interests of rural labor and thus set limits to the types of concession that might be granted to opposing strata.

The effectiveness of rural labor's role in safeguarding its social interests through the mass organizations can be seen in the thoroughness with which their enemies were expropriated, the short shrift given to agro-capitalists, and the care given to legislation benefiting rural labor. Meanwhile, the process of revolutionary struggle in China and Vietnam saw a massive incorporation of rural labor into the politico-military structures, with many former peasants rising to substantial positions of influence, after varying periods of resocialization into the ideas and norms of collectivism. The combined influence of early working-class struggles and ideas on long-term leaders and of confrontation and struggles with imperialist forces on the uprooted rural laborforce produced an influential militarized rural cadre. Their presence within the party at upper and middle levels, as well as at the base, was a product of their entry into the party during the middle years of the revolution.

In the Russian case, the peasants as a mass never played a major role *within* the organized movement (although they did play a substantial political role informally and provided decisive military support at the base); hence, they were unable to influence and shape rural policy. This is part of the explanation for the manner in which collectivization was ultimately imposed on the peasants from above. The case of Cuba is closer to that of China or Vietnam, insofar as rural labor was incorporated into the last but decisive stages of the socialist transformation and, as such, remained to play a role in *indirectly* shaping regime priorities and the allocation of resources. However, the late involvement of the Cuban rural laborforce ensured that its position in the strictly organizational structures of the revolutionary movement would remain peripheral. For the earlier rural labor enters the revolutionary struggle, the more influential its role is in political decision-making, as well as in military operations. At the same time, it is not sheer numbers alone that determine what say rural labor will have in the revolutionary process. Cuba, for example, had less than 50 percent of its laborforce in agriculture—a smaller proportion than in Russia—yet its influence on the revolutionary process was greater. Likewise, in China and Vietnam, rural labor was just as numerous in the 1920s and early 1930s as it was later, yet it became influential only when its numerical strength was embodied in party and military organizations that exercised control over productive units.

The early involvement of rural labor in the revolutionary movement depends above all upon the elaboration by the party of an appropriate program and its application to the concrete struggles emerging in the countryside. In Russia,

the prior existence of widespread commercial agriculture and a preexisting petty-commodity structure inhibited the Bolsheviks from developing organic ties to the rural laborforce—fearing, as they might, their ideological influence on the party. The different character of the peasantry in Russia and the different development of the class struggle led the Bolsheviks to formulate programs that relegated the peasantry to a supportive role, outside the political organization—thus ensuring that they would continue to follow the view of the petty-commodity producer. Hence, even when the peasants were drafted en masse into the army during World War I, they retained a peasant rather than a proletarian consciousness. In China and Vietnam, by contrast, the prolonged struggles fought and the organic ties forged in rural areas prior to the revolution were accompanied by an early formulation and application of an agrarian program as one of the centerpieces of party policy.

However, that the revolutionary leaderships in China, Cuba, and Vietnam developed a conception of the peasantry as a proto-proletarian mass was itself a reflection of the uprootedness and relative proletarianization that accompanied imperialist penetration in those countries. Thus, it was not merely a program that created a political unity between displaced urban cadres and rural labor: It was ultimately the common bonds of uncertainty and uprootedness generated by imperialist penetration that enabled the two to merge in a common organization. While the early presence of a party agrarian program *facilitated* the early entry of rural labor into the party, it was the development of imperialism on a world scale that uprooted and radicalized rural labor en masse and precipitated the conflicts that led to its disciplining and integration into a revolutionary movement.

In this way, the attempt by world capitalism to overcome its historic crisis through external expansion proved, in the specific conditions of its military-economic intervention in Vietnam, China, and Cuba, to carry within it the seeds of capitalism's own destruction: For it catalyzed a rural laborforce, uprooted and without the chains of age-old oppression, but with a newly forged revolutionary socialist leadership. Thus, the program and ideology of the revolutionary struggle did not express internally generated productive forces, but those resulting from the advanced social formations of the imperial world. A collectivist consciousness developed within rural labor not because of past landlord abuses, but as a direct product of the new forces of destruction and production, operating on a world scale, that originated in the imperialist countries. Thus, it is not subjective will or local backwardness that generates revolutionary action among rural labor: there is no inverse relationship between rural radicalization and development of the productive forces. Nor are rural movements for socialist revolution premature, because the productive forces have not been developed within the social formation itself. For from a world-historic perspective, as the most developed forces operated within the backward formations to precipitate revolutionary socialist action, they provided ample testimony to the ripeness of the social situation.

THE ROLE OF URBAN WORKERS

Conventional sociology has often downplayed the role of the urban working class in socialist revolutions. A number of attributes imputed to the working class are alleged to have prevented it from making any decisive contribution to the overall success. Not infrequently, the thinly disguised purpose has been to deny the centrality of class struggle in the making of history and to refute Marxism as a science: Revolutions have been explained by conjunctural causes (wars, crises), social psychological phenomena (power drives of intellectuals), and/or the collapse of precapitalist societies.

One fundamental error is the notion that class consciousness is an attribute possessed by an individual, which can be measured outside of the class struggle. The attitude studies, the opinion surveys, the interviews that purport to measure class consciousness—all abstract the individual from the class, the class from the class struggle, the class struggle from the historical process. Yet the essential relationships established prior to the individual's response, the social and political organizations within which he or she acts, the struggles in which he or she is involved, and the global relationships between conflicting classes and the state are in fact the crucial determinants of class consciousness. Class consciousness has its basis in the class struggle, and the class struggle is rooted in class consciousness. The study of class consciousness requires the study of classes acting in history: It is a dimension of a historical process, not a static, psychological attribute derived from interpersonal encounters.

When conventional sociology studies consciousness, it tends to isolate the individual and, in the context of immediate circumstances, record responses registering what is most urgent, obvious, and obtainable for him. Hence, most close-up studies of consciousness have discovered over and over again that workers subject to the constraints of local circumstances and pressing needs respond with preferences for immediate economic rewards. From this limited vantage point, the conventional anti-Marxists argue that the working class—conceived of as an aggregate of static individualized responses—is economic and lacking in revolutionary will. If workers take part in revolutionary movements, it is basically because clever leaders (intellectuals) have manipulated their immediate needs to serve the alien larger ends. This approach denies the reality of larger movements existing in their own right, providing a new reality, existing as a social force capable of increasing the power of individuals insofar as they stand together behind a common set of demands that subsume immediate needs and define new historical projects. It cannot comprehend that the economic interests of isolated individuals are, through the action of the class, converted into collective class demands: The movement of a class that has elaborated on the demands of each member is no longer speaking merely the economic language of the individual worker.

In reality, that economic issues may initially be felt to be important by isolated individuals does not at all preclude the elaboration of a general class political program. Merely to ascertain the economic stance of the individual

worker is to scratch the surface of social reality, leaving unexplored the socio-political matrix that constrains or facilitates further elaboration of political and social demands. In the course of the socialist revolutions that have occurred in this century, there have certainly been many instances in which workers have raised economist demands; and these, at a certain point, may have embodied the sentiments of the bulk of the class. Nonetheless, the historic process of working-class struggle soon led to an incorporation of economic with political demands. The greater the scope and intensity of the class struggle, the more closely economic and political, or immediate and historic, demands became merged: wages and redistribution, working conditions and control, repressive laws and state power. And it was in the whole complex of demands and in the struggles, over time, to win them—not in the one-dimensional, immediate wants of individual workers—that the class consciousness of the working class was expressed.

At the same time, history makes clear that class consciousness can continue to exist in a latent form even when repression has enforced an apparent surcease of the class war. For example, in the 1920s the Chinese urban labor movement was clearly spearheading a social and political movement of substantial dimensions. That movement was savagely repressed. Throughout the 1930s and up to the mid-1940s, workers, we are often told, became nonrevolutionary and economistic. Yet with the overthrow of the KMT, the workers became integral elements in the process of social transformation. Similar cycles appear in the cases of Russia, Cuba, and Vietnam. In Russia, the revolutionary mobilization of the working class in 1905 was followed by an economistic slide until 1917, when revolutionary struggles and organization reemerged in much the same form (Soviets) as before. In Cuba, militancy in the 1930s was followed by repression in the 1940s, then by an urban proletarian resurgence in the anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist struggles of the early 1960s. Similarly, Vietnamese workers, active in the mass upsurge of the 1930s and 1940s, were relatively less active in the 1950s; the Tet Offensive, however, gave a fresh indication of worker consciousness, and the postliberation reconstruction of industry has witnessed a massive incorporation of the working class within the revolutionary process. Clearly, therefore, the decline or even disappearance of revolutionary working-class activity in a particular period, whether as the result of repression or, more generally, as a reflection of the possibilities inherent in those specific conditions with that specific state regime, does not mean that the workers have become economistic in any essential historical sense—that they have given up their historic interest in social transformation. It is rather the case that conjunctural circumstances may force revolutionary consciousness to become latent, subject to a change in state relations.

A second (and related) characteristic error of non-Marxist sociology is the mechanistic counterposition of reform to revolution. It is assumed that the presence of reformist demands within the workers' movement *ipso facto* excludes the possibility that workers will carry the struggle through to a revolutionary outcome. When workers, at a particular moment, put forward a set

of discrete demands, the conclusion is drawn that these demands define the nature of the movement. The unspoken assumption is that workers are by nature reformist and incapable of transcending their immediate surroundings. It is ironic indeed that a corollary thesis to this patronizing view of the working class should present the revolutionary party as fundamentally elitist—an outside presence, imposing its values and political beliefs on the class.

In reality, the relation of reform to revolution is by no means so simple. The knowledge the working class obtains of the social system is a function of the scope and depth of the class struggle. Some segments of the class historically arrive at an understanding of the nature of society and its contending forces before others. This uneven process results in differential degrees of political organization and combativity. The class, as a whole, becomes fully involved only at certain key conjunctural moments, thereby signaling a social crisis or even a prerevolutionary situation of dual power. At other times, the process of working-class struggle involves merely segments of the class and partial demands (reforms). But it is the overall trajectory of the movement that determines whether these are mere reforms or the building blocks for the mobilization of the whole class toward a systematic confrontation.

To argue that the working class is inherently reformist because, in a particular historical conjuncture, only part of it is involved in class struggle, or because the class as a whole is demanding only partial changes, is to reduce historical movement to the changing circumstances of the moment. In a word, working-class support for reforms does not make the working class *reformist*. On the contrary, all profound revolutionary changes have had their immediate origins in limited demands for reforms. But what is crucial in the ensuing struggles is the speed and extent to which these immediate issues lead to revolutionary struggles for power, challenging state authority and the dominance of existing ruling classes. In all socialist revolutions, the workers' movement has integrated struggles for reform with wider demands for revolutionary change.

THE MYTH OF WORKING-CLASS PRIVILEGE

A third common misconception (in which Fanonism rubs shoulders with functionalism) sees the working class throughout the Third World as, by and large, incorporated into existing society, its relatively higher wages and greater privileges (by comparison with the rural masses) having been purchased at the price of its subordination to the dominant classes. Once again, this view sees the working class as fundamentally economic, its consciousness determined in the last resort by its wage levels, whether absolute or relative. However, a consideration, first, of the significance of differential wages within the working class itself and, second, of the relationships between workers and peasants will clearly show the spurious nature of this conception.

In the first place, the overwhelming participation of relatively better-paid workers (relative to peasants) in revolutionary mass organizations in Russia both before and after 1917, in China during the 1920s and after 1949, in Cuba

during the 1930s and in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and in Vietnam during the 1930s and 1940s and again in 1968 and after Liberation suggests that class consciousness is not reducible to salary payments. The class nature of society is brought home to workers constantly, and in extremely material forms: a repressive state, fluctuations of the economy and of state economic policy, oppressive social relations of production, and so on. Thus, the broader sociopolitical context of class society and the exploitative relationships embodied in it have often proved to be more fundamental determinants of class consciousness than wage levels. Moreover, the degree to which certain segments of the working class are paid higher wages may precisely be a function of their greater militancy, and it may reinforce their political allegiance to a revolutionary party. Hence, the notion that workers, or even better-paid workers, are in essence privileged strata, incapable of participating in revolutionary struggles, is both historically and logically incorrect. The notion of a privileged working class assumes that higher wages are derived from exploiting others. Yet in reality the workers neither employ labor nor appropriate surplus. Rather, usually located in highly productive imperialist enterprises, they are themselves producers of surplus value and, in fact, are technically subject to greater exploitation (i.e., produce greater surplus value). By not increasing their share of the value that is produced, they would not lessen the exploitation in society or improve the condition of other toilers; rather, they would simply heighten the concentration of wealth in the hands of the capitalist class.

The degree of solidarity in action of the working class, of course, varies with the issue being contested. Structural differentiation is obvious and extensive. Yet in Russia, China, Cuba, and Vietnam issues arose that made clear the common situation and evoked a class solidarity, despite any historic differences in wage levels. In Russia, the war and the exceptional cost it imposed on the working class blurred over internal differences and hastened the formation of Soviets, incorporating all segments of the class. In China, the common demands of all urban labor for improved minimum conditions of payment, hours, and political rights evoked a massive and turbulent mobilization. In Cuba, the corrupt and repressive character of the Batista regime, and the generalized insecurity of employment under US dominance, triggered a massive unified working-class movement. In Vietnam, the colonial situation combined with state repression of labor struggles forced miners, plantation workers, and municipal employees to unite behind revolutionary socialist forces. Thus, internal differentiation of the working class has not historically proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to the unity of high- and low-wage workers in mass revolutionary struggle.

Perhaps more weighty arguments have been adduced in an attempt to establish an incompatibility and even fundamental antagonism between urban and rural labor. These have pointed to disparities in income, standard of living and social relations, and to all the very real inequalities that subsist between countryside and city. The notion has been popularized that the highly organized, better-paid workers are unwilling to support peasant struggles; that the

workers' movement is simply another particularistic interest group, intent only on satisfying its immediate demands by negotiating with the state and employers for better terms. For Fanon, the workers are part of colonial society; for others, they form an aristocracy of labor divorced from the revolutionary class struggles waged by the peasants. In addition, it is true that relationships between workers' parties and peasant movements have not always been optimal, conducive to the forging of a revolutionary alliance. However, in reality, there is no structural reason why an alliance between workers and peasants cannot be brought about; moreover, the historical experience of the four socialist revolutions we have considered has shown this conclusively. The revolutionary alliance was achieved in each case, despite the disparities, and was to prove sufficiently strong to lead to a fundamental transformation of the entire social structure and economic system. In each revolution, the role of the working class and its party was to provide moral, political, and material direction for, and support to, the peasant struggles.

THE REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE

In China, the Communist Party, which became the leading revolutionary force in the countryside, was formed in and by urban workers' struggles. Throughout the 1920s, the workers' movement supported agrarian reform demands and frequently provided material support. Later, after the suppression of the mass workers' movement in 1926–1928, thousands of cadres shaped and influenced by those urban struggles turned to the rural masses, organizing and directing revolutionary activity in the countryside. The overthrow of the KMT set the stage subsequently for the full integration of rural and urban labor in the task of collectivizing the economy and transforming social relations. The apparent break in the emerging alliance of urban and rural labor after the 1926–1928 urban repression occurred only at the level of *mass* movements. For the Communist Party carried proletarian ideology, embodied in its cadres, to the peasants. Basing itself on past working-class experience, and anticipating the future reassertion of the alliance, the Communist Party during the 1930s and 1940s became the link between the working class and the peasantry.⁴ The proof lies in the post-1949 overthrow of capitalist relations of production, which was the expression not merely of peasant forces, but of combined elements from both the working class and the peasantry. Had the working class been completely eclipsed, had only the peasants counted, the subsequent act of alliance in collectivization would be a gratuitous act, an inexplicable occurrence because of fortuitous circumstances. This is hardly convincing.

In Cuba, the disintegration of petty-commodity production and the construction of sugar mills in the countryside created a rural proletariat able and willing to politicize and radicalize the remaining peasantry. The differences between urban and rural labor became obliterated: Both were wage workers employed by corporate capital, both were organized in trade unions and engaged in class struggle, and both provided a base for the Communist Party.

As the dominant social force in the countryside, rural wage labor thus served as a bridge between urban wage labor and rural petty-commodity production. The struggles of the 1930s and the subsequent revolutionary movement of the 1950s and 1960s saw a convergence in action. And the rural laborers and urban workers, who provided the central core of forces pressing through the elimination of capitalist relations of production, also guaranteed the continued existence of petty producers, making them, in effect, into an auxiliary support group for the revolution.⁵

In Vietnam, the semiproletarian rural laborforce (part-time petty-commodity and subsistence peasants, part-time migratory laborers), which mingled with wage workers in the mines and plantations, was organized and engaged in class-struggle politics under the leadership of the Communist Party and thereby became linked to the urban working class. The heightened repression in the late 1930s and the subsequent emergence of a Communist-led rural guerrilla movement facilitated the transfer of urban working-class-influenced cadres to the countryside and the communication of ideas and spread of organizations among petty-commodity producers and semiproletarians.

During the 1960s, the massive US invasion of Vietnam and the ensuing uprooting of millions of peasants hastened the flow of ex-peasants simultaneously into the guerrilla movement and into the festering slums of Saigon. The forced marches, concentration camps, and terror bombing freed the peasants from their land and from petty-commodity production and facilitated their recruitment by the Communist Party. The synthesis of forcibly uprooted peasants and a revolutionary vanguard party, grounded in past proletarian struggles and ideology, provided the driving force for a mass movement that would be not merely anti-imperialist, but socialist.

In the case of the Russian Revolution, the worker-peasant alliance was less the product of large-scale movements of capital, uprooting and transforming peasants into rural proletarians, than was the case in Cuba; nor were the military incursions of imperialism sufficient to erode the organization of petty-commodity production, as was the case in Vietnam and China. On the contrary, by devastating the cities and the marketing system, imperialist intervention positively encouraged a return to small self-sustaining agriculture. Moreover, huge areas of Russia were without any working-class presence whatsoever, which made the task of extending proletarian hegemony and sustaining the alliance with the peasants more difficult. Thus, some of the basic historic forces that facilitated and cemented the worker-peasant alliance in China, Cuba, and Vietnam were absent—or operated in the opposite direction—in Russia. And the alliance, although it was decisive in establishing a workers' state, could not be maintained over time.⁶

We can now summarize the forces that have acted to forge the revolutionary alliance of workers and peasants. Uprooting and proletarianization of the peasantry have reduced some of the crucial structural differences between rural and urban labor. While these processes have not brought about a clean break with the past, they have nevertheless served to sever the primordial ties to local

authority, custom, and tradition (what Marx called village idiocy). Stripped of his means of production, the ex-peasant has become more open to proletarian ideology and worker-founded parties. The social and geographic proximity of centers of capitalist production, in the economic enclaves established by imperialism, has helped to spread the organizational skills and ideology of working-class struggle throughout the countryside, incorporating strata only partially linked to the capitalist mode of production. Revolutionary armies and militia have served as mechanisms for the diffusion of socialist ideas and cadres, as transmission belts for the revolutionary party. Paradoxically, the defeat of geographically anchored and concentrated proletarian movements in earlier periods resulted in a greater mobility of revolutionary collectivist ideas and organization throughout the countryside, whereas victorious capital became entrenched and inflexible in limited areas of influence and dominance.

The transmission of revolutionary ideas and organization to the countryside, via productive and politico-military apparatuses, has thus converged with structural changes within the countryside to create a dynamic toward worker-peasant alliance. The crucial subjective force acting upon this objective dynamic to realize the alliance in practice has been the revolutionary party. It is the party that incorporates the experience of class struggle in the cities; forms the cadres in the fields, mines, and armies; and organizes the diffusion of collectivist ideology and practice throughout the countryside, analyzing the basic coordinates of the situation and intervening in the crucial political, economic, and military structures to detonate revolutionary struggles. The alliance between the working class and the peasantry is a historic product of the unfolding of capitalist and imperialist development, insofar as this brings the two classes into a common set of exploitative relations. But this objective convergence only becomes a political force and reality if a revolutionary party formulates a program and devises a strategy capable of channeling the energies of both classes toward common goals and against common enemies. Without such a party, the objective situation of common oppression can be dissipated into a thousand secondary struggles involving communal, ethnic, or sectoral interests—struggles that, incidentally, provide the favorite terrain for conventional bourgeois sociologists intent on refuting Marxist class analysis.

THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AND THE WORKING CLASS

But what is the relationship of the party leading the struggle for socialist revolution to the working class itself?⁷ It has often been argued that such parties, made up of professional revolutionaries, mainly intellectuals and other nonworking-class elements, are distinct and apart from the class and pursue policies that the workers themselves would not elaborate: The party *of* the working class is in reality the party *over* the working class. Moreover, elitist in composition, it is also elitist in its methods; it acts from “outside,” “manipulating” the interests of the workers to serve the power drives and the interests of the intellectual elite that runs the party. In the arena of social struggles, the

workers' economic interests are "sacrificed" to the political aims of the party, which stands to gain from its accession to power. The ground is thus prepared for the new exploitative society that will emerge when this proto-class takes power and begins to reorganize society to serve its own as opposed to the workers' interests. Such a view of the party seeks to minimize the extent of working-class participation in the revolutionary struggle; or, if it is clear that masses of workers are active, it seeks to differentiate party involvement from that of workers in general; or, if the two cannot be separated, it argues that the common orientation is merely conjunctural, and that the long-term conflict of interests will become manifest over time. A related line of argument presents the party as basically oriented toward "modernization" and "industrialization," while the workers are allegedly concerned only with immediate problems.

Although this way of presenting the relationship between party and class is misconceived, there does exist a certain material basis for it, in the nature of postrevolutionary developments in a number of countries. "Elites" have emerged and have restratified society; industrial plans have been imposed rather than debated by workers' councils; gaps have appeared between the concrete interests of the workers and the demands of the planners; above all, decision-making has been the prerogative of the party, or rather of the party leadership, and the workers have consequently often expressed their interests in narrowly economic terms.⁸ Moreover, these real divergences of interest after the revolution have not merely been pointed to by anti-Marxists as evidence of a universal and inherent contradiction between party and class; they have also been endowed with a similarly universal value from the other side, by the postrevolutionary regimes and their apologists. Liberal scholars discover that all subsequent distortions were inscribed in the process, party, and ideology of socialist revolution. Quotations out of context from Lenin, vacuous sociological generalizations about party structures and class/party relations, social psychological hypotheses about the motives of political and social leaders—all serve as a substitute for concrete analysis of the historical process. Propagandists for the postrevolutionary regimes, for their part, follow an essentially similar procedure, although from a sympathetic rather than a hostile vantage point: once again, out-of-context citations from Lenin, a one-sided emphasis on the role of the party and its leaders, and a claim for absolute continuity between the period of revolutionary change and postrevolutionary policies. The only difference is that the authoritarianism, economic developmentalism, and bureaucratic domination associated with the postrevolutionary period are presented as necessary and positive accompanying features of the revolution, whereas the liberals present them as elements of a new exploitative society.

In fact, however, the problem of relationships between the working class and the revolutionary party, and of the role of the working class in the socialist revolutions that have occurred to date and in the societies created by them, is both more complex and dialectical and more historically specific than such simplistic theses suggest. The essential point here is that postrevolutionary undermining of the working classes' power is no reason to omit, distort, or

downplay the historic role of the working class in providing the impetus to revolution. And to get at the real relationship between party and class during the revolutionary process itself, it is necessary to clear the field of the two mirror-opposite views described above.

First, the founding of a party does not necessarily reflect the activities of the class it will ultimately represent. Usually, parties are founded by small groups of people from diverse backgrounds, drawn together by a common set of ideas or a common project. Thus, the founding meetings of the Communist parties of Russia, China, and Vietnam included substantial numbers of intellectuals, who had as yet little direct connection with the burgeoning social struggles of the period. The small initial organization could hardly be said to “represent” the class. But in a sense, this goes without saying. The crucial test, however, is the capacity of a party to move from a primarily intellectual position outside the working class and to integrate itself into the mass movement, winning new members and transforming itself from a party of the “elite” into a party representing a substantial segment of the working class.

The early history of the Russian, Chinese, or Vietnamese parties shows an evolving relationship with the working class, in the course of which they were progressively transformed into parties increasingly composed of workers. This was achieved by a direct and growing participation in class struggles, and subsequently through the establishment of mass organizations. “Overlap” of membership between party and mass organization, mass organization and working class, is the prime index for the true relationship of party to class. The quantitative growth in working-class membership of the party and the extension of party-affiliated or influenced mass organizations suggest a progressive *integration* of the party in the class, a convergence of political and economic interests. The capacity of the party to sustain its working-class membership and affiliates, to augment the level of struggles, and to extend its influence on the basis of more elaborate programmatic statements (going beyond immediate economic-political interests, in the direction of a full socialist program), suggests that its integration within the class was not conjunctural, but reflects its own historic nature as a working-class party.

A second strand in the argument that the revolutionary party is something alien to the working class concerns the explicit central role of “professional revolutionaries.” Since workers work all day, the argument goes, the possibility for them to play any substantial role in the “vanguard party” is necessarily limited. Hence, the party of professional revolutionaries acts *upon* the class, and not vice versa. But this confuses a number of issues. First, the notion of professional revolutionaries should not be taken to mean footloose intellectuals dissociated from the work place. Rather, it refers to workers who are *primarily political activists*, precisely *in work* as well as *after work*. The capacity to act effectively as a serious, committed (“professional”) revolutionary presupposes insertion within a network of solidarity and joint activity, at the point of production or within a mass front. The capacity of the Bolshevik Party to enroll tens of thousands of members in the few months after February 1917, or of the

Chinese Communist Party to grow by leaps and bounds in the 1924–1927 period, was based on the prior recruitment of working-class cadres, who were in a position to insert themselves in the mass upsurge when this erupted. The party could not have created such cadres when the struggle erupted, any more than it could have “imposed” its line or leaders upon the mass movement from outside. After all, there were other organized political forces fighting for hegemony over that movement, some of which could draw on the power of the state (however weakened this may have been).

It is also true, of course, that the revolutionary party has nowhere embodied all of the working class. In the cases, we have been considering, not only were there competing political groups with influence in the working class, but many workers were not organizationally committed to any party. The point is that a substantial part of the party was in each case made up of workers, and these in turn acted within the broad working-class movement to provide political direction and leadership, transmitting to the class programmatic demands for transforming society. At the same time, the course of party activity, to the extent it has succeeded, has reflected the capacity of the workers’ movement not merely to assimilate but to modify the party’s program and orientation. It is not merely the party that has shaped the workers’ struggle, but the workers’ struggle that has influenced and formed the members of the party: The whole growth of party-class integration is a dialectical process. And, of course, successful policies of the party at moments of class upsurge have resulted in a new influx of members, while severe defeats have resulted in mass exodus.

THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS

The central issue raised by the massive entry of workers into a revolutionary party is that of *representation* of the class and *articulation* of its historic interests. There is no reason to take up the highly politicized and demanding existence of a party militant, unless there is some prior commitment to transforming the *political* role of the working class in society. To enter a revolutionary socialist party presumes recognition of the inadequacy of existing forms of political representation and, more important, of existing social relations of production—central targets of party program and activity. The positive act of joining the party and the affirmation of its program through party-directed activity reflect a primary concern not for economic issues (whether consumption or production), but rather for political and social ones: political freedom, embodied in direct forms of workers’ representation and power; and the replacement of exploitative social relations of production by collective ownership and self-management.

In each successful revolutionary experience, the outcome depended upon the fusion of significant segments of the working class with the revolutionary party, and the incorporation of representative demands of the class into the activity of the party. In the Russian Revolution, the central slogan of the Bolsheviks was a *political* demand to concentrate power in the hands of the most representative

institutions of workers' struggle: "All power to the Soviets." This was the high point of the revolution, the *culmination* of foregoing economic and social struggles; it reflected the intense interaction between the Bolshevik working-class cadre and the class as a whole. In China, the massive upsurge of the working class was cut short by the savage repression in 1926–1928; nevertheless, the notion of mass representative councils (Soviets), popular militia, and other forms of mass representation in the state remained in the forefront of the rural struggle throughout the prerevolutionary period. That the idea of mass representation, derived from the workers' experiences, should have persisted through the radical-agrarian and anti-fascist periods—in fact right up to the seizure of state power—suggests that while socioeconomic demands could be downplayed for conjunctural reasons, the issue of representation could not.

In Vietnam, the shift from urban class struggle to guerrilla war and national liberation struggle was sustained through the elaboration of a variety of institutions of representation. In liberated villages, parallel committees were formed; in factories clandestine councils were established. Everywhere, demands for freedom from bourgeois rule predominated, even while economic and social demands were watered down to accommodate petit-bourgeois and other forces. Political representation and the organizational articulation of worker and peasant interests played a central role in orienting and directing the protracted struggle; this accounts for the relative ease with which the Vietnamese were able to administer the war-devastated country, after the defeat and the departure of the United States and their clients.⁹

In Cuba, the revolutionary process emphasized the elimination of class differences to the point where all private businesses, even the most petty, were expropriated during the Great Revolutionary Offensive of 1968. An end to exploitation, and the social relations based on it, was a central priority of the revolution for at least the first decade. The elaboration of representative organs found expression especially in military-security units—the popular militia, the People's Courts, the local Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. This form of representation was confined to acting *against* enemies of the revolution—a key task in the early years, when imperialist intervention was a real and constant threat. Nevertheless, it became increasingly obvious that this was an inadequate form for articulating the workers' demands and interests. The attrition of the trade unions as organs of representation, and the failure to replace them with new institutions, has led to a crisis of consciousness: Confronted with an absence of political channels and with demands for economic performance, workers inevitably tend to revert to economic demands.

Thus, the central importance of the dialectical relationship between the revolutionary party and the working class needs no further emphasis. No twentieth-century socialist revolution occurred without the establishment of such a relationship. The party experience and the class struggles that resulted from the integration of party and class interests were essential in forging the ideology and cadre that made the revolution possible. And that integration was based on political demands—for freedom, representation, and an end to exploitation.

CONCLUSION

We have seen the many ways in which non-Marxist sociology has misconstrued or distorted working-class activity and consciousness: the counterposition of reforms to revolution; the separation of economic issues from political; the attempt to derive consciousness from a particular set of immediate demands or attitudes, or directly from wage levels, extrapolating from the wider social and political context of class struggle and state; the imputation of fundamental political cleavages between industrial workers and rural labor, on the basis of cultural or conjunctural differences, and so on. We have noted that these conceptions fail to grasp the real historic processes involved in twentieth-century socialist revolutions. Throughout the century, in major social transformations involving Europe, Asia, and Latin America, the workers' movement has played an essential role. In Russia, China, Cuba, and Vietnam, it was the large-scale entry of the working class onto the center stage of political struggle that transformed a process aimed at political reform into one leading to a combined political and social revolution. In Russia, it was the workers' parties that moved beyond demands for the overthrow of the autocracy toward a social transformation. In China, it was with the large-scale urban and rural movements organized by the working-class-centered Communist Party that the national struggle of the 1920s became also a struggle over land ownership and against class exploitation. In Cuba, the extension of the revolutionary process beyond the anti-Batista struggle to the expropriation of land and US enterprises was accompanied by a massive entry of urban and rural labor into the political arena.

Far from being inherently economistic, workers are stimulated by the adoption of broader political and social demands, while their activity in turn radicalizes social and political struggle in general. Thus, the development of those working-class movements that have led to social revolutions has been accompanied by an integral interplay between widening working-class participation and an ever-greater combination of political and economic demands. In no sense are immediate demands eliminated; but they become linked to a broader struggle for basic changes in regime and property ownership. Individual demands for land become linked to the expropriation of the landlord class. It thus makes no sense to seek to measure consciousness through observation of individual attitudes; what alone makes sense is to study the political and social organizations that mobilized rural and urban labor and that formulated the goals and found the means to realize them.

Working-class consciousness is not the product of some essential "condition," but rather of all the collective associations and struggles within which an individual worker is correctly located. Hence, in the case of Russia, China, Cuba, and Vietnam, the presence of better-paid as well as lower-paid workers within the same revolutionary organizational matrix was a function of their common exploitation by imperialist capital, warlords, or local capitalists. No matter how great the income disparities, savage encounters with the state and constant efforts by employers to raise the level of exploitation forced "aristo-

crats” and “coolies” into the same general struggle. What is crucial is not the differential gains that may have accrued to different segments of the working class, but the *method of struggle* adopted to win these. High- and low-paid workers alike engaged in class struggle under the leadership of the Communist Party, which acted to unify the disparate forces and provide a central political focus.

The common methods, political organizations, and programs that embraced high- and low-paid workers thus overrode the internal differentiation of the class. Confronted by a set of overarching problems and adversaries, income differences were subordinated to the common struggle. In Cuba, for example, skilled and semiskilled urban workers and cane cutters united to furnish the backbone of the popular militias that defeated US-backed military incursions, guerrilla attacks, and urban sabotage. A shared experience of class struggle created common bonds between different segments of the working class, and these sustained the revolutionary movement and formed the cadres that eventually succeeded in transforming society. In the absence of revolutionary perspectives and organization, day-to-day economic struggles have reflected the internal differentiation of the working class, taking the form of a whole series of disparate conflicts and demands. But to the degree to which the party has extended its membership and influence in the working class, to the degree to which the entire activity of the class has thus become party-oriented, even the most apparently “economistic” struggles have served as a basis for the large-scale, long-term changes, evidenced in subsequent, societal confrontations. Individual subjectivity has become subsumed within movements-in-struggle, and it is these movements that have defined the level of consciousness of the working class.

The strategic importance of the working class in the development of these revolutions derived, above all, from its qualitatively greater capacity to pose socialist goals. No other class possessed the same degree of cohesiveness and organization, linked to a socialist purpose. For while masses of peasants supported agrarian demands, and dispossessed peasants moved toward collectivist solutions, it was the proletarian forces—clearly separated from the means of production—that initially supported the formulation of a collectivist program. And the disparate strata of intellectuals, petty-commodity producers, shopkeepers, or civil servants were incapable even of themselves uniting as coherent, organized forces, let alone of formulating a program envisioning the socialization of production. The fact that individuals from these strata came over to the working class, and even played a major role within the working-class movement in formulating such a program, does not change the fundamental nature of the strata themselves. Such individuals were *won over* to the revolutionary movement, as a result of the prior existence of an organized revolutionary pole rooted in the working class.

Since the twentieth-century revolutions in which the workers’ movement played such an important role occurred in mainly rural societies, it is clear that the numerical size of the working class was less important than its strategic

position. Tied to urban industrial centers, largely exploited by imperialist capital, organized in class-based unions, the collective experience of propertylessness and class struggle permeated its political experience and facilitated its mobilization behind socialist objectives. The centers of capitalist production gave birth to the key ideas, organization, and cadres that were to provide leadership and an orientation for the vast, amorphous rural masses. And the strategic role of the proletariat was further made manifest in the outcome of those primarily rural-based revolutions: The means of production, including land, were collectivized, not fragmented into the peasant ideal of small property.

The historic role of the working class as “initiator” and “definer” of the revolutionary process made possible only by the adoption en masse of socialist goals. In Russia, China, Vietnam, and Cuba alike, it was the idea of an end to exploitative relations, to class and class privilege that detonated the assault on property holders and their instruments of domination. Economic demands became, as it were, only pretexts. Arguments about inadequate economic performance (important in winning over petit-bourgeois strata) rationalized an attack on the existing regime, whose real motives were far more fundamental. The emotional energy and the political drive behind the mobilization of the masses in the course of these revolutions are derived from the thousand indignities they suffered daily at the hands of the authorities—the industrialists, merchants, generals, and police chiefs—with their absolute power concentrated in the state. The appeal of socialism was rooted in this latent class hatred; and the revolutionary movement removed social inhibitions at the same time as it provided a focus for political expression. After the assumption of state power, the working-class character of the postrevolutionary state was in each case consolidated and made manifest in the transformation of property relations (despite programs that, in the Chinese, Cuban, and Vietnamese cases, had before the seizure of power not posed this as an objective). In each case, this was crucial in ensuring the survival of the workers’ state, in a world still dominated economically (and, at least until recently, also militarily) by imperialism. Further advance in the direction of socialism, moreover, requires the establishment of forms of *working-class* democracy and power, which alone are capable of transcending the nationally limited, bureaucratic structures of the postrevolutionary regimes.

NOTES

1. Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974); Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford, 1962). See also Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), and Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China* (New York, 1941).
2. In a complementary study, the author investigates the highly disruptive effects of imperialism and war on a global scale. See James Petras, “Toward a Theory of Twentieth Century Socialist Revolutions,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, no. 3, 1978. But see also Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War* (New York, 1968); Gabriel

- and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power* (New York, 1976); Fernando Claudin, *The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform* (London, 1976); Ernest Mandel, *Late Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1975), especially chaps 2 and 11; and Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
3. See, for example, Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1969); Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, *National Liberation Revolution in the Third World* (New York, 1971); Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York, 1963).
 4. For social forces in the Chinese revolutionary process, see, in particular, Jean Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement 1919–1927* (Stanford, 1968); Harold Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (New York, 1966); Lucien Bianco, *The Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949* (Stanford, 1971); Jean Chesneaux, *Peasant Revolts in China, 1840–1947* (London, 1973); Nym Wales, *The Chinese Labor Movement* (New York, 1945); and Jack Belden, *China Shakes the World* (London, 1975). The underlying element of political continuity from the 1920s to the 1940s and beyond is discussed in Isaac Deutscher, “Maoism: Its Origins and Outlook,” in Robin Blackburn (ed.), *Revolution and Class Struggle* (London, 1977).
 5. For social forces in twentieth-century Cuba, see, in particular, *Pensamiento Critico*, no. 39, April 1970 (Havana), special issue on the struggles of the 1920s and 1930s; Lowry Nelson, *Rural Cuba* (Minneapolis, 1950); Luis Aguilar, *Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution* (Ithaca, 1972); Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution* (New York, 1961); Che Guevara, *Episodes of the Revolutionary War* (Havana, 1966); Maurice Zeitlin, *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class* (Princeton, 1967); James Petras (ed), *Fidel Castro Speaks* (London, 1973); and Vania Bambirra, *La Revolución Cubana* (Mexico, 1974).
 6. The popular basis of the Russian Revolution, and the exceptional vitality and initiative displayed by the working class during the period of the conquest of power, is well conveyed in Alexander Rabinowitch, *The Bolsheviks Come to Power* (New York, 1976). But see also Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, 3 vols. (London, 1967); E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution* (London, 1966), vols. 1 and 2; Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin* (London, 1949); James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1918* (Stanford, 1974); Marcel Liebman, *Leninism under Lenin* (London, 1975); and Moshe Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power* (London, 1966).
 7. While a great deal of attention has been paid recently by Marxists to the relative autonomy of the state, and correlatively to the extent of its institutionalization, there has been less discussion of the relative autonomy of political organizations. But see Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (London, 1971); Lucio Magri, “Problems of the Marxist Theory of the Revolutionary Party,” *New Left Review* 60, March–April 1970; Ernest Mandel, “The Leninist Theory of Organization,” in Blackburn (ed.), *Revolution and Class Struggle*; Louis Althusser, “What Must Change in the Party,” *New Left Review* 109, May–June 1978.
 8. On postrevolutionary developments in the Soviet Union and China, with special reference to the relationship between bureaucracy and the working class, see E. H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country*, vols. 1 and 2 (London, 1958 and 1959); Deutscher, *Stalin*, and *The Prophet Unarmed* (London, 1959), Moshe Lewin, *Lenin’s Last Struggle* (London, 1969); Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge*

- (New York, 1973); Lucio Colletti, "The Question of Stalin," in Blackburn (ed.), *Revolution and Class Struggle*; and Livio Maitan, *Party, Army, Masses in China* (London, 1976).
9. For social forces in the Vietnamese revolutionary struggles, see, in particular, Ho Chi Minh, *Selected Writings* (Hanoi, 1977); Phang Thang Son, "Le mouvement ouvrier vietnamien de 1920 a 1930," in Chesneaux, Boudarel, and Hemery (eds.), *Tradition et Revolution au Vietnam* (Paris, 1971); John T. McAlister, *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution* (New York, 1965); Joseph Buttinger, *A Dragon Defiant* (New York, 1972); anon., *Brief History of the Vietnam Workers' Party 1930-1975* (Hanoi, 1976); Pierre Rousset, *Le Parti Communiste Vietnamien* (Paris, 1975); William Duiker, *The Rise of Nationalism 1900-1941* (Ithaca, 1976); Van Tien Dung, *Our Great Spring Victory* (New York, 1977); Ti-ziano Terzani, *Giai Phong: The Fall and Liberation of Saigon* (New York, 1976); Daniel Hemery, *Revolutionnaires Vietnamiens et Pouvoir Colonial en Indochine* (Paris, 1975); I. Milton Sacks, "Communism and Nationalism in Vietnam," (Ph.D. diss., Yale); Ta Thu Yhau, "Indochina: The Construction of the Revolutionary Party," *Fourth International*, November/December 1938; and Hoang Quoc Viet, *Short History of the Vietnamese Workers' and Trade Union Movement* (Hanoi, 1960).

REFERENCES

- Aguilar, Luis. 1972. *Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution*. London: W. W. Norton.
- Althusser, Louis. 1978. What Must Change in the Party. *New Left Review* 109 (May-June).
- Belden, Jack. 1975. *China Shakes the World*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Bianco, Lucien. 1971. *The Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bunyan, James, and H.H. Fisher. 1974. *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Carr, E.H. 1958-1959. *Socialism in One Country, vols. 1 and 2*. London: W. W. Norton.
- Carr, Edward Hallett. 1966. *The Bolshevik Revolution, vols. 1 and 2*. London: W. W. Norton.
- Chesneaux, Jean. 1968. *The Chinese Labor Movement 1919-1927*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- . 1973. *Peasant Revolts in China, 1840-1949*. London: W.W. Norton.
- Claudin, Fernando. 1976. *The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Deutscher, Isaac. 1977. Maoism: Its Origins and Outlook. In *Revolution and Class Struggle*, ed. Robin Blackburn. London: Harper Collins.
- Duiker, William. 1976. *The Rise of Nationalism, 1900-1941*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Fanon, Frantz. 1963. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove.
- Frank, Andre Gunder. 1969. *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers.
- Guevara, Che. 1968. *Episodes of the Revolutionary War*. New York: International Publishers.

- Ho Chi Minh. 1977. *Selected Writings, 1920–1969*. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Press.
- Huberman, Leo, and Paul Sweezy. 1960. *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Johnson, Chalmers. 1962. *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Kenner, Martin, and James Petras, eds. 1969. *Fidel Castro Speaks*. New York: Grove.
- Kolko, Gabriel. 1968. *The Politics of War*. New York: Random House.
- Kolko, Gabriel, and Joyce Kolko. 1976. *The Limits of Power*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Lewin, Moshe. 1968. *Lenin's Last Struggle*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- . 1975. *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power*. London: W. W. Norton.
- Liebman, Marcel. 1975. *Leninism under Lenin*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Magri, Lucio. 1970. Problems of the Marxist Theory of the Revolutionary Party. *New Left Review* 60 (March–April).
- Maitan, Livio. 1976. *Party, Army, and Masses in China: A Marxist Interpretation of the Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath*. London: New Left Books.
- Mandel, Ernest. 1975. *Late Capitalism*. London: New Left Books.
- . 1977. The Leninist Theory of Organization. In *Revolution and Class Struggle*, ed. Robin Blackburn. New York: HarperCollins.
- McAlister, John T., Jr. 1970. *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Miller, Norman, and Roderick Aya. 1971. *National Liberation Revolution in the Third World*. New York: The Free Press.
- Nelson, Lowry. 1950. *Rural Cuba*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Petras, James. 1978. Toward a Theory of Twentieth Century Socialist Revolutions. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 8: 167–195.
- Rabinowitch, Alexander. 1976. *The Bolsheviks Come to Power*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Schwartz, Benjamin. 1971. *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Selden, Mark. 1974. *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Snow, Edgar. 1941. *Red Star over China*. New York: Garden City Publishing Company.
- Terzani, Ti-ziano. 1976. *Giai Phong: The Fall and Liberation of Saigon*. New York: The Book Service.
- Tien Dung, Van. 1977. *Our Great Spring Victory*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Trotsky, Leon. 1967. *The History of the Russian Revolution, 3 vols.* London: Sphere Books.
- Wales, Nym. 1945. *The Chinese Labor Movement*. New York: Ayer Co. Pub.
- Wolf, Eric. 1999. *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Zeitlin, Maurice. 1967. *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

PART II

Social Movements and Social Change:
Varieties of Social Movements in the
Twentieth and Early Twenty-First
Century



Repression, Resistance, and Development of the Labor Movement in the United States

Andrew Kolin

The symptoms that characterize the current state of American labor can be understood in the context of what produces and reproduces labor's relation to capital. What in part defines this relation is capital's ownership of the means of production. As a result, the working class must sell its labor power for a set period of time in order to live, producing during part of the work day surplus value and labor in the workplace under authoritarian conditions. It is this inequality of social power within political and economic institutions that explains over time why there is labor repression and a corresponding decline in the quality of life of the working class.

One obvious sign of labor's decline is the erosion of hourly and weekly wages to 1970s levels. In addition, a third of the workforce now relies on public assistance to live. Since the 1970s and 1980s, the industrial heartland has become deindustrialized along with a shift toward greater state support for finance capital. Since the 1980s, labor union membership has fallen by half to under 10 percent in the private sector. Public sector unions, meanwhile, dodged what would probably have been an unfavorable ruling in the deadlocked Supreme Court case *Friedrichs v. California Teachers*. In *Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)*, the Supreme Court will probably have another opportunity to assault public sector workers. In early 2017, Kentucky and Missouri were added to the list of "right-to-work" states. An anti-public sector initiative was passed in Iowa as well, restricting public sector unions from bargaining over anything but wages.

A. Kolin (✉)

Department of Political Science, Hilbert College, Hamburg, NY, USA

e-mail: akolin@hilbert.edu

© The Author(s) 2019

B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_6

As union membership has declined, the impact on non-union workers has been growing inequality, in part due to the lowering of wages of non-union workers. Contributing to this downward trend, which has depressed wages and the standard of living among the working class, has been the export of manufacturing and service companies, the accelerated use of technology at the workplace and in producing commodities, and greater labor segmentation in the use of guest workers and contingent-temporary labor. Also, the various trade agreements, such as the Border Industrial Program, the Most Favored Nation states, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have increased unemployment and depressed wages in the United States.

With this wholesale decline of union membership, social inequality expressed as the gap between the few and the many has reached pre-Depression levels. This social inequality is expressed in the Trump's administration budget and policy initiatives, including tax cuts for the upper classes and extensive cuts in social welfare programs. His antipathy for unions and labor is evident in his appointment of Alexandra Acosta for Secretary of Labor, who was a pro-business voice on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), while his Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos, the Amway billionaire, supports privatization of schools and is openly hostile to teachers' unions. With the nomination of William Emanuel and Marvin Kaplan, Trump has filled NLRB vacancies with attorneys also hostile to labor unions.

But an examination of the symptoms of labor's decline does not address its root causes, most of all, how and why capital dominates labor. It is not just the export of capital. Since the early 1980s, the importation of capital to the United States also known as "nextsharing" pioneered by Toyota Motor Manufacturing has been a factor for both foreign and US capital. The goal is to secure access to markets, government subsidies, and linked supply chains. Establishing foreign companies in southern states has enhanced what has been the historical geographic division of labor between southern and northern states. Both foreign and domestic capital have found many advantages to locate in southern states, such as availability of cheap, non-union labor and legislatures friendly to business.

These trends, which reduce labor-union membership, have increased social inequality between the few and the many, which, in turn, translates into increasing political inequality, since unions have been advocates of greater worker participation and pro-labor legislation. Over time, union households have demonstrated greater political participation than non-union households. It was with this greater political voice that the working class managed to achieve "middle class" standing.

It has been the standard practice of many historical surveys of American labor to overlook the scope and scale of the political economy of labor repression over the course of US history. Any history of labor is incomplete without taking into account the conflict-ridden interactions between capital and labor, in terms of it being between unequal participants. It is an inequality of power in which capital seeks to reproduce its dominance over labor through institutional exclusion. Under consideration is how the literature on labor—

consisting of both broad surveys and studies of specific periods in labor history—examines labor repression. With the exception of Philip Foner's *History of the American Labor Movement*, which addresses the role of class and repression in his work, and Jeremy Brecher's *Strike!*, there is a tendency among historical surveys to overlook the scope and scale of labor repression as well as the political economy of institutional repression.

This neglect appears in such mainstream works as Joseph Rayback's *A History of American Labor* and the writings of Melvin Dubofsky, such as *The State and Labor in America*. In the recent book, *There is Power in Union*, Philip Dray often ignores labor repression. Even the labor activist James Green, in *World of the Worker*, fails to consider the full extent to which capital oppresses labor. The earlier labor histories of Commons and Perlman do not take into account the role of the state and the economy in orchestrating labor repression. Philip Nicholson in *Labor's Story of the United States* avoids looking at how capital-labor social relations shape labor repression.

Many labor histories include no consistent assessment of the cyclical nature of US capitalism as a general factor in shaping qualitative aspects of labor repression as well as older labor histories, such as *A History of Trade Unionism in the United States* by Selig Perlman and *The History of Labor in the United States* by John Commons. Perlman's theory of the labor movement fails to consider how institutional exclusion of labor has a fundamental role in policy-making, which serves to put labor, with the exception of radical labor, in a position to collaborate with political and economic elites. The ill-fated worker parties of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries couldn't succeed against the political hegemony of the Democratic and Republican parties. A careful study of the production and reproduction of labor repression within the context of institutional exclusion is essential in order to understand how capital has dominated labor. There are period-specific labor historians who understand how labor is oppressed by institutional exclusion.

Some historians whose work is more period-specific are more conscious of how repression limits labor's role in policymaking. They adopt a systematic approach, placing labor repression within the context of a capitalist economy. Prominent among them are Stanley Aronowitz in his *False Promises, How Class Works*, and his recent work, *The Death and Life of American Labor*. *False Promises* is noteworthy in providing a broad historical analysis of capital-labor relations in American capitalism. Richard Edwards' *Contested Terrain* outlines a theme further discussed in this book of how labor is excluded from decision-making in the workplace. Barry Bluestone and Bennet Harrison in *The Deindustrialization of America* trace workplace restructuring and labor exploitation starting in the 1980s. They also touch upon labor repression in *U-Turn* and *Segmented Work, Divided Workers*. David Montgomery writes in *Workers' Control in America* about the political struggle between capital and labor at the workplace.

Radical labor's influence and pushback against repression appears in such works as Judith Stepan-Norris and Maurice Zeitlin in their book *Left Out*. They trace the rise of Communist-run and affiliated unions and how they

embodied the idea of economic democracy. Rhonda Levine takes a look at the role of radical labor organizations in the 1930s, centering her discussion in terms of a class struggle between capital and labor in her book *Class Struggle and the New Deal*. In *Talking Union*, Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin explain the concerted efforts made to organize unions in the face of tactics utilized by capital to disorganize labor from the 1930s to the 1950s. Postwar repression of labor is associated with the rise of labor anti-Communism as described in Fraser Ottanelli's *The Communist Party in the United States*, which examines the roots of labor anti-Communism. Also, Bert Cochran and Harvey Levenstein in *Communism, anti-Communism and the CIO* look at the role of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the rise of labor anti-Communism. In *The Second Red Scare*, Landon Storrs traces the role of labor anti-Communism and the assault on the social welfare state.

Often omitted from labor histories is the change at the state level from policies associated with class alliance and the social welfare state to class conflict between capital and labor during the 1980s, with the rise of finance capital. The growth and decline of the managerial state are covered in the volume *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order* edited by Fraser and Gerstle. Mainstream labor unions had tied themselves to the capitalist state. One reason for the decline of unions is not only this problematic attachment to the capitalist state, but also the shifting policies favoring finance capital. In *The Labor Wars*, the radical labor historian Sidney Lens traces the violent repression of labor associated with labor anti-Communism starting in the 1930s. Similarly, M. J. Heale in his insightful work, *American Anti-Communism*, and Ellen Schrecker's "Labor and the Cold War" provide historical evidence as to why anti-Communism is followed by an attack on organized labor, especially during the Cold War.

These and other works have contributed to a better understanding of labor repression in specific historical periods. However, what has been lacking is a comprehensive review of how individual examples are not isolated events but are fundamentally connected, as labor repression develops from the past to the present to establish a political economy of repression, a main theme of my book, *The Political Economy of Labor Repression in the United States*. Nonetheless, some scholars clearly understand the connection between how the segmenting of workers is used to oppress them through the restructuring of workplace relations, such as in Nelson Lichtenstein and Elizabeth Shermer's *The Right and Labor in America*. This includes the volume *Labor Rising*, edited by Richard Greenwald and Daniel Katz, which contains the insightful article by Lichtenstein on Wal-Mart. Clayton Sinyar in *Schools of Democracy* summarizes how labor contributed to our understanding of democracy. But absent from this discussion is the pushback from anti-democratic, corporate America. In David Brody's *Labor Embattled*, one finds a collection of essays about labor's struggles against capital, but it lacks a coherent theory of a political economy of repression. The same could be said of Steven Babson's *The Unfinished Struggle*. His history of labor begins with the 1877 strike and goes up to the present. Lacking in this book is a theory of how the state and the

economy work in tandem to eliminate labor unrest. Melvin Dubofsky in *Hard Work* illustrates in articles in the book the political struggles of labor and nowhere does he explore how labor is challenged and the decline of its social presence in terms of the use of overt and covert repression, a theme emphasized throughout my book mentioned above. This small but representative sample points to the overall neglect of a historical outline of labor repression linking the past to the present. The task at hand in this chapter is to survey American history with an emphasis on identifying historical moments so as to present a comprehensive depiction of repression and struggles of the labor movement in the United States.

INSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSION AND LABOR'S RESPONSE TO REPRESSION

Institutional exclusion, expressed as the production of labor repression, results in the control of resources by the property-owning class and allows for the reproduction of measures designed to repress labor both overtly and covertly. Once in place, institutional exclusion functions as a dependent variable of labor repression and results in elites generating an ideology of repression. This exclusion is defined as a right to monopolize decision-making in the state and the economy and results in a covert repression of labor. This institutional exclusion necessary in order to reproduce labor repression unfolds in the context of the economic cycles of US capitalism. Placing labor repression during period-specific moments within the contours of US history is useful in illustrating both how capital employs covert and overt repression in varying degrees against labor and how labor responds. This approach makes it possible to examine the full spectrum of class divisions, as well as collaboration and conflict, between capitalists and organized labor.

Our historical survey begins with the elements that coalesce around creating various forms of labor repression before and after the American Revolution. An alliance between colonial and British elites, as the colonies were established, put in place various labor segments: indentured, slave, and craft labor, which were exploited to generate wealth. This alliance began to unravel as the well-to-do colonists took issue with the unequal partnership they had with the British. In seeking liberation from this subordinate relationship, colonial elites sought independence to monopolize control over the state and the economy. Steps taken to move the colonies toward eventual independence would sever the politics and economics of American reliance on Great Britain. After the revolution, the dominant classes developed policies that associated economic expansion with the acquisition of land and treaties in North America. Even though the revolution unfolded as a democratic one based on mass support, it revealed early signs of an alliance along class lines.¹ Although the labor of indentured servants, slaves and craftsmen was exploited, they were conscious enough to stage a revolt against a foreign colonizer and to begin to question the lack of democracy in the colonies. It's obvious that the revolution would not have succeeded without support from the masses.

What explains the mass mobilization that made the American Revolution succeed? From the perspective of members of the upper class, making the revolution democratic would serve their economic goal of liberating themselves from the British. In considering the motive of the masses, this alliance with elites would realize the idea of a democratic America. Significantly, both during and after the American Revolution, there were expressions of greater inclusion of people in policymaking. The Articles of Confederation were one expression of a broad-based democracy. While during the revolution, an alliance of the few and the many appeared to promote everyone's interests, after the revolution, the notion of democracy as all-inclusive would create conflict: decision-making in government and at the workplace would further cement private over public interests. To denigrate the notion of a more inclusive democracy would translate into actions that repress labor. The economic downturn after the revolution was one precondition, diminishing any notion of political economic leverage.² Even before the downturn, the political shift was toward representing the interests of a privileged minority. Policymaking was already underway with the shift from the Articles of Confederation to the US Constitution. Added to the mix were the accumulated wartime debt and taxation policies. The social divisions within the Constitutional Convention were, in large part, about economic growth and the direction of the economy. Property owners were divided over the issue of slave and wage labor, but not over how to exploit them.

The lower ranks understood the importance of being included in decision-making in shaping political and economic priorities. In post-revolutionary America, there was greater institutional inclusion of the masses at the state and local levels. Nonetheless, there were clear differences as to who controlled the organization of the economy.³ The property-owning class, including those who controlled banking and credit, also maintained and supported policies that controlled labor markets. As popular voices engaged in a social revolution against British rule, property owners were willing to tolerate their criticisms and actions taken against the unequal distribution of property. But after the revolution, they realized the necessity of reining in such radicalism. The class consciousness of property owners is evident as they forged stronger links with the state and as the economy would diminish any effort by labor to call into question the prerogatives of property owners. It is no coincidence that as a more centralized economy was established, the concept of business would undergo a fundamental transformation.⁴ Corporate charters would be replaced by the concept of personhood for the corporation. This development was significant in how the private sector could strengthen its social control over the workplace, further justifying labor oppression in the workplace. What resulted was greater legal and social exclusion of labor at the workplace.

Property owners were conscious of labor unrest and resistance and the means to curtail it. One response was to restructure the state as illustrated in the shift from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution. From the point of view of the various framers, economic growth and confronting social

unrest did factor into the restructuring of state control. A powerful centralized government was necessary to attain economic growth. Territorial expansion within North America took place in association with Federalist principles of rule. Economic policymaking coincided with this land grab. The adoption of a national taxing authority and control over national monetary policies and credit emphasized economic nationalism as a growth promoter. Politics and economics blended together and were characterized by the Jeffersonian ideal in which democracy was defined in terms of an ever-expanding agrarian democracy. Jefferson's belief in a democracy tied to commercial agriculture would tend to leave out urban wage labor.

By the end of the Civil War, the fundamental division between slave and wage labor gave way to how to develop the means to best exploit wage labor. Capital had divided labor into slave and wage labor segments and this division made it all the more difficult for labor in general to organize and express unified class interests. Given the enormous obstacles, labor activists confined their efforts to organizing wage labor.

The rise of the factory system and how labor responded to it as well as the social conflict between capital and labor inside and outside the workplace determined the intensity of labor repression.⁵ To oppress labor, capital had to attain a monopoly of control over the resources of power in the state and the economy. This monopoly of control explains in part how the property-owning class can confront, and in most instances defeat, any possible demands to alter labor's exclusion from decision-making. The historical inability of labor to expand its decision-making role in the state and workplace results in persistent labor repression.⁶ It also explains why labor's political consciousness was fragmented into reformist and more radical wings. As political outsiders in the state and the economy, labor cannot often prevent capital from increasing labor repression in response to economic downturns. What is also consistent is organized labor's belief that there was no alternative to forming alliances with capital. In examining the function of reformist labor movements, while there was an understanding that workers had separate economic interests from property owners, until the arrival of German Socialists, labor organizers had never called into question by word or deed the structural exclusion of labor from decision-making.

This is not to ignore the importance of strikes, which, at times, raised issues of working conditions and the number of hours spent on the job. In oppressing labor, capital could and did call upon government officials to use legal means to diminish reforms. This combination of a state functioning as semiautonomous from the economy, while at the same time conscious of the necessity of protecting capital's interests along with the private ownership of property generates comprehensive forms of labor repression. It results in a dominant labor segment of craft workers who, with the exception of periodic strikes, accepted a subordinate role in the state and the workplace.⁷

What little labor radicalism there was in the nineteenth century was both homegrown and imported from the wave of German immigrants with the rise

of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). The reformist unionism of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) reflected acceptance of the dominance of capital and was clearly against calling into question issues of ownership and control of the state and the economy. That the AFL accepted the institutional exclusion of labor is evidence that it made no demands other than basic economic ones. Samuel Gompers' AFL was up against an emerging powerful tool, which further subordinated labor to capital in which law would serve to legitimize a concentration of capital in the form of the corporation. Laws were developed to create objective criteria justifying private ownership and to disorganize labor through the use of the labor injunction. When the corporation was given personhood by the Supreme Court and due process rights, it made it all the more difficult to directly challenge the legitimacy of private ownership.⁸ Along with a legal right of ownership, the laws also legitimized the use of coercion to enforce ownership rights. Economic and political elites understood the need to economize repressive measures and when circumstances permitted, took action to coopt organized labor. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the most extreme repression was reserved for small, radical segments represented by socialists, communists and the IWW.

The brief electoral success of these segments caused property owners to express concern leading to a more comprehensive and systematic use of repression with the goal of eliminating their visible presence. Property owners were concerned over statements made and actions taken by radical labor segments, which called into question a wholesale institutional exclusion of labor from decision-making. The silencing of these dissident voices served to increase labor's reformist alliance with capital. Of equal concern to labor reformers and business owners were the independent actions and strikes undertaken by labor's rank and file. They represented a worker-led democratic labor movement, often opposed to labor leaders and management policies. Labor repression began to shift throughout the twentieth century, targeting a potential social force advocating greater political and economic democracy represented by the rank and file.

An essential aspect of labor repression is institutional exclusion of labor's rank and file through the use of repressive policies at the workplace.⁹ To understand the political repression of labor is to take into account the production and reproduction of repression in the institutional context of workplace relations between capital and labor. Social divisions among various sections of labor contributed to how labor is excluded from decision-making at the workplace. Reproducing capital's domination of labor required greater integration and discipline of labor within the corporate structure, accelerating the production of capital and stepping up measures to limit labor unrest. This development coincided with the external restructuring of the business enterprise as American capitalism makes the transition to monopoly capitalism. State regulatory policies proved to be inadequate as anti-trust regulations did not limit the growth of monopolies; instead, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act served as a means to limit union growth. An aspect of this restructuring of workplace relations

involved the formation of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), designed to use the courts to undermine unions and the rights labor had acquired. In limiting an organized labor presence at work, capitalists were putting in place social and technical means intended to accelerate production. With the introduction of technology and the use of company unions, the labor process was sped up. This acceleration of production would diminish the presence of craft labor and add greater numbers of semiskilled and unskilled laborers.

Coinciding with the economic downturns of the 1870s–1880s, unskilled labor became politically conscious, as strike waves unfolded in response to company policies designed to create a homogenous labor force. Property owners responded by creating a novel form of labor repression through indirect control, the bureaucratic workplace.¹⁰ On the surface, it had many advantages. It was as if capital and labor were in agreement in terms of doing what was best for the company, including an emphasis upon labor discipline. This bureaucratic-corporate model was augmented with welfare programs. The shortcomings of this approach point to an ongoing contradiction as capital pursued the reproduction of labor repression. It wasn't long before business owners understood the drawbacks of this strategy as labor unrest reappeared, leading to a search for other remedies that would resolve class struggle. One underlying reason why capital cannot permanently eliminate labor unrest has to do with the cyclical nature of American capitalism; each upward and downward cycle presents new challenges to the maintenance of labor discipline. The contradiction between the goals of capital and those of labor are further intensified in periods of economic crisis. When profit maximization becomes limited due to obstacles impeding capital accumulation, labor repression accelerates. Labor repression intensifies as American capitalism seeks to increase profits.

At various points in US history, labor repression has increased when capital seeks to expand the boundaries of capital accumulation. Consider the increase in labor repression in relation to America's entry into World War I (WWI). During the war, cooptation and repression appear, expressed through the actions of the National Civic Federation (NCF) and the NAM. While the NCF advocated class collaboration in contrast to NAM, which viewed capital and labor in conflict, both were in agreement over the importance of quelling the activities of more militant rank and file laborers. Most troubling to class-conscious capitalists were issues raised by these radical labor segments, such as the absence of economic democracy, the lack of input from labor into workplace decision-making and the goal of organizing all workers into unions. While calling into question the lack of institutional democracy, AFL leadership believed there was more to lose if it supported radical labor's social agenda.¹¹ This division within organized labor helped give property owners a freer hand in imposing measures designed to oppress the rank and file. It also points to the AFL's political weakness; its only option in rejecting ties to radical labor was to collaborate with property owners, whose goal was a homogenous and disciplined workforce. Nonetheless, the AFL also understood that it had much to lose in

cooperating with business owners, for skilled labor was in the process of being replaced by technology. In response, the AFL was willing to accept the need to engage in defensive strikes in order to preserve the role of skilled labor at the workplace. Throughout WWI, labor repression was ever-present but also selective. At the time, the primary agent was the US government responding to labor's demand for wage increases with the resulting strike waves which were disrupting war production. Selective repression was underway as the US government began to target identified radicals and Reds responsible for the strikes. In the postwar period, a Red scare was driven by the goal of eliminating the ideas of a small segment of the labor movement that questioned private ownership and raised the idea of economic democracy. Another goal of the Red scare was to further cement mainstream labor's class collaboration with capital. Once mainstream labor had no choice but to collaborate, property owners began to target these unions.

Although by the early 1920s, more radicalized sections of labor were eliminated as a force for social change, there were still some remaining elements of progressive labor, which rejected AFL reformism. A large number of postwar strikes indicated that labor unrest had emerged from the rank and file, who sought economic and political concessions from the corporations. Workers supported general strikes, which they believed could support their goal of improving working conditions especially in the steel industry. The rank and file's independence from union officials represented a rejection of class collaboration between union leaders and the powers that be. Such rejection also explains the timing of actions taken against labor's rank and file. Rank and file defiance continued in the form of wildcat strikes. Workers used them as a means to create greater workplace democracy. The wildcats also were a rejection of union leaders who collaborated with employers. Employers reacted to this primitive form of worker control by stepping up labor repression. As union leaders continued to partner with the Hoover and Harding administrations, a political economy of labor repression took hold during the Depression of 1920–1921. This short-lived economic downturn was followed by a concerted effort by corporate America to eliminate strikes. One can draw a simple enough conclusion that capital will repress labor during an economic crisis.

The question remains, however: why did labor repression continue even after the economy recovered from this postwar recession? A simple answer would be that capital always strives to coerce labor. A more complicated answer involves considering the motives behind capital's assaults on organized labor. There appears to be an inconsistency in the amount of labor repression during tough economic times. There are quantitative and qualitative differences between labor repression during the 1920s and the 1930s. Throughout the 1930s, there was some reduction in oppressive actions against labor. One explanation for the more intense repression during WWI was the need to eliminate radical labor segments. This motive was absent during the 1930s. The economic downturn of the early 1920s also was short-lived in comparison to the far more persistent Depression of the 1930s, which indicates that during a

brief economic downturn, business owners believe intense repression will provide tangible results. The earlier downturn affected a smaller section of labor in sharp contrast to the widespread economic dislocation during the Depression. Corporate leaders would find it more difficult to contain labor unrest in the 1930s.

In contrast to organized labor throughout the Great Depression, labor unions during the 1920s were in such a weakened state that they couldn't slow down the wave of intense repression. In addition, business owners were beginning to push back against, and eventually remove, economic regulations.¹² Yet, as the economy recovered by the mid-1920s, in what might at first appear to be counterintuitive, labor repression increased. With the disappearance of radical labor elements and the AFL experiencing a steep decline in membership along with a decline in strike actions, the AFL had no choice but to market itself as a partner of business. Green's AFL engaged in class collaboration as the organization agreed to tie wages to productivity. It's no coincidence that at that time corporate America promoted the open-shop, the American plan and Yellow Dog contracts. These overt approaches were augmented by covert ones as companies fostered labor's loyalty to the company by the use of profit-sharing, bonuses and company stock. What little remained of labor radicalism attempted to stage a comeback through the use of the Communist-inspired Trade Union Education League (TUEL) with limited success. There were also a few socialist-led unions, which remained isolated from mainstream labor. By the latter part of the 1920s, it was clear that ideas of worker control were disassociated from the broader labor movement. But by the 1930s, the most profound economic crisis of American capitalism provided labor with an opportunity to stage its most dramatic comeback.

The political fallout of the Great Depression unfolded with organized labor pushing back against repression due to labor's renewed social visibility and most of all, rank and file activism and the resurgence of radicalized labor segments.¹³ While a political economy of repression was in place due to the institutional exclusion of labor, capital began to make concessions, institutional provisions to include labor as a junior partner in policymaking. This appeared in the form of the New Deal, encompassing a concept of class alliance between capital and labor. Other factors were the increased social presence of leftist labor organizations and most of all, the growth of industrial unions associated with the CIO and the Communists, which were advocating greater economic democracy. It wasn't possible for policymakers to ignore organized labor's increased viability.

At the state level, policymakers led by President Roosevelt outlined measures to mediate between capital and labor. One tangible result was the partial inclusion of labor in the state structure as New Deal policies allowed workers in principle to organize into unions and engage in collective bargaining. However, this inclusion was limited. The administration was focused on the idea of limiting labor repression in favor of class harmony between capital and labor. This emphasis appears in the formation of the National Industrial

Recovery Act (NIRA), which attempted to make capital and labor give concessions in order to harmonize their distinct class interests through, for example, the Codes of Fair Competition and Section 7A. This state tactic of instilling class harmony had been used before during WWI. It eventually gave way to class conflict as it would during the 1930s. One indication of the reemergence of class conflict was corporate America's assumption of a leading role in limiting the scope of Section 7A. Business owners eventually shifted from shaping a watered down version of labor organizing under 7A to outright resistance. Sensitive to the problem of labor unrest, the Roosevelt administration sought to strengthen Section 7A through the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act. For the time being, the most overt examples of labor repression were put on the political backburner.¹⁴

What the administration hadn't been prepared for was a rising tide of expectations emerging from labor's rank and file and from the reappearance of radical labor, the roots of which stemmed from the industrial working class, and in particular the growth of the United Mine Workers union. Ever class conscious, corporate America was paying close attention to the rise of industrial unions and sought to undermine Section 7A through the formation of company unions. The mouthpiece of corporate interests, the NAM had been providing information on how to undermine Section 7A. Thus, the social divisions among organized labor persisted. The AFL kept its distance during and after the formation of the CIO. This division would continue to haunt organized labor and by the time the two organizations merged in the 1950s, repression had taken its toll on organized labor.

For a time, the vitality and growth of the labor movement was related to CIO direct mass actions.¹⁵ The rise of the CIO had much to do with the reappearance of Communism and the association of Communists with the CIO. What would alarm business interests were ideas and actions calling into question the undemocratic nature of the American workplace and the unequal political division of control. The formation of Communist-affiliated, worker-run unions gave corporate America another reason to be concerned along with an increase in strike actions. Radical labor couldn't expect support from the AFL, whose apolitical and collaborative role with capital was justified by its anti-Communist perspective. AFL anti-Communism was active in its efforts to undermine the formation and growth of industrial unions. So while the CIO and Communist-affiliated unions sought to promote workplace democracy, the AFL fought against it. The activism of rank and file workers was being demonstrated with the goal of increasing greater workplace democracy through the use of the sit-down strike. Through the use of the sit-down, workers became empowered, learning by doing, developing the means of organizing the day-to-day activities of the plant. It wasn't long before the sit-down spread to many plants.

The preceding references to the CIO's association with Communists must, however, be qualified. While John L. Lewis was willing to use Communist organizers to build the CIO, he was a staunch anti-Communist himself. He was

careful to exclude Communists from the organization's most important positions and often, once a union was formed, would fire the Communist organizers. The Communist-formed unions were a model of worker-run labor organizations best represented by the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE). This union was a sharp contrast to the top-down leadership model of the United Automobile Workers (UAW). Communists were involved in numerous progressive causes, such as advocating racial and gender equality. In large part, the Roosevelt administration's shift away from policies designed to promote class alliance can be understood in terms of the policies and actions of the CIO as well as the Communist Party's increased social presence.

In many ways, this shift from more moderate to extreme labor repression took place as state and corporate policymakers used this CIO-Communist association and the appearance of Communist-led unions to justify the eliminating of class alliance in favor of class conflict-driven policies. The result would be the growth and acceleration of labor anti-Communism justifying labor repression. A part of this coalition of labor anti-Communists emerged from the ranks of organized labor as the AFL and eventually the CIO, would embrace labor anti-Communism. Both organizations had tied their political fortunes to the Democratic Party and were therefore prepared to go along with and support labor anti-Communism.

During the Roosevelt administration, the full scope of labor repression, which had moderated, was confined to covert repression expressed as institutional exclusion. Full-scale overt repression had been scaled back. This can be attributed to the administration's goal of fostering a class alliance between capital and labor as expressed through New Deal programs. The path toward ever-greater labor repression begins as policymakers were calling into question the basis of the New Deal.¹⁶ This growing opposition to the New Deal would eventually encompass a fundamental shift in state policy from what had been class alliance mediated by the state in favor of the state expressing conflict between capital and labor. Class conflict meant anti-Communism, which translated into labor repression. The AFL and then the CIO were put in the position of supporting labor anti-Communism, which would, over time, turn out to be self-destructive to organized labor.

SOCIAL DIVISIONS AND THE ROLE OF LABOR ANTI-COMMUNISM

Labor anti-Communism first appeared in the late 1930s as the "Little Red Scare." As it had been expressed in previous decades, the social divisions between mainstream and more radicalized sections of labor contributed to this growth of labor anti-Communism and actions designed to repress labor. An underlying motive behind much of labor anti-Communism was the intention to enhance control over labor with policies resulting in a more homogenized workforce. It wasn't just homogenization in terms of greater political control at work, it was also expressed by supporting divisions among workers as a

social division of labor dividing unskilled from skilled and immigrant labor. As business owners exploited these divisions, they created a labor hierarchy at the workplace through the enactment of wage and benefit differences. While the AFL understood the advantages of supporting this labor hierarchy with skilled labor at the top of the heap, more progressive labor forces were well aware that the bulk of workers were at a severe political disadvantage. The AFL associated support for unskilled and immigrant labor as policies emanating from Communist-led unions. In other words, greater workplace democracy was being associated with Communist ideas. Even the CIO, which was supposed to represent the interests of unskilled and semiskilled workers, was beginning to recognize the need to disassociate from the Communists. The first government-sponsored witch hunts were a search by the Dies Committee to identify Communists associated with the CIO. Contributing to this Little Red Scare, were the strike actions taking place in the latter part of the 1930s, which were being blamed on Communist influence in labor unions. In addition, another motive in labor anti-Communism was the goal of undermining the class alliance concept of the Roosevelt administration by questioning the motives behind the CIO's connections to the Democratic Party.¹⁷ Not long after charges of a Communist-CIO link were leveled against the Party, the CIO began to disassociate from Communists. The AFL-CIO's promotion of labor anti-Communism was more than an example of the organizations policing themselves, it also demonstrated how they repressed themselves. As policy-makers stepped up labor anti-Communism, organized labor policed itself by limiting demands and focusing on preventing rollbacks.

This process was effective in making labor unions more apolitical, focusing their attention on bread and butter issues and placing less emphasis on workplace conditions. Labor anti-Communism was most effective in delegitimizing strikes by identifying particular strikes as Communist-inspired. By embracing labor anti-Communism, the capitalist class had shifted its ideological direction from class alliance to a primary emphasis on class conflict. The recession of 1937 convinced economic elites to blame it on the New Deal and the administration's tolerance of labor unrest. Another result was red-baiting in the form of the Foreign Agents Registration Act followed by the Hatch Act. In response, the CIO began to clean house, by preventing members from supporting or electing Communists to CIO unions. This was one step away from what would become the outright exclusion and ouster of Communists who had played a significant role in building the CIO. For a brief historical moment, labor anti-Communism was put on hold as the United States entered World War II (WWII).

While war would for a time suspend some of the most extreme forms of overt oppression, the subsequent Cold War would accelerate the most blatant forms of labor repression.¹⁸ The recurring pattern from the Great Depression until the end of WWII was the political division among monopoly capital between class alliance and class conflict. This tension was shaping how intense repression of labor would become. The state continued to mediate between

capital and labor in some instances, while in most cases it aligned itself with the needs of capital. Since the government had assumed a leading role in setting economic priorities during the Depression, its role during wartime wasn't called into question. At first, the Roosevelt administration resurrected the concept of class alliance between capital and mainstream labor. A political economy of war was temporarily taking precedence over the overt expression of labor repression.

The administration's use of class alliance was not being fully embraced by Lewis and the CIO. The CIO had chosen to embrace peacetime Keynesianism over wartime Keynesianism. Lewis found himself in an uneasy alliance with American Communists who also at first opposed US entry into the war. Nonetheless, the antiwar position of Lewis and the Communists was a minority viewpoint, for once Lewis resigned and Murray became CIO president, the organization took a pro-war position. As for many rank and file unionists, they were opposed to supporting the war effort. The eventual shift toward state support of class conflict during the war would step up labor repression. This shift was the product of the increased militancy of labor's rank and file and the continued presence of Communists within the CIO. It soon became clear to the rank and file and to Communists that in rejecting class alliance, capital would be stepping up labor suppression. As labor's hierarchy further aligned itself with corporate America, the leadership came to view labor unrest as the result of a Communist presence in unions. In the context of WWII, circumstances were dictating to labor's hierarchy and business owners the necessity of class alliance.

For the ever-growing block of labor anti-Communists, the problem during the war became how to confront labor's rank and file and sections of radical labor.¹⁹ These members of the upper class were also in the process of considering an about-face, which had, at the start of the war, given unions some degree of legitimacy on the federal level. Prior to enacting what would become full-blown labor anti-Communism, policymakers believed labor unrest could be diminished and collaboration could be achieved through the War Labor Board (WLB), which would serve to mediate differences between labor and management. In seeking to head off strikes during the war, the Board would make use of the "little steel formula," limiting raises to 15 percent. To supplement the WLB, the federal government put in place the Tri-Partite War Labor Board, which included members of labor's hierarchy. These boards failed to understand the root source of strikes. Many of them weren't confined to pure bread and butter issues, but were often political in nature, seeking to reform workplace conditions. At the time, there were various outbreaks of wildcat strikes, a response to unequal work relations between labor and management.

To justify a more comprehensive crackdown on strikes and labor unrest, labor anti-Communists placed the blame on Communists who were involved in only a small percentage of strikes.²⁰ In addition, the labor anti-Communists in the government claimed as they had during WWI, that the Communists were taking marching orders from the Comintern. It made no difference to them

that the Communist Party was by this time both pro-war and independent from Moscow. Labor unions, especially high-ranking union officials, took action to isolate members of the rank and file who organized strikes and any rank and file members affiliated with the Communist Party.²¹ While the AFL and CIO began the process of purging Communists from unions, the political result was preserving the authority and prerogatives of high-ranking union officials. For them, labor anti-Communism was a means to prove their allegiance to the goals of big business in how they could promote a disciplined labor force, while it seems the end result was to reinforce a class alliance between capital and labor, class conflict was beginning to take precedent through the use of labor anti-Communism. While organized labor's leadership continued pursuing a class alliance strategy with capital, at the same time union officials were working with corporate leaders unfolding a strategy of class conflict targeting the rank and file.²² What limited internal democracy existed in the workplace and in unions was diminished in favor of centralized control over the rank and file by labor leaders.

Nonetheless, despite this centralized command structure, the rank and file throughout the war continued to participate in wildcat strikes, indicating workers were still very concerned over working conditions. In spite of the ever-growing labor anti-Communism, the rank and file staged many strikes until the end of WWII, and sought to preserve in the workplace, especially on the shop floor, the autonomy of stewards and committee people to resist management initiatives to speed up production. It wasn't until the end of the war that labor felt the full force of labor anti-Communism. The heyday of labor anti-Communism began in the postwar era as American capitalism experienced an economic upswing.

Labor anti-Communism created the postwar reproduction of capital's repressive policies. Through this form of anti-Communism, corporate America was employing covert and overt forms of labor repression, which would continue into the twenty-first century. The primary aim was consistent in terms of excluding labor from having a primary role in decision-making in the state and the economy. It has been, and continues to be, the institutional exclusion of labor over time that allows capital to monopolize decision-making, which in turn, justifies labor repression. During the postwar era, specific elements would coalesce, contributing to a political economy of labor repression.

By the end of WWII, labor unions, especially their leadership, had aligned themselves with the Democratic Party. This was one part of a two-part alliance, the second one being the compliance and support of labor's hierarchy with corporate America's goals.²³ In the process of forming this alliance, it was possible to initiate an accelerated restructuring of work relations, creating divisions among labor, which were prominent throughout the 1970s and the subsequent decades by the increased use of contingent, temporary and part-time workers. Rank and file labor in the latter part of the twentieth century would have very few options, mostly reacting to rollbacks and at best demanding wage and benefit increases.²⁴ From WWII into the 1980s, it was clear that

capitalists understood the necessity of limiting strikes. In the postwar era, the economy was in the process of shifting from wartime to peacetime production. During the war, labor had been included as a junior partner in wartime production. In peacetime, business owners sought to disentangle themselves from any cooperative agreements with organized labor. In the postwar era, anti-New Deal forces seized the opportunity during the postwar strike wave to diminish the role of labor leaders in policymaking. Business leaders were expressing concern over the CIO's ties to the Democratic Party. In spite of this concern, postwar labor organizations were divided over what should be the national goals for organized labor.

Even though the number of workers in unions had risen sharply from what it had been in the 1930s, the crucial question for labor was, where do we go from here? The powerful labor leader, Walter Reuther, believed the best labor could hope for was to further cement ties and collaborate with corporate America. Reuther and other labor leaders sought to prove their worth to business owners by ensuring the support of a disciplined labor force, free of radical influences. He collaborated with capital by negotiating wages and benefits with the understanding that in return, workers wouldn't strike. Labor unions also would concede to business owners increased control over the pace of work by reducing the role of the union shop steward. Labor's rank and file became dependent on centralized leadership of the union, as Reuther removed shop control from stewards. As Reuther and UAW officials negotiated with General Motors (GM), the company demanded and achieved the elimination of worker autonomy at the shop level. Reuther essentially agreed to class collaborate with the heads of GM by eliminating political demands in exchange for wage and price increases. Rank and file labor understood what was taking place at the macro-economic level; the economy was growing and workers believed they should expect wage increases during this postwar period of economic growth. As far as the Truman administration was concerned, the needs of capital should take precedent over labor's needs. Truman reacted to one of the first postwar strikes by steel workers by seizing control over the steel plants. The hostility he displayed to strikers sent a signal to Congress, which initiated anti-labor legislation. The tenuous and contradictory relation between unions and Communists was severed in favor of punitive labor anti-Communism.

The postwar strike wave and labor leaders' currying favor with business owners were essential preconditions launching the force of labor anti-Communism. Red-baiting and the public purges of identified Communists from labor unions solidified labor's collaboration with big business. The resulting top-down authoritarianism of labor's hierarchy convinced business owners that labor could be made to cooperate to serve corporate America's interests. Further evidence of this collaboration was the campaign against Communist-run or affiliated labor unions. Many of the most democratic and worker-run unions were eventually absorbed into mainstream unions or completely dismantled. Such was the situation when the US government intervened in the UE, the largest Communist union, to support the CIO's assault on it. What

mainstream labor leaders didn't anticipate was that once these unions were neutralized, policymakers could then turn their attention to the mainstream unions, seeking to prevent their growth by passing the Taft-Hartley Act, which, among other things, gave the government authority to tighten control over all labor organizations. A consistent theme of labor repression in the United States is that after the more progressive labor segments are targeted, efforts target mainstream labor organizations. Labor anti-Communism was an important ideological tool in achieving this goal, masking the underlying aim of capital to maintain the anti-democratic institutional exclusion of labor.

Labor's collaboration with capital through labor anti-Communism took a heavy toll on union membership. Other than appealing to a worker's interest in seeking better wages and benefits, labor unions abandoned what they had used in the past to recruit workers, namely that unions would help improve working conditions. Instead, in cooperating with corporate America to maximize profits, unions functioned to discipline workers and make them more productive. As a result, workers worked longer and harder. One can characterize what was taking place in the postwar era to organized labor as a form of self-induced repression. Mainstream labor leaders continued to delude themselves that the Democratic Party would serve their interests, but it became increasingly clear, especially starting in the late 1960s to the present, that both the Democratic and Republican parties were either indifferent or downright hostile to labor's interests. By the early 1970s, coinciding with economic decline, capital would abandon class alliance in favor of moving toward class conflict and the resulting acceleration of labor repression.

The historical continuity of labor repression is evident in its development from the late twentieth century into the twenty-first century. Common trends have occurred over time and new strategies have emerged to reshape the social conflicts between capital and labor. While institutional exclusion continues to be a common cause of, and precondition for, repressing labor, additional measures have been brought to bear in order to reproduce labor repression. Together with institutional exclusion, these measures have accelerated the downward spiral of organized labor.²⁵ In addition, the cyclical nature of American capitalism is an independent variable, which, from the 1970s, has been expressed as periodic sectional economic decline, which, in turn, has strengthened the qualitative exploitation of labor.²⁶ One cause in particular for the decline of the industrial base has been the renewed focus toward increasing profit margins and economic growth with finance capital. As finance capital realized there are profits to be made in the deindustrialization of the economy through downsizing and the export of capital, the social cost to labor became evident, from increasing unemployment to the loss of pensions and social services. It is with America's deindustrialization that the significance of labor's institutional exclusion can best be understood. With labor functioning at the mercy of business owners, who can shut down or transplant a company overseas, unions have grown painfully aware of the consequences of striking and became far more reluctant to utilize them.

Strikebreaking also has become a more refined art through the use of replacement labor. This was first illustrated with the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization and Caterpillar strikes. Business owners exploited the segmented labor force, which emerged as a cost-cutting measure and a means of exercising greater social control over workers. The political division of the workforce was functional also in depressing wages and benefits. This increased use and prevalence of segmented labor reflects a social division among the property-owning class, in which finance capital, supply-side economics and deregulation prevailed over class collaboration, the social welfare state and Keynesian economics. Given these events, the political folly of AFL-CIO business unionism became clear, underscoring how the Democratic and Republican parties relate to organized labor. AFL-CIO business unionism also made organized labor captive to the policies of a corporate state. While both parties clearly enact policies supportive of a capitalist economy, they view labor unions in two ways. Democrats seek to hold onto union votes while in office, but with a few exceptions, they act with disregard toward enacting pro-labor policies. While Democrats clearly represent the party of capital, they are also seeking to hold onto its captive labor constituency, Republicans, as the other party of capital, simply express clear hostility toward organized labor.²⁷ It would be some time before the AFL-CIO would attempt to become more independent from the Democratic Party. During George Meany's reign, the AFL-CIO's official policy was, according to his claim, "American labor never had it so good."

Yet, as the limits of economic growth were reached in the early 1970s, this association of labor's good fortune with economic growth ceased to be the case. With looming threats to capital accumulation on the horizon at the start of the 1970s, it was clear to the property-owning class that if growth were to continue, social welfare expenditures and labor costs both had to be cut. While labor repression was a consistent response by capital to the upward and downward movement of American capitalism, rank and file labor began pushing back against increased exploitation. Workers revolted against the hold that union leadership had on them, as wildcats and walkouts reappeared with limited success. Even though labor's hierarchy was becoming disillusioned with the Democratic Party, especially with the pro-capital and anti-labor policies of the Carter and Clinton administrations, there wasn't much they could do beyond verbal protests.

THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE RISE OF FINANCE CAPITAL

Labor leaders stood by as the Carter and Clinton administrations embraced finance capital. Once in office, Reagan and his administration built upon the pro-capital policies of the Carter administration, which itself had been backing away from supporting New Deal social welfare expenditures, accepting those that were more pro-capital. The Reagan administration stepped up its rhetoric

of government as the enemy in order to further destabilize the small social welfare state and shift government expenditures to support greater capital accumulation.

When lawyer and future Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell wrote his memo, calling for a more aggressive corporate agenda and pushing back against social movements and the social welfare state, it was finance capital that benefited. Within labor's hierarchy, even its leaders realized that finance capital's rise came with more aggressive policies against labor. The Meany-Kirkland option of a collaborative and streamlined AFL-CIO proved ineffective as a means of preventing the decline and rollback of labor gains. One response was the rise of John Sweeney as a leader in the AFL-CIO, as an effort to change course. Sweeney, to his credit, attempted to broaden the organization's social base, reaching out to students, intellectuals and minorities and attempting to step up organizing efforts. Like his predecessors, he still believed that labor had to collaborate with capital. This "business unionism" with its top-down management approach limited strikes to bread and butter issues. It also generated infighting within the AFL-CIO between those who supported centralization of authority versus those who supported the more decentralized approach represented by the proposals of SEIU President Andy Stern and UAW President Ron Gettelfinger, who advocated creating larger locals and less centralization while still accepting business unionism and collaboration with capital.

These approaches in the long run didn't prevail and at best only offered unions potentially better wage and benefit packages. These reformers and the measures they advocated would not address the fundamental structural issues of the political divide, separating capital and labor. This kind of labor reformism failed to address the ongoing historical question: how can labor overcome its institutional exclusion from decision-making in the state and economy? Property owners would never willingly give up their monopoly of control over the institutional decision-making process. Most of all, the social divide of capital over labor is recreated within the context of a capitalist economy in which profit maximization is equated with labor repression. Whether political elites are Democrats or Republicans, they fully understand that they function within the state to serve capital's interests and the reproduction of a capitalist economy.

While union leaders were streamlining and reforming unions' day-to-day operations in the early 1990s in the hope of enacting basic reforms, the Clinton administration was, behind the scenes, further cementing its ties to finance capital. Clinton was assisting finance capital through the deregulation of banking, supporting the passage of NAFTA, decreasing government spending, shrinking the social welfare state, including the elimination of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, as well as cuts to Medicare and Medicaid. Meanwhile, union membership continued its decline and with it came increased income inequality. While finance capital was reaping record profits, labor time increased among blue and white-collar workers, a sign that exploitation was increasing. The overworked American is a fact of life as the technical means of exploiting

labor has accelerated through the introduction of various technologies at the workplace. Mass surveillance has been employed to monitor workers and ensure that their work pace speeds up. Temporary and contingent workers are another important feature, characteristic of a disposable workforce, exploited for profit maximization.

By the latter part of the twentieth century, capital had achieved a time-honored goal to increase worktime as it has moved from a 40-hour week toward a 60-hour week, with corresponding labor repression as illustrated by the Wal-Mart model of cheap labor in a non-union shop with no benefits. Wal-Mart demonstrates an authoritarian workplace where workers are under constant surveillance, especially those who might harbor pro-union sentiments. Finance capital and the labor repression that came with it culminated in the stock market crash of 2008. It was not just the result of deregulated capitalism, but was, as it had been in the 1920s the product of capitalism that sought profit maximization at any social cost. Looking at the Bush and Obama administrations, one finds continuity of support for the aims of finance capitalism. Labor pays the ultimate social cost in its exploitation and declining standard of living. The preceding chain of events raises a question: is labor repression inevitable? If not, possible options exist within American capitalism.

THE FUTURE OF ORGANIZED LABOR

In moving from the past to the present, the limits of labor repression and possible options for the liberation of labor can be considered.²⁸ An assessment of the state of labor in the twenty-first century indicates that limitations in the oppression of labor have been reached. There appear to be structural limits on the extent to which capital can dominate labor. These limits are, in effect, the limits of American capitalism, diminishing the scope of labor repression. While social relations are market driven, not all social interactions are associated with the reproduction of capital. For example, there are geographic enclaves where interactions are not just market relations.²⁹ What provides breathing room for non-market, non-profit-driven interactions result from the cyclical nature of American capitalism; whether or not it is on an upswing or downswing, alternatives to capital accumulation appear. The existence of these non-capital enclaves creates possibilities to liberate labor.

What are the possible options and how can they lead to labor's liberation from capital's dictates? The burden for developing a collective political consciousness focused on non-capitalist social interactions is on labor. In simple terms, labor would have to come to a collective understanding that capitalism cannot solve its inherent problems. A political economy of upward and downward movements in which reproduction of capital is based on the exploitation and repression of labor will continue as long as there is a capitalist economy. The ultimate goal for labor can be the formulation of a coherent, social strategy working to undermine and transform social relations as they currently exist in a capitalist economy. This social strategy has to take into account possible

short-term and long-term changes.³⁰ Given the increase in actions taken to oppress labor in recent decades, it is counterproductive for organized labor not to push back against the rollback of wages and benefits. Labor has to call into question corporate theft of workers' wages by such practices as making workers work off the clock, minimum wage and overtime violations, toward creating a political climate more conducive to protecting the acquired rights of labor. The issue of income and class inequality should be an essential component of labor's campaign to address class issues.

For these and other reasons, in order to succeed, labor must become more visible by increasing membership through organizing the segmented and non-union labor force. This should be part of a larger strategy to overcome existing social divisions in the labor force. Labor also should support quality of life issues, such as good schools, increased social services as well as the elimination of race and gender discrimination. This could put corporate America on the defensive and should be regarded as a means through which labor can call into question the corporate claim of a legitimate right of ownership. Labor can and should advocate on the state level for the rechartering of corporations. A greater challenge toward increasing union membership must go beyond the lip service paid by the Obama administration to the failed passage of the Employee Free Choice Act. Organized labor must be careful to avoid past mistakes made through its alliance with capital. Pure business unionism must be rejected. One of the biggest challenges for labor will be not only avoiding a counterproductive class alliance with capital, but it needs to know how to respond when capital engages in class conflict, for example, the current corporate campaign to disorganize workers and prevent the formation of new labor unions. This struggle is all the more complicated given recent Supreme Court decisions, such as *Citizens United*. With the buying of politicians, labor has always been at a serious disadvantage in shaping public policy. Labor in the 1990s flirted with the idea of forming a labor party. Such efforts have failed, leaving the AFL-CIO confined to reformist electoral politics. Political and economic elites have been very effective in absorbing progressive demands, limiting the impact on labor.

Organized labor has yet to fully realize how the structural limitations of American capitalism offer possibilities to lessen labor oppression. The most recent financial crisis serves to illustrate the inherent limits capitalism reaches in seeking to accumulate capital. Built-in barriers to accumulation generate an economic crisis and expose the inherent weaknesses of a capitalist economy. To compensate, capital wages campaigns, stepping up labor exploitation. Looking at the current state of capital and labor in the early twenty-first century, there are other indicators of built-in problems associated with the functioning of American capitalism: scarce investment resources, uneven geographic development and underconsumption to name a few. As American capitalism continues to engage in creative destruction, it creates opportunities for alternatives to develop. This could include workplace models not driven by profit and labor

exploitation. One significant enclave existing within American capitalism are the many people involved in cooperative and credit-union arrangements. Some of these worker cooperatives have formed alliances with labor unions.

Although at this time they are limited in scope, there is room for the growth of producer cooperatives through which labor forges ties with, and moves toward, a concept of a worker-owned company. One of the best examples is the United Steelworkers Union agreement to align and work with Mondragon Capital Internacional, the largest worker-owned business in Spain. Labor would have to, over time, develop a more comprehensive strategy toward acquiring ever-greater control over economic resources to develop a workplace in which labor takes over control from capital. This would have to include some form of a nationalization of banking. Presently, economic elites do not consider non-profits and worker-run enterprises a threat. The challenge is to further develop these models upward from the local to the state level. With sufficient political will, labor can expand these companies by a takeover of plants abandoned due to the export of capital overseas. Much has been written about building worker-run businesses linking production and consumption in the form of consumer councils. On a smaller scale, there exist community developed corporations, which support the needs of communities on a not-for-profit basis. It is very common in many states and for local government to make use of some form of social ownership, such as public utilities. The key to ending labor repression must be associated with social ownership. In so doing, economic democracy would serve as the basis to lead toward political democracy.³¹ However, the fundamental question remains: to what extent can the ongoing economic crisis of capitalism and the existing enclaves of non-capitalist alternatives provide labor the means to overcome institutional exclusion and eventually end labor repression?

NOTES

1. Even mainstream scholars of the Revolutionary era acknowledge the crucial role played by labor before and during the American Revolution: Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution* (New York: Norton and Co., 1991); Gordon Wood *The American Revolution* (New York: Modern Library, 2002); Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

Many progressive historians have depicted labor's role in the Revolution as essential: Ray Raphael, *A People's History of the American Revolution* (New York: The New Press, 2002); Woody Holton, *Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution* (New York: Wang and Hill, 2007); R. B. Bernstein, *The Founding Fathers Reconsidered* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

2. Institutional exclusion of labor from the state is illustrated in the structural shift from the Articles of Confederation to the US Constitution. The implications of this shift are explained in Robert A. McGuire *To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) and David Brian Robertson, *The Original*

- Compromise: What the Framers were Really Thinking* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) Max M. Edling, *A Revolution In Favor of Government: Origins of the US Constitution and the Making of the American State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
3. The questions of who had control over the economy and what were the economic goals after the American Revolution are discussed in John Ashworth, *Slavery, Capitalism and Politics in the Antebellum Republic* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992); Joyce Appleby, *Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s* (New York: NYU Press, 1984); Ernest L. Bogart and Donald Kemmerer, *Economic History of the American People* (New York: Longans, Green and Co. 1947); Michael Lind, *Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States* (New York: Harper Collins, 2012); Curtis Mettels, *The Emergence of a National Economy (1775–1815)* (New York: ME Sharpe, 1962). The impact of industrialization and the formation of the working class with the resulting conflict between capital and labor appears in Bruce Laurie's *Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth Century America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997) and Mark Lause's *Free Labor: The Civil War and the Making of an American Working Class* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2015).
 4. The role of law in both institutional exclusion and labor repression can be understood in relation to how it mediates the functions of the state and economy. The idea appears in Jeffrey D. Clements, *Corporations are not People* (San Francisco, Bennett-Koebler Publishers, 2012); William E. Forbath, *Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Lawrence Friedman, *A History of American Law* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1973); Morton J. Horowitz, *The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); John Lauritz Larson, *The Market Revolution in America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). This idea of law that developed to create and enforce institutional exclusion of labor is a theme in Christopher Tomlins' *Law, Labor and Ideology in the Early Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). The impact of law on organized labor was used to limit labor unrest and tied labor unions to the state; this occurred during industrialization and the formation of the social welfare state as explained in Tomlins' *The State and the Unions: Labor Relations and the Organized Labor Movement in America 1880–1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980). To use law to enforce the monopoly of ownership by property owners is a theme in Daniel Ernst's *Lawyers Against Labor* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995).
 5. In considering labor exclusion and repression, it is important to take into account how labor responded to both. Over time, the consciousness of labor was at first a social consciousness, assuming the form of worker associations. When labor became more politically conscious, labor unions were formed as workers developed the understanding that their class interests were not the same as those of capital. Broad historical surveys and those that are more period-specific illustrate labor's limited options and divisions within organized labor when it confronted capital. The nine-volume set by Philip S. Foner, *History of the Labor Movement in the United States* (New York: International Publishers, 1994) details conflicts between capital and labor during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Labor's limited options are discussed in Mel Van Elteran's *Labor and the American Left* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co., 2011);

Victoria Hattam, *Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); John H. M. Laslett, *Labor and the Left: A Study of Socialist and Radical Influences in the American Labor Movement, 1881–1924* (New York: Basic Books, 1970); David Montgomery, *Citizen Worker: The Experience of Workers in the United States with Democracy and the Free Market During the 19th Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

6. Institutional exclusion and the resulting use of covert and overt repression had presented labor with two options: collaborate or exist in isolation without any means of shaping decision-making. The concept of a progressive labor movement excluded from the state appears in Patricia Coye's *The War on Labor and the Left* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).
7. The fate of radical labor in the latter part of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, including the wholesale oppression of the IWW and the Communists provide more examples of how institutional exclusion and repression limited mass-based economics and political democracy as discussed in Daniel Fusfeld's *The Rise and Repression of Radical Labor* (Chicago,: Charles Kerr Publishing, 1992). While Melvin Dubofsky's *We Shall Be All: A History of the IWW* (New York: Quadrangle Press, 1969), points to the IWW's shortcomings, it is also apparent that the organization's demise can be attributed to a mobilization of the US government's resources to wage an all-out offensive on the IWW as discussed in Eric Thomas Chester's *The Wobblies in their Heyday: the Rise and Destruction of the Industrial Workers of the World during the World War I Era* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2014). Although the IWW was targeted for such extensive repression, it survived to the present, but a shadow of its former self, as described in Fred Thompson and Patrick Murfin's *The IWW: Its First Seventy Years* (Chicago: Industrial Workers of the World, 1976). A pervasive labor anti-Communism is the ideology that justified the elimination of greater labor inclusion in decision-making, as explained in Robert Justin Goldstein's *Little Red Scare: Anti-Communism and Political Repression in the US, 1921–1946* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2014). This anti-Communism, which was, at times, virulent, is reminiscent of what Richard Hofstadter referred to as *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); it is also discussed in articles edited by Robert Cherny, William Issell and Kieran W. Taylor in *American Labor and the Cold War*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004) and appears in discussions of the red scare in the post-war period in Murray Levin's *Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity for Repression* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).
8. This was in the misinterpreted US Supreme Court decision of *US v. Santa Clara*.
9. The recurring labor repression in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries involved the structure of workplace relations between capital and labor in which capital, by virtue of ownership, enacted various forms of covert repression. They developed in relation to capital's goal to increase the rate of surplus value in order to maximize profit. In periods of economic transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism, the use of covert repression tends to increase. This tendency is described in Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy's *Monopoly Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966) and Harry Braverman's *Labor and Monopoly Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), which explains how the rate

of exploitation or covert repression increases as capital becomes more concentrated. Overt repression is built into the structure of the modern corporation expressed in terms of a political division of labor, as discussed in Edward Herman's *Corporate Control, Corporate Power* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). At the shop floor level, the covert repression assumes the form of a reorganization of the division of labor, a theme in Richard Edwards' *Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Basic Books, 1979). The workplace as a political battleground between capital and labor as well as labor's inherent syndicalist manifestations, is explained in Howard Kimeldorf's *Battling for American Labor: Wobblies, Craft Workers and the Making of the Union Movement* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999).

10. The corporate bureaucracy as a structural means to contain class struggle and oppress labor is a theme of Edward S. Herman's *Corporate Control, Corporate Power* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
11. The class collaboration of the AFL is an indication of labor's institutional exclusion. Victoria Hattin in *Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) traces the helplessness of organized labor when faced with capital's monopoly of control.
12. The scope and scale of labor repression in the 1920s has its roots in capital's class conscious response to the economic downturn of the early 1920s. A deradicalized labor movement that had been subjected to intense labor anti-Communism was another factor contributing labor's helplessness as explained in Irving Bernstein's *The Lean Years: The History of the American Worker* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2010).
13. The most striking example of the limits of labor repression in the twentieth century emerges during the economic downturn of the Great Depression. What declined during the Depression was the consistent use of overt repression. Covert repression, while still in place, had declined, due in part to the formation of the social welfare state, which allowed for the inclusion of labor as a junior partner in decision-making. These shifts are discussed in Irving Bernstein's *The Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker 1933–1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Rhonda Levine's *Class Struggle and the New Deal* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1988); David Milton's *The Politics of US Labor: From the Great Depression to the New Deal* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982) and Steve Fraser and Gay Gerstle (eds) in *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order 1930–1980* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). The continuity and pattern of labor's revolts against capital is examined in Samuel Yellen's *American Labor Struggles, 1877–1934* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974). It is significant that labor unrest not only impacted the development of the social welfare state, it also put in place a minimum of basic legal rights established during the New Deal as explained in Staughton Lynd and Daniel Gross's *Labor Law and the Rank and File* (Oakland, CA: Oakland Press 2011). Even though the New Deal measures were intended to generate class collaboration, capital and labor were often in conflict, as capital employed repression against labor, described in John Newsinger's *Fighting Back: The American Working Class in the 1930s* (London: Bookmarks Publications, 2012). Capital understood its maintenance of a monopoly of control over the state and

the economy involved organizing to push back and defeat labor: demands for greater inclusion are discussed in *Against Labor: How US Employers Organized to Defeat Union Activism*, eds. Rosemary Feurer and Chad Pearson (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2017) and Chad Pearson's *Reform or Repression: Organizing America's Anti-Union Movement* (Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).

14. Most important was the reappearance and increased presence of radical labor, as demonstrated by the rise of the CIO and the Communists as separate forces and also working interdependently, as discussed in Harvey Klehr's *The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Roger Keeran's *The Communist Party and the Auto Workers Union* (New York: International Publishers, 1980); Harvey Levenstein's *Communism, Anti-Communism and the CIO* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981); Judith Stepan-Norris and Maurice Zeitlin's *Left Out: Reds and America's Industrial Unions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and Fraser Ottanelli's *The Communist Party in the United States: From the Depression to World War II* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1991).
15. The role of the Communists in forming the CIO is examined in Bert Cochran's *Labor and Communism: The Conflict That Shaped Labor Unions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
16. The reappearance of labor anti-Communism was a pushback by sections of capital opposed to a class alliance concept put forth by the Roosevelt administration. The roots of this return to labor anti-Communism is associated with the inability of the state to fully address the crisis of US capitalism, as elaborated in Robert Goldstein's *Little Red Scares: Anti-Communism and Political Repression in the US 1921–1926* (London: Routledge, 2014) as well as in David Caute's *The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978). Prior to the more fully developed labor anti-Communism of the forties and fifties, labor unrest especially the "little steel" strike was intended to expand the presence of labor unions in the steel industry. Capital then began to establish a strategy as to how to deal with mass strikes. The defeat of labor in this strike made its leaders more willing to collaborate through "business unionism," as explained in *The Last Great Strike: Little Steel, the CIO and the Struggle for Labor Rights in New Deal America* by Ahmed White (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016).
17. In keeping with the leadership of mainstream labor, which continued to support the idea of class collaboration, labor anti-Communism linked the AFL and the CIO to capital's goal to oppress by creating a homogenized workforce. In *Communism, anti-Communism and the CIO*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), Levenstein traces this class collaboration between labor leaders and elite policymakers.
18. During WWII, the divisions among elites already manifested during the Depression between those in labor who favored class alliance versus those who favored class conflict had diminished over the need to win the war. Class alliance was the state's policy toward labor. With the exception of John Lewis, sections of mainstream and radical labor accepted the legitimacy of capitalism. The Communist Party had worked to become more mainstream prior to and just as the United States entered the war, as discussed by Maurice Isserman's *Which Side Were You On? The American Communist Party During the Second World War* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1993).

19. Even though a class alliance had prevailed between mainstream labor leaders and elites, labor anti-Communists had continued to call it into question. The persistence of labor anti-Communism over the course of US history is a theme in M.J. Heale's *American Anti-Communism: Combatting the Enemy Within, 1830–1970* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990). In post-war America, this division and tension between capital support for class alliance versus capital support of class conflict increased. Prior to the rise of finance capital in the early 1980s, the class conflict segment would call into question class alliance expressed as the social welfare state. This development is traced in Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolfe's *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945–60* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994). Prior to the formation of a more fully developed welfare state, the US government had no legal obligations to provide social benefits to the masses as explained in Walter Trattner's *From Poor Law to Welfare State* (New York: Free Press, 1979) and Sidney Fine's *Laissez-Faire and the General Welfare State* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1966). As a class conflict model increases in scope and scale, labor anti-Communism contributes to the assault on the social welfare state as discussed in Patrick Renshaw's *American Labor and Consensus Capitalism, 1935–90* (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1991).
20. The wartime strike waves, which intensified from labor's rank and file added to the idea of labor anti-Communists that strikes were Communist-led and inspired. Harvey Levenstein discusses this in *Communism, anti-Communism and the CIO* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981).
21. The alignment of AFL and CIO leadership with labor anti-Communists prevented a more progressive labor movement, as discussed in Stanley Aronowitz's *The Death and Life of American Labor* (New York: Verso Press, 2014) and his earlier *False Promises: The Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992).
22. The co-optation of the leadership of organized labor increased labor repression. Labor leaders became the enforcers of collective bargaining as a legal means to limit progressive demands from the rank and file.
23. There were two aspects of this process: the reorganization of the workplace and greater political division of labor in the workplace and capital's divide-and-conquer strategy toward labor. New labor categories, such as contingent and temporary workers, were created and expanded, as described in Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone's *Corporate Restructuring and the Polarizing of America* (New York: Basic Books, 1988) and Steven Greenhouse's *The Big Squeeze: Tough Times for American Workers* (New York: Anchor Books, 2009).
24. There are various forms of strike-breaking. The more crude examples expressed as overt repression from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are explained in Jeremy Brecher's *Strike!* (Boston: South End Press, 1997). More subtle and covert forms of strike-breaking involved the simple replacement of striking workers as described in Jake Rosenfeld's *What Unions No Longer Do* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).
25. The downward spiral of American labor in the 1970s coincides with the acceleration of labor repression. In part, this increased repression is the result of organized labor's leadership embracing corporate capitalism and its association with the Democratic Party. The contradictions inherent in a capitalist economy between accumulation and legitimation, in which the state promotes

conditions for accumulation while expending resources to legitimize the market is explored in the argument made by James O'Connor's *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2012). To legitimize requires increased social expenditures, especially in tough times. The fiscal crisis is, in effect, a social crisis, in part alleviated by increased labor repression.

As capitalists seek new means with which to accumulate capital, the exploitation of the working class is stepped up. This is explained in detail in Barry C. Lynn's *Cornered: the New Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics of Destruction* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2010) and Matt Taibbi's *The Divide: American Injustice in the age of the Wealth Gap* (New York: Spiegel and Grau, 2014).

26. From the 1980s to the present, labor repression has had its roots in a shift in emphasis by political and economic elites to finance capitalism. This shift is explained in detail by Greta Krippner's *Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance Capital* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). The social effect on labor amounts to a significant decrease in social welfare spending as well as an increase in economic policies that further favor an upward redistribution of wealth. This political focus was adopted by Democratic and Republican administrations, both of which had clear ties to finance capital, as illustrated in detail in Nomi Prins' *All the President's Bankers* (New York: Nation Books, 2014). The pivotal role assumed by finance capital in the repression of labor coincided with the rise of finance capital, as shown in David Kotz's *The Rise and Fall of Neoliberal Capital* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2015) and Rana Foroohar's *The Rise of Finance and the Fall of American Business* (New York: Crown, 2016). The devastating impact of finance capital is laid bare especially in social services in Kim Phillips-Fein's *Fear City: New York's Fiscal Crisis and the Rise of Austerity Politics* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2017).

As labor unions, union membership and the social welfare state declined, the economic climate became supportive of the Wal-Mart workplace model with its top-down authoritarian organization of work as explained in *Wal-Mart: the Face of Twenty-first Century Capitalism*, (New York: New Press, 2006) edited by Nelson Lichtenstein. The Wal-Mart business model represents an advance over business unionism. The role of business unionism set the stage for the Wal-Mart model. See Kim Moody's *An Injury to All: the Decline of American Unions* (New York: Verso Press, 1993), which traces business unionism from 1945.

27. While both political parties represent the overall interests of corporate America, the Democratic Party had been willing to support managerial capitalism in the form of a social welfare state. This liberal corporatism was opposed by the conservative and reactionary policies of the Republican Party. Elaboration of this division appears in Kim Phillips-Fein's *Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009) and Nelson Lichtenstein and Elizabeth Tandy Schermer's *The Right and Labor in America* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).
28. The inherent structural limits and the overall inability of American capitalism to effectively resolve the problems of production and consumption continue to offer possible historical opportunities for labor to challenge its exploitation and repression. The ongoing crisis of capitalism is the theme in David Harvey's *The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis of Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

29. The idea of non-capitalist social enclaves has been an aspect of the history of American capitalism, in the following: John Curl's *For All the People: Uncovering the Hidden History of Cooperation, Cooperative Movements and Communalism in America* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2009) and Wilson Carey McWilliams' *The Idea of Fraternity in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
30. The idea of various kinds of non-reformist reforms should be a goal of progressive labor. Some of these reforms are presented in Micheal Yates' *Why Unions Matter* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009) and Thomas Geoghegan's *Only One Thing Can Save Us: Why America Needs a New Kind of Labor Movement* (New York: New Press, 2014). The challenges and possibilities confronting American labor is discussed in Tamara Draut's *Sleeping Giant: How the New Working Class Will Transform America* (New York: Doubleday, 2016). Alternatives for labor moving forward are a theme in Staughton Lynd's *Solidarity Unionism: Rebuilding the Labor Movement from Below* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2015) and Kim Moody's *In Solidarity: Essays on Working Class Organization in the United States* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014).
31. To end the historical repression of labor amounts to the development of economic democracy centered on worker-run and controlled workplaces. Social ownership of business exists in various forms; examples are described in details in Michael Albert's *Moving Forward: Program for a Participatory Economy* (San Francisco: AK Press, 2000; Robin Hahnel's *Of the People, By the People: The Case for a Participatory Economy* (New York: AK Press, 2012); Hahnel and Erik Olin Wright's *Alternatives to Capitalism: proposals for a Democratic Economy* (Kindle edition, 2014) and David Schweickart's *After Capitalism* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011).

REFERENCES

- Appleby, Joyce. 1984. *Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Aronowitz, Stanley. 2014. *The Death and Life of American Labor*. New York, NY: Verso.
- Ashworth, John. 1995. *Slavery, Capitalism and Politics in the Antebellum Republic. Volume 1: Commerce and Compromise, 1820–1850*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Bailyn, Bernard. 1992. *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bernstein, R.B. 2009. *The Founding Fathers Reconsidered*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Bernstein, Irving. 2010. *The Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933–1940*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Bluestone, Barry, and Bennett Harrison. 1982. *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment and the Dismantling of Basic Industry*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Bogart, L. Ernst, and Donald Kemmerer. 1947. *Economic History of the American People*. New York, NY: Longmans, Green and Co.
- Braverman, Harry. 1974. *Labor and Monopoly Capital*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.

- Brecher, Jeremy. 1997. *Strike!* Boston: South End Press.
- Caute, David. 1978. *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
- Chester, Thomas. 2014. *The Wobblies in Their Heyday: The Rise and Destruction of the Industrial Workers of the World During the World War I Era*. Santa Barbara, CA: Levellers Press.
- Clements, D. Jeffrey. 2012. *Corporations Are Not People*. San Francisco: Berret-Koebler Publishers.
- Cochran, Bert. 1977. *Labor and Communism: The Conflict that Shaped Labor Unions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Coye, Patricia. 1991. *The War on Labor and the Left*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Draut, Tamara. 2016. *Sleeping Giant: How America's New Working Class Will Transform America*. New York, NY: Doubleday Press.
- Dubofsky, Melvin. 1969. *We Shall Be All: A History of the IWW*. New York, NY: Quadrangle Press.
- Edling, M. Max. 2003. *A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the US Constitution and the Making of the American State*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Edwards, Richard. 1979. *Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Elteren, Van Mel. 2011. *Labor and the American Left*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co.
- Feurer, Rosemary, and Chad Pearson, eds. 2017. *Against Labor: How US Employers Organized to Defeat Union Activism*. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Fine, Sidney. 1966. *Laissez-Faire and the General Welfare State*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Foner, S. Philip. 1994. *History of the Labor Movement in the United States, vols. I–X*. New York, NY: International Publishers.
- Forbath, E. William. 1991. *Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Foroohar, Rana. 2016. *The Rise of Finance and the Fall of American Business*. New York, NY: Crown.
- Friedman, Lawrence. 1973. *A History of American Law*. New York, NY: Touchstone Books.
- Geoghegan, Thomas. 2014. *Only One Thing Can Save Us: Why America Needs a New Kind of Labor Movement*. New York, NY: The New Press.
- Goldstein, Justin Robert, ed. 2014. *Little Red Scare: Anti-Communism and Political Repression in the US, 1921–1946*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
- Greenhouse, Steven. 2009. *The Big Squeeze: Tough Times for the American Worker*. New York, NY: Anchor Books.
- Harvey, David. 2011. *The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis of Capitalism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Hattan, Victoria. 1993. *Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Heale, M.J. 1990. *American Anti-Communism: Combatting the Enemy Within, 1830–1970*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hermion, S. Edward. 1981. *Corporate Control, Corporate Power*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Hofstadter, Richard. 1996. *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Horowitz, Morton J. 1992. *The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Isserman, Maurice. 1993. *The American Communist Party During the Second World War*. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Keeran, Roger. 1980. *The Communist Party and the Auto Workers' Union*. New York, NY: International Publishers.
- Kimeldorf, Howard. 1999. *Battling for American Labor: Wobblies, Craft Workers and the Making of the Union Movement*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Klehr, Harvey. 1984. *The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Kotz, Daniel. 2015. *The Rise and Fall of Neoliberal Capital*. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Krippner, Greta. 2011. *Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Larson, John Lauritz. 2010. *The Market Revolution in America*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Laslett, H.M. John. 1970. *Labor and the Left: A Study of Socialist and Radical Influences in the American Labor Movement, 1881–1924*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Laurie, Bruce. 1997. *Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth Century America*. New York, NY: Hill and Wang.
- Lause, Mark. 2015. *Free Labor: The Civil War and the Making of an American Working Class*. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Levenstein, Harvey A. 1981. *Communism, Anti-Communism and the CIO*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Levin, Murray. 1971. *Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity for Repression*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Lind, Michael. 2012. *Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States*. New York, NY: Harper Collins.
- Lynd, Staughton. 2015. *Solidarity Unionism: Rebuilding the Labor Movement from Below*. Oakland, CA: PM Press.
- Lynn, C. Barry. 2010. *Cornered: The New Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics of Destruction*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.
- Maier, Pauline. 1991. *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776*. New York, NY: Norton and Co.
- McGuire, Robert A. 2003. *To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Millon, David. 1982. *The Politics of US Labor: From the Great Depression to the New Deal*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
- Montgomery, David. 1993. *Citizen Worker: The Experience of Workers in the United States with Democracy and the Free Market During the Nineteenth Century*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Moody, Kim. 1993. *An Injury to All: The Decline of American Unions*. New York, NY: Verso Press.
- Newsinger, John. 2012. *Fighting Back: The American Working Class in the 1930s*. London: Bookmarks Publications.

- O'Connor, James. 2012. *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Ottanelli, Fraser. 1991. *The Communist Party in the United States: From the Depression to World War II*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Prins, Nomi. 2014. *All the President's Bankers*. New York: Nation Books.
- Renshaw, Patrick. 1991. *American Labor and Consensus Capitalism, 1935–90*. Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi.
- Rosenfeld, Jake. 2014. *What Unions No Longer Do*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schweickart, David. 2011. *After Capitalism*. New York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Tomlins, Christopher. 1993. *Law, Labor and Ideology in the Early Republic*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Trattner, Walter. 1979. *From Poor Law to Welfare State*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- White, Ahmed. 2016. *The Last Great Strike: Little Steel, the CIO and the Struggle for Labor Rights in New Deal America*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
- Wright, Erik Olin. 2014. *Alternatives to Capitalism: Proposals for a Democratic Economy*. Brooklyn, NY: Verso. Kindle edition.
- Yates, Michael. 2009. *Why Unions Matter*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.



Decade of Turbulence: Social Movements and Rebellion in the 1960s

Alan J. Spector

The 1960s is seen as a decade of great turbulence in the United States and globally and in fact, it was an unusually rebellious decade, particularly in the United States, Western Europe, and China. However, two caveats are in order. First of all, historical change is not neatly divided into tight ten-year packages with specific beginnings and ends. Certainly in the United States, and much of Europe, the 1960s arguably started with the election of President John F. Kennedy in late 1960 and includes the first few years of the 1970s as well.

Every change has a history, and it is impossible to separate the historical buildup of forces from the particular turning points that qualitatively changed aspects of the social order. This history must be understood as well as analyzed as to what it was that caused these turning points to happen, to gain momentum, and to be sustained for a period of time.

In the United States during the 1960s, there were a number of important movements that interacted with and influenced one another. More than just an intersection of disparate interest groups, their discontents arose from the same roots, branched out and then further intertwined and saturated each other. All of these movements had elements that reached out for broader unity, and all of them also had elements which narrowly defined their goals, whether simply higher wages, Identity Politics, isolationist forms of environmentalism, or self-absorbed cultural rebellion.

There certainly was continuity between the rebellious 1920s and 1930s (mainly centered around unionization and unemployment and often led by socialists and communists) and the 1960s. Some activists in the 1930s were still

A. J. Spector (✉)

Department of Behavioral Sciences, Purdue University Northwest,
Hammond, IN, USA

© The Author(s) 2019

B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements,
Revolution, and Social Transformation*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_7

active in the 1960s and often influenced some of these movements. A few of these organizations persisted through the 1950s. Particularly important, many of the early leaders of the 1960s movement were the children of parents who had been active in the movement in the 1930s.¹ However, there was something very different about the movements that emerged in the 1960s—alienation from the prevailing system and the promise of a new, just world order. Revolutionary upsurges do not simply happen because of deprivation and misery. That can lead to spontaneous rebellion; it can also lead to despair, demoralization, passivity and escapism. There must also be some sense of optimism—that the rebellion might accomplish something.²

BACKGROUND TO THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF THE 1960s

The postwar decade of the 1950s was a time of prosperity in North America, Europe, and other parts of the world. Often, after a war, the economy goes into a slump as soldiers return home looking for work, and this is compounded by the cutting back of war production. Unemployment often surges. World War II, however, destroyed so many lives and so much property that there was now room for the economy to expand. Over 400,000 in the US military were killed and many more seriously injured. That helped ameliorate the problem of returning soldiers needing jobs. War also opens up new “markets” in the form of rebuilding what is needed. This is why some say war is good for the economy. It is built on the ruins of massive amounts of property and human lives, but this economic calamity does allow for many of the survivors to experience a period of economic growth. Thus, in the postwar period the economic gains both in the surge in production and the international expansion of US business gave the US corporations more flexibility in meeting the economic demands of the working class so as to avert the kind of massive strike waves of the 1930s. But if the 1960s were so tumultuous, what was it about the 1950s that planted some of the seeds?

When many people think of the turbulent 1960s, the two decisive movements that come to mind are the Student Antiwar Movement and the Civil Rights/Black Liberation Movement. While they were arguably the most well-known, in fact there were *five* major movements that emerged in the United States in the 1960s. The term “New Left” is often applied to these movements, although the insurgent labor movement and much of the women’s rights movement, both of which played important roles, were not explicitly anti-capitalist. There were explicitly or implicitly anti-capitalist forces within the New Left, but they were not extensions of the socialist and communist movements of the early twentieth century. They were influenced by them to some degree, but they tended to manifest strong anti-authoritarianism combined with a youthful exuberance that challenged and sometimes dismayed the more disciplined strategy and tactics of the “Old Left.”

These movements often had interests which overlapped and sometimes had members and leaders who overlapped and were generally supportive of each

other. All of these movements reflected the tension between rising expectations and blocked goals. The five movements were the Civil Rights/Black Liberation movement; the anti-Vietnam War/Peace movement; the labor movement; the women's rights movement; and a somewhat amorphous counter-cultural movement that critiqued the banal commodification of culture and human relationships. All these movements were simmering for decades.³ Why did they erupt in the 1960s?

THE CIVIL RIGHTS/BLACK LIBERATION MOVEMENT

The driving force that ignited the other movements was the Civil Rights movement. There were a number of reasons for this. The movement for racial equality ultimately flowed from the abolitionist movement of the 1800s. In the 1920s repression of the black population became especially severe in the South and the massive industrialization in the North provided jobs and, after much struggle, labor unions. Many of the labor unions had racially discriminatory policies and there was segregation in housing and schools, but putting black and white workers side-by-side in factories and coal mines often in struggle against the companies provided some breakdown of the intense racism. World War II had a very important impact as well. Black and white soldiers fought side-by-side. Moreover, anti-Nazi propaganda often emphasized the racist nature of Nazi ideology and policies. When the soldiers came home, many of the black soldiers wondered why they could fight and die against the Nazis and Japanese but could not use the public library or the drinking fountain. Even the G. I. Bill and other aid to veterans often discriminated against black veterans.

By the early 1950s, a major section of the US corporate capitalist class and their allies in government began to consider more seriously the costs of such intense discrimination. This was also impacted by the ways that the socialist USSR was looking for allies in Africa and using the racially discriminatory policies of the United States as a way to try to win over the loyalty of Africans. It was the confluence of these factors, but especially led by the economic boom of the 1950s, that gave hope to black Americans that they could win better conditions. That hope in turn provided more motivation and energy to keep on pushing for more equal rights. Because the US corporate capitalist class was reaping such huge profits, they were willing, with some resistance, to accede to some of the political demands in the interest of social and political stability. Economically, the postwar boom lifted hundreds of thousands of black families into the unionized, relatively higher-paying industrial working class. This combination of economic gain and political concession gave many an optimistic hope that by organizing and pushing forward, they could realize the "American Dream." These political concessions against segregation emboldened the civil rights organizers, especially college age youth. The integration of Little Rock, Arkansas schools, the Montgomery bus boycott, and the struggle to integrate restaurants and shops and transportation systems were all underway before

JFK assumed the Presidency.⁴ His election provided more hope, although local organizers believed that the federal government was still too slow to act, and therefore they continued to press their demands. That was the surge that the Civil Rights Movement experienced as the 1960s took form.⁵

In 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. organized and led a massive march in Washington, D.C. This march energized hundreds of thousands of black people and anti-racist Latinos and whites and further gave momentum to the movement.⁶ Other national organizations that took non-violent approaches included the NAACP, CORE, and the Urban League. These tended to be less militant, more “middle class” and professional, and often had some infusion of corporate funds.

Parallel to the non-violent movement, more militant organizations developed. The Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was initially focused on voter registration, but moved more in the direction of militant direct action.⁷ The massive voter registration campaigns were often met with violence from local authorities in the South.⁸ And again, the question was raised: “We have so much hope in a fair and just America, so how can it be that registering people to vote is met with such government violence? And why is the federal government so slow to act?”⁹ The beatings and arrests of activists whose supposed crime was registering people to vote—hardly a radical demand—further caused many in the grassroots to come together in such a massive militant way. Once again the contrast between what was possible and what was the current reality became a flashpoint. The bombing of a church in Birmingham, Alabama, which resulted in the murder of four children, contradicted people’s vision of what “American Democracy” should be.¹⁰ The murder of civil rights organizers in Mississippi and the realization that the FBI was often spying on the civil rights organizers further fueled the distrust.¹¹

The Nation of Islam, informally referred to as Black Muslims, had been organizing for years, especially in prisons.¹² They were not connected to the Civil Rights Movement and mainly focused on building their membership. They were not an offshoot of any of the huge Muslim sects of the Middle East and Central-South Asia. They were one of the very few organizations that had an active “anti-white” ideology, although they would temper it occasionally. They had a large base of support among prisoners, ex-prisoners, and their families. Out of this movement came a very dedicated, very outspoken organizer—Malcolm X.¹³

Malcolm was a talented orator and rose within the organization to where he was perhaps its second most powerful leader. He began to have serious misgivings over what he saw as personal corruption on the part of various leaders. In March of 1964 he formally left the Nation of Islam and formed a new organization. Shortly after, he took a pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia. There he saw Muslims of many different nationalities—black, brown, white, blond hair, blue eyes—from all over the world. This experience led him to abandon the anti-white perspective he had had, and while he maintained a Black Nationalist stance, he absolutely rejected any theory that said that, in essence, white people

were “the enemy.”¹⁴ For the next 11 months, his popularity soared in the black community and among many white youth as well. He spoke all over the world, especially in Europe and throughout Africa and was widely respected as someone who was principled and militant but who eschewed the religious cult-like aspects of the Nation of Islam. In February of 1965, he was assassinated while giving a speech in Harlem. Several members of the Nation of Islam were convicted although many activists believe that the FBI also had a hand in this because J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI, had said that Malcolm was the most dangerous man in America, and because subsequent revelations of documents at the time demonstrate that the FBI infiltrated many organizations far more than was previously thought.¹⁵

THE URBAN REBELLIONS

The Civil Rights/Black Liberation Movement reached another qualitative stage in the summer of 1964. A protest in Harlem against the police killing of a 15-year-old black child turned into a confrontation and a large crowd fought back for three days and nights against the police and those businesses that were seen to be exploiting the neighborhood.¹⁶ While no specific demands were won, it gave many in the black community the hope that the powerful “machine” of the government and the police were not invulnerable. There were four other, smaller, rebellions in Rochester (NY), Dixmoor (IL), Paterson (NJ), and Philadelphia (PA). In 1965, the Watts neighborhood in South Central Los Angeles went up in rebellion, again as a result of a confrontation between the police and the community. It lasted six days with thirty-four deaths. Thirty-one of them were caused by the police; two of the dead were police officers and one was a fire fighter. Hundreds of buildings destroyed but no private homes were intentionally attacked or looted. Contrary to popular perception in the white community, it was not a focused attack on white people nor a generalized “madness.” There were some isolated incidents of white people pulled from cars, but that was not an important feature of the rebellion. It is estimated that 30,000 people participated actively or were on the streets during the rebellion although the media at the time stoked fears that it was an anti-white uprising.¹⁷ In 1967, an uprising in Newark, New Jersey left 26 dead and hundreds injured. Again, the inciting incident was sparked by the police arresting and badly beating a black driver. The media often tried to fan the flames of racial discord, asserting that these rebellions were a threat to white people; however, they also documented incidents of police killing unarmed civilians.

Later that summer, Detroit had arguably the most intense uprising. Once again, the rebellion was sparked by a police action forcibly closing an illegal bar which had been operating openly for months with the knowledge of the police.¹⁸ The uprising in Detroit was so widespread that two of the military’s top units, the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division were diverted from going to Vietnam and sent to Detroit. In the end, 43 people were killed,

again, almost all by the police, including a group murdered in cold blood in the Algiers Motel.¹⁹ Contrary to popular perception, the typical arrestee was not a young, unemployed criminally-inclined black male. The average age was about 26 and most were employed. The Detroit Rebellion, in particular, wrested significant concessions from major corporations and thousands of jobs were opened to black workers in the auto industry.

By the end of 1967, more than 150 more urban rebellions took place in the United States.²⁰ At this point, various movements, while not necessarily coordinated, were feeding off the energy of other movements as there was a growing realization that the government was vulnerable to change. By 1967 mass marches against the Vietnam War had begun and protests were a common occurrence on a variety of issues all over the United States. Black soldiers in Vietnam began to organize protests. The Long Binh stockade was burned by prisoners and during the war an estimated 250 officers were killed or wounded by their own men.²¹ In the first few years of the war, there were a disproportionate number of black troops, especially on front line combat missions. When many of them returned, they brought with them anger and toughness and entered into a country that was different from the one they left. When many returned, they often faced problems overcoming drug addictions—drug use was tolerated by many of the military brass—and difficulties finding employment.

In 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was murdered while addressing a group of striking workers in Tennessee. This was yet another tipping point in the radicalizing of many black people, especially youth. If King, the advocate of non-violence was killed by violence, what hope was there for peaceful change? Another wave of rebellions swept across the United States. As many as twenty thousand took to the streets in Washington, D.C.—some within two blocks of the White House.²² In Chicago, it took a combined force of twenty thousand police, National Guard and Army units. Eleven people were killed, five hundred injured and over two thousand arrested.²³ Police were particularly aggressive. In Baltimore, the Governor utilized five hundred local police, thousands of National Guard soldiers and five thousand paratroopers from the US military. When it was over, seven people were dead, over 400 injured, and 3000 were arrested. There were other significant rebellions in New York City, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Wilmington, Delaware, Trenton, Kansas City, and Louisville.

The impact of these rebellions goes far beyond the dozens of people killed. Many thousands witnessed firsthand the reactions of the police and military. In Detroit, for example, a young child was killed because someone said there was a sniper in a high rise and the police sprayed that area with rapid gunfire.²⁴ Many thousands had friends and relatives involved in these incidents and the news media, while generally taking the side of the authorities, nevertheless often showed video footage of the rebellions, bringing it into the homes of millions.

Other organizations developed as part of the movement. The Poor Peoples Campaign held a major protest in Washington, D.C. and the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) organized chapters and held takeovers of welfare offices; while not explicitly an organization of black women, it was clearly black women who were the major force in that movement.

Another important stream in the civil rights/black liberation movement was inside labor unions, especially in the auto industry but also in the steel industry and among hospital workers. In Detroit, the League of Revolutionary Black Workers and the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement were militant auto worker organizations that were led by black workers but gave leadership far beyond black workers. They led a number of important struggles, mainly around working conditions as well as against racist treatment by the companies.²⁵ In the steel industry, black workers were again the most militant, fighting against discriminatory practices as well as economic demands that benefited all workers. The massive 1970 strikes against General Motors and against the Post Office also had significant black leadership.²⁶

Flowing out of this activity and then feeding into it was the black student movement on campus. Numbers of black students took part in civil rights activities, especially with SNCC, and then returned to their campuses motivated to organize against racism. While the campus anti-war movement is seen as primarily consisting of white students, there was considerable protest activity on predominately black campuses as well.²⁷ Black college students at that time were mainly “baby boomers.” Many had parents that served in World War II and relatives that served in Korea and friends and family that were serving in Vietnam. Most were first generation college students, brought up on the somewhat increasingly affluent 1950s and filled with hope that a growing economy, a college education, and the passage of the Civil Rights Bill and other political victories would lead to a fulfillment of the promise of equality in America. They were hyper-aware of racist discrimination and determined to push back. One of the main arenas of struggle was opposing policies that excluded black students from admission to colleges. In some places it was overt. In others it was more convoluted—using standardized tests applied in an inflexible way. Years later the educators who designed the Scholastic Aptitude Test (“College Boards”) claimed that they had now modified the tests to eliminate cultural bias—effectively acknowledging that the tests had been culturally biased.²⁸ More important, lower income youth, who were disproportionately black, had less preparation for the test-taking experience and often had gone to high schools which did not prepare them adequately. The result was that black applicants who had the potential to do as well as other applicants were blocked. All of this simmering anger provoked more response from the black community. On a symbolic level, Muhammed Ali, the world champion boxer, refused to serve in Vietnam and two Olympic athletes raised their fists in solidarity with the black power movement at the 1968 Summer Olympics. Pop music icons Marvin Gaye and Stevie Wonder, among others, penned songs explicitly decrying racism.

On the grassroots level, the situation continued to intensify. In 1967 at Texas Southern University in Houston, a protest was organized against the city's policy of placing dangerous garbage dumps, which often included garbage-filled pools of water, in the predominately-black neighborhoods.²⁹ The students held a sit in at the dump where a child had drowned and a number were arrested. They then reorganized at a local church and when they attempted to return to campus, the police blocked them. The students resisted and bottles and rocks were thrown. Some students got back into the dorms where other students were staying, and barricaded the doors. There was a report of gunfire coming from the dormitory and the police then opened fire on the building, shooting out the windows with an estimated 3000–5000 rounds of ammunition while students lay huddled on the floor of their room, bullets whizzing over their heads. Five hundred students were arrested and eventually five students were charged with murder because one police officer died in the melee. One .22 caliber gun was found but eventually all charges were dropped because it could not be ascertained where the bullet came from.³⁰ One common assumption is that it came from one of the thousands of bullets ricocheting through the building.

Massive police or National Guard also took place at other predominantly black schools, including Central State University in Ohio, at Orangeburg, South Carolina, at South Carolina State University and at Jackson State in Georgia in 1970.³¹ There students had been protesting a bowling alley where the owner prohibited them from entering. The protesters left peacefully but there were subsequent protests. At one, the police began to randomly beat protesters, sending eight to the hospital. That night they started a bonfire on a lawn and when police and firefighters arrived, the students resisted. One officer was hit by a thrown object and the police opened fire on the whole crowd. Twenty seven students were injured. Most were shot in the back. Three males were killed; two students and one high school student who was nearby waiting for his mother to finish her shift at work.³² At Jackson State in Georgia, student confrontations with the police left two students dead.³³

Beyond these more violent confrontations, there were dozens of other protests against racist discrimination. From Brandeis in Boston to the University of Wisconsin to numerous other campuses, black students were pressing their demands. In many cases, large numbers of white and Latino students joined in the protests. Two of the most important were at San Francisco State College (now University) and City College (now University) of New York.³⁴ Both had their main focus around open admissions—opening up the universities to larger numbers of black and Latino students. College tuition costs were very low at those two schools, so excluding students of color meant that their families were paying taxes to support white students. San Francisco State had arguably the longest, most militant series of protests of any US college in the 1960s.³⁵ It lasted five months. Day after day, week after week hundreds and hundreds of students were arrested. The Third World Liberation Front was the umbrella

coalition, led mainly by the Black Students' Union with significant support from the Intercollegiate Chinese for Social Action, the Mexican American Student Confederation, the Philippine American Collegiate Endeavor, La Raza, the Native American Students Union, and later the Asian American Political Alliance.³⁶ The mostly white Students for a Democratic Society also played an important role as did the teachers' union. The demands included more admissions for minority students, more faculty of color and additions to the curriculum that focused on history and culture of people of color. The strike was precipitated by the firing of a popular black instructor and the Chair of the Black Studies program. Police brutality was common. When the strike was settled, the university acceded to many of the academic demands and the inclusion of more ethnic studies departments became more common at many universities. The opening up of admissions scored a partial victory with the university's agreement to admit an extra 120 EOP (economically or educationally disadvantaged) students into the next class.³⁷

The City College strike was similarly militant. At the time, the school, which was located in almost all black Harlem, was 92% white and only 2% black. It was ultimately successful in winning the demand that access to the school would be granted to anyone with a high school diploma. This resulted in a significant increase in the number of black and Latino students. A little discussed other consequence is that college was made available to many working class white students who otherwise would not have been able to attend.³⁸

This last point is especially important to understanding the pivotal role that the struggle against racism, generally led by the black working class, opened up opportunities to many non-black people as well. In particular cases, including the City College example, the concessions won by striking workers, and the role of rebellious black soldiers during the Vietnam War one can see how that struggle was also a force in other struggles. On a more fundamental level, however, the Civil Rights/Black Liberation Movement shifted the whole discussion about human rights and against discrimination. Organizations defending Latino and Asian people's rights developed. The Women's Liberation Movement against discrimination had a long history, but it too was given a boost by the climate created by the Civil Rights/Black Liberation Movement. Other smaller or more diffuse movements such as for Disability Rights, the rights of the elderly and consumer rights were all boosted by intense discussions about equal protection and discrimination. This point is key to understanding how racist discrimination in the United States (and in different forms in other countries) is at once embedded into the workings of capitalism and is also the Achilles Heel of discrimination as it provides the bases for seemingly disparate struggles to realize that what is needed to oppose repression is not simply one of cobbling together temporary coalitions, but rather understanding that the roots of these oppressions are organically connected.

THE CAMPUS ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

The campus anti-war movement evolved out of two distinctively different but somewhat connected movements of the 1950s and early 1960s. In the 1950s the major peace organization was the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, often called SANE. SANE was mainly a pacifist organization with strong influences from the American Friends Service Committee (Quakers) but also with input from socialists and communists. SANE organized protests in the community against nuclear testing, military draft and peace in general. The Civil Rights Movement, and especially SNCC, made inroads on a number of campuses as Freedom Summer volunteers returned to school.

The University of California at Berkeley had a long tradition of protests. There was a large protest at the Sheraton Palace hotel in opposition to hiring practices and other policies perceived as racially discriminatory. About four thousand people from the community were involved including many students.³⁹ In the fall of 1964 the University decided to enforce a regulation that said the only political groups that were permitted to raise funds on campus were the Democratic Party club and the Republican Party club. Organizers from the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) set up a table at the intersection of Bancroft and Telegraph streets in the middle of the campus on what was thought to be city property. They were raising money to support voter registration drives in the South. The university attempted to shut that down. The organizer, Jack Weinberg, refused to show his identification to the campus police, and when they tried to arrest him, as many as 3000 students surrounded the car for 32 hours.⁴⁰

On December 2, after weeks of open discussions on the steps of nearby Sproul Hall, the protesters entered Sproul Hall to pressure the university into negotiations. They were particularly upset because the university refused to drop the charges against four of the leaders. Thousands of students were involved and 1500 of them chose to occupy the building for one night. At 2 AM on December 4 the police surrounded the building and began to arrest those occupying it. Nearly 800 students were arrested. Most were released within a day, but many students were brutalized by the police during the protests, with photos of female students being dragged down the steps by their hair.⁴¹

It is important to understand the context of this action as well as its impact on the protest movement. From the point of view of students all over the United States, here was a situation where students in the North, in this case California, were being denied the right to peacefully raise money for voter registration drives in the South. Every week there were more photos of civil rights organizers being brutalized in the South. The Birmingham church bombing was in the summer of 1963, and in the summer of 1964 the discovery of the bodies of three civil rights organizers who were murdered by racists further intensified the anger and confusion.⁴² To many students who had optimism and faith in US democracy, it was puzzling and then enraging that even in California students

who were peacefully raising money to support voter registration were being attacked, arrested en masse, and beaten.

In 1964 there were a number of very small protests against the Vietnam conflict. In the summer President Johnson convinced Congress and the Senate to give him a blank check to take whatever actions were “necessary to protect American interests.” The hysteria was created on a false report that boats from communist North Vietnam fired on an American ship.⁴³ Actually, plans for a big troop buildup were already in place, but this falsified story helped build public support for what was thought to be a short military action—bombing the port in North Vietnam at which the boats from that alleged attack were supposedly stationed.⁴⁴ While there had been covert actions against North Vietnam, the United States did not publicly admit to military action against North Vietnam with the exception of this one set of bombings. However, the wording of the congressional mandate allowed the president to take any steps he deemed necessary.

On February 5, 1965, the United States commenced large-scale bombing of North Vietnam and a major troop buildup in South Vietnam.⁴⁵ To many on college campuses this was another shock to their belief that the future looked bright. The military began drafting young people but it is important to emphasize that college students were generally immune from being drafted for the first few years of the war, but nevertheless organized mass protests. It was much more than just students trying to protect themselves.

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was a relatively small organization that originally emerged out of the liberal Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID). Some SDS members had participated in the Freedom Summer events in the South and returned to college campuses around the United States more committed to working for social change. The Educational Research and Action Project (ERAP) was SDS’s main project.⁴⁶ Established in 1963, its purpose was to build an interracial movement of the poor. The most successful projects were in Newark, Chicago and Cleveland. Other projects were established in a few other places. This was a time when increased consciousness about poverty among white people in the midst of the relatively prosperous 1950s and early 1960s (as chronicled in the widely read book *Night Comes to the Cumberlands*) dovetailed with the Civil Rights Movement.⁴⁷ Organizers sought to build a unified movement through tenants’ unions, rent strikes and other forms of protest. These activities met with the approval of the parent organizations tied to the union movement. SDS also promoted the policy of “participatory democracy” to promote grassroots input into decisions in opposition to more centralized, top-down organizations. The core leadership and general tenor of SDS was of optimism and a fierce commitment to social justice.⁴⁸

When President Johnson ordered the expanded bombing of Vietnam and the beginnings of a massive troop buildup, anti-war sentiment began to grow. Anti-war organizations with names like the Committee to End the War in Vietnam, were organized on dozens of campuses, and protests involving thousands spread across the United States. SDS took the stand that if they were working on behalf of poor and oppressed people, it had a responsibility to oppose the war in Vietnam. Some of its original sponsors in the trade union movement were unhappy with this. That is not surprising because many of the top leaders of the US trade union movement had been working with the CIA and other government agencies to undermine social change movements in other countries.⁴⁹ Many of them were strong supporters of the Cold War. Nevertheless, SDS stood its ground and called for a nationwide demonstration in Washington, D.C. on April 15, 1965 to protest against the war in Vietnam.⁵⁰ The leadership was expecting perhaps a few thousand people to show up. Instead somewhere between 15,000 and 25,000, mainly students, poured into Washington, D.C.

This protest thrust SDS into the national spotlight as the leading campus-based national anti-war organization. There were soon hundreds of local organizations—for example, the Vietnam Bay Area Committee in California. A national organization, the Student Mobilization Committee (later the National Mobilization Committee) was focused on organizing large coalition demonstrations in Washington, D.C.⁵¹ Its approach was quite different from that of SDS which had a multi-issue approach seeking to link opposition to the war with other important social issues. SDS was also focused on being a membership organization with local chapters recruiting people to the organization from the grassroots rather than organizing mass demonstrations with union leaders and politicians who were beginning to turn against the war but who had often been complicit with other Cold War policies.

In spite of this, President Johnson ordered more and more troops to Vietnam. The numbers swelled from 25,000 advisers under Kennedy to 50,000 and then 100,000 and more.⁵² The fact that there was forced conscription (the draft) increased opposition to the war, but it would not be accurate to say that young people's opposition to the war was based mainly on personal, selfish fear. Students, after all, were safe from being drafted until 1969. Women were not drafted. But students, including women, were the mainstay of the early opposition to the war because it was seen as a matter of social justice rather than self-preservation.

One by one the patriotic, optimistic beliefs about American democracy were being contradicted by reality. The Civil Rights movement exposed how deep and widespread the undemocratic nature of racism in US society was manifested. Turning points in the anti-war movement which moved it from being a peace movement to a militant movement came from the repeated lies, often easily exposed, that came from US government officials: the public was told that the troop buildup would be small; they were told that it was communist soldiers that were killed by US bombings, even as newsreel footage on national

TV showed the bodies of so many hundreds of civilians including children who were being killed. In one case the US government issued a White Paper asserting that there was major involvement by Russian and Chinese military arming the rebels and used that as a justification for US involvement in the war.⁵³ But in the footnotes in that same paper it was stated that over 97% of the weapons captured from the rebels were made in the United States, and likely captured initially from US forces by the rebels. Successive government leaders in South Vietnam proved to be corrupt. In the first case the United States flew into South Vietnam a Roman Catholic politician, Diem, from New Jersey and announced to the South Vietnamese that he was their new leader.⁵⁴ South Vietnam at that point was about 85% Buddhist and Diem began cracking down on all types of protests while he and his family lined their pockets. He was assassinated, most likely by agents of the CIA, and there was a succession of various other appointed leaders all of whom were similarly corrupt.⁵⁵

What one heard again and again was “*What happened to the America I believed in?*” From the beatings of civil rights organizers to the slow response of the federal government to the assassination not just of John F. Kennedy, but of the presumed assassin the next day, while surrounded by police on national television and then the unexpected death of his assassin, to then a constant parade of shifting explanations, misstatements and outright fabrications about the war, a deep sense of betrayal swept through especially college youth who were at the stage of life when they wanted clear and truthful explanations. Along the way, a duly elected leader was overthrown in the Dominican Republic and the United States sent 25,000 troops there to keep the coup leaders in power.⁵⁶ The explanation was that they were protecting the country from Communists and the US government produced a list of 58 names alleged to be Communist organizers.⁵⁷ It was shortly exposed that most of those people had died or were government agents who had joined rebel groups in order to spy on them. It was more stretching of the truth; more disillusionment; more a sense of betrayal.

The national protests got bigger and bigger and campus protests also grew, opposing ROTC, recruitment by war profiteering companies such as Dow Chemical, and military recruiting on campus. Internationally, the youthful Cuban Revolution seemed to be different from the rigid USSR and that energized a section of the Left in the United States. In the summer of 1967, the death of Che Guevara turned some of that positive energy into the opposite. In the fall of 1967, perhaps 100,000 marched in New York City to oppose the war.⁵⁸ There were protests at major universities and at small colleges in remote towns. There was a march of 100,000 on the Pentagon, where police attacked many of the demonstrators.⁵⁹ This particular action was intertwined with various cultural rebels, including rock bands and beat generation writers and poets including Allen Ginsberg who claimed that their united energy could “levitate the Pentagon.” This aspect of the protest drew both support from some and scorn from others who saw it as a distraction that undermined the seriousness of the war.

The energy of the anti-war movement was also fed by the militant urban rebellions and anti-draft protests. Students were beaten and gassed in 1967 at the University of Wisconsin. At many protests, the police reacted violently to students whose only offense might mean a \$15 fine for trespass only to have arms broken and stitches in their heads as the police arrested them. Furthermore, the police often attacked bystanders, not differentiating them from the more militant protesters, and this also pushed more students toward a radical stance.

By late 1967, some in the government were having second thoughts, but the decision to send more troops to Vietnam prevailed and the war intensified. The Tet Offensive by the rebels in Vietnam resulted in hundreds of US soldiers killed in a short time and many more wounded. On March 31, President Johnson announced that he was not running for reelection and was pursuing peace talks with the National Liberation Front (NLF) and North Vietnamese to end the war.⁶⁰ This gave war opponents a big boost in morale. It seemed that their efforts were at least part of the reason for this concession. Again, the continuous oscillation between optimism and sense of betrayal was at work, this time toward optimism.

A few days later Martin Luther King, Jr., who was becoming more vocal in opposition to the Vietnam War, was assassinated while supporting strikers in Memphis—an example of how the different movements of the 1960s were beginning to energize each other and become more supportive of each other. Many cities went up in revolt. Just as the nation was trying to get its bearings from that, Robert Kennedy, a peace candidate and front runner for the Presidency, was assassinated in May. This further alienated young people from the notion that the United States was a bastion of hope and democracy.

In the spring of 1968, students at Columbia University took over a major building and hundreds were arrested, often violently. All this had a major impact on the student movement, as Columbia was one of the most prestigious universities in the United States. This action was also important because it included a demand that the university refrain from demolishing residential housing to build a new gymnasium, a demand in explicit support of the surrounding black community.

In May of 1968 student protests in Paris turned into a nationwide general strike of millions of workers demanding major changes in France and in China there was a movement that appeared to be pushing China toward a more revolutionary path to avoid becoming a more ossified bureaucracy as many viewed the USSR. Many young protesters in the United States saw these as further indications that the momentum of history was on their side.

Later in the summer of 1968, there was another turning point. The Democratic Party was holding its national convention in Chicago. There were thousands of protesters in Grant Park, alongside Lake Michigan, nowhere near the convention nor where they could shut down the city. As the evening turned to night, the police ordered the protesters to empty the park. Once again, the penalty for being in the park after closing was a small fine, but the police action to clear the park was extremely violent. Horses ran through the crowd,

protesters were badly beaten, the police beat passersby who had nothing to do with the protest. The cameras were filming and videos of the police action appeared on millions of television screens as the protesters chanted: "The Whole World is watching." Police then charged eight movement leaders with conspiracy, a felony, and the trial further exposed how unfair the system seemed to be. Stage by stage the disillusionment and alienation grew as optimism was continuously shattered.

The 1968–1969 school year saw many protests, including the militant one at San Francisco State and the takeover of Harvard University. In the summer of 1969, SDS split. Despite the fact that many SDS chapters were flourishing, the news media reported that SDS "was dead." This was a major blow against the positive momentum of the movement. The summer of 1969 also witnessed the Woodstock music festival, drawing hundreds of thousands. In the early 1960s there was considerable solidarity between the civil rights/anti-war protest groups on the one side, and the cultural rebels who were challenging the restrictive nature of US culture.⁶¹ By 1969, much of that unity continued but it was being eroded. Marijuana flooded college campuses and contrary to popular belief, it undermined political protest rather than intensifying it. Clouds of smoke wafted out of the windows of even conservative fraternities. The same could be said of Woodstock. It had a rebellious tone, much of it anti-war, but it was offering a playground, a diversion, a way to feel rebellious without challenging the power of capitalism, racism and war. In the fall of 1969 there was a massive mobilization against the war in Washington, D.C. By now, some sections of the capitalist class and various politicians were stepping up their opposition to the war.

The workers at General Electric, one of the largest US corporations, went on a national strike in 1969.⁶² While not directly an anti-war protest, they struck in spite of government officials' assertions that this would hurt the war effort. In a number of cities, students, especially from SDS, went to the picket lines to support the demands of the strike and discuss why the Vietnam War was against their interests. In many cases, the strikers greeted the students in a positive way and this provided more motivation for the anti-war movement.⁶³

The movement against the Vietnam War and racism gained momentum in December, 1969 when the US government announced a lottery for conscription into the US military. Young men were given random numbers and suddenly many young men who thought they could avoid combat found themselves facing jail or going to Vietnam. This not only affected the men, of course. Family members now had to deal with the stress of loved ones being sent to fight a war that week by week seemed more senseless. Then, in December two members of the Black Panther Party in Chicago were murdered in their beds during a police raid.⁶⁴ The police used the excuse that there were weapons in the house, but planned a surprise raid on their house in the middle of the night with guns blazing. Police spokesmen later appeared on television and acted out how they were dodging bullets from inside and had no choice but to shoot back. Later scientific analysis of the bullet holes by forensic experts and

physicists concluded that hundreds of bullets were fired by the police while either none, or possibly one, was fired from the residents.⁶⁵ Once again liberal illusions about the government were shattered for many young people.

In early 1970 there were a number of protests and in May, President Nixon ordered US ground troops into Cambodia and protests erupted on hundreds of US campuses. Many of the protests were militant but President Nixon inflamed the situation by calling the protesters “bums.” Massive numbers of police and National Guard were called out. At Kent State University in Ohio, National Guard fired on a mostly retreating crowd of unarmed students. Four were killed, others wounded.⁶⁶ Students were also shot at Ohio State University and other campuses. At Jackson State, eleven students were shot and two students died.⁶⁷ Then protests erupted on hundreds of other campuses, and some 536 campuses were shut down nationwide, many for the rest of the school term.⁶⁸ The killings at Kent State, followed by Jackson State had a devastating impact on the campus movement. While other incidents of police suppression often angered protesters entered deepening their commitment, the campus killings took it to a level of shock that stunned and terrified thousands of people. It was as if the tsunami of fear overwhelmed the campuses and while there was a burst of protests immediately following and there continued to be campus protests for some time, it was clear that this was a turning point.

While the anti-war movement continued for several years, there were a number of events that led to its decline as a national social movement. There were a number of factors external to the movement that were important. The continuous negotiations with the North Vietnamese gave the impression that perhaps the war would wind down (although the 1972 bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong provoked an upsurge in protest). Furthermore, the welcoming of President Nixon to China (based on common interests of opposing the Soviet Union) confused many on the Left; China was ostensibly the most revolutionary manifestation of the Left worldwide, and President Nixon could not speak in any city in the United States or Europe without a protest and yet here was the Chinese leadership welcoming him. Another external factor was the economic recession and tight job market that the activist students faced upon graduation. Additional factors included the resignation of President Nixon and Vice President Agnew, a peace candidate winning the Democratic Party nomination for president, and the granting of the vote to 18 year olds.⁶⁹ Among many there was a renewed hope that maybe the system could correct itself.

There were also internal factors that affected the development of the movement during this period, a central one of which was the inability of the mainly white student movement to make deep, lasting ties with black students, with workers in general, and especially the more militant black workers. There clearly was support for each other's movements but it did not deepen to the point where it became a solid unified movement. Identity politics, and in particular black nationalism, poses challenges to multiracial unity, but rather than seeking to build that unity, many white students backed away even though the potential

for unity was still there. It is, however, inaccurate to state that black nationalism was the main factor; the main responsibility lay and lies, with white students to continue to struggle against racist practices. So the movement on campus never was able to bridge the gap and carry that movement deep into the society at large, and without taking it to the level of becoming a broader based social movement, it gradually dissipated. Contrary to popular discourse, it is not as if the activists all became passive. Many thousands of them chose to not “go corporate” and instead chose careers where they could perform some kind of public service such as being teachers, social workers, working in universities or for non-profits of one kind or another and many continued to participate in the smaller issue-oriented movements that were still very common in the following decades.

THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT

There is a commonly held idea that the Women’s Rights Movement, or as it was called by many, the Women’s Liberation Movement, came to prominence in the 1970s rather than the 1960s. There certainly were many symbolic events and campaigns in the 1970s that involved large numbers of women and others concerned with women’s rights. There was a struggle for the Equal Rights Amendment, there were mass marches insisting on women’s rights to control their bodies, and symbolically there was the famous tennis match between Billie Jean King and Bobby Riggs, where she defeated him handily. The films “The China Syndrome” and especially “Norma Rae” (about a militant working-class woman) came out in the 1970s and helped make women’s rights issues more mainstream, as did a 1980s comedy “9 to 5” about women taking revenge on a sexist boss. One of the more popular songs, “I am Woman” started with the lyric “I am woman, hear me roar.” This song stirred the hearts of millions outside the Left movement as well as inside the Left movement. The 1970s are seen as the decade when the women’s movement surged, but that movement did not just appear out of nowhere.⁷⁰

In the 1960s women played an important role in the Civil Rights Movement and in the anti-war movement. The development and widespread availability of a birth control pill gave women more power over when or even whether to bear children. A decade earlier, Betty Friedan wrote an important book, “The Feminine Mystique” that challenged many assumptions about “women’s place in society” and was important in organizing the National Organization for Women (NOW).⁷¹ As younger and more militant women came into NOW and the organization adopted stronger positions, Friedan ultimately came to oppose the more militant approach of the movement. Her proposals for women’s rights were seen as making many compromises with those discriminating against women.

In the 1960s, Gloria Steinem emerged as a powerful voice for women’s rights. It was later revealed that she had worked for the CIA in the 1950s although she argued that the job was of a “good will ambassador” for the US government rather than a spy.⁷² In 1968 a group of one hundred women picketed the Miss America contest. Within the Left there were many theoretical pieces published and many debates about discrimination in general and even

within the Left itself. In 1967, a group of women were treated in a condescending way by the male leadership of the liberal National Conference for New Politics and in reaction, organized among themselves and later formed the Chicago Women's Liberation Union which became one of the more influential groups.⁷³ At the University of Chicago, there was a major struggle, including the two-week occupation of a campus building, in support of Marlene Dixon, a radical sociology professor whose contract was not renewed. In Boston, the Boston Women's Health Book Collective published "Our Bodies, Ourselves," a comprehensive book about women's health, including issues of sexual health.⁷⁴ It was important not simply for the content but because that book "crossed over" to large numbers of working-class women outside of the Left organizations and gave them a sense of empowerment.

While the women's movement has often been critiqued as being dominated by "middle class" professionals, it did touch the lives of many working-class women, who in turn added their energy and insights to the 1960s struggles. Hospital workers, including large numbers of black women, took part in militant actions.⁷⁵ Even in auto plants and steel mills, women workers were demanding an end to discrimination that prevented them from being promoted to higher paying skilled jobs.

It is important to note that the Civil Rights movement played an important role in opening up the whole discussion of equal rights—equal rights for Latinos, for women, for gays, for the elderly (there was a movement called "The Grey Panthers"), and for disability rights. As the women's movement was influenced by the climate of the times, it also contributed importantly to it. It was not until the 1970s that the women's rights movement grew rapidly and became more of a mass issue, but it was in the tumultuous 1960s that the foundation was laid and the wheels set in motion.

LABOR INSURGENCY

A common misconception about the US labor movement is that it has been fundamentally conservative since the great organizing drives of the 1930s. In the late 1940s there was a purge expelling not just communists (who initially organized many of the major labor unions) but other leftists as well and the top leadership had become more closely linked to the corporate bosses and in some cases the CIA. However, there were a number of important strikes in the 1950s and in 1959 the United Steelworkers organized a nationwide strike. The rebellious energy of the broader 1960s movement fed into the labor movement. The workers at General Electric struck in 1960 and workers struck at General Motors plants in 1961. The East Coast longshoremen had a strike in 1962 and there was an important newspaper strike in New York City in 1962.⁷⁶ But all these strikes were not connected to the broader movement of the 1960s.

By the mid-1960s, however, the intertwining of the labor movement with the militancy of the 1960s social and political climate began to converge in important ways. In 1965, farmworkers in Delano, California organized a major

strike. The largely Mexican-American United Farm Workers of America (UFW) union reached out nationally and their cause was picked up in dozens of cities, and boycotts of California grapes were organized in cities and on college campuses around the country.⁷⁷ The anti-racist nature of the strike converged with traditional labor demands for better wages and working conditions. Another major insurgency was in the auto plants of Detroit. Black workers organized the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM) and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (LRBW).⁷⁸ The auto industry in Detroit experienced a number of wildcat strikes in the 1960s. These strikes were not sanctioned by the union and were often opposed by the union leadership. They were generally over issues of working conditions and discrimination against black workers, which was rampant. Studies of the 1967 Detroit rebellion indicate that many of the rebels were not unemployed street people, but were rather autoworkers.⁷⁹ It is no accident that the Ford Motor Company opened up tens of thousands of new jobs after that rebellion.

As mentioned above, General Electric workers went on strike in 1969. The strike was significant in part because it was a strike of electrical workers during the Vietnam War, and government attempts to appeal to patriotism fell flat. In a number of cities students went up to the picket lines to support the strike and discuss the reasons why they were opposed to the Vietnam War, and they generally met with a friendly response. In 1970 General Motors workers went on strike again, disregarding the President's argument that they were hurting the war effort. The strikes built multiracial unity within the workforce and had an important impact on thousands of students who had held the stereotype that workers, especially white workers, were hopelessly conservative. A group of about 1500 people in Detroit, mainly students, organized a demonstration in support of the GM strikers, while also bringing up the issue of the Vietnam War. Students on a number of campuses organized to oppose corporate recruiters from General Motors, and at the massive 1970 Washington D.C. march against the Vietnam War, thousands of protesters chanted: "War Maker-Strike Breaker, Smash GM."⁸⁰ Two other crucial strikes were the strike against the US Post Office and the Teamsters' strike.

As was the case in other 1960s era strikes, the postal workers' strike had significant black leadership. It was significantly influenced by the anti-racist struggles of the previous decades. The letter carriers did not have collective bargaining status with the government. This strike of 210,000 workers was a wildcat strike, opposed by the union leadership and declared illegal.⁸¹ Nevertheless, the multiracial work force struck. Once again, the President declared that the strike was hurting the war effort and a state of emergency was declared.⁸² About 20,000 National Guard and military personnel were assigned to deliver the mail in an attempt to break the strike, but mail service was effectively shut down. After eight days, the strike ended with workers continuing negotiations with the government. Most saw it as a victory because collective bargaining rights were granted and because despite being declared illegal, not one worker was fired.⁸³

The Teamsters Strike, also in 1970, was another mass revolt against the national union leadership as well as the companies. The union leadership had promised to never tie up the nation's freight delivery and the companies said that they would not capitulate. The strikers organized groups to stop strike breakers from carrying freight across the United States and there were many violent confrontations. Because the strike was not sanctioned, employers obtained injunctions to force the drivers back to work. The Ohio governor called out over 4000 National Guard soldiers to put down the strike.⁸⁴ Ironically, or not, these same soldiers were among those sent to Kent State University where the four students were shot and killed. Once again, while the stereotype of conservative truck drivers persists, there were many willing to carry out this national strike during wartime. After 12 weeks, the companies began to capitulate to the workers' demands. In the end, the workers won a major increase in pay over what the company initially offered.

On the surface, all these worker rebellions were disconnected from the two major movements in the United States—the Civil Rights/Black Liberation Movement and the campus anti-war movement. In fact, there were some links but perhaps more profoundly, all these movements energized each other.

THE COUNTER CULTURAL MOVEMENT

The Counter Cultural Movement was not so much a movement as it was a broader socio-cultural trend in society. It did have many aspects of a movement, however, both in its influence and in its organizational forms. The counter cultural trend existed long before the 1960s. In the 1930s there were surrealists, both leftist and conservative. The existentialist writers of the 1950s challenged the idea that meaning in life should be dictated by dogmas. The "Beat Generation" of the 1950s in the United States flowed from the alienation that mainly young people felt from not finding meaning in the increasingly materialistic and commodified world.

The separation of the cultural rebellion aspect of the movement from the more political one was also very important. Woodstock was symbolic of this, but the mainstreaming of aspects of the countercultural movement, the willingness of some of those in power to ease restrictions, such as eliminating the requirement that women be in their dormitory rooms by a certain hour or turning a blind eye to marijuana use in white, middle and upper income college settings provided the space in which these countercultural experiments could be further explored. Music, as well, captured the flavor of rebellion while removing its activist political core. It overlapped with modern jazz, bebop—music that lay people could not understand. It explored Eastern religions and spirituality and often experimented with psychedelic drugs.

It was a rebellion against the conformity of the post-World War II climate in the United States and Europe. While it is often seen as nihilistic, in fact even as most of the culture around the Beat Generation was rejectionist, many of the proponents were earnestly searching for meaning in a culture that seemed

content with acquisition of material goods and forced conformity. Elements of this flowed into the mainstream. J.P. Salinger's book *The Catcher in the Rye* was in no sense explicitly political but captured the feelings of many youth in its tone of youth's frustration with what seemed to be a meaningless world.⁸⁵ There were legal battles over the censorship of sexually-oriented literature and films. There was a rejection of conservative, conforming styles of dress. It flowed into what has been called the "Hippie" movement and much of it went mainstream. Bob Dylan's songs were political at first, but also laden with complex imagery and symbolism of youth's trying to find meaning in an absurd world. The Beatles and the Beach Boys, among others, brought counterculture to the mainstream. Long hair and unconventional dress became conventional. Schools softened their dress codes. Often these converged with leftist issues, including especially peace, but even when they did not converge, they added the spirit of rebellion among the youth. In the end, much of that movement was coopted. As discussed above, the use of marijuana, seen as a symbol of rebellion, actually undercut the anti-capitalist movement as young people were told they could achieve their personal liberation without changing the core of society and the system.

CONCLUSION

If the movement of the 1960s was primarily the result of intense optimism being blocked and pushing forward, the fading away of that movement was the result of the decline of optimism combined with some distractions and cooptation. Thus, the tumultuous 1960s became the coopted 1970s and the passive 1980s. The campus movement of the 1960s is often seen as negative and pessimistic as opposed to the 1980s and beyond, when campuses were quieter. But actually, the campus rebels were saying: *We believe that if we keep pushing, we can make the system change* while later, more passive cohorts said: *We don't believe we can change the system. I had better just get what I can.* Which is more negative?

The combination of "carrot and stick"—cooptation and repression were critical. The killings at Kent State and Jackson State, the flooding of black communities with drugs and the subsequent mass incarceration destroying families, even as sociologists were claiming that problems in the black community stemmed from supposedly weak families, the infusion of large amounts of money into those sections of the black community that promoted black capitalism and the promotion of more black people into positions, such as mayors and police officers where they could effectively continue keeping black communities in check, while simultaneously giving the appearance that black people won an important victory—these were all important. Within the women's movement the drive to promote more female executives during a time when lower income women were dealing with wage freezes, wage cuts and unemployment also added to the confusion. The constant retreats of the labor union leadership,

combined with mass deindustrialization and the movement of jobs to outside the United States dampened the optimism of the working class.

In the early 1970s, political scientist Samuel P. Huntington wrote that a main problem in the United States was that there was too much optimism and too many groups were demanding concessions based on that optimism, and that there needed to be a strategy of dampening that optimism. Throughout this, a culture that simultaneously promoted *You can't make collective change in society* and *You should take what you can* undercut that mass movement. The movement was not without an important impact on society. Very important, but often understated, many thousands of participants in that movement chose to work in careers where they could effect positive social change on the local level, whether as community organizers, social workers, nurses and doctors, or teachers and professors who brought critical thinking and understandings of history and politics to hundreds of thousands of young people who would not have been exposed to this in the 1950s.

Furthermore, after the 1960s, there continued to be some large protests in the United States, such as marches in opposition to US government involvement in Central America, protests against the mass firing of air traffic controllers with a huge labor solidarity march, organizing against sweatshops, the Million Man March against racism, and when the first Gulf War (Desert Shield) was started there were large demonstrations, and with the second Gulf War (Desert Storm) there were even larger protests. Forty and fifty years after the 1960s, those protests and the mass marches in support of immigrants and large-scale protests across the nation by the Occupy Wall Street movement had a powerful impact, but did not have the lasting power of the movements of the 1960s. However, the Black Lives Matter movement against police brutality toward black people, the hundreds of thousands marching in support of women's rights in 2017 and 2018, the hundreds of thousands of mainly young people marching against gun violence have all been reinforcing and building on each other. All these waves of protests are feeding each other and creating a more sustained momentum that can lead to the kind of unified movement that the United States has not seen for the past 50 years. While these most recent actions do not yet constitute the kind of social-political movement of the 1960s—with protests, rebellions and major strikes as daily occurrences—it was the 1960s that laid the basis and paved the way for these later movements to develop in subsequent decades and that inspires today's activists. The mass movements of the tumultuous 1960s changed the world forever.

NOTES

1. Gerald DE. Nash, *The Great Depression and World War II: Organizing America, 1933–1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
2. Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York: Bantam, 1993).
3. Jeff Kisseloff, *Generation on Fire: Voices of Protest from the 1960s: An Oral History* (Louisville, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2007).

4. Martin Luther King, Jr., *Why We Can't Wait* (New York: Signet, 2000); Martin Luther King, Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story* (Boston: Beacon, 2010).
5. Aldon D. Morris, *Origins of the Civil Rights Movement* (New York: Free Press, 1986).
6. Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, *Voices of Freedom: An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement from the 1950s through the 1980s*. Reissue Edition (New York: Bantam, 1991); Clayborne Carson, *The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (Turtleback, 2001).
7. Howard Zinn, *SNCC: The New Abolitionists* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013).
8. Juan Williams, *Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954–1965*, Reprint Edition (New York: Penguin, 2013); Howard Zinn, *SNCC: The New Abolitionists* (Chicago, IL: Haymarket, 2013).
9. Ursula Wolfe-Rocca, "Why We Should Teach About the FBI's War on the Civil Rights Movement," (Zinn Education Project, March 2016).
10. Parott-Sheffer, "16th Street Baptist Church Bombing—Terrorist Attack," Birmingham, Alabama, United States (1963).
11. Arthur Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp. 332–333.
12. Zoe Colley, "'All America Is a Prison': The Nation of Islam and the Politicization of African American Prisoners," *Journal of American Studies*, 48 (2014), pp. 393–415.
13. Malcolm X, Alex Haley and Attallah Shabazz, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* (New York: Ballentine Reissue, 1992).
14. Malcolm X, Haley and Shabazz, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*.
15. Wolfe-Rocca, "Why We Should Teach About the FBI's War on the Civil Rights Movement."
16. http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/nycdata/disasters/riots-harlem_1964.html.
17. Peter B. Levy, *The Great Uprising: Race Riots in Urban America During the 1960s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
18. Hubert G. Locke, *The Detroit Riot of 1967* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2017).
19. <http://www.history.com/topics/1967-detroit-riots>.
20. Peter B. Levy, *The Great Uprising: Race Riots in Urban America During the 1960s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
21. <http://www.historynet.com/long-binh-jail-riot-during-the-vietnam-war.htm>.
22. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/04/1968theyearofrevolt.usa>.
23. Levy, *The Great Uprising*.
24. Allen D. Grimshaw (ed.), *Racial Violence in the United States* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969).
25. <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/african-american-auto-workers-strike-union-democracy-and-better-working-conditions-drum-1968>.
26. Philip F. Rubio, *There's Always Work at the Post Office: African American Postal Workers and the Fight for Jobs, Justice, and Equality* (Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press 2010).
27. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/07/education/edlife/Black-History-Activism-on-Campus-Timeline.html#/#time393_11377.

28. <https://newpittsburghcourieronline.com/2014/03/13/sat-officials-hope-to-score-high-in-eliminating-racial-bias/>.
29. https://blogs.library.unt.edu/unt125/2016/04/11/student_protests/.
30. <http://www.houstonpress.com/news/houston-101-an-earlier-time-when-shots-rang-out-at-tsu-6722963>.
31. <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/1968-three-students-were-killed-police-today-few-remember-orangeburg-massacre-180968092/>.
32. <http://www.encyclopedias.biz/encyclopedia-of-american-race-riots/27732-texas-southern-university-riot-of-1967.html>.
33. <https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/03/us/soundtracks-kent-state-jackson-state-orangeburg/index.html>.
34. Martha Biondi, *Black Revolution on Campus* (Berkeley: University of California Press 2012).
35. http://www.foundsf.org/index.php?title=STRIKE!..._Concerning_the_1968-69_Strike_at_San_Francisco_State_College.
36. http://www.foundsf.org/index.php?title=STRIKE!..._Concerning_the_1968-69_Strike_at_San_Francisco_State_College.
37. http://www.foundsf.org/index.php?title=STRIKE!..._Concerning_the_1968-69_Strike_at_San_Francisco_State_College.
38. <http://cdha.cuny.edu/coverage/coverage/show/id/23>.
39. Neil J. Smelser, *Reflections on the University of California: From the Free Speech Movement to the Global University* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).
40. David L. Goines, *The Free Speech Movement* (Ten Speed Press, 1993).
41. Ibid.
42. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 2009: <https://www.britannica.com/event/16th-Street-Baptist-Church-bombing>.
43. *The Vietnam War: A Film by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick* (2017).
44. Ibid.
45. Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS: The Rise and Development of the Students for a Democratic Society*, (New York: Vintage, 1973).
46. Harry M. Caudill, *Night Comes to the Cumberland: A Biography of a Depressed Area* Jesse Stuart Foundation Reprint 2001.
47. Sale, *SDS: The Rise and Development of the Students for a Democratic Society*.
48. Herbert Hill, "The CIA in National and International Labor Movements" *The International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 6 (3) (Spring, 1993), pp. 405–407.
49. Sale, *SDS: The Rise and Development of the Students for a Democratic Society*.
50. <https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/DG051-099/dg075nmc.htm>.
51. *The Vietnam War: A Film by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick* (2017).
52. <https://web.viu.ca/davies/H102/Vietnam.WhitePaper.Feb1965.htm>.
53. Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History* (ABC CLIO, 2011).
54. *The Vietnam War: A Film by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick* (2017).
55. Ibid.
56. https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/hemispheres/_files/pdf/newsletters/cold_war_docs/Dominican_Crisis.pdf.
57. <https://www.newhistorian.com/usa-invades-the-dominican-republic/3619/>.

58. <https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/DG051-099/dg075nmc.htm>.
59. <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/100000-people-march-on-the-pentagon>.
60. *The Vietnam War: A Film by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick* (2017).
61. Mike Evans and Paul Kingsbury (eds.), *Woodstock: Three Days that Rocked the World* (Sterling, 2010).
62. <https://stanforddailyarchive.com/cgi-bin/stanford?a=d&d=stanford19691027-01.2.4&e=-----en-20--1--txt-txIN----->
63. Alan Spector, *SDS, the 1960's and Educating for Revolution*. (Cultural Logic, 2013), pp. 243–277.
64. <http://www.newsweek.com/fred-hampton-black-panther-shot-killed-chicago-730503>.
65. <http://worldchannel.org/programs/episode/eyes-prize-nation-law-1968-1971/> (Corporation for Public Broadcasting 1979).
66. Jerry M. Lewis and Thomas R. Hensley, “The May 4 Shootings at Kent State University: The Search for Historical Accuracy,” <https://www.kent.edu/may-4-historical-accuracy>.
67. <http://www.houstonpress.com/news/houston-101-an-earlier-time-when-shots-rang-out-at-tsu-6722963>.
68. <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/students-launch-nationwide-protest>.
69. <http://www.history.com/topics/the-26th-amendment>.
70. Ruth Rosen, *The World Split Open: How the Modern Women's Movement Changed America*, Revised Edition (New York: Penguin, 2006).
71. Sarah Maxwell, *Success and Solitude: Feminist Organizations Fifty Years After The Feminine Mystique* (University Press of America, 2009).
72. <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-gloria-steinem-cia-20151025-story.html>.
73. <https://www.cwluherstory.org/organizing/5pcdckbt9l7c4cs4cgelr935hek36m>.
74. That book is still being revised and reprinted. It has been translated into 29 languages and sold over four million copies. See <https://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/history/>.
75. Peter B. Levy, *The New Left and Labor in the 1960s* (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press 1994).
76. <https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2012/11/1963-newspaper-strike-bertram-powers>.
77. Larry Dane Brimner, *Strike! The Farm Workers' Fight for Their Rights* (Calkins Creek, 2014). <http://ufw.org/1965-1970-delano-grape-strike-boycott/>.
78. <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/african-american-auto-workers-strike-union-democracy-and-better-working-conditions-drum-1968>.
79. <http://www.history.com/topics/1967-detroit-riots>.
80. <http://plpcolumbia.blogspot.com/2007/10/while-you-wont-find-it-in-bosses-media.html>.
81. <http://www.history.com/news/how-a-postal-strike-became-a-national-emergency-for-richard-nixon>.

82. <http://www.history.com/news/how-a-postal-strike-became-a-national-emergency-for-richard-nixon>.
83. <http://www.history.com/news/how-a-postal-strike-became-a-national-emergency-for-richard-nixon>.
84. <https://libcom.org/history/teamsters-wildcat-strike-1970-jeremy-brecher>.
85. J. D. Salinger, *Catcher in the Rye* (Bantam Books 1968).

REFERENCES

- Biondi, Martha. 2012. *Black Revolution on Campus*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Brimmer, Larry Dane. 2014. *Strike! The Farm Workers' Fight for Their Rights*. Calkins Creek. <http://ufw.org/1965-1970-delano-grape-strike-boycott/>.
- Evans, Mike, and Paul Kingsbury (eds.). 2010. *Woodstock: Three Days that Rocked the World*. Sterling.
- Gitlin, Todd. 1993. *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage*. New York: Bantam.
- Grimshaw, Allen D. 1969. *Racial Violence in the United States*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing.
- Hampton, Henry, and Steve Fayer. 1991. *Voices of Freedom: An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement from the 1950s Through the 1980s*. Reissue Edition. New York: Bantam.
- Kisseloff, Jeff. 2007. *Generation on Fire: Voices of Protest from the 1960s, An Oral History*. Louisville, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
- Levy, Peter B. 1994. *The New Left and Labor in the 1960s*. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- . 2018. *The Great Uprising: Race Riots in Urban America During the 1960s*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Locke, Hubert G. 2017. *The Detroit Riot of 1967*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.
- Malcolm, X., Alex Haley, and Attallah Shabazz. 1992. *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*. New York: Ballentine Reissue.
- Morris, Aldon D. 1986. *Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*. New York: Free Press.
- Sale, Kirkpatrick. 1973. *SDS: The Rise and Development of the Students for a Democratic Society*. New York: Vintage.
- Spector, Alan. 2013. *SDS, the 1960's and Educating for Revolution*. Cultural Logic.
- Williams, Juan. 2013. *Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954–1965*, Reprint Edition. New York: Penguin.
- Zinn, Howard. 2013. *SNCC: The New Abolitionists*. Chicago, IL: Haymarket.



Neoliberalism and Social Movements in Latin America: Mobilizing the Resistance

James F. Petras and Henry Veltmeyer

The imposition of the neoliberal imperial order in the early 1980s polarized society and sharpened the contradictions between regions, classes, and ethnic groups. This chapter focuses on the dynamic growth of social movements that organized to recover political space and reverse the regressive capitalist ‘reforms’ imposed from above with the blessing and backing of the United States.¹ The chapter analyzes the revival and buildup of the new class-based movements in the 1990s and the ensuing class and ethnic struggles that culminated in the new millennium in the replacement of the United States’ client neoliberal regimes in the region. From the smoldering embers and the ashes of the Washington Consensus in the first decade of the twenty-first century, there emerged a new, more pragmatic neoliberal order (and several post-neoliberal ones) based on a perceived need to retreat from an unregulated form of free market capitalism and move toward a more inclusive form of development. The conditions needed to bring about this ‘progressive cycle’ in Latin American politics included the activism of social movements in their resistance to the neoliberal policy agenda. These movements, with their social base in the working class, the peasantry, indigenous farming communities, and a semi-proletariat formed in conditions of peripheral capitalism, were responsible not only for bringing about the rejection of neoliberalism as an economic doctrine

J. F. Petras

Department of Sociology, SUNY Binghamton, Binghamton, NY, USA

e-mail: jpetras@binghamton.edu

H. Veltmeyer (✉)

Development Studies, St. Mary’s University, Halifax, NS, Canada

and a model but also in paving the way for the emergence of a number of post-neoliberal regimes oriented toward inclusionary state activism. These regimes, brought into power or backed by the social movements, shared with these movements a concern for bringing about an alternative form of national development, ‘another world’ beyond neoliberalism—and in some cases (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela) beyond capitalism.²

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The neoliberal agenda of ‘structural reform’ in macroeconomic policy was widely implemented in the 1980s via the agency of the World Bank and the IMF as extensions of the imperial state system, in the context of a call for a new world order, a region-wide debt crisis, and the defeat and destruction of both urban labor movements and rural movements for land reform and national liberation. However, these neoliberal policies in their turn generated forces of resistance.

At the time the state was in partial retreat, having shed its responsibility for social welfare and economic development, turning it over to the ‘private sector’ (the multinational corporations and financial institutions of global capital) and civil society in an alliance with the overseas development associations formed under the umbrella of international cooperation. As for the popular movement for national liberation and social change, in the dual form of a labor movement and the land struggle, for the most part they had been defeated, decapitated or brought to ground in a process of integrated rural development and the deployment of the repressive apparatus of the client states, backed up by imperial power. On the dynamics of this struggle.³

In the vortex of these political developments, and with the dual and combined agency of the World Bank and the IMF, Latin America entered a period ‘lost to development’ in terms of productive investment of capital, and the destruction of the productive forces in both industry and agriculture, with a resulting decline in living standards and a deterioration in the social conditions of most people in the popular sector.

In response to the forces that generated these conditions a variety of new social movements were organized. Some of them were class-based, focused on a concern with issues of land reform and the rights of labor. But others were focused on issues that were not directly connected to the class struggle, giving rise to all sorts of postmodernist misconceptions.

In the working class, barrio movements were formed to defend members of the community from the ravages of capitalist development (soup kitchens, self-defense organizations, etc.), to demand an end to military rule and to protest the new wave of neoliberal policies.⁴ This movement, as well as a growing cycle of spontaneous protests against ‘IMF reforms’—culminated in the *Caracazo* of 1989, were class-based. However, the attention and concern of many academics at the time, armed with a postmodernist political ‘imaginary’ and ensconced in their offices, was a wave of ‘new social movements’ formed in conditions of

an emerging 'civil society' composed of a myriad of social organizations rooted in the urban middle-class. These organizations, and the associated 'new social movements', were concerned with issues such as the protection of human rights and the environment and the advancement of gender and other forms of social equality, issues that to a new generation of postmodernist scholars attuned to cyberspace rather than the real world appeared to have no class basis or any connection with the workings of capitalism.

As for the neoliberal policies foisted on the governments in the region under these conditions, opposition and resistance was marked by sporadic protest—IMF riots, as they were termed, with reference to the perceived agency behind neoliberal policies. But at the time there was little organized resistance to these policies—only sporadic outbreaks of protest, allowing a new generation of postmodern intellectuals to advance their theory of 'new [non-class] social movements'. But with the emergence of new sociopolitical movements mounted by rural landless workers, peasants, and, in some contexts, indigenous communities, this would change soon. These class-based movements would come to dominate the political landscape in the 1990s, rendering irrelevant the postmodernist theory of 'new' non-class social movements.

THE RESURGENCE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN LEFT

The Latin American Left, both in its political parties and in the form of labor movements in the cities and the movements for land and national liberation in the countryside, was or appeared to be in retreat, defeated by the forces of reaction mobilized by the imperialist state and its lackeys in Latin America. However, all was not as it seemed. The neoliberal model itself was already under serious question, surrounded by periodic outbreaks of protest in the urban centers and besieged by opposition and resistance, even from within the ramparts of empire—by those concerned that the advance of 'economic freedom' (and economic stabilization) came at an excessively high social cost that was likely to translate into political instability.

While most publicists, journalists, academics, and government and World Bank officials celebrated the advent of 'neoliberalism', opposition, which in time could lead to a challenge to the whole free-market power structure, was growing. As yet only loosely associated—in forums, seminars, and international gatherings—this new oppositional force had solid roots in a number of countries and was extending its support from specific regions and classes to the construction of several national counter-hegemonic blocs. The Left was staging a comeback.

To write about the Left in this context may be somewhat misleading because there was more than one: there were the older parties that remained, weakened but active, and the new sociopolitical movements. What many casual observers, and not a few journalists and academics, referred to as 'the Left' included organizations that had abandoned the class struggle and in large part had been accommodated to the development agenda of the liberal political establish-

ment. What may explain the confusion is the manner in which this conversion was staged: many former leftists at the time resorted to intellectual posturing in which they labeled their own earlier positions—and that of an emerging revolutionary left as ‘outmoded’, presenting themselves as more up-to-date, renovated, modernized, post-something or other—a social democratic Left.

To come to terms with these political developments at the beginning of the last decade of the old millennium, we need firstly to identify the different waves of social movements that had emerged and were emerging on the Left and to differentiate them; secondly, to identify their social base, style of political action and political perspective; and thirdly, to document the growth, internal contradictions and political challenges that confronted the burgeoning sociopolitical movements on the Left.

THE POLITICAL LEFT IN THE NEOLIBERAL WORLD ORDER

The stronghold for the resurgence of the Left at the beginning of the 1990s was the countryside. In a number of countries, the political landscape was dominated by peasant movements with their base in the peasant or indigenous communities or a semi-proletariat of landless rural workers. The most important of these movements was CONAIE, an amalgam of over 20 organizations representing the country’s indigenous nationalities, and the Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil that pioneered the tactic of massive land occupations, forcing the government to negotiate with the movement the expropriation of the land that they had settled.⁵ Armed with hundreds of organizers and hundreds of thousands of active supporters in the countryside, the MST forced the renewal of a national debate in Brazil among all the political parties on the issue of agrarian reform. Most observers of Brazilian politics at the time agreed that the MST was the most dynamic, well organized and effective social movement not only in Brazil but in all of Latin America. In Bolivia, the closing of most of the tin mines, and the heavy influx of cheap imports and government-condoned contraband had weakened the mining and industrial unions that had survived the neoliberal assault of the 1980s. In their place the indigenous movement and the peasant confederations, particularly the *cocaleros* or coca farmers, mobilized the forces of resistance and led a series of major confrontations with the State and their American patrons, blocking highways and spearheading general strikes that paralyzed the country.⁶ In Paraguay, the National Peasant Federation was at the core of the political mobilization that blocked the return of the military, forcing agrarian issues into the center of a national debate. Together with other peasant organizations, they led 50,000 peasants through the streets of Asunción to the Presidential Palace and National Congress (*Informativo Campesino* [Asunción], No. 91, April 1996). In Mexico, major popular struggles took place throughout the countryside. Guerrero, Chiapas and Oaxaca saw large-scale confrontations between indigenous peasants and the State (*La Jornada*, 10 August, 1996, p. 3). In Ecuador, Colombia, and El Salvador, similar processes of peasant mobilizations redefined the national political agenda.

But not all the instances of left resurgence in the 1980s and 1990s were located in the countryside. In a number of countries—indeed in most where the neoliberal policy agenda had been implemented—there was also a resurgence of widespread resistance in the cities based on a fragile coalition of the semi-proletarianized informal workers and the urban poor and ‘new social movements’ formed by diverse organizations formed in a burgeoning ‘civil society’ that had materialized in the wake of the retreat of the State from its assigned responsibilities for social welfare and development.⁷ In Peru *Senderos Luminosa*, a Far-Left guerrilla formation engaged the forces of reaction in both the cities and the countryside. In Colombia the FARC-EP (Revolutionary Forces of Colombia—People’s Army)—the one revolutionary movement (army of national liberation) formed in the 1960s that had not been defeated or brought to ground expanded their operations in the countryside, engaging both government and paramilitary forces. And in a number of countries the labor movement, whose forces of resistance had been virtually destroyed in the 1980s by a combination of structural and political forces mobilized by the neoliberal policy offensive, was showing signs of new life. In Chile the Communist Party increased their influence within the trade unions, while ‘class oriented’ trade union activism emerged in Argentina and Mexico City and in the north of the country among auto workers. In addition, dissident and combative sectors of the National Labor Confederation (CUT) were active in Brazil, as were militant teachers’ unions led by Marxists in Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Mexico, and Brazil.⁸ Nevertheless, while organized, urban, working-class movements were not absent from the struggle, and in some instances took center stage, the truly revolutionary action and the most dynamic movements in this resurgence of the Left were rural.

Many commentators and analysts, even those as distinguished as Eric Hobsbawm,⁹ wrote of the political eclipse of the peasantry. The obituaries, however, proved premature. There are a number of reasons why demographic arguments about the shrinking size of the rural labor force do not necessarily translate into political analysis for Latin American countries. First, notwithstanding the forces of production and social transformation, shrinking numbers do not nullify the fact that tens of millions of families continued to live in the countryside. Second, given the crises affecting urban areas then and now, particularly growing unemployment and poverty, the cities no longer were seen as sites of ‘opportunity’ for young peasants seeking a more secure livelihood and better living conditions for their families. Third, when and where land occupations were on the agenda, there was even a movement from provincial towns and cities back to the countryside—a ‘re-peasantization’ effect. Fourth, neoliberal policies had battered small producers, driving down prices of staples and increasing indebtedness, creating family and social bonds between the mostly young landless sons and daughters involved in the land invasions. Fifth, ‘structural’ considerations apart, a new generation of (primary or secondary school) ‘educated’ peasant leaders, with strong organizational capabilities, a sophisticated understanding of national and international politics, and a profound commitment to creating a politically educated set of cadres, had emerged.

Local leaders of both genders intervened in regions of conflict, transforming previously spontaneous and easily defeated land occupations into well-planned and executed mass political actions. The combination of structural conditions and the growth of a new political leadership built around the principle that 'every member is an organizer' were instrumental in the rise of the peasant movements.

It should be noted, though, that these were not peasant movements in the traditional sense, nor were the rural cultivators who comprised them divorced from urban life or activities. In some instances, the new peasants were former workers, particularly, in the case of Bolivia, miners, displaced because of plant or mine closures, or they had been peasants a generation earlier.¹⁰ In other cases, they are the 'excess' sons and daughters of peasants who entered religious institutions, became involved in the rural struggles, and abandoned the Church to lead the struggle for land reform.¹¹ In many cases, they were daughters of small peasants with a primary or secondary education who joined and sometimes led land occupations rather than migrate to the cities to work as domestic servants.¹²

The 'new peasantry', especially those who led the struggle, travelled to the cities, participated in seminars and leadership training schools, and engaged in political debates. In short, even as they were rooted in the rural struggle, lived in land settlements and engaged in agricultural cultivation, they had a cosmopolitan vision. The quantity and quality of these 'peasant intellectuals' has varied from country to country depending on the resources and maturity of the movement. In Brazil, the MST was well known for its heavy investment in leadership training, with hundreds of its members passing each year through different levels of sociopolitical and technical education.¹³ Other movements such as those in Paraguay and Bolivia still relied on a small number of well-informed leaders.

Another point regarding the 'new peasantry' was that it was generally autonomous of any electoral and/or sectarian left parties, even the most radical. It was largely engaged in direct action rather than the electoral process. The MST in Brazil has had and still has 'fraternal' relations with the Workers' Party (PT), generally supporting their candidates and occasionally presenting its own within the Party.¹⁴ But the main strength of the MST was its extra-parliamentary struggle, including land invasions, the blocking of highways and sit-ins at the Agrarian Reform Institutes. MST tactics, strategy and ideological debates are also decided within the movement and are not subordinated to the PT or its parliamentary representatives. On the contrary, the MST's actions shaped the commitment of the PT leadership to the agrarian struggle at the time, before Lula's advent to state power.

Similarly in Bolivia, the militant peasant organizations broke with the nationalist parties and socialist sects on the parliamentary Left, and engaged in internal debates about forming their own political movement (Movement Towards Socialism, as it turned out). In Paraguay, many leaders of the National Federation of Peasants who sought to provide a national focus for the peasantry launched a new revolutionary socialist movement.

In discussion with the leaders of CUT, the major Confederation of Brazilian Workers, it was clear that the MST was on the frontlines and at the cutting edge of the popular struggle for land and against neoliberalism. Most trade union leaders readily admitted that the MST was far more cohesive and organized for confrontation than the urban industrial unions, which, as elsewhere in Latin America, had lost both their radical edge and capacity to wage political struggle. Posters plastered on the walls of downtown Rio condemning a major massacre of MST militants in Pará made it clear that the rural struggle had become a major 'cause' for militant sectors of the CUT. Hitherto, the labor movement based on organized labor tended to marginalize if not totally neglect the struggle in the countryside.¹⁵

Furthermore, the new peasant movements were strongly influenced by a blend of classical Marxism and, in differing contexts, by ethnic, gender, and ecological considerations. In Paraguay, and particularly in Bolivia, the questions of social liberation and the rural struggle are strongly infused with a revindication of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and even national claims.¹⁶ In Brazil and Bolivia, organized groups of peasant women pressured these movements for greater influence and representation.¹⁷

The new peasant movements were linked together in a Latin American regional organization, the Congreso Latinoamericano de Organizaciones del Campo (CLOC), and were increasingly involved in the international formation Via Campesino set up to advance the struggle for land and rural livelihoods, and against the neoliberal model of capitalist development and agrarian change. Through these links and others, an emerging 'internationalist' consciousness and practice emerged. For example, the militants of the Brazilian MST began to work across national borders with their counterparts in Paraguay and, to a lesser degree, Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay.

In summary, the resurgence of the peasant movements in the 1990s was not a simple replay of the movements of the 1960s. In many cases the successes and failures of the earlier movements had been studied and debated within the movement. While there was a certain continuity because of the presence of a handful of older militants in the new movements, and some of the leaders were the children of the past generation of activists, a series of important differences at the tactical, strategic, political and organizational levels indicated that the indigenous, landless rural workers and peasant-led movements of the 1990s were to some (or a considerable) extent 'new'—not 'new' in the sense ascribed by Burbach¹⁸ and Holloway¹⁹ to the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, but nevertheless a promising and creative political force.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR THE RESURGENCE OF POPULAR MOVEMENTS

The resurgence of the popular movement in the 1990s took place in a complex and changing political context. In the first place, the policies of the neoliberal regimes negatively impacted a vast array of social groups and classes, including segments of the bourgeoisie—operators of small and some medium-level

‘enterprises’, farms, and ranches—many of which were forced into bankruptcy or bank indebtedness.²⁰

Since the late 1980s, the urban movements and trade unions were in decline in most countries, their organizational and political capacity seriously diminished. In this situation, the rise of the indigenous and peasant movements was looked upon favorably by social groups adversely affected by the neoliberal policies pursued by virtually every government. They were regarded as a political mechanism to delegitimize or weaken the application of neoliberal policies, hence the favorable press and media accounts that appeared on occasion, particularly in Brazil. Support for the MST by sectors of the bourgeoisie was graphically illustrated while the authors were in Brazil in May 1996, when a group of entrepreneurs organized a luncheon for the MST to express their support for agrarian reform.²¹

The peasant movements in resistance and opposing neoliberalism filled the political space abandoned by electoral coalitions on the center-left. The center-left at the time either failed to win elections or turned toward assimilating liberal politics, in some cases joining neoliberal regimes. This ebbing in the tide of electoral center-left oppositional politics was accompanied in many cases by the weakening of the trade unions, partly as a result of anti-labor legislation, mass firings and high unemployment, and partly because of the accommodating attitudes of the trade union leadership. And, as argued above, there were also ‘structural’ forces at work in weakening the organizational and political capacity of organized labor. For one thing, the working class of the 1990s was very different from that of the 1970s. The makings of an industrial proletariat were entirely replaced by the formation of a new class of street workers—the vaunted (and often misconceived) ‘informal sector’. Under these conditions, the eruption of class warfare in the countryside was a ‘spark’ that served to ignite public debate and call into question the overall political project of the neoliberal regime everywhere in power.

THE LEFT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: MOBILIZING THE ANTI-NEOLIBERAL RESISTANCE AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION

Over the last three decades of neoliberal rule, what we might describe as the ‘social movement Left’ emerged in three distinct waves. To understand the significance and nature of those sociopolitical movements, it is important to place them in the context of conditions at the time and to distinguish them from their predecessors.

The first wave took place as the import substitution phase went into crisis and led to the confrontation between socialist popular movements and what became the neoliberal restoration and military-led regimes. The first wave of the contemporary Left began in the 1960s and continued into the mid-1970s. It included mass social movements, guerrilla armies and electoral parties. Sometimes class and military activities merged.²² Sometimes electoral and trade union politics were combined.²³

This was the period of the so-called New Left—movements and parties that challenged the dominance of the pro-Moscow communist parties. There were Maoists, Fidelistas, those influenced by Trotskyist ideas, and others who grew out of the Christian and Populist movements. As mentioned, the national security regimes or dictatorships that dominated the political landscape at the time decimated this wave. Hundreds of thousands of activists were killed, jailed or forced into exile. As a result of the repression, and overseas relations with social democratic foundations, the great majority who returned to politics did so as social democrats, and sometimes as neoliberals. This connects with the first wave of anti-neoliberal social movements.

The second wave of leftists emerged in the dictatorial period and the years following—first in opposition to the authoritarian regimes and later to the ‘neoliberal agenda’. This wave found expression in the Foro of São Paulo and included the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Workers’ Party of Brazil, the Broad Front of Uruguay, Venezuela’s Causa R, the Revolutionary Democratic Party of Mexico, and the Frente Grande in Argentina.²⁴ These parties, coalitions and ex-guerrilla movements, however, were drawn into the electoral politics trap and began to accommodate to neoliberal policies on privatization, ‘globalization’ and other issues. In time, they lost a good part of their identity as parties of the Left and became more and more divorced from the popular struggles in the shantytowns, countryside and factories. Some were assimilated into the NGO framework, working in the niches of the World Bank’s free-market and anti-statist politics. In most of these parties or movements there remain leftist and activist currents, but they are marginalized in the interests of respectability.

The third wave of the movement to some extent overlapped with the second group but demonstrated greater force and resilience. Its leaders tended to be young, in their early twenties to mid-thirties, and were drawn from the peasantry, provincial trade unions, and school teachers. These activists differed significantly from their predecessors. First, many were not from the university—in fact, the intellectuals were still largely oriented to the center-left electoral machines or to their professional careers. Second, the new movements had few financial resources but tremendous élan and ‘mystique’. Their leaders travelled to meetings by bus (sometimes 30 or 40 hours), lived on their wages or farm income and had rather Spartan offices. There were very few full-time paid officials and virtually no bureaucracy. There were no privileges—no cars, office equipment, or staff. The leaders (e.g., Evo Morales) were ‘moral persons’, honest and scrupulous in their financial affairs and personal relations. Very few were ‘personalist’, concerned with their own mystique. Rather, they debated in assemblies and were part of a collective leadership. The idea of the new organizations was that each member would be an organizer. To a greater or lesser extent, these leaders were highly critical of the opportunism of the electoral Left and NGO intellectuals who they experienced as manipulative outsiders serving external patrons. Those who were

previously part of guerrilla struggles were highly critical of the vertical style leadership in those organizations. They generally rejected the call to become cogs in the electoral machines of the politicians on the Left, choosing instead to deepen ties to their social base. Even so, while this third wave represents intransigent opposition to the imposition of neoliberalism, it has never offered a fully articulated plan for the seizure of power or for an alternative form of national development, such as constructed by Bolivia's current social movement regime since Evo Morales assumed state power in 2006.

A THIRD WAVE OF ANTI-NEOLIBERAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THE RURAL LANDLESS WORKERS OF BRAZIL TAKE CENTER STAGE

The most dynamic of the third wave of anti-neoliberal social movements, for the most part organized in the 1980s, grew massively and escalated their activity in the 1990s. These movements were based on an organization of rural landless workers, peasants and, in some contexts, indigenous communities. Here we will provide more details about the dynamics of one of the most important of the movements formed in the 1990s.

The MST is not a revolutionary organization, and it has never been concerned with the seizure of state power as such. Rather, it has worked toward an effective implementation of the Constitution, which stipulated that uncultivated land could be expropriated for social use. Thus, it has been both 'legalist' and oriented toward direct action. The politics of direct action were inserted into the gap between democratic ideology (and the progressive clauses of the Constitution) and the socioeconomic ties of the liberal regime with the ruling class. The resurgence of the Left in Brazil took place in distinct settings and is not easily pigeonholed. The MST, for example, grew from a regional movement that was based largely in the south-central region into a national movement with organizers increasingly active in the north, northeast and western regions of the country (*A Luta pela Terra No Brazil*, pp. 23–39). Their struggle over the course of the 1990s increasingly drew support from the cities among trade unions and sectors of the church. They were viewed with respect and sympathy by the bulk of the *favelados* of Rio and São Paulo. Midway into the decade they shifted toward organizing large-scale land occupations near provincial cities, both to facilitate the gathering of mass support and to form urban alliances.²⁵ As they moved into the inner heartland of large uncultivated estates, however, they faced increasing violence and in some cases were forced to set up self-defense committees to confront marauding *pistoleros* hired by the landowners to drive out the settlers.

Over the course of the decade they organized over 139,000 families into productive cooperatives, some of them even engaged in export agriculture. They 'expropriated' a total of 7.2 million hectares of land, and organized 55 rural cooperatives in twelve states. They established 880 schools with 38,000 pupils.²⁶ Successful cooperatives usually freed activists to participate in the

support of landless peasants making new occupations, and contributed food to land occupants waiting for government expropriation and credits. The MST Congress in July 1995 drew over 5000 delegates representing several hundred thousand peasants (*Jornal dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra*, São Paulo, August 1995). Each state hired buses and brought their own food and bedding. The leadership training school in Santa Catarina houses about 80 persons in bunk beds. There was bread, cheese, and coffee for breakfast, cold showers and rudimentary classrooms. But it all came together.

The countryside in Brazil in the mid-1990s was a tinderbox. The problem was not organizing land occupations; hundreds of thousands of hungry families were ready to respond—and usually did—to an MST appeal. The problem was organizing to win. For that, there needed to be political support prior to any occupation, political organization to resist displacement, and logistical support—food, supplies, and so forth—while the movement negotiated with the government to finance production. For the most part, the MST was able to generate the needed level of public and popular support to conduct its ‘occupations’ and campaign. In 1995, for example, the MST led 92 land occupations and by June 1996 another 120 land occupations, resulting in a total of 168 *campamentos* (land settlements) with 40,000 families awaiting government expropriation (*Sem Terra*, July 1996, p. 8). However, the rightward shift of the PT in 1995 following its defeat in the presidential elections by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (it would take another two national elections before Ignacio [Lula] Da Silva would assume state power in the name of the PT), set the stage for another major land occupation offensive.

This offensive in part was in response to the recognition that Cardoso, the former Marxist sociologist and advocate of ‘dependency theory’, was closely tied to the parties of the right-wing agro-export landed elite (the PFL and PMDM) as well as the reactionary sectors of his own party (the PSDB). Cardoso’s links with the World Bank and overseas multinational corporations deepened his commitment to privatize strategic industries, promote agro-export sectors and encourage large-scale foreign investment in Brazil under favorable ‘rules of the game’. Another reason for the offensive was growing pressure from a number of MST militants for a more aggressive policy outside of and independent of the PT, which was correctly perceived as being an electoral party in which sectors were moving beyond classical social democratic politics toward ‘social liberal’ policies.²⁷

Finally, it was recognized that ‘objective’ conditions and ‘subjective’ factors in the countryside were increasingly ‘maturing’ for an offensive. The initial response to the first occupations was extremely positive in the areas adjoining them. Spontaneous land occupations materialized. The MST decided to provide organizational leadership and conscious organization to turn these spontaneous local activities into a national movement.

Toward the end of 1995 and in early 1996 land invasions became everyday affairs all over the country in regions that had previously been bulwarks of the Right. Cardoso responded by threatening to use force and by offering empty

promises to settle squatters in exchange for a moratorium on new occupations. The MST negotiated but pointedly refused to stop the land occupations—knowing that a truce would eliminate its main negotiating card, weaken its appeal to the landless and demobilize hundreds of its young leaders and activists ('Sem-terra nao aceitam a trégua dos ruralistas', *Jornal do Brasil*, June 4, 1996, p. 1ff). So the struggle deepened and was extended into the most dangerous regions.

In retrospect, it is evident that from mid-decade of the 1990s to 2002 was a watershed in MST politics. At one level it sought to develop an effective counter-hegemonic strategy and a powerful political bloc that could integrate the city and countryside. At another level, however, the MST was forging links and alliances with diverse groups and NGOs in an emerging 'civil society' both in Brazil's cities and globally, in order to broaden the social base of political and financial support for its struggle and to transform a politics of land occupation and settlements into a strategy for cooperative social production.

To understand the direction, dynamics, and particular forms of this struggle, we need to make reference to the analysis provided by MST leader and strategist João Pedro Stedile. There have been diverse attempts to analyze and assess the ideological orientation and the class nature of the MST as a social movement—whether the movement has a socialist character (anti-neoliberal, anti-capitalist and oriented toward socialist transformation) or whether its fundamental aim is limited to maximizing gains for its members within the capitalist system. In this connection, it appears (by different, if not all, accounts) that the MST leadership is Marxist, with a clear anti-capitalist, anti-neoliberal socialist orientation. On the other hand, it is evident that the members of the MST over the years have been mobilized not on the basis of this ideology but by an appeal to class interest. The political practice of the MST from the beginning and since has been confined to advancing the land struggle within the political limits of the existing economic and political system: mobilizing land occupations rather than mobilizing against the government's neoliberal policies. Within these limits, the MST has cultivated a dense network of ties with all sorts of organizations in the anti-globalization movement and has helped form a dense global network of organizations concerned with bringing about 'another world', an alternative to neoliberal globalization. However, at the level of national politics the MST's approach has been pragmatic rather than ideological—directed by what is possible in diverse conjunctures of the class struggle.

Stedile's own position vis-à-vis what he sees as the broader class struggle (beyond the politics of mobilization for land) is fairly clear, enunciated in different documents and discussions. On June 22, 1996, in an interview and discussions with the authors and movement militants, he identified three moments in the recent history to that date of this struggle: (1) the final stages in the struggle against the military dictatorship in the late 1970s and early 1980s; (2) the mass struggle to impeach former President Collor; and (3) the current phase in which Cardoso was actively implementing the neoliberal agenda. In each period, he noted, important sectors of the bourgeoisie and their allies in

the mass media and the major political parties were interested in weakening the incumbent power-holders, in effect giving 'conjunctural support' to the MST. However, after they accomplished their mission and achieved their goal (to advance their immediate, medium-, and long-term economic interests) they withdrew that support.

Thus, as Stedile saw it, points of internal division within the ruling bloc provide propitious moments for the MST to launch activities that at least had the tacit backing of sectors of the elite and the press. On the other hand, the strategic and tactical moves made by the MST in subsequent conjunctures of the class struggle, especially under the more opportunistic neoliberal regime established by Da Silva ('Lula'), suggests that the correlation of class forces have not been too favorable to the MST. Not only has the pace of rural mobilization been on the decline, in large part because of its 'critical support' of the Lula regime but it appears that the MST has lost some of the active support of the broad public it once had prior to Lula's election. Rather than advancing the anti-neoliberal forces of socialist transformation the MST seems to have settled for advancing the land struggle within the existing system.

REGIME CHANGE AND CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

The new millennium once again provided conditions for launching a new phase of capitalist development and a corresponding change in both the relations of production and the dynamics of the class struggle. At issue here was the emergence of a progressive cycle in Latin American politics—a pink and red tide of left-leaning 'progressive regimes' committed to moving beyond neoliberalism.²⁸ Although there is a continuing debate on this question of regime change it would appear to be the result of a number of changing conditions. One was the widespread disenchantment with and rejection of neoliberalism, which can be attributed to the activism of the social movements formed in the 1990s in the resistance against the policies pursued by the neoliberal regimes in the 1990s in a second cycle of 'structural reforms'.²⁹ Another was the formation of a new consensus on the need to bring the state back into the development process and bring about a more inclusive form of development.³⁰ A third 'development' related to changes in the world capitalist system and global economy: the ascension of China as an economic power and an associated spurt in the demand for energy and natural resources to fuel the expanding economies and 'emerging markets' of China and the BRICS.

One of several outcomes of these changing conditions was the emergence and formation of what some analysts conceptualized as a post-neoliberal state, with reference to the 'inclusionary state activism' of the 'progressive' (center-left) political regimes formed in this conjuncture of the capitalist development process.³¹ A second outcome was a heated and as yet unsettled debate regarding the pros and cons of several economic models: the *neoliberal* model promoted by the United States and the guardians of the new world order, and used by the

government in Mexico, Colombia, Peru (and undoubtedly by Argentina after Macri's ascension to state power); the *neodevelopmentalist* model used until 2016 as a guide to macroeconomic development policy in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay; the *Vivir Bien* or *Bien Vivir* model used to frame a strategy of national development and as a guide to policy by the current governments of Bolivia and Ecuador; and the model of *twenty-first century socialism* constructed by Hugo Chávez and still pursued—albeit in conditions of a vicious class struggle—by the Maduro regime in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Not only is the Maduro regime in crisis and beset by forces released in an ongoing class struggle but each of these development models and associated political projects in their own way are immersed in crisis.³² One of the conditions of this crisis is the pursuit of so many governments in the region (mostly in South America, as it happens) of an extractivist strategy of natural resource development and the export of these resources in primary commodity form.³³ All of the governments mentioned above, no matter the policy regime (neoliberal or post-neoliberal), have elected to incorporate extractivism—natural resource extraction and primary commodity exports—into their national development plan, fomenting a heated theoretical and political debate, but pushing each government into a crisis.

The implementation by various governments of extractivist model of national development—extractivism or neoextractivism, as the case might be—have not only generated conditions of a profound political crisis (and the apparent end of a progressive cycle in Latin American politics)³⁴ but also an extended policy and theoretical debate on the contradictions and pitfalls of extractivism—particularly as regards its negative socioenvironmental impacts but also what economists have described as a 'resource curse',³⁵ not to mention the Dutch disease and a propensity toward social exclusion, as well as the concentration of benefits of resource-led growth together with enormous social economic and environment costs, the brunt of which are borne by communities contiguous to the sites of extractive operations.

In the vortex of the debates and the political conflicts that surround extractivism some peasant and indigenous movements have not only engaged the resulting political conflicts and a class struggle over access to the commons, but they have joined the theoretical and political debate regarding projects of alternative development or alternatives to development.³⁶

Many of the organizations in these movements have coalesced and formed an alliance to the purpose of sharing experiences and ideas. In the case of *Via Campesina*, an international movement of 'peasants' (basically small-landowning cooperative and family farmers committed to an anti-capitalist non-corporate model of agricultural development), as well as *Via Campesina Brazil*, a key player in *Via Campesina*, these ideas have crystallized into a vision and model of a sustainable form of agriculture based on the virtues of small-scale production for local markets and the principles of an agroecological revolution that has swept across academe—agroecology as part of a broader program of agrarian reform.^{37,38} These peasant movements, together with the continental alliance of indigenous

communities and social movements (ALAI), are all but united in their opposition to the corporate agribusiness model and the capitalist global food regime.³⁹

THE RESISTANCE, CLASS STRUGGLE, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ON THE EXPANDING FRONTIER OF EXTRACTIVE CAPITAL

A class struggle over access to the commons (land and natural resources) and associated conflicts have been part of Latin America for a long time, a fundamental legacy of the capitalist development process, which at the beginning involves the resistance and the struggle of communities against conditions conceptualized by David Harvey⁴⁰ in terms of a process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’—the separation of the direct producers from the land and their means of production, and a resulting proletarianization’ (conversion of a peasantry into a proletariat and a working class of some sort or the other). In these terms the capitalist development of the forces of production in the agricultural sector, and the corresponding process of productive and social transformation, is advanced in two ways. First, by exploiting the mass—and, according to Sir Arthur Lewis, the ‘unlimited supply’—of surplus rural labor generated by the transition toward capitalism. And secondly, (according to Ruy Mauro Marini)⁴¹ by means of ‘superexploitation’—remunerating or ‘rewarding’ labor (working class and the small-landholding direct producers on the periphery of the system) at below its cost of production. This is the fundamental form taken by capitalism, namely, the exploitation of labor. However, capitalism also takes another form: extractivism—the extraction of natural capital, the wealth of natural resources bound up in land—and the transfer of these resources from the periphery to the center of the system. This is the dominant form taken by capitalism in Latin America prior to the twentieth century.⁴²

Capitalism in the form of natural resource extraction is bound up with the beginnings of the world capitalist system in the fifteenth century. However, in recent decades—with the massive inflows of ‘resource-seeking’ capital in the form of FDI (what we might describe as the ‘new geoeconomics of capital’)—there has been a pronounced shift toward extractivism as a development strategy (the second pillar of the new development model used by many governments, and, as an adjunct to this strategy, toward a ‘(re) primarization of exports’.⁴³

This ‘development’ is reflected in the increased use of landgrabbing (‘large-scale foreign investments in the acquisition of land’), commodification (via privatization of the means of production and access to natural resources such as water), concessions to explore and extract metals and minerals, violation of territorial rights, and environmental degradation as mechanisms of ‘accumulation by dispossession’—the accumulation of extractive capital—what some analysts have conceptualized as a new way of ‘enclosing the commons’.⁴⁴

Under these conditions, both the resistance and the class struggle have necessarily assumed new forms, as have the social movements that can best be understood as an expression of the class struggle in the current conjuncture of capitalist development.

There is a burgeoning literature that analyzes the emergence of socioenvironmental conflicts related to the extractive sector—to the negative impacts of extractivism on both the environment and rural livelihoods and thus the sustainability of an indigenous culture and an entire way of life environment. This literature can be placed into four categories. First, there are those studies that explore the sociopolitical and cultural implications of such conflicts for development policies and processes.⁴⁵

A second set of studies stress the implications of these conflicts on state-building processes as part of shifting interrelations between social movements, corporations and states.⁴⁶ And a third set of studies explores the negative socioenvironmental impacts of extractivism and the political responses of local communities directly affected by them, which is to demand respect for their territorial and human rights and the accountability of powerful state and corporate interests for undermining their sources of livelihood.⁴⁷ As Martinez-Alier⁴⁸ sees it, conflicts emerge when there are asymmetric expectations and understandings concerning the economic, ecological, social, and cultural value of different resource-sensitive projects. And a fourth small group of studies have begun to explore the regional and international dimensions of extractivism and related socioenvironmental conflicts.⁴⁹

Another set of studies and approach, one used in the mainstream of development thinking and practice, focuses on how these conflicts can be managed.⁵⁰ From this conflict resolution or resource management perspective the problems associated with the political economy of natural resource extraction are not systemic or endemic but can be ‘managed’, while the negative impacts and associated social and environmental costs mitigated. Resource conflict management, it is argued, is a matter of ‘corporate social responsibility’ and ‘good governance’, which includes engagement of the communities, even ‘civil society’, in the process of securing a ‘social license’ to operate (explore and extract) in addition to a government-issued concession to explore for resources and a license to operate.

In addition and in contrast to these studies, a number of scholars have begun to explore the social class dynamics of these socioenvironmental movements that have sprung up on the latest frontier of capitalist development.⁵¹ From this class struggle perspective, extractivism represents the emergence of a new form of rentier capitalism based on the pillage of natural resources rather than the more customary exploitation of labor. It can also be seen as a new form of imperialism, which, according to Girvan,⁵² in the historical context of the Americas has always involved pillage.

From this perspective the socioenvironmental conflicts and resource wars that have surrounded the contemporary operations of extractive capital are viewed as a new form of ‘primitive accumulation’ as Marx had it (to separate the direct producers from their means of production, forcing their expulsion from the land and leading to their proletarianization). Essentially, it is argued that the operations of extractive capital represent a new form of enclosing the commons—denying the indigenous and farming communities close to the mines and extractive operations of capital access to the global commons of

land, water, and resources, and denying any respect for the territorial rights claimed by the indigenous communities.

The mechanism of 'enclosure' in this analysis is the concession granted by the state to the corporations to explore for and extract the sub-soil resources (oil and gas, minerals and metals) from land occupied or owned by these communities or their members. Therefore, the form taken by the resistance on the new frontier of extractive capital includes rejection of the economic model used by the governments to make public policy in the area of economic development; the demand that their territorial and human rights be respected; and, above all, protests against the negative impact of extractivism on both their livelihoods and the environment on which they depend.

THE CLASS STRUGGLE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT DYNAMICS OF THE RESISTANCE

A class analysis of these socioenvironmental conflicts and associated struggles and social movements is concerned with three sets of issues, each a matter of debate. The first has to do with the social base of these social movements, establishing the social relation of community members to the system of economic production. The second concerns the matter of understanding the relationship of the communities affected by the operations of extractive capital with both the state and with the companies involved, as well as the relationship of capital to the state. A third issue, which is not explored here, concerns the political dynamics of the broader class struggle.

In regard to the first issue, the prevailing view is to see community members as a proletariat, the latest victims of the capitalist development process in which the direct producers are separated from their means of production as a mechanism of capital accumulation—'accumulation by dispossession', as Harvey⁵³ has it. In the classical context analyzed by Marx the mechanism of accumulation—the generation of a proletariat, or a class for hire, and with it a reserve army of surplus labor—involved the enclosure of the commons needed by the communities of small-scale direct producers, or peasant farmers, to subsist. In the contemporary context analysts have established two mechanisms of dispossession: one is large-scale foreign investment in the acquisition of land, or 'landgrabbing'⁵⁴; the other is enclosure of the commons by means of a public policy of privatization and commodification, converting natural resources into means of production and productive resources or assets.

Extractivism in the current context has taken and is taking diverse forms, including 'landgrabbing'⁵⁵ and enclosures of the commons: large-scale foreign investments in the acquisition of land with the aim of securing access to natural resources for extraction and sale on the world market. Although it has not generated significant forces of resistance or any social movements, it has resulted in a relation and condition of conflict with the local communities who are pressured to abandon the land either by the local agents of the foreign or local investors, or by legislative or administrative fiat.

A second dimension of the class struggle on the expanding frontier of capitalism is the relation of the communities negatively impacted by the mining of minerals and metals, and by the commodification and extraction of water and other resources, to the companies in the extractive industry and to the state. The relation of the communities to these companies is one of economic exploitation and political conflict. However, their relation to the State, or the role of the state in this struggle, is a different matter and very much at issue. By a number of accounts,⁵⁶ because of a coincidence of economic interest (resource rents and additional fiscal resources for the government, super-profit for the companies) the state tends to side with the companies in their relation of conflict with the communities negatively affected by the operations of extractive capital.

A revealing example of this is Peru under President Humala who came to power in June 2011 with a promise to support local communities against the mining companies (on a platform of ‘water before gold’). However, when open and violent protests erupted between the Canadian mining company Minera Afrodita and the Awajun indigenous communities in the town of Bagua, the Armed Forces under his watch turned against the protesters, resulting in 33 deaths, 200 wounded, and 83 detentions. This event on June 29, 2013, was the last episode of a long process of protests led by the Awajun to oppose the concessions of exploration and exploitation rights to Afrodita in an area located in the Cordillera del Condor region where there has been a long-standing controversy between the government, indigenous communities, and the company.⁵⁷

The main ‘actors’ involved in this ‘politics of resistance’ against the incursions of capital in the exploitation of natural resources—and the Minera Afrodita-Awajun struggle is but one of many such struggles all across the region—are the predominantly indigenous communities that populate the areas ceded by the different governments (be they neoliberal or post-neoliberal in form) to the foreign mining companies for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources in their territorial lands. But they also include an array of civil society groups and NGOs that have been drawn into the conflict between global capital and local communities. And the forces of resistance to extractive capitalism and resource imperialism also include new social movements formed to protest against the damage caused by resource extraction to the environment, as well as against its effects on the health and livelihoods of the local population and the miners themselves, who face life-threatening working conditions and health concerns. In other words, many of these movements are mounted by those negatively affected by the impacts of resource extraction and mining operations (e.g., *Red Mexicana de Afectados por la Minería* and the *Confederación Nacional de Comunidades del Perú Afectadas por la Minería* or CONACAMI).

In the pre-neoliberal era, the resistance and the popular movements in Latin America were primarily concerned with demands related to the land struggle and the labor struggle for improved wages and working conditions. But in the 1990s the popular movement, with the agency of peasant-based social organizations and indigenous communities, mobilized against the state in the form of the

neoliberal policies of the governing regimes. By the end of the decade, some of these movements, led by semi-proletarianized indigenous peasant farmers and rural landless workers (e.g., in Ecuador, Chiapas, Brazil, and Bolivia) had achieved one major gain in the struggle, which was to place the existing neoliberal regimes on the defensive and provoke a legitimization crisis regarding the economic model used by most governments to make public policy.

By the turn of the twenty-first century this model (neoliberal globalization) for all intents and purposes was dead, no longer able to serve its legitimating function or as a template for public policy. The social movements, organized by what remained of the peasantry as well as the mass of rural landless workers and the indigenous communities, had played an important role in advancing the class struggle—in creating the conditions for regime change and a new progressive cycle in Latin American politics. Thus, the road to state power by the political left in the first decade of the new century was paved by the activism of the social movements in their resistance against the neoliberal policy agenda.

However, the role played by the social movements in the next and current phase of the class struggle is not so clear. On the one hand, the collective organized protests against the destructive operations of extractive capital engaged and mobilized the forces of resistance not just against the policy agenda of the governing regimes, but to some extent turned them against the operative capitalist system. Thus, the so-called politics of natural resource extraction has turned out to be not merely a matter of better resource management, a post-neoliberal regulatory regime, a more socially inclusive development strategy or a new form of governance—securing the participation of local communities and stakeholders in the strategic decisions of policy makers. The opposition to, and resistance against, the neoliberal policy agenda took form not only in the search for an alternative form of (capitalist) development but as a rejection of the underlying system: ‘post-development’, one might argue.^{58,59} On the other hand, the new social movements formed in recent decades on the frontier of extractive capital in the Latin American countryside have not been able to engage with the broader class struggle, consigning themselves to historical irrelevance in the ongoing process of social change and transformative development.

The anti-extractivist protesters and the resistance of those negatively impacted by the destructive operations of extractive capital—as for example, in the Mexican context, the *Asamblea Nacional de Afectados Ambientales* (ANAA)—have garnered international activist (and academic) recognition as part of a global environmental justice movement (rather than as a class struggle). But, just like the officials and functionaries of the neoliberal regimes found up and down the Pacific Coast (excluding Ecuador) from Chile to Mexico, officials of the post-neoliberal regimes formed in the recent ‘progressive cycle of’ of Latin American politics do not embrace these protestors and critics. Indeed, like Rafael Correa, President of a country that has gone so far as to embed the post-development concept of *Buen Vivir* in the Constitution, in a coincidence of economic interest with Global Capital has branded the leaders of the socio-environmental (anti-extractive) movements as criminals

and terrorists who are prepared to put the environment ahead of the country's poor and its development.⁶⁰ Dismissing or criminalizing these anti-extractivist social movement activists and their supporters in the international and NGO community—or, in the case of Alvaro García Linera, Bolivia's Vice-President, viewing them as stooges of US imperialism or outside interests—the agents and officials of the regimes formed in what remains of the 'progressive cycle' have denounced them as provocateurs or environmental terrorists.^{61,62} Thus, the politics of resistance against natural resource extraction, and the social movements formed in this resistance, resolves into a particular dimension of the broader class struggle—combatting the workings of capitalism and mobilizing the forces of resistance located in the indigenous communities of semi-proletarianized peasant farmers.

This is one conclusion that can be drawn from our review of social movement dynamics in the current context—that these socioenvironmental movements are in the vanguard of the resistance. But another conclusion is that these movements do not fundamentally challenge the power structure, the ruling class or the underlying system. As argued by Raul Zibechi,⁶³ and other theorists of the new social movements formed on the frontier of extractive capital, these movements are not anti-systemic; the social and political struggles that they convey tend to be episodic and localized, and are not revolutionary in any way. They are disconnected from the main arena of the class struggle, which revolves around the capital-labor relation and the politics of regime change. With the exception of Bolivia, where it could be argued that the indigenous social movements played a crucial role in Evo Morales' ascent to state power, the social movements in the current context of Latin American politics are not positioned, nor have the power, to challenge the guardians of the dominant capitalist system. For this we have to await the resurgence of the labor movement and a much-needed reconstruction of the political Left.

The Disconnect between the Old and New Left

In Latin America as a whole, what was striking in the political situation in the late 1990s, on the eve of a new millennium, was the minimal influence that the former leftists of the 1960s had on the third-wave revolutionaries of the 1990s. The halo effect of the past no longer held. The eruption of peasant land occupations, the politics of direct action created tension between the legalist, electoral politics of the second wave and their pragmatic center-left coalitions. The new revolutionaries called on the center-left to support their struggles, to pass progressive legislation, to resign from repressive regimes even as they developed the strategy of building autonomous centers of popular power in communities, cooperatives and provincial municipalities.

It appeared to be only a question of time until the right-leaning electoral coalitions and the left-moving new sociopolitical movements would part ways. Popular disenchantment with center-left governments was provoked by their endemic corruption, and by their resort to austerity, repression and privatization. Thus, formerly revolutionary or leftist politicians, associated with the

governments in, for example, Chile, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, all brought discredit upon themselves and the 'Left'. The insurgent politicians of the 1980s who failed to win power nationally were undermined in a different way. Their electoral bids were defeated and they lost whatever mystique they might have had. With some local exceptions, they failed to use electoral interventions as a way of building movements and propagating a long-term program of social transformation.

Even the PT in Brazil and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in Mexico lacked a clear program for tackling the crises in their countries, having been outflanked by agile new forces on the Right (Cardoso and PAN) and new extra-parliamentary movements on the Left. They risked being seen as pure politicians waiting their turn. Nevertheless, if Cárdenas were to win election as mayor of Mexico City, activists hoped that a PRD administration would clip the wings of the repressive forces and use municipal initiatives to strengthen popular movements.

As for Marcos, he was keenly aware of the pitfalls of the peace accords in Central America and the limited nature of 'democratization' under the auspices of the military and the IMF in much of the rest of Latin America. Even where the Left advanced electorally, strategic retreats were hidden. In El Salvador the peace accords of 1992 allowed for electoral advances by the FMNL, with the Left winning control of the capital, San Salvador, for the first time in March 1997. The peasant activists of the Asociación Democrática Campesina naturally welcomed the end of the death squad's reign of terror and the advent of a local administration that was more likely to be open to pressure. But government policies had hit poor peasants and rural laborers hard while the FMNL's orientation toward 'productive capitalism' led to a reduced concern for their interests. In these last elections abstentions ran at 60 percent, with many poorer or rural voters staying at home. Although landlord and employer intimidation was much reduced, nevertheless, four activists were killed during the election period.

Politics and Revolutionary Ethics

As the Owl of Minerva spread its wings over the decade, the twentieth century and the old millennium, Marcos offered a new type of social movement leadership. For whatever it meant, the differences between Marcos and the other peasant leaders were obvious: Marcos was an intellectual of urban origins with a literary flair unmatched among his counterparts in Latin America. Yet, Marcos was equally concerned with the cultural, subjective, and historical dimensions of social revolution. While thinking 'globally', Marcos and the new leadership were grounded in 'national' and regional realities with a sensibility for the nuances of local customs, traditions and norms. None of the social movement leaders at the time followed a 'model' extrapolated from other countries, past or present. Most leaders were conscious of the need to avoid personality cults and to be responsive to the rank and file. While the new leaders were excellent organizers and effective leaders, they were neither charismatic spellbinders nor

apparatchiks. They ruled, as Marcos liked to repeat, by obeying (at least to some degree) and did not force their ideas on the militants through emotional fervor; they sought instead to convince through discussion.

The resurgence of the new peasant and urban movements of the 1990s resulted from the fact that they were defending vital interests and that no one questioned the personal integrity of their leaders. If they lost these qualities, the movements would dissolve or become fragmented into electoral clienteles. Such groups were not simply 'new social movements'. They retained and developed Marxism in new circumstances and adapted to new class actors engaged in novel types of struggle with the clear perspective of changing the national, if not international, structure of political and economic power. Former miners became coca cultivators, indigenous communities linked to urban intellectuals became guerrilla leaders, rural landless workers built anti-liberal power blocs, Guaraní-speaking peasants challenged the hegemony of drug and contraband 'capitalists'. It would appear that Marxism could be a creative tool in coming to terms with these new protagonists of social change.

An encouraging feature of the new movements was that, confronting an environmentally rapacious socioeconomic system, their resistance was often infused with a strong commitment to the defense of a sustainable ecology. The indigenous people's identification with their native earth remains a powerful strand of rural radicalism. And since women so often bear the brunt of popular survival strategies, the new movements only thrived when they displayed a concern for women's issues and gender equality. While most of the nationally known leaders are still men, there were increasing numbers of women taking the lead at the community level. Where water supplies were polluted or traditional cultivation plots taken over by developers, it was very often the women in the forefront of the resulting popular struggles.⁶⁴

Also, many of the new leaders had a 'religious background', either directly or through their association with their members. The Zapatistas, for example, drew heavily on the consciousness-raising of the progressive Catholics of Chiapas, particularly Bishop Samuel Ruiz. Most of the original organizers of the MST came out of seminaries and rural pastoral movements. Some of the Paraguayan peasant leaders are sons and daughters of earlier militants organized in the Ligas Campesinas promoted by progressive church people; the Bolivian leadership drew on the spiritual traditions of the indigenous communities. Thus, popular religiosity fused with Marxism in a syncretic fashion. However, we should take care in not simply carrying over 1980s stereotypes. Catholic liberation theology remained a socially radical force, but in many countries its strength had waned, partly because of the Vatican's hostility and partly because of its partial recuperation in the NGO culture. Protestant and Pentecostal groups were also a dynamic and growing presence in many parts of Latin America, with a special appeal to the rural and urban poor, to women and to Indian and black populations—indeed, it is said that in Latin America there are now more Protestants than Catholics. In this connection Latin American Protestantism should be seen as the Left's keenest rival for the allegiance of the poor, channeling popular hostility toward the political establishment into

other-worldly directions and stimulating a culture of self-help and self-reform amongst the most deprived. While the established Left parties failed to respond to this challenge, the practical, extra-electoral or revolutionary orientation of the new movements equipped them well to do so.⁶⁵

Empire building is about the extraction of interest payments, the pillage of natural resources, and the large-scale transfer of public property to multinationals. Together, these forces in the 1990s, along with the machinations of neoliberal policies, put tremendous pressure on the Latin American social system. Since the 'local power structure' is located in the central cities, in this process of extraction and appropriation, the 'provinces' and the rural areas have been especially hard hit.

The logic of the expansion of the new peasant movements in the 1990s was intimately related to the internal transformations of the peasantry—politically, culturally, and economically—as well as a dialectical resistance to the extension of neoliberalism and the encroachment of imperialism. The displacement of educated peasants linked to modern urban centers created a new peasantry with modern organizational and media skills that linked agricultural activities to urban class struggle.

Notwithstanding the ebbing of the revolutionary tide of the peasant movement in the conditions of new millennium, it would be a serious mistake to dismiss the peasant movements of the 1990s as the last gasp of anti-neoliberal resistance and rebellion. In the 1990s, the Empire in Latin America flourished as never before, but at the same time the activism of the social movements slowed down or halted implementation of the neoliberal agenda, placing its advocates on the defensive and providing substantive gains to diverse populations engaged in the resistance and the struggle for survival and resistance.

The Empire struck and tore asunder the economic, cultural, and political fabric of Latin American societies. It assimilated a few and exploited many. But as the Left struck back—in the villages of Paraguay and Bolivia, in the rural squatter settlements of Brazil, and in the jungles of Mexico—a new movement that developed its own theory and wrote its own history took hold.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT DYNAMICS IN THE POST-NEOLIBERAL ERA

A class analysis of the post-neoliberal social movements is concerned with three sets of issues. The first has to do with the social base of these social movements, establishing the social relation of community members to the system of economic production. The second concerns the matter of understanding the relationship of the communities affected by the operations of extractive capital with both the state and with the companies involved, as well as the relationship of capital to the state. A third issue, which is not explored here, concerns the political dynamics of the associated class struggle.

On the first issue, the prevailing view is to see community members as a proletariat, the latest victims of the capitalist development process in which the direct producers are separated from their means of production as a mechanism of capital accumulation—'accumulation by dispossession', as Harvey has it.

In the classical context analyzed by Marx the mechanism of accumulation—the generation of a proletariat, or a class for hire, and with it a reserve army of surplus labor—involved the enclosure of the commons needed by the communities of small-scale direct producers, or peasant farmers, to subsist. In the contemporary context analysts have established two mechanisms of dispossession: one is large-scale foreign investment in the acquisition of land, or ‘landgrabbing’; the other is enclosure of the commons by means of a public policy of privatization and commodification, converting natural resources into means of production and productive resources or assets.

Extractivism in the current context is taking diverse forms, including ‘landgrabbing’⁶⁶ and enclosures of the commons: large-scale foreign investments in the acquisition of land with the aim of securing access to natural resources for extraction and sale on the world market. Although it has not generated significant forces of resistance or any social movements, it has resulted in a relation and condition of conflict with the local communities who are pressured to abandon the land either by the local agents of the foreign or local investors, or by legislative or administrative fiat.

A second dimension of the class struggle on the expanding frontier of capitalism is the relationship of the communities that are negatively impacted by the mining of minerals and metals, and by the commodification and extraction of water and other resources, to the companies in the extractive industry and the state. The relation of these communities to the companies is one of economic exploitation and political conflict. However, the role of the state in this struggle is very much at issue. By a number of accounts,⁶⁷ because of a coincidence of economic interest (resource rents and additional fiscal resources for the government, super-profit for the companies) the state tends to side with the companies in their relation of conflict with the communities negatively affected by the operations of extractive capital.

A good example of this is Peru under President Humala who came to power in June 2011 with a promise to support local communities against the mining companies (on a platform of ‘water before gold’). However, when open and violent protests erupted between the Canadian mining company Minera Afrodita and the Awajun indigenous communities in town of Bagua, during his term, the Armed Forces turned against the protesters, resulting in 33 deaths, 200 wounded and 83 detentions. This event on June 29, 2013, was the last episode of a long process of protests led by the Awajun to oppose the concessions of exploration and exploitation rights to Afrodita in an area located in the Cordillera del Condor region where there has been a long-standing controversy between the government, indigenous communities, and the company.⁶⁸

Prior to the decade of the 1990s, the resistance and the popular movements in Latin America were primarily concerned with issues of social class relating to the struggle over land in the countryside and wages and working conditions in the urban centers. In the 1990s, however, the popular movements, with the agency of class-based and community-based social movements, mobilized against the policies of the neoliberal state (and the governing regimes). By the end of the decade, a number of these movements, led by proletarianized peasant farmers,

rural landless workers, and indigenous communities (e.g., in Chiapas, Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia), achieved major gains in their struggle, placing the existing neoliberal regimes on the defensive and provoking a legitimization crisis for the neoliberal state. At the turn of the twenty-first century, for all intents and purposes, neoliberalism was in decline if not dead, no longer able to serve its legitimating function in regard to the idea of globalization and the new world order.

The key agents involved in this 'politics of resistance' against the imperial incursions of capital in the exploitation of natural resources—at least in the Latin American context—were and remain the predominantly indigenous communities that populate the areas ceded by the different governments (be they neoliberal or post-neoliberal in form) to the foreign mining companies for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources in their territorial lands. However, they also include a variety of civil society groups and NGOs that have been drawn into the conflict between global capital and local communities. And the forces of resistance to resource imperialism include new social movements formed to protest against the damage caused by resource extraction to the environment, as well as against its effects on the health and livelihoods of the local population and the miners themselves, who face life-threatening working conditions and health concerns. In other words, many of these movements are rooted in those negatively affected by the impacts of resource extraction and mining operations (e.g., *Red Mexicana de Afectados por la Minería* and the *Confederación Nacional de Comunidades del Perú Afectadas por la Minería* or CONACAMI).

The social actors who engage these forces of resistance use tactics such as marches and demonstrations, road and access blockades, and other forms of direct collective action to impede mining operations. According to a forum of people, communities and groups affected by the operations of mining capital, the exploitation of the region's mineral resources in 2009 had reached levels never before experienced (Foro de los Pueblos Indígenas Minería, Cambio Climático y Buen Vivir 2010). Of particular concern was the Amazon region, where abundant deposits of gold, bauxite, precious stones, manganese, uranium, and other materials are coveted by the companies operating in the mining sector.

Another concern was the perceived connection between the multinational corporations in the sector and a host of foundations and NGOs with an alleged humanitarian or religious concern for the environment and the livelihoods of indigenous peoples and communities. In this connection, Eddy Gómez Abreu, president of the *Parlamento Amazónico Internacional*, declared that they had 'incontrovertible evidence of these transnationals and foundations, under the cover of supposed ecological, religious or humanitarian concerns, collaborat[ing] in the effort to extract ... strategic minerals', as well as espionage and illegal medical experiments on the indigenous population.⁶⁹ In effect, he alleged that the mining companies regularly used foundations and other NGOs as one of their tactics to secure the consent of the local population to their projects and operations, and to manipulate them. If this is true, these foundations and NGOs continue the long, sordid history of European missionaries in the Americas of expropriating the lands of the indigenous, but in an updated form.

CONCLUSION

Each phase in the capitalist development of the productive resources is accompanied by a process of social transformation (corresponding social relations of production) and class struggle based on the resistance to this development. As we have seen this resistance generally takes the form of social movements—the labor movement and the land struggle in the 1950s–1970s, peasant (and indigenous) movements in resistance against the neoliberal policy agenda of governments in the 1990s, and the socio-environmental and other social movements resisting the advances and destructive consequences of extractive capital in the new millennium.

In the post-world War II context of capitalist development the resistance and the class struggle in Latin America primarily took the form of social movements. From the 1950s to the 1970s, that is, the era of the developmental capitalist state—the political landscape was dominated by variations of two types of social movements—the labor movement and the land struggle of the peasants.

By the end of the 1970s, a period of transition between two phases in the evolution of the capitalist system in Latin America, the movements that had been formed in the course of the land struggle—the struggle of dispossessed or landless agricultural producers and peasant farmers to reconnect to the land ('land reform', in the dominant political discourse)—had been either defeated or brought to ground by a combination of two tactics deployed by the State, acting in the interest and on behalf of the capitalist class: (i) to offer the 'rural poor' (the dispossessed peasants) a non-confrontational alternative to revolutionary change (to join the social movements) in the form of 'development' (technical and financial 'assistance' with international cooperation); and (ii) deployment of its repressive apparatus of armed force—repression.

As for the labor movement, it succumbed to diverse pressures and forces released in the process of capitalist development—the destruction of built-up forces of production in both industry and agriculture. Under the impact of forces released in this process the industrial proletariat, formed over several decades of capitalist development in the form of industrialization and modernization, disappeared—its capacity to organize and resist the expansion of capital undermined where not destroyed.⁷⁰

In the neoliberal era that opened up in the mid-1980s with the installation of a 'new world order' of neoliberal globalization, the labor movement (formed around the capital-labor wage relation in the form of the labor movement, and predominantly concerned with improving wages and working conditions for the working class) was but a shadow of its former self, while the land reform movement (i.e., the State's land reform program) was officially declared to be dead. However, in hindsight the activism of the social movements in the class struggle and the resistance to the expansion of capital and the consolidation of capitalism in the region by no means had come to an end. It simply changed its form under changing conditions.

In the 1990s there was a resurgence of social movement activism, but this time not as a land and labor struggle but in the form of resistance to the neo-

liberal policy agenda and led by landless and semi-proletarianized peasants and the indigenous communities of peasant farmers. As it turned out this social movement activism was a critical factor in the transition toward a new phase of capitalist development at the turn of the twenty-first century and a new progressive cycle in Latin American politics based on a seafaring of regime change, inclusive state activism, and class struggle on the expanding frontier of extractive capital.

The growing protest movement against mining capital and extractivism in the post-neoliberal era has engaged the forces of resistance not just against neoliberalism and globalization, but against the operative capitalist system. Thus, the so-called politics of natural resource extraction is not merely a matter of better resource management, a post-neoliberal regulatory regime, a more socially inclusive development strategy or a new form of governance—securing the participation of local communities and stakeholders in decisions and policies in which they have a vital interest. But given the interests that the state represents, and the coincidence of these interests with those of the ‘transnational capitalist class’ (to use the phrase of some globalization sociologists), the officials and managers of the post-neoliberal state generally side with capital against labor and have not reacted well to the civil society organizations that criticize or resist their mineral policies or extractive projects. The anti-extractivist protests in the region have received international activist (and academic) recognition as part of a global environmental justice movement, but the agents and progressive officials of the post-neoliberal states simply ignore them—and proceed with their geopolitical project: to advance the exploitation of the country’s natural resources by global capital against the public interest. Thus, the politics of natural resource extraction resolves into a matter of class struggle—of combatting the workings of capitalism and imperialism in the economic interests of the dominant class, and mobilizing the forces of resistance, found in the indigenous communities of semi-proletarianized peasant farmers, against these interests.

NOTES

1. The analysis of Latin American social movement dynamics in this chapter is based on a more extended analysis found in J. Petras and H. Veltmeyer, *What’s Left in Latin America* (Ashgate Publishing, 2009); J. Petras and H. Veltmeyer, *Social Movements in Latin America: Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
2. J. Burdick, P. Oxhorn, and K.M. Roberts (eds.), *Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America? Societies and Politics at the Crossroads* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); F. Gaudichaud, *El volcán latinoamericano. Izquierdas, movimientos sociales y neoliberalismo en América Latina*, Otramérica (2012), <http://blogs.otramerica.com/editorial>; M. Cameron and E. Hershberg (eds.), *Latin America’s Left Turns: Politics, Policies, and Trajectories of Change* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010); Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts (eds.), *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011); Petras and Veltmeyer, *What’s Left in Latin America*; Petras and Veltmeyer, *Social Movements*

- in Latin America*; E. Sader, *The New Mole: Paths of the Latin American Left* (London: Verso Books, 2011); E. Silva, *Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
3. See J. Petras and H. Veltmeyer, "Neoliberalism and the Dynamics of Capitalist Development in Latin America" in Berch Berberoglu (ed.), *Globalization in the Twenty-First Century* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 57–86; H. Veltmeyer, "Neoliberalism and Imperialism in Latin America: Dynamics and Responses," *International Review of Modern Sociology* 33 (2007), Special Issue.
 4. J. Petras and F. Leiva with H. Veltmeyer, *Poverty and Democracy in Chile* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).
 5. W. Robles and H. Veltmeyer, *The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Brazil: The Landless Rural Workers Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); J.P. Stedile and S. Frei, *A luta pela terra no Brasil* (São Paulo: Editorial Pagin Alberta, 1993); J.P. Stédile and B. Fernandes Mançano, *Brava gente: a trajetória do MST e a luta pela terra no Brasil* (São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo, 1999).
 6. A. Contreras Baspineiro, *La Marcha Historico* (Cochabamba: CEDIB, 1994).
 7. H. Veltmeyer, "New Social Movements in Latin America: The Dynamics of Class and Identity," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 25, no. 1 (October 1997).
 8. J. Petras and H. Veltmeyer, *The Class Struggle in Latin America: Contemporary Dynamics* (London: Routledge, 2017).
 9. E. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes, 1914–1991* (London: Abacus, 1994), pp. 8, 289.
 10. Based on interviews with Pedro Stedile, leader of the MST, and Evo Morales, leader of the Cocaleros en Bolivia. Many of the names of the peasant unions were taken from mining centers of Oruro.
 11. Interview with regional leaders of the MST of Brazil at the I Curso Latinoamericano de Formación, March 19–29, 1995, Instituto Cajamar São Paulo.
 12. Interviews with Brazilian rural women of the MST at a Conference on Peasant Women in Rural Struggles, June 22, 1996, Cajamar, São Paulo.
 13. MST, Dirección Nacional, *Como organizar a la masa* (Sao Paulo: MST, 1991).
 14. Based on interviews at the time with MST leaders João Pedro Stedile and Ademar Bobo Egidio Brunetto in March 19–29, 1995. See also *Documento Básico do MST*, pp. 24–30.
 15. Interview with Ina Meireles, President of CUT, Rio de Janeiro, May 17, 1996, and Vito Giannotti, Educational Director, Aeronautical Workers, Rio de Janeiro, May 16, 1996.
 16. In Bolivia, during a seminar presented by the authors in June 1996 at the training school for mostly coca-growing peasants in La Paz, the central topic of debate was the relation of class to nation. In Paraguay the issue was less clearly defined, although in everyday conversations with peasant leaders it was clear that the Guaraní cultural-linguistic universe was central.
 17. At a seminar in Cajamar on May 21, 1996 attended by the authors there were over 80 peasant women leaders from all regions of Brazil discussing such issues as gender equality in cooperatives, greater leadership roles, and greater acceptance of married women attending cadre schools. In a seminar presented by Petras, the class-gender framework was generally accepted and the debate flowed within the parameters of a rejection of bourgeois (classless) feminism and class reductionist economism.

18. R. Burbach, "Roots of the Postmodern Rebellion in Chiapas," *New Left Review* 205 (May–June, 1994), pp. 113–124.
19. J. Holloway, *Change the World Without Taking Power* (London: Pluto Press, 2002).
20. In Mexico the exclusion of the small-and middle-sized enterprises from the neo-liberal model, led to the formation of a 750,000 strong organization of indebted farmers, *El Barzon*. Although in recent years, the dynamics of *El Barzon* has significantly declined in the 1990s it was a force to be reckoned with by the neoliberal regime.
21. Cf. interview with João Pedro Stedile of the MST, May 13, 1996.
22. This was partly the case at least in some industries and factories in Argentina. The Montoneros and People's Revolutionary Army did have influence in certain unions, particularly in Cordoba and Rosario. But this was generally not the case in the major metallurgical industries in the Greater Buenos Aires area.
23. Chile was the classic case during the late 1960s and early 1970s. See James Petras, *Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
24. A typical list of declarations from the Foro appears in *América Libre* (Buenos Aires), No. 7, July 1995, pp. 115–118.
25. Interview with MST leader João Pedro Stedile, 13 May 1996.
26. An example of the redistributive and productionist approach of the MST—and a favorable response from the mass media—is found in 'De sem-terra a produtor rural', *A Notícia*, 31 May 1996, p. 1. On the data see *Brazil Report: Latin American Research Report*, 19 September 1996, pp. 6–7.
27. Based on interviews (May 13, 1996) with regional leaders of the MST, Santa Catarina.
28. Jean Grugel and Pia Riggirozzi, "Post Neoliberalism: Rebuilding and Reclaiming the State in Latin America," *Development and Change* 43, no. 1 (2012), pp. 1–21; Levitsky and Roberts, *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*; L. Macdonald and A. Ruckert, *Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
29. J. Petras and H. Veltmeyer, "Social Movements and the State: Political Power Dynamics in Latin America," *Critical Sociology* 32, no. 1 (2006), pp. 83–104.
30. R.B. Infante and O. Sunkel, "Chile: Hacia un desarrollo inclusive," *Revista CEPAL* 10, no. 97 (2009), pp. 135–154.
31. Patrick S. Barrett, Daniel Chávez, and César A. Rodríguez Garavito (eds.), *The New Latin American Left: Utopia Reborn* (London: Pluto, 2008); Ben Fine and K.S. Jomo (eds.), *The New Development Economics: After the Washington Consensus* (London: Zed Books, 2006); J. Petras and H. Veltmeyer, *Social Movements and State Power: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador* (London: Pluto Press, 2005).
32. Petras and Veltmeyer, *The Class Struggle in Latin America*.
33. E. Gudynas, "Diez tesis urgentes sobre el nuevo extractivismo. Contextos y demandas bajo el progresismo sudamericano actual," in Política y Sociedad (ed.), *Extractivismo* (Quito: CLAES/CAAP, 2009), pp. 187–225. Available from <http://extractivismo.com/documentos/capitulos/GudynasExtractivismoSociedadDesarrollo09.pdf>.
34. On the policy and political dynamics of this progressive cycle see C. Katz, "Is South America's 'Progressive Cycle' At an End? Neo-Developmentalist Attempts

- and Socialist Projects,” *The Bullet*, E-Bulletin No. 1229 (March 4, 2016); Gaudichaud, *El volcán latinoamericano. Izquierdas, movimientos sociales y neo-liberalismo en América Latina*; and Petras and Veltmeyer, *The Class Struggle in Latin America*.
35. A. Acosta, *La maldición de la abundancia* (Quito: Comité Ecuménico de Proyectos CEP/Ediciones Abya-Yala, 2009); A. Acosta, “Extractivismo y neoextractivismo: dos caras de la misma maldición,” in M. Lang and D. Mokrami (ed.), *Mas allá del Desarrollo* (Quito: Abya Yala, 2011); R.M. Auty, *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis* (London: Routledge, 1993).
 36. Abya Yala, *Diálogo de Alternativas y Alianzas de los Movimientos Indígenas, Campesinos y Sociales del Abya Yala*. Minga Informativa de Movimientos Sociales, La Paz, 26 (2009).
 37. Robles and Veltmeyer, *The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Brazil*; Via Campesina, *Agrarian Reform in the 21st Century: Building a New Vision, Redefining Strategies, and Celebrating Victories*, Press Release (July 19, 2012); Via Campesina-Brazil, Por qué nos movilizamos? ALAI-América Latina en Movimiento, Asamblea Popular (Junio 10, 2008). <http://alainet.org/active/24605&langes>.
 38. “The MST and Via Campesina have developed a common understanding, a common reading, of the historical evolution of capitalism in Brazil. We had four centuries of what might be called the “agro-export model”, which was inaugurated by colonial capitalism. Industrial capitalism was not really implanted until 1930 [as] a model of dependent industrialization, because it was so highly dependent on foreign capital’ see João Pedro Stedile, “The Class Struggles in Brazil: The Perspective of the MST,” *Socialist Register* 44 (2008), pp. 193–216.
 39. Abya Yala, *Diálogo de Alternativas y Alianzas de los Movimientos Indígenas, Campesinos y Sociales del Abya Yala*.
 40. D. Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
 41. Ruy Mauro Marini, *Subdesarrollo y revolución*, 5th ed. (México: Siglo XXI Editores, 1974) was one of the few exponents of ‘dependency theory’ who explained the dynamics of uneven capitalist development in terms of a Marxist theory of labour exploitation. He argued that development in the centre of the world system was based on ‘super-exploitation’, that is, remunerating the labour of workers and producers in peripheral social formations not at its value (exploitation) but below its value (superexploitation). He also elaborated a theory of class struggle and the resistance to the superexploitation of workers and peasants in the form and with the agency of revolutionary social movements.
 42. N. Girvan, “Extractive Imperialism in Historical Perspective,” in J. Petras and H. Veltmeyer (eds.), *Extractive Imperialism in the Americas* (Leiden: Brill Books, 2014), pp. 49–61.
 43. J. Cypher, *Neoextractivismo y Primarización: ¿la subida y decadencia de los términos del intercambio en América del Sur?* Presentation at the International Seminar ‘Como Sembrar el Desarrollo en América Latina’, UNAM—IIE, México, DF (October 29–31, 2012).
 44. S. Spronk and J.R. Webber, “Struggles Against Accumulation by Dispossession in Bolivia: The Political Economy of Natural Resource Contention,” *Latin American Perspectives* 34, no. 2 (March 2007), pp. 31–47.
 45. D. Tetreault, “Mexico: The Political Ecology of Mining,” in H. Veltmeyer and J. Petras (eds.), *The New Extractivism* (London: Zed Books, 2014), pp.

- 172–191; P. Collier and A.J. Venables, *Plundered Nations? Successes and Failures in Natural Resource Extraction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
46. A. Bebbington, “The New Extraction: Rewriting the Political Ecology of the Andes?” *NACLA Report on the America* (September/October 2009), pp. 12–20.
 47. S. Polischuk, Massacres of the Extractivist Industry: Poisoning and Criminalisation of Our Towns and Indigenous Peoples. *The Dawn*, Enero 5 (2016). <http://www.thedawn-news.org/2016/01/05/massacres-of-the-extractivist-industry-poisoning-and-criminalisation-of-our-towns-and-indigenous-peoples>; M. Saguier, *Minería para el desarrollo integral en la estrategia de UASUR*, Presentation to the Conference ISA/FLACSO, Buenos Aires (July 23–25, 2014); Tetreault, “Mexico: The Political Ecology of Mining,” pp. 172–191.
 48. J. Martinez-Alier, *The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation* (London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003).
 49. Collier and Venables, *Plundered Nations? Successes and Failures in Natural Resource Extraction*; Tetreault, “Mexico: The Political Ecology of Mining,” pp. 172–191; Henry Veltmeyer and James Petras, *The New Extractivism* (London: Zed Books, 2014).
 50. Collier and Venables, *Plundered Nations? Successes and Failures in Natural Resource Extraction*.
 51. Veltmeyer and Petras, *The New Extractivism*.
 52. Girvan, “Extractive Imperialism in Historical Perspective,” pp. 49–61.
 53. Harvey, *The New Imperialism*.
 54. S. Borras Jr., J. Franco, S. Gomez, C. Kay, and M. Spoor, “Land Grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean,” *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39, no. 3–4 (2012), pp. 845–872.
 55. Landgrabbing makes reference to what the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) terms ‘large-scale investments in the acquisition of land’. This phenomenon has expanded dramatically both in Latin America and elsewhere in the context of what might be described as ‘agro-extractivism’.
 56. See, e.g., the case studies in Veltmeyer and Petras, *The New Extractivism*.
 57. IWGIA—International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, *The Indigenous World 2010*, Copenhagen (2010). Available from http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0001_I_2010_EB.pdf.
 58. E. Gudynas, “Postdevelopment as Critique and Alternative,” in H. Veltmeyer and P. Bowles (eds.), *The Essential Critical Development Studies Guide* (London: Routledge, 2017).
 59. Post-development, as Gudynas understands it—that is, with reference to the indigenous concept of *Vivir Bien* (Bolivia) or *Buen vivir* (Ecuador): to live in social solidarity and harmony with nature—is anti-systemic (constructed within a ‘non-capitalist paradigm’) but as opposed to socialism and any form of ‘structuralism’ as it is to capitalism.
 60. The President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, just reelected to a second term, on February 4, 2013 affirmed the need for a ‘responsible use of the country’s vast reserve of non-renewable resources (i.e., with adequate environmental protection), as a necessary means of meeting the government’s commitment to eradicate poverty in the Amazonian region where these resources are found. In response to opponents and critics in the environmental and indigenous movements—who he branded as criminals, ‘environmental terrorists’ willing to sacrifice the country’s development on the altar of environmental idealism—he declared the government’s intention to promote the exploitation of minerals on

- a large scale. As he put it some days later (February 15) ‘we are not with the poor, not the multinationals’—adding that ‘we can no longer be beggars sitting on a bag full of gold’ (Latinoamérica, 24 de Febrero).
61. FIDH – Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos, *Criminalización de la protesta social frente a proyectos extractivos en Ecuador* (2015), www.fidh.org.
 62. The opposition of the most ‘progressive’ post-neoliberal regimes in the region, namely Bolivia and Ecuador, to the forces of resistance on the extractive frontier is a function of the regimes’ dependence on extractive capital, a dependence that has led these regimes to side with capital (the multinational corporations in the extractive sector) in their relation of conflict with the communities that are negatively impacted by their extractive operations. On this see Veltmeyer and Petras, *The New Extractivism*.
 63. R. Zibechi, *Territories in Resistance: A Cartography of Latin American Social Movements* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2012).
 64. See, for example, C. Fonseca and E. Mayer, *Comunidad y Producción en el Peru* (Lima, 1988), p. 187.
 65. M. Löwy, *The War of Gods: Religion and Politics in Latin America* (London: Verso, 1996).
 66. Landgrabbing makes reference to what the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations see FAO – Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, *The State of Food and Agriculture*, (Rome: FAO, 2011), terms ‘large-scale investments in the acquisition of land’. This phenomenon has expanded dramatically both in Latin America and elsewhere in the context of what we might term ‘agro-extractivism’. But our focus on extractivism in the mining sector precludes further discussion of the issue.
 67. See, e.g., the case studies in Veltmeyer and Petras, *The New Extractivism*.
 68. IWGIA—International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, *The Indigenous World 2010*.
 69. Sena-Fobomade, Se intensifica el extractivismo minero en América Latina, *Foro Boliviano sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo*, 03-02 (2011), <http://fobomade.org.bo/art-1109>.
 70. In theory—a theory shared by both mainstream development economists and Marxists—the advance of industrial capitalism (based on the ‘exploitation of the unlimited supplies of surplus rural labor’) would result in the ‘disappearance of the peasantry’. But under conditions found on the Latin American periphery of the world capitalist system in the 1980s it was the industrial proletariat that virtually disappeared with the formation of an informal sector of workers who were forced to ‘work on their own account rather than exchange their labor power against capital for a living wage.

REFERENCES

- Abya Yala. 2009. Diálogo de Alternativas y Alianzas de los Movimientos Indígenas, Campesinos y Sociales del Abya Yala. Minga Informativa de Movimientos Sociales, La Paz, 26.
- Acosta, A. 2009. *La maldición de la abundancia*. Quito: Comité Ecuménico de Proyectos CEP / Ediciones Abya-Yala.
- . 2011. Extractivismo y neoextractivismo: dos caras de la misma maldición. In *Mas allá del Desarrollo*, ed. M. Lang and D. Mokrami. Quito: Abya Yala.

- Auty, R.M. 1993. *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis*. London: Routledge.
- Barrett, Patrick S., Daniel Chávez, and César A. Rodríguez Garavito, eds. 2008. *The New Latin American Left: Utopia Reborn*. London: Pluto.
- Bebbington, A. 2009. The New Extraction: Rewriting the Political Ecology of the Andes? *NACLA Report on the America* September/October: 12–20.
- Borras, S., Jr., J. Franco, S. Gomez, C. Kay, and M. Spoor. 2012. Land Grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39 (3–4): 845–872.
- Burbach, R. 1994. Roots of the Postmodern Rebellion in Chiapas. *New Left Review* 205 (May–June): 113–124.
- Burdick, J., P. Oxhorn, and K.M. Roberts, eds. 2009. *Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America? Societies and Politics at the Crossroads*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cameron, M., and E. Hershberg, eds. 2010. *Latin America's Left Turns: Politics, Policies, and Trajectories of Change*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Collier, P., and A.J. Venables. 2011. *Plundered Nations? Successes and Failures in Natural Resource Extraction*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Contreras Baspineiro, A. 1994. *La Marcha Historico*. Cochabamba: CEDIB.
- Cypher, J. 2012. Neoextracciónismo y Primarización: ¿la subida y decadencia de los términos del intercambio en América del Sur? Presentation at the International Seminar ‘Como Sembrar el Desarrollo en América Latina’, UNAM—IIE, México, DF, October 29–31.
- FAO – Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. 2011. *The State of Food and Agriculture*. Rome: FAO.
- FIDH – Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos. 2015. *Criminalización de la protesta social frente a proyectos extractivos en Ecuador*. www.fidh.org.
- Fine, Ben, and K.S. Jomo, eds. 2006. *The New Development Economics: After the Washington Consensus*. London: Zed Books.
- Fonseca, C., and E. Mayer. 1988. *Comunidad y Producción en el Peru*. Lima.
- Gaudichaud, F. 2012. *El volcán latinoamericano. Izquierdas, movimientos sociales y neo-liberalismo en América Latina*. Otramérica. <http://blogs.otramerica.com/editorial>.
- Girvan, N. 2014. Extractive Imperialism in Historical Perspective. In *Extractive Imperialism in the Americas*, ed. J. Petras and H. Veltmeyer, 49–61. Leiden: Brill Books.
- Grugel, Jean, and Pia Riggirozzi. 2012. Post Neoliberalism: Rebuilding and Reclaiming the State in Latin America. *Development and Change* 43 (1): 1–21.
- Gudynas, E. 2009. Diez tesis urgentes sobre el nuevo extractivismo. *Contextos y demandas bajo el progresismo sudamericano actual*. In *Extractivismo*, ed. Política y Sociedad, 187–225. Quito: CLAES/CAAP. Available from <http://extractivismo.com/documentos/capitulos/GudynasExtractivismoSociedadDesarrollo09.pdf>.
- . 2017. Postdevelopment as Critique and Alternative. In *The Essential Critical Development Studies Guide*, ed. H. Veltmeyer and P. Bowles. London: Routledge.
- Harvey, D. 2003. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. 1994. *The Age of Extremes, 1914–1991*. London: Abacus.
- Holloway, J. 2002. *Change the World Without Taking Power*. London: Pluto Press.
- Infante, R.B., and O. Sunkel. 2009. Chile: Hacia un desarrollo inclusive. *Revista CEPAL* 10 (97): 135–154.
- IWGIA—International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 2010. *The Indigenous World 2010*. Copenhagen. Available from http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0001_I_2010_EB.pdf.

- Katz, C. 2016. Is South America's 'Progressive Cycle' At an End? Neo-Developmentalist Attempts and Socialist Projects. *The Bullet*, E-Bulletin No. 1229, March 4.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth Roberts, eds. 2011. *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Löwy, M. 1996. *The War of Gods: Religion and Politics in Latin America*. London: Verso.
- Macdonald, L., and A. Ruckert. 2009. *Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Marini, Ruy Mauro. 1974. *Subdesarrollo y revolución*. 5th ed. México: Siglo XXI Editores.
- Martinez-Alier, J. 2003. *The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation*. London: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- MST, Dirección Nacional. 1991. *Como organizar a la masa*. Sao Paulo: MST.
- Petras, J., and H. Veltmeyer. 2005. *Social Movements and State Power: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador*. London: Pluto Press.
- . 2006. Social Movements and the State: Political Power Dynamics in Latin America. *Critical Sociology* 32 (1): 83–104.
- . 2009. *What's Left in Latin America*. Ashgate Publishing.
- . 2010. Neoliberalism and the Dynamics of Capitalist Development in Latin America. In *Globalization in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Berch Berberoglu, 57–86. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 2013. *Social Movements in Latin America: Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 2017. *The Class Struggle in Latin America: Contemporary Dynamics*. London: Routledge.
- Petras, J., and F. Leiva with H. Veltmeyer. 1994. *Poverty and Democracy in Chile*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Polischuk, S. 2016. Massacres of the Extractivist Industry: Poisoning and Criminalisation of Our Towns and Indigenous Peoples. *The Dawn*, Enero 5. <http://www.thedawn-news.org/2016/01/05/massacres-of-the-extractivist-industry-poisoning-and-criminalisation-of-our-towns-and-indigenous-peoples>.
- Robles, W., and H. Veltmeyer. 2015. *The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Brazil: The Landless Rural Workers Movement*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sader, E. 2011. *The New Mole: Paths of the Latin American Left*. London: Verso Books.
- Saguier, M. 2014. Minería para el desarrollo integral en la estrategia de UASUR. Presentation to the Conference ISA/FLACSO. Buenos Aires, July 23–25.
- Sena-Fobomade. 2011. Se intensifica el extractivismo minero en América Latina. *Foro Boliviano sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo*, 03-02. <http://fobomade.org.bo/art-1109>.
- Silva, E. 2009. *Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Spronk, S., and J.R. Webber. 2007. Struggles Against Accumulation by Dispossession in Bolivia: The Political Economy of Natural Resource Contention. *Latin American Perspectives* 34 (2, March): 31–47.
- Stedile, João Pedro. 2008. The Class Struggles in Brazil: The Perspective of the MST. *Socialist Register* 44: 193–216.
- Stédile, J.P., and B. Fernandes Mançano. 1999. *Brava gente: a trajetória do MST e a luta pela terra no Brasil*. São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo.

- Stedile, J.P., and S. Frei. 1993. *A luta pela terra no Brasil*. São Paulo: Editorial Pagin Alberta.
- Tetreault, D. 2014. Mexico: The Political Ecology of Mining. In *The New Extractivism*, ed. H. Veltmeyer and J. Petras, 172–191. London: Zed Books.
- Veltmeyer, H. 1997. New Social Movements in Latin America: The Dynamics of Class and Identity. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 25 (1, October).
- . 2007. Neoliberalism and Imperialism in Latin America: Dynamics and Responses. *International Review of Modern Sociology*, 33, Special Issue.
- . 2014. *The New Extractivism*. London: Zed Books.
- Via Campesina. 2012. Agrarian Reform in the 21st Century: Building a New Vision, Redefining Strategies, and Celebrating Victories. Press Release, July 19.
- Via Campesina-Brazil. 2008. Por qué nos movilizamos? ALAI-América Latina en Movimiento, Asamblea Popular, Junio 10. <http://alainet.org/active/24605&langes>.
- Zibechi, R. 2012. *Territories in Resistance: A Cartography of Latin American Social Movements*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.



Neoliberalism, State Repression and the Rise of Social Protest in Africa

Patrick Bond

Frantz Fanon's critique of African politics deserves continual recalling: "For my part the deeper I enter into the cultures and the political circles, the surer I am that the great danger that threatens Africa is the absence of ideology."¹ In the period since the great era of anti-colonialism in which he participated, ideology has regularly appeared, but in incomplete and often truncated form. Two strong ideological currents have variously risen and fallen: liberal, focusing on democratic electoral challenges, using resource revenue transparency as a key lever; and radical, focusing on socio-economic and resource-related or other environmental grievances, with an aim to challenging deeper-rooted power relations.

Occasionally the two are conjoined, and indeed wide-ranging movements of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) spanning the continent began appearing in the 2000s: Jubilee 2000 Africa, the African Social Forum, the Africa Water Network, Publish What You Pay, the Tax Justice Network-Africa (TJN-A), and the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA), for example. A successful continent-wide Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa claims 4000 members. Occasionally the intellectuals and NGOs (or their arguments) are also embedded within grassroots social movements. Indeed by 2017, the notion of "Africans Rising" led to an NGO-driven network launched in Arusha, Tanzania, by that name, appealing to a wide variety of members demanding social justice. Its intention is to "amplify broad

P. Bond (✉)

Political Economy, Wits School of Governance, University of Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg, South Africa

e-mail: pbond@mail.ngo.za

© The Author(s) 2019

B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_9




Fig. 9.1 African riots, protests, and state violence against civilians across time and space. Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (2018). *Conflict Trends*. <http://www.acleddata.com>

demands connecting struggles, building solidarity and cooperation within and amongst campaigns for social, economic, environmental and gender justice.”²

Community and shopfloor terrains of struggle, however, often evade academics and NGOs, especially when there are genuine waves of *uprisings* against various political, economic, and ecological injustices. These are occurring in more places and at an ever more rapid pace, as even a glance at one collection of hotspots illustrates (Fig. 9.1). According to one of the five continent-wide on-line databases monitoring political unrest, the US Pentagon-funded Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), so-called riots and protests ratcheted up in number over the past decade, from a monthly average of 20 prior to 2010 to nearly 400 during 2010–2012, to 600 from 2012 to 2015, to 1000 from 2015 to 2017. In 2017–2018, the number surpassed 1500 in two months.

Although there are debates about the varying quality of different methodologies and sources of protest information, other databases—the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset, the Social Conflict in Africa Database, and the *Global Database* of Events, Language, and Tone—suggest similar trends. Revealingly, the final one of the five—the African Development Bank’s *African economic outlook* chapter on governance—ceased publication in January 2018.

Based on these indications of social unrest, this is a continent that deserves far more attention when it comes to documenting bottom-up resistance to injustices. One reason is that there are so many facets of political-economic-ecological devastation visited upon a billion innocent people, by forces beyond the victims’ control, such as international financial flows and resource extraction, big-power geopolitics, and climate change. Not only are there tens of

billions of dollars' worth of "illicit financial flows" that drain financial resources from Africa,³ a splurge of new loans in the 2006–2014 period (especially from China) caused the return of foreign-debt crises in many African countries, which in turn generates austerity and social resistance.

The most devastating cause of unrest in coming years, however, will be climate change, a factor recognized by the US military when it funded the Minerva research program at the University of Texas and Sussex University.⁴ In part, the project considers the impact of climate change on malgovernance, protest and, social dislocation (e.g. in Sudan's Darfur region), although there is a danger of simplistic, false correlations.⁵ There is already a hint of how droughts will prove debilitating even in the best of circumstances: Cape Town, the continent's most glamorous, second-richest (behind Johannesburg) and fourth most unequal city (behind Johannesburg, Lagos, and Nairobi, using the Palma Index).⁶ Its three-year drought left all residents fretting about the mid-2018 "Day Zero" when dams were scheduled to empty and new desalination plants reached maximum capacity, leaving residential taps bone dry.⁷ Intense tactics may again characterize protests as water shortages intensify; the throwing of excrement during Cape Town protests—against poor-quality sanitation in 2013 and against Cecil Rhodes' statue at the University of Cape Town in 2015—proved effective in making demands visible and rapidly forcing authorities to concede. Indeed across South Africa, thousands of "service delivery protests" have been documented, as discussed below.

The yet more dangerous likelihood is that nine out of ten peasants across Africa will not be able to grow food by the end of this century. Hence the ecological conditions of Africa's underdevelopment require even more debate, and the extent to which socio-political-economic protests are also climate-related should be surfaced. After all, new 2018 data showed even more conclusively the extent to which Africa's resources—now termed "natural capital" in the most advanced official accounting⁸—are being drawn from the continent by the extractive industry's multinational mining and petroleum corporations. They do so without reinvesting, as occurs in contrast in other resource-intensive economies and societies (such as Australia, Canada, and Norway). This value transfer is also evident with fossil fuels, thus justifying renewed consideration of ways to compensate Africans whose lands hold coal, petroleum, and gas, for *leaving them underground*.

By setting up the ideological challenge in such far-reaching terms, it is possible in the pages below to hone in on national sites of unrest—especially South Africa where social movements of both liberal and radical hues have risen up against their leaders—to identify where opportunities arise for more than the present series of disconnected protests, and potentially for an *eco-socialist-feminist* approach to Africa's crises.⁹

BOTTOM-UP RESISTANCE RISES

Generating a broad-brush ideology cognizant of activist campaigning was the subject of the Africa Rising network's 2016 Kiliminjaro Declaration, in which 272 delegates declared,

1. Africa is a rich continent. That wealth belongs to all our People, not to a narrow political and economic elite. We need to fight for economic development that is just and embraces social inclusion and environmental care. We have a right to the "better life" our governments have promised.
2. Africans have a diverse, rich, and powerful heritage that is important to heal ourselves and repair the damage done by neoliberalism to our humanity and environment. Being African, embracing the philosophy of *Ubuntu* should be a source of our pride.
3. African Youth are a critical foundation of building the success in our continent and must play a central role in building Africans Rising.
4. Africa's Diaspora, whether displaced through slavery and colonialism or part of modern day migration, are part of Africa's history and future. They are a reservoir of skills, resources, and passion that must be harnessed and integrated into our movement.
5. We are committed to a decentralized, citizen-owned future that will build support and solidarity for local struggles, empower local leadership, and immerse our activists in grassroots work of building social movements from below and beyond borders.
6. We are committed to building a citizens movement that is accountable to the constituencies we represent and enforcing the highest standards of ethical behavior.¹⁰

This is one of the most compelling of linkage efforts that followed African Social Forum efforts a decade earlier to link social justice struggles.¹¹ It may well suffer the same fate, in which major international NGOs (in ASF's case Oxfam and Ford Foundation, in Africa Rising's, ActionAid) find faddish campaigns that require local-level grounding, rather than the other way around. Even where major NGO coalitions are built from grassroots groups—TJN-A and PACJA—the danger persists.

One example comes from Tanzanian NGOs, whose foreign donor-driven character has been criticized by Issa Shivji.¹² In June 2017, Tanzanian President John Magufuli demanded that Canadian mining giant Barrick Gold pay billions of dollars in taxes that had been illegally exported: "We are in an economic war," he declared. "Billions in revenue have been lost. It's something that is very painful and shameful for Tanzania." In response, the NGO network HakiRasilimali—an affiliate of George Soros' Publish What You Pay (PWYP)—praised Magufuli for standing up, but also warned the government to be mindful of the legal conundrums that could arise from "international legal

commitments [under which] the government is bound with guaranteeing companies protection from nationalization and safeguards against retrospective legal applications.” The group further emphasized “the need to continue being an investor friendly country where both the investor and government engage in a win-win situation.”¹³

In contrast, grassroots opposition aimed at blocking mining and petroleum extraction—not reforming extractivism through top-down processes as PWYP attempts—could be far more effective. The Women in Mining network expressed this militancy in relation to one hotly contested coal mine in South Africa.

Climate change impacts are felt most intensively by women because of patriarchal role allocations and unequal control over natural resources in families, communities and economies. Peasant women in Africa will carry the brunt of climate change effects because of their responsibilities for provisioning between 60 and 80% of food consumed by rural households, the collection of safe drinking water, and the care of sick household members.

“Coal kills. It has destroyed our land, our lives and our community.” These are the words of a woman member of the Somkhele community in KwaZulu-Natal who has endured devastating environmental and social effects of coal mining over the last decade. Just a few miles west, communities in Fuleni are fighting Ibutho Coal, a shadowy firm linked to BHP Billiton and Glencore—the world’s largest mining house and commodity trader—which aims to mine coal on the southern boundary of the iMfolozi Wilderness Area.

Thousands of local residents in Fuleni will be relocated (for the second time in a generation) to make way for the mine in an area already suffering more than a year of deep drought. Thanks to increased burning of coal and other fossil fuels, such conditions are now more commonplace, as climate change takes hold across the world. South Africa is both victim and villain, on a grand scale, and this is just one of many sites where the class, race and gender character of the winners and losers are blatantly obvious.¹⁴

Such anti-extractive militancy is widespread. In 2015, Anglo American CEO Mark Cutifani conceded to Bloomberg news service that due to community protests, “There’s something like \$25 billion worth of projects tied up or stopped,” a stunning feat given that all new mines across the world were valued that year at \$80 billion.¹⁵ According to a 2018 pamphlet prepared by Johannesburg faith-based mining watchdog Bench Marks Foundation for civil society’s Alternative Mining Indaba, “Intractable conflicts of interest prevail with ongoing interruptions to mining operations. Resistance to mining operations is steadily on the increase along with the associated conflict.”¹⁶ This is true especially in South Africa but in many other mining sites across Africa.

The Alternative Mining Indaba typically faced a difficult choice: either embrace this resistance or retreat into reformist NGO silos, promoting transparency and the AMV even though these were obviously failing. By choosing the reform option, the Indaba participations generally were compelled to

ignore mining's adverse impact on energy security, climate, and resource depletion.¹⁷ Moreover, the vast African protest wave after 2011, including in mining areas, was typically reduced to specific sites of struggle, with few attempts to draw out commonalities, either conceptually or in linking organizations engaged in protest.

Such linkage is rare, however, even in research. For example, using the ACLED database covering 1997–2010 incidents associated with mining conflict (mostly in southern Africa), Berman et al. identify how “riots and protests” can become more serious “battles” that involve warlords and rebel groups:

mining activity does not only increase the scope for localized protests and riots, but it also systematically fuels larger-scale battles ... gaining the territorial control of a mining area leads rebel groups to intensify and spread their fighting activity elsewhere in the territory in the successive periods ... mines spread conflict across space and time by making rebellions financially feasible. More precisely we first show that spikes in the price of minerals extracted in the ethnic homeland of a rebel group tend to diffuse its fighting operations spatially outside its homeland ... the *commodities super-cycle* (i.e., the steep increase in mineral prices during the 2000s) accounts for 14 percent to 24 percent of the average violence observed in African countries over 1997–2010.¹⁸

In these instances, the distinction between the rebel warlords' objectives in taking control of mining—for financial benefit (there are few if any ideological struggles akin to those of the 1990s when right-wing rebels like UNITA took Angolan diamond sites for political purposes)—contrasts sharply with protests and riots which are often aimed at preventing African mining. In yet other cases, there are religious-extremist “terrorist” activities financed by resource extraction, not considered in this analysis. Again the difference between a top-down and bottom-up perspective is obvious. As Berman et al. conclude,

It is likely that mineral extraction relaxes the financing constraints of rebels, because armed groups can sell minerals illicitly on the black market through the benefit of tacit or active support in various areas of society. Our empirical results suggest that one way for domestic governments to dampen rebellion feasibility effects would be to put in place more stringent anti-corruption policies, and to support transparency/traceability initiatives in the mining industry. The multinational foreign firms have too their work to do, as we find that mines operated by companies complying with socially responsible practices are less at risk to fuel violence.¹⁹

The dilemma here is not that resistance to systematic plundering generates resistances that turn to warlordism, although that danger exists in some parts of Africa. It is that the protests are too often focused on the most immediate socio-economic and environmental injustices and cannot address the larger levels of political power in society. One example of how such linkages can be




Fig. 9.2 Environmental justice conflicts in Africa. Source: Environmental Justice Atlas: <http://ejatlas.org>

made is through expression of opposition to fossil fuels, in ways that are also clearly aimed at slowing climate change. The “Blockadia” mapping within the Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas.org) (Fig. 9.2) is an example of preliminary analysis with that aim, beginning with a Nigerian site of struggle:

On every continent there is an increasing frequency and intensity of resistance movements against fossil fuel projects. These interwoven spaces of resistance are Blockadia. Originating from movements such as the Ogoni People against Shell in the Niger Delta since the 1990s and the Yasuni initiative in Ecuador to leave the oil in the soil, local people and activists are demanding we keep fossil fuels in

the ground. Today there are diverse and widespread resistances such as the Ende Gelände mass civil disobedience in Germany; the indigenous-led Standing Rock camp against the Dakota Access Pipeline; the movement in Kenya to “deCOALanize”; and, amongst many others, the campaigns #BreakFree and #SaveTheArctic. Naomi Klein popularized the term Blockadia in the book *This Changes Everything* describing the “roving transnational conflict zone [...] where ‘regular’ people are stepping in where our leaders are failing” along the whole fossil fuel chain, from extraction to transportation to combustion. These struggles are not only against the local impacts of such projects, but also against their impacts on the climate.²⁰

For the EJAtlas mappers,

By bringing together inspiring case studies, the diversity of the movements can be celebrated whilst the connectivity between them can be strengthened and the real ‘glocal’ threats of fossil fuel extractivism can be better understood. The local causes of resistance vary case by case, but many include the violation of human rights, contamination of water, land dispossession, loss of livelihoods, poor working conditions, biodiversity loss, cultural loss, severe health impacts and inadequate compensation. The Blockadia Map serves as a tool for activists to unite their struggles and build a stronger movement against the multitude of injustices presented by fossil fuel projects. When we come together in acts of defiance, our struggles become part of a bigger movement. Just as these resistances are real spaces where people and causes are connected, the Blockadia Map is a space for movement-building and international solidarity.²¹

As observed already, however, even in Africa’s best case of ideologically infused protest—South Africa—there are profound limits to the way social movement activists have expressed their opposition, and limits to the organizational form their protests will take.

PROTEST, REPRESSION, AND RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

Like so many other sites, a central dilemma in South Africa is whether the social movements which helped shake off apartheid in 1994 and then President Jacob Zuma’s rule in 2018 can expand into a struggle for socio-economic-ecological justice at a time the new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, is imposing a creeping-austerity budget, making it more difficult for labor to go on strike, and encouraging a return to extreme extractivism. Ramaphosa was implicated in the 2012 Marikana Massacre, so consideration of overlap between protest and state repression in a context of sustained neoliberalism is especially revealing.²²

The South African state’s services to crony corporations and its need for a growing security apparatus are evident, although the initial attempts to intimidate activists were unsuccessful. Examples from the early 2000s showed clearly that protests could defeat repression, but subsequent state efforts became more decisive.

- In 2001, at the UN World Conference Against Racism in Durban, the first inklings of mass protest against President Thabo Mbeki's 1999–2008 regime emerged.
- A year later, at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, state paranoia came into full view with repressive policing tactics before and during a protest march of 30,000 from Alexandra to the Sandton Convention Centre.
- In late 2003, ANC leaders sided with the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and instructed Mbeki to retreat from his claims that the US Central Intelligence Agency was working alongside Big Pharma multinational corporations to manipulate TAC against the South African government. The result was a reversal of Mbeki's AIDS-denialist policies and hence a rise in life expectancy from 52 then to 64 in 2018.
- In 2008, four months before his forced departure from the presidency, Mbeki announced that xenophobic attacks that left hundreds of thousands of immigrants displaced were the result of an artificial "Third Force"; Mbeki had openly denied the possibility of xenophobia six months earlier when the African Peer Review Mechanism pointed out the dangers.
- In mid-2010, as World Cup soccer matches were played in South Africa, state fears about mass unrest was inherited and amplified by Zuma. This led to an initial ban on protest anywhere near the main soccer stadiums, a condition that the World Cup organizers—FIFA—insisted upon. Anti-FIFA protests prior to the World Cup made the government nervous: informal traders facing restrictions, displaced Durban fisherfolk, Cape Town residents of the N2 Gateway project forcibly removed, construction workers, AIDS activists prevented from distributing condoms, environmentalists concerned about World Cup's offset "greenwashing," Mbombela students who lost access to schools, disability rights advocates, poor towns' residents demanding provincial rezoning, SA Transport and Allied Workers and Numsa members at Eskom who won major wage struggles just before the Cup began, and on the first days of play, Stallion Security workers protesting against labor broking and opaque payments.
- In August 2012, with paranoia by now hard-wired into the securocrat mentality, 34 miners were murdered by police at Lonmin's Marikana platinum mine while on a wildcat strike. Proof of the connection between capital's extractive needs and state security came from the now-notorious email from Cyril Ramaphosa describing the strikers as "dastardly criminal" and requesting "concomitant action" from police (in 2017 he apologized for the wording but the stain of complicity remains). In addition, as one police general finally revealed, the main concern was the sudden surge in the popularity of Julius Malema, who had just been expelled as ANC Youth League leader (by a committee Ramaphosa led) and who would soon launch a political party to the ANC's left, resulting in the 2016 ouster of the ANC from its rule in the Johannesburg and Tshwane municipalities.

The protest-repression cycle was intensifying to the extent that by mid-2013, Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa announced that there were 46,180 “protests” (his word, although many such incidents were merely mass gatherings) from 2009 to 2013, and “all were successfully stabilized, with 14,843 arrests effected.” At that point, as Duncan points out, the Public Order Policing division desired “an armoured fleet of 200 Nyalas (the infantry mobility vehicle); pyrotechnic weaponry, including tear gas and stun grenades; more water cannons, equipped with red and blue dye; video cameras for recording protests and other surveillance equipment; and Long-Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs). Commonly known as ‘sound cannons’, LRADs emit sounds that are painful to the human ear and can even cause deafness.” Duncan reminds, “In making their arguments for more resources, the police pointed to the spike in violent service delivery protests in the 2013–2014 financial year.”²³

Some protests were as a result of specific turf battles within the ruling party; some were based on petty corruption, such as councilors’ ability to profit from housing waiting lists and sales; and others were based on endless micro-grievances.²⁴ The general trend in analysis is to characterize the strategies and tactics adopted by protesters based on a typology of “non-violent, disruptive and violent.” The SA Police Service’s Incident Registration Information System database is much clumsier and inconsistent in identifying protests only as “peaceful” or “unrest-related.” Although both municipal and national police have quirky modes of data collection, it is not surprising that the leading causes of protests recorded by police over the period 1997–2013 were wage demands (approximately 17,500 protest incidents), labor disputes (10,000), “solidarity” (7000), “forcing of demands” (6500), and service delivery (4500).²⁵

Qualitative research on the large South African social movements that emerged during the early 2000s includes the well-known edited collection *Voices of Protest* by Richard Ballard, Adam Habib, and Imraan Valodia, in part because many drew directly upon prior (anti-apartheid-era) community or sectoral organizing traditions: TAC (founded in late 1998), Durban’s Concerned Citizens Forum (1999), the Johannesburg Anti-Privatization Forum (2000), and Landless People’s Movement (LPM) (2001).²⁶ In two cases—Durban’s activists and the LPM—their brief rise and subsequent decline reflect processes observed elsewhere (e.g. by Manuel Castells, the major scholar of twentieth century urban social movements), in which they are either successful and dissolve, or fail, leaving a major void.²⁷ Indeed, some of the site-specific analysis relates to Durban.²⁸ Other research on South African social protest mixes quantitative and qualitative material, critiques of state-society relations at purely municipal level,²⁹ for example, attitudinal survey research,³⁰ social movement views of diverse electoral strategies,³¹ protest tactics,³² and the rise of the township and shack community “Amakomiti” (committee as a unit of organization).³³

From the standpoint of relating the high levels of unrest in South Africa to trends across Africa, the major question that arises from the research is whether there are national (as opposed to local) political processes that might generate an alternative ideology to the dominant neoliberal nationalism of the ruling

African National Congress. Duncan confirms the national-to-local “Equitable Share” grant does not offer sufficient subsidies to permit adequate municipal service delivery.³⁴ Likewise, electricity protesters—often connected directly by the national supplier Eskom to the grid (as well as by municipalities)—regularly express grievances over acquiring their first connections to the grid, over the need to prevent disconnections, over their demand for a larger lifeline supply (the norm is a merely tokenistic 50 kWh/household/month), and over prices (from 2008 to 2013, the 350% increase in electricity prices imposed by Eskom on both its direct customers and municipalities amplified the desperation of electricity protesters). The electricity price is just one of several national considerations when theorizing protest in a Polanyian manner, that is, following Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” in which stresses caused by excessive “market” expansion in turn create resistance.³⁵

Duncan notes that Pretoria’s National Intelligence Coordinating Committee has “identified labor issues, political intolerance, service delivery protests and anti-foreigner sentiment” as common causes of unrest. In the same vein, Duncan looks for a universal process:

the “micro-mobilizations” that protests represent are not isolated phenomena: they can be related to broader processes of social change. More specifically, in expansionary periods, when political and economic elites can afford democracy, they will tolerate higher levels of dissent, including protests. In such periods, they are likely to promote a negotiated management of protests, where protesting is recognized as a right within clearly circumscribed legal and institutional frameworks.³⁶

But since 1994—especially since 2011 at the peak moment of the commodity super-cycle—the macroeconomic conditions have degenerated:

In recessionary periods, when profits decline, these elites are more likely to resort to coercion than negotiation, and to circumscribe the right to protest. At the same time, protests are likely to increase in frequency and intensity, as it is less possible for society to be held in equilibrium through consensus, and as a result social relations become more conflictual. South Africa is in just such a recessionary period.³⁷

The Polanyian challenge in South Africa is not just in tracking the myriad of grievances and, where appropriate, correlating these to political-economic processes so as to promote more linkage in analysis. It is to avoid the dangers of localism, when far too many activists and analysts discuss grievances in a way that begins and ends with the municipal councilor, city manager, or mayor. This limited perspective on state failure partly reflects how too many turf-conscious leaders look inward, failing to grasp golden opportunities to link labor, community, and environmental grievances and protests, and to think globally while acting locally. They see solutions mainly through “quadruple-C” demands: ending municipal corruption, improving delivery capacity, restoring

competence, and raising the level of consultation. Ignored in such demands are the over-determining national neoliberal policies (such as outsourcing and cost-recovery) and the inadequate national-to-local financing provisions.

Reflecting the build-up of both such socio-economic and political grievances, in February 2018, Zuma was pushed out of power 15 months early by his deputy, Ramaphosa, as widespread popular delegitimization and the prospect of his ANC ruling party faring poorly in the 2019 election allowed for an intra-elite peaceful shift. The importance in political-economic terms though was profound: the defeat of the so-called Zupta network comprising the president, his family, three Indian immigrant brothers (the Guptas), and a wide group of hangers-on in an extended patrimonial system. In 2017, the “Zuma must go!” demand was made in mass demonstrations, protest marches, and legal maneuvers by everyone from the Afrikaner white rightwing to big capital to the far left.

In this sense, the “social movement” against Zuma was purely oriented to political *personality* change, with the bulk of liberal-to-centrist-to-conservative supporters (in groups like the Democratic Alliance opposition and “Save SA” civil society network) rallying in mass mobilizations in February–April 2017. The liberals were celebratory in February 2018, while radicals remained extremely skeptical of the incoming government. The largest trade union, the metalworkers (with 350,000 members), declared the period ahead one of “class war.” Given the austerity budget in February 2018 and return to pro-corporate policies, for example, the National Development Plan (which Ramaphosa co-authored in 2012), an increase in already-high levels of class conflict can be readily predicted.

CONTINENTAL BOTTOM-UP PROTESTS IN SEARCH OF AN OVERARCHING IDEOLOGY

It is here that we can return to the continental scale of protest analysis to also reflect upon potential patterns. African protests have begun to exhibit patterns so stark they were even recognized in the African Development Bank’s annual *African Economic Outlook* (AEO) chapter on governance. The 2017 AEO found that after protests over wages and salaries,

Dissatisfaction with political arrangements was among the main drivers of public protests in Africa from 2011 to 2016. The majority of these protests called for more accountability and justice in the public management systems and for fairer elections. This is an indication of demand for higher standards of integrity within public institutions.³⁸

Socio-economic grievances drove many specific sites of uprisings. Indeed, the rise of generalized protests since 2011 (Fig. 9.1) is remarkable. There were always major outbursts and in some countries—*Zambia* (2001), Malawi (2002), Gabon (2003), Nigeria (2006), Cameroon (2008), and Niger (2009)—they had a

major impact on politics. But notably in 2011, the protest wave did not simply briefly crest as a result of North African uprising (misabeled the “Arab Spring”). The Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan uprisings caught the world’s attention, but only Tunisia’s outcome generated democracy and even then the next stage of socio-economic unrest began as neoliberalism failed the country by early 2018. Many protests subsequently led to such strong pressure against national power structures that, just as with the once-invincible 2011 Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Gaddafi regimes, long-serving leaders were compelled to leave office.

But higher levels of African protests persisted, moving across the continent.³⁹ The pressure was maintained in specific sites, including *Senegal* (2012), *Burkina Faso* (2014), Burundi (2015), Rwanda (2015), Congo-Brazzaville (2016), and DR Congo (2016). In 2017–2018, leaders backed by similarly formidable state and political party apparatuses as enjoyed by Zuma (South Africa), Desalegn (Ethiopia), and Mugabe (Zimbabwe) fell surprisingly rapidly, in part due to mass uprisings with tens of thousands of protesters massing in national capitals and other major cities. Other protests with strong prospects of maintaining pressure on their governments at the time of writing (early 2018) include Togo (against the dictator Faure Gnassingbé), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (against Laurent Kabila), Cameroon (mainly against Paul Biya, some of which demanded Anglophone-Cameroonian independence), Somalia (against Islamic extremism), Morocco (against corruption and unemployment), Libya (against slave markets), Uganda (against Yoweri Museveni’s overturning of term limits), and Kenya (against Uhuru Kenyatta’s dubious election). In The Gambia, protests against Yahya Jammeh succeeded in ensuring the integrity of a December 2016 election, which the long-serving dictator lost.

In November 2017, Zimbabwe’s 93-year old Robert Mugabe—who had served for 37 years—was replaced in a popularly supported soft coup by his former chief henchman Emmerson Mnangagwa (whom he had attempted to fire a week before in favor of his wife Grace taking power after he died). Again, the surface appearance was that of an intra-elite transition in which the armed forces rose up, sending 17 tanks to key locations in the capital city after Mugabe over-reached and lost control of his party and especially the military’s Joint Operations Command. However, it took the 18 November mobilization of tens of thousands of anti-Mugabe protesters in the streets—from all political ideologies and class positions—to both give the coup legitimacy and send the strong signal to Mugabe that sustained protests would continue. It was ultimately the beginning of an impeachment in parliament—anticipated to have unanimous support—three days later that forced his resignation.

In Ethiopia, February 2018 witnessed a dramatic presidential resignation, as Hailemariam Desalegn quit once the Oromo ethnic group (the country’s largest) maintained consistent protests. Notwithstanding a geographically specific character, they were sufficiently widespread as to force change, including ethnic balancing in a future regime which at the time of writing still remained unclear. This is notable in part because socio-economic stresses were continuing in a

country with extremely rapid growth and a reputation as the next world sweat-shop site, as Chinese mega-project development (e.g. urban infrastructure, hydropower, and a railroad connecting Addis Ababa to Djibouti) provided a highly visible veneer of “development.”

In 2011, one of the central forces in the North African protests had been the Tunisian and Egyptian independent trade unions. Since official unions are often coopted, it is to a measure of worker anger that we turn in conclusion. The World Economic Forum’s annual *Global Competitiveness Reports* poll corporate managers to rate “Cooperation in labor-employer relations” in each country on a scale from “generally confrontational” (1) to “generally cooperative” (7).⁴⁰ The 32 African countries included in the poll are by far the most militant of the 138 which are surveyed annually, for of these, 28 African proletariats score above the world median of militancy, and just four below. Of the top 30 countries in terms of labor militancy in 2017, a dozen were African: South Africa (scoring 2.5 in 2017, ranking its workers the world’s most un-cooperative, as has been the case every year since 2012) followed by Chad (3.5), Tunisia (3.6), Liberia (3.7), Mozambique (3.7), Morocco (3.7), Lesotho (3.7), Ethiopia (3.8), Tanzania (3.8), Algeria (3.8), Burundi (3.8), and Zimbabwe (4.0).

If we take these signs of dissent seriously, it is not only the removal of corrupt, unpatriotic regimes that is needed, though that is a pre-condition. What is now urgent to discuss in many settings growing ripe for revolution is the replacement of neo-colonial African compradors with a political party and program of popular empowerment. Otherwise, without structural change based on ideological clarity, the same conditions will generate the same corrupt elites. The forces of resistance may be rising fast—labor, community, environmental, women’s, youth, students’ and other groups angry about the real meaning of “Africa Rising”—but they urgently need ideological and organizational coherence to bring about the kind of changes that are needed to improve the condition of working people across Africa.

NOTES

1. Frantz Fanon, *Toward the African revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.
2. Africans Rising. Homepage. Arusha. <https://www.africans-rising.org/www/> (2017).
3. T. Mbeki, *Track it! Stop it! Get it! Illicit Financial Flow, Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa*, United Nations Economic Commission on Africa (Addis Ababa: UNECA, 2015). <http://www.uneca.org/iff>.
4. Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. *Final Program Report on Climate Change and African Political Stability* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2016); and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, *Conflict Trends* (2018). <http://www.acleddata.com/>.

5. C. Raleigh, "Climate violence? Lecture to the Oxford Martin School," (Oxford, UK, 11 May, 2017). <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y90WzN5wGq8>.
6. *Euromonitor*, "Income Inequality Ranking of the World's Major Cities" (London, 31, October, 2017). <https://blog.euromonitor.com/2017/10/income-inequality-ranking-worlds-major-cities.html>.
7. Environmental Monitoring Group. *EMG's Guide to the Cape Town Drought* (Cape Town, January, 2018). <http://www.emg.org.za/programmes/water-and-climate-change/215-emg-s-guide-to-the-cape-town-drought-december-2017>.
8. G. Lange, Q. Wodon, and K. Carey (eds.), *The Changing Wealth of Nations 2018* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018), <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1046-6>; and Gaborone Declaration, *Gaborone Declaration for Sustainability in Africa*. Gaborone, 12 May, 2012. <http://www.gaboronedeclaration.com/>.
9. L. Wengraf, *Extracting Profit* (Chicago: Haymarket Press, 2018).
10. Africans Rising, *The Kilimanjaro Declaration* (Arusha, 24 August 2016). <https://www.africans-rising.org/www/the-kilimanjaro-declaration/>.
11. Patrick Bond, *Gramsci, Polanyi and Impressions from Africa on the Social Forum Phenomenon*. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29 (2) (2005), pp. 433–440. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2005.00596.x/full>.
12. Issa Shivji, "The Silences in the NGO Discourse" *Africa Development* (31 April, 2006). http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/2_-Shivji.pdf.
13. Haki Rasilimali. Position on Presidential Committees' Reports on Mineral Exports" (Dar es Salaam, 16 June 2017). <http://www.policyforum-tz.org/hakirasilimali-position-presidential-committees-reports-mineral-exports>.
14. Women in Mining, "Women Stand their Ground against Big Coal," Women in Mining Declaration (Johannesburg, 22 January, 2015). <http://www.ngopulse.org/press-release/women-stand-their-ground-against-big-coal-southern-african-exchange>.
15. F. Kayakiran, and A. J. Van Vuuren, "Community Acceptance is the Mother Lode of Mining," *Business Day* (30 March, 2015).
16. Bench Marks Foundation, "Empowering Communities, Turning the Tide." Booklet (Johannesburg, 9 February, 2018).
17. Patrick Bond, "Disconnecting the Minerals-Energy-Climate Dots," *Counterpunch* (13 March, 2015). <https://www.counterpunch.org/2015/03/13/disconnecting-the-minerals-energy-climate-dots/> and F. Maguwu and C. Terreblanche, "We Need a Real 'Alternatives to Mining' Indaba," *Pambazuka* (12 February, 2015). <https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/we-need-a-real-%E2%80%9Calternatives-to-mining%E2%80%9D-indaba>.
18. N. Berman, M. Couttenier, D. Rohner, and M. Thoenig, "This mine Is mine!" *American Economic Review*, 107 (6) (2017), pp. 1564–1610.
19. Berman, Couttenier, Rohner and Thoenig, "This mine Is mine!"
20. EJAtlas, *Environmental Justice Atlas* 'Blockadia' (2018). <https://ejatlas.org/featured/blockadia>.
21. EJAtlas, *Environmental Justice Atlas*. African cases with detailed maps include Cape Boujdour (Offshore Block) oil and gas exploration, Western Sahara; a

- Coal Power Plant in Lamu, Kenya; the Fuleni blockade and leave the coal in the hole campaign, South Africa; and Hydraulic fracking in the Karoo, South Africa.
22. Patrick Bond, *Elite Transition* (London: Pluto Press 2014). The leading expert on the topic is Jane Duncan, author of *Protest Nation* (2016) which surveys social conflict and state repression. Duncan's colleagues Peter Alexander, Carin Runciman, Luke Sinwell, Trevor Ngwane, Mahlatse Rampedi, Boikanyo Moloto, Boitumelo Maruping, Eunice Khumalo, Sehlaphe Sibanda, Mary Galvin and others based at the University of Johannesburg's Centre for Social Change are doing updates based upon tens of thousands of even more detailed protest cases, and their regular reports in *South African Crime Quarterly* continue to update scholars and activists about the scope and scale of dissent.
 23. Jane Duncan, *Protest Nation* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2016).
 24. Jane Duncan's *Protest Nation* considers protests in a dozen sites representative of national trends: the Eastern Cape's Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth), Lukhanji, Makana and Blue Crane Route municipalities, the Western Cape Winelands (in part because of impressive farmworker protests in early 2013), Mpumalanga's capital of Mbombela (Nelspruit), KwaZulu-Natal's eThekweni (Durban) metro, and Johannesburg.
 25. P. Alexander, C. Runciman, and B. Maruping, "The Use and Abuse of Police Data in Protest Analysis," *SA Crime Quarterly*, 58 (2016), pp. 9–21. <http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/sacq/n58/02.pdf>; and C. Runciman, P. Alexander, M. Rampedi, B. Moloto, B. Maruping, E. Khumalo, and S. Sibanda, "Counting Police-recorded Protests," University of Johannesburg Research Chair in Social Change, Report #2 (Johannesburg, 2016). https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Peter_Alexander9/publication/304076282_Counting_Police-Recorded_Protests_Based_on_South_African_Police_Service_Data/links/5765768708aedbc345f380d5/Counting-Police-Recorded-Protests-Based-on-South-African-Police-Service-Data.pdf.
 26. R. Ballard, A. Habib, and I. Valodia, *Voices of Protest* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006).
 27. Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
 28. S. Mottiar and P. Bond, "The Politics of Discontent and Social Protest in Durban," *Politikon* 39 (3) (2012), pp. 309–330. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589346.2012.746183>; T. Lodge and S. Mottiar (2017). South Africa's 'unrest' or 'rebellion', in M. Paret, C. Runciman and L. Sinwell (eds.), *Southern Resistance in Critical Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2017); P. Bond and S. Mottiar, "Terrains of Civil and Uncivil Society in post-apartheid Durban," *Urban Forum* (2018).
 29. S. Matebesi, *Civil Strife Against Local Governance* (Leverkusen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2016). <http://weiterlesen.de/Leseprobe/Civil-strife-against-local-governance/9783847411345/pdf>.
 30. N. Bohler-Muller, B. Roberts, J. Struwig, S. Gordon, T. Radebe, and P. Alexander, "Minding the Protest," *SA Crime Quarterly* 62 (2017), pp. 81–92.
 31. C. Runciman, "The Ballot and the Brick" *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 34 (4) (2016), pp. 419–436. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2017.1287347?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=cja20>.

32. M. Paret, "Violence and Democracy in South Africa's Community Protests," *Review of Political Economy* 42 (143) (2015), pp. 107–123.
33. T. Ngwane, "'Amakomiti' as 'Democracy on the Margins,'" (PhD thesis, University of Johannesburg, Department of Sociology, Johannesburg, 2017). <https://ujcontent.uj.ac.za/vital/access/manager/Repository/uj:22963>.
34. Duncan, *Protest Nation*.
35. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).
36. Duncan, *Protest Nation*.
37. Duncan, *Protest Nation*.
38. African Development Bank, *African Economic Outlook 2018*, (Abidjan, 18 January, 2018). <https://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/publications/african-economic-outlook/>.
39. N. Brandes and B. Engels, "Social Movements in Africa," Stichproben. *Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien*, 11 (2011), pp. 1–15; S. Ekine, "Defiant in the Face of Brutality," *Pambazuka News*, 532 (2 June, 2011) <http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/73738>; F. Manji and S. Ekine, *African Awakening* (Oxford: Fahamu Books, 2012); P. Dwyer and L. Zeilig, *African Struggles Today* (Chicago: Haymarket Press, 2012); R. Mampilly, "Urban Protests and Rural Violence in Africa: A Call for an Integrated Approach," African Futures Forum (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2013). <http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2013/02/04/urban-protests-and-rural-violence-in-africa-a-call-for-an-integrated-approach/#sthash.4KB0d0vO.dpuf>; A. Branch and Z. Mampilly, *Africa Uprising* (London: Zed Books, 2015); Wengraf, *Extracting Profit*.
40. World Economic Forum, *Global Competitiveness Report 2017–18* (Davos, 2017) <https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2017-2018>.

REFERENCES

- African Development Bank. 2018. *African Economic Outlook 2018*, Abidjan. January 18. <https://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/publications/african-economic-outlook/>.
- Africans Rising. 2016. The Kilimanjaro Declaration, Arusha. August 24. <https://www.africans-rising.org/www/the-kilimanjaro-declaration/>.
- . 2017. Homepage, Arusha. <https://www.africans-rising.org/www/>.
- Alexander, P., C. Runciman, and B. Maruping. 2016. The Use and Abuse of Police Data in Protest Analysis. *SA Crime Quarterly* 58: 9–21. <http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/sacq/n58/02.pdf>.
- Ballard, R., A. Habib, and I. Valodia. 2006. *Voices of Protest*. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- Bench Marks Foundation. 2018. *Empowering Communities, Turning the Tide*. Johannesburg: Booklet.
- Berman, N., M. Couttenier, D. Rohner, and M. Thoenig. 2017. This Mine Is Mine! *American Economic Review* 107 (6): 1564–1610.
- Biney, A. 2013. Is Africa Really Rising? *Pambazuka News*, July 31 and September 4. <http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88748>. Accessed 4 June 2017.
- Bohler-Muller, N., B. Roberts, J. Struwig, S. Gordon, T. Radebe, and P. Alexander. 2017. Minding the Protest. *SA Crime Quarterly* 62: 81–92.

- Bond, P. 2005. Gramsci, Polanyi and Impressions from Africa on the Social Forum Phenomenon. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29 (2): 433–440. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2005.00596.x/full>.
- . 2014. *Elite Transition*. London: Pluto Press.
- . 2015. Disconnecting the Minerals-Energy-Climate Dots. *Counterpunch*. March 13. <https://www.counterpunch.org/2015/03/13/disconnecting-the-minerals-energy-climate-dots/>.
- Bond, P., and S. Mottiar. 2018. Terrains of Civil and Uncivil Society in Post-Apartheid Durban, Urban Forum.
- Branch, A., and Z. Mampilly. 2015. *Africa Uprising*. London: Zed Books.
- Brandes, N., and B. Engels. 2011. Social Movements in Africa. *Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien* 11: 1–15.
- Duncan, J. 2016. *Protest Nation*. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- Dwyer, P., and L. Zeilig. 2012. *African Struggles Today*. Chicago: Haymarket Press.
- EJAtlas. 2018. *Environmental Justice Atlas* ‘Blockadia’. <https://ejatlas.org/featured/blockadia>.
- Ekine S. 2011. Defiant in the Face of Brutality. *Pambazuka News*, 532. June 2. <http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/73738>.
- Environmental Monitoring Group. 2018. EMG’s Guide to the Cape Town Drought, Cape Town. January. <http://www.emg.org.za/programmes/water-and-climate-change/215-emg-s-guide-to-the-cape-town-drought-december-2017>.
- Euromonitor. 2017. Income Inequality Ranking of the World’s Major Cities, London. October 31. <https://blog.euromonitor.com/2017/10/income-inequality-ranking-worlds-major-cities.html>.
- Fanon, F. 1967. *Toward the African Revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Gaborone Declaration. 2012. Gaborone Declaration for Sustainability in Africa, Gaborone. May 12. <http://www.gaboronedeclaration.com/>.
- HakiRasilimali. 2017. Position on Presidential Committees’ Reports on Mineral Exports. Dar es Salaam. June 16. <http://www.policyforum-tz.org/hakirasilimali-position-presidential-committees-reports-mineral-exports>.
- Kayakiran, F., and Van Vuuren. 2015. Community Acceptance Is the Mother Lode of Mining, *Business Day*. March 30.
- Lange, G., Q. Wodon, and K. Carey, eds. 2018. *The Changing Wealth of Nations 2018*. Washington, DC: World Bank. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1046-6>.
- Lodge, T., and T. Mottiar. 2017. South Africa’s ‘Unrest’ or ‘Rebellion’. In *Southern Resistance in Critical Perspective*, ed. M. Paret, C. Runciman, and L. Sinwell. London: Routledge.
- Maguwu, F., and C. Terreblanche. 2015. We Need a Real ‘Alternatives to Mining’ Indaba. *Pambazuka*. February 12. <https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/we-need-real-%E2%80%9CAlternatives-mining%E2%80%9D-indaba>.
- Mampilly, R. 2013. Urban Protests and Rural Violence in Africa: A Call for an Integrated Approach. African Futures Forum, Social Science Research Council, New York. <http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2013/02/04/urban-protests-and-rural-violence-in-africa-a-call-for-an-integrated-approach/#sthash.4KB0d0vO.dpuf>. Accessed 4 June 2017.
- Manji, F., and S. Ekine. 2012. *African Awakening*. Oxford: Fahamu Books.

- Matebesi, S. 2016. *Civil Strife Against Local Governance*. Leverkusen: Barbara Budrich Publishers. <http://weiterlesen.de/Leseprobe/Civil-strife-against-local-governance/9783847411345/pdf>.
- Mbeki, T. 2015. *Track It! Stop It! Get It! Illicit Financial Flow, Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa*. United Nations Economic Commission on Africa, Addis Ababa. <http://www.uneca.org/iff>.
- Mottiar, S., and P. Bond. 2012. The Politics of Discontent and Social Protest in Durban. *Polirikon* 39 (3): 309–330. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589346.2012.746183>.
- Ngwane, T. 2017. ‘Amakomiti’ as ‘Democracy on the Margins’. PhD thesis, University of Johannesburg Department of Sociology, Johannesburg. <https://ujcontent.uj.ac.za/vital/access/manager/Repository/uj:22963>.
- Paret, M. 2015. Violence and Democracy in South Africa’s Community Protests. *Review of Political Economy* 42 (143): 107–123.
- Paret, M., C. Runciman, and L. Sinwell, eds. 2017. *Southern Resistance in Critical Perspective*. London: Routledge.
- Raleigh, C. 2017. Climate Violence? Lecture to the Oxford Martin School, Oxford. May 11. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y90WzN5wGq8>.
- Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. 2016. *Final Program Report on Climate Change and African Political Stability*. Austin: University of Texas.
- Runciman, C. 2016. The Ballot and the Brick. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 34 (4): 419–436. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2017.1287347?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=cjca20>.
- Runciman, C., P. Alexander, M. Rampedi, B. Moloto, B. Maruping, E. Khumalo, and S. Sibanda. 2016. Counting Police-recorded Protests. University of Johannesburg Research Chair in Social Change Report #2, Johannesburg. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Peter_Alexander9/publication/304076282_Counting_PoliceRecorded_Protests_Based_on_South_African_Police_Service_Data/links/5765768708aedbc345f380d5/Counting-Police-Recorded-Protests-Based-on-South-African-Police-Service-Data.pdf.
- Shivji, I. 2006. The Silences in the NGO Discourse. *Africa Development* 31 (4). http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/2-_Shivji.pdf.
- Wengraf, L. 2018. *Extracting Profit*. Chicago: Haymarket Press.
- Women in Mining. 2015. Women Stand Their Ground Against Big Coal. Women in Mining Declaration, Johannesburg. January 22. <http://www.ngopulse.org/press-release/women-stand-their-ground-against-big-coal-southern-african-exchange>.
- World Economic Forum. 2017. *Global Competitiveness Report 2017–18*. Davos. <https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2017-2018>.



The Naxalite Movement, the Oppressive State, and the Revolutionary Struggle in India

Ashok Kumbamu

Fifty years ago, on May 25, 1967, an *adivasi* (the aboriginals of India) peasant uprising began in Naxalbari (a small village in the Siliguri sub-division of Darjeeling district, West Bengal)—hence the name, the Naxalite movement or the Naxalites. For the Indian Left, the Naxalite movement has provided not only new experiences but also a new political discourse. To further develop and sustain the momentum of the movement, the communist revolutionaries officially announced a new party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [CPI (ML)], on April 22, 1969—Lenin’s birth anniversary. Based on its characterization of Indian society as semi-colonial and semi-feudal, the CPI (ML), rather than taking up the insurrectionist path, followed the Protracted People’s War strategy of the Chinese revolution. The CPI (ML) explicitly declared that its objective was to seize political power through an armed agrarian revolution. They repudiated the revisionist path of parliamentary politics by claiming that “Nothing can be more illusory than to think of capturing state power from the bourgeois rulers without smashing their state machine with which they suppress the toiling masses. There is no shortcut to smash this instrument of class rule.”¹

As Charu Mazumdar, the founding General Secretary of the CPI (ML), envisioned, the Naxalite movement spread across the country, sustained for 50 years, and sent tremors through the landscape of Indian politics. Since its inception, however, the Naxalite movement has undergone a great deal of transformation, having been fragmented into several parties based on differences in strategies and tactics in advancing the revolution.² One among such

A. Kumbamu (✉)

Qualitative Research Unit, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, MN, USA

parties, the CPI (Marxist-Leninist) People's War [CPI (ML) PW] in the erst-while state of Andhra Pradesh has emerged as a major Naxalite party. At the same time, all revolutionary parties have been attempting to overcome their internal differences in the interest of a common goal. As part of those efforts, in August 1998, the CPI (ML) Party Unity, another Maoist party that had a very strong presence in Bihar and parts of Madhya Pradesh, merged with the CPI (ML) PW. In September 2004, the Maoist Communist Centre, which had a strong base in Bihar, merged with the People's War party. Together they formed a new unified party, the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Further unification of revolutionary parties occurred in May 2014, when the CPI (ML) Naxalbari merged with the CPI (Maoist). Now, the media interchangeably use the two names, Naxalites and Maoists, to describe revolutionary Communists.³

Despite many setbacks, the movement has spread to 16 out of 29 Indian states. The Maoist movement has not only influenced the Indian Left,⁴ but also intimidated the exploitative, oppressive ruling class, who realized that the ultimate threat to their class rule could *only* come from the Maoists. With this clarity in mind, the ex-prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh, on several occasions publicly announced that the country's biggest internal security threat comes from the Naxalites.⁵

Since the Naxalbari "Spring Thunder" in 1967,⁶ social scientists, journalists, and writers have published numerous articles and books on the dynamics of revolutionary politics in India. Vivek Chibber observes, "naxalbari served to not only renew Left culture, but to unleash a torrent of debate on everything from political strategy to the more abstruse questions regarding the conceptualization of Indian history and culture. In doing so, it opened entirely new vistas in scholarship."⁷ In the last decade itself, more than 50 books were published.⁸ Among them, Nandini Sundar's *The Burning Forest: India's War in Bastar* stands out for its insight into the Maoist movement.⁹ Previously, the majority of the books on the movement were journalistic or literary studies. Sundar uses socio-historical sources (court orders, police records, government documents, human rights organizations' reports, the Maoist party official documents), combined with ethnographic field research and critical reflections, to provide a compelling and heart-rending narrative of state violence and the dispossession of *adivasis* in the undivided Bastar district (which, in 1999, was divided into three districts: Bastar, Dantewada, and Kanker) of the state of Chhattisgarh.

For the past two decades, Sundar has been a witness to the ongoing process of "the annihilation of a people [i.e., *adivasis*] and their way of life" in Bastar.¹⁰ She has informed the world about the harrowing violence inflicted upon *adivasis* in Bastar by the Indian state and its vigilante groups. She candidly mentions in her "Preface": "This book is written because, in the absence of justice, at least the truth must be on record."¹¹ While admiring sacrifices made by the Maoists, she nevertheless raises concerns about the revolutionary violence of their path. Sundar grounds her book in reality, drawing on people's experiences of numerous incidents, personal encounters, and observations. Disappointingly,

she does not provide a conceptual framework that evaluates this grounded reality against the larger context of neoliberal globalization. In this chapter, I attempt to place her detailed work within a critical analysis of neoliberalism and anti-systemic movements.

THE ADIVASIS AND THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT

Today Bastar has become the center of India's war on adivasis, the indigenous people who make up about 8 percent of India's population. The Maoist movement in Bastar started with the decision of the erstwhile CPI (ML) PW to develop guerrilla zones to expand its activities into other parts of the country. With that vision, the Maoists drafted a historical document, titled "Perspectives for a Guerrilla Zone," in 1979. Guided by this stance, in 1980, the PW party sent their first six-member squad to undivided Bastar, a region in Central India, at the time about the size of Kerala state. Since then, the PW party has spread to other parts of India. Until the first squad of CPI (ML) PW entered Bastar, the Indian government did not really bother about the lives of adivasis. But, how did the revolutionaries enter into the lives of adivasis and how did they become a "threat" to the state? Sundar explains that when the Maoist revolutionaries first arrived, they took quite some time to understand adivasi lives and culture. The squad members had worked mostly in the feudal conditions of Telangana before entering Bastar. At the outset, they were able to identify a class enemy. And, it was easy to mobilize people along class lines. But, the class structure in adivasi communities is different. The Maoists found it difficult to use tactics of class struggle that had worked elsewhere among the Indian peasantry.¹² As Sundar describes, the squads conducted numerous village meetings and even surveyed villages to better understand the local class structure. In the initial phase, they put a concerted effort into making the existing government work for the adivasis. They mobilized people to fight for the minimum wage. They ordered teachers and healthcare workers, who take salary but never worked in villages, to serve rural people. They challenged forest officers, revenue officers, and police who harassed people or demanded bribes. They fought against the corrupt and dysfunctional system. And, they lived up to their principles by demonstrating commitment to the people.¹³

Following the great tradition of *Jana Natya Mandali*, a cultural organization that propagates the Naxalite politics in lay language through songs and stage performances, the squads used songs to educate adivasis about politics and cooperative development, superstitions, alcohol consumption, and gender equality. Songs became an effective tool of political communication for the squads. Sundar notes that "villagers would joke with the guerillas, threatening not to feed them till they sang for their supper. Initially, the revolutionaries asked only for leftovers, but later people themselves decided they deserved fresh cooked food."¹⁴ As the squads started working with adivasis, their social relationships strengthened. Adivasis started seeing the revolutionaries as part of

their social fabric. Adivasis began to approach the Maoists for help with all kinds of problems from land issues to marital disputes.

Rather than working as “Robin Hoods,” the Maoists mobilized and organized adivasis to fight for their own cause. Since 1995, they have been building a new administrative structure consisting of the revolutionary people’s committees (PRs) or the *Janathana Sarkar* (JS, People’s Government). As a result of this, the old regressive power structures (such as *pargana majhis*, old administrative units) have gradually disappeared. To protect the JS and advance the revolution, the Maoists developed “three magic weapons”: The party, the army, and the united front.¹⁵ In terms of the army, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) was built with a designated task of fighting the state forces. Adivasi women’s recruitment into the Maoist party is important and has been on the rise. They constitute 40 percent of the PLGA.¹⁶ In addition to fighting forces, they developed several mass organizations such as the cultural organization the *Chetna Natya Manch*; the peasants and workers’ wing the *Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor Sangathan* (DAKMS); and the women’s organization the *Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangathan* (KAMS). With about 100,000 active members, KAMS is the biggest, most active, and dynamic women’s organization in the entire country.¹⁷

In addition to building various organizations for adult members, the Maoists have been mobilizing adivasi children into the children’s organization, the *Krantikari Adivasi Bala Sangathan* (KABS). However, children do not participate in combating activities, but work as “messengers” in the Maoist intelligence network at the ground level. Contrary to the bourgeois media uproar, Sundar observes, “the children take immense pride in their work.”¹⁸ Not surprisingly, adivasis constitute over 90 percent of the Maoist rank-and-file in Chhattisgarh. The Maoists now conduct all their party meetings in adivasis’ language, *Gondi*. In this protracted process of revolution, as Sundar reports, the fine line between the Maoists and adivasis has eventually disappeared. Gautam Navalakha and Aish Gupta write: “The people [in Bastar] do not perceive a divide between the two. The claimed disconnect between the Maoists and the people is as unreal as the rift between the people and the State (which is carrying out a savage war for ‘development’) is real.”¹⁹ But, not everyone agrees with the notion that all adivasis are Maoists.²⁰

Social anthropologist Alpa Shah argues that “the Maoists were far from an Adivasi movement but consisted of leaders, cadres and sympathizers from a range of different castes and classes brought together in a political organization around class struggle which reflected the transforming history of recruitment.”²¹ Shah argues that adivasis do not necessarily join the Maoist party with the understanding of its politics, but do so based on their subjective interpersonal relationship. From a moral economy perspective,²² Shah argues that the driving force for adivasis to join the revolutionaries is not the objective conditions of their lives, but the “relations of intimacy” between them through kinship, family relationships, and friendship. Furthermore, she suggests, “the Maoist success in developing relations of intimacy is *simultaneously dependent*

on the Indian state's ideology of domination and exploitation..."²³ Moreover, based on her ethnographic research, she points out (without providing any concrete evidence) that the "relations of enmity" (in a similar way as the relations of intimacy) among families and friends also resurface in the party. She offers the idea of enmity relations to explain why some adivasis go into and come out of the Maoist party. Paradoxically, she suggests that Hindu right-wing organizations also use the relations of intimacy for mobilization.²⁴

However, Sundar disagrees with Shah's claims regarding kinship and family relationships being the basis of adivasis' support for the Maoists. Kinship and family relationships may explain why some individuals join the Maoists, but not hundreds of villages under the conditions of state terror. She suggests that anthropologists should examine and analyze "how the movement originates, is sustained or dissipates under certain conditions."²⁵ Moreover, echoing what Mao once famously said, "a revolution is not a dinner party or writing an essay,"²⁶ Sundar reminds Shah that "the Maoists are not a social club, but a political party"²⁷ that is fighting the cruel state system. Critiquing Shah's extrapolative interpretations and absurd explanations of subjective humanity for the growth and sustenance of the Maoist revolution, Sundar comments: "...one wonder[s] if Shah has understood anything about Maoist ideology or practice, or even the implications of her own fieldwork."²⁸ Of course, there is a component of "humaneness"²⁹ in the movement, but that is not based on subjective or intimate relationships. As Azad, the official spokesperson of the Maoist party in India until he was killed in a fake encounter in June 2010, once mentioned: "In a class society, where the ruling classes fiercely crush the oppressed at every step, real humanity entails fierce hatred for the oppressors. There can be no love without hate; there is no all-encompassing love."³⁰ Thus, "humaneness" or "relations of intimacy" need to be understood within the framework of class struggle. Attributing the sustenance of the revolutionary armed struggle to relations of intimacy is an empty academic exercise.

From a socio-cultural perspective, adivasis still identify as adivasis, but, from a political standpoint, they see themselves as Maoists. With the political orientation of the Maoists, adivasis are in the process of a transformation from a "class in itself" to a "class for itself."³¹ The social construction of adivasis as "innocent" people and apolitical subjects by some commentators is nothing but a cultural determinist anthropological myth. This is a serious attempt to undermine the political agency of adivasis. In fact, adivasis are conscious of what the revolutionary movement entails and what it would bring to them. However, this consciousness is not uniform among adivasi members of the Maoist party.³² Knowing about party members' strenuous efforts and sacrifices, adivasis hail the martyrdom of their comrades. Sundar quotes a villager: "Once gone, these children belong to the party. It is as if they had died for us."³³ Allegations of the state, some human rights organizations, and the bourgeois media that the Maoists force "innocent" adivasis into their party are not believable. During a month-long field trip in the Maoist stronghold, Paani asked an adivasi about the allegations of the state: "Did the Maoists force you to join

them?” The adivasi responded by questioning: “If they brought me in forcefully, then why would I stay here and talk with you now?”³⁴

While expanding their party into new areas in Bastar, the Maoists initiated alternative administrative and development systems through the JS. The JS operates through eight departments: financial, defense, agriculture, judicial, education-culture, health, forest protection, and public relations. For example, the agricultural department focuses on land distribution, cooperative agricultural activities, collective building of ponds, seed and grain banks, biodiversity conservation, and farm credit without interest.³⁵

All JS departments work in a coordinated manner for effective functioning. From past experience with the revolutionary people’s committees in north Telangana, the Maoist party knows that exclusive focus on welfare activities may lead to economism, which, as Lenin strongly cautioned in *What Is To Be Done*, can pose a grave threat to the revolutionary movement.³⁶ Keeping this in view, the Maoist party has been constantly educating JS members to transcend economic motives. Even in the sphere of culture and gender relations, rather than imposing their “modernist” principles on adivasis, the Maoists educate and dialogue with the people to reconsider and disavow some oppressive “traditional” customs and superstitions.³⁷

Overall, the Maoist movement has transformed the lives of adivasis. Drawing from her 26 years of research experience in the region, Sundar unequivocally states:

If there is one major change the Maoists have introduced, it is to give people a new confidence. Citizens of the Maoist state now look in the eye and shake hands, compared to the evasive glance with which adivasis traditionally greeted strangers. And it is thanks to the Maoists that the rest of India now knows of the existence and incredible bravery of the people of Bastar.³⁸

While acknowledging the enormous contribution of the Maoist movement to adivasis, Sundar also poses critical questions about revolutionary violence. But, it is not difficult for someone like Sundar to find answers for such questions. In fact, her elaborate account of the repressive nature of the state and its crude methods of terror as presented throughout her book offers some indisputable answers.

NEOLIBERALISM, EXTRACTIVE CAPITAL, AND THE OPPRESSIVE STATE

Like any other adivasi areas in the country, the Indian state neglected Bastar in terms of infrastructure development, health, education, and basic welfare programs. Not surprisingly, neither the British colonial administration nor the Indian government ever developed proper topographic maps of the region. Nevertheless, the Indian State and transnational corporations (TNCs) identified abundant mineral reserves in Bastar. The mineral reserves include coal,

iron ore, bauxite, platinum, corundum, dolomite, limestone, diamonds, manganese, and so on. In addition, Bastar has a variety of timber and non-timber forest products such as tamarind, Mahua flowers and seeds, sal seeds, and gum. Natural resources contribute about 10 percent of net state domestic product in Chhattisgarh.³⁹ To tap into this mineral wealth, the transnationals, as well as big Indian corporations, have signed hundreds of memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with the Chhattisgarh government. Between 2000 and 2011, the government signed 121 MoUs with a projected investment of \$31.9 billion.⁴⁰ To execute these MoUs and extract resources, the state has been attempting to remove the adivasis from their land. But, adivasis are resisting with a revived spirit of the 1910 *Bhumkal* (meaning, earthquake) rebellion against the colonial British rule.⁴¹ In the context of today's corporate land grabbing, the adivasis rally under their slogan "*Jal, jangal, jameen*" (adivasi rights over water, forest, and land), *izzat* (self-respect), and *adhiakar* (political power).⁴²

To clampdown on the adivasi-supported Maoist movement, the State is using various notorious counter-insurgency strategies practiced earlier, such as the creation of "New Villages" and "Strategic Hamlets" in Malaysia and Vietnam, to eliminate the communists. The main idea behind these strategies is to evict people from their land, natural environment, and social fabric, and relocate them to a new locality with puzzling new social relationships where they find themselves as strangers. Through this process of alienation, the State wanted to control the people and undermine their support to the revolutionaries. Metaphorically speaking, this is nothing but a strategy of "separating the 'fish' from the 'sea' in which they 'swam'."⁴³

Sundar draws parallels between imperial "strategic hamletting" in Vietnam and Malaysia and "the mass burning and grouping of villages" in Bastar. The State first implemented this strategy in 1990–1991, creating and acting through a vigilante group called *Jan Jagran Abhiyan* (JJA). The name suggests that the aim of this group is to raise people's awareness. In contrast, the JJA forced people to rally against the Maoists, killed many adivasis who they suspected as supporters of the Maoists, raped women, and burned their houses. Although the infamous Congress leader Mahendra Karma led the JJA, in its initial phase Hindu fundamentalist organizations and the Communist Party of India (CPI) also lent support to such atrocities. The State gave complete support, financially and otherwise, to the wanton destruction of adivasi lives.

In 2005, the JJA changed its name to become *Salwa Judum* (which means, in Gondi, "Purification Hunt"). The main aim of this group has been to dismantle the base of the Maoists, the *sanghams* (local organizations). They forced adivasis to join the Salwa Judum, and killed whoever resisted. The Salwa Judum continued its rampage, looting adivasi houses, burning villages, and raping women. Whereas the JJA destroyed only targeted houses in a village, the Salwa Judum burnt down the entire intended village. To aid the Salwa Judum "hunting," the State deployed paramilitary forces, border security forces, and local police forces to intensify its attack on the Maoist movement. Fearing brutalities,

many adivasis fled to the neighboring states of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. Others are forced to live in the “relief” camps that are nothing but concentration camps. Brutal tortures and inhuman conditions have become part of everyday camp life. Raping women and keeping them as sex slaves became routine practices. Sundar quotes a fact-finding report in which an adivasi woman describes what the Salwa Judum and security forces said to her after a gang rape: “You are a Naxalite and we have taught you a lesson today.”⁴⁴ Women were raped irrespective of their age. Wives raped in front of their husbands, mothers raped in front of their children, and children raped in front of their parent. With impunity, the so-called relief camps have in effect been turned into brutal death camps and “rape centers.”⁴⁵ Sundar writes: “Fortunately, adivasi society, unlike the rest of ‘civilized’ India, does not stigmatize women who have been raped, and many have subsequently got married.”⁴⁶ While the state mercenaries are scorching everything that adivasis own, Hindu fundamentalist organizations such as the Gayatri Parivar and Christian organizations have been trying to influence and convert them into their respective religions.

In addition to promoting the criminal gang, the Salwa Judum, the State also created an auxiliary force called the Special Police Officers (SPO) recruiting local adivasi and non-adivasi youth, as well as former Maoists into the SPO force. There are no set criteria (including minimum age, education, or training requirement) to be an SPO, only willingness to assist paramilitary forces as well as the Salwa Judum in their counter-revolutionary activities.⁴⁷ The state government pays their salaries, but never makes them accountable for their heinous crimes. As Sundar points out, wherever SPOs and the Salwa Judum go to adivasi villages, they do not come back without burning houses, raping and/or killing women.⁴⁸ This notoriety has become normalized in Bastar. There is no punishment and no one is made accountable for these crimes. To deter this unconstitutional system, civil rights activists and scholars, including Sundar, approached the Supreme Court in 2007. In 2011, in its judgment, the Supreme Court’s bench consisting of Justice B. Sudershan Reddy and Justice Surinder Singh Nijjar (recalling Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*, which offers a scathing critique of colonialism in Africa) stated:

Through the course of these proceedings, as a hazy picture of events and circumstances in some districts of Chhattisgarh emerged, we could not but arrive at the conclusion that the respondents were seeking to put us on a course of constitutional actions whereby we would also have to exclaim, at the end of it all: ‘the horror, the horror.’⁴⁹

In their judgment, the Supreme Court ordered the Government of Chhattisgarh to disband the SPO force and cease all support to other anti-constitutional activities aimed at destroying the Maoist movement. But, as Sundar describes, within a month, instead of implementing the court order, the Government passed the Chhattisgarh Auxiliary Armed Police Force Ordinance, and regularized SPOs by changing their name and weapon status. Moreover, the government equipped them with more sophisticated weapons, and even increased

their salaries. Again in 2013, the government changed the name of the force to the District Reserve Guard. Whatever the avatar of the beast, it is still doing the same thing in the same old cruel way. All these undeterred criminal activities clearly demonstrate that there is no constitutional punitive system in place. The state-legalized terror took reign over Chhattisgarh.

In addition to these auxiliary forces, the Indian State, in 2009, launched a nation-wide coordinated attack on the Maoists, “Operation Green Hunt,” using the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Border Security Forces (BSF), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), and specialized police forces such as Greyhounds along with the local police. The main goal of this operation is to hunt, kill, and enclose the land. While implementing the third phase of Operation Green Hunt, in 2017, the Indian government also announced a low-intensity warfare (LIW) strategy, abbreviated as SAMADHAN: **S**mart leadership, **A**ggressive strategy, **M**otivation and training, **A**ctionable intelligence, **D**ashboard-based key performance indicators, **H**arnessing technology, **A**ction plan for each theatre, and **N**o access to financing. In addition to all these efforts, the Indian State also brought in new draconian laws to terrorize Maoist sympathizers, journalists, civil rights activists, researchers, and the general public. While aggressively moving forward on the military front, the state is not delivering basic welfare programs. As Sundar explains, prisons are overcrowding mostly with adivasis under trial. School buildings are being occupied by paramilitary and auxiliary police forces. Healthcare facilities are nowhere in sight. Other state welfare programs are implemented to the bare minimum extent.⁵⁰

Exposing the large-scale blatant atrocities of the state, Sundar also criticizes the Maoists for their violent actions. Placing the state and the Maoists on the same plane, she argues:

One might well turn around and note that what the adivasis of Bastar had received for their armed struggle was permanent occupation by CRPF camps, and thousands of deaths, rapes and arrests. On the other hand, it is true that had they not resisted, the area would have been occupied by mines, steel plants and dams at a faster rate. Either way, it is a question of the pace and intensity with which occupation takes place, not whether it will happen.⁵¹

Sundar goes on to say: “The choices we are offered instead are the impossible dream of armed revolution or the soul-numbing acceptance of armed repression.”⁵² This “neutral” position of equating state violence with revolutionary violence is not new. For instance, human rights activist the late K. Balagopal spoke and wrote about this aspect on numerous occasions.⁵³ But, the question still remains is: how to change the violent nature of the State and the exploitative and extractive nature of capital, which have been trying to alienate (if not annihilate) adivasi from their *jal, jangal, and Jameen*? On the question of the violence of the Maoists, Azad categorically states:

The violence of the Maoists, which is preceded and provoked by the violence of the oppressors, is not really the main issue; justice is. If Naxalite violence is to be

discussed, it should be in the context of violence pervading every aspect of our system. If not seen in this framework, one falls prey to the abstract bourgeois concept that 'violence breeds violence,' without understanding the structural causes of violence.⁵⁴

Sundar criticizes the Maoists' election boycott tactic, which she thinks sometimes "appears opportunistic."⁵⁵ She finds that the Maoists are "unable to appreciate even the symbolic importance of elections as a moment of mobilization for popular demands or for the expression of popular anger, leave alone the necessity of working both inside and outside elected bodies."⁵⁶ Again, this is not a new proposition put forward by Indian intellectuals.⁵⁷ In response to these appeals or criticisms, the Maoists have clarified many times their long-standing position on parliamentary democracy and electoral politics. The Maoist spokesperson, Azad, clearly elucidates: "The parliament is no democratic institution (as in countries that have been through a democratic revolution—a bourgeois democracy) but has been instituted on the existing highly autocratic state and semi-feudal structures as a ruse to dupe the masses."⁵⁸ He further clarifies that their party, in the context of the "futility of the very system of parliamentary democracy and the drama of elections" use the tactic of election boycott "to enhance the awareness of the people regarding the futility and irrelevance of elections to their lives and in solving their basic problems."⁵⁹

After presenting the chronicle of state violence in Bastar, Sundar does not want to end the book with a gloomy picture. Thus, in the book's epilogue, she paints a dreamy image of a new Bastar, in which "a new constitution gave all people the right to decide how they wanted their resources to be used."⁶⁰ But, the question that still remains unanswered is: How does this "impossible" dream come true without overthrowing the existing oppressive State?

CONCLUSION

Why India is waging a war in Bastar can only be understood by situating the war in the context of the changing dynamics of neoliberal imperialism and its relationship with the Indian capitalist class and its state apparatus. In the semi-colonial Indian context, a political-economy concept that offers us appropriate analytical tools to fathom the underlying factors of the war is *neoliberal extractivism*. Extractivism is an age-old process that the colonial power used for the expropriation and exploitation of marginalized people and their resources.⁶¹ However, this process of extractivism has various manifestations across (geopolitical as well as social) space and time. Although extractive methods and dynamics have changed, what remain intact are the ruthless plunder, violence, and the enclosure of the commons.⁶² Without having the benefit of this broader political perspective, Sundar's emphasis on the inhuman methods of state violence on adivasis may generate some sympathy for adivasis, but it does not provide a comprehensive understanding of why India is really waging a war in Bastar.

In the age of neoliberalism, the State has been rolling back from its responsibility on the public welfare front, but, at the same time, it has been aggressively moving forward to protect the interests of the capitalist class. In essence, the State's role has been reduced to, what Louis Althusser alluded, a "permanent watchman, night and day" to see that "class struggle—that is, exploitation—is *not abolished, but, rather, preserved, mainlined, and reinforced*, for the benefit, naturally, of the dominant class."⁶³ In other words, the bourgeois state uses all of its "legitimized" mechanisms to provide feasible conditions for capital to grow, reproduce, and accumulate further. In this "parliamentary form of robbery," as Marx has said in his discussion about the enclosure of the commons, "the history of their [the dispossessed] expropriation is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire."⁶⁴

To conclude, in Bastar, when adivasis attempt to claim ownership over their *jal, jangal*, and *jameen*, the state deploys terror forces to dispossess them from their territory. When adivasis resist extractive capital, they are branded "extremists." When adivasis exhibit strong resilience, they are tortured more. When adivasi women stand for *izzat, adbhikar*, and gender equality, they are raped and killed. When civil rights activists support adivasis, their voice is brutally stifled. These horrors remind us Native Americans' predicament as described in Dee Brown's *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*.⁶⁵ However, adivasis in Bastar are still standing tall on their hills, and may even be chanting a song of their counterparts in other parts of the world—the Sioux (native Americans of the Black Hills in South Dakota, who fought against US expansionism and extractivism). Unlike Native Americans, however, adivasis in Bastar are with the Maoists, who are armed with Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism. And they became a major force in the Indian revolution. Thus, rather than being bogged down in a quagmire of pessimism, it is important to live with a hope that "the impossible will take a little while," but one day it will become a reality.

NOTES

1. Liberation, May 1968. Quoted in Samantha Banerjee, *India's Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising* (London: Zed Books, 1984), p. 98.
2. For a detailed account of the history of the movement, see Sankar Ghosh, *The Disinherited State. A Study of West Bengal, 1967–1970* (Kolkata: Orient Longman, 1971); Mohan Ram, *Maoism in India* (Delhi: Vikas, 1971); Bhabani Sen Gupta, *Communism in Indian Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Biplap Dasgupta, *The Naxalite Movement* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1974); Asish Kumar Roy, *The Spring Thunder and After* (Kolkata: Minerva, 1975); Rabindra Ray, *The Naxalites and Their Ideology* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988); Pradip Basu (ed.), *Discourses on Naxalite Movement, 1967–2009: Insights into Radical Left Politics* (Kolkata: Setu Prakashani, 2010); N. Venugopal, *Understanding Maoists: Notes of a Participant Observer from Andhra Pradesh* (Kolkata: Setu Prakashani, 2013); Banerjee, *India's Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising*.

3. Nandini Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar* (New Delhi: Juggernaut Books, 2016).
4. Vivek Chibber, "On the Decline of Class Analysis in South Asian Studies," *Critical Asian Studies* 38 (4) (2006), pp. 357–387.
5. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*.
6. Roy, *The Spring Thunder and After*.
7. Chibber, "On the Decline of Class Analysis in South Asian Studies," p. 379.
8. See Alpa Shah and Dhruv Jain, "Naxalbari at its Golden Jubilee: Fifty Recent Books on the Maoist Movement in India," *Modern Asian Studies Journal* (2017); John Harris, "What Is Going on in India's 'Red Corridor'? Questions about India's Maoist Insurgency—Literature Review," *Pacific Affairs* 84 (2) (2011).
9. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*.
10. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. xv.
11. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. xv.
12. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 53.
13. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 54.
14. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 54.
15. *People's War*, No. 9 (September 2014). Theoretical Organ of the Central Committee of the CPI (M). [http://www.bannedthought.net/India/People'sWar-CPI\(Maoist\)/PWSPL-9E_Final.pdf](http://www.bannedthought.net/India/People'sWar-CPI(Maoist)/PWSPL-9E_Final.pdf).
16. Jan Myrdal, *Red Star Over India* (Kolkata: Setu Prakashani, 2012).
17. Arundhati Roy, *Broken Republic: Three Essays* (New Delhi: Penguin Group, 2011).
18. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 75.
19. Gautam Navlakha and Aish Gupta, "The Real Divide in Bastar," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 44 (33) (2009), p. 23.
20. Alpa Shah, "Eco-incarceration: 'Walking with the Comrades'," *Economic and Political Weekly* 47 (21) (2012).
21. Alpa Shah, "The Tensions over Liberal Citizenship in a Marxist Revolutionary Situation: The Maoists in India," *Critique of Anthropology*, 33 (1) (2013), p. 493.
22. See James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976).
23. Shah, "The Tensions over Liberal Citizenship in a Marxist Revolutionary Situation: The Maoists in India," p. 499 (emphasis added).
24. Shah, "The Tensions over Liberal Citizenship in a Marxist Revolutionary Situation: The Maoists in India," p. 500.
25. Nandini Sundar, "Reflections on Civil Liberties, Citizenship, Adivasi Agency and Maoism: A Response to Alpa Shah," *Critique of Anthropology*, 33 (3) (2013), p. 365.
26. Tse-tung, Mao. 1968 [1927]. Notes on Mao Tse-Tung's "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan." Peking: Foreign Language Press.
27. Sundar, "Reflections on Civil Liberties, Citizenship, Adivasi Agency and Maoism: A Response to Alpa Shah," p. 365.
28. Sundar, "Reflections on Civil Liberties, Citizenship, Adivasi Agency and Maoism: A Response to Alpa Shah," p. 362.

29. Alpa Shah, "Humaneness and Contradictions: India's Maoist-inspired Naxalites," *Economic and Political Weekly* 52 (21) (2017).
30. Azad, *Maoists in India: Writings and Interviews* (Hyderabad: Charita Impressions, 2010).
31. For a detailed account of this transformation, see Paani, *Janatana Raajyam (People's State)* (Hyderabad: Virasam Publications, 2015).
32. Paani, *Janatana Raajyam (People's State)*.
33. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 74.
34. Paani, *Janatana Raajyam (People's State)*, p. 73.
35. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*; Paani, *Janatana Raajyam (People's State)*; Myrdal, *Red Star Over India*.
36. V. I. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement* (New York: International Publishers, 1988 [1902]); Paani, *Janatana Raajyam (People's State)*.
37. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 81.
38. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 86.
39. See R. Nagaraj and Motiram Sripad (eds.). *The Political Economy of Contemporary India* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
40. Vrinda Grover, "The Adivasi Undertrial, a Prisoner of War: A Study of Undertrial Detainees in South Chattisgarh." In Deepak Mehta and Rahul Roy (eds.), *Contesting Justice in South Asia* (New Delhi: Sage India, 2018).
41. Arundhati Roy, *Broken Republic: Three Essays* (New Delhi: Penguin Group, 2011).
42. Roy, *Broken Republic: Three Essays*; Paani, *Janatana Raajyam (People's State)*.
43. Robert Weil, "Is the Torch Passing? The Maoist Revolution in India," *Socialism and Democracy* 25 (3) (2011), p. 6.
44. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 124.
45. People's March, Vol. 8, No.7 (July 2007). <http://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/2007/PM2007-07.pdf>.
46. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 125.
47. Suhas Chakma (ed.). *India's Child Soldiers* (New Delhi: Asian Center for Human Rights, 2013).
48. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 197.
49. The Supreme Court of India, *Nandini Sundar and Others Vs. State of Chhattisgarh*, Writ Petition (Civil) No 250 of 2017, p. 4.
50. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*.
51. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 288.
52. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 290.
53. See, for example, K. Balagopal, "Maoist Movement in Andhra Pradesh," *Economic and Political Weekly* 26 (2006), pp. 3183–3187.
54. Azad, *Maoists in India: Writings and Interviews* (Hyderabad: Charita Impressions, 2006), p. 6.
55. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 242.
56. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 240.
57. See, for example, Samanta Banerjee, *India's Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising* (London: Zed Books, 1984).
58. Azad, *Maoists in India: Writings and Interviews*, p. 2.
59. Azad, *Maoists in India: Writings and Interviews*, p. 46.
60. Sundar, *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*, p. 349.

61. Henry Veltmeyer and James Petras, *The New Extractivism* (London: Zed Books, 2014).
62. Veltmeyer and Petras, *The New Extractivism*.
63. Louis Althusser, *Philosophy of the Encounter. Later Writings, 1978–1987* (London: Verso, 2006), p. 125 (emphasis in the original).
64. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol.1 (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 885.
65. Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee* (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 2009).

REFERENCES

- Azad. 2010. *Maoists in India: Writings and Interviews*. Hyderabad: Charita Impressions.
- Balagopal, K. 2006. Maoist Movement in Andhra Pradesh. *Economic and Political Weekly* 26: 3183–3187.
- Banerjee, Samanta. 1984. *India's Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising*. London: Zed Books.
- Basu, Pradip, ed. 2010. *Discourses on Naxalite Movement, 1967–2009: Insights into Radical Left Politics*. Kolkata: Setu Prakashani.
- Brown, Dee. 2009. *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*. New York: Sterling Publishing Co.
- Chakma, Suhas, ed. 2013. *India's Child Soldiers*. New Delhi: Asian Center for Human Rights.
- Chibber, Vivek. 2006. On the Decline of Class Analysis in South Asian Studies. *Critical Asian Studies* 38 (4): 357–387.
- Dasgupta, Biplap. 1974. *The Naxalite Movement*. Bombay: Allied Publishers.
- Ghosh, Sankar. 1971. *The Disinherited State. A Study of West Bengal, 1967–1970*. Kolkata: Orient Longman.
- Gilbert, Hila. 1968. “*Big Bat*” *Pourier*. Sheridan, Wyoming: Mills Company.
- Grover, Vrinda. 2018. The Adivasi Undertrial, a Prisoner of War: A Study of Undertrial Detainees in South Chattisgarh. In *Contesting Justice in South Asia*, ed. Deepak Mehta and Rahul Roy. New Delhi: Sage Publishing India.
- Gupta, Bhabani Sen. 1972. *Communism in Indian Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Harris, John. 2011. What Is Going on in India's ‘Red Corridor’? Questions About India's Maoist Insurgency—Literature Review. *Pacific Affairs* 84 (2): 309–327.
- Kumbamu, Ashok. 2010. Farewell to Imperialism? A Critical Sociological Study of Empire. In *Imperialism, Crisis and Class Struggle: The Enduring Verities and Contemporary Face of Capitalism. Essays in Honour of James Petras*, ed. Henry Veltmeyer. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Publishers.
- Lahiri-Dutt, Kuntala, ed. 2014. *The Coal Nation: Histories, Ecologies and Politics of Coal in India*. London: Ashgate.
- Lave, R. 2012. Neoliberalism and the Production of Environmental Knowledge. *Environment and Society: Advances in Research* 3: 19–38.
- Loeb, Paul Rogat, ed. 2004. *The Impossible Will Take a Little While. A Citizen's Guide to Hope in a Time of Fear*. New York: Basic Books.
- Myrdal, Jan. 2012. *Red Star Over India*. Kolkata: Setu Prakashani.
- Nagaraj, R., and Sripad Motiram, eds. 2017. *The Political Economy of Contemporary India*. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.

- Navlakha, Gautam, and Aish Gupta. 2009. The Real Divide in Bastar. *Economic and Political Weekly* 44 (33): 20–23.
- Paani. 2015. *Janatana Raajyam (People's State)*. Hyderabad: Virasam Publications.
- Peck, Jamie. 2004. Geography and Public Policy: Constructions of Neoliberalism. *Progress in Human Geography* 28: 392–405.
- People's March. 2007. Vol. 8, No.7. July. <http://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/2007/PM2007-07.pdf>.
- People's War. No. 9. 2014. Theoretical Organ of the Central Committee of the CPI (M). September. [http://www.bannedthought.net/India/People'sWar-CPI\(Maoist\)/PWSPL-9E_Final.pdf](http://www.bannedthought.net/India/People'sWar-CPI(Maoist)/PWSPL-9E_Final.pdf).
- Ram, Mohan. 1971. *Maoism in India*. Delhi: Vikas.
- Ray, Rabindra. 1988. *The Naxalites and Their Ideology*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Roy, Asish Kumar. 1975. *The Spring Thunder and After*. Kolkata: Minerva.
- Roy, Arundhati. 2011. *Broken Republic: Three Essays*. New Delhi: Penguin Group.
- Scott, James C. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Shah, Alpa. 2012. Eco-incarceration: 'Walking with the COMRADES'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 47 (21): 32–34.
- . 2013. The Tensions over Liberal Citizenship in a Marxist Revolutionary Situation: The Maoists in India. *Critique of Anthropology* 33 (1): 91–109.
- . 2017. Humaneness and Contradictions: India's Maoist-Inspired Naxalites. *Economic and Political Weekly* 52 (21): 52–56.
- Shah, Alpa, and Dhruv Jain. 2017. Naxalbari at Its Golden Jubilee: Fifty Recent Books on the Maoist Movement in India. *Modern Asian Studies Journal* 51 (4): 1165–1219.
- Sundar, Nandini. 2013. Reflections on Civil Liberties, Citizenship, Adivasi Agency and Maoism: A Response to Alpa Shah. *Critique of Anthropology* 33 (3): 361–368.
- . 2016. *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*. New Delhi: Jugernaut Books.
- The Supreme Court of India. Dairy number: 14030/2007; Case no: W.P.(C) No.-000250-000250/2007; Judgment date: July 5, 2011. <http://supremecourtfindia.nic.in/jonew/judis/38160.pdf>.
- Tse-tung, Mao. 1968 [1927]. Notes on Mao Tse-Tung's "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan." Peking: Foreign Language Press.
- Veltmeyer, Henry, and James Petras. 2014. *The New Extractivism*. London: Zed Books.
- Venugopal, N. 2013. *Understanding Maoists: Notes of a Participant Observer from Andhra Pradesh*. Kolkata: Setu Prakashani.
- Weil, Robert. 2011. Is the Torch Passing? The Maoist Revolution in India. *Socialism and Democracy* 25 (3): 1–81.



Neoliberalism, Contentious Politics, and the Rise of Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia

Walden Bello

Authoritarian movements are on the march globally. Southeast Asia is no exception. Our aim in this chapter is to gain a sense of the dynamics of this trend in Southeast Asia. Democracy is definitely on the wane in the region, with only Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Myanmar meeting the criteria of having competitive electoral politics and the non-monopolization of power by any single individual or institution, to use the narrowest definition of democracy. Moreover, with the exception of Indonesia, one would find it difficult to characterize the others as being in a healthy state. In Myanmar, the military is non-accountable to the fragile civilian administration led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Malaysia's democratic system is built on the institutionalized supremacy of one ethnic group, the Malays, over another, the Chinese. And while the Philippine government continues to retain the trappings of electoral democracy, under the presidency of President Rodrigo Duterte, it is fast sliding into strongman rule, with widespread state-sponsored extra-judicial executions carried out with impunity and a largely successful concerted executive effort to subjugate Congress and the Supreme Court.

The ascendant authoritarian side of the equation displays a variety of regimes, ranging from the authoritarian post-socialist regimes in Vietnam and Laos to the emerging personalist dictatorship of Hun Sen in Cambodia, the military dictatorship in Thailand, and the autocratic monarchy in Brunei. This chapter does not aim to elucidate the dynamics of all the varieties of authoritarian

W. Bello (✉)

Department of Sociology, State University of New York, NY, USA

© The Author(s) 2019

B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_11

regimes or movements in the region. Its focus is on three regimes, those of Cambodia, Thailand, and the Philippines, which, in the author's opinion, illustrate best the convergences and divergences in the dynamics of what is regarded as the "new wave" of authoritarianism that has captured the interest of social and political analysts.

Before beginning, we would like to address one concern: It is fashionable to attribute the global rise of authoritarianism and fascism to rapid capitalist transformation and the dislocations created by globalization. Certainly, the latter play a role in shaping political outcomes, and this will be evident as we work our way through the three countries, especially the cases of Thailand and the Philippines, all of which have experienced rapid economic change, with its attendant tensions. Our focus here, however, is not on a theoretical exposition of the political economy of authoritarianism but on an empirical analysis of how the conflicts among classes and political groups for political power create divergent paths to authoritarian rule. From this perspective, capitalist transformation is one of several factors influencing the process, interacting with political and economic institutions and with individual actors to produce unique outcomes.

CAMBODIA: TOWARD A PERSONALIST DICTATORSHIP

Political developments in Cambodia after the Vietnamese ousted the Khmer Rouge in 1978 did not yield a democratic regime. At the same time, it cannot be said that they gave rise to a full-blown authoritarian system. Perhaps the best, though theoretically, muddy description of the regime of President Hun Sen is one where the leader "has near-absolute power" but "remains bound by various limits to his authority."¹

A Regime in Transition

The character of the Hun Sen regime must be seen as having been strongly influenced by its beginnings. It originated from the United Nations-sponsored elections in 1993 to stabilize the country after the ouster of the Khmer Rouge by the Vietnamese. By then, Hun Sen, who had been handpicked by the occupying Vietnamese to serve as one of the country's top leaders, had been in power as prime minister since 1985 and had time to consolidate a strong power base. The UN wanted stability and Hun Sen needed legitimacy, and the elections achieved both goals. To maintain this legitimacy as well as to access foreign funding and foreign investment, Hun Sen has provided some space for a multiparty system, a free press, and non-governmental organizations to operate, though one with occasional crackdowns to keep opponents and critics from becoming serious challengers.

Another serious limit to full dictatorial rule has been the presence of potential rival individuals, factions, and institutions within his Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and his broader power base, which Hun Sen has had to buy off

with favors and positions. These internal barriers have been weakened considerably, however, according to some analysts like Lee Morgenbesser, who argues that over time, Hun Sen has achieved preponderance in six “domains”: gate-keeping of appointments to high office, appointment of relatives to key positions, creation of a paramilitary group to provide personal protection, control over the security apparatus, monopolization of decision-making within the party executive committee, and management of the party executive committee membership. The consequence has been the effective elimination of rivals within the party so that the regime has been transformed from a party-personalist regime to a personalist-party regime.²

Overcoming Social and Political Challenges

Even as Hun Sen was in the process of gaining undisputed hegemony within the ruling coalition, challenges to his rule emerged in both the social and political arenas. Over the last two decades, Cambodia has attracted significant investments in land and in the garment industry. Displacement of people from lands and low wages in the garment industry has triggered the formation of protest movements and unions.

Economic land concessions (ELCs) given to local and foreign investors have been the prime mechanism for agricultural development. ELCs are extensive, with over 255 concessions covering 2 million hectares. This is an area the size of Israel. With only 20 percent of landholders possessing formal title to their land,³ it is not surprising that numerous conflicts have broken out between smallholders and big corporations they accuse of stealing their land over the last two decades.⁴ Some 200,000 people have been affected by land conflicts since 2000, many of them forcibly displaced by a process described by one human rights agency as a “toxic cocktail” made up of “a corrupt and politically-obedient judicial system, the misuse of armed forces, including soldiers, as well as collusion between well-connected companies and authorities.”⁵

Land grabs are fueling confrontations that often end up in police or soldiers shooting militant farmers. Typical of these clashes pitting corporate farms versus smallholders was a much publicized incident in the Kratie province that resulted in the death of several villagers:

The protest began when military police and soldiers burned down huts belonging to the villagers, angering the villagers who then proceeded to block the road. The huts were on land at the centre of a long-running dispute between the Memot Rubber Plantation Company and residents who moved into the area around the same time that the land was granted to the company.⁶

Protesters have been routinely repressed and convicted, some charged with “armed rebellion.”⁷

More organized has been the resistance from Cambodia’s nascent working class. Union organizing and protest actions by thousands of workers escalated

throughout the country in 2015 and 2016, provoking management and the state authorities to combine strike-breaking action with hired thugs and judicial harassment of union leaders. The most potent response has been the passage of a very restrictive trade union law that imposed very onerous registration requirements, restrictive qualifications for union leaders, and a wide leeway for authorities to declare strike actions illegal and dissolve unions.⁸

In response to worker organizing, many foreign and local investors have taken shelter in also special economic zones (SEZs), where they enjoy special incentives, like hard infrastructure such as water and electricity provided by the state and a system for governing and policing workers provided by the state.⁹ While it has not stopped them from trying, labor organizers have found it harder to reach out to and organize workers in the SEZs, with one organizer comparing them to “frogs in a well.”¹⁰

Most threatening to Hun Sen, however, were developments in the electoral arena, which needed to be maintained to provide legitimacy both inside and outside the country. The 2013 national elections saw the CPP lose 22 seats and the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) gain 26 seats. This was the biggest loss of seats the CPP had ever experienced, indicating widespread disaffection with the regime. The CPP downswing and CNRP upswing trends continued in the 2017 communal elections, portending the possibility that the CNRP could come out the victor in the 2018 parliamentary elections and, with it, the displacement of Hun Sen and the CPP.

Observers of the Cambodian scene did not expect Hun Sen to take these losses sitting down but were wondering what his response would be. Hun Sen’s expected blitzkrieg took place in two stages: first, he had Kem Sokha, leader of the CNRP, arrested on treason charges in September 2017, and then he had the Supreme Court order the dissolution of the CNRP and the reallocation of seats it had to smaller parties that had failed to win seats in the previous parliamentary elections. This enfranchisement of the smaller parties at the expense of the CNRP was a typical Hun Sen strategy of repressing while bribing, coopting parties that would otherwise have made common cause with his main target.

Weaponizing Social Media

To some observers, the recent events showed that while Hun Sen has enjoyed the advantage of near-absolute control of the bureaucratic and military apparatus, his rule does not rest entirely on coercion. Taking advantage of the decentralization of information sourcing and delivery afforded by social media, the regime has been able to derive consent, if not legitimacy, from its manipulation of the sourcing, delivery, and interpretation of news. The freedom that the internet appeared to offer in the 2000s, as a way to get around government censorship, has evaporated, as the regime has discovered that with its superior resources, it could turn Facebook into an effective mechanism of control and legitimacy. According to a fascinating—and scary—account by a Cambodia

specialist, Geoffrey Cain, who was tagged as a “spy” by the regime’s internet operators, the recent grab for absolute power by Hun Sen would have been inconceivable without Facebook:

In the past, Hun Sen has relied on more traditional strongman tactics to maintain power. In 1997, Hun Sen removed his rivals in a coup d’état, sending tanks and soldiers into the streets. But with fake news, autocrats no longer need to resort to open violence or to dispatch their special forces to capture radio and TV stations to broadcast their messages. From Facebook, leaders can dream up conspiracies, publish them on their own fake-news pages, use targeted advertising to reach susceptible audiences, and *voilà*—they have manufactured a new ruling mandate.

What’s incredible, I learned, is that people believe these government fictions. In the days after the espionage accusations against me, hundreds of Cambodians tried to add me on Facebook and wrote to me that they knew I was a spy. With declining access to independent newspapers and radio broadcasts, Facebook seemed to be their most-trusted source of information. They were keen to out me like the “traitors” and “puppets” of past revolutions. If there is a lesson, it’s that institutions—the universities, businesses, newspapers, and government offices whose interest should be distributing reliable information—do not, perhaps cannot, stand in the way of fake news.¹¹

Cain concludes, histrionically perhaps, but with a strong dose of truth, that “Today’s power grabs can happen on obscure websites, in foreign languages, away from prime-time international television.”¹²

A Personalist Dictatorship

The recent lightning events led many to believe that Hun Sen had made the transition to a largely personalist dictatorship of the Marcos or Suharto type maintained through a combination of direct coercion, legal repression, neopatrimonial distribution of the spoils, and social media manipulation. As was the case with Marcos and Suharto, the consolidation of near-total personal control over all key dimensions of the state apparatus came in response to growing popular disaffection with the regime that was expressed via electoral means or street mobilizations.

Neighboring Thailand had a military dictatorship in place since 2014, while in the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte was in the process of dismantling democratic institutions. But the dynamics of authoritarianism in these two countries were very different from that in Hun Sen’s Cambodia.

THAILAND: REVOLUTION AND COUNTERREVOLUTION

In Thailand, authoritarian rule was not the product of a personal lunge for absolute power by an individual fearing displacement by a process of democratization but of counterrevolution, a middle-class-based counterrevolution.

To understand these dynamics, it is important to briefly revisit the 1960s and 1970s. The Thai countryside was in a state of ferment, as peasants organized for land reform and new tenure arrangements. This revolutionary upsurge was, however, stopped in its tracks by the landed elites that mobilized fascist-like paramilitary groups to engage in systematic assassination of peasant leaders to stop the implementation of the measures decreed by a weak reformist parliamentary regime in Bangkok. These elites hooked up with the conservative bureaucratic and military elites at the national level to halt the process of political reform that had begun with a student uprising in 1973. This counter-revolutionary process climaxed with the bloody storming by the paramilitary groups of Thammasat University in 1976, which resulted in scores killed and hundreds arrested and imprisoned.

Though peasants were forced into quiescence, the agrarian crisis deepened in the next 25 years. A middle-class-based revolution ended a military dictatorship in 1992, but this resulted in few tangible benefits for huge swathes of the rural and urban underclasses. Things appeared to brighten, however, when a dynamic but controversial political entrepreneur, Thaksin Shinwatra, appeared on the scene at the time the whole country was experiencing economic dislocations precipitated by the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and a wrenching International Monetary Fund-supervised stabilization program.

The Thaksin "Revolution"

Thaksin will probably go down as Thailand's most controversial early twenty-first-century figure. After building up a telecommunications empire through government connections, he went into politics, rising from being a subordinate of traditional political figures to being the dominant figure in a political force, initially called the *Thai Rak Thai* (Thai Love Thai) Party, that won the 2001 elections and the three other elections thereafter by landslides. He bent government rules to advance his business interests while he was prime minister and used his office to create opportunities for his business cronies. But he also posed as a reformer who would modernize Thailand's politics and a nationalist who freed the country from the clutches of the International Monetary Fund. Most important, he set in motion a political project that drew massive support from the rural and urban masses, and from the populous north and northeastern regions and most of central Thailand, which threatened to upend the country's political landscape.

Thaksin was the supreme opportunist, but an extremely clever one, who saw an opening in the vacuum of leadership for the lower classes that had been created by the loss of progressive formations like the Farmers' Federation of Thailand (FFT) and the Communist Party. Advised by former student radicals, he devised in the wake of the IMF stabilization program debacle a Keynesian program that pulled the country out of the depths of crisis and that had a strong redistributive component. The key elements of this program were a universal health-care system that allowed people to be treated for the equiva-

lent of a dollar, a 1 million baht fund for each village that villagers could invest however they wanted, and low-interest loan programs along with various kinds of food subsidies and agriculture price supports.

To the rural masses, Thaksin offered the “New Deal” they had long been in search of, and they became a central force in the political rollercoaster that was interrupted by a military coup in 2006 against Thaksin and by another putsch, in 2014, against a government headed by his sister Yingluck. While the rising opposition to Thaksin characterized them as “the greedy poor” that Thaksin “bought” with his populist politics, the reality was more complex. Naruemon Thabchumpon and Duncan McCargo claimed that the characterization of the hardline Thaksin supporters known as the Redshirts as coming from the poor peasantry was simplistic. Many were, rather, “emerging forces on the margins of the middle class” or “urbanized villagers” who were not from the lowest class who were motivated mainly by a demand for political justice and fair play rather than socio-economic concerns.¹³ The complex character of Thaksin’s rural mass base stemmed from the fact that the spread of capitalist production relations and the commercialization of land had contradictory effects, impoverishing some while providing an opportunity for others, including people who were able to access the pro-Thaksin’s government support to help them build small businesses. Both losers and winners came together in support of Thaksin.

A not unfair judgment of Thaksin’s impact on the rural masses is provided by political scientist Ukrist Pathamanand:

[Thaksin’s] policies were perceived to have an impact on ordinary people’s lives far beyond anything experienced under previous governments. Thaksin also presented himself as a leader of ordinary people, responsive to their demands, unlike any predecessor. Many who later came to join the Red Shirts explained that they felt grateful to Thaksin for his policies and for the sense of empowerment he gave them...

As a result, when Thaksin was toppled by a coup in 2006, many villages in the north, northeast, and central regions saw this as wrong and came out to join demonstrations. After the clashes at Sanam Luang, Victory Monument, and Ding Daeng junction in Bangkok in April-May 2010, many became even more opposed to state power and more sympathetic to Thaksin.¹⁴

Many Thaksin supporters were not uncritical admirers of the man. Some acknowledged he had a corrupt and authoritarian side, but that he was a modern, capitalist force that was progressive in comparison to the reactionary military-bureaucratic-aristocratic elite. Others saw him as a useful symbol behind which to build a new progressive movement that would eventually develop dynamics independent of him. Indeed, the 2006 coup that overthrew Thaksin spawned the “Redshirt” movement that became more and more independent of the self-exiled Thaksin, leading some activists to claim that “the movement signaled a real revolution in political consciousness and organization in the countryside, reflecting a shift toward a postpeasant society.”¹⁵ This view—that

Thaksin's main contribution was to serve as a springboard to people's self-empowerment—is expounded in some detail by Ukrist:

[V]illagers' political sophistication advanced election by election. Vote buying declined in effectiveness, as people increasingly paid attention to the policies on offer. Elections became increasingly aware of the power of the vote and their ability to use it to bring about improvement in their own lives. Loyalty to Thaksin was less and less about Thaksin himself and more and more an expression of the villagers' wish to protect their newly gained and understood power.¹⁶

Counterrevolution and the Middle Class

The five years of Thaksin's government gave the traditional royalist elite a big scare about the effects of mass democracy. After the coup of 2006, their apprehensions deepened as the results of the 2007 and 2011 elections showed that the Thaksin coalition was simply unbeatable at the polls. The elite knew, however, that to preserve their interests, they had to win over the country's middle class. One way to gather the support of the middle sectors was to paint the Thaksin movement as seeking to subvert the royalty, claiming that Thaksin and key advisers on the left had met in Finland in 1999 to plot the overthrow of the monarchy.¹⁷ Yet the elite did not have to resort to sensationalist claims to win the middle sectors since the latter had themselves become alarmed at the increasing politicization and empowerment of the lower classes unleashed by Thaksin. Middle-class intellectuals themselves began to question majority rule, a core concept of democracy. A key figure was Anek Laothamatas, whose influential thinking was summed up by Pasuk Phongpaichit and Christ Baker:

Anek argued that Thaksin's populism was the inevitable result of trying to make electoral democracy work in a country where most of the electorate were rural people still bound by old-style patron-client ties. In the early years of Thailand's democracy, politics was dominated by godfather politicians who translated patron-client bonds into electoral majorities. Thaksin's brilliance had been to transfer those bonds to a national leader. The rural voter used to exchange his vote for the promise of the godfather's local patronage, and now exchanged it for cheap health care and local loans. In this social setting, Anek argued, a "pure democracy" was bound to lead to de Tocqueville's "tyranny of the majority" and irresponsible populism.¹⁸

Another influential figure, Thirayut Boonmee, an icon from the 1973–1976 student uprising, came out in favor of royal intervention to check democracy, saying the critics of such a move had "to step beyond the Western frame of thinking."¹⁹ Yet another prominent figure, a Chulalongkorn University professor, otherwise known as a liberal, confessed to me in an interview, "For me, democracy is not the best regime. I'm in this sense an elitist. If there are people

who are more capable, why not give them more weight. Why should they not come ahead of everybody else? You may call me a Nietzschean.”²⁰ This reactionary thinking emerged in the context of the rise of the anti-Thaksin “Yellow Shirt” movement, composed mainly of the Bangkok middle class, that came out into the streets and helped trigger the coup that ousted Thaksin in September 2006. With Thaksin’s electoral support remaining strong, the Yellow Shirts engaged in increasingly militant actions, such as their seizure of Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi International Airport in November 2008, to destabilize a pro-Thaksin government that had won the national elections in 2007.

When the Thaksin coalition won the parliamentary elections a fourth straight time in 2011, bringing Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck, to the premiership, the elite-middle-class opposition began to rapidly lose hope in a democratic reversal of what they considered a political trajectory harmful to their interests. Over the next few months, a strategy evolved gradually: use the judicial system to paralyze the government with charges of corruption and anti-constitutional moves, get the middle classes to stage massive demonstrations in Bangkok, which was largely anti-Thaksin territory, and get the military to launch a coup to resolve the political deadlock. Bangkok in 2013–2014 became the site of almost daily demonstrations by the middle class led by the Democrat Party personality Suthep Thaugsuban, which were punctuated by instances of deadly violence. A last desperate effort by the government to resolve the crisis through new elections was sabotaged by demonstrators and thugs that tried to prevent people from voting, their rationale expressed in the slogan “reform before elections,” which was a sanitized code word for devising constitutional arrangements that would prevent the Redshirts from ever coming to power again.

On May 22, 2014, the military ousted the Yingluck government. In April 2017, a new constitution was promulgated, the main feature of which was a fully appointed Senate of 250 that could veto the moves of the National Assembly. Not surprisingly, this reflected the views of anti-Thaksin middle-class intellectuals like Anek Laothamatas, who had proposed several years earlier that to avoid the “tyranny of the majority” that had brought Thaksin to power through thumping majorities, there had to be a “better democracy” that was “a balanced compromise between three elements: the representatives of the lower classes who are the majority in the country, the middle class, and the upper class.”²¹ Laothamatas, a former communist turned counterrevolutionary thinker, was a member of the junta-appointed National Reform Council.

By the middle of 2017, the military government headed by Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, the former army chief of staff, remained in place, having gone far beyond its originally stated goal of staying in power for only 15 months. Unlike earlier military regimes, it was comfortably ensconced in power, a condition created partly by the successful intimidation of all opposition, but mainly by the solid support of a middle class that had, like Laothamatas, turned counterrevolutionary.

DUTERTE AND THE REVOLT AGAINST LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES

If Hun Sen's move toward a personalist dictatorship was an effort to stave off democratization and the Thai military dictatorship was a product of an elite-led but middle-class-based counterrevolutionary response to the mobilization of the lower classes, in the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte's road toward authoritarian rule was paved by the failure of liberal democracy.

The overthrow of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos in February 1986 and its replacement with a liberal democratic regime headed by Corazon Aquino, the widow of the assassinated opposition leader Benigno Aquino, was a process spearheaded by the middle class. Thirty years later, large numbers of that same middle class, as well as the elite, were behind the electoral insurgency of Rodrigo Duterte, who promised an iron hand to deal with the problems of the country, including killing drug users and other criminals without due process. Duterte won the presidential elections of May 2016 with nearly 40 percent of the vote.

There is no doubt that Duterte's promise to deal in a draconian fashion with the drug problem was a major factor in his being elected in a society where fear of crime is widespread among all sectors of the population. It is testimony to his political acumen that he was able to successfully latch onto an issue that most politicians had ignored. Yet there are more profound causes for his victory and his current popularity. One cannot understand Duterte's hold on society without taking into consideration the deep disenchantment with the liberal democratic regime that came into being with the landmark "EDSA Uprising" that overthrew the dictator Ferdinand Marcos in February 1986, EDSA being the acronym for the north-south highway that bisects Metro-Manila where the major mass actions took place. In fact, the failure of the "EDSA Republic" was a condition for Duterte's success.

What destroyed the EDSA project and paved the way for Duterte was the deadly combination of elite monopoly of the electoral system, uncontrolled corruption, the continuing concentration of wealth, and neoliberal economic policies and the priority placed on foreign debt repayment imposed by Washington.

By the time of the elections of 2016, there was a yawning gap between the EDSA Republic's promise of popular empowerment and wealth redistribution and the reality of massive poverty, scandalous inequality, and pervasive corruption. There was virtually no change in the proportion of people living in poverty between 2000 and 2015. With 21.6 percent of the people living in poverty, the Philippines had the third largest proportion of poor people in Southeast Asia, after Myanmar and Laos.²² The Gini coefficient, the best summary measure of inequality, increased from 0.438 in 1991 to 0.506 in 2009.²³ Add to this brew the widespread perception of inept governance during the preceding administration of President Benigno Aquino III, and it is not surprising that a good part of the electorate saw Duterte's tough guy, authoritarian approach, which he had cultivated as mayor of the southern frontier city of Davao for

over 30 years, as precisely what was needed. To borrow the novelist Anthony Doerr's description of the state of mind of pre-war Germans, Filipinos were "desperate for someone who can put things right."²⁴

Moreover, the EDSA Republic's discourse of democracy, human rights, and rule of law had become a suffocating straitjacket for a majority of Filipinos who simply could not relate to it owing to the overpowering reality of their powerlessness. Duterte's discourse—a mixture of outright death threats, *coarse street-corner* language, misogynistic outbursts, and frenzied railing, coupled with disdainful humor directed at the elite, whom he calls "coños" or cunts—was a potent formula that proved exhilarating to his audience who felt themselves liberated from what they experienced as the stifling political correctness and hypocrisy of the EDSA discourse.

Duterte as Fascist

What marks Duterte off from other authoritarian figures is that he fits the category of a fascist. If we see as central to the definition of a fascist leader one who (1) derives his or her strength from a heated multiclass mass base, (2) is a charismatic individual with strong inclinations toward authoritarian rule, (3) is engaged in or supports the systematic violation of basic human, civil, and political rights, and (4) pursues a political project that contradicts the fundamental values and aims of liberal democracy or social democracy, then Duterte fits the bill. The following sections will deal in more detail with these aspects of Duterte and his regime.²⁵

Duterte's Middle-Class Base

There is no doubt that Duterte is popular, with some 78 percent of the people, according to a recent poll, registering satisfaction with his actions.²⁶ While he draws approval from all classes, his support is most aggressively displayed among the aspiring and downwardly mobile middle classes. Borrowing from Gramsci, one might advance the provisional observation that unlike Duterte's middle-class base, whom we might characterize as exhibiting "active consensus" behind Duterte's authoritarian rule, the lower classes that support the president might be said to be marked by "passive consensus."

The Philippines provides an interesting case study of the volatility of the middle class. At times, it can be a force for democracy, as the middle classes were in the late eighties, when they played a central role in the overthrow of Marcos and other authoritarian regimes throughout the global South. At other times, they provide the heated mass base for authoritarian rule, as they did for Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany and as they do now for Duterte.

Duterte's middle-class base is not passive. Beginning with the presidential campaign in 2016, they have mobilized to dominate the social media, engaging in the worst kind of cyber-bullying of people who dare to criticize the president's policies on line. Shortly after his declaration of martial law in Mindanao in May 2017, for instance, one of the most prominent pro-Duterte bloggers

publicly called for the execution of two women journalists. Another Duterte fanatic registered his hope online that a woman senator who had criticized Duterte's martial law declaration would be "brutally raped." Indeed, rational discourse is an increasingly scarce commodity among Duterte's partisans, who ape their leader's penchant for outrageous and incendiary utterances.

Much of Duterte's online support comes from Filipino workers overseas, many of them people with college education who suffer from occupational dissonance owing to their seeing themselves as trapped in menial blue-collar or service jobs for which they are overqualified. Their backing of Duterte is heartfelt and spontaneous, just as that of most of his other supporters. Nevertheless, much like the Hun Sen regime in Cambodia, Duterte's followers have not hesitated to weaponize the internet to manufacture consent. A study by Oxford University's Computational Propaganda Research Project claims that the Duterte campaign paid \$200,000 for as many as 500 dedicated trolls to attack dissenters and spread disinformation. Pro-Duterte bloggers, some claiming followers from the hundreds of thousands to millions, have been rewarded with government positions owing to their aggressive dissemination of false or slanted news.²⁷ Expressing dissent on Facebook invites concerted attack, my own experience being very similar to that of a prominent analyst:

My opposition to the president's violent rhetoric and his disdain for democratic checks and balances has earned me attacks and threats. Usually Duterte Diehard Supporters will seize on one of my columns or Facebook posts, engaging in ad hominem assaults on their pages that they tacitly encourage their followers to continue onto mine... I am far from the only Filipino to get this treatment. The attacks come in waves from outraged trolls—with social media accounts and inboxes flooded with insults, promises of violence and memes made to expressly mock and disgrace—before they move on to the next target after several days. The duration and intensity seem directly correlated to the reach and influence of the person being attacked.²⁸

Carino Brutal

Duterte is charismatic, but his charisma is not the demiurgic sort like Hitler's nor does it derive so much from an emotional personal identification with the people and nation as in the case with some populists. Duterte's charisma would probably be best described as "*carino brutal*," a Filipino-Spanish term denoting a volatile mix of will to power, a commanding personality, and gangster charm that fulfills his followers' deep-seated yearning for a father figure who will finally end the national chaos.

Eliminationism

Duterte's fascist signature is his bloody war on drugs. Unlike most politicians, Duterte delivered on his main promise, which he had described as "fattening the fish in Manila Bay" with the cadavers of criminals. Thousands of drug users have been slain either by the police or by police-controlled vigilante groups,

with the police admitting that 2600 deaths were attributable to police operations while another 1400 were the work of vigilantes.²⁹ Other, more reliable sources put the figure at above 7000 as of early May 2017.³⁰ By the last quarter of 2017, some estimates put the numbers killed at over 20,000.³¹

What is beyond doubt is that Duterte has brazenly encouraged the extra-judicial killings and discouraged due process. The very night of his taking his oath of office on June 30, 2016, he told an audience in one of Manila's working-class communities: "If you know of any addicts, go ahead and kill them yourselves as getting their parents to do it would be too painful."³² In October 2016, Duterte told the country, with characteristically sinister humor, that 20,000 to 30,000 more lives might have to be taken to cleanse the country of drugs.³³ Having learned to take Duterte seriously even when he seems to be joking, many observers expect this figure to be an underestimate. More recently, to any policemen who might be convicted of killing drug users without justification, he has offered an immediate pardon "so you can go after the people who brought you to court."³⁴

Duterte's mass killing of drug users is underpinned by an eliminationist rationale that reminds one of the pseudo-scientific basis of Nazi racial theory. A whole sector of society has been unilaterally stripped of their rights to life, due process, and membership in society. This category—drug users and drug dealers—is said to comprise some 3–4 million of the country's population of 104 million. Duterte has all but written off these out of the human race. With rhetorical flourish, he told the security forces a few months ago: "Crime against humanity? In the first place, I'd like to be frank with you: are they humans? What is your definition of a human being?"³⁵

Drug users are consigned outside the borders of "humanity" since their brains have allegedly shrunk to the point that they are no longer being in command of their faculties to will and think. In his speeches justifying the killings "in self-defense" by police, Duterte said that a year or more of the use of "shabu"—the local term for meth or methamphetamine hydrochloride—"would shrink the brain of a person, and therefore he is no longer viable for rehabilitation."³⁶ These people are the "living, walking dead" who are "of no use to society anymore."³⁷ Not only do these people turn to violent crime to slake their drug habit, but they are paranoid and could resist arrest, putting the lives of policemen in danger.³⁸

Needless to say, most neuroscientists claim that the effects of drug use on the brain are reversible and that rehabilitation, using chemical and electro-mechanical means, carried out in a supportive social context is not only possible but is actually being successfully carried out.³⁹

Duterte's Political Project

As to his political project, Duterte is not a reactionary seeking to restore a mythical past. He is not a conservative dedicated to defending the status quo. His project is oriented toward an authoritarian future. He is best described, using Arno Mayer's term, as a counterrevolutionary. Duterte is a counterrevo-

lutionary and has excelled in the political improvisation characteristic of skilled counterrevolutionaries like Hitler and Mussolini.⁴⁰ Counterrevolutionaries are not always clear about what their next moves are, but they often have an instinctive sense of what would bring them closer to power. Ideological purity is not high on their agenda, with them putting the premium on the emotional power of their message rather on its intellectual coherence. But aside from seizing power, counterrevolutionaries do have an ideological agenda and ideological enemies. Mussolini and Hitler were leading a counterrevolution against the left or social revolution. In Duterte's case, the target, one can infer from his discourse and his actions, is liberal democracy, the dominant ideology and political system of our time.⁴¹ In this sense, he is both a local expression and a pioneer of an ongoing global phenomenon: right-wing backlash against liberal democratic values and liberal democratic discourse that Francis Fukuyama had declared as the end of history in the early 1990s.⁴²

A Fascist Original

While Duterte fits the fascist category, it must also be pointed out that he is no simple reproduction of past actors. He is a fascist original. Interpreting his mandate as a blank check to do whatever it takes to "defend the nation," Duterte has reversed the usual model by which fascists and authoritarian populists come to power. In the conventional model of "creeping fascism," the fascist personality begins with violations of civil and political rights, followed by the lunge for absolute power, after which follows indiscriminate repression. Duterte reverses the process. He starts with massive, indiscriminate repression, that is, the killing with impunity of thousands of drug users, leaving the violation of civil liberties and the grab for total power as mopping up operations in a political atmosphere where fear has largely neutralized opposition. His approach might be called "blitzkrieg fascism," in contrast to "creeping fascism."

By the end of 2017, Duterte had put his most vociferous critic in jail, declared martial law in the southern Philippines, subjugated Congress, controlled the Supreme Court, obtained a legal ruling to have the last independent national media outlet shut down, and was on the verge of rewriting the constitution.

CONCLUSION

Authoritarianism is on the march in Southeast Asia. However, this examination of three countries that have moved toward authoritarian rule during the last few years shows that the roots and dynamics of the authoritarian project differ markedly in the three cases.

In Cambodia, the move toward authoritarianism has three key features. First, it is a consolidation of an already authoritarian regime, with the latter moving from being a party-personalist regime to a personalist-party regime. Second, Hun Sen does not exercise absolute power but continues to allow

elections to take place, a free press to exist, and non-governmental organizations to operate, though under highly restrictive conditions and with occasional crackdowns to make sure they do not pose threats to the regime. Third, the move toward tighter personal control of the political process by Hun Sen is a response to growing popular disaffection, as shown in increasingly negative electoral outcomes for the ruling regime. All this does not mean that Hun Sen is bereft of significant popular support. His regime has shown itself to be an expert in using the social media as tools to mobilize public opinion through the dissemination of false news.

The dynamics of authoritarianism in Thailand has been mainly driven by an elite and middle-class counterrevolutionary response to the rise of a populist figure, Thaksin Shinwatra, whose route to power was mobilization of the rural masses that had benefited least from the country's economic growth. The aim of the elite-middle-class street mobilizations that wracked Thailand in 2013 and 2014 was to provoke the military to intervene and oust the elected pro-Thaksin civilian government. It is thus not surprising that the current military dictatorship enjoys an unparalleled degree of stability because, unlike other military regimes, it is not socially isolated but enjoys the support of the middle class.

In the Philippines, the rise of authoritarianism stems directly from popular disappointment with the economic performance of the democratic regime that was ushered in by the so-called EDSA Revolution that overthrew Marcos in 1986. If Duterte did not exist, he would have had to be created. The same middle class that was on the barricades in 1986 was also the key force behind Duterte's electoral insurgency. Duterte is, however, not just an authoritarian politician. He is a fascist who displays the same characteristics of the more classical fascist figures like Hitler and Mussolini, the most prominent of which are a heated middle-class base, a charismatic personality, a project to dismantle liberal democracy, and an eliminationist ideology.

Understanding the varieties of authoritarianism is indispensable for the proponents of democratic rule to be able to come up with effective strategies of containing and overcoming one of the most potent political challenges of our time.

NOTES

1. Michael Dickison, "Hun Sen's Paradox: Absolute Power With Limits," *The Cambodia Daily* (June 1, 2017) <https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/hun-sens-paradox-absolute-power-with-limits-130813/>.
2. Lee Morgenbesser, "Misclassification on the Mekong: The Origins of Hun Sen's personalist Dictatorship," *Democratization*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2018), <http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.binghamton.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2017.1289178>.
3. Stuart Grudgings and Prak Chan Thui, "Insight: Land conflict, Impunity Dim Cambodia's Awakening," *Reuters* (November 13, 2012) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-protests/insight-land-conflict-impunity-dim-cambodias-awakening-idUSBRE8AB17J20121112>.

4. Mark Grimditch, *The Engine of Economic Growth: An Overview of Private Investment Policies, Trends, and Projects in Cambodia* (Bangkok: Focus on the Global South, 2016), p. 18.
5. Prasanth Parameswaran, "Cambodian Land Conflicts Surge," *The Diplomat* (February 21, 2015) <https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/cambodian-land-conflicts-surge/>.
6. Kong Meta, Soth Koemsoeun, and Phak Seangly, "Authorities Deny Six Killed in Kratie Clash between Protesters, Soldiers," *Phnom Penh Post* (February 8, 2018). <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/updated-authorities-deny-six-killed-kratie-clash-between-protesters-soldiers>.
7. Grudgings and Thui. "Insight: Land conflict, Impunity Dim Cambodia's Awakening."
8. Cambodian Center for Human Rights, "Fact Sheet: Escalation of Violent Repression of Trade Union Activists," Phnom Penh (March 2016). http://www.cchrcambodia.org/index_old.php?title=-Escalation-of-Violent-Repression-of-Trade-Union-Activities&url=media/media.php&p=factsheet_detail.php&fsid=69&id=5&lang=eng.
9. Charles Main, *SEZs and Value Extraction from the Mekong: A Case Study on the Control and Exploitation of Land and Labor in Cambodia and Myanmar's Special Economic Zones* (Bangkok: Focus on the Global South, 2017), p. 16.
10. Main, *SEZ and Value Extraction from the Mekong*, p. 23.
11. Geoffrey Cain, "Fake News and the Death of Democracy in Cambodia," *The Nation* (November 21, 2017). <https://www.thenation.com/article/fake-news-and-the-death-of-democracy-in-cambodia/>.
12. Geoffrey Cain, "Fake News and the Death of Democracy in Cambodia."
13. Naruemon Thabchumpon and Duncan McCargo, "Urbanized Villagers in the 2010 Thai Redshirt Protests: Not Just Poor Farmers?," *Asian Survey*, Vol 51, No 6 (November–December 2011), p. 1018.
14. Ukrist Pathamanand, "Network Thaksin: Structure, Roles, and Reaction," in Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, *Unequal Thailand: Aspects of Income, Wealth, and Power* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2016), p. 153.
15. Kanokrat Lertchoosakul, *The Rise of the Octobrists in Contemporary Thailand* (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2016), p. 262.
16. Pathamanand, "Network Thaksin: Structure, Roles, and Reaction," pp. 153–154.
17. Lertchoosakul, *The Rise of the Octobrists in Contemporary Thailand*, pp. 243–244.
18. Phongpaichit and Baker, *Unequal Thailand: Aspects of Income, Wealth, and Power*, p. 240.
19. Thirayut Boonmee, quoted in Lertchoosakul, *The Rise of the Octobrists in Contemporary Thailand*, p. 237.
20. Quoted in Walden Bello, "Military Suspends Class Conflict in Thailand," *Telesur*, August 8, 2014, <http://www.telesurtv.net/english/opinion/Military-Suspends-Class-Conflict-in-Thailand-20140806-0010.html>.
21. Quoted in Phongpaichit and Baker, *Unequal Thailand: Aspects of Income, Wealth, and Power*, p. 240.
22. "Poverty in the Philippines," *Asian Development Bank*. <https://www.adb.org/countries/philippines/poverty>.

23. See A. Martinez, M. Western, and W. Tomazewski, "Is There Income Mobility in the Philippines?," *Asian-Pacific Economic Literature*, Vol 28, No. 1 (2014), pp. 96–115. According to the National Statistical Coordination Board, people from the high-income class, which account for between 15.1 and 15.9 percent of the country's population, enjoyed a 10.4-percent annual growth in income in 2011. In contrast, incomes of people in the middle-income segment grew by only 4.3 percent and incomes of those in the low-income group by 8.2 percent. Overall inequality thus increased as the incomes of the top bracket increased faster than other brackets. Michelle Remo, "Rich-Poor Divide in Philippines Widening," *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (July 10, 2013). <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/441817/rich-poor-divide-in-ph-widening>.
24. Anthony Doerr, *All the Light We Cannot See* (London: Fourth Estate, 2014), p. 63.
25. Some of the points made below were originally laid out in Walden Bello, "The Spider Spins his Web," *Philippine Sociological Review*, Vol 65 (2017).
26. "SWS: Duterte Receives Record-high Net Satisfaction Rating," *SunStar Manila* (July 7, 2017). <http://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/local-news/2017/07/07/sws-duterte-receives-record-high-net-satisfaction-rating-551578>.
27. Miguel Syjuco, "Fake News Floods the Philippines," *New York Times* (October 24, 2017). <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/opinion/fake-news-philippines.html>.
28. Syjuco, "Fake News Floods the Philippines." <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/opinion/fake-news-philippines.html>.
29. "The General Running Duterte's Anti-drug War," *New York Times* (June 2, 2017). https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/world/asia/the-general-running-dutertes-antidrug-war.html?emc=edit_th_20170603&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=57179294&_r=0.
30. "The Philippines' Drug War Death Denial Complex," *Human Rights Watch* (May 9, 2017). <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/09/philippines-drug-war-deaths-denial-complex>.
31. Ted Regencia, "Senator: Rodrigo Duterte's Drug War has Killed 20,000," *Al-Jazeera* (February 22, 2018). <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/senator-rodrigo-duterte-drug-war-killed-20000-180221134139202.html>.
32. Statement at solidarity dinner at Del Pan Sports Complex, July 1, 2016, quoted in I-Defend, "End Impunity, Stand Up for Human Rights, Uphold Due Process" (August 12, 2016).
33. "Duterte on Drug-related Deaths: Expect 20,000 to 30,000 More," *ABS/CBN News* (October 28, 2016). <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/10/27/16/duterte-on-drug-related-deaths-expect-20000-or-30000-more>.
34. Speech before a conference of local government officials carried over DZRH (March 14, 2017).
35. 'Drug Users Aren't Human,' Says Duterte, *GMA News Online* (August 28, 2016). <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/579277/drug-users-aren-t-human-says-duterte/story/>.
36. Quoted in Marichu Villanueva, "Duterte Likens Addicts to Zombies," *Philippine Star* (August 24, 2016) <http://www.philstar.com/opinion/2016/08/24/1616655/duterte-likens-drug-addicts-zombies>.

37. Quoted in Marichu Villanueva, "Duterte Likens Addicts to Zombies." <http://www.philstar.com/opinion/2016/08/24/1616655/duterte-likens-drug-addicts-zombies>.
38. Quoted in Marichu Villanueva, "Duterte Likens Addicts to Zombies." <http://www.philstar.com/opinion/2016/08/24/1616655/duterte-likens-drug-addicts-zombies>.
39. Interview with Dr. Yo Ying Ma, Binghamton (March 5, 2017).
40. Here, I find Arno Mayer's distinction among "reactionaries," "conservatives," and "counterrevolutionaries" still very useful. Fascism, in Mayer's typology, falls into the counterrevolutionary category. See Mayer.
41. This is not to say that liberal democracy was not also a subject of derision on the part of Hitler and Mussolini. However, the principal target of both leaders was the socialist project and the workers' movement and they played on the threat of a working-class revolution to unite the right on their way to power.
42. See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

REFERENCES

- Bello, Walden. 2014. Military Suspends Class Conflict in Thailand. *Telesur*. August 8. <http://www.telesur.tv.net/english/opinion/Military-Suspends-Class-Conflict-in-Thailand-20140806-0010.html>.
- . 2017. "Rodrigo Duterte: A Fascist Original," in Nicole Curato, ed., *A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte's Early Presidency* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2017), pp. 77–91.
- Cain, Geoffrey. 2017. Fake News and the Death of Democracy in Cambodia. *The Nation*. November 21. <https://www.thenation.com/article/fake-news-and-the-death-of-democracy-in-cambodia/>.
- Cambodian Center for Human Rights. 2016. Fact Sheet: Escalation of Violent Repression of Trade Union Activists. Phnom Penh. March.
- Dickison, Michael. 2017. Hun Sen's Paradox: Absolute Power With Limits. *The Cambodia Daily*. June 1. <https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/hun-sens-paradox-absolute-power-with-limits-130813/>.
- Doerr, Anthony. 2014. *All the Light We Cannot See*. London: Fourth Estate.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Grimditch, Mark. 2016. *The Engine of Economic Growth: An Overview of Private Investment Policies, Trends, and Projects in Cambodia*. Bangkok: Focus on the Global South.
- Grudgings, Stuart, and Prak Chan Thui. 2012. Insight: Land Conflict, Impunity Dim Cambodia's Awakening. *Reuters*. November 13. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-protests/insight-land-conflict-impunity-dim-cambodias-awakening-idUSBRE8AB17J20121112>.
- Lertchoosakul, Kanokrat. 2016. *The Rise of the Octobrists in Contemporary Thailand*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.
- Main, Charles. 2017. *SEZs and Value Extraction from the Mekong: A Case Study on the Control and Exploitation of Land and Labor in Cambodia and Myanmar's Special Economic Zones*. Bangkok: Focus on the Global South.

- Martinez, A., M. Western, and W. Tomazewski. 2014. Is There Income Mobility in the Philippines? *Asian-Pacific Economic Literature* 28 (1): 96–115.
- Meta, Kong, Soth Koemsoeun, and Phak Seangly. 2018. Authorities Deny Six Killed in Kratie Clash Between Protesters, Soldiers. *Phnom Penh Post*. February 8. <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/updated-authorities-deny-six-killed-kratie-clash-between-protesters-soldiers>.
- Morgenbesser, Lee. 2018. Misclassification on the Mekong: The Origins of Hun Sen's Personalist Dictatorship. *Democratization* 25 (2). <http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.binghamton.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2017.1289178>.
- Pathamanand, Ukrist. 2016. Network Thaksin: Structure, Roles, and Reaction. In *Unequal Thailand: Aspects of Income, Wealth, and Power*, ed. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker. Singapore: NUS Press.
- Regencia, Ted. 2018. Senator: Rodrigo Duterte's Drug War Has Killed 20,000. *Al-Jazeera*. February 22. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/senator-rodrigo-duterte-drug-war-killed-20000-180221134139202.html>.
- Remo, Michelle. 2013. Rich-Poor Divide in Philippines Widening. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. July 10. <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/441817/rich-poor-divide-in-ph-widening>.
- Syjuco, Miguel. 2017. Fake News Floods the Philippines. *New York Times*. October 24. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/opinion/fake-news-philippines.html>.
- Thabchumpon, Naruemon, and Duncan McCargo. 2011. Urbanized Villagers in the 2010 Thai Redshirt Protests: Not Just Poor Farmers? *Asian Survey* 51 (6). November–December.
- Villanueva, Marichu. 2016. Duterte Likens Addicts to Zombies. *Philippine Star*. August 24. <http://www.philstar.com/opinion/2016/08/24/1616655/duterte-likens-drug-addicts-zombies>.



Nationalism and Nationalist Movements in the Age of Neoliberal Globalization

Berch Berberoglu

Nationalism and nationalist movements have developed and spread around the world ever since the emergence of the nation-state as a product of the bourgeois revolutions in Europe in the transition from feudalism to capitalism in the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Since then, people around the world who never had an independent nation that they could call their own have fought under the banner of nationalism to free themselves from colonial and imperial bondage to become independent and launch a nation-state free of control and domination by powerful forces outside their national geographic territories. Thus, anti-imperialist struggles for national liberation and self-determination in the postcolonial era have resulted in the emergence of a series of independent nation-states on a global scale.¹

Nationalism, originally the ideology of a rising national bourgeoisie, subsequently became the rallying cry of the masses against other states in the battle between rival rising capitalist states as they fought for control and domination of the global political economy under the supremacy of one or another powerful nation-state. It is in this context of inter-national and inter-imperialist rivalries for global domination and within the framework of the developing internal class relations and struggles in each nation that a renewed nationalist ideology became a political tool of rival capitalist states to control and dominate the masses in “their own” states to prevent rebellions and revolutions that would end the exploitation and oppression of the multitudes that they ruled over in their zeal to codify their authoritarian class rule in society.

B. Berberoglu (✉)

Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, NV, USA

e-mail: berchb@unr.edu

The rise of nationalism under these conditions of the evolution and development of capitalism and capitalist rule in society aimed at exploitation and oppression of the working class and other toiling masses throughout modern history, cultivated and spread right-wing, ethnocentric, racist, and xenophobic and narrowly nationalist ruling-class ideology to control the masses, set them against each other, and against those in other nations to divert attention away from the exploitation and oppression that working people have suffered under the rule of their own bosses who have dictated and manipulated a pseudo-nationalist ideology to control the masses, hence to prevent or derail potential revolutions that would topple the ruling classes and put an end to capitalism throughout the world. This is precisely what happened in Nazi Germany and other advanced capitalist states in the aftermath of the Great Depression (as in Italy, Spain, and elsewhere) and no less in the Third World in the aftermath of the anti-colonial struggles when a series of “nationalist,” state-capitalist dictatorships were established to repress the working class and the laboring masses to prevent socialist revolutions throughout the developing world.

This chapter addresses these key theoretical and substantive issues in accounting for the rise and spread of nationalism and nationalist ideology, historically and today, and establishing the relationship between nationalist ideology and class struggles in contemporary capitalist society, including how this pervasive ideology at the service of the dominant ruling classes has succeeded in dividing people to impose class-driven bourgeois ideological hegemony over the masses to legitimize the class rule of the capitalist class through the instrumentality of the capitalist state and other superstructural institutions of capitalist society (such as religious, educational, mass media, and legal institutions) that define and reinforce the prevailing capitalist social order.

THE CLASS NATURE OF NATIONALISM AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

Nationalism and nationalist movements are phenomena that cannot be studied in isolation without taking into account the social and class structure of the society in which they arise. National and ethnic divisions (as well as nationalist ideology, as an extension of such divisions) are manifestations of social classes, class conflicts, and class struggles.

“National relations,” writes G. Glezerman, “cannot be understood outside of and independently of class relations”: “This being the case, a class approach is one of the most important features inherent in the ... analysis of social phenomena, including nations, national interests and national movements.”² Thus, “The division of society, or a nation, into classes,” Glezerman continues, “and the division of humanity into nations, nationalities, etc., have different historic roots. Yet relations between nations and classes cannot be viewed in isolation from each other.”³ In this sense, “Nations like classes are connected with a definite set of conditions of the material life of society.”⁴

A few key substantive questions that lie at the heart of nationalism must be briefly raised to sort out the class nature of nationalism and nationalist movements. Thus, while all nationalist movements possess characteristics that are historically specific, the central question that must be raised as theoretically applicable to all such struggles is the necessity of a *class analysis approach* to the study of nationalism. Nationalism, writes Albert Szymanski in his book *Class Structure*, "is the ideology that members of a nation, people, ethnic group, or 'racial' minority have more in common with each other than the various constituent classes of the group have with other people in similar class positions."⁵ Moreover,

"nationalism" dictates that because of their postulated overriding common interest, all classes within the ethnic group, people, or "racial" minority should work together economically and politically to advance their collective interests *against* other "nations," "races," ethnic groups, or peoples (even against those who are in the *same* classes). Nationalism is the advocacy of ethnic or "national" solidarity and action over class consciousness and action. It is, thus, the opposite of class consciousness that argues solidarity should occur and political alliances be formed primarily along *class* lines (even against the relatively privileged groups within one's subordinate ethnic group). Nationalism and class consciousness are, thus, alternative strategies of political action for gaining improvement in one's life.⁶

"In fact," adds Szymanski, "nationalism is a product of class forces. Although different kinds of nationalism differ qualitatively in their effects, *all* serve some classes within a given racial or ethnic group as opposed to others."⁷ Given the complex process involving the use of nationalist ideology in the modern world, nationalism and national movements today must be studied and understood not as a uniform ideology solely used by the dominant bourgeois forces in society to maintain the class rule of the bourgeoisie, but in terms of how such a powerful ideology glorifying the nation as a collective entity can be (as it has been) used by diverse class forces to advance their interests as part of the class struggles that such ideologies may promote (or hinder) the interests of competing class forces that adopt nationalism as their strategy to take or maintain state power in order to prolong or transform existing social, political, and economic relations.

The adoption of a class analysis approach to the study of nationalism, therefore, would entail an analysis of the class base of a particular national movement, the balance of class forces within it, and the class forces leading that movement. On this basis, one could determine the nature and future course of development of a national movement and whether a given movement is progressive or reactionary. Once the *class character* of a national movement and its leadership is thus determined, a political differentiation of various types of national movements can be ascertained, which in turn would provide us with clues to the social-political character of the movement in question.⁸

An understanding of the class nature of a given national movement may also inform us of the nature of the class forces that movement is struggling *against*, hence the nature and forms of the class struggle. The class content of the anti-imperialist liberation struggle, then, transforms the national struggle into a *class* struggle, which is fought at the national and international levels.

This struggle, which *appears* in the form of a national struggle, is, in essence, a *class struggle for state power*.⁹ "If national struggle ... is class struggle, [i.e.,] ... one very important form of the struggle for state power," writes James Blaut, then a number of questions arise which are central to an understanding of nationalism and a national movement: "which classes make use of it, in which historical epochs, and for which purposes?"¹⁰ Thus, through such an analysis, one can expect a relationship between the class character of a national movement, its political goals, and the nature and direction of the postindependence state following a successful national struggle.

In national struggles led by the petty bourgeoisie, for example, the class position of this segment of Third World societies often leads to an anti-imperialist liberation struggle in which the petty bourgeois forces play a dominant role. In such situations, writes Szymanski,

Both sectors of the petty bourgeoisie tend to become nationalist because of their feelings of social humiliation and lack of fundamental control over their lives—a situation they can easily attribute to foreign domination. This class becomes disillusioned with the authoritarian rule of the transnational-local capitalist coalition. Its tendency is to increasingly support various nationalist opposition movements often in alliance with the working class and peasantry—movements to which they attempt to provide leadership.¹¹

"The nationalist propensities of the petty bourgeoisie," Szymanski continues, "are felt especially strongly in the intelligentsia":

Those whose lives center on learning, teaching, writing, and art have an especially strong identification with the idea of the nation, and an especially strong resentment of foreign cultural and economic domination. This is both because of their own material interest in advancing their careers, and because of their genuine feelings of offended dignity as the representative of an oppressed culture. Similar feelings of national humiliation are experienced by junior military officers who sense their nation's economic (and thus military) inferiority and the subordination of their countries.... This intelligentsia and/or junior officer strata of the petty bourgeoisie often lead anti-imperialist movements that have sometimes succeeded in defeating imperialist influence, local allies of imperialism in the bourgeoisie, and the incipient national bourgeoisie to establish essentially petty-bourgeois states.¹²

This same process under the leadership of another class, for example, leads to a completely different outcome in favor of the class that succeeds in taking state power. In either case, the important question once again becomes the class

nature of the social forces that wage the national struggle and lead the rest of society in a particular political direction.

National movements that are struggling for self-determination are also engaged in struggles against dominant class forces that are in control of the prevailing social system. As a result, national struggles often turn into class struggles where a subordinate, oppressed class comes to express its interests through a revolutionary movement aimed at taking state power. Such a movement is often led by a single class or an alliance of class forces whose interests are opposed to those who control the state. Thus:

Class forces mobilized by the petty bourgeoisie and other intermediate sectors of society ... have seized power by rallying people around a nationalist ideology directed against imperialism and its internal reactionary allies, the landlords and compradors.... [R]evolutions led by worker-peasant alliances against imperialism and local reaction have resulted in the establishment of socialist states.¹³

Hence, a national movement led by the national or petty bourgeoisie—that is, bourgeois nationalism—can, when successful, set the stage for the building of a national *capitalist* state; an anti-imperialist national movement that is led by the working class in alliance with the peasantry, on the other hand, can, upon waging a successful national liberation struggle, begin building a popular *socialist* state.¹⁴ In other instances, actions by a coalition of class forces that mobilizes a variety of social classes through cross-class alliances aimed at capturing state power may, due to the absence of a clearly articulated class position, result in the transformation of society in an “ambiguous” direction, such that in the absence of a clear and resolute action against existing social, political, and economic institutions of society, the new order may soon lose its dynamism and become incorporated into the structures of the global political economy dominated by the imperialist states.

Given the dominant role of imperialism today, it is important to recognize the force brought to bear by the imperialist states in shaping the nature and direction of such movements that have an immense impact on the balance of class forces at the global level. Such intervention by an external force becomes a crucial determinant of the class struggle when it is articulated through various internal class forces that are allied to it. An alliance of dominant classes at the global level is thus aimed at blocking the struggles of national movements in an effort to forestall the development of the class struggle that would transform the state and society and bring to power forces whose interests are contrary to and clash with those in control of the prevailing social order.

The critical factor that distinguishes the nature and dynamics of contemporary forms of nationalism and national movements, then, is the *class character* of these movements and their *class leadership*. It is within this context of social-political developments in the struggle against the existing state and social-economic structures of society that we begin to delineate the nature and dynamics of ongoing class struggles and social transformations embarked

upon by movements determined to succeed in gaining national liberation and self-determination.

The diverse settings in which struggles for autonomy, self-determination, and national liberation take place necessitate a careful analysis of the relationship between class, state, and nation—phenomena that are central to our understanding of the nature and dynamics of nationalism, national movements, class struggle, and social transformation. It is thus within the framework of an understanding of the relationship between these phenomena that we find the social relevance of nationalism and national movements as manifested in different spatial, temporal, and political contexts. An analysis of the class nature of national movements, then, provides us a clear understanding of the nature, form, and class content of nationalism, as well as the nature and dynamics of the society that a given movement is struggling to build. With a clear class perspective on the ideology of nationalism and national movements, we can thus better comprehend this powerful and persistent phenomenon that has gripped the attention of the world community throughout the twentieth century.

NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT ON A WORLD SCALE

During the course of the twentieth century, there have been several major forms of national domination that have historically given rise to nationalism and national movements struggling for national liberation. First is the dispossession of a people through colonial and imperial domination, occupation, and carving out of their historic homeland, reducing them to a subject population, as in the Western colonial and imperialist domination and enslavement of the African people through the Transatlantic slave trade. Later, the peoples of the Americas, Asia, and the Middle East came under similar forms of domination and rule, culminating in the occupation and partition of various territories through a series of mandates, as in the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the Western imperialist powers and the dispersion of its native populations, which led to the current predicament of the Palestinian and Kurdish peoples. Second is the denial of the right to national self-determination to peoples dominated by the imperial state in the advanced capitalist countries. These include the domination of Northern Ireland by Great Britain, of Puerto Rico by the United States, of the Basque Country by Spain, and of Quebec by the Canadian state, among others. A related situation within the advanced capitalist countries involves the oppression of immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities, such as Native Americans, African Americans, and Mexican Americans in the United States and Algerians, East Indians, Arabs, Turks, and others in France, Britain, Germany, and other advanced capitalist countries in Europe and elsewhere. Third, and more recently, in the aftermath of the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the past decade, we have seen the rise of right-wing reactionary forces in these countries that have found the opportunity to capture state power through ethnonationalist mobilization, targeting an

increasingly ineffective and weakened socialist state that came under pressure during the Cold War years of the postwar global capitalist political economy. Here, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the ensuing ethnonational conflict has led to ethnic strife and civil war. Let us take up each of these cases briefly and highlight the dynamics of the process that affects the nature and forms of national identity and expression culminating in ethnonational conflicts that have fostered the emergence and development of social movements for national self-determination.

The Third World

Historically, the Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, and British colonial powers came to confront indigenous peoples and cultures around the world that more and more came under the control and influence of the dominant Western powers and were suppressed and denied their national identity, autonomy, and self-determination.

Spanish colonial expansion to the New World was characterized by plunder of the newly acquired colonies. As the Indian population declined, and Spain accelerated its acquisition of new territory, it became necessary to secure Indian labor to work the land. The Spanish conquerors destroyed native irrigation systems, incorporated native land into Spanish estates, and forced the evacuation of Indians from their land.¹⁵

Elsewhere, in Brazil, an insufficient number of Indians necessitated the importation of slaves from Africa. Thus, feudal Portugal set up slavery as the dominant mode of production in its Brazilian colony in order to facilitate the extraction of precious metals and other raw materials for sale on the world market. Slaves were used first in sugarcane fields and later in mining gold and diamonds.

In the Caribbean and along the Atlantic coast of North America, a similar pattern was established. Black slaves from Africa worked the sugar and cotton plantations, while the Native Americans of these areas were displaced or physically eliminated, thus transforming local social structures.¹⁶ In these regions, the British colonialists became the dominant force.

Large areas of Asia were colonized by Western powers until the middle of the twentieth century. British and European imperialism mercilessly plundered these regions at the height of their empires. Through their presence in the region, they effected major changes in the social and economic structures of the societies they came to dominate.

Britain assumed political sovereignty in India late in the eighteenth century. As trade with Britain increased, and the demand for Indian goods grew, local capital expanded into crafts, textiles, and industrial production. This gave rise to a renewed expansion of local manufacturing industry and with it the development of a national industrial bourgeoisie that came to be seen as a competitor with British imperialism. This prompted Britain to take steps to crush Indian industry and turn India into an appendage of its colonial economy.¹⁷

Antagonism between the British and local industrial capital led to the national bourgeois alliance with the peasantry to throw off the British yoke through the independence movement.¹⁸ Much as in North America, but unlike the situation in Latin America, the national bourgeois forces were able to consolidate power and capture the leadership of the movement in a victory over the British. By the late 1940s, they installed a state committed to the development of local capitalism in India following independence. Given the relatively weak position of the national bourgeoisie, the victorious nationalist forces were able to utilize the powers of the state and establish a state-capitalist regime to assist in the accumulation of capital by the Indian bourgeoisie.¹⁹

Although not formally colonized, China too came under the influence and control of the Western imperialist powers, as traditional forms of exploitation were reinforced through the link to Europe and other centers of Western imperialism. The Western powers intervened in China and attempted to incorporate it into the world capitalist orbit at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries.²⁰ A protracted struggle against Western imperialism followed and ushered in a period of intense nationalism that paved the way for the national bourgeois forces to capture state power by the early twentieth century.

In Africa, the European colonial powers imposed slavery and spread the slave trade throughout the continent in the sixteenth century. Slaves became Africa's major export, as they were sold to masters in various parts of the world, especially in the Americas. During this period, the African economy became highly dependent on the European colonial economy tied to the slave trade.²¹

Until the middle of the twentieth century, when most African countries won their formal independence, the local economies were a direct appendage of the colonial center, which directed development in the colonies. The pattern was based on the logic of the capitalist mode of production that dominated the economies of the center states and evolved according to its needs of accumulation, resulting in uneven development between the imperial center and the colonies, and within the colonies. This classic colonial relationship prevailed in a number of African countries after the granting of formal independence, and led to the restructuring of social-economic relations on a neocolonial basis.

Elsewhere in Africa, nationalist forces have taken the initiative to lead the newly independent states along a less dependent path. Utilizing the military and state bureaucracy as supportive institutions to carry out their development programs, the petty bourgeois leaders in these countries have opted for a state-capitalist path that has corresponded well with their class vision of society and social-economic development. Nasser in Egypt, Boumediène in Algeria, Kaunda in Zambia, and Nyerere in Tanzania could be cited as prime examples of petty bourgeois nationalist leaders in charge of postcolonial states developing along the state-capitalist path.

Historically, the presence of a racist apartheid regime in South Africa has been a great impediment to the development of revolutionary forces in the southern cone of Africa and has had a major impact on the scope and pace of development on the continent in a progressive direction. With the official abo-

lition of the apartheid regime in South Africa in the 1990s, however, the last vestiges of racist colonial and neocolonial oppression was removed, so that an open political struggle could be waged by the masses to take control of their destiny and build a new society free of oppression and exploitation that they have suffered for so long.

In the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire was the major political force until the beginning of the twentieth century. After centuries of expansion and conquest, the Ottoman state began to lose ground to rival powers in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and became vulnerable to pressures from the West. European powers, taking advantage of the endless wars in the empire's various provinces, found their way in through direct economic controls and military occupation of large parts of Ottoman territory, which culminated in the occupation of virtually every corner of the empire during World War I.²²

Following the collapse of the empire at the end of the war, Britain, France, Italy, and other European powers colonized its territories and remained in control of its various provinces for several decades. From the Persian Gulf to Palestine, to the Suez Canal, down to the Arabian Peninsula, and across North Africa, the Ottoman territories came under the jurisdiction primarily of Britain and France, who divided up these lands to secure trade routes, raw materials, and new markets for the expanding European-controlled world economy. The Palestinian and Kurdish national questions—two classic cases of ethnonational oppression—are a product of this imperialist division and occupation of the Middle East.²³

The partition of Palestine and Kurdistan, as well as the rest of the Middle East that came under British and French rule, effectively dispersed or divided these two peoples from their historic homelands, subjecting them to the whims of newly emergent postcolonial states that came to power in the aftermath of World War I or following the British and French Mandates.²⁴ All were created under imperialist treaties that parceled out occupied Ottoman lands among the Western powers that came to rule over the peoples of the Middle East, including the Palestinians and the Kurds.²⁵

In Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran the Kurds came under newly independent states in which they became minorities. Palestine came under the control of Israel, which emerged as an independent state at the end of the British occupation of this old Ottoman territory. Subsequently, many Palestinians were either forced to disperse to neighboring Arab states and became a minority immigrant population that constituted the Palestinian diaspora, or remained in Israel as a second-class minority population under repressive rule of the Israeli state.²⁶ Today, it is in these independent Middle Eastern states that the Palestinians and the Kurds have been facing the most brutal oppression and are in turn fighting for their national liberation.²⁷ It is from the point of view of both of these historic events (i.e., the division of their homeland by the imperialist states and the denial of their rights as minorities in the new states in which they now reside) that the Palestinians and the Kurds came to face their predicament as oppressed national groups who lack a national homeland and a national state.²⁸

The Advanced Capitalist Countries

In the advanced capitalist countries, the national question and ethnonational conflict have continued to be central components of racial and ethnic relations for centuries. Beginning with the slave trade that accompanied the looting and enslavement of Africa by the Western colonial powers, entire populations of diverse ethnic origin were transported across the oceans to exploit their labor in the vast plantations and mines of the colonies.²⁹ Africans, Native Americans, and indigenous populations across the world came under this global assault of the colonizers as the latter engaged in the plunder of native lands and the exploitation and oppression of natives in distant outposts, which served to further the economic expansion of the colonial and imperial centers.³⁰ Thus, a dual process of domination of racial and ethnic minorities began to unfold as the lands and peoples of the conquered territories (as in the case of the Americas) came under colonial control, while others were brought in from distant colonial outposts to the imperial heartland to generate wealth through the use of slave labor.³¹ Although the North American Indians did not make good slaves, they did nonetheless become subjugated by the white European colonists as the indigenous populations of North and South America came under the direct control of the British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and other European colonial powers at different periods in history, during which new colonial empires were built on the backs of the exploited and oppressed peoples of the continent. In this process of plunder and enslavement, millions of natives perished through a combination of factors that together resulted in a genocide of unprecedented proportions, leading to an enormous decline in native populations throughout the Americas.³²

The conquered Native American populations, north and south, were supplanted by a steady flow of African slaves brought to labor in the mines and fields across the US South and the Caribbean basin, who in time became part of the local population, albeit as second-class citizens whose worth rarely exceeded that of three-fifths of their white colonial counterparts. Together, the Native American and black African American peoples came to constitute the basis of the early minority population in North America, with a varied combination of their mestizo, mulatto, as well as native sisters and brothers in the rest of the continent, who also came under severe discrimination over the course of centuries of exploitation and oppression under colonial and imperial rule—first by foreign and later by local ruling classes of European origin.³³ Later, during the Spanish occupation of North America and following the Mexican American war of the mid-nineteenth century, the United States inherited a Mexican population of native-born Chicanos and Mexican immigrants who came to constitute another major ethnic group in the new nation-state in formation that came to encompass the 50 states of the United States of (North) America.³⁴

Hence, the Native American, African American, and Mexican (or Hispanic) American populations formed the three main minority populations of the United States. Notwithstanding the steady flow of immigrants from various

European, Asian, and other countries who came to America in the nineteenth and the turn of the twentieth centuries, adding to the diversity of the US population, these three major racial/ethnic groups came to define the nature of racial/ethnic relations in the United States over the course of the twentieth century.³⁵

While the struggles of colonized peoples like Native Americans, Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians, and others under the US yoke bring up the national question, the racist oppression visited upon colonized peoples and immigrants in the imperial heartland, wherein they have been reduced to powerless minorities treated as second-class citizens, confronts the tensions surrounding racial and ethnic relations that are part of domestic, national life within the confines of established nation-states like the United States.³⁶

These dual problems of racial/ethnonational conflict that define the parameters of both the national question *and* domestic racial/ethnic relations confronting the advanced capitalist countries are not restricted to the United States alone; they are, in fact, the creation of the major European colonial and imperial powers like Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and others who are responsible for colonial plunder and occupation of distant native lands.³⁷ The problems that these powers face with their own racial/ethnic minority populations at home, who were either forcefully brought in from the colonies to supplant local labor or have (through their economic, political, cultural, and educational links with the colonies) immigrated to the colonial/imperial centers, stem from the legacy of colonialism that has created the conditions for the racial/ethnic strife that these countries now confront in their midst. Thus, East Indians, Africans, Middle Easterners, Caribbean islanders, and others in Britain; Algerians, Tunisians, Moroccans, and other African and Middle Eastern immigrants in France; and a variety of other peoples from the ex-colonies of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and other European powers who carved out Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas all represent the historic end result of colonial and imperial domination that has created this dual problem of the national question, on the one hand, and domestic racial/ethnic oppression, on the other, that have affected colonized and oppressed peoples everywhere.

While the oppression of ethnic minorities in the advanced capitalist centers continues to be the main source of racial/ethnic tensions at home, the occupation of ethnonational territory by the chief imperialist states, such as the British occupation of Northern Ireland, US occupation of Puerto Rico, Israeli occupation of Palestine, and the domination of Basques in Spain and Quebecois in Canada, continues to foster struggles for national liberation as the basis of resolving the national question in the advanced capitalist countries.

Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union

Transformations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the 1990s fueled the upsurge in national rivalries and led to ethnic conflict and civil

war. The rise of nationalism and nationalist movements in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the aftermath of the collapse of socialism during the past decade came about when right-wing bourgeois forces in these countries succeeded in capturing state power through ethnonationalist mobilization directed against the weakened socialist states that were under constant assault by the capitalist West during the Cold War years of imperialist expansion.

Under socialism, the multitude of nationalities and ethnic groups in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union lived in peace and progressed within the context of a cooperative social environment in which minority culture and values were protected. The customs, traditions, languages, and ways of life of these groups were promoted within the boundaries of socialism and social life that brought together these diverse nationalities under one roof, cultivating cooperation and diffusing conflict as part of the process of progress toward full communism. But, with the collapse of socialism and communist rule in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the past decade, these former socialist states have been in turmoil and embroiled in violent ethnonational conflict and civil war that has been tearing down their societies. The most violent and bloody of these conflicts have occurred in traditionally peaceful regions of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (namely, Yugoslavia and the Transcaucasian republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan).³⁸

Why? Why have formerly peaceful regions that lived in harmony for years suddenly erupted in flames and caused wars and destruction and despair? What social forces are responsible for this predicament and for what results? How and why have these forces succeeded and imposed their rule on society and unleashed a reign of terror over the people to maintain their dominance and to prolong their rule? The social forces that stand to benefit from the recent developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have been able to mobilize a considerable amount of support to deal with problems of the post-Soviet transition to a private market-oriented economy. Such mobilization has served a dual purpose: to protect the interests of a newly privileged dominant class *and* to channel the discontent of the general population in a right-wing ultranationalist direction that can be controlled and regulated. At the same time, the economic crises that these countries have been facing in this period of transition have led to enormous material deprivation of broad segments of the population,³⁹ and this has been the primary factor for the emergence of ultranationalist movements. Mindful of the declining living standards of the general population, while enriching themselves through legal and illegal means (especially through government corruption), the newly emergent dominant groups have promoted right-wing reactionary activity to fan the flames of ethnic strife as a means of social control. But behind the ethnonational conflicts that are fostered by these forces, characteristic of this period, it is increasingly becoming evident that such conflicts are deeply rooted in socioeconomic relations that are at base *political* in nature—that is, struggles for political power.

Looking at the situation in Yugoslavia, one is struck by the fact that this once peaceful multiethnic and multinational society of diverse cultures and

religions was forced into senseless conflict, hatred, and civil war. The forces that pushed Yugoslavia into civil war and subsequently caused its destruction were those that wanted Yugoslavia to be dismembered, broken up, and turned into a series of weak dependent states—dependent on the West.⁴⁰ The partition of Yugoslavia and dismemberment of its constituent parts into small independent states served rival capitalist interests in the Balkans and that led to an all-out war against the last remaining territory of the former Yugoslav state (Serbia) following the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Through this process (a process based on intense social conflict), the fate of Yugoslavia was decided in favor of one group (the right-wing bourgeois forces) against another (the working class and the masses). The new rulers of Yugoslavia represent the interests of a rising bourgeois elite that has entered the political scene with Western assistance. With the secessionist republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina becoming integrated into the Western orbit, the United States has succeeded in transforming Yugoslavia to serve as a key power broker in the Balkans to advance Western imperialist interests.

The former Soviet Union likewise went through a similar process of upheaval and ethnic conflict that led to open war in various parts of its vast territories. The war in Chechnya, pitting rebel groups against the Russian army, was dwarfed by the all-out war between two former Soviet republics in the Transcaucasian region—Armenia and Azerbaijan.⁴¹

The rapid changes set into motion by the collapse of the Soviet Union during the early 1990s prompted a number of former Soviet republics in the Transcaucasian region and elsewhere to assert themselves in seeking national independence, cultural freedom, and political autonomy. Such political assertion, under the leadership of a series of right-wing nationalist movements, gained these republics their formal political independence in the form of a sovereign nation-state. Deep-seated national sentiments throughout the Transcaucasian region, which go back several decades and were kept in check during Soviet times, subsequently led to the violence centered around the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave within the boundaries of the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan.⁴²

The intense nature of the conflict between these two newly independent states brought to the surface long-suppressed national aspirations of ethnic identity and self-determination among Armenians and Azeris, which go to the heart of the phenomenon of nationalism.⁴³ Nationalist movements in this region of the world, led by right-wing reactionary forces, thus found an opening to assert themselves to give expression to popular national feelings that are deep in the collective psyche. Ethnonational conflicts, emerging from pent-up popular drives for national identity and self-determination, are thus the outcome of the clash of national interests articulated by organized political forces that are determined to advance their own narrowly defined national agenda. And the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, no less than the conflict in

the former Yugoslavia, confirms this particular feature of nationalism and ethnonational strife.

National chauvinism in these rival former Soviet republics tore down the decades-long peaceful coexistence that the socialist state had worked so hard to achieve since its inception in the 1920s. The forces of reactionary bourgeois nationalism and national chauvinism thus created once again the material basis for competition and conflict over territory, language, religion, and other forms of national identity that bourgeois nationalism cultivates, which leads to inevitable conflict and crisis.

As the recent experience of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union amply illustrates, nationalism and nationalist movements are often used to advance narrow class interests. Nationalism, the ideology of the national and petty bourgeoisies, is an ideology that is antithetical to the interests of working people everywhere. While national mobilization against imperialism through revolutionary leadership can lead the masses to victory, as in the case of Cuba, one should not underestimate the lethal force that nationalism represents, which, in the wrong hands, can cause much devastation and bloodshed, as we have seen throughout history.

The superiority of socialism over capitalism is bound to demonstrate, in the long run, the necessity for the masses to move beyond the narrow bounds of nationalism and the national project, all too often promoted by reactionary bourgeois elements, and strive toward a collective, egalitarian future that serves the interests of all the people in a society that is free of exploitation, oppression, and inequalities that have caused, and continue to cause, so much misery. Thus, striving toward equality, in no uncertain terms, acquires its true meaning only under socialism—a fact one hopes the people of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as oppressed peoples everywhere, will once again rediscover in the not too distant future.

THE RISE OF RIGHT-WING ULTRANATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN THE TWENTIETH AND EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

In examining the relationship between global capitalist expansion and the decline of national economies, we observe the rise of right-wing ultranationalist movements around the world. Developments in Eastern Europe and the Third World over the past three decades have set the stage for an understanding of similar movements that are now emerging in the United States and other advanced capitalist countries, especially in the aftermath of the latest global capitalist crisis over the past decade. Examining these developments at some length, I will attempt here to explain the factors that have contributed to the emergence of these movements in the context of economic decline and political reaction in a variety of social settings on a global scale. Observing the development of nationalism in diverse settings, I will examine a number of national movements that have come to power during the course of the twentieth and

early twenty-first century. Of special interest here is the emergence of the Nazi movement in Germany, Italian and Spanish fascism, Islamic fundamentalism, Third World military dictatorships, and contemporary right-wing nationalist movements in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, as well as the rise of racist, ultranationalist forces in contemporary mainland Europe, Britain, and the United States, important examples that need to be studied further. Here we attempt to outline the nature and dynamics of some of these movements and their practices in the context of an analysis of the social, economic, and political transformations that have taken place in the twentieth century. Such an analysis would provide us the broader parameters of socioeconomic and political factors that impact the contemporary world situation and help us explain the dynamics of social change and social transformation that have been taking place in recent decades.

Factors Contributing to the Rise of Right-Wing Ultrnationalist Movements

In an attempt to explain the nature and dynamics of extreme right-wing movements in broad sociological terms, one finds the following conditions that have historically contributed to the rise of nationalism and ultranationalist movements in different societal settings:

1. Socioeconomic conditions:
 - a. the consolidation of economic power through the concentration and centralization of capital and international capitalist expansion by the transnational monopolies that now operate on a world scale;
 - b. recessions and depressions in the domestic economy, effected by the internationalization of capital with the attendant consequences of high unemployment and domestic economic decline;
 - c. growing inequality in income and wealth between different segments of the population, especially between labor and capital at home and abroad;
 - d. decline in the overall standard of living and a rise in the level of poverty on a world scale;
 - e. the contraction of the world economy, including rivalry between the chief economic powers for greater share of the global market.
2. Sociopolitical conditions:
 - a. the nature of the government in power;
 - b. the level of tolerance and repression by the political regime;
 - c. the world political–military situation, with rivalry between the chief economic powers for territorial expansion;
 - d. the level of political organization and the seriousness of the political threat to the regime in power.

The class nature of the relationship between nationalist movements and the various social classes that support these movements is of crucial importance in the context of the above socioeconomic and political conditions that lead to the rise of extreme right-wing social movements in capitalist society. Here, it is important to delineate the role of various classes in this process—the capitalist class, the petty bourgeoisie, and the working class. Moreover, to understand the dynamics of the relationship between these classes and movements we need to understand the class interests of the social classes involved in this relationship⁴⁴:

1. The class interests of the capitalist class:
 - a. to maintain order (the capitalist order) through control of the state to facilitate the exploitation of labor for private profit;
 - b. to cultivate relations with petty bourgeois elements and to utilize them in maintaining capitalist rule;
 - c. to use the powers of the state to repress labor or otherwise prevent the working class from coming to power, thus preventing the emergence of socialism.
2. The class interests of the petty bourgeoisie:
 - a. to safeguard and promote its intermediate class interests;
 - b. to smash the power of big business and the monopolies to carve out a better position for itself under capitalism;
 - c. to smash the power of the working class and the communist movement to prevent the emergence of socialism;
 - d. to advance nationally based small business interests as against those viewed as alien, minority, or belonging to immigrant populations that are seen as threatening local petty bourgeois interests.
3. The class interests of the working class:
 - a. to fight against capitalist exploitation of labor through strikes and other forms of mass action;
 - b. to fight for the immediate improvement of socioeconomic conditions and increased benefits through trade union activity;
 - c. to fight against the capitalist system through the leadership of a worker's party to establish a society ruled by the working class.

The class interests of these classes and the class relations that they entail at various levels of class consciousness are facilitated by domestic economic crisis and a volatile global political-economic situation that give rise to the emergence of various reactionary, ultranationalist movements to safeguard the existing social order.

Variations in Right-Wing Ultranationalist Movements

There are a variety of right-wing ultranationalist movements in the world today that range from secular nationalist/fascist to religious fundamentalist. Although one can find such movements in many countries across the globe, we focus here on three distinct forms of right-wing radicalism in three different regional settings: (1) those found in the Third World; (2) those that are specific to the advanced capitalist countries; and (3) those that have emerged in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Nationalism takes on a diverse meaning in these three different contexts, and the dynamics of their class leadership and class alliances have thus yielded very different results, depending on the nature and context of the movements that have emerged in these settings.

The Third World

In the Third World, the absence of a viable national bourgeoisie that would lead an anti-imperialist struggle against transnational capital to free itself from neocolonial bondage has led the petty bourgeoisie (especially within the military) to become the leading political force against imperialism.⁴⁵ In the absence of a strong workers' movement to take up the leadership of the anti-imperialist nationalist movement, the petty bourgeois forces have come to assume their nationalist role through ironclad dictatorial rule directed not only against foreign capital and its internal neocolonial allies, but also against the working class itself in preventing a worker-led socialist revolution that would put an end to capitalism. Thus, ultranationalist right-wing movements in the Third World came to articulate bourgeois nationalist ideology under the leadership of the petty bourgeoisie with the intention of smashing both transnational monopoly capital and the working class (communist) movement.

In Turkey, for example, the nationalist movement and the origins of the modern Turkish state go back to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 led by right-wing ultranationalist (fascist) military officers. Later, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, another group of nationalists emerged from within the military to fight against imperialism and maintain internal order in favor of the national and petty bourgeoisies. Rallied behind the nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal, the Kemalists waged a full-scale offensive against the imperialist forces and the internal class forces tied to it. The peasantry was recruited as the natural ally of this nationalist cadre, and it was in this group of independent smallholders that the nationalist leadership found its mass base to defeat imperialism and its internal neocolonial agents.⁴⁶

The petty bourgeois nationalist control of the state in Turkey was a turning point in the consolidation and institutionalization of bourgeois nationalism, which, under the direction of the state, opened the way for independent, national capitalist development. At the same time, the openly repressive nature

of the nationalist state toward labor and other progressive sectors of society resulted in the suppression of the people's movement throughout the nationalist period.

In Egypt, similar social, economic, and political conditions led to a mass nationalist uprising against the imperialist forces. Supported by a series of revolts of poor peasants and agricultural workers, as well as strikes by industrial workers, the petty bourgeois nationalist forces in the army led by Gamal Abdel Nasser made a successful coup and overthrew the king and the monarchy propped up by British imperialism. The victory of the Free Officers in deposing the monarchy ushered in a period of nationalism and anti-imperialism. As in the case of other nationalist regimes, the Nasser regime rallied the support of broad segments of the masses and used the state as an instrument of national development under petty bourgeois bureaucratic rule.⁴⁷ Thus, while the state became the key agent of capital accumulation and the main source of capitalist development that transformed Egypt into an emerging capitalist state, it also became an instrument of mass repression of the working class and other sectors of society that demanded social justice and equitable distribution of the national wealth. Progressive organizations, especially the communists, were subjected to the most severe forms of state repression during this period of right-wing petty bourgeois rule.

In Iraq, a similar dynamic in place led to a nationalist reaction that resulted in the victory of right-wing petty bourgeois forces after independence. Excluded from centers of political and economic power and subordinated to the dictates of the monarchy, the petty bourgeois nationalists came to articulate widespread resentment of foreign control and local ruling-class collaboration with the imperialists. This led to numerous clashes between the colonial state and popular sectors of Iraqi society, including a series of tribal rebellions, labor strikes, mass demonstrations, and clashes between the people and the colonial authorities.⁴⁸ The crisis situation emerging from this configuration of social forces led to the emergence of petty bourgeois nationalists who came to lead the national movement against imperialism and its internal neocolonial allies, while at the same time preventing the working class and the popular sectors from exerting influence on the nationalist project. The active role of labor and other progressive organizations among the masses led to large-scale repression of the popular movement once the petty bourgeois nationalist forces came to power. Mass arrests, torture, and execution of communists and other leftists during successive right-wing nationalist regimes became a mainstay of social life in Iraq for decades.

In Iran, the revolution that toppled the Shah in 1979 took place under the guise of a mass popular uprising through the use of Islamic and nationalist ideology directed against foreign capital and its internal neocolonial allies.⁴⁹ Led by the mullahs under the direction of Imam Ayatollah Khomeini, the uprising was billed as a nationally based religious uprising, hence its characterization as an Islamic revolution. The mass numbers of urban, unemployed, ex-rural peasant migrants thus came to form the political force that the mullahs

used, together with the *bazaari* merchants, to collectively challenge the Shah's regime.⁵⁰ Broad sections of the masses were mobilized through the use of religious and nationalist ideology, as right-wing fundamentalist forces were able to manipulate and redirect mass discontent in a religious and nationalist direction, preventing the prevailing class conflicts in Iranian society from becoming open struggles for state power.⁵¹

The state, ushered in by the revolutionary forces in Iran in February 1979, was not a religious one at all. It was Islamic in name only, and only to the degree that some key clergy, with full religious credentials, were presented as spokespersons for the new state, legitimized by their repeated appearances on radio, television, and in print media. Behind the scenes, however (in the national assembly, in the supreme organs of the state, down to the various local bodies of state organizations), the reality was quite different. The imposition of a theocratic dictatorship over the masses was less for its theocratic or nationalist character than its authoritarian class nature. The fact that the landlords and the *bazaari* merchants captured state power with the aid of the Islamic clergy explains well why Islam, much as nationalism, could so easily come to serve the interests of these forces in legitimizing their rule.⁵² In this way, Islam was able to rationalize the rule of its class masters in serving as the ideology of the new social order, hence serving a similar function as nationalism in mobilizing the masses behind the banner of a "religious" revolution. Thus, religion through this process became an important ideological tool in the hands of the social forces intent on winning the support of the masses in their drive to take state power. And it is in this way that the organic link between religion and nationalism was established and utilized to provoke a mass, anti-imperialist revolution that overthrew the Shah's regime in Iran.⁵³

Although variations exist in factors determining the nature and outcome of a specific Third World nationalist movement (such as the influence of religious and cultural factors most visible in fundamentalist movements, as in Iran under the Ayatollahs, in Afghanistan under the Taliban, and elsewhere in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, by Islamic terrorist groups such as Al Qaida and ISIS or other Jihadist movements), one can identify the class forces leading these movements by focusing on their social base and the internal structure of their main organizations. In this way, one can be better able to understand the nature and dynamics of right-wing religious and ultranationalist movements and their political agenda to effect change.

The Advanced Capitalist Countries

There have been a number of right-wing ultranationalist movements in advanced capitalist countries throughout the course of the twentieth century. The most extreme and well-known case is that of Nazism in Germany in the mid-twentieth century. While other forms of ultranationalist movements exist in Europe, the United States, and other advanced capitalist regions of the world, such as Italian fascism, Spanish Francoism, and the US Ku Klux Klan, German Nazism has been the most violent and brutal form of extreme nationalism, leading to the calculated mass murder of millions of people in a few short years.

The Nazi movement was heavily financed by German monopoly capitalists. Big business in Germany used the Jewish threat to control and repress the working class through the use of the Nazi movement to safeguard capitalist interests and maintain the capitalist order at a time of great economic crisis.⁵⁴ The fact that Germany had plunged into a severe depression and that an extreme ultranationalist movement could divert the frustrations of the working class away from capital and toward an ethnic group characterized as a rival force helped consolidate the Nazi ultranationalist program that big business could promote as a way out of the capitalist crisis.⁵⁵ The growing power of the working class and the electoral gains of the communist party showed the urgency of smashing the power of labor to prevent a socialist revolution during the German great depression. In this case, Nazism served as a source of social control and prolongation of the existing capitalist order through repression in its most brutal form. Hence, in Germany (as in Italy) fascism became monopoly capital's answer to the threat of socialism, when the working class had come very close to overthrowing the capitalist state.⁵⁶

Today, conditions that in the past led to the emergence of extreme right-wing nationalist movements are developing rapidly throughout the advanced capitalist countries. In Germany, France, Italy, and Britain, these movements have begun to resurface under a neo-Nazi banner, targeting immigrant groups and people of Asian, Middle Eastern, and North African origin.⁵⁷ Violent fascist gangs are terrorizing and killing their chosen opponents without fear of police intervention. These groups and others like them have become the shock troops of monopoly capital in decline, desperately seeking and utilizing right-wing extremist forces to dampen popular resistance to its rule in a last-ditch effort to stay in power.

In Germany, anti-immigrant racist attacks by neo-Nazi groups have been directed against Turkish "guest" workers who constitute a good part of the low-paid industrial workforce that has been flowing into the country over the past few decades. Their distinct cultural practices and social standing in segregated immigrant neighborhoods have turned them into easy targets for disaffected German youth organized into right-wing racist gangs affiliated with neo-Nazi groups that fuel such antiforeign ultranationalist propaganda and violence that have resulted in burning of homes and cold-blooded murder in incidents across Germany in recent years.⁵⁸

In Britain, the targets of antiforeign racist attacks are East Indian, African, Middle Eastern, and Caribbean immigrants. Occupying the lowest levels of the industrial and service sectors and found in many of the menial jobs mainly concentrated in London and surrounding cities, these clearly identifiable immigrants are often victims of gang violence perpetrated by skinheads and other racist groups promoted by ultranationalist fascist cults like the National Front.⁵⁹ These groups, while having their own rightist agenda, perform a key function in preserving existing capitalist relations by misdirecting the anger and hostility of the British working class against immigrant workers in racist

terms. Weakening the unity of the working class through such “divide and conquer” tactics propagated in ultranationalist language, the powerful interests that support and finance such efforts are clearly the beneficiaries of the violence perpetrated against the communities who pay a heavy price for their very right to exist.

In France and Italy, right-wing anti-immigrant attacks have been directed against North Africans and people of Middle Eastern origin. Cities like Paris, Marseilles, Rome, Milan, and Naples have become hotbeds of right-wing fascist activity directed against Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Libyans, and Albanians who have immigrated to France and Italy in search of better jobs and a better life for their families.⁶⁰ These previously colonized peoples are now resented by ultranationalist groups in the typical racist mode of colonial thinking that characterize them in culturally and socially inferior terms. Right-wing political parties backed by big business have fanned the flames of racist violence directed against these immigrants to confuse the working class and middle sectors of society and cultivate a fascist movement to keep the labor movement in check. As the blame for the continuing economic crisis in these countries is placed on immigrants, the violence perpetrated against them has become institutionalized and justified by a variety of extremist groups operating as street gangs in pursuit of immigrant families.

In the United States, right-wing ultranationalist groups are becoming more and more visible. The decline of the US economy over the past several decades has brought about a lowering of the living standards of the US working class, and this has led to resentment against immigrants who are blamed for taking away American jobs. Although higher rates of unemployment are the result of plant closings and the corporate move to low-wage Third World countries, such as Mexico and China, the Trump Presidency has exploited the racial divide by fueling racist propaganda against immigrant groups, blaming them for the ills of society.⁶¹ While this has served to divide people and thus prevent the development of a strong labor movement, which helped elect Donald Trump to the Presidency in the United States, a growing segment of the working class is becoming more and more aware of the situation and of its central role in the fight against the forces of reaction that are behind the right-wing agenda led by Trump and his cronies. Thus, this latest turn to the right and the rise of right-wing racist/fascist movements in the United States in recent years under the banner of “alt-right” or “white nationalism” as manifested in the events in Charlottesville, Virginia, is a reflection of the crisis of US imperialism in its highest (and final) stage of global capitalist expansion.⁶² However, with the growing people’s movements in both the advanced capitalist countries and the Third World, broad segments of the working class and its allies are beginning to forge a popular coalition of forces to fight the ultra-right reaction and halt the racist agenda fostered by big business, which is the real force behind the assault against the working class in the United States and throughout the world.

Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union

In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, most notably in the former Yugoslavia, the reactionary nationalist forces that had been hiding behind the thin veil of state-socialism took advantage of the opening accorded by the changes in East Europe to impose an openly right-wing bourgeois dictatorship, first in Slovenia and Croatia, and later in other parts of the former Yugoslavia—most violently in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶³ A similar process of state control in the hands of bourgeois and petty bourgeois officials in other provinces, including Serbia, led to a destructive confrontation between rival nationalist forces in postsocialist Yugoslavia.

A situation similar to this has also been developing elsewhere in Eastern Europe and in the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. In Romania and Bulgaria, right-wing anticommunist elements that came to power after the collapse of the Ceausescu and Zhivkov regimes have through a succession of bourgeois governments consolidated their hold over the state. In Poland and Hungary, the movements that brought to power anticommunist bourgeois elements in the late 1980s have likewise strengthened the hands of right-wing forces in the struggle for control of the state.⁶⁴

In Poland, the failure of liberal reforms under the Lech Walesa regime led to the growth of not only a leftist opposition but also a rightist, ultranationalist movement. In the Czech Republic, the bourgeois anticommunist leadership that came to power under Vaclav Havel in the aftermath of the collapse of the communist state in Czechoslovakia set the stage for right-wing anticommunist elements to freely operate throughout the country.⁶⁵

In East Germany, neo-Nazi groups have sprung up and spread to many cities. High levels of unemployment and social deprivation throughout the former GDR have brought misery to millions and forced them into destitution. The devastating economic situation experienced by millions of Germans in the East has led to resentment on both sides of the new united Germany. The move toward privatization and the transition to a market economy have generated a new set of contradictions that are beginning to surface in the eastern half of the country.⁶⁶

The appeal to national symbols under an ultranationalist banner has led to the mobilization of right-wing extremist groups from Poland to Russia, from the Baltic states to the Transcaucasian republics.⁶⁷ The right-wing bourgeois forces that have come to play a central role in maintaining power in these and other newly independent republics have strengthened the hands of ultranationalist groups on the extreme right—a situation that has further inflamed ethnic passions, as in Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, for example, has led to further destabilization of the entire Transcaucasian region. Moreover, the strengthening of religious and cultural ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey has led to increased tensions between Armenia and Turkey regarding Turkish intentions toward Armenia, given the continued discord between the two countries.⁶⁸

The economic crisis that these countries have been facing in the post-Soviet period has been the primary instigator for the emergence of extreme nationalist movements. As the collapse of the newly established market economies in these former socialist states has resulted in mass unemployment, poverty, and destitution among large segments of the population, the reactionary bourgeois forces are attempting to consolidate their power and impose repressive authoritarian rule over the population to maintain control. And in this context, various minority ethnic populations have been used as scapegoats to channel the anger and frustration of the masses in a right-wing, racist/ethnonationalist direction to prevent a popular uprising against the system.⁶⁹

If these competing ultraconservative, right-wing nationalist movements represent different forms of repressive authoritarian rule in the classic sense (one applying to the case of the advanced capitalist countries, another to that of the Third World, and yet a third, modified version in the postsocialist states), how then is one to explain the reemergence of the radical right in Europe (directed primarily against immigrants) in the Third World (under the guise of Islamic fundamentalism), and in Eastern Europe and the Balkans (in the form of ethnic conflict)? What are the class forces behind these movements and what are their social agenda? What are their nature, origins, dynamics, and contradictions? What are the danger signs and the implications of their coming to power in this period of economic crisis and decline? What are the parallels between contemporary developments and what we have experienced in the not too distant past following the great depression?

An analysis of the social context of the emergence and development of these movements and their dynamics would go a long way in helping us understand the contending class forces and class struggles in society that will eventually lead to the resolution of these contradictions. It would also provide us some tentative answers to these important questions and hence delineate the nature and types of right-wing ultranationalist movements that have come to play a significant role in the world today.

CONCLUSION

While class, state, and nation are the quintessential pillars of nationalism and ethnic conflict, it is the political dynamics of this triangular relationship that gives nationalism its ideological expression. Thus, I have argued here that the class nature of nationalism and ethnic conflict becomes evident when ethnonational struggles are placed in their proper historical and sociopolitical context. Moreover, this dynamic operates at both the national and international levels and is the result of a complex set of relations that are class based.

Nationalism and ethnic conflict are, therefore, in a very fundamental way the outcomes of a process wherein various competing class forces have a particular relationship to the state. And this relationship is inherently political in nature and takes place within the context of a nation-state. Given this reality, it is of utmost importance to study the nature and dynamics of the nation-state

and the process by which vested interests within the nation-state have a stake in promoting nationalism and fomenting ethnic conflict to advance their particular class interests.

It has been my contention throughout this chapter that the phenomena of nation and nationalism cannot be fully understood without an analysis of their class nature and dynamics. Class relations and class struggle are central to the dynamics and contradictions of class society, above all to the structure and operation of the state and the nature and composition of the nation and society in general, as well as their transformation.

"The formation of nations," writes Glezerman, "always has a definite socio-economic content."⁷⁰ Although a nation encompasses all classes, not all classes play a similar role in the formation of a nation. What is crucial, Glezerman points out, is to distinguish the leading (ruling) class that puts its mark on the nation and determines its social, economic, political, and ideological course of development.

In the first place it is a class which embodies the mode of production that forms the foundation for the community of economic life emerging in a nation. In the second place, this class is the hegemon in the struggle for the realization of the historical tasks on which the development and the future of the nation depend. In the third place, it plays the decisive role in defining the socio-economic image of a nation and its relations with other nations.⁷¹

Thus, Glezerman continues:

The formation of nations, for example, in Western Europe, North America and elsewhere was closely connected with the growth of capitalist relations. And since this took place on the basis of the development of the capitalist mode of production, the rise of national links was in effect ... a process of the creation of bourgeois links. Consequently, the national state which took shape under these circumstances was a bourgeois state.⁷²

Clearly, as Glezerman points out, the history of the bourgeois state is the history of capitalism and the capitalist class. The fact that the emergence and development of capitalism has coincided with the development of the capitalist state over the course of European history and the history of other regions where capitalism has made headway attests to the relationship between the two, which is more than coincidental—it is the outcome of class interest and class intent. This is true with similar developments in nations that have embarked on (or are in the process of embarking on) capitalism and capitalist relations elsewhere in the world, historically and today.

In this context, I have argued that the dominant class in capitalist society controls the state and dictates its terms over society to serve its own narrow class interests (and does so through its social, economic, political, and ideological hegemony), and that the contradictions imbedded in capitalist society facilitate the development of class conflict and class struggle that brings to the fore the class nature of society and the nation. Hence, while "National consolida-

tion became an essential factor in the formation of bourgeois nations,” Glezerman reminds us, “the further development and intensification of the class struggle brings the contrast between classes into the forefront.”⁷³

This view further reinforces my argument that the political, ideological, cultural, and other superstructural manifestations of class can only be clearly understood through an analysis of the structure and contradictions of class relations and class struggle as rooted in historically specific, social-economic conditions of society.

The point being stressed here is that an analysis of property-based unequal social relations in the organization of material production is the key to an understanding of the nature of class divisions in society. The social location of people in the production process, situated according to their relation to the ownership/control of the means of production, is the decisive element that defines class relations. And it is from these historically specific social relations of production that inequalities arise, leading to class conflict and class struggles—that is, struggles for state power.

“Is there any reason to be surprised,” Marx asks, “that a society based on class conflict leads to brutal opposition, and in the last resort to a clash between individuals?”⁷⁴ “An oppressed class,” he writes, “is the condition of existence of every society based on class conflict. Thus the liberation of the oppressed class necessarily involves the creation of a new society.”⁷⁵

Under capitalism, the dominant capitalist class, through its control of the major superstructural institutions, obtains political control and disseminates capitalist ideology, hence assuring its ideological hegemony over society. An aspect of this ideological control that promotes the interests of the bourgeoisie at the superstructural level is bourgeois nationalism—an ideology propped up by the capitalist class to promote national and ethnic distinctions and divisions in order to prevent the development of class consciousness among workers and to neutralize their frustration against the system by channeling mass discontent toward other nations and ethnic groups.

“The bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties,” writes Glezerman, attempt “to impose a ‘unified’ national ideology upon the proletariat”:

They preach class peace within a nation in order to cover up class antagonism with a national banner and prevent the proletarians from coalescing into a class. Bourgeois ideologues incite mistrust and hatred for “alien” nations so as to strengthen the “unity” of their own nation.⁷⁶

“Many bourgeois sociologists and reformists regard national interests as a sort of ‘neutral’ ground on which all classes unite,” Glezerman continues; “This conception has nothing in common with reality”:

It tears national interests away from class interests in order to hide or smooth over the contradictions between the interests of the opposing classes in a given nation and, at the same time, to place proletarians of different nations in opposition to each other.⁷⁷

Thus, “many bourgeois sociologists attach primary importance to the struggle of races and nations,” Glezerman concludes, “in order to slur over the contradictions between the interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.”⁷⁸ This is done with the attempt to “dampen the class struggle and replace it with a struggle against ‘alien’ nations.”⁷⁹

While this process has served to block the development of class consciousness among workers, thus hampering the prospects for social revolution, the material conditions of life under capitalism, however, eventually force workers to organize and rise up against the prevailing exploitative system. As the working class becomes class conscious and discovers that its social condition is more and more the result of its exploitation by the capitalists, it invariably begins to organize and fight back to secure for itself economic benefits and political rights that it is generally denied in capitalist society.

The exploitation of labor and the domination of the working class by capital eventually lead to class struggle, and ultimately to the struggle for state power: “The conflict between proletariat and bourgeoisie,” Marx and Engels remind us, “is a struggle of one class against another, a struggle that means in its highest expression a total revolution.”⁸⁰

It is in this context of the centrality of class and class struggle in capitalist society that we find the state as a decisive political force that assumes the task of determining the boundaries of the nation and fosters nationalism and ethnic conflict to hide underlying social divisions that are driven by the logic of class relations and class struggle under capitalism.

NOTES

1. This chapter consists of sections of my book *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Class, State, and Nation in the Age of Globalization* published by Rowman and Littlefield, which are included here with permission of the publisher.
2. G. Glezerman, *Classes and Nations* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979), pp. 7–8.
3. Glezerman, *Classes and Nations*, p. 21.
4. Glezerman, *Classes and Nations*, p. 15.
5. Albert Szymanski, *Class Structure: A Critical Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 430.
6. Szymanski, *Class Structure* (emphases in the original).
7. Szymanski, *Class Structure* (emphasis in the original).
8. See Berch Berberoglu, *The Internationalization of Capital: Imperialism and Capitalist Development on a World Scale* (New York: Praeger, 1987), chap. 7. See also, Berch Berberoglu, *Political Sociology in a Global Era* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2013), chap. 2.
9. Berberoglu, *The Internationalization of Capital*. See also James Blaut, *The National Question: Decolonizing the Theory of Nationalism* (London: Zed Books, 1987), pp. 23, 46, 123.
10. Blaut, *The National Question*, pp. 4, 46.

11. Albert J. Szymanski, *The Logic of Imperialism* (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 426.
12. Szymanski, *The Logic of Imperialism*, p. 427.
13. Berberoglu, *Political Sociology in a Global Era*, p. 98–99.
14. Berberoglu, *Political Sociology in a Global Era*, p. 99.
15. Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
16. Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (New York: Capricorn, 1966).
17. Hamza Alavi, "India and the Colonial Mode of Production," *Economic and Political Weekly*, August 1975.
18. See Bipan Chandra, "The Indian Capitalist Class and Imperialism before 1947," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 5, no. 3 (1975).
19. A. I. Levkovsky, *Capitalism in India* (Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1966). See also, Berch Berberoglu, *Class, State, and Development in India* (New Delhi: Sage, 1992).
20. Frances V. Moulder, *Japan, China and the Modern World Economy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 98–127.
21. Basil Davidson, *The African Slave Trade* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961).
22. Berch Berberoglu, *Turkey in Crisis: From State Capitalism to Neocolonialism* (London: Zed Books, 1982); Fatma Muge Gocek, ed., *Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002).
23. Berch Berberoglu, *Turmoil in the Middle East: Imperialism, War, and Political Instability* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).
24. Berberoglu, *Turmoil in the Middle East*.
25. Berberoglu, *Turmoil in the Middle East*.
26. Samih Farsoun and Christina Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).
27. Robert Olson, ed. *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996).
28. Farsoun and Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*; Olson, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s*.
29. Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*.
30. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London and Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House and Bogle L'Ouverture, 1972).
31. Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*.
32. Ward Churchill, *A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to the Present* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1997).
33. Stein and Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America*.
34. Rodolfo Acuna, *Occupied America*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1988).
35. Martin N. Marger, *Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives*, 5th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2000). See also Joseph F. Healey, *Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1995) and Andrew L. Barlow, *Between Fear and Hope: Globalization and Race in the United States* (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
36. Marger, *Race and Ethnic Relations* and Healy, *Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class*.
37. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.

38. Jasminka Udovicki, "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Former Yugoslavia," in *The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Berch Berberoglu (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995); Aleksandar Pavkovic, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Dusan Kecmanovic, *Ethnic Times: Exploring Ethnonationalism in the Former Yugoslavia* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Cathie Carmichael, *Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: Nationalism and the Destruction of Tradition* (New York: Routledge, 2002); Suzanne Goldenberg, *Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder* (London: Zed Books, 1994).
39. Jan Adam, *The Social Costs of Transformation in Post-Socialist Countries: The Cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary* (New York: Palgrave, 2000). See also Laszlo Andor and Martin Summers, *Market Failure: A Guide to the East European "Economic Miracle"* (London: Pluto Press, 1998).
40. Pavkovic, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia*; Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003).
41. Goldenberg, *Pride of Small Nations*.
42. Goldenberg, *Pride of Small Nations*.
43. Goldenberg, *Pride of Small Nations*.
44. For an extended discussion on the nature and interests of various classes in capitalist society, see Berch Berberoglu, *Class Structure and Social Transformation* (Westport, CT: Praeger 1994). See also Albert J. Szymanski, *Class Structure: A Critical Perspective* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1983).
45. See Albert J. Szymanski, *The Logic of Imperialism* (New York: Praeger, 1981).
46. Berch Berberoglu, "Nationalism and Ethnic Rivalry in the Early Twentieth Century," *Nature, Society, and Thought* 4, no. 3 (1991): 269–301.
47. For an analysis of Egypt under Nasser as a nationalist state–capitalist society, see Mahmoud Hussein, *Class Conflict in Egypt: 1945–1970* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).
48. Joe Stork, "Class, State, and Politics in Iraq," in *Power and Stability in the Middle East*, ed. Berch Berberoglu (London: Zed Books, 1989), pp. 31–54.
49. Fred Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development* (New York: Penguin, 1979).
50. Farideh Farhi, "Class Struggles, the State, and Revolution in Iran," in *Power and Stability in the Middle East*, ed. Berberoglu, pp. 90–113.
51. M. Parsa, *The Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989); Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*.
52. A. Ashraf, "Bazaar and Mosque in Iran's Revolution," *MERIP Reports* 13, no. 3 (March–April 1983).
53. N. Keddie, *Iran: Religion, Politics, and Society* (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
54. See Franz L. Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944* (New York: Harper & Row, 1944). See also Daniel Guerin, *Fascism and Big Business* (New York: Monad Press, 1945).
55. Arthur Schweitzer, *Big Business and the Third Reich* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964). See also James Pool and Suzanne Pool, *Who Financed Hitler: The Secret Funding of Hitler's Rise to Power, 1919–1933* (New York: Dial Press, 1978).
56. Guerin, *Fascism and Big Business*. See also Albert J. Szymanski, *The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, 1978).

57. Piero Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003).
58. Alana Lentin, *Racism and Anti-Racism in Europe* (London: Pluto Press, 2004).
59. Lentin, *Racism and Anti-Racism in Europe*.
60. Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*.
61. For an analysis of the economic roots of racism, see Peter Knapp and Alan J. Spector, *Crisis and Change* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1991).
62. However, the recent upsurge of racist activity by the Klan and Neo-Nazi groups following the election of Donald Trump to the Presidency, as exhibited in Charlottesville and elsewhere in 2017, should not be exaggerated, as these fringe groups now surfacing more and more freely under a climate of increasing racism in the country, constitute a tiny fraction of the broader US population to pose a real threat in imposing a neo-Nazi fascist regime in the United States.
63. Udovicki, "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Former Yugoslavia." See also Pavkovic, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans*; Kecmanovic, *Ethnic Times: Exploring Ethnonationalism in the Former Yugoslavia*; Carmichael, *Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: Nationalism and the Destruction of Tradition*; David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).
64. Adam, *The Social Costs of Transformation in Post-Socialist Countries: The Cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary*.
65. Adam, *The Social Costs of Transformation in Post-Socialist Countries: The Cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary*.
66. Andor and Summers, *Market Failure: A Guide to the East European "Economic Miracle."*
67. Goldenberg, *The Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder*; Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
68. Given the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Turkey's alliance with Azerbaijan, there has not been any diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia since the early 1990s, and the border between the two countries has remained closed since that time.
69. These include the repression of Chechnians in Russia and discrimination against the Hungarians in Romania, as well as mistreatment of gypsies (Roma) in Slovakia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and various other minority ethnic groups in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
70. G. Glezerman, *Classes and Nations* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979), p. 23.
71. Glezerman, *Classes and Nations*, p. 22.
72. Glezerman, *Classes and Nations*, p. 23.
73. Glezerman, *Classes and Nations*, p. 28.
74. Karl Marx quoted in Ralph Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 18.
75. Marx quoted in Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*.
76. Glezerman, *Classes and Nations*, p. 27.
77. Glezerman, *Classes and Nations*, p. 34.
78. Glezerman, *Classes and Nations*, pp. 34–35.
79. Glezerman, *Classes and Nations*, p. 35.
80. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels quoted in Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, p. 18.

REFERENCES

- Adam, Jan. 2000. *The Social Costs of Transformation in Post-Socialist Countries: The Cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary*. New York: Palgrave.
- Andor, Laszlo, and Martin Summers. 1998. *Market Failure: A Guide to the East European "Economic Miracle"*. London: Pluto Press.
- Berberoglu, Berch. 1987. *The Internationalization of Capital: Imperialism and Capitalist Development on a World Scale*. New York: Praeger.
- . ed. 1995. *The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Twentieth Century*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- . 1999. *Turmoil in the Middle East: Imperialism, War, and Political Instability*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- . 2004. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Class, Nation, and State in the Age of Globalization*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Blaut, James. 1987. *The National Question: Decolonizing the Theory of Nationalism*. London: Zed Books.
- Carmichael, Cathie. 2002. *Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: Nationalism and the Destruction of Tradition*. New York: Routledge.
- Farsoun, Samih, and Christina Zacharia. 1997. *Palestine and the Palestinians*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Glezerman. 1979. *Classes and Nations*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Göçek, Fatma Muge, ed. 2002. *Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Goldenberg, Suzanne. 1994. *Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder*. London: Zed Books.
- Guerin, Daniel. 1945. *Fascism and Big Business*. New York: Monad Press.
- Ignazi, Piero. 2003. *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kecmanovic, Dusan. 2001. *Ethnic Times: Exploring Ethnonationalism in the Former Yugoslavia*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Lentin, Alana. 2004. *Racism and Anti-racism in Europe*. London: Pluto Press.
- Neumann, Franz L. 1944. *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Olson, Robert, ed. 1996. *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990*. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky.
- Pavkovic, Aleksandar. 2000. *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pool, James, and Suzanne Pool. 1978. *Who Financed Hitler: The Secret Funding of Hitler's Rise to Power, 1919–1933*. New York: Dial Press.
- Schweitzer, Arthur. 1964. *Big Business and the Third Reich*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Szymanski, Albert J. 1981. *The Logic of Imperialism*. New York: Praeger.
- . 1983. *Class Structure: A Critical Perspective*. New York: Praeger.
- Thomas, Raju G.C., ed. 2003. *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination Intervention*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Udovicki, Jasminka. 1995. Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Former Yugoslavia. In *The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Berch Berberoglu. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Williams, Eric. 1966. *Capitalism and Slavery*. New York: Capricorn.

PART III

Social Movements, Revolution, and
Social Transformation in the
Twenty-First Century



Global Justice Movements: Past, Present, and Future

Lauren Langman and Tova Benski

The concerns with social justice have informed most of the world religions as well as philosophical systems since antiquity. Most such concerns have consisted of debates over the definition of social justice and how states, groups, and individuals should act. But there has been little attention paid to the social factors that determine what constitutes justice and how it might be attained. Such concerns with justice, especially claims of subordinate groups for freedom, agency, respect, recognition, and/or dignity, have long been intertwined with the question of human rights especially since the Magna Carta placed limits on royal power to grant other nobles certain rights. For our purposes, part and parcel of the Enlightenment was its claims that human beings, as such, have certain basic rights. For John Locke, “natural law” entitled all men (sic) to freedom and property. To be sure, his claims were embraced by the rising bourgeois classes that promised life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, *égalité, liberté, fraternité*. The realization of these values, qua the basis of justice, often required violent revolutions as in the 13 American colonies, or France.

The growing bourgeois classes’ claim to “rule in the name of the people,” heretofore repressed and dominated by aristocratic tyrants, was part of their attempt to secure various forms of legitimate political domination typically with parliamentary governance based on “representative government” with

L. Langman (✉)

Department of Sociology, Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA

T. Benski

School of Social Sciences, The College of Management, Rishon Leziyon, Israel

© The Author(s) 2019

B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_13

“democratic” elections and bureaucratic administrations that collectively promised “equal justice for all.” This was already evident with the revolutions of 1776 and 1789—but what was also evident was that most “elected” representatives and leaders were rich white men from the more affluent bourgeois and/or landowning classes. Thus in 1848, growing numbers of urban bourgeois women, indignant over the exclusion from political participation, gathered in Seneca Falls to establish the first wave of the feminist movement, the suffragettes who demanded the right to vote—about 75 years later, American women not only got that right, but encouraged women in many other countries to seek that right. In a similar way, when the bourgeoisie began to use steam power to produce commodities, they created an alienated, exploited proletariat that eventually organized to seek justice through political change, indeed, the very overthrow of capitalism. But as was clearly seen in France in 1848 and 1871, their efforts were met by both massive violence to suppress these movements and nationalisms that, as hegemonic ideologies, would obscure class interests as the “interests” of “citizens” with equal rights. While the proletarian movements “failed” to transform bourgeois societies, with the growth of entitlement programs, for example, unemployment compensation and retirement benefits, as well as various ameliorative labor laws, elimination of child labor, eight-hour days, and so on, proletarian radicalism waned. In the early twentieth century, between mass media and mass consumption, the working classes were eventually incorporated into the bourgeois societies. In many cases, reformist socialist parties emerged—but at the same time, we know that political parties tend to be the graveyards of social movements.¹ Nevertheless, the various movements of workers, women, left legacies, cultural memes of struggles for social justice that were often reawakened at times of crises, as was seen in the 1930s and again in the 1960s. This spirit of contestation against the elites has been rekindled in the last few decades especially as capitalism morphed into its present globalized, neoliberal iteration, growing numbers of the population secured college educations, and finally, the Internet revolutionized the flows of information and means of political organization in the emerging “network society.”²

A salient aspect of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries consists of the various struggles for social justice, understood as claims for certain civil rights demanded by certain social movements, for example, suffrage for women, the emancipation of slaves, and a bit later, workers’ rights to organize, demand better pay/benefits, seek improved working conditions, and eliminate child labor. Conditions of hardship, injustice, and/or anger/indignation to existing elites have been seen as responsible for such adversities that might lead to revolutions such as the one that took place in Russia in 1917 or the many postcolonial independence movements that followed World War II. But most of the struggles tended to be national, even if various movements and struggles had a more international aspect. The American Revolution was aided and abetted by French money, wealth, and military acumen. The ending of the slave trade to America began among the English Quakers in the late eigh-

teenth century. What becomes important for our analysis is the Marxist legacy of internationalism, worker solidarity across national borders, and revolution as the means of overcoming capitalist domination, exploitation, and alienation that serve to limit and deny dignity to the vast masses of peasants, workers, women, and others.

At the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first, between the rise of the EZLN, the Zapatistas, and massive protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, Davos, G8 summits, and so on marked a new cycle of protest, in which long-standing struggles for social justice became global justice movements (GJMs).³ But how do we understand the causes, dynamics, and consequences of social movements, particularly in the GJMs of recent times. Structural theories of social movements, often shading into poststructuralisms, generally elide the role of agency given the individual actor and his/her motives, feelings, understandings, and so on that dispose reactions to social conditions, emotions, joining activist networks, and, in turn, mobilizations. Marxist approaches to social movement studies (SMS) generally maintain a robust role for agency, both collectively and individually. Conversely, social psychological approaches often give little consideration to structural factors in general, let alone the strains and crises of political economy. We would argue that for understanding GJMs, it becomes necessary to consider the nature of neoliberal global capitalism rooted in the Marxist legacy of internationalism, worker solidarity across national borders, and revolution as the means of overcoming capitalist domination, exploitation, and alienation that have served to limit and deny dignity to the vast masses of peasants, workers, women, and others. As social movement scholars, it becomes necessary for us to explain the how, the why, and the fates, immediate and long-term, of these various GJMs, noting that each one has taken place in a relatively unique cultural, political, and economic location with specific features. But we also need to use such understandings to foster change.

The study of collective behavior moved from its early concerns with the irrational mobs described by Le Bon and Freud to structural strain models of Smelser to resource mobilization, political process, political opportunity structure theories, and framing theories in the United States. SMS were no longer seen as irrational forms of organized collective actions to attain certain social changes. Today, there are two major approaches to the study of social movements, whether reactionary movements such as the National Front, the Tea Party, Alt.right or Trumpism, or the progressive movements such as GJMs, alternative globalization movements, Arab Spring, Occupy, M 15, or the more recent Black Lives Matter or Me Too. The resource mobilization theories focus on the importance of social movement entrepreneurs, available time, and finances for social activism, undergirded by a rational-cognitive approach that emphasized the extent to which new understandings, aka “cognitive liberation,” disposed political action.

Meanwhile in Europe, especially in France, the various New Social Movement(NSM) theories, themselves influenced by the Frankfurt School,⁴ updated Marxist traditions for the new historical circumstances of the late twentieth century, emphasizing more organizational, cultural, as well as social psychological aspects, especially concerns with impacting identity, values, and meaning. Moreover, many of these GJMs have broader ranges of activists than either trade unions or left political parties that are often hierarchically organized. Thus, certain theoretical traditions emerged in attempts to account for the changing nature and scope of the mobilizations, their participants, forms of organization, structures, goals, strategies, and/or visions of the possible. Such newer approaches emphasized struggles and contestations over identity and meaning for the relatively free, uncommodified spaces, namely the public spheres apart from the political spheres that had become completely dominated by global capital as a means to fostering future social changes that required new/different understandings and values.⁵ We basically find that these approaches, while important starting points, need to more fully consider the salience of political economy on the one hand and emotional reactions on the other to understand contemporary GJMs.

If we take a quick note of the *History of the Russian Revolution*, Leon Trotsky⁶ as much a Marxist scholar as an organizer/activist suggested two factors were salient—the political economy, primarily the hardships experienced by the newly emancipated serfs, the harsh, real-world conditions of the small but growing urban working class, and the vast amount of deaths and injuries suffered by the Russian armies who were indeed no match for the better armed, better trained, better disciplined Prussians. Humiliating military defeats were inevitable, generating growing resentment toward the Tsar. Secondly, although Trotsky did not use these words, he nevertheless strongly suggested that emotional reactions to these events evoked widespread anger and disdain, indeed hatred, toward the Tsar and the Boyars. Thus, given the widespread legitimization crises that migrated to the life worlds of emotion, primarily anger toward the elites who had led masses in destitution and led a poorly prepared, poorly armed military to face massive defeat and slaughter.⁷ There was a waning of consent and withdrawal of loyalty to the landowning Boyars, as well as to the Russian Orthodox Church that had legitimated the dynastic rule then headed by Nicholas II. As a result, many people were more open to alternative views of society and, indeed, the Bolsheviks, the communist party, offered an analysis of domination, an organization whose goal was the emancipation of workers and peasants with analyses, tactics, and strategies for transformation, and a vision of the possible.

Thus, little discussed in most current social movement theory/research has been the economic basis of many of the GJMs, namely considerations of the political economy—its crises and contradictions evoking the emotions that dispose some people toward joining or supporting social movements, participating in them, and the transformations of collective identity mobilizations that mediate structural change. Yes, economic factors play a major role, but so too do aspects of collective identity, especially resistance identities⁸ and emotions.⁹

But how do we theorize these aspects of subjectivity within a social movement framework? Marx's writings on alienated labor gives us a hint. Domination and hardship for the masses have been part of societies for the past ten thousand years, but with capitalism/wage labor, alienation as objectification and estrangement, is not simply a form of domination and hardship; when the worker is alienated, sells his/her labor, s/he becomes an abstraction, a dehumanized being, bereft of agency, devoid of community and estranged from his/her fundamental humanity (species being). In short, subjectivity becomes truncated and distorted and the worker is left without fundamental human dignity. In order to theorize the current GJMs, and their implications for social change, we need to integrate the macro factors, primarily the structural aspects of the global political economy and its ideological justifications of neo-liberalism, with social psychological factors, especially questions of identity, emotions, and above all the quest for human dignity.

It is at this point where Habermas' notion of the legitimation crises of the capitalist system in general remain in its global/neoliberal phase, fostering crises at the level of the economy, the state, and culture. Crises at the level of the system, however, migrate to "the life worlds" of emotion, motivation, and identity—in other words, various crises at the macro level foster a variety of micro-social consequences beginning with emotional responses. More specifically these systemic events, mediated through both individual and collective identities, foster various emotions, or more often, "constellations of emotions" with a variety of consequences, beginning with the withdrawal of legitimacy of the system and openness to alternative frames of explanation and/or alternative futures. Thus, political economic conditions, the macro-social objective/structural conditions of the system, and their crises and contradictions have consequences at the micro level. For James Jasper,¹⁰ without considering subjectivity, we cannot understand how larger social structures and/or economic systems like capitalism impact social movements; macro factors affect the micro through emotions. For certain actors, economic strains and crises impact identities and notions of justice/injustice, triggering "moral shocks"¹¹ that often give rise to unpleasant emotional constellations (anger and fear, anxiety, and discontent) that come from the thwarting of fundamental human needs agency and freedom to realize one's potential, membership in a community and recognition of one's basic worth provide satisfactions that enable individuals and groups to attain dignity while avoiding shame, humiliation and indignation

Moreover, various economic conditions and social psychological reactions foster a withdrawal of commitment and loyalty to existing systems, openness to alternatives, and for specific actors, often in "submerged networks," recruitment to social movements and social activism. Such moments of legitimation crises are open to, if not actually denying consent to, the dominant classes and thus foster forms of disruption that challenge authority.¹² These movements are generally outside the realms of traditional electoral politics, political parties, or political organizations as such. Nevertheless, in order to implement their goals, such movements eventually need to confront the political and indeed, in many times, themselves do become the political.

GLOBALIZATION AND NEOLIBERALISM

Although scholars may debate the origin of globalization—the emergence of a deterritorialized, global market—Immanuel Wallerstein, echoing Marx, argued that the current world system began in 1492 with the “discovery” of the New World and rounding of the Cape. For our purposes, the current iteration of globalization began in 1944 with the Bretton Woods conference. As World War II ended, the United States was the pre-eminent military, economic, and political hegemon whose industrial base was unscathed by the damage caused by the war and quickly turned to the production of domestic goods. Bretton Woods established basic international economic agencies that would become the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO. The American dollar replaced the pound sterling as the basic international currency. This led not only to an era of domestic prosperity, rising incomes, and explosion of consumerism but also to a rapid expansion in international commerce and trade. But in so far as this moment of capitalism also depended on a Keynesian model of government support, by the 1970s, between increased competition from manufactured goods from abroad and growing crises of the Keynesian model, a series of economic crises led to the ascent of neoliberalism. Perhaps this was most evident when President Richard Nixon took the dollar off the gold standard.

By the end of the 1970s, it was evident that a seamless, deterritorialized world market was growing throughout the “free world.” At the same time, while globalization radically changed the nature of the capitalist market, *as a capitalist system*, it nevertheless had many of the same problems intrinsic to capitalism—the exploitation of the working classes to appropriate surplus value, along with its inherent contradictions by generating inequality and the ascendancy of the direct power of capital over the state. This new iteration of capital marked the emergence of a transnational capitalist class beholden to its shareholders and indifferent to local populations where its offices, plants, or distribution centers were located.¹³

While globalization and its neoliberal ideology produced vast wealth primarily for the ruling classes, its free market fundamentalism also led to growing riches for local political leadership. Much like earlier forms of capitalism, in which profits were based on the extraction of surplus value, with globalization, a great deal of manufacturing and/or assembly has moved to third world countries where sweatshop labor in satanic mills was cheap, regulations few, and there was little concern for environmental despoliation. This has often been called the “race to the bottom” in which capital quickly moves about the world to find the lowest wages and fewest regulations. In response, some GJMs sought to improve the conditions of workers; for example, United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) has been particularly successful in finding other means to exert leverage on corporations, specifically by using the licensing agreements many big apparel firms like Nike and Reebok have with colleges to produce goods with college logos on them (licenses the firms badly want to allow them to advertise to a captive student audience) as a form of leverage

over these companies. USAS has campaigned on college campuses to get college administrations to implement pro-labor codes of conduct for these licensees. Given the pervasiveness of sweatshops, these codes are frequently violated, but, when they are, USAS can use the threat of a suspension or cancelation of college licensing agreements over the heads of the big apparel firms to force their contractors to correct the worst abuses.¹⁴ Meanwhile, a central principle of neoliberalism, the privatization of social spending, for example, resources, benefits, and entitlements, led to economic stagnation, if not decline, for the multitudes. And let us not overlook the trafficking of workers (including sex workers) and modern forms of actual slavery.

An essential aspect of the new global economy has been the explosion of Internet communication technologies (ICT) that enables transnational corporations to coordinate operations that might include dozens if not scores or more centers of locations for their commercial activities, manufacturing, transportation, services, and banking/investment across many countries of the world. But the same communication technologies allow the dissemination of information, the organization of social movements, and what is important for our concern, GJMs have been especially successful at using the Internet and social media to disseminate information, organize protests, and coordinate direct actions as they take place.

MOBILIZATIONS FROM BELOW

While contemporary globalization may include a vast number of new and different technologies, the explosion of the financial sector, which now accounts for the majority of world commerce, has created unprecedented wealth. However, most of the benefits have shifted to its elites—eight men now have as much wealth as the bottom half of the world.¹⁵ While its iteration today may be new, global capitalism nevertheless remains a capitalist mode of production, distribution, and finance, with its quest to maximize profits, often measured as wealth. Given the extent to which technologies of production and increasingly new forms of management have displaced vast numbers of workers, we have seen the explosion of precariat classes.¹⁶ While capitalism may well have fostered a “middle class” of relatively economically comfortable consumers in the first world, that middle class has now been hollowed out by economic stagnation, quite often decline; at the same time, between deregulation and privatization, the costs of many resources and services, from utilities to education and often health care, have grown. Many of the adversities of this new moment are especially evident in third world countries, where vast masses of populations have been displaced to either raise cattle for fast food outlets, extract various resources, from rare earths to not-so-rare fossil fuels, which has resulted in massive dispossessions and expulsions.¹⁷

While the rich have grown richer, vast numbers of people have faced a variety of hardships from poorly paid jobs in sweatshops, discrimination and oppression, famines, civil wars, in some cases government supported paramilitary

hit squads, ecological hardships, and so on. These various adversities (economic, cultural, and political) have inspired a vast number of social mobilizations throughout the now highly interconnected globalized world that have been collectively termed GJMs. While each movement might well be locally situated, the causes, consequences, and influences are rooted in global neoliberal capitalism. Perhaps this was first evident with the rise of the Zapatistas, in Chiapas, Mexico, channeling the legacy of the Mexican Revolution, which began on January 1, 1994, the day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect when they captured seven cities. To understand this movement, we must first step back and note the major transformations that took place in Mexican rural political economy in the late 1960s as it shifted from corn production in the *ejidos* (communal farms). It became far cheaper to import corn from the United States while cutting off price supports for locally grown corn. Meanwhile, more profitable crops (strawberries, avocados, tomatoes melons, etc.), requiring greater capital investments in irrigation, chemical fertilizers, and so on provided by the government, were grown for export, primarily to the United States and Canada. While the already landowning classes, typically allied with the highly corrupt governments, amassed huge profits, the peasantry suffered. Then came NAFTA that benefited the elites both in Mexico and the United States. The prosperity of the rich meant crises and hardships to the poor peasants. Many of the growing ranks of poor peasants migrated to the United States to do such menial work as was available, especially “stoop labor” working in the agricultural sector, picking fruits and vegetables under a hot sun all day while living in squalor. Others found work in landscaping, construction, and meat/fish processing, one of the most dangerous jobs in the United States.

The Zapatistas were neither seeking revolution nor secession from Mexico but a degree of autonomy, independence, and self-determination for Chiapas. Their struggles were ultimately successful. Today they have a large network of schools, health centers, and community centers. Indeed, their health care for all is vastly superior to what the Mexican government can provide. But what is most significant for understanding GJMs today is that the skillful use of the then new Internet enabled the EZLN to inform a large and growing global audience of their plight, their cause, and their goals by drawing large support from all over the world. Their charismatic “leader,” with the nom de guerre, *Subcomandante Marcos*, seemingly a former professor of sociology or philosophy, well versed in Marxism, often appeared on their website and some television interviews, which both encouraged many of the peasants to join the movement and maintained the enthusiasm of those in the movements.

But what is crucial for understanding the rise of GJMs is how the Internet enabled the proliferation of “virtual public spheres” that in turn became the precondition for various Internetworked social movements.¹⁸ For us, the Zapatistas became an important marker of contemporary GJMs from the bottom—and the extent to which they are often successful.¹⁹ A global neo-Zapatista network emerged especially in Europe and remains a significant part

of the European left that connects *Las Canadas* in the *Lacadan* forest with Berlin, London, or Barcelona.²⁰ It is at this point that we can begin to talk about the rise of a “movement of movements.”²¹ Nevertheless, for otherwise widely dispersed activists and organizations, the Internet provided a great deal of information about the impact of neoliberal globalization, both the global corporations and regulatory organizations (WTO, World Bank, and IMF) on local communities. There then followed a number of other GJMs. The “Battle of Seattle,” an unexpected massive demonstration that shut down the WTO, marked the beginning of widespread protests against the adversities of globalization, namely growing inequality and poverty, the denial of human rights (including death squads), ecological devastation, and so on.²² A number of other protests against the WTO took place—in Washington, Genoa, Melbourne, and elsewhere.

In light of the proliferating and growing movements for global social justice, in 2001, a number of progressives, led in part by Chico Whitaker, an architect and Christian social activist of Brazil, created the World Social Forum (WSF) to remedy the isolation and fragmentation of a number of diverse progressive groups. All too often, progressive movements can be seen as “activist silos” in which various activists struggle for their own cause, such as anti-poverty, pollution and environmental despoliation, inadequate health care, sexism, trafficking, and so on for the most part, “bottom up” social justice movements—local, national, or global, are widely dispersed and fragmented, each having little to do with each other, yet all facing adversities of capitalism in general, become especially onerous in its neoliberal global phase in which from the poisoning of rivers, to depleted aquifers, malnutrition, the employment of death squads against various activists, and so on. The WSF was meant to be a meeting ground, a forum, a place where otherwise widely separated and generally diverse progressive organizations and movements might come together to disseminate information about their cause, share information, strategies, tactics, and visions, and forge linkages with similar organizations in other parts of the world. Moreover, such a forum permits diverse activist communities to see their struggles have a common basis—global capitalism. Thus, the WSF became a space where thousands of various GJMs and tens of thousands of activists could gather together, share information, strategies, tactics, and pedagogy as well as form networks, coalitions, and so on in order to educate, and utilize various strategies to mobilize to undermine the dominant powers, and realize social justice, human rights, and universal dignity. The WSF, as a forum, has been seen as a gathering space for the “movement of movements” where Internetworked social movements can be forged and hopefully work together in diverse struggles against a common enemy.²³

By design, the WSF has avoided taking direct political stances, and in fact, political leaders and parties were generally excluded from participation in the WSF. (At times, however, there were political activities taking place at the same time as the WSF but in different, yet accessible locales.) The WSF brings together groups in which several thousand progressive movements, and tens of thousands of activists from various NGOs and indigenous people’s organizations

gather together unified by the belief that “another world was possible.” The WSF has since its first meetings in Brazil met in India, Tunisia, Canada, and elsewhere, and its most recent meeting took place in Salvador, Brazil, in 2018.

GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENTS

Given the ever-growing hardships and crises that came about as a result of neoliberal globalization, especially since the economic implosion of 2008, there have been increasing numbers of progressive social movements and struggles typically directed toward the local or national impacts of global capital. This became extremely evident with the Arab Spring, soon followed by various anti-austerity movements in Southern Europe, especially Greece, Spain, and Portugal, as well as Occupy Wall Street that began in the United States and eventually spread to over 1500 occupations of public spaces in 82 countries.²⁴ While each of these movements and mobilizations had its own specific features, each was a reaction to the growing hardships faced by many of the people that called into question the policies of the national elites, typically beholden to global capital indifferent to the poor, embracing privatization and the outsourcing of jobs to 3^d world countries that was especially harmful poor workers.²⁵ Finally, what may ultimately be the most important social movements of our times, there is a growing number of progressive youth, opposing the more difficult and uncertain economic times of our day, as well as the persistence of a variety of traditional, repressive, and authoritarian attitudes regarding race, class, gender, and sexual orientation. The majority of such youth prefer socialism to capitalism and as they age, and in growing numbers, they may well be the vanguard of a postcapitalist society.

As we will argue, many of the movements we will discuss (environmentalism, Black Lives Matter, or Me Too) may not seem directly tied to political economy, but indeed one of the major problems with what is often termed “identity politics” is the encapsulation of identity/recognition as a social psychological concern of particular groups, seemingly unconnected to underlying economic factors. With scholars like Charles Taylor or Axel Honneth, the desire for recognition is a powerful incentive for individuals/groups to mobilize. Nevertheless, this recognition cannot be isolated from political economy, especially in so far as every political economy does influence notions of identity, individual or collective, while at the same time their perspectives can little explain the impact of strains, crises, or larger political economic changes. Focus on the cultural/social psychological, collective or individual identity, or interactional aspects of leadership and networks, or processes of framing, tends to obscure if not ignore the salience of political economy. This has been typical of most mainstream social movement theories which have given little attention to the notion of intersectionality and the impact of political economic factors on issues of race, gender, and sexual orientation, but we shall argue *au contraire*, such factors are essential. Perhaps the work of Frantz Fanon most clearly indicated how larger structures of colonial domination and imperialism led to the denigration of subaltern identities and cultures.

We will suggest that many of the recent GJMs can be understood as “mobilizations for dignity” linked at the macro level to the various processes, outcomes, strains, and legitimization crises of global capitalism that with its embrace of neoliberal economic and financial practices has led to explosion of wealth—albeit inequitably distributed—with a growing unemployment and a growing “precariat” class.²⁶ This precariat, especially the migrants from third world countries, represent the “wretched of the [twenty-first century] earth.”²⁷ Further, among the less discussed outcomes of global capitalism is the process of the changing nature of “work” and the effects it has on one’s social and psychological daily lives. A long tradition clearly noted in Marx, echoing Hegel, has argued that selfhood demanded recognition. The alienated labor of commodity production not only denied the worker recognition, but agency, community, and the realization of species being—in sum, workers were objectified, estranged, dehumanized, and bereft of dignity. Not only did the worker suffer the direct hardships of poorly paid tedious work but also faced various emotional consequences of subordinate positions—what has been called the “hidden injuries of social class.”²⁸ As we have suggested, the contemporary inequality of wealth, and the indifference of ruling classes become especially blatant at times of crisis and the resulting contradictions evoke powerful emotions.

As we see it, few SMS scholars attempt to systematically link neoliberal capitalist political economy and its legitimating culture to issues of emotion, identity, morality, and visions of a better world—nor do they do so in a way that sheds light on the emergence and development of the major movements of the present age. Very few SMS publications deal with economic factors and those that do, rarely mention capitalism. Nevertheless, some, such as Donatella Della Porta, have recently shown the adverse consequences of the austerity programs—especially in Southern Europe. We might note that her recent book *Social Movements in Times of Austerity* is subtitled *Bringing Capitalism Back into Protest Analysis*. Conversely, there is a rich Marxist literature on social movements, and most of this research is little addressed by mainstream conventional sociological social movement theory and research.

While the GJMs are typically progressive, unlike earlier progressive movements, many of the major actors are neither organized unions nor left-wing political parties with radical leadership advancing the class interests of their own members. The GJMs from the bottom are rarely well funded, and while many activists may be highly educated, they have not taken professional careers. Moreover, while many of the contemporary movements critique the consequences of neoliberal capitalism, most of these GJMs generally do not call for socialism or communism—although many individuals in such movements do indeed embrace various aspects of radical alternatives to the prevailing capitalist system.²⁹ Some disdaining the role of any State choose anarchism, while others, especially those tied to rural peasant groups, seek to establish cooperatives. What unites these newer movements, in the words of the WSF, is the belief that “another world is possible.” Also, although identity issues are important in

these movements, they are not simply expressions of the earlier wave of identity politics in which heretofore marginalized subaltern actors sought recognition and/or valorization of a stigmatized identity. Nevertheless, many such marginalized groups—women, minorities, and others—have become parts of activist coalitions within the GJMs. Finally, the use of space, both as the locations for demonstrations and occupations and “virtual public spheres” of the Internet create high visibility, using direct, participatory democratic ways of acting and organizing, while the new digital technologies represent a departure from both “old” and “new” social movements.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

As we entered the second decade of the twenty-first century, social mobilizations raged in opposition to the neoliberal turn that capitalism has taken in recent decades in Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. The global bankers created a variety of new investment instruments, including hedge funds, financed using collateralized mortgages that magically transformed mortgage debts to assets to finance investment instruments whose virtual value was over \$600 trillion—roughly 12 times the GNP of the world. Millions of seemingly “bargain basement” mortgages were unscrupulously sold to unsophisticated buyers who were told they could buy a three-bedroom house with a two-car garage for \$1000 a month. But a year or two later, when the teaser rate expired, and the cost of mortgages doubled if not tripled, most of the buyers were unable to make the payments. Millions of houses went into foreclosure, the stock markets across the globe tanked, and the massive debt-financed investments became worthless. After the implosion of the housing and stock markets in 2008, many businesses folded, many of the major banks in the United States and abroad were suddenly insolvent. Many millions lost their jobs and their homes. After the worst economic crisis since the 1930s, the then president Bush reluctantly began a plan to bail out the banks—a plan continued and expanded by President Obama to include Goldman Sachs, General Motors, and AIG (and several foreign banks like *Deutschebank*).

The mishandling of the global capitalist crisis by governments and corrupt politicians and dictators, and the adverse economic consequences of these for ordinary people led to outbursts of mass protests and uprisings from across North Africa, the Middle East, through Europe and the United States. After years of economic hardship in 2007–8 the global crisis of capitalism made life more difficult for poor workers and street peddlers. This precipitated the self-immolation of the poor Tunisian fruit peddler Mohamed Bouazizi, on December 17, 2010, which led to the expressions of indignation, anger, and rage to the government of President Ben Ali. This was the trigger for the Arab Spring, and the massive demonstrations in Tahrir Square against Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak who resigned 18 days later. This was followed by mass mobilizations across Southern Europe, especially Greece, Spain, and Portugal, and finally the Occupy Wall Street movement erupted in New York, all of which

came about in the aftermath of the implosion and crisis of global capitalism. In most of these mobilizations, students were an integral part of the body of activists alongside ordinary citizens. Moreover, while these demonstrations included some union workers and/or left parties, for the most part, the participants were likely to be students and/or young people, many of whom however attempted to understand their circumstances through the aid of the Marxist lens.

At the same time that these mass movements emerged, students were also involved in specific students' movements around the world—in places such as Quebec, Chile, the United Kingdom, Mexico, and elsewhere. The focal point of the students' mobilizations was the opposition to the neo-liberalization of higher education and the attempt to recover the public sense of education.

In Chile, starting in September 2011, students from all over the country began to organize to struggle against financializing higher education system with the goal of finding profits through privatization of typically state-supplied products or services. The systematic occupation of schools, universities, and public institution buildings used by the students and their supporters were dramatic expressions of their demands for a profound transformation of the Chilean educational system. Their main demands were equal access to and increase in public investment in the higher education system. Similarly, the "Maple Spring" of Quebec in 2012 was another dramatic mobilization of students in opposition to proposed tuition fee increases. In the background of the Quebec students' mobilizations were the profound reforms in higher education and the establishment of the ministry of education in the 1960s. As the ministry announced its leading ideology and commitment to the values of equal access to education, autonomy of institutions of higher education, secularism, and regional representation, the students fought quite systematically for the implementation of these values.³⁰ Like many governments in the world, the Quebec's Liberal government, embracing neoliberalism, began implementing austerity measures in 2009. These also included increase in tuition and fees. Influenced by the Chilean and British students, Quebec students prepared themselves for a long fight that started with a strike in 2012, condemning the tuition fee raise and demanding the abolition of tuition fee altogether. Picket lines, strikes, protests, and nightly demonstrations continued for six months, with artists, organizations, and citizens joining in support of the students. At the same time, the government that had been in power for nine years was under fire with allegations of corruption in public hearings, and a wide range of pressure groups were already fighting against fees, privatization, and outsourcing. As a result of all these pressures, the government resigned. The newly elected government canceled the tuition fee increase and decided on a new index fee. Additionally, there were other successes, most notably, the initiation of major policy discussions in the educational ministry to deal with issues of accessibility and quality of higher education.

We might also mention the "water wars" of Cochabamba, Bolivia, that followed the privatization of the municipal water supply, which was sold to a French corporation—and as would be typical, the cost for water jumped. But it should be noted that after a long period of neoliberalism, in which many

workers, especially tin miners, lost jobs, there was a large population of now jobless workers, victims of previous struggles lost to the powers of neoliberal capital ready, willing, and able to mobilize and protest via marches, blockades, and barricades shutting down the city. Eventually the government tore up the contract and the multinational firm was expelled.³¹

At the time of Arab Spring, Scott Walker, the Wisconsin governor, imposed massive cuts on education and attempted to end public employee unions, namely teachers, especially likely to include women and often people of color. Given that the capital of Wisconsin is in Madison, home of a large multi-university, the inevitable came—massive demonstrations, and an occupation of the State house. Curiously, some of the occupiers of Tahrir Square sent pizzas to the occupiers of the Wisconsin State house. While the occupation did not change the neoliberal policies, it did bring national notice to progressive demonstrations and seemingly acted as a model for subsequent mobilizations qua occupations.

Among those especially hard hit by the 2008 meltdown were recent college graduates facing a dismal job market. *Adbusters*, a Canadian publication of satire and progressive politics, called for an occupation of Wall Street. In response to that call, a number of demonstrators, occupiers, from New York City, long a center for liberal thought and progressive causes, descended upon Zuccotti Park, near Wall Street. They set up tent camps, and occupied the park. Soon, the numbers of demonstrators swelled and a major national, and then an international movement, Occupy Wall Street, exploded.³² In a short time, there were over 1500 occupations in various public spaces in the United States and 82 countries abroad. The camps were radically democratic; all participants had equal say in activities and camp organization. There were no clear-cut leaders nor a clear agenda. While many of the participants were veterans of earlier progressive politics, many of the student demonstrators came from local New York universities and learned about Marxism and/or progressive politics as taught at CUNY, New School, Pace or Colombia. Nevertheless, inspired by radically democratic, anarcho-syndicalist traditions, coached by the likes of Howard Graeber the anthropologist and Marina Sitrin, activist lawyer and veteran of the Argentinian factory takeovers, there was no clear political agenda—indeed political action was disdained—the occupation itself was seen as a political act in bringing widespread attention to growing inequality, making the “1%” an integral part of the national vocabulary, and articulating the hardships of students facing massive debt and difficult job markets.³³

Eventually, many of the encampments were dispersed by the police, acting upon the orders of Democratic mayors, working in conjunction with a Democratic administration. While Occupy did not itself form a lasting movement, it did show that millions could organize, mobilize, and critique capitalism. Nevertheless, many of the participants splintered and continued to engage in various kinds of social activism, for example, aiding the victims of hurricane Sandy. Moreover, and essential to our particular perspective on social movements, the actual participation in movements, often leads to lasting connections to members of activist

networks, which in turn impacts personal and collective identity in such ways that have enduring effects especially tendencies to support if not participate in further mobilizations and actions. While Occupy disdained direct political participation, as would be evident in 2016, it did raise the political consciousness of large numbers of youth, and the majority of young people in the United States subsequently supported Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primary because of, not in spite of, his openly expressed socialist views and promised support for single-payer health care, free higher education, and so on.

On another front, despite the educational and occupational gains made by African Americans in recent decades, resulting from the successes of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s to secure the rights of black people in the United States, racism and racial discrimination have endured and continues to persist. The legacy of slavery and racial subordination and racism in the United States has had, and continues to have, a great impact on race relations and discrimination against African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities to this day. Despite the abolition of slavery more than a century and a half ago, and subsequent struggles for civil rights that erupted and continued throughout the course of the second half of the twentieth century and despite the emergence of mass movements among African Americans that endured through a turbulent period in recent American history, racism and its institutionalized forms of repression have continued to persist in the United States. High unemployment, low wages, discrimination in housing, education, and other spheres of life affecting the social condition of millions of black people in America, combined with racist police brutality, have triggered a collective political response through the mass mobilization of the black community across the United States led by various social movements over the past several decades—from the Civil Rights movement, to the Black Panthers, to the Revolutionary Black Workers, and other radical organizations since the 1960s.

The persistence of institutionalized violence in the form of police brutality targeting African-American communities in cities large and small across America has led to eruptions of protest from Ferguson to Baltimore, from Chicago to South Central Los Angeles, and beyond, reaching a boiling point when new movements like Black Lives Matter have emerged to respond to the rise of racist police violence that has fanned the flames of the resurgence of racism in the age of Trump.³⁴ The emergence of new social movements like Black Lives Matter at a time of a renewed racist climate in the aftermath of the recent global capitalist crisis and rightist politics targeting minorities, immigrant communities, and the working poor is part and parcel of the racist climate in which long-standing traditions of racism have been rekindled by the powers that be to both sustain divisions among working people and at the same time divert attention away from the fundamental economic problems facing global capitalism and the capitalist state in the age of neoliberal capitalist globalization that has greatly affected segments of the working class that finds itself in a very precarious position. Scapegoating minorities masks the nature of capitalism and “explains” its adversities by blaming racial and/or ethnic minorities and/

or certain kinds of elites. This has, in turn, fed into racist attitudes and behavior on the part of a segment of the white population stemming from the racist institutional structure, which has encouraged and emboldened police violence against the black community.³⁵ It is in this context of increasing racist violence (and deaths) perpetrated by the authorities against black people that organizations such as Black Lives Matter have turned such repression into a nationwide movement for social justice.

Ever since World War II, as more and more women have entered the paid labor forces of the world, they have at the same time faced a variety of cultural and structural barriers toward economic, political, and social equality with men—patriarchy being primarily the entrenched legacy of long histories in which patriarchal power, ensconced in the structural organizations of power, articulated as hegemonic masculinity, has not only served as a barrier to women's progress but as a system that has justified male domination in general, and various kinds of sexual exploitation from trafficking to various types of sexual assault and harassments. One of the main consequences of the "war economy" was the influx of massive numbers of women into the work force where they assumed heretofore "male" jobs, from operating complex machinery to piloting aircraft.³⁶ These experiences of agency, empowerment, and independence, followed by the postwar re-entry of women to housework, or "women's work," which created the discontents pointed out by Simone De Beauvoir, simply saw a woman as "other," while what Betty Freidan called the "problem that has no name" created the conditions and emotions that led to the various eruptions of feminism in the 1960s.³⁷ As more and more women entered the work force, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, at the same time as wages began to stagnate in the face of automation, the growth of services and job exports, there was a growing male resentment toward working, liberated, independent women. We are today witnessing a growing and massive movements throughout the world of women mobilizing and organizing, many young women often marching for the first time, against the adverse consequences of neoliberalism and patriarchy.

It is interesting to note the beginnings of growing "Me Too" movements throughout the world as women are mobilizing and organizing; many young women especially those with more education are often marching for the first time, against various kinds of patriarchy, from harassment to actual rape, as an expression of patriarchal power which is as much rooted in social structures and ideology as individual. The underlying phallic aggressive aspects of transnational capital not only sustain age-old forms of patriarchy but enable its expression in such diverse ways as global sex trafficking, expectations of sexual favors for employment in sweatshops as well as the sleek offices of global corporations. While surely feminist sentiments of indignation and rage have existed for a long time, today feminists, like many progressive activists, have adroitly used the Internet to spread information, organize mobilizations, and so on especially in parts of the Moslem world that are particularly restrictive toward women.³⁸

As we were finishing this chapter in March 2018, a massive protest movement, March for Our Lives, erupted across the United States in response to the mass killing of students and teachers in a high school in Parkland, Florida. More than 800,000 youth and others descended on Washington, DC, in the biggest protest march in US history. There were similar protests in hundreds of cities across the United States and in other countries around the world. About 20 years prior to this tragedy, 2 high school students murdered 17 others at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. Since then school and college shootings, whether Virginia Tech or Sandy Hook, have become all too regular, and while there has been growing public support for stricter laws regarding gun ownership, background checks, and banning military assault weapons, after each such lethal assault, the political leadership, typically conservative Republicans, well funded by the National Rifle Association, offer thoughts and prayers but little else. And true to form, once again, after the most violent mass shooting in Las Vegas, in which 59 people were killed and 527 wounded, the political leaders offered their prayers but made no effort to control access to guns. In most cases, the gunman is seen as an isolated loner, mentally ill and/or troubled—thus exonerating the providers of guns and the lax gun laws “justified” by certain interpretation of the second amendment. But something different happened when another shooting killed 17 people at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. Perhaps the ultimate form of indignity is to face a senseless death that could so easily be avoided. All of a sudden, the students were not just saddened but enraged and indignant that the political authorities are so indifferent. And so they organized walkouts, and articulated that enough was enough, but this time, in face of the growing numbers of the population that support gun control, their protest struck a resonant chord with high school youth across the nation and indeed many other segments of the population as well. Moreover, many of the organizers and leaders of the protests, understanding that change can only come from changing the laws, have launched a massive voter registration campaign and a large number of high school and college youth, many of whom generally don’t vote, that may well impact the outcome of a number of congressional races. Moreover, if we also look at the consequences of Black Lives Matter, as well as Me Too, we also note the trajectory of successful social movements that begin with some form of emotional reactions, and in the case of most of the social justice movements, anger and indignation toward elites, prompting mobilization, joining or creating activist networks, organizing, mobilizing, and eventually gaining enough power to foster political and/or cultural change. Moreover, what is especially important about movements like these is that not only do we see massive numbers of youth but many of this new generation of activists are likely to come from minorities. Further, as will be noted, as this generation moves through the life course, the events that shaped their lives in their youth generally continue to have influence throughout the lifespan.

The articulation of discontent and even massive protests can easily be seen in many of the major social movements of our times that must be understood

at a number of levels. Indeed, following the research and theory that came out of the movements, such as the alternative globalization movements, especially Arab Spring, Southern Europe, Occupy, and more recently Black Lives Matter, Me Too, and Never Again that culminated in the March for Our Lives. Several common elements seem clearly evident beginning with particular incidents that evoke crises of legitimacy that may challenge economic inequality, political indifference, or cultural norms such as the “acceptability” of the phallic aggressive hegemonic masculinity. These “moral shocks”³⁹ evoke adverse emotional consequences often intertwined with cultural stigmatization of victims. But as shame and indignation give way to anger, and anger becomes outrage, among a large and growing group of discontented actors, then come precipitating incidents and in turn widespread mobilizations for human dignity—a notion of equality freedom, toleration, agency, and self-fulfillment engendering the challenges, contestations, and mobilizations against various systems of domination whether by the economic system, by race, class, or gender that thwart the free and full development of anyone and everyone.

THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

Progressive social movements and struggles seek to act now to change the future of society in ways that promote social justice and universal dignity. But such visions of the possible must challenge and struggle against inequality, domination, and denigration, and thus necessarily and inevitably confront entrenched power that would seek to preserve its current economic interests, its political control, and maintain their “superior” social position by any means necessary, up to and including violence. Accordingly, in many cases, right wing, conservative leaders and constituencies are not only resentful, perhaps fearful, toward progressives and progressive agendas but the very emergence of such movements often disposes virulent reactionary social movements that would halt, if not reverse, social change and end such movements. Notwithstanding the highly visible and audible right wing, especially with its blaring cacophony of talk radio, television, and reactionary news outlets in newspapers, or websites, typically well supported by many members of the dominant classes, beneath the appearance of conservative power, we nevertheless see the successes of many of the social justice movements.

In the case of most social justice movements, there is often a long gestational period in which various forms of domination, denigration, and exploitation, engender critique and resistance initially articulated by a few activists whose writings, speeches, and polemics nevertheless resonate with a larger audience, and slowly but surely, as the critique and support for the cause becomes more widespread, and more intense, activist networks are formed and grow. Eventually, at certain moments, existing social relationships (and values) are discarded. But this is a slow process that often requires the mediation of generational changes. Thus, given the salience of collective identity, such as generational identity, as being shaped by events and for some actors, participation in movements, it becomes quite evident that many movements, especially

those which require transformations of identities and values, often take years if not generations to realize their goals of social justice. Nevertheless, we would suggest that despite the prevalence of reactionary movements today, there is an ever-growing support for social justice, and given the utility of the Internet for younger cohorts, and greater connectivity and awareness with global conditions, there is ever-growing popular support for GJMs. Thus, we anticipate that the millennials of today and activist teens will carry forth their progressive, indeed often socialist, values with them through the lifecycle, while, at the same time, the older, more conservative, indeed reactionary cohorts who would thwart social justice exit from the stage of world history. Clearly, most of the changes that have brought about a more just world have typically been the result of people organizing themselves into social movements that have mobilized popular support and impacted State polices to secure various aspects of justice that enhance human dignity, beginning with struggles against exploitation and oppression, that struggle for racial, ethnic, and sexual equality; and indeed equality not only of rights, but inclusion into various kinds of groups and organizations that reject the many prejudices of the past. Indeed, our analysis of mobilization for dignity regards such dignity as the primary goal of social justice. Between various struggles, mobilizations, demonstrations, and political action, often as a result of popular support for the causes of activists, together with the changing identities and values of new generations flowing through the life cycle, eventually, between social activism, changes in public opinion, and political actions, progressive social changes do take place.

In so far as a variety of expressions of injustice today are ultimately rooted in the nature of current global capitalism and its neoliberal ideology celebrating "free markets," individualism, privatization, and so on, it becomes necessary to not only critique and mobilize against such injustice that would celebrate the wealthy, and pit races against each other to keep wages low. Capitalist profits can grow when codpanies channel women, children and minorities into lower paid work, all the while corporate interests remain oblivious to the devastation of the environment for the sake of short-term economic gain. The only potential solution would begin with the transformation of capitalism and the elimination of private property. However, without strong left political parties, or labor unions, given the fragmentation of the many GJMs, this transformation may take a long time and go through various forms over a long period. Instead of a system based on the owner ship of private property, one of the growing movements that must be noted, has been the tendency for cooperatives, collectives, and community economic organizations. There are many examples of successful co-ops, collectives and employee owned companies such as the City of Bologna where 85% of the businesses are employee owned, the 200 plus companies of the Mondragon collective are the seventh largest company in Spain, while worker takeovers of the abandoned factories of Argentina have come back to life. Like most social movements, these may be small and often unnoticed changes. Given the conditions of our time, from growing poverty and immiseration to ecological devastation and threats of nuclear war, if these movements for social justice, for cooperative economic systems in harmony

with nature, for truly representative governments, and for inclusive systems of meaning are not successful, it seems very doubtful that the human race will survive much longer. However, as we survey the world, notwithstanding its current bleak moment dominated by various shades of right-wing populisms, nationalisms, and authoritarian governments, if we look at the growing numbers and many successes of various national and global social justice movements, it becomes quite clear that an undercurrent of progressive change is actually happening. Ever more people are becoming conscious, progressive, tolerant, and politically involved, whether confronting inequality, environmental devastation, militarism, or violations of civil/human rights. And thus, as the numbers of older, more typically conservative and authoritarian populations continue to fall, they tend to be replaced by more liberal, indeed progressive, and multicultural populations sympathetic with socialism, feminism, environmentalism, and so forth. Indeed, it is evident to us that the growing numbers and power of social justice activists and movements will ultimately realize the hope that “another world” is indeed possible.

NOTES

1. Marx had already warned in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* that reformist measures undermined proletariat's demands for radical transformation.
2. Manuel Castells, *The Rise of Network Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, second edition 2010).
3. Donatella Della Porta (ed.), *The Global Justice Movement: Cross-national and Transnational Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2007).
4. Jurgen Habermas, “New Social Movements,” *telos* 49 (1981), pp. 33–37; Claus Offe, “New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics,” *Social Research* 52 (1985), pp. 817–868.
5. See also Alain Touraine, *The Voice and the Eye* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981/1991); Conny Roggeband and Bert Klandermans, “Introduction,” in Bert Klandermans and Conny Roggeband (eds.), *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2010), pp. 1–13.
6. Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution* (Chicago, IL: Haymarket, 2008 [original 1933]).
7. See Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press; 1975); Jurgen Habermas, “New social movements,” *telos* 49 (September 21, 1981), pp. 33–37; and Claus Offe, “New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics,” *Social Research* 52 (1985), pp. 817–868.
8. Catherine Eschle and Bice Maiguashca, “Reclaiming Feminist Futures: Co-Opted and Progressive Politics in a Neo-Liberal Age,” *Political Studies*, Vol 62, no. 3 (2014), pp. 634–651.
9. James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope*, 2nd ed. (London: Polity, 2015).
10. Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts*, 3rd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2015).

11. James Jasper, *Protest: A Cultural Introduction to Social Movements* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2014).
12. France Fox-Piven, *Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).
13. Leslie Sklair, *The Transnational Capitalist Class* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2001).
14. Matthew S. Williams, *Strategizing Against Sweatshops: The Global Economy, Student Activism and Worker Empowerment* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2018).
15. Oxfam, "Just 8 Men on the Same Wealth Is Half the World" (2017). <https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-men-own-same-wealth-half-world>.
16. Guy Standing, *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class* (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).
17. David Harvey, "The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession," *Socialist Register* 40 (2004), pp. 63–87; Saskia Sassen, *Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).
18. Lauren Langman, "Political Economy and the Normative: Marx on Human Nature and the Quest for Dignity" in Michael Thompson (ed.), *Constructing Marxist Ethics* (Leiden: Brill, 2016).
19. This is not to ignore historical precursors, not the least of which was the internationalism of the Soviet Union, or even the then global abolition movements of the nineteenth century.
20. See Xotchitl Leyva Soalno, "Geopolitics of Knowledge in the Neo Zapatista Social Movement Networks," in Jain Sen, *The Movement of Movements* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2017).
21. Laurence Cox and Alf Gunvald Nilsen, "Social Movements Research and the 'Movement of Movements': Studying Resistance to Neoliberal Globalization" *Sociology Compass* 1 (2) (2007), pp. 424–442.
22. While as we noted the Internet has been essential for disseminating information, organizing actions, and, as will be seen in the Arab Spring and Occupy movements, directing movements in real time, we must not forget that successful SMS do require face-to-face interactions and one function of demonstrations, direct actions such as occupations, is to encourage and/or reinforce social connections. See George Monbiot, *Out of the Wreckage, A New Politics for an Age of Crisis* (London, UK: Verso, 2017); L. A. Kaufman, *Direct Action* (London, UK: Verso, 2017).
23. Lauren Langman, "From Virtual Public Spheres to Global Justice: A Critical Theory of Internetworked Social Movements," *Sociological Theory*, 23 (1) (2005), pp. 42–74; Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2015).
24. Tova Benski, Lauren Langman, Ignacia Perugorria, and Benjamin Tejerina, "From the Streets and Squares to Social Movement Studies: What Have We Learned?" *Current Sociology* 61 (4) (2013), pp. 541–568.
25. Paul Mason has shown the extent to which neoliberalism in general and privatization in particular led to greater poverty and inequality in the Middle East. Then came the global crisis and the capitalist legitimacy, followed by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010, that precipitated the expression of indignation, anger, and rage to the government of Ben Ali, followed shortly thereafter by the massive demonstrations against Hosni Mubarak.

- See Paul Mason, *Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions* (London: Verso, 2012).
26. Guy Standing, "The Precariat: Why It Needs Deliberative Democracy" (2012). <https://www.opendemocracy.net/guy-standing/precariat-why-it-needs-deliberative-democracy>.
 27. Lauren Langman, "From Great Refusals to Wars of Position: Marcuse, Gramsci, and Social Mobilization" in Andrew Lamas, Todd Wolfson and Peter Funke (ed.), *The Great Refusal: Herbert Marcuse and Contemporary Social Movements* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2017), pp. 367–388.
 28. Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, *The Hidden Injuries of Class* (New York: Knopf, 1972).
 29. In some cases however, the movements were able to establish political parties, *Syriza* in Greece and *Podemos* in Spain, although they had a number of seats in their parliaments, they were little label to impact the economic power of the EU and find debt relief that might enable economic growth.
 30. Olivier Bégin-Caouette and Glen A. Jones, "Student Organizations in Canada and Quebec's 'Maple Spring,'" *Studies in Higher Education* 39 (3) (2014), pp. 412–423.
 31. David McNally, "University of the Diverse: Working-class Formations and Popular Uprisings from Cochabamba to Cairo." In Colin Barker, Lawrence Cox, John Krinsky, and Alf Gunvald Nilsen (eds.), *Marxism and Social Movements* (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
 32. See Levin Welch, "Neoliberalism, the Global Capitalist Crisis, and the Occupy Wall Street Movement," in this volume, Chap. 10.
 33. Anarchism like Marxism seeks to establish a free society based on freedom, solidarity and freely consenting participants. But they reject importance of the State insofar as all states ultimately rest on instruments of coercion—especially when there are great degrees of inequality and the police, if not the military, exist as instruments of coercion.
 34. It is notable that BLM not only began as a movement from below, but was founded by three radical black women organizers to contest state sanctioned violence—assassinations—of black people by the police.
 35. Joe Fegin, *The White Racial Frame: Centuries of Racial Framing and Counter-Framing*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013).
 36. One of the less told stories of World War II was how American women flew bombers to combat zones while Russian women, the Night Witches, flew in combat missions (2010). <https://www.npr.org/2010/03/09/123773525/female-wwii-pilots-the-original-fly-girls>.
 37. One of the main precipitants of second wave feminism was the relegation of second class status for women in the anti-war and civil rights movements, "the place for women was on their backs." See Simone De Bevoir, *The Second Sex* (New York: Vintage, 1974) and Betty Freidan, *The Feminist Mystique* (New York: Vintage, 1963).
 38. Valentine Moghadam, *Globalization and Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism, and the Global Justice Movements* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008).
 39. Jasper James, *The Art of Moral Protest* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

REFERENCES

- Barker, Colin, Lawrence Cox, John Krinsky, and Alf Gunvald Nilsen, eds. 2013. *Marxism and Social Movements*. Leiden: Brill.
- Bégin-Caouette, Olivier, and Glen A. Jones. 2014. Student Organizations in Canada and Québec's 'Maple Spring,'. *Studies in Higher Education* 39 (3): 412–423.
- Benski, Tova, Lauren Langman, Ignacia Perugorria, and Benjamin Tejerina. 2013. From the Streets and Squares to Social Movement Studies: What Have We Learned? *Current Sociology* 61 (4): 541–568.
- Carroll, William. 2017. *Expose, Oppose, Propose*. London: Zed Books.
- Castells, Manuel. 2010. *The Rise of Network Society*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
- . 2015. *Networks of Outrage and Hope*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Cox, Lawrence, and Alf Gunvald Nilsen. 2007. Social Movements Research and the 'Movement of Movements': Studying Resistance to Neoliberal Globalization. *Sociology Compass* 1 (2): 424–442.
- . 2014. *We Make Our Own History: Marxism and Social Movements in the Twilight of Neoliberalism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Eschle, Cathrine, and Bice Maiguashca. 2014. Reclaiming Feminist Futures: Co-opted and Progressive Politics in a Neo-Liberal Age. *Political Studies* 62 (3): 634–651.
- Feagin, Joe. 2013. *The White Racial Frame: Centuries of Racial Framing and Counter-Framing*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
- Goodwin, Jeff, and James Jasper. 2015. *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts*. 3rd ed. Malden, NJ: Wiley Blackwell.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1975. *Legitimation Crisis*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- . 1981. New Social Movements. *Telos* 49: 33–37.
- Harvey, David. 2004. The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession. *Socialist Register* 40: 63–87.
- Jasper, James. 1999. *The Art of Moral Protest*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 2014. *Protest: A Cultural Introduction to Social Movements*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Kaufman, L.A. 2017. *Direct Action*. London: Verso.
- Langman, Lauren. 2005. From Virtual Public Spheres to Global Justice: A Critical Theory of Internetworked Social Movements. *Sociological Theory* 23 (1): 42–74.
- . 2016. Political Economy and the Normative: Marx on Human Nature and the Quest for Dignity. In *Constructing Marxist Ethics*, ed. Michael Thompson. Leiden: Brill.
- . 2017. From Great Refusals to Wars of Position: Marcuse, Gramsci, and Social Mobilization. In *The Great Refusal: Herbert Marcuse and Contemporary Social Movements*, ed. Andrew Lamas, Todd Wolfson, and Peter Funke. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1952. The Problem of Generations. In *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge: Collected Works*, ed. Paul Kecskemeti, vol. 5. New York: Routledge.
- Mason, Paul. 2012. *Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions*. London: Verso.
- McNally, David. 2013. University of the Diverse: Working-Class Formations and Popular Uprisings from Cochabamba to Cairo. In *Marxism and Social Movements*, ed. Colin Barker, Lawrence Cox, John Krinsky, and Alf Gunvald Nilsen. Leiden: Brill.

- Moghadam, Valentine. 2008. *Globalization and Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism, and the Global Justice Movement*. Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield.
- Monbiot, George. 2017. *Out of the Wreckage, A New Politics for an Age of Crisis*. London: Verso.
- Offe, Claus. 1985. New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics. *Social Research* 52: 817–868.
- Oxfam. Just 8 Men on the Same Wealth Is Half the World. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-men-own-same-wealth-half-world>.
- Piven, Frances Fox. 2006. *Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Roggeband, Conny, and Bert Klandermans. 2010. Introduction. In *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines*, ed. Bert Klandermans and Conny Roggeband. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
- Sassen, Saskia. 2014. *Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sen, Jain. 2017. *The Movement of Movements*. Oakland, CA: PM Press.
- Sklair, Leslie. 2001. *The Transnational Capitalist Class*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Standing, Guy. 2011. *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. New York: Bloomsbury.
- . 2012. The Precariat: Why It Needs Deliberative Democracy. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/guy-standing/precariat-why-it-needs-deliberative-democracy>; <https://www.npr.org/2010/03/09/123773525/female-wwii-pilots-the-original-fly-girls>.
- Touraine, Alain. 1981. *The Voice and the Eye*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, Matthew S. 2018. *Strategizing Against Sweatshops: The Global Economy, Student Activism and Worker Empowerment*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.



Neoliberalism, the Global Capitalist Crisis, and the Occupy Wall Street Movement

Levin Welch

This chapter provides an explanation for the rise and fall of the Occupy Wall Street movement, a social movement “from below” that dared to “dream dangerously” in the wake of the most devastating economic crisis the United States had experienced since the Great Depression. Scholars and analysts have documented extensively the structural underpinnings of the Great Recession in the United States (December 2007 to June 2009 [official timeline]) and the 2008 financial collapse as consequences of neoliberal political economic policies that have led to some of the most dramatic increases in economic, political, and social inequality since the 1930s. The Occupy Wall Street movement was an outcome of the contradictions of contemporary capitalism and capitalist crisis in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This chapter is a narrative reconstruction of Occupy Wall Street’s online discourse that stems from an inquiry into the origins and development of the Occupy Wall Street movement that emerged in 2011. It is a product of a research project that I undertook as the Occupy movement evolved into a full-blown political response to the prevailing neoliberal capitalist order.

STRUCTURAL CONTEXT

Neoliberalism is both state policy and ideology that explicitly privileges private ownership over public control. Neoliberalism is the current hegemonic ideology of the world capitalist system, the latest “brand” in a long list of time-/place-specific ideologies justifying the development of global capitalism over

L. Welch (✉)
University of California, Riverside, CA, USA

the past several hundred years. Colonization, slavery, exploitation of labor, war, and revolution are all critical components of capitalism's historical evolution and inform its current form and function. As state policy, neoliberalism is a US-centric response to domestic and international crises of the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., stagflation, trade deficits, the devaluation of dominant currencies, the OPEC oil embargo, etc.).¹ And, while each country's path toward incorporation into the global economy must take into account local history and culture, neoliberalism operates on specific Anglo-American capitalist logics that inform the form and function of both global and local political economic relationships.²

One way to read the history of neoliberalism's development is a shift in economic policy from state-centric Keynesianism, which operated as a type of contract guaranteeing workers a minimum cut from the surplus value they created through state regulation to that of market liberalization and deregulation. In other words, neoliberalism was a way for capitalism to survive its own contradictions since economic "deregulation leads to crisis which [are] then resolved with public money and authority."³ The implementation of neoliberal policies signaled a break from the labor movement's hard-won compromise between labor and capital as the terms and obligations of the state to its citizens changed dramatically. Furthermore, the diffusion of neoliberalism was thought to be inevitable by many mainstream economists, characterized by economic laws and thus, economic activity was created by those who claimed to be its objective observers.⁴

Consistent with the several hundred year development of capitalism, the distribution of resources and the exertion of power under neoliberalism are demarcated along difference through class, race, gender, and other forms of oppression. In the early 1970s, US capital united in response to the social movements and unrest of the 1960s by replacing Keynesian policies with that of neoliberalism. Neoliberal ideology justifies extremely unequal distribution of resources by privatizing public property and services.⁵ Neoliberalism also lends itself to a racist and patriarchal ideology and state policy⁶ just as all the other hegemonic ideologies used to justify the development of the global capitalist system over the past several centuries.⁷ In other words, neoliberalism promotes a globalized version of capitalist imperialism through manipulation of state power to transfer what's left of the commons (e.g., national parks, social security, schools, water, etc.) to private hands under the authority of "self-regulation."⁸ This redistribution of resources is drawn against socioeconomic, racial, and gendered lines, and the consequences are clear, but who ultimately benefits remains the same—that is, the global capitalist class.⁹

Over the past 40 years, neoliberal policies have significantly contributed to a number of serious trends documented in the social scientific literature.¹⁰ These include, among others, the deregulation of the financial sector, the gutting of environmental protection and worker safety laws, increased risk of climate catastrophe with growing greenhouse gas emissions and pollution, international, civil and proxy wars over critical resources such as oil and water, outsourcing and offshoring, hostile takeovers (mergers and acquisitions), widening

gaps in wealth and income, housing, health, and educational inequality between the wealthy and the rest of the population that are exacerbated by race, gender, and other forms of oppression, resulting in financial collapse of 2008 in the United States and across the globe.

This is the basic ideological and policy context in which the Occupy Wall Street movement mobilized people and resources to demand social, economic, and political change. The 2008 US economic meltdown hit the middle-income working class and the poor the hardest,¹¹ creating fertile conditions for class-based social movements to form and grow. Global capitalism was demonstrating its limits and disregard for everyone except the capitalist class, inspiring people across the globe (e.g., the Arab Spring) to organize and demand social change. Regardless of political affiliation, class, race, or gender, the 2008 financial collapse became an opportunity for people to question the legitimacy of the economy and their government. Occupy was able to mix and frame many ideologies (such as anarchism and communism) to mobilize a massive horizontal (“leaderless”) grassroots movement that changed the national debate about wealth and poverty in the United States and across the world.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, IDEOLOGY, AND WEB 2.0

Social movements are often described as broad collective groupings of people, organizations, and other entities that come together to either promote or resist social change through direct and indirect action.¹² Social movements are old and perennial forms of collective human behavior that people engage in when groups believe social change is necessary.¹³ In the modern era, people join social movements for many reasons, yet a common theme is the realization of the gap between the real (what one thinks should be) and the Real (what is).¹⁴ One common way a gap is recognized is either when something external to an individual or group causes a massive disruption in the existing social and political order—“trigger events”¹⁵—or, when prolonged oppression and exploitation (like the terror of Jim Crow or Indian Termination) becomes too much to bear.¹⁶

Ideology, broadly defined, is the totality of shared assertions, ideas, beliefs, norms, values, and theories about the nature of people and society structured in ways that justify specific political, economic, or social systems, which either promotes or resists social change.¹⁷ In this way, ideology “provides [people with] a framework for organizing and interpreting the political world [as] it defines core values and principles.”¹⁸ However, ideology does not appear in a vacuum, it is a semi-autonomous historical institution¹⁹ that evolves with other institutions and influences how people interact.²⁰ That is to say, ideology is an empty shell that can be filled with whatever is necessary given time and place but always to fulfill rigid interests,²¹ changing while staying the same. Therefore, analyzing the ideological vocabulary employed by a movement demonstrates the limits and possibilities of action within a linguistic framework of a social movement. It is at this juncture where we can observe the (in)flexible nature of ideology and how it is used to negotiate social change or its reproduction.

Most social movements employ ideology that suggests a new class structure, or at least that the current structure needs to be fixed.²² For Occupy, the 2008 financial crisis and Great Recession prompted a discourse about the reasons as to why the American Dream was “dying” through the class-based ideological frames of anarchism, communism, socialism, libertarianism, and American exceptionalism. Ideology organizes collective action (e.g., strategies and tactics) used by a group, the peculiarity of frames, and so on.²³ Typically, social movements must reconcile multiple ideologies that might complement, complicate, or contradict each other. It is difficult work to negotiate multiple ideologies to mobilize a movement, but when social movements are able to square ideological conflicts within the group, social movement ideology forms what might be considered the “glue” of a movement.²⁴ Of course, “ideologies [are] more influential during unsettled times”²⁵ and now with the new technologies of social media (i.e., Web 2.0), ideological frames reach and influence more people more quickly than ever before.

Web 2.0 refers to “technology which is multi-directional, collaborative, interactive, participatory, live and instantaneous ... [where] collective creation of web content ... encourages hybridity and [horizontal participation] ... [and creates] new transcultural forms.”²⁶ In other words, instead of people only consuming media, they have the opportunity to participate in its creation to stimulate dialogue or action. Web 2.0 media platforms (social media such as Facebook or Twitter) of many-to-many communication (as opposed to one-to-many, such as cable news) not only allow ideas to travel across great distance extremely quickly, it also enables the possibility of “horizontal” social movement leadership (what Occupy called “leaderless”) instead of vertical or hierarchical leadership. In this way, Web 2.0 helped Occupy spread like wildfire across the country (within a year about 750 US cities had their own occupations addressing local, national, and global issues) with no central leadership.

The creation of Web 2.0 began in the 1990s when activists would use e-mail and listservs as means of communication to plan meetings, share ideas, and promote collective action.²⁷ Since then, in the Middle East and North Africa,²⁸ Central and South America,²⁹ Australia,³⁰ and in the United States,³¹ social media has played a critical role (some would argue a decisive role) in organizing waves of protest, political reform, civil unrest, or the overthrow of national governments.

There are two main factors explaining why Web 2.0 has become so attractive for activists: cost and speed. Web 2.0 provides more access to the political process to historically disadvantaged groups.³² Furthermore, Web 2.0 diversifies and democratizes global online dialogue in limited ways which, in some cases, helps make organization and action unpredictable to authorities and increases the difficulty of the state to monitor and suppress a movement.³³

One of the greatest accomplishments of Web 2.0 is the Zapatista uprising in Mexico where the democratic nature of Web 2.0 allowed for inclusive rather than exclusive dialogue, affording the movement opportunities to gain support from unlikely places locally, nationally, and internationally. The Zapatistas “vir-

tually invented struggle via the internet”³⁴ and completely countered the trends of global ethnic conflict so pervasive in the 1990s. The end goal and major challenge of these “netwars”³⁵ is to organize “online activism that moves offline.”³⁶

Translating ideology into action is one of the most difficult tasks for a movement using the internet as a main form of communication and organization, that is, how to move into “Activism 2.0.”³⁷ There are many reasons why this is difficult. The first, which applies less to the United States than the rest of the world (yet is still significant), is the “technology gap” between the well-to-do and others.³⁸ Second, Web 2.0 is relatively cheap for the state to monitor.³⁹ Third, the state has long recognized the power of Web 2.0 and has been monitoring activity and infiltrating groups by gaining access and trust through social media networks.⁴⁰ Fourth, social media can create inactive participants, as sharing and reading information online can promote passive activism as people may feel like they have “done enough” by spreading information (“clicktivism”).⁴¹ Fifth, there is no substitute for the rich relationships formed by activists in the streets.⁴² Nevertheless, the internet is an effective tool in aligning many folks together with ideologically charged propaganda when framed in a coherent and strategic manner. Thus, the online dialogue produced by Occupy via social media can provide a window into not only how this social movement fought against neoliberal ideology and policies, but also how neoliberalism constrains debates to single issues that divide people and quell civil unrest.

METHODS AND DATA

In 2012, I collected data from two Facebook (FB) pages and social movement internet homepages of the Occupy Wall Street movement. FB was most important for the diffusion of protest activities in cities across the United States⁴³ and the Web 2.0 tool that gave way to a “functional hierarchy” and “structural division of labor” that undermined the anarchist principles of Occupy after most occupations were physically removed by police.⁴⁴ Thus, it is imperative to reconstruct and analyze the FB narrative to further understand the strengths, weaknesses, limits, and potential of Web 2.0 as a tool for social movements seeking a more equitable distribution of resources and administration of justice for the majority of people through direct democratic discourse and action. The two FB pages analyzed here were the most popular: Occupy Wall St. [community] and Occupy Together [community]. Occupy Wall Street had 413,514 “likes” in December 2012 and 833,426 “likes” in December 2017, while Occupy Together received 227,727 “likes” in December 2012 and 301,684 “likes” as of December 2017. The two homepages were <http://occupywallst.org> and <http://www.occupytogether.org>. From the two FB pages, I used non-probability quota sampling from the “highlights” (the most popular posts in a given year) of each FB “wall” (a wall is the webpage that one sees when visiting any FB page).⁴⁵ Starting at the beginning (founding date) of the FB page and working up until December 31, 2012, I collected posts in chronological order

by selecting a number from a random numbers chart found on Google.⁴⁶ If, for example, the first number selected was 14, I would collect every 14th post on the FB wall. If I did not collect 80 posts the first time through (which was always the case), I would repeat the process until I collected 80 posts.

I copied the text from all FB posts into the qualitative data analysis software NVivo to generate rhetorical word clouds to help identify themes and patterns in some of the online discourse of Occupy Wall Street. Finally, I triangulated my data with news stories, scholarly reports, and Occupy Wall Street's official webpage to construct a narrative that highlights how ideology guided responses to the global capitalist crisis and how neoliberalism entered that discourse.

The contents of the FB posts (including the content of linked webpages such as blogs or news articles) are my units of analysis. NVivo produces rhetorical "word clouds" that map out what words and phrases are most commonly used. According to Charles Stewart, Craig Smith, and Robert Denton, we can identify a social movement's ideology by "identifying key words and phrases in its rhetoric because they are 'the basic structural elements, the building blocks, of ideology.'"⁴⁷ Thus, NVivo is an appropriate tool. Word clouds provide a foundation for my coding schemes—that is to say, the main words identified by NVivo distinguish themes from Occupy's rhetoric. These themes allowed me to reconstruct the Occupy narrative, one that tells an ideological story of America, where we've been, where we are, where we're going, and what we need to do to get there.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF OCCUPY WALL STREET

The Occupy Wall Street movement (henceforth, Occupy), in the beginning, represented a collaboration of resources and energies of various left-leaning individuals, groups, and organizations whose primary goal became physically creating "democratic alternatives" that directly contest the legitimacy of neoliberal political economic policies in the United States.⁴⁸ The ideologies of the movement were as diverse as the coalition, the most salient of which were anarchism, communism, socialism, and some libertarianism. These ideological traditions (excluding libertarianism) seek to promote the equal distribution of resources in society and created the foundation on which the frame "we are the 99%" was built. As far as Occupy was concerned, "the 1%" were the enemy. They controlled Wall Street and Washington DC and are thus responsible for the 2008 financial collapse, the endless so-called War on Terror, increasing inequality, and a whole host of other miseries.

Inspired by the Arab Spring and Spanish Indignados, Occupy began on September 17, 2011. Many credit Kalle Lasen—co-founder of the politically charged Canadian magazine *Adbusters*—for sparking the movement via Twitter. Lasen called on people to occupy public spaces in protest of the lack of action in response to "the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008" and the sense of betrayal that many Obama supporters were beginning to feel after realizing that they were not receiving any "change they can believe in."⁴⁹ Lasen's call

was propelled through a broader Twitter conversation among progressive and radical groups (such as #FuckYouWashington or USDOR [US day of rage]) about political, economic inequalities and need to protest.⁵⁰

When the occupation commenced in September in Zuccotti Park (renamed by the protestors as Liberty Plaza) in New York City, mainstream media ignored them for almost one week. However, the movement gained momentum without TV coverage and worked hard to come to a consensus on what the values and goals of “the 99%” should be. While the goals remained somewhat nebulous, the values of equality and direct democracy were most salient for people observing the growth of the movement on the streets and online⁵¹ and became too big for mainstream media to ignore. The vast majority of mainstream media outlets were immediately confused and cynical. Reporters and other public figures were quick to claim that the “hacky-sack throwing” and “STD [infected]” protestors don’t even know what or why they are protesting.⁵² The “horizontal” (leaderless) nature of the movement made it difficult for political organizations (e.g., the Democratic Party) to gain a monopoly on ideology and rhetoric and for media to describe accurately what was happening. Almost any problem—education, healthcare, war, the environment, prisons, corruption, economic inequality, and so on—was presented by Occupy since any member of “the 99%” (theoretically) had a say in what happened. Occupiers understood themselves as directly attacking the U.S. power structure and staged a number of actions, such as marching on the homes of corporate executives, blocking traffic, making protest signs and marching, or working in the general assemblies (where governance through consensus was built), or other working groups (such as makeshift kitchens, medical clinics, and libraries). They called for an end to the “relationship built on money and donations between our elected officials and corporate interests” and the creation of “a system that operates in the interest of the people” (occupytogether.org) and advanced a democratic platform for the 99% to decide how to reach such goals.

As such, and as the movement grew more popular online and more people joined physical encampments, there were many confrontations with police and other political and economic institutions, sometimes with hundreds of protestors arrested at the same time. As police cleared the democratic encampments, Occupy became more hierarchical online because people were relying more on FB administrators for information as opposed to the general assemblies of the physical occupations.⁵³ Sometime around late 2012, the Occupy movement seemed to go dormant, in part due to state repression, but maybe also because of the re-election of President Barak Obama somewhat pacified leftist individuals and groups.⁵⁴

While Occupy did not institutionalize itself in the form of a social movement organization (such as the NAACP), many of those who participated in its actions continued their activism for a variety of causes in many different ways, such as rallying support for the family of murdered Trayvon Martin or helping the victims of Hurricane Sandy. Furthermore, and most critically, Occupy broke the seeming code of silence about economic inequality in the United

States to a point where the terms “the 99%” and “the 1%” are now a part of mainstream conversations. So, while it is easy to say that Occupy didn’t accomplish their grand goals of wealth and power redistribution, we should not forget that in order to solve massive problems, we must first talk about them. Furthermore, Occupy provided the left with many lessons for future activism by demonstrating various strengths and weaknesses of using Web 2.0 as a central organizing tool, especially in terms of creating a workable narrative that engages enough people in ways that create long-lasting positive social change. Some of these lessons are found in the narrative they created online.

ANALYSIS OF OCCUPY WALL STREET ONLINE DISCOURSE

[Occupy] aims to fight back against the system that has allowed the rich to get richer and the poor to get poorer. We no longer want the wealthiest to hold all the power, to write the rules governing an unbalanced and inequitable global economy, and thus foreclosing on our future. (occupytogether.org).

Occupy used Facebook (FB) for more than just raising money or recruiting members—FB was a tool used to articulate social problems, grievances, hopes, fears, and dreams. It was the central forum by which a social movement ideology was developed and a narrative about the origins and purpose of the movement was constructed. This articulation is the product of a mass response to the inherent contradictions of neoliberalism that came to a head in 2008 with the financial collapse in the United States and around the world. Occupy framed social problems in terms of class-specific ideologies (working class and middle class) with anarchist, communist, socialist, and even libertarian overtones. Occupy expressed their understanding of the ideal distribution of wealth, resources, and political representation. Typically, Occupy imparted ideological frameworks pressing for more equal (not necessarily equitable) distribution of wealth, power, and political representation. The common themes that materialized from the coded homepages and FB pages of Occupy start with one central problem: the greedy and corrupt 1% (the owning class). Within this theme, others emerged, including the financial collapse of 2008, the theft of homes through foreclosure, a failing educational system, and a disastrous War on Terror. Occupy identified friends and enemies. Enemies (targets) were members or servants of the 1% and the state (see Fig. 14.1); friends are the 99%, that is, everyone else who is not included in the list of enemies. These themes, when taken together, tell a story of a class of people who have hijacked this country and how the 99% can take it back.

Online, Occupy articulated problems of various US political and economic institutions, claiming ordinary citizens have lost rights and voice. For Occupy, owners of big business and large banks, that is, the 1%, have “hijacked” this beautiful country and its “government of and for the people.” Accordingly, the 1% successfully disenfranchised the majority of “the people” from the political and economic process, leaving them to suffer the consequences of the 1%’s

The State			The 1%		
The police	Legislation (NDAA)	President Obama	The banks	Large Corporations	Wall Street
"Last night the enforcers of the 1% attacked and destroyed the occupations in Philadelphia and Los Angeles. They ignored both the constitution and our rights as free people. The 1% control our economy, our governments, and the police force." (OWS, FB: 11.30.11)	"The potential impact of the NDAA's provisions to expand military detention without trial could render the other issues we all address seemingly trivial; any activist stands at risk of designation as a potential terrorist, especially if their interests include either foreign policy or enterprises that impact the environment." (OT, FB: 12.15.11)	"What Obama wanted to do was to kill the health plans that they [workers at Chevrolet] had sacrificed for and fought for 50 years, giving up plenty of other things in the struggle" (OT, FB: 05.14.12).	"[We are] looking to build popular resistance to all forms of debt imposed on us by the banks. Debt keeps us isolated, ashamed, and afraid [...] We want an economy where our debts are to our friends, families, and communities — and not to the 1%" (OT, FB: 12.16.12)	"Corporations and the 1% have been using their money to change the rules so they don't have to pay for these things...Join us" (OWS, FB: 04.06.12)	"Wanna 'see how the 1% lives'? Then join us on a walking tour of some of the bank and corporate executives that don't pay taxes, cut jobs, engaged in mortgage fraud, tanked our economy.....all while giving themselves record setting bonuses! [...]march from house to house, demanding accountability for Wall Street crimes, and an extension of the Millionaire's tax" (OWS, FB: 10.0010.11).

Fig. 14.1 Occupy targets. "This is an Occupation, Not a Permitted Picnic" (OT, FB: 10.13.11)

greed and bad decisions. Occupy called for a resurgence of political activity because our elected representatives no longer "work in the interest of the 99%" (occupytogether.org). As such, the people must "*reclaim OUR space from the oligarchy of corporations that have hijacked democracy and marginalized the voice of the people*" (OT, FB: 04.30.12) (my emphasis; capitals in original). In other words, the 99% must "take back" control of the government from the 1% if we are to have a real democracy again. This viewpoint is a typical rendition of the American Dream in US politics (conservative and liberal alike) that characterize the Dream as something to be "reclaimed" from a group of people who "hijacked" or "stole" the democracy that we used to have.

For Occupy, the 1% exploits the labor and health of the 99% for profits via their control of the state (organized legitimate violence) and other important institutions such as media and education. The following statement is a common example used by Occupy to illustrate this point: "the feds are doing more to protect [the 'financial crooks' who brought down the world's economy in 2008] than to prosecute them" (OWS, FB: 07.11.12). Financial institutions, considered "too big to fail," were bailed out of the calamity they themselves created at the expense of the people and are just one more example of how the "political system has been corrupted and taken over by Wall Street. The banks have destroyed *our economy* and *captured our democracy*" (OWS, FB: 10.10.11) (my emphasis). These banks and financial institutions must "be broken up" (occupytogether.org) and control given to the people.

The 1% is a crafty group whose ability to manipulate systems of government and economy is uncanny.

If there is one thing I know, it is that the 1 percent loves a crisis. When people are panicked and desperate and no one seems to know what to do, that is the ideal time to push through their wish list of pro-corporate policies: privatizing education and social security, slashing public services, getting rid of the last constraints on corporate power. Amidst the economic crisis, this is happening the world over. (OT, FB: 10.06.11)

The 1% are entirely responsible for the Great Recession and must be held accountable for their illegal and unethical practices, such as “predatory lending” (OT, FB: 12.16.12), that stole the futures and dreams of millions of Americans and others all over the world.

Occupy often made the case that “Main Street [and] Washington DC [are] Occupied by Wall Street” (OT, FB: 06.28.12), and this has created “a government for protecting business only” (OT, FB: 07.18.12). This relationship has undermined everything that America has promised to itself and the world: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Thus, Occupy represented a struggle for the people who “want to decide what [their] countries should be, instead of dictators, markets, or governments that do not listen to the people” (OWS, FB: 10.08.11). Accordingly, they must put an end to the corporate-political relationships built on money that has caused “rampant corruption and criminal activities that undermine our economic and political system” (occupytogether.org). A good place to start to achieve these goals includes reversing Citizens United, the Supreme Court decision that “declared money as speech and corporations as people” (occupytogether.org).

Corporations [which are owned and controlled by the 1%] have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help facilitate and structure the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their ‘personhood’ often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of *‘We the People’* by whom and for whom our Constitution was established. (OWS, FB: 01.04.12) (my emphasis)

Occupy often conceptualized the state as abusing its power and an inhibitor to human freedom. One example is how Occupy consistently took a stand against the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This legislation “allows for the arrest and indefinite detention of U.S. citizens by the military, on U.S. soil and without the right of trial” (OT, FB: 12.15.11). This action of the Obama Administration is egregious and threatens the civil liberties of every citizen, going far “beyond [what George W.] Bush” ever did (OT, FB: 05.14.12). For Occupy, the NDAA is the most vulgar attack on the Bill of Rights that will benefit only the 1%.

The Bill of rights was ratified 220 years ago, on December 15, 1791. It is shameful that today, in the United States, we are forced to come together in defense of the Bill of Rights and our civil liberties, as the representatives of the 1% who rule this country continue to take our rights away. (OT, FB: 12.15.11)

Occupy was adamant about reclaiming the rights of “we, the people,” urging us to “take the power back” from the 1%. The 99%, as a collective, must put an end to “the corporate greed, corruption, and interference that has affected all of us” (OT, FB: 10.09.11). Corporate “profits are at an all-time high [and] wages at an all-time low” (OT, FB: 07.11.12), which is why so few of the 99% are upwardly mobile and so many are broke or homeless (see Fig. 14.2). Occupy claimed “We come to you at a time when corporations, which place profit over people, self-interest over justice, and oppression over equality, run our governments” (occupywallst.org). We can no longer tolerate such situations and our resistance must be felt. A new social order is necessary.

For Occupy, neoliberal capitalism puts the 1%’s profits above people. Their system produces “crimes against humanity” (OWS, FB: 10.18.11) everyday, all over the world. To highlight this point, Occupy would often share images and reports framing police as agents of the state and guardians of capital by highlighting police brutality, mass arrests, and other attempts to stop nonviolent protest and squash people’s civil liberties. While Occupy is “protecting the people from the powerful” (OT, FB: 09.11.12), the police are protecting the rich and powerful from the people while forgetting they too are members of the 99% (see Fig. 14.3). The 1% uses the “military and police force to prevent



Full text:

- Why shouldn't workers—who bring the 1% their wealth—be able to make a wage that allows them to afford housing, food, utilities, transport, and health care?
- Minimum wage earner: \$7.25 per/hr; 1 gallon of milk \$3.70, has to work ½ hour for 1 gallon of milk.
- Median wage earner: \$16.57 per/hr; has to work 13 min for 1 gallon of milk.
- CEO guy: \$20,160 per/hr; has to work 0.01 seconds for 1 gallon of milk.

Fig. 14.2 OT, FB: 07.11.12


<p>Occupy Together shared Occupy Wall St.'s photo. June 21, 2012</p> <p>Hoping to keep it under control even after the police lose their pensions....</p>  <p>"I'm just hoping we can keep this</p> <p>Like · Comment · Share 2,220 77 3,539</p> <p>Likes: 2,220; Comments: 77; Shares: 3,539.</p>	<p>Full text:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• I'm just hoping we can keep this whole thing under control after the police find out we're stealing their pensions!• Shut down Wall Street; Tax the rich; Rip offs; Mad as hell; Where's my bailout?; End Wall St. greed; Capitalism is organized crime; people over profit; Wall Street wrecked our economy; Fat cats; Jail the bankers.
---	--

Fig. 14.3 OT, FB: 06.21.12

freedom of the press” (occupywallst.org). Occupy countered these actions by, for example, posting a “livestream” video (live video feed recorded and viewed online in real time) of police arresting people and clearing out an occupation in Oakland, California. Occupy shared the phone numbers of the Mayor and Chief of Police in Oakland, stating that the “Police acting on the wishes of the mayor and the 1% she represents attack citizens in Oakland” (OWS, FB: 10.25.11). For Occupy, “The world wide resistance to austerity is well under way. The police are merely the defenders of the king/government/empire/banks. We will not be intimidated. Wall Street, see you in a couple hours and as long as it takes” (OWS, FB: 07.11.12).

Along with organized physical violence, the 1% perpetuates and reproduces violence through its control of mainstream media to manipulate the thoughts and opinions of the 99%. To quote Malcolm X, “if you’re not careful, the newspapers will have you hating the people who are being oppressed, and loving the people who are doing the oppressing” (OWS, FB: 03.28.12). The control of information is more powerful and usually more effective than physical force, and, as such, a free press is a necessity for any free society (see Fig. 14.4). The 1% “purposefully keep people misinformed and fearful through their control of the media” (occupywallst.org). In a democracy, we must hold the media, like other corporations, governments, or police, accountable for their actions. Perpetuating false narratives (e.g., the media’s compliance with the government’s narrative in the buildup for the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq) and blind adherence to advertising cash flows stifles democracy and freedom of


 <p>Occupify Wall St. shared Occupy Brazil's photo. June 21, 2012 · 4h</p> <p>Question everything, starting by your own thoughts. Questione tudo, a começar pelos seus próprios pensamentos.</p> <p>It's Media</p> <p>Like · Comment · Share 30,752 316 6,703</p>	<p>Full Text:</p> <p>Question everything, starting by your own thoughts. Questione tudo, a começar pelos seus próprios pensamentos.</p> <p>It's media!</p>
---	--

Fig. 14.4 OWS_06.21.12

thought. We need critical dialogue about the world's biggest problems, such as the crisis of home foreclosures or rising homelessness, the catastrophe of climate change, or the travesty of the War on Terror. Global capitalism produces such phenomena, and, to keep profits flowing, it is in the interest of the 1% not to talk much of these issues. Thus, we need not only to seek out quality information untarnished from corporate greed but to challenge the official narrative via civic engagement and community work.

For Occupy, the 1% is out to destroy the very foundation of the American Dream for everyone except themselves. The movement called on the 99% to take a stand and "direct aim at corporate power" (OT, FB: 10.06.11) so that we may reclaim the American Dream. The 1% has the ability to steal jobs, homes, and "freedoms," but they cannot "steal our ability to *dream*" (OWS, FB: 07.16.12) (my emphasis). We must re-build the American Dream through occupation and the creation of alternative "democratic spaces" (OWS, FB: 04.16.12). Occupy was well aware that the 99% must work hard together to achieve this goal, at times referencing the Protestant American work ethic. Some of this work, accordingly, includes putting an end to corporatism, repealing the Bush era tax cuts, stopping the XL Keystone Pipeline, making a physical presence in public space, and challenging the official story of how capitalism works. "Remember: Occupying is a militant nonviolent tactic meant to assert control over physical space by *reclaiming* it for a new purpose while disrupting the ability of your adversary to use that space, thus forcing recognition of your cause" (OT, FB: 07.14.12) (my emphasis). It is up to the people to recover the

Dream for the sake of this country and future generations, and this reclamation will not come about by casting a vote—we must dream and act outside the system

Remember remember the sixth of November. Your votes fan the embers of fascist offenders, both lying pretenders, are bailout defenders, death-by-drone senders, and liberty enders. (OT, FB: 11.06.12)

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MOVEMENT: OCCUPY WALL STREET AND ITS INSENSITIVITY TO COLOR-BLIND RACISM

At the same time the United States was transitioning from a Keynesian to a neoliberal political economy, American society was also changing mainstream discussions and institutional practices regarding race and racism from the overt racism of the Jim Crow era to the covert racism that claims “colorblindness.”⁵⁵ Colorblind racism and neoliberalism complement each other as both ideologies separate one from the other as if capitalism and slavery were unrelated.⁵⁶ But race and class are intimately connected in terms of history, ideology, lived experience, distributions of resources, exertions of power, and much more. Race and class (like gender and religion) are institutions and they are categories that interact to produce particular outcomes under certain conditions.⁵⁷ These interactions, from micro to macro, inform, reproduce, perpetuate, contradict, and change each other, creating a sort of web or mesh (what Patricia Hill Collins calls the “matrix of domination”⁵⁸) through which we experience and understand social life. A major source of strength for these social institutions and categories is the hegemonic idea that they are all separate from one another. For Occupy, the operation of race in the social movement ideology was covert because the movement claimed to represent “the 99%,” and thus was most salient in the absence of discussions about the importance of race for creating a new, more equitable social order. In some cases, factions like “Occupy the Hood” or “Decolonize Oakland” developed to address specific community needs of people of color, such as police brutality (not just during a protest), the disproportionate effects of the housing crisis on people of color, or the massive and enduring wealth, income, unemployment, or education gaps between racial groups. By why did these factions have to develop if the 99% was all-inclusive?

Take, for instance, the original draft of the “Declaration of Principles of Occupy Wall Street,” created in Zuccotti Park that affirmed the 99% “As one people, formerly divided by the color of our skin, gender, sexual orientation, religion.”⁵⁹ The general assembly quickly changed the language to better recognize and respect difference while at the same time highlighting the overarching problem of global capitalism and corporate greed and the imperative of building a new society, but only after harsh criticism from communities of color.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the very word “occupy” is problematic without proper contextualization considering the history of North American indigenous peoples. As activist John Paul Montano wrote in an open letter to Occupy protestors on September 24, 2011:

I hope you would make mention of the fact that the very land upon which you are protesting does not belong to you—that you are guests upon that stolen indigenous land. I had hoped mention would be made of the indigenous nation whose land that is. I had hoped that you would address the centuries long history that we indigenous peoples of this continent have endured being subject to the countless ‘-isms’ of do-gooders claiming to be building a ‘more just society’, a ‘better world’, a ‘land of freedom’ on top of our indigenous societies, on our indigenous lands, while destroying and/or ignoring our ways of life. I had hoped that you would acknowledge that, since you are settlers on indigenous land, you need and want our indigenous consent to your building anything on our land—never mind an entire society. See where I’m going with this? I hope you’re still smiling. We’re still friends, so don’t sweat it. I believe your hearts are in the right place. I know that this whole genocide and colonization thing causes all of us lots of confusion sometimes. It just seems to me that you’re unknowingly doing the same thing to us that all the colonizers before you have done: you want to do stuff on our land without asking our permission.⁶¹

While some would claim such a critique does not undermine the goals of Occupy because the idea of the 99% is inclusive,⁶² I believe this was a major reason for why Occupy did not achieve goals beyond opening up important dialogue on the causes and consequences of economic inequality. One idea that scholars have put forward for Occupy’s mistake of historical amnesia that made a narrative of justice and freedom comfortable for those in the movement with the most privilege is that it was a function of demographics: the majority of those present at physical occupations were young and well-educated white men.⁶³ So while Occupy was not a single-issue social movement and thus addressed a wide range of grievances in ways not experienced before in the United States, it nevertheless took for granted some of the more important issues facing members of the 99% who, for whatever reason, could not or would not attend occupations in person or online. In other words, as Occupy would say, “The system is not broken. It’s fixed.” Occupy laid a solid foundation for future progressive work that will continue to challenge the fixed system of neoliberal capitalism, but we need to reconsider how we will tell the story next time.

Occupy created a narrative that claimed inherent “rights” of the 99% that have recently come under attack by the 1%. The use of rights as a major framework is historically consistent with most U.S. populist and liberal social movements.⁶⁴ These rights make America seem exceptional, and when treated as something stolen (as opposed to something that is a noble goal but not yet achieved) a discourse of rights, at best ignores, and at worst idealizes or romanticizes a history where colonization, war, slavery, exploitation, genocide, and patriarchy are among the central forces. These are not aberrations of capitalism but inherent features necessary for the continued accumulation of wealth for the owning class. Thus, idealizing rights that never existed for the 99% creates confusion and division. This frame was most likely an understandable way to motivate the greatest number of supporters and activists because the status quo

enjoys a psychological advantage and most of us learned idealized versions of U.S. and world history in our primary and secondary education.⁶⁵ A person uses “cognitive reference points” that are reflective of the status quo and are unconsciously used as the starting point for comparing any alternative.⁶⁶ Subsequently, even if a person is thinking critically about a problem we can still succumb to working within the boundaries that the system has in place because, “existing states seem to be assigned worth, value, and goodness by virtue of their existence. Research also demonstrates the devaluation of non-existing states; options are dismissed, disregarded, and/or devalued when they represent alternatives to the status quo.”⁶⁷ In other words, it is no surprise that Occupy perpetuated an incomplete history that is conducive to popular (mis) conceptions and is ideologically satisfying to many people. Its message of inclusivity was still exclusionary. It is the view of this author that in order to form inclusive coalitions capable of overthrowing capital, the socially constructed divisions between us that “the 1%” use to their advantage must be reconciled first. To do so includes an honest articulation of many peoples’ histories, how they fit together, and how they will contribute to making the world a better place. Occupy might not have succeeded on that front, but they certainly demonstrated there is great potential for such ideals to spread rapidly and inspire on-the-ground action.

When viewed in this light, the calls of Occupy to “take *our* democracy back” from the greedy 1% who have “hijacked our government and economy” were, in fact, more in line with the false history propagated by the dominant ideology of neoliberalism than those in opposition to it. Occupy commonly romanticized the American Dream as something to be “reclaimed,” ignoring the fact that the American Dream has historically been reserved for a select few. On the one hand, Occupy proposed building “democratic alternatives” to the current economic, political, and social system, yet on the other hand, it did not put forth a coherent or feasible plan for such action that would consider the complexities of race and gender within neoliberal capitalism. Put differently, Occupy’s articulations of social problems and proposed solutions were consistent with ideologies that justified, in a contradictory way, both the equal and unequal distribution of resources. Thus, Occupy adhered (to a certain extent) to the rhetoric and logic of colorblind racism in the sense that it denied its own whiteness (both in terms of its major ideas and the majority of its membership) and thus the real differences of lived experiences that exist between whites and non-whites in the global capitalist system.

Occupy often ignored the importance of race in social, political, or economic life, effectively dismissing or alienating the concerns of potential allies of color.⁶⁸ This, in part, helps explain the emergence of splinter groups, such as Occupy the Hood and Decolonize Oakland. While many would leave the problem with demographics, I think this is an example of the power of neoliberalism in influencing thought to separate everything from one another (the economy is separate from the environment, race and gender are separate from class, etc.), as a twenty-first century version of divide and conquer.

CONCLUSION

Occupy Wall Street generated the greatest wave of left-wing protest this country had seen in over 40 years. They broke the taboo of discussing capitalism, its exploitation of workers and the environment, and the material and symbolic inequality it creates. Using Web 2.0 as a tool for organization and mobilization was truly effective as the movement boasted occupations in over 1500 cities and towns across the world (750 in the United States) by the end of 2012. People occupied physical space and pressured public officials and private corporations into making some concessions. For example, Occupy helped put an end to excessive bank overdraft fees and encouraged people to transfer their money out of big banks and into local credit unions. President Obama's focus on taxing the very rich or reducing the burden of student debts had "an Occupied Movement ring" to them.⁶⁹ It is also possible that the Occupy movement helped set the stage for Bernie Sanders, a self-proclaimed democratic socialist, to make it as far as he did in the 2016 Democratic Presidential Primary race.

Above all, the Occupy movement showed that there is great potential for radical coalition building across a variety of groups throughout the nation and the world. The common charge against Occupy was the message was unclear, but that is not necessarily true. They did connect a myriad of seemingly disconnected problems (e.g., student debt, police brutality, and climate change) in ways that not only galvanized enough people to take to the streets and risk arrest or worse, but that it fundamentally challenged the legitimacy of neoliberalism as hegemonic ideology and state policy. Simply put, the message was we can and should do better and it is up to the people to do it themselves. But how? This is the question that Occupy could not answer and thus deserves our inquiry if we are concerned with continuing the positive work of Occupy and other radical and progressive movements before and after. From my view, we must reconsider the origin myths and folklore of Western domination that colors mainstream historical understandings of who we are as a nation and as people. The point that Occupy missed is that the 99% have never enjoyed a democracy in the United States—our system of government is one that places the interests and needs of the capitalist class above all else since the beginning. To claim our origins are democratic whitewashes the importance of our history of colonization, genocide, slavery, patriarchy, war, and other crimes that inform the particular and peculiar ways in which our society today distributes resources (material and immaterial) and exercises power. Like much else, many of the ideas of Occupy were stuck in the traps of inevitable Western progress. Nothing is inevitable. To plan for and build a just and equitable future requires a deep and honest understanding of our different and shared histories.

Occupy dared to "dream dangerously,"⁷⁰ imagining a better world not governed by corporate greed, but whose dreams were represented in the narrative constructed by the movement. Although Occupy dramatically advanced the mainstream discussion on wealth and income inequality and demonstrated the

potential and limits of various digital and physical methods of social activism, I cannot help but think of the emerging theoretical tradition of intersectionality.⁷¹ Intersectionality demands that we do not reduce one kind of oppression to another (e.g., it is *all* about class or race or gender) and embrace the complexities of social life. In other words, it is about centering the people, not their oppressors. Maybe if Occupy had ideologically centered the hood, the reservation, the poor and working class, and not Wall Street, a more holistic understanding of the past and vision for the future could have materialized. Or maybe not, but it seems clear that the differences between the 99% became too great to sustain the movement beyond a couple of years. Of course, the work of Occupy is unfinished and many of those who participated in the movement understand this and continue to work on a number of causes, such as participating in the Black Lives Matter movement or the Fight for \$15 minimum wage campaign.⁷² I have no answers on how to resolve issues of inclusion and representation that build revolutionary coalitions, but I think understanding how it cannot work is important. What Occupy has done (up to now) is case in point. What Occupy showed us is that not only will we have to build a better society ourselves, but we will have to rebuild the relationships we have with one another if we are to unite in revolutionary struggle that can start building real democracy for the 99%.

NOTES

1. Miguel Centeno and Joseph Cohen, "The Arc of Neoliberalism," *Annual Review of Sociology* 38 (2012), pp. 318–319. Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas and Sarah Babb, "Neoliberalism in Four Countries" *American Journal of Sociology* 108 (2002), pp. 533–579.
2. Nafeez Ahmed, *A User's Guide to the Crisis of Civilization: And How to Save It* (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2010). Centeno and Cohen, "The Arc of Neoliberalism," *ARS* 38 (2012). Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, "Neoliberalism in Four Countries," *AJS* 108 (2002). David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005). Karen Ho, *Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009). Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: Volume 4, Globalizations, 1945–2011* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
3. Centeno and Cohen, "The Arc of Neoliberalism," *ARS* 38 (2012), p. 323.
4. Centeno and Cohen, "The Arc of Neoliberalism," *ARS* 38 (2012). Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, "Neoliberalism in Four Countries," *AJS* 108 (2002). Ho, *Liquidated*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).
5. Ahmed, *Crisis of Civilization*, (London: Pluto Press, 2010). Harvey, *History of Neoliberalism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Ho, *Liquidated*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
6. Nilda Flores-González, Anna Guevarra, Maura Toro-Morn, and Grace Chang (Editors), *Immigrant Women Workers in the Neoliberal Age*, (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2013). Also see Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, *Racism with-*

- out Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2014). Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States, 3rd Edition*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014). William Robinson and Xuan Santos, "Global Capitalism, Immigrant Labor, and the Struggle for Justice." *Class, Race and Corporate Power* 2, no. 3 (2014), pp. 1–16.
7. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, "More Than Prejudice: Restatement, Reflections, and New Directions in Critical Race Theory." *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity* 1, no. 1 (2015), pp. 73–87. James Fenelon, "Genocide, Race, Capitalism: Synopsis of Formation within the Modern World-System," *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 22, no. 1 (2016), pp. 23–30. William Robinson, "Globalization and Race in World Capitalism," *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 22, no. 1 (2016), pp. 3–8.
 8. Ahmed, *Crisis of Civilization*, (London: Pluto Press, 2010). Harvey, *History of Neoliberalism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Ho, *Liquidated*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, "The Global Capitalist Crisis: Whose Crisis, Who Profits?" *International Review of Modern Sociology (Special Edition on the Global Capitalist Crisis)* 38, no. 2 (2012), pp. 199–220.
 9. Fenelon, "Genocide, Race, Capitalism." *JWSR*, 22, no. 1 (2016), pp. 23–30. Robinson, "Globalization and Race." *JWSR*, 22, no. 1 (2016), pp. 3–8.
 10. For example: Josh Bivens, *Failure by Design: The Story Behind America's Broken Economy*, (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, an imprint of Cornell University Press, 2011). John Campbell, "Neoliberalism in Crisis: Regulatory Roots of the U.S. Financial Meltdown." *Research in the Sociology of Organizations*, 30, no. B (2010), pp. 65–101. David Fasenfest, "Global Economy, Local Calamity," *Critical Sociology* 36, no. 2 (2010), pp. 195–200. Harvey, *History of Neoliberalism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Ho, *Liquidated*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). Martijn Konings, "Neoliberalism and the American State," *Critical Sociology* 36, no. 5 (2010), pp. 741–765. Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Petras and Veltmeyer, "The Global Capitalist Crisis," *IRMS* 38, no. 2 (2012), pp. 199–220. Howard Sherman, *The Roller Coaster Economy: Financial Crisis, Great Recession, and the Public Opinion*, (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, Inc, 2010).
 11. Berch Berberoglu (Editor), *The Global Capitalist Crisis and Its Aftermath*, (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2014).
 12. Robert Ash, *Social Movements in America*, (Chicago, IL: Markham Publishing Company 1972). Leslie King, "Ideology, Strategy and Conflict in a Social Movement Organization: The Sierra Club Immigration Wars," *Mobilization: The International Quarterly* 13, no. 1 (2008), pp. 45–61.
 13. Christopher Chase-Dunn, "Social Movements and Collective Behavior in Premodern Polities," *IROWS Working Paper #110* (2016). (<http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows110/irows110.htm>).
 14. Slavoj Žižek, *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously*, (London, UK: Verso Books, 2012).
 15. Ion Vasi, "The New Anti-war Protests and Miscible Mobilizations," *Social Movement Studies* 5, no. 2 (2006), pp. 137–153.
 16. Raymond Arsenault, *Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006). Vine Deloria, Jr., *Custer Died for*

- Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto*, (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1969).
17. Melissa Ferguson, Travis Carter, and Ran Hassin, "On the Automaticity of Nationalist Ideology: The Case of the USA," pp. 53–82 in *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, edited by John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009).
 - Aaron McCright and Riley Dunlap, "The Nature and Social Bases of Progressive Social Movement Ideology: Examining Public Opinion toward Social Movements," *The Sociological Quarterly* 49 (2008), pp. 825–848.
 - Vasi, "New Anti-war Protests," *SMS* 5, no. 2 (2006), pp. 137–153.
 18. King, "Ideology," *MIQ* 13, no. 1 (2008), p. 46.
 19. Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
 20. Christopher Chase-Dunn, Matheu Kaneshiro, James Love, Kirk Lawrence, and Edwin Elias, "Neoliberalism, Populist Movements and the Pink Tide in Latin America," *IROWS Working Paper #58* (2010). (<http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows58/irows58.htm>).
 - Chase-Dunn, "Social Movements," *IROWS* #110 (2016).
 21. Žižek, *The Year*, (London: Verso Books, 2012).
 22. King, "Ideology," *MIQ* 13, no. 1 (2008), pp. 45–61.
 23. Chris Hilson, "Framing the Local and the Global in the Anti-nuclear Movement: Law and the Politics of Place," *Journal of Law and Society* 36, no. 1 (2009), pp. 94–109.
 - King, "Ideology," *MIQ* 13, no. 1 (2008), pp. 45–61.
 - McCright and Dunlap, "Nature and Social Bases," *TSQ* 49 (2008), pp. 825–848.
 - Nicola Pizzolato, "Transnational Radicals: Labour Dissent and Political Activism in Detroit and Turin (1950–1970)," *International Review of Social History* 56, no. 1 (2011), pp. 1–30.
 - Edward Walker, Andrew Martin, and John McCarthy, "Confronting the State, the Corporation, and the Academy: The Influence of Institutional Targets on Social Movement Repertoires," *American Journal of Sociology*, 114, no. 1 (2008), pp. 35–76.
 24. King, "Ideology," *MIQ* 13, no. 1 (2008), p. 57; also see Taylan Acar, Robert Chiles, Garrett Grainger, Aliza Luft, Rahul Mahajan, João Peschanski, Chelsea Schelly, Jason Turowetz, and Ian F. Wall, "Inside the Wisconsin Occupation," *Contexts* 10, no. 3 (2011), pp. 50–55.
 - McCright and Dunlap, "Nature and Social Bases," *TSQ* 49(2008): 825–848.
 - Theresa Petray, "Protest 2.0: Online Interactions and Aboriginal Activists," *Media, Culture & Society*, 36, no. 6 (2011), pp. 923–940.
 - Peter Rosset, Maria Elena Martinez-Torres, and Luis Hernandez-Navarro, "Zapatismo in the Movement of Movements," *Development* 48, no. 2 (2005), pp. 35–41.
 25. Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," *Annual Review of Sociology* 23 (1997), pp. 263–287.
 26. Petray, "Protest 2.0," *MC&S* 36, no. 6 (2011), p. 924.
 27. Petray, "Protest 2.0," *MC&S* 36, no. 6 (2011), pp. 923–940.
 28. Merlyna Lim, "Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004–2011," *Journal of Communication* 62 (2012), pp. 231–248.
 - Petray, "Protest 2.0," *MC&S* 36, no. 6 (2011), pp. 923–940.
 29. Summer Harlow, "Social Media and Social Movements: Facebook and an Online Guatemalan Justice Movement that Moved Offline," *New Media & Society*, 14, no. 2 (2011), pp. 225–243.
 - Rosset et al., "Zapatismo," *Development*, 48, no. 2 (2005), pp. 35–41.

30. Petray, "Protest 2.0." *MC&S* 36, no. 6 (2011), pp. 923–940.
31. Acar et al., "Wisconsin Occupation," *Contexts* 10, no. 3 (2011), pp. 50–55. Fay Payton and Lynette Kvasny, "Considering the Political Roles of Black Talk Radio and the Afrosphere in Response to the Jena 6: Social Media and the Blogosphere," *Information, Technology & People*, 25, no. 1 (2012), pp. 81–102.
32. Harlow, "Social Media." *NM&S* 14, no. 2 (2011), pp. 225–243. Payton and Kvasny, "Black Talk Radio," *IT&P* 25, no. 1 (2012), pp. 81–102. Petray, "Protest 2.0." *MC&S* 36, no. 6 (2011), pp. 923–940. Rosset et al., "Zapatismo," *Development*, 48, no. 2 (2005), pp. 35–41.
33. Acar et al., "Wisconsin Occupation," *Contexts* 10, no. 3 (2011), pp. 50–55. Harlow, "Social Media." *NM&S* 14, no. 2 (2011), pp. 225–243. Lim, "Clicks," *JC* 62 (2012), pp. 231–248. Payton and Kvasny, "Black Talk Radio," *IT&P* 25, no. 1 (2012), pp. 81–102. Petray, "Protest 2.0." *MC&S* 36, no. 6 (2011), pp. 923–940. Rosset et al., "Zapatismo," *Development*, 48, no. 2 (2005), pp. 35–41.
34. Rosset et al., "Zapatismo," *Development*, 48, no. 2 (2005), p. 37.
35. Rosset et al., "Zapatismo," *Development*, 48, no. 2 (2005), pp. 35–41.
36. Harlow, "Social Media." *NM&S* 14, no. 2 (2011), p. 226.
37. Harlow, "Social Media." *NM&S* 14, no. 2 (2011), p. 227.
38. Harlow, "Social Media." *NM&S* 14, no. 2 (2011), pp. 225–243. Petray, "Protest 2.0." *MC&S* 36, no. 6 (2011), pp. 923–940. Rosset et al., "Zapatismo," *Development*, 48, no. 2 (2005), pp. 35–41.
39. Jack Bratich, "User-Generated Discontent," *Cultural Studies* 25, no. 4–5 (2011), pp. 621–640. Petray, "Protest 2.0." *MC&S* 36, no. 6 (2011), pp. 923–940.
40. Bratich, "User-Generated Discontent," *CS* 25, no. 4–5 (2011), pp. 621–640. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2011. "National Operations Center Media Monitoring Capability Desktop Reference Binder." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
41. Petray, "Protest 2.0." *MC&S* 36, no. 6 (2011), pp. 923–940.
42. Arsenault, *Freedom Riders*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Petray, "Protest 2.0." *MC&S* 36, no. 6 (2011), pp. 923–940.
43. Ion Vasi and Chan Suh, "Online Activities, Spatial Proximity, and the Diffusion of the Occupy Wall Street Movement in the United States," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 21, no. 2 (2016), pp. 139–154.
44. Thomas Swann and Emil Husted demonstrate that after police evicted Occupiers from their physical encampments the movement leadership became more "vertical" online because there were no longer daily "general assemblies" where folks attempted to reach consensus on issues using the "people's mic." Thus, the message online became more centralized and less people commented on the FB postings, creating a division of labor between FB group page administrators creating content and group members sharing content as opposed to the original forum of direct democracy which propelled Occupy's early successes. Paolo Gerbaudo and Ion Vasi and Chan Suh corroborate Swann and Husted's findings of the importance of in-person action and dialogue for maintaining the democratic construction of social movement ideology, recruitment, organization, and mobilization for Occupy (notwithstanding all the problems that come with mostly young and white, highly educated men thinking of how to represent the 99% cited by these scholars and others [e.g., Milkman]). Thomas Swann and

- Emil Husted, "Undermining Anarchy: Facebook's Influence on Anarchist Principles of Organization in Occupy Wall Street," *The Information Society* 33, no. 4 (2017), p. 198. Paolo Gerbaudo, "Social Media Teams as Digital Vanguards: The Question of Leadership in the Management of Key Facebook and Twitter Accounts of Occupy Wall Street, Indignados and UK Uncut," *Information, Communication & Society* 20, no. 2 (2017), pp. 185–202. Ion Vasi and Chan Suh, "Online Activities, Spatial Proximity, and the Diffusion of the Occupy Wall Street Movement in the United States," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 21, no. 2 (2016), pp. 139–154.
45. Posts found on FB group pages are controlled by administrators, meaning that only certain people can post to the groups wall. It is assumed, then, that those posting content on FB are accountable in some way (most likely by having administration access revoked) to their respected movements. FB users who have "liked" the page can like, share, or post comments on wall postings from admins, but they cannot post content onto the wall itself.
 46. Find random number chart at http://limpetsmonitoring.org/docs/ds/random_numbers.pdf.
 47. Charles Stewart, Craig Smith, & Robert Denton, *Persuasion and Social Movements*, (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc. 2007), p. 70.
 48. Noam Chomsky, *Occupy (Occupied Media Pamphlet Series)*, (New York, NY: Zuccotti Park Press, 2012).
 49. Chomsky, *Occupy*, (New York: Zuccotti Park Press, 2012).
 50. Mark Tremayne, "Anatomy of Protest in the Digital Era: A Network Analysis of Twitter and Occupy Wall Street," *Social Movement Studies* 13, no. 1 (2014), pp. 110–126.
 51. Sheetal Agarwal, Michael Barthel, Caterina Rost, Alan Borning, W. Lance Bennett and Courtney Johnson, "Grassroots Organizing in the Digital Age: Considering Values and Technology in Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street," *Information, Communication & Society* 17, no. 3 (2014), pp. 326–341. Ruth Milkman, "A New Political Generation: Millennials and the Post-2008 Wave of Protest," *American Sociological Review* 82, no. 1 (2017), pp. 1–31.
 52. John Stewart, "The 99%," *The Daily Show With John Stewart*, October 18, 2011 (New York, NY: Comedy Central, 2011).
 53. Swann and Husted, "Undermining Anarchy." *TIS* 33, no. 4 (2017), pp. 192–204.
 54. George Amedee, "Movements Left and Right: Tea Party and Occupied Wall Street in the Obama Era," *Race, Gender & Class*, 20, no. 3/4 (2013), pp. 33–39.
 55. Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). Bonilla-Silva, "More Than Prejudice," *SRE* 1, no. 1 (2015), pp. 73–87. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation*. (New York: Routledge, 2015).
 56. Cedric Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
 57. Bonilla-Silva, "More Than Prejudice," *SRE* 1, no. 1 (2015), pp. 73–87. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation*. (New York: Routledge, 2015).
 58. Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and Empowerment* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), p. 226.
 59. Milkman, "A New Political Generation," *ASR* 82, no. 1 (2017), p. 17.
 60. Milkman, "A New Political Generation," *ASR* 82, no. 1 (2017), p. 17.

61. For the full open letter visit: <http://www.zashnain.com/2011/09/open-letter-to-occupy-wall-street.html>.
62. Brian Creech, "Digital Representation and Occupy Wall Street's Challenge to Political Subjectivity," *Convergence: The International Journal of Research* 20, no. 4 (2014), p. 472.
63. Amedee, "Movements Left and Right," *RG&C* 20, no. 3/4 (2013), pp. 33–39.
64. Milkman, "A New Political Generation," *ASR* 82, no. 1 (2017), pp. 1–31.
64. Ash, *Social Movements* (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1972). Arsenault, *Freedom Riders* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Daniel Bell, *The Radical Right*, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964). Lauren Edelman, Gwendolyn Leachman, and Doug McAdam, "On Law, Organizations, and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 6 (2010), pp. 653–685. McCright and Dunlap, "Nature and Social Bases," *TSQ* 49 (2008), pp. 825–848.
65. Ann Nevin, *Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong* (New York, NY: The New Press, 2008).
66. Scott Eidelman and Christian Crandall, "A Psychological Advantage for the Status Quo," pp. 85–106 in *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, edited by John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009).
67. Eidelman and Crandall, "Psychological Advantage" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 92.
68. Angie Beeman, "Post-Civil Rights Racism and OWS: Dealing with Color-Blind Ideology," *Socialism and Democracy* 26, no. 2 (2012), pp. 51–54.
69. Amedee, "Movements Left and Right," *RG&C* 20, no. 3/4 (2013), p. 39.
70. Žižek, *The Year*, (London: Verso Books, 2012).
71. Collins, *Black Feminist Thought* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008). Crenshaw, Kimberlé, "A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics" pp. 356–380 in *The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique*, edited by David Kairys (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998).
72. Amber Jamieson, "Occupy Wall Street reunites five years later: 'It never ended for most of us.'" *The Guardian*, September 18, 2016.

REFERENCES

- Acar, Taylan, Robert Chiles, Garrett Grainger, Aliza Luft, Rahul Mahajan, João Peschanski, Chelsea Schelly, Jason Turowetz, and Ian F. Wall. 2011. Inside the Wisconsin Occupation. *Contexts* 10 (3): 50–55.
- Ahmed, Nafeez. 2010. *A User's Guide to the Crisis of Civilization: And How to Save It*. London: Pluto Press.
- Aikau, Hokulani, Maile Arvin, Mishuana Goeman, and Scott Morgensen. 2015. Indigenous Feminisms Roundtable. *Frontiers* 36 (3): 84–106.
- Amedee, George L. 2013. Movements Left and Right: Tea Party and Occupied Wall Street in the Obama Era. *Race, Gender & Class* 20 (3/4): 33–39.
- Arsenault, Raymond. 2006. *Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Ash, Robert. 1972. *Social Movements in America*. Chicago, IL: Markham Publishing Company.

- Barrera, Mario. 1979. *Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Beeman, Angie. 2012. Post-Civil Rights Racism and OWS: Dealing with Color-Blind Ideology. *Socialism and Democracy* 26 (2): 51–54.
- Bell, Daniel. 1964. *The Radical Right*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
- Berberoglu, Berch. 2009. *Class and Class Conflict in the Age of Globalization*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- . ed. 2014. *The Global Capitalist Crisis and Its Aftermath*. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing.
- Bivens, Josh. 2011. *Failure by Design: The Story Behind America's Broken Economy*. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, an imprint of Cornell University Press.
- Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2014. *Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- . 2015. More than Prejudice: Restatement, Reflections, and New Directions in Critical Race Theory. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity* 1 (1): 73–87.
- Boyte, Harry. 2012. The Politics of Civic Agency. *Development* 55 (2): 205–207.
- Bratich, Jack. 2011. User-Generated Discontent. *Cultural Studies* 25 (4–5): 621–640.
- Campbell, John L. 2010. Neoliberalism in Crisis: Regulatory Roots of the U.S. Financial Meltdown. *Research in the Sociology of Organizations* 30 (B): 65–101.
- Castañeda, Antonia I. 1993. Sexual Violence in the Politics and Policies of Conquest: Amerindian Woman and the Spanish Conquest of Alta California. In *Building with Our Hands: New Directions in Chicana Studies*, ed. Adela De La Torre and Beatriz M. Pesquera, 15–33. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 2016. *Social Movements and Collective Behavior in Premodern Politics*. IROWS Working Paper #110. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows110/irows110.htm>. Accessed 16 Feb 2017.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Matheu Kaneshiro, James Love, Kirk Lawrence, and Edwin Elias. 2010. *Neoliberalism, Populist Movements and the Pink Tide in Latin America*. IROWS Working Paper #58. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows58/irows58.htm>. Accessed 19 Apr 2017.
- Chomsky, Noam. 2012. *Occupy (Occupied Media Pamphlet Series)*. New York, NY: Zuccotti Park Press.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. 2008. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and Empowerment*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Conteno, Miguel, and Elaine Enriquez. 2016. *War and Society*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1998. A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics. In *The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique*, ed. David Kairys, 356–380. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Deloria, Vine, Jr. 1969. *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto*. New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co.
- DiMaggio, Paul. 1997. Culture and Cognition. *Annual Review of Sociology* 23: 263–287.
- Edelman, Lauren, Gwendolyn Leachman, and Doug McAdam. 2010. On Law, Organizations, and Social Movements. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 6: 653–685.
- Eidelman, Scott, and Christian S. Crandall. 2009. A Psychological Advantage for the Status Quo. In *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, ed.

- John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir, 85–106. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Fasenfest, David. 2010. Global Economy, Local Calamity. *Critical Sociology* 36 (2): 195–200.
- Fenelon, James. 2016a. Critique of Glenn on Settler Colonialism and Bonilla-Silva on Critical Race Analysis from Indigenous Perspectives. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity* 2 (2): 237–242.
- . 2016b. Genocide, Race, Capitalism: Synopsis of Formation Within the Modern World-System. *Journal of World-Systems Research* 22 (1): 23–30.
- Ferguson, Melissa J., Travis J. Carter, and Ran R. Hassin. 2009. On the Automaticity of Nationalist Ideology: The Case of the USA. In *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, ed. John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir, 53–82. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Flores-González, Nilda, Anna Guevarra, Maura Toro-Morn, and Grace Chang. 2013. *Immigrant Women Workers in the Neoliberal Age*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Friedman, Milton. 1962. *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Glenn, Evelyn Nakano. 2015. Settler Colonialism as Structure: A Framework for Comparative Studies of U.S. Race and Gender Formation. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity* 1 (1): 52–72.
- Hall, Thomas, and James Fenelon. 2009. *Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: Resistance and Revitalization*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Harlow, Summer. 2011. Social Media and Social Movements: Facebook and an Online Guatemalan Justice Movement that Moved Offline. *New Media & Society* 14 (2): 225–243.
- Harvey, David. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Hilson, Chris. 2009. Framing the Local and the Global in the Anti-nuclear Movement: Law and the Politics of Place. *Journal of Law and Society* 36 (1): 94–109.
- Ho, Karen. 2009. *Liquidated; An Ethnography of Wall Street*. London: Duke University Press.
- Horne, Gerald. 2015. *Confronting Black Jacobins: The United States, the Haitian Revolution, and the Origins of the Dominican Republic*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
- Juris, Jeffrey. 2012. Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social Media, Public Space, and Emerging Logics of Aggregation. *American Ethnologist* 39 (2): 259–279.
- Kelley, Robin D.G. 2003. *Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- King, Leslie. 2008. Ideology, Strategy and Conflict in a Social Movement Organization: The Sierra Club Immigration Wars. *Mobilization: The International Quarterly* 13 (1): 45–61.
- King, Leslie, and Deborah McCarthy. 2005. In *Environmental Sociology: From Analysis to Action*, ed. Leslie Kaing and Deborah McCarthy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Klare, Michael. 2008. *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy*. New York, NY: Henry Hold and Company, LLC.
- Konings, Martijn. 2010. Neoliberalism and the American State. *Critical Sociology* 36 (5): 741–765.

- Kuper, Leo. 1981. *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Lim, Merlyna. 2012. Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004–2011. *Journal of Communication* 62: 231–248.
- Malešević, Siniša. 2010. *The Sociology of War and Violence*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Mann, Michael. 2012. *The Sources of Social Power: Volume 4, Globalizations, 1945–2011*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Marx, Karl. 2004. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. Lawrence, KS: Digireads.com Publishing.
- Marx, Karl, and Fredrick Engels. 2003. The Communist Manifesto. In *The Communist Manifesto and Other Revolutionary Writings*, ed. Bob Blaisdell, 123–150. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc.
- Mason, Paul. 2012. *Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions*. London, UK: Verso.
- McCright, Aaron, and Riley Dunlap. 2008. The Nature and Social Bases of Progressive Social Movement Ideology: Examining Public Opinion toward Social Movements. *The Sociological Quarterly* 49 (2008): 825–848.
- Mills, Charles W. 1997. *Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Mills, C. Wright. 2000. *The Sociological Imagination*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Nevin, Ann. 2008. *Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong*. New York, NY: The New Press.
- Nilsen, Alf Gunvald. 2009. 'The Authors and the Actors of Their Own Drama': Towards a Marxist Theory of Social Movements. *Capital & Class* 33 (99): 109–139.
- Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. 2014. *Racial Formation in the United States*. 3rd ed. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Parenti, Michael. 2011. *Democracy for the Few*. 9th ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
- Payton, Fay Cobb, and Lynette Kvasny. 2012. Considering the Political Roles of Black Talk Radio and the Afrosphere in Response to the Jena 6: Social Media and the Blogosphere. *Information, Technology & People* 25 (1): 81–102.
- Petras, James, and Henry Veltmeyer. 2012. The Global Capitalist Crisis: Whose Crisis, Who Profits? *International Review of Modern Sociology (Special Issue on the Global Capitalist Crisis)* 38 (2): 199–220.
- Petray, Theresa Lynn. 2011. Protest 2.0: Online Interactions and Aboriginal Activists. *Media, Culture & Society* 36 (6): 923–940.
- Piketty, Thomas. 2014. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Trans. Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press.
- Pizzolato, Nicola. 2011. Transnational Radicals: Labour Dissent and Political Activism in Detroit and Turin (1950–1970). *International Review of Social History* 56 (1): 1–30.
- Robinson, Cedric. 2000. *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Robinson, William. 2016. Globalization and Race in World Capitalism. *Journal of World-Systems Research* 22 (1): 3–8.

- Robinson, Cedric. 2017. W.E.B. Du Bois and Black Sovereignty. *Verso Books*, online blog. <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3378-w-e-b-du-bois-and-black-sovereignty>. Accessed 1 Sep 2017.
- Robinson, William, and Xuan Santos. 2014. Global Capitalism, Immigrant Labor, and the Struggle for Justice. *Class, Race and Corporate Power* 2 (3): 1–16.
- Rosen, Ruth. 2012. The Tea Party and Angry White Women. *Dissent* 59 (1): 61–65.
- Rosset, Peter, Maria Elena Martinez-Torres, and Luis Hernandez-Navarro. 2005. Zapatismo in the Movement of Movements. *Development* 48 (2): 35–41.
- Shapiro, Thomas, Tatjana Meschede, and Sam Osoro. 2013. The Roots of the Widening Racial Wealth Gap: Explaining the Black-White Economic Divide. *Research and Policy Brief, Institute on Assets and Social Policy*, February 2013: 1–8.
- Shepard, Benjamin. 2012. Labor and Occupy Wall Street: Common Causes and Uneasy Alliances. *Working USA: The Journal of Labor and Society* 15 (March): 121–134.
- Sherman, Howard J. 2010. *The Roller Coaster Economy: Financial Crisis, Great Recession, and the Public Opinion*. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, Inc.
- Stewart, John. 2011. “The 99%.” *The Daily Show with John Stewart*. October 18. New York, NY: Comedy Central.
- Stewart, Charles, Craig Smith, and Robert Denton. 2007. *Persuasion and Social Movements*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
- Trudell, Megan. 2011. Mad as Hatters? The Tea Party Movement in the U.S. *International Socialism*, 129. <http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=698>. Accessed 19 Feb 2013.
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2011. *National Operations Center Media Monitoring Capability Desktop Reference Binder*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
- Vasi, Ion. 2006. The New Anti-war Protests and Miscible Mobilizations. *Social Movement Studies* 5 (2): 137–153.
- Voyles, Traci. 2015. *Wastelanding: Legacies of Uranium Mining in Navajo Country*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Walker, Edward, Andrew Martin, and John McCarthy. 2008. Confronting the State, the Corporation, and the Academy: The Influence of Institutional Targets on Social Movement Repertoires. *American Journal of Sociology* 114 (1): 35–76.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2007. *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Yates, Michael D. 2003. *Naming the System: Inequality and Work in the Global Economy*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
- Zinn, Howard. 2003. *A Peoples History of the United States: 1492-Present*. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers.
- Žižek, Slavoj. 2012. *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously*. London, UK: Verso Books.



Neoliberal Globalization and Transnational Women's Movements in the Early Twenty-First Century

Ligaya Lindio-McGovern

Social movements operate within particular social contexts. While these contexts may bear on these movements in a way that may constraint movement actors, social movements also create opportunities for action that confront and may shape the social, political, economic, and cultural contexts in which they live and work. Movement actors do not just wait for an opening in the social system, as the theory on political opportunity structure seems to imply. They devise strategies to confront systems of authority to build a just society and do not just run away at the first sight of repressive action from the keepers and beneficiaries of oppressive systems. Such dialectical dynamics can create the crucible for change. Thus, various social movements have occurred in varied periods of human history responding to conditions of oppression and exploitation that violate their sense of human dignity and inalienable human rights.

In this chapter, I will deal mainly with selected transnational women's movements in the context of neoliberal globalization. I speak of women's movements in the plural sense because there is no single women's movement given the varied contexts in which women live and work, and given the women's position in the classed and gendered structures of society. However, there have been instances where women have made attempts to create transnational women's movements (although they may be based in a particular locality) in which they establish solidarity networks with other women going beyond national

L. Lindio-McGovern (✉)

Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Kokomo, IN, USA

e-mail: lmcgover@iuk.edu

© The Author(s) 2019

B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_15

borders as they organize resistance to neoliberal globalization. At this juncture it is logical before proceeding further to clarify how neoliberal globalization is defined in this chapter.

Neoliberal globalization is an ideology of development that has an economic project of continually expanding capitalism on a global scale. For global capitalism to sustain itself, it should create the necessary preconditions for transnational capital to be super-profitable. The first precondition is to create a docile and controlled workforce in order to make labor super cheap. Therefore, workers' rights get repressed and their collective power suppressed. Without a massive pool of cheap labor global capitalism will fall apart. It is the labor of low-waged workers that produces profits, not the machines or other instruments of production. The second precondition for global capitalism to be super-profitably sustained is to structure social inequalities based on gender, class, and race in nation-states where capitalism is to be embedded. Without these inequalities capitalism will crumble because it is the structuring of these inequalities that stratifies the labor market and divides the working class who will collectively challenge capitalism. The third precondition is to create a process of, what David Harvey calls, "accumulation through dispossession,"¹ such as dispossessing peasants and indigenous communities of their ancestral lands and the resources therein for transnational capital. Dispossession of their ancestral lands destroys their non-capitalist pre-colonial communal concept of land and their communal modes and relations of production. Hence, the indigenous communities are the last frontier of neocolonialism or modern imperialism. The fourth precondition is the social construction of neoliberal states with limited sovereignty to determine its economic and political development. Through regional formations, like the ASEAN and NAFTA, and other supranational organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB) that formulate neoliberal policies, dominant countries are able to control the economies of poorer countries to the benefit of transnational corporations and the transnational capitalist class that own and control these corporations. The fifth precondition to maintain global capitalism is to create a war economy, maintained by imperialism and militarism. The United States is the dominant war economy in the world. Ironically, the capitalist system that the war economy protects is the very system that has caused in 2008 the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Finally, to sustain capitalism on the nation-state and on the global scale, a culture of individualism must be promoted. Individualism is the enemy of solidarity necessary to transform the capitalist system.

Neoliberal globalization is not a neutral process² that could be simply defined as the "global integration of the world economies," that some may say, as if no one is disadvantaged in the process or that the playing field is one where stakeholders are equal in power, access to resources, or control of their labor and environment. The process of neoliberal globalization is gendered, class-structured, and racialized in many instances. In such a process, the working class, minorities, and the low income and poor sectors of society are more

deeply affected in a negative way. But due to gendered structures, working-class and poor women may be even more disadvantaged. In the post-globalization phase where extractive capitalism becomes the dominant mode,³ the indigenous communities are adversely affected as they lose their ancestral lands to transnational corporate mining whereby destruction of indigenous women's subsistence farming occurs.⁴ Hence, neoliberal regimes have become contested terrains and women have formed movement organizations and networks that are both national and transnational, addressing problematic issues that directly affect them. Movement organizations provide organizational structures for women's resistance and protests as they confront neoliberal regimes. It is theoretically and methodologically sound to take a look at these women's movement organizations (WMOs) to get a glimpse of understanding of how women are attempting to transnationalize their resistance to establish human bonds against the tide of individualism and the disempowering divide-and-rule strategies and tactics promoted by neoliberal regimes. In the following sections, I examine a few examples of these women's movements incorporating resistance to neoliberalism in the context in which they operate.

THE CONTEXT OF THE NEOLIBERAL NATION-STATE AND BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS: THE PHILIPPINE CASE

As in other countries, neoliberal globalization in the Philippines has been a contested terrain.⁵ Filipino women are a significant part of the major forces in this contestation. Not without external pressures, the Philippine neoliberal state has implemented the neoliberal policies of—deregulation (lessening government regulation of the capitalist economy), economic liberalization (lifting restrictions to the entry of transnational corporations), privatization (opening various spheres of the economy to private capital, cutting down on state subsidy on social services, public utilities), finance capitalism (making profit out of money or financial exchange versus meeting human needs), labor flexibilization (making labor cheap), and labor export (state promotion of labor migration to temporary or contractual work). These policies facilitate the global expansion of capitalism that is constantly seeking ways to maximize profits on the backs of workers and peasants.⁶ Bolstered by the IMF and the WTO, the transnational corporations are the major engines of the global expansion of capitalism, and the G-7 that dominate the process of neoliberal globalization. The neoliberal policies that they have promoted have exacerbated poverty and class inequality in the Philippines, thus widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Poor women and children have experienced more heavily the negative impact of these policies, thus, creating a fertile ground for organized resistance.

Filipino women's resistance to neoliberal globalization operates on two levels: the local and the transnational.

The Local Front of Struggle

At the local front the women's resistance to globalization is embodied in GABRIELA, the national coalition of women's organization in the Philippines.⁷ GABRIELA has facilitated and supported the political organization of grassroots women, such as peasant women, women workers, and urban poor women. So it has incorporated class orientation in its politics of resistance. Among some of these grassroots women's organizations that are under the national alliance of GABRIELA include Amihan (the national federation of peasant women's organizations with local chapters),⁸ KMK (Kilusang Manggawang Kababaihan) composed of women workers in the manufacturing sector, and SAMAKANA (Samahan ng Malayang Kababaihang Nagkakaisa, Association of United and Free Women), an organization of urban poor women that includes women in poor neighborhoods mainly in Metro Manila. GABRIELA has conducted consciousness-raising on the impact of globalization on the Philippine political economy through study sessions and dissemination of its publications which are critical of neoliberalism. Neoliberal globalization has an ideological project that shapes people's consciousness in constructing consent to the mythical promise of neoliberalism that it will eliminate poverty, promote progress for all, and that freedom is attainable through an unregulated capitalist market.⁹ GABRIELA's consciousness-raising activities that question these premises are forms of counter-ideological resistance to the ideological project of neoliberal globalization.

Since globalization is affecting all sectors in the Philippines, GABRIELA works in alliance with other organizations to combat some of the tenets of globalization. It has contested the neoliberal policy of privatization that seeks new spheres of private capitalist penetration of areas of the economy and dismantling of government control or subsidies that can make certain social services or state-subsidized enterprises more accessible to a greater number of people. One segment of the Philippine economy that has been privatized is water, which has ignited resistance from various sectors. One movement organization that crystallized around the issue is the Water for the People Network that mobilized a national campaign to halt the privatization of water in the Philippines. GABRIELA was among the various organizations that participated in this national campaign since the privatization of water in the Philippines would hurt more intensely poor people and which would have greater negative impact on women's and children's health. GABRIELA was one of the conveners of the First National People's Convention on Water held on August 10–11, 2004, at the University of the Philippines, and mobilized approximately 400 activists.¹⁰ A historic achievement of this convention was the formulation of *Filipino People's Water Code*, which is an exercise in grassroots policy formation and which could actually guide official state policy legislation. Framed as a human right, this Code demanded that the policy of water privatization be reversed. It asserted that access to potable and sanitary water is a right that every person is entitled to. It argued that water is a people's resource and should be accessible to all and must be under the public domain. In fact, as a component of nature

that is essential to life, water belongs to all and should not be sold for profit. Instead of being under the unregulated “free market” and control of transnational corporations, water as a national resource should be under state responsibility and regulatory mechanisms to make sure that equality in access to water is guaranteed. Equality in access to water, the People’s Water Code asserts, should entail “preferential treatment and positive action for the poor and marginalized sectors” (such as the unemployed poor, children, and women).¹¹

Part of contentious politics is to educate the public about the People’s Water Code. Often this would entail relating to the media. Therefore, GABRIELA formulated and disseminated a press statement that voiced the basic principles in the People’s Water Code. In framing the press statement, it targeted the Philippine neoliberal state. It unequivocally criticized the government for being subservient to neoliberal interests that promote policies for the privatization of public utilities. It brought attention to transnational corporate control of water for profit at the expense of the poor. Giving voice to grassroots women is part of GABRIELA’s politics of struggle. Hence, the press statement also voiced out the unheard complaints of women in Metro Manila that although they pay the inflated water rates, the water that comes out of their faucets is stinky and dirty, posing more difficulties for poor women whose work relies mainly on water, such as food vendors.¹²

One of the important aspects of framing in social movements is prognostic framing, suggesting a solution to the social problem at hand.¹³ Hence, in this press statement GABRIELA issued a call to action from the Philippine government: takeover water service and regulate water rates. However, the government did not heed their demands, making it even harder for the poor to have adequate access to potable water. This demand demonstrated GABRIELA’s political consciousness that privatization and deregulation (that diminishes government regulation of segments of the social economy) interlink in their policy implementation, hence reinforcing each other in constructing the hegemony of the neoliberal regime. Thus, political action must persistently target the neoliberal state toward its radical transformation.

One of the strategies that GABRIELA employs in transforming the Philippine neoliberal state is to create and maintain a women’s party. It has been able to maintain the GABRIELA Women’s Party List, which has successfully had its candidates elected into Congress. However, their presence is still a minority. But there have been legislations that the Women’s Party has been able to pass in both the Philippine Congress and Senate. One example is the legislation against the sex trafficking of Filipino women and children, an important legislation since under neoliberal globalization sex trafficking has expanded. GABRIELA combines official parliamentary politics and street parliament through mass action, rallies, and demonstrations that publicly articulate policy demands—which in some instances have been found to be effective in demanding some reforms. GABRIELA Party list has many chapters nationally and also in other countries where migrant Filipino women get organized and through exercise of their Overseas Voting Rights, are able to cast votes for GABRIELA candidates.

As economic liberalization (creating borderless economies) gets implemented, transnational capital entry into the Philippines gets less and less restricted, and one can see clearly what David Harvey calls, “accumulation by dispossession.”¹⁴ Rural and indigenous farming communities lose land for food production as transnational corporations enter their communities for agribusiness or mining. At times forced evacuation occurs when the military respond with violent repression when the community organizes against these transnational mining encroachments into their communities that destroy their livelihoods.¹⁵

Military repression and state violence is another strategy of the Philippine neoliberal state to coerce consent to neoliberal policies, since the contradictory nature of these policies inevitably generates resistance. Thus, GABRIELA’s politics of resistance to neoliberalism includes confronting (in alliance with other movement organizations) the Philippine militaristic state through exposing its atrocities and human rights violations through public rallies, demonstrations, organizing victims of the state’s human rights violations, and legal actions.

Under the current Duterte regime, there is a growing militarization and ominous signs of rising dictatorship and perpetuation of previous government programs of counter-insurgency (Duterte labeled his own counter-insurgency program “Oplan Kapayapaan”) and repression including targeting legal organizations, NGOs, students/youth, and indigenous people who are defending their ancestral lands from corporate extractions. Amidst popular protest disclaiming Marcos was not a hero, Duterte emulated the former dictator Marcos by allowing his burial in the *Libingan ng mga Bayani* (Heroes’ Cemetery), erasing the collective memory of thousands of victims of Marcos’s Martial Law regime. He has proposed a constitutional change that would lift whatever restrictions there is on foreign corporations’ ownership of land and investment and the setting up of a political structure that would dissolve Congress and the judiciary’s independence—consequently consolidating power in the executive branch, giving him legislative power and in the appointment of judges.

Duterte has closed down *Rappler*, an online outlet for critical writings and reporting on Philippine society. Currently, in his war on drugs, he is already exercising extra-judicial powers with the increasing number of extra-judicial killings which he justifies by his statement that suspected drug users are no longer human beings and therefore it is alright to kill them since the Philippine government cannot afford their imprisonment and rehabilitation. In his war against the revolutionary forces, human rights violations are also committed as extra-judicial killings of suspected members of the New People’s Army, harassment of people’s organizations, human rights defenders/advocates, and student activist movements. He made a statement ordering soldiers to shoot women guerillas “in the vagina” because if they have “no more vagina they will be useless”¹⁶—sexualizing state violence against women and delivering an implicit violent message that a woman’s place is not in the struggle is in effect a violent counter-attack to what one of the founders of MAKIBAKA, Lorena

Barros, had said, “A woman’s place is in the revolution.” Duterte’s misogynist-fascist statement becomes an ideological counter-insurgency of the Filipino women redefining their political identity as active participants and leaders in the broad movement for justice in Philippine society, thus curtailing their political rights. It did not take long for Filipino women to fight back, and (as of this writing) they continue to fight back. Congresswoman of the GABRIELA Women’s Party immediately was quoted in the press condemning President Duterte’s statement as “macho-fascist,” “anti-woman,” and raising “state terrorism against women and the people to a new level.”¹⁷ On February 14, 2018, GABRIELA staged a mass action against Duterte’s statement making public their outrage through protest dance and other forms of art in a street rally and delivering speeches that extended the concept of violence against women to include state violence of fascism, dictatorship, and the structural violence of imperialism, and neoliberalism resulting in poverty of many Filipinos.

On February 24, the 32nd anniversary of EDSA uprising, People Power 1, that toppled the Marcos dictatorship,¹⁸ a massive rally of various groups of students, youth, clergy, nuns, urban poor, drivers, peasants, workers, health workers, families of victims of extra-judicial killings and counter-insurgency, government employees, indigenous people, and women took to the streets to express their resistance to the rising authoritarianism of the Duterte regime and determination to bring back the collective spirit of EDSA to crush Duterte’s aspiration to dictatorship.¹⁹ Even earlier, in August 2017, protest against the growing state violence and repression took a cross-sectoral mass movement when the *Movement Against Tyranny* was launched in Quezon City. GABRIELA was part of the launching assembly of the cross-sectoral Movement.²⁰ It has been the strategy of GABRIELA to be part of the larger movement for national liberation in the Philippines since it views that the liberation of women is not separate from the liberation of the whole nation from the larger national and global structures that are at the roots of oppression and poverty in the Philippines—such as the embedding of neoliberal policies that has historical roots in its colonial and neocolonial domination. In fact, the *Movement Against Tyranny* and the *No to Cha-Cha Movement* have criticized that the constitutional change Duterte is proposing will entrench constitutionally neoliberalism in Philippine economic and political development, deleting the provisions on human rights and social justice²¹ that are enshrined in the current Philippine Constitution. What is needed is not a new constitution and a move to federalism but a greater implementation of the current Constitution, Christian Monsod asserted in his speech on February 13, 2018, at the gathering of the *No to Cha-Cha Movement*. Therefore, there is a growing campaign against the charter change both in the Philippines and among Filipino activists in the United States, Canada, and other countries.

In the area of agrarian reform, Amihan, the Peasant Women’s Movement in the Philippines under the alliance of GABRIELA and in alliance with the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasant Movement in the Philippines), is at the forefront of the struggle for genuine agrarian land reform. Amihan advocates a land

reform that is sensitive to peasant women's situation and resistance to militarization since peasant families are the ones who are most affected by military atrocities, as military units and its paramilitary arm are mostly stationed in the rural areas for counter-insurgency.²²

In the area of manufacturing, women workers have organized to defend their rights as workers and as women in the Free Trade Zones or special economic zones where transnational corporations, in their quest for cheap labor, violate workers' rights. KMK (*Kilusan Ng Manggagawang Kababaihan*, Movement of Women Workers), previously mentioned as under the umbrella alliance of GABRIELA, had been organizing women workers in these zones, while at the same time it continues to be part of the larger workers' movement, KMU (*Kilusang Mayo Uno*, May First Movement), wherein KMK established as well as Women's Desk to make sure women workers' rights and needs are attended to in the broader workers' movement. KMK's presence in GABRIELA serves as a constant reminder that class and gender must be addressed in the struggle for women's liberation in the Philippines since poor and working-class women comprise the majority of women in the Philippines.²³

Class divides women and gender divides men and women in the relations of production. Men and women workers, for example, are both sources of cheap labor in the capitalist relations of production. However, the logic of profit maximization requires structuring the labor market so that women would provide even cheaper labor than men, thus structuring gender inequality to serve capital. Consequently, women may experience certain difficulties at work unknown to male workers. KMK, for example, brought attention to the "double burden" that women workers experience that male workers seldom do, and advocated for the establishment of day care centers in workplaces.²⁴ Indeed, in the Free Trade Zones and special economic zones, women comprise 80–90% of the workforce. Through unionization, women can exert collective pressure against transnational corporations' labor flexibilization schemes to maximize profits. Their unionization and struggles, however, have not been spared from military repression and violence. But, nonetheless, organized women worker activists continue to take the risks. This is an important response since as neoliberalism continues to expand capitalism globally as its economic project, unions become important collective agents to defend workers' rights. The global expansion of capitalism is worth pursuing for the "transnational capitalist class"²⁵ only to the extent that it generates maximum profits. Various schemes of profit maximization put workers vulnerable to exploitation, abuse, and repression, with women workers facing even greater vulnerability if they face greater restrictions in union activities due to the double burden they experience.²⁶ As neoliberalism tends to divide and rule to undermine collective power of workers, KMK's task of unionizing and organizing women workers is a form of resistance to individualism inherent in capitalist relations of production and demonstrates the important role of collective gender and class struggle in transforming capitalism.

The Transnational Front of Struggle

On the transnational scale of resistance, GABRIELA has also played a significant role in forming international solidarity networks in forging transnational resistance to neoliberalism. For example, it has been instrumental in the formation of the International Women's Alliance (IWA) in 2012 that brings together grassroots organizations and individuals around the platform of resisting capitalist imperialism bolstered by militarism and the global promotion of gender equality and women's liberation. Such agenda strike at the heart of the neoliberal economic project of modern imperialism—epitomized in the power of transnational corporations, the impositions of austerity measures and of the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the policies of the WTO—that facilitate the external control of the economies of Third World nations, disrupting their self-determination and their right to sovereignty. IWA's initial formation took place in August 2010 in Montreal, which I had the opportunity to attend. In this meeting there were workshops that analyzed issues relevant to women in the context of neoliberal regimes. Then, in July 2011, IWA held its First General Assembly in the Philippines, attended by nearly 100 international delegates and observers from 67 organizations in 20 countries.²⁷ Liza Largosa Masa, former congresswoman of GABRIELA Women's Party in the Philippines, became IWA's first chairperson. After she served her term, the second chairperson to serve is from Pakistan, and its vice-chairperson is from Canada. The international network demonstrated in this assembly indicates that there is a growing critical awareness and resistance to neoliberalism that is affecting women in both the Global North and the Global South.²⁸

Forging international solidarity among women across the globe is an important dimension in creating critically conscious resistance to the violence inflicted by neoliberal imperialism that the term "globalization" seems to neutralize. When some scholars of globalization define the term as "the integration of the economies of the world" such naming tends to portray globalization as devoid of the power relations between the North and South where the G-7 has the dominant voice and shrouds the social inequalities produced and perpetuated within regions and between the North and South. This politics of naming brings to light the power of language and the importance of women's participation in discursive struggle, as part of consciousness-raising. Rightly so, that IWA does not mince words in calling neoliberal globalization as "capitalist imperialism" since by its nature it is gendered. By including the promotion of gender equality and the liberation of women from exploitation and oppression alongside the struggle to fight capitalist imperialism as it concretely manifests itself in the various countries, IWA calls attention to the gendered process of neoliberalism and that women of the world must collectively and in solidarity fight back.²⁹

The Underground Revolutionary Struggle: A Strategy Under a Repressive Regime

Discussion about Filipino women's resistance is incomplete without mention of MAKIBAKA (the underground revolutionary women's movement) that advocates for the liberation of women to be linked to the liberation of the Philippine nation from the stranglehold of imperialism, capitalism, and semi-feudalism. During the crackdown of activists under the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, MAKIBAKA went underground. The succeeding regimes in the post-Marcos era continued the counter-insurgency. One of its founders, Lorena Barros, gave up her life in the struggle. Going underground is a way to create opportunities for action under repressive regimes that defends transnational capital, the engine that drives global capitalism. Some of its members joined the New People's Army, the revolutionary army of the underground national liberation movement. Membership to the New People's Army, as a people's defense force against the state violence of the official Philippine military, grew during the Marcos military regime. The presence of MAKIBAKA in the revolutionary movement has brought the feminist issue in the movement. They have been adamant on changing the revolutionary consciousness that national liberation without addressing the issues of class and gender is not a genuine liberation. MAKIBAKA carries a Marxist-Feminist frame in its politics of struggle and resistance, and it is as well critical and resistant to the current course of neoliberal globalization that perpetuates and deepens global inequalities as it aggressively and subtly fortifies the global expansion of capitalism.

SOCIAL REPRODUCTION AS A CONTEXT OF STRUGGLE:
TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF MIGRANT
DOMESTIC WORKERS

The global re-organization of capitalist production is accompanied by a global re-organization of reproduction which Shireen Ally calls the "female shadow of globalization"³⁰—wherein along the transnational flow of capital, there occurs the transnational flow of domestic, reproductive workers. The general pattern of this flow is from poorer to richer countries, not only from the Global South to the Global North but also from poorer countries to richer ones within regions, and mostly it is women

The maintenance of capitalism requires the social reproduction of the labor force. Production and social reproduction are two sides of the same coin. Social reproduction entails not only the biological reproduction, but also the caring and socialization of the young, the caring/maintenance of the household so that working members can get fed and rest, the caring of the elderly that once were productive workers. But to make reproductive labor serve capitalism well, it must be cheap, even super cheap and should be viewed as delinked from productive work. The global flow of migrant domestic workers from the poorer to richer countries makes reproductive labor serve global

capitalism as their labor is usually cheaply paid and given the invisibility of the context of their work they are also vulnerable to various forms of abuse and exploitation.³¹ Although as paid domestic workers they are wage workers that maintain the labor of men and women in the formal labor market, in many instances they are not covered by formal labor standards. That is one way to make their labor cheap.

But how is the migration of reproductive workers from poorer countries link to neoliberalism? One explanation is that the impacts of structural adjustment policies imposed on many Third World countries create the preconditions for out-migration: increased poverty, dispossession from land, unemployment, labor contractualization, low wages, decreasing state subsidy on social services, inflating cost of education, destruction of livelihoods, and displacement from land due to extractive industries of transnational corporations. The existence of employment agencies in labor-receiving countries and in labor-sending countries facilitates the migration of women to do domestic/reproductive labor in foreign countries. Some governments in developing countries may also promote labor migration as a way of dealing with unemployment, such as the Philippines, that has created a government bureaucracy to manage migration.³² Since domestic work is easier to trade and in demand in richer countries, it is women who predominantly migrate to this sector as domestic work is still largely defined as women's work. The need for paid domestic work in richer countries emerges as more women took jobs outside the home in the formal labor market while there was no corresponding adequate state subsidy for the reproductive functions of the family. An International Labor Organization (ILO) 2013 estimate would put the number of migrant domestic workers worldwide to be 11.5 million out of 67.1 million domestic workers worldwide. Of the 11.5 million migrant domestic workers, 73.4% are female and 26.6% are male.³³

Reproductive work has thus become a context for transnational women's movement as domestic workers of different nationalities realized that they have common problems and empowering themselves would require collective action. Movements produce outcomes, like policy reform or new policy formation, or change in public consciousness. One policy outcome of the domestic workers' transnational collective action is the *First Convention and the Accompanying Recommendation for Decent Work for Domestic Workers* (referred to as the Convention on Domestic Workers 2011 or C189 the Convention for Domestic Workers' Rights)³⁴ that was adopted on June 16, 2011, by representatives of governments, employers, and organizations of workers at the 100th International Labor Conference of the ILO that took place in Geneva, Switzerland. This was a historic achievement because the Convention sets up international standards that recognize domestic work as work that needs protection and the inalienable rights of domestic workers as workers and as human beings. It provides international standards as basis for establishing national employment standards for protecting the rights and dignity of domestic workers. For a long time domestic service work has been an unregulated segment of

the informal economy although it is linked to the formal and global economy, and the presence of migrant domestic workers creates such nexus.

Among the organizations of migrant domestic workers or organizations that comprise mostly domestic workers that worked and organized campaigns to achieve this policy outcome were the Asian Migrants Coordinating Body (AMCB) located in Hong Kong, the International Migrants Alliance (IMA), and the International Domestic Workers' Federation (IDWF). The AMCB is an inter-ethnic alliance of migrant domestic workers from Indonesia, Nepal, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Its formation evolved in Hong Kong when it became necessary for the domestic workers to have a collective action for a united stance against the Hong Kong government's attempt to decrease by 30% the domestic workers' minimum wage as their share of "sacrifice" during the 1998 Asian economic crisis. The IMA is a global alliance of migrants and migrant organizations, displaced peoples, and refugees, from different countries to address issues affecting the rights and welfare of migrants. IMA's membership consists of both men and women migrants, but most of its members are women, and most of these are domestic workers. AMCB and IMA organized caucuses on the ILO Convention and formulated proposals and resolutions that they wanted to be included in the Convention. They specifically submitted their demand to include a provision in the formulation of the Convention that domestic workers should have the right to unionize with collective bargaining and that the live-in requirement should not be compulsory. Their proposal was indeed heard and was included in the provisions of the Convention.³⁵

The IDWF is a global organization of domestic and household workers—they defined persons engaged in domestic work within an employment relationship. In November 2006, they first gathered together by organizing an international conference of domestic workers in the Netherlands, with the initial goal to internationally network domestic workers. It brought together domestic workers' unions and associations from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, North America, and Europe. It was first named as the International Domestic Workers' Network (IDWN) and with a structure that has a base in Geneva and with an international coordinator and regional coordinators in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean. In 2008, it formed a steering committee to serve as its decision-making body wherein the different regions are represented to design an action plan that would launch a campaign for the ILO Convention.³⁶ In 2009, during the International Labor Conference, the IDWN was formally launched by leaders of key domestic workers' organizations from different countries and regions—from Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, South Africa, Indonesia, Peru, and the United States—with the goal of mobilizing domestic workers and advocates worldwide to win an ILO Convention for the protection of domestic workers' rights. After the ILO Convention C189 Decent Work for Domestic Workers was won in June 2011, IDWN decided in 2012–2013 to become a formal federation of domestic workers' organizations instead of an informal network—thus its current name of International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF). As of October 2017, IDWF claims it has 65 affili-

ated organizations from 53 countries, representing 500,000 household/domestic worker members.³⁷ It has become apparent that one of the ingredients in transnationalizing movements and to achieve some outcomes is to have specific goals around which to rally and that the goals must be relevant to the needs of the sector targeted to be organized.³⁸ Policy change or formulation must be intended and a repertoire of actions directed to achieve it must be organized, including mobilizing support from other advocates and sectors.

INDIGENOUS WOMEN'S TRANSNATIONAL RESISTANCE AND GLOBAL WOMEN'S SOLIDARITY

Extractive capitalism under neoliberal regime refers to the extraction of resources—such as mining minerals (metallic and non-metallic), fossil fuels, and so on—from underneath the earth controlled by transnational corporations for profit. Extractivism as a political economic model of global capitalism is the “unbridled commodification and exploitation of nature” in unsustainable ways.³⁹ According to Peter Colley, “the extraction of minerals from the Earth has been practiced by virtually all societies throughout history,” but “[w]hat is different about mining since the colonial period is that mining is now often done by one society within the living environment of other societies—rather than in its own backyard” and that the rate of extraction has exponentially grown beyond a century ago.⁴⁰ Extractive industries—like large-scale mining, open-pit mining—have brought destruction to the environment and the livelihoods of people, dislocated people from their communities, dispossessed indigenous people of their ancestral lands, and violated their self-determination, and human rights, including the right to life as the state/military collude with mining corporations’ defense forces to quench resistance in defense of extractive capital.⁴¹ On the other hand, transnational mining companies garner huge profits from extractive industries as they siphon these minerals out of the countries where they extract, usually from the Global South to the core economies of the Global North where they are processed or manufactured into other products, contributing little to the economies of the Global South.⁴²

Since large-scale mining often takes place in lands where indigenous communities live, they are the ones who suffer most from the destructive impacts of extractive industries, especially mining. Thus, there is a growing resistance to these extractive industries from indigenous people, and women have been active players, at times at the frontlines of resistance and their resistance has brought them to link transnationally with other women within regions or across regions. The *Mining the Womb of the Earth: Struggles of Indigenous Women Against Destructive Mining*⁴³ documents the resistance of indigenous women in Laos, the Philippines, and Indonesia against destructive mining in their countries, and they are part of the Indigenous Peoples Human Rights Defenders Network (IPHRD Net) that defends the collective rights of the indigenous peoples and their communities in Asia.

Women in Africa unite as well around the platform of environment and sustainability against destructive extractivism. For example, the African Women Unite Against Destructive Resource Extraction (WoMin Alliance) brought women from South Africa, Uganda, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Senegal, and Zimbabwe to the Peoples Climate Summit 2017 and the 23rd UN Climate Conference (COP23) held in Bonn. Joining thousands of climate activists, their purpose was to “advance an ecofeminist perspective on the systems of oppression” which they see underlies “the manifold crises facing humanity and the planet” and proposed needed solutions.⁴⁴ WoMin is an alliance of organizations across the African continent that works with national and regional movement organizations of women, communities, and peasants impacted by mining to raise public awareness about “the impacts of extractivism on peasant and working class women” and counter its destruction—such as water and land grabbing, displacement of communities, pollution, violence against women—and critically seek for development alternatives that are women-centered and just.⁴⁵ At the People’s Climate Summit 2017, WoMin organized two workshops themed around (a) the “violence of climate change, extractivism, capitalism and patriarchy,” (b) “organizing for people’s development sovereignty, Our right to say NO”—that looked at how extractive projects displace communities, destroy livelihoods and culture, and dispossess people of their land and sovereignty over their own development.⁴⁶ The workshops were meant to bring together movements that work around the issues of “women’s rights, land and food sovereignty, climate justice, rights of nature, indigenous peoples’ rights, development sovereignty and self-determination, and struggles for a different world order.”⁴⁷ The workshops also provided an apt occasion for the launching of the paper titled “Extractive vs development sovereignty: building living consent rights for African women” that was made accessible to the attendees.⁴⁸ Here we see that one of the functions of social movements is to produce and disseminate knowledge and ideas about change. We need knowledge to bring about change, and the experiences of the oppressed and the exploited and how we make sociological sense of them are valuable sources of knowledge making. As W.E. DuBois has said we need to understand the oppressive system, how it is maintained, so we would know how to change it.

In Latin America women have also come together to protect the forests and call for a shutdown of extractive industries that threaten the earth’s critical living systems and the global community. They form alliances across continents, such as the “Women for Forests” program of the Women’s Earth & Climate Action Network (WECAM) that focuses on three regions—the Amazon rainforest in Ecuador, the Congo rainforest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Tongas Rainforest of Alaska and California, US Redwoods, and in the Canadian Boreal forests. WECAM engages women worldwide to take action as stakeholders in climate change and solutions for sustainability.⁴⁹

Globally, *One Billion Rising* builds solidarity among women around the issue of “violence against women and girls,” which they have extended to include all forms of violence from domestic violence to destruction of the envi-

ronment as violence against women, war and imperialism, global capitalism, militarism, and state violence, including fascism, extractivism, poverty, and economic injustice.⁵⁰ In *One Billion Rising* we see the role of framing in social movements, how to craft a message or issues to bring into the network as many people as possible and how to deliver the message that would reach as many people as possible. The goal of *One Billion Rising* is to establish solidarity (a sense of connectedness) of women globally as they fight for change, amidst the resilience of the structures of violence, through dance and other forms of art, to express their resistance. To celebrate every Valentine's Day, women across the world synchronize their dance to express their protest against forces that inflict violence against women and post their dance on social media. In the current digital age, social movements utilize various forms of social media to network, to deliver and mobilize call to actions, to convey messages, and to document their activities and informational resources for accessibility to the global community. The rationale is that whatever form of violence—be it poverty, environmental destruction, economic violence from corporate greed, extractivism, and unbridled capitalist development—inflict on the human body and spirit. Through collective dance, one can be relieved, be inspired, and enjoy being in the struggle. With a sense of solidarity that one is not alone in the struggle, women get empowered and develop a sense of hope that can sustain their struggle. And social movements are partly sustained because movement actors have hope, see the possibility of change, and work together and invite others to create opportunities to achieve the change.

CONCLUSION

Social movements, like women's movements, operate within various contexts in different periods of human history that gave rise to various women's movements with different agenda and foci and different strategies as they create opportunities for change. The current neoliberal regimes that promote the global expansion of capitalism that creates and exacerbates global inequalities that are gendered, racialized, and classed have provided a context for the emergence of transnational women's movements. While these movements may be localized to target the neoliberal nation-state that locally embed neoliberal policies that shape the capitalist global political economy, the global impacts of these policies have affected women and their children and families and spurred a growing transnational women's movements (TWMs) that address specific issues arising from neoliberal globalization. These TWMs may take the form of alliances comprising women's organizations from different countries and regions addressing particular issues produced by capitalism as it expands globally through the politics of imperialism and militarism.

Such transnational alliances provide the potential for the global challenges to global capitalism and its projects that destroy the environment, people's livelihoods and health, indigenous lives and cultures, human rights, and its constant search for cheap labor that hurt both local and migrant workers. They are planting

the seeds of change by small successes in policy change or creation of new policies as demonstrated by the transnational actions of the migrant domestic workers. The persistence of these transnational women's movements as they target systems of corporate and state power structures and their neoliberal ideologies is etching cracks in the neoliberal design that can contribute to the shaping of a new social order that is more sustainable and just. Social movements are indispensable tools for social change, and we must learn to make it part of our everyday lives to achieve the kind of changes that are necessary and must take place for our liberation.

NOTES

1. David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
2. Ligaya Lindio-McGovern and Isidor Walliman, *Globalization and Third World Women: Exploitation, Coping and Resistance* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2012 [2009]).
3. James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Power and Resistance* (Leiden: Brill, 2016).
4. Insights from interviews with indigenous women displaced by corporate mining in the Philippines during my Fulbright fellowship in the Fall of 2017.
5. Ligaya Lindio-McGovern, "Neoliberal Globalization in the Philippines: Its Impact on Filipino Women and Their Forms of Resistance" in Erica Polakoff and Ligaya Lindio-McGovern (eds.), *Gender & Globalization: Patterns of Women's Resistance* (Whitby, Ontario, Canada: de Sitter Publications, 2011), pp. 33–56.
6. Ligaya Lindio-McGovern, *Globalization, Labor Export and Resistance: A Study of Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers in Global Cities* (New York: Routledge, 2012).
7. Established in 1984, GABRIELA is a grassroots-oriented alliance of more than 200 organizations, institutions, and programs of women on a national scale in the Philippines. It organizes women especially from the sectors of farmers, workers, urban poor, and students, and works for the liberation of oppressed Filipino people. The name GABRIELA was adopted to honor Gabriela Silang, the first woman revolutionary leader in the struggle for liberation from Spanish colonialism in the Philippines. She bravely led the forces that her husband, Diego Silang, left after his death. The organization, however, gave a meaning to the name GABRIELA as General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership, and Action.
8. For a more thorough discussion of the politics of resistance of Amihan, see Ligaya Lindio-McGovern, *Filipino Peasant Women: Exploitation and Resistance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997).
9. David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
10. Ligaya Lindio-McGovern, "Neoliberal Globalization in the Philippines: Its Impact on Filipino Women and Their Forms of Resistance" in Erica Polakoff and Ligaya Lindio-McGovern (eds.), *Gender & Globalization: Patterns of Women's Resistance* (Whitby, Ontario, Canada: de Sitter Publications, 2011), pp. 33–56.
11. Lindio-McGovern, "Neoliberal Globalization in the Philippines."
12. Lindio-McGovern, "Neoliberal Globalization in the Philippines."

13. David Snow and Sarah Soule, *A Primer on Social Movements* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2010).
14. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, p. 178.
15. Based on the testimonies of witnesses in the International People's Tribunal held in Washington, DC in 2015, which I attended.
16. Hannah Ellis-Petersen, "The Philippines: Rodrigo Duterte Orders Soldiers to Shoot Female Rebels 'in the Vagina,'" *The Guardian*, 12 February 2008. Accessed 13 February 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/13/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-orders-soldiers-to-shoot-female-rebels-in-the-vagina>.
17. Ellis-Petersen, "The Philippines."
18. The EDSA Revolution or People Power I that took place on February 22–25, 1986 toppled the 21-year (1965–1986) totalitarian rule of Ferdinand Marcos. More than 2,000,000 protestors/demonstrators lined the streets, primarily along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The sustained massive civil resistance led Marcos and his family to flee Malacanang Palace to exile in Hawaii.
19. See Marya Salamat, "Protest, Calls for Solidarity, Defiance, Collective Action Mark EDSA People Power Commemoration," February 26, 2018. <http://bulatlat.com/main/2018/02/26/protest-calls-solidarity-defiance-collective-action-mark-edsa-people-power-commemoration/>.
20. Based on my participant observation since I attended the founding assembly of the Movement Against Tyranny during my Fulbright Fellowship in the Philippines in the Fall of 2017.
21. Christina Monsod, "A Cha-Cha Against the Pro-poor and Pro-Filipino Provisions of the Constitution," speech delivered at the gathering of the No to Cha-Cha Movement, 13 February 2018.
22. Ligaya Lindio-McGovern, *Filipino Peasant Women: Exploitation and Resistance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997).
23. Louis West, *Militant Labor in the Philippines* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997).
24. West, *Militant Labor in the Philippines*.
25. William Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Leslie Sklair, *The Transnational Capitalist Class* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publisher, 2001).
26. Ligaya Lindio-McGovern, "The Philippines: Pressures for Change in the Work Care Regime" in Marian Baird, Michele Ford, and Elizabeth Hill (eds.), *Women, Work and Care in the Asia-Pacific* (New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 87–101.
27. These included Argentina, Australia, Canada, Ecuador, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Kurdistan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, the Netherlands, and the United States. <https://internationalwomensalliance.wordpress.com>.
28. McGovern and Wallimann, *Globalization and Third World Women*; and Erica Polakoff and Ligaya Lindio-McGovern (eds.), *Gender and Globalization: Patterns of Women's Resistance* (Whitby, Ontario, Canada: De Sitter Publications, 2011). These earlier works of mine show the growing resistance to neoliberalism from women across the world—from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America.
29. In addition to the formation of IWA, GABRIELA also has chapters in other countries, including the United States, Italy, Canada, and Australia. By branching out to women in other countries, GABRIELA is able to establish interna-

- tional solidarity, as well as extend its feminist vision and ideology across national borders.
30. Shireen Alley, "Regional Division of Reproductive Labor: Southern African Migrant Domestic Workers in Johannesburg" in Ligaya Lindio-McGovern and Isidor Walliman (eds.) *Globalization and Third World Women* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2012), p. 15.
 31. Ligaya Lindio-McGovern, *Globalization, Labor Export and Resistance: A Study of Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers in Global Cities* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); Joy Zarembka, "America's Dirty Work: Migrant Maids and Modern-Day Slavery" in Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russel Hoschild (eds.), *Global Woman: Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in the New Economy* (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Company, 2002), pp. 142–153.
 32. For a detailed discussion, see Lindio-McGovern, *Globalization, Labor Export and Resistance*.
 33. ILO, Labor Migration Branch, Department of Statistics, "ILO Global Estimates on Migrant Workers: Results and Methodology, Special focus on Migrant Domestic Workers." Accessed 3/16/2018. www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/document.
 34. The document can be downloaded at: www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/100th-Session/reports/provisionsl-records/WCMS_en/index.htm for the Domestic Workers Convention 2011; www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed-norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms-157836.pdf for the accompanying recommendation.
 35. I participated in one of these causes and served as a resource person.
 36. See "International Domestic Workers' Network," WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing), <http://www.wiego.org/informal-ecinimy/international-domestic-workers%E2%80%9999-network>.
 37. <http://www.idwfed.org/en/about-us-1>.
 38. See "Strategic Plan 2016–2020" of IDWF, <http://www.idwfed.org/en/about-us-1/strategic-plan-2016-19>.
 39. Immaculata Barcia, *Women Human Rights Defenders Confronting Extractive Industries: An Overview of Critical Risks and Human Rights Obligations* (Creative Commons: AWID and Women and Human Rights Defenders International Coalition, 2017), p. 10. This is a research report.
 40. Peter Cooley, "The Political Economy of Mining" in Geoff Evans, James Goodman, and Nina Lansbury (eds), *Moving Mountains: Communities Confront Mining and Globalization* (London: Zed Books, 2002), p. 19.
 41. James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Power and Resistance* (Leiden: Brill, 2016); Geoff Evans, James Goodman, and Nina Landsbury, *Moving Mountains: Communities Confront Mining and Globalization* (London: Zed Books, 2002); Angus MacInnes, Marcus Colchester, and Andrew Whitmore, "Free Prior and Informed Consent: How to Rectify the Devastating Consequences of Harmful Mining for Indigenous Peoples," *Perspectives in Ecology and Conservation*, 15 (2017) 152–160.
 42. AntonioTujan, Jr. and Rosario Bella Guzman, *Globalizing Philippine Mining (revised edition)* (Manila, Philippines: IBON Foundation Inc., 2002).
 43. Charlotte Hinterberger, "Mining the Womb of the Earth: Struggles of Indigenous Women against Destructive Mining" (Ampur Sansai, Chiang Mai, Thailand: Asia Indigenous People Pact (AIPP) Foundation, 2013), Accessed

- 3/5/2018, <http://forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/2013/12/women-and-mining/finalbookforweb.pdf>.
44. "Women at the People's Climate Summit 2017," Accessed March 5, 2018, women.org.za/womin-at-the-people%E2%80%99s-climate-summit-2017.
 45. https://womin.org.za/images/Womin_Flyer_English_flyer_1.jpg.
 46. https://women.org.za/images/Consent_WoMin_flyer_ENG_ipeg.jpg.
 47. https://womin.org.za/images/Womin_Flyer_English_flyer_1.jpg.
 48. https://women.org.za/images/Consent_WoMin_flyer_ENG_ipeg.jpg.
 49. See WECAN, "Women for Forests and Fossil Fuel/Mining/Mega-Dam Resistance," <http://wecaninternational.org/pages/forests-fossil-fuel-resistance>.
 50. See the video Tamera One Billion Rising—Rise for Mother Earth Action—as part of the Defend the Sacred Gathering, August 12, 2017; <http://defendthe-sacred.tamera.org>; Anne Maxine D. Umil, "OBR 2018/Women rise against 'fascist, misogynist Duterte,'" Bulatlat.com, February 16, 2018, URL: <https://wp.me/p7Nbdo-qxS>. In this paragraph I based my analysis on my content analysis of various materials I could access on the internet on One Billion Rising, sometimes videos that I watched from the website.

REFERENCES

- Ally, Shireen. 2012. Regional Division of Reproductive Labor: Southern African Migrant Domestic Workers in Johannesburg. In *Globalization and Third World Women*, ed. Ligaya Lindio-McGovern and Isidor Wallimann. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Barcia, Immaculata. 2017. *Women Human Rights Defenders Confronting Extractive Industries: An Overview of Critical Risks and Human Rights Obligations*. Creative Commons: AWID and Women and Human Rights Defenders International Coalition. This is a research report.
- Coley, Peter. 2002. The Political Economy of Mining. In *Moving Mountains: Communities Confront Mining and Globalization*, 19–36. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Davide, Hilario G, Jr., Retired Chief Justice. 2018. Charter Change at this Time is Tyranny. Keynote address at the Forum of Anti Cha-Cha groups sponsored by the Movement Against Tyranny held at the Malcolm Hall, UP College of Law, Diliman, Quezon City, February 13.
- Ellis-Petersen, Hannah. 2008. The Philippines: Rodrigo Duterte Orders Soldiers to Shoot Female Rebels 'In the Vagina. *The Guardian*, February 12. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/13/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-orders-soldiers-to-shoot-female-rebels-in-the-vagina>. Accessed 13 Feb 2018.
- Evans, Geoff, James Goodman, and Nina Landsbury. 2002. *Moving Mountains: Communities Confront Mining and Globalization*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Harvey, David. 2007. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hinterberger, Charlotte. 2013. *Mining the Womb of the Earth: Struggles of Indigenous Women Against Destructive Mining*. Ampur Sansai, Chiang Mai, Thailand: Asia Indigenous People Pact (AIPP) Foundation. <http://forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/2013/12/women-and-mining/finalbookforweb.pdf>. Accessed 5 Mar 2018.
- ILO, Labor Migration Branch, Department of Statistics. 2013. ILO Global Estimates on Migrant Workers: Results and Methodology, Special Focus on Migrant Domestic

- Workers. ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/document. Accessed 16 Mar 2018.
- Lindio-McGovern, Ligaya. 1997. *Filipino Peasant Women: Exploitation and Resistance*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- . 2011. Neoliberal Globalization in the Philippines: Its Impact on Filipino Women and Their Forms of Resistance. In *Gender and Globalization: Patterns of Women's Resistance*, ed. Erica G. Polakoff and Ligaya Lindio-McGovern, 35–56. Whitby, ON: de Sitter Publications.
- . 2012. *Globalization, Labor Export and Resistance: A Study of Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers in Global Cities*. London and New York: Routledge.
- . 2017. The Philippines: Pressures for Change in the Work Care Regime. In *Women, Work and Care in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. M. Baird, M. Ford, and E. Hill, 87–101. London and New York: Routledge.
- Lindio-McGovern, Ligaya, and Isidor Wallimann. 2012 [2009]. *Globalization and Third World Women: Exploitation, Coping and Resistance*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press.
- MacInnes, Angus, Marcus Colchester, and Andrew Whitmore. 2017. Free Prior and Informed Consent: How to Rectify the Devastating Consequences of Harmful Mining for Indigenous Peoples. *Perspectives in Ecology and Conservation* 15 (2017): 152–160.
- Monsod, Christina S. 2018. A Cha-Cha Against the Pro-Poor and Pro-Filipino Provisions of the Constitution. Speech delivered at the gathering of the No to Cha-Cha Movement, February 13.
- Petras, James, and Henry Veltmeyer. 2016. *Power and Resistance*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Polakoff, Erica, and Ligaya Lindio-McGovern. 2011. *Gender and Globalization: Patterns of Women's Resistance*. Whitby, ON: de Sitter Publications.
- Robinson, W.I. 1996. *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Sklair, L. 2001. *The Transnational Capitalist Class*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publisher.
- Snow, David, and Sarah Soule. 2010. *A Primer on Social Movements*. New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company.



Social Movements and New Technology: The Dynamics of Cyber Activism in the Digital Age

Victoria Carty and Francisco G. Reynoso Barron

Every social movement is in part shaped by the technology available. Activists have always utilized the latest communication devices to recruit, share and distribute information, and mobilize support—whether it be the pen, printing press, telegraph, radio, television, the Internet, or high-speed digital technologies. Though communication and information have historically been fundamental sources of power and counter-power of domination and social change, this has been exasperated by the recent digital revolution which has advanced a new repertoire now at the disposal of activists.

This revolution and introduction of new information communication technologies (ICTs) and social networking sites has shifted the relevance from activists merely gaining media attention from the mainstream press to ordinary citizens who become the message creators, or Mojoes (often referred to as mobile citizen journalists), who construct and distribute their own information. They can then circulate live and unedited footage through mobile devices in a horizontal rather than top-down manner which in turn is changing the nature of political struggle and social movement activism as corporations, government officials, and other authoritative entities no longer unilaterally shape the communication field.

Another result is that the concept of journalism, and how it enhances social movements is being reconfigured. In this new communication and media setting, almost anyone and anything can be recorded and disseminated without

V. Carty (✉) • F. G. Reynoso Barron
Department of Sociology, Chapman University, Orange County, CA, USA
e-mail: carty@chapman.edu; reyno171@mail.chapman.edu

the permission of the elites (be they the professional mainstream press, corporate gatekeepers, the police, the military, or campaign managers). For example, despite mainstream media attempts to trivialize social movements activists can impact public opinion in their favor by providing more sympathetic accounts that sometimes mount after episodes of police brutality which can be disseminated by Mojos and ultimately make their way into the mainstream press.

The 1999 Battle of Seattle protesting the World Trade Organization, the Arab Spring uprisings across parts of North Africa and the Middle East which began in 2009, Occupy Wall Street, and Occupy Student Debt which caught fire across the United States in 2011 all demonstrate how authorities' attempts to make filming of events difficult if not impossible through physical obstructions and "frozen zones" typically result in failure. These strategies are aimed to prevent even credentialed journalists from entering areas of protest. However, these can be circumvented by amateur journalists with their smart phones and other recording devices. In each of these instances, police were videoed pepper spraying, tear gassing, beating, falsely arresting, and in some instances shooting at peaceful protesters, and activists successfully live-streamed the events and uploaded them onto the Internet and social media.¹

In terms of collective behavior, the introduction of social media calls on us to theorize, in some new ways, why social movements emerge when and where they do, how the important resources activists have at their disposal are evolving, and what new tactics and strategies social movement activists employ. In this chapter, we argue that Web 2.0 technologies enable, facilitate, and encourage social movement activity by allowing individual actors to share grievances, accelerate social movement activity, decentralize mobilization efforts, and facilitate recruitment efforts through virtual forms of collective identity.

Though social movement scholars have long noted that the evolution of new media and technology allows activists to develop new strategies to adapt to the new media terrain, much of the analyses has focused on progressive leaning causes. In this contribution, we pay particular attention to how the digital revolution has opened up new mobilizing strategies for actors on both sides of the political spectrum. We also explore how uses of new technology include cyber tactics that activists engage in such as cyber activism, hacktivism, culture jamming, and doxing, and ways in which the emergence of anonymous online groups is redefining journalism and whistleblowing that can assist social movements.

NEW TECHNOLOGY PLATFORMS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZING

New types of communication flows have changed the organizational process and structure of social movements as collective behavior is now less dependent on professional leadership and expertise and operates more at the grassroots level and in ad-hoc settings. Unlike past forms of technology, which relied on

the one-to-many flow of information, largely controlled by state or corporate interests, the new media ecosystem is a bottom-up approach to communication. Ordinary citizens, equipped with their tech-savvy sense, now organize and hold politically oriented events to effect social change in both cyberspace and in local communities.

Additionally, new ICTs have made it easier and faster than ever before for activists to gain support for boycotts, garner signatures in petitions, or simply get the message out to people sympathetic to their cause. Effective online petitions and calls for boycotts abound, and this form of e-activism is now an integral part of most people's social media activity. There are websites, such as PetitionOnline.com that host or link online actions as a free service through which visitors can create and maintain online petitions for any cause. Other sites feature action centers that allow citizens to choose from a variety of actions such as boycotts, online petitions virtual sit-ins, rallies, demonstrations, or email or fax correspondence about a particular cause of concern.²

Manuel Castells summarizes the impact of new media on social movement activity and collective behavior this way: "Indeed, the ongoing transformation of communication technology in the digital age extends the reach of communication media to all domains of social life in a network that is at the same time global and local, generic and customized in an ever-changing pattern. As a result, power relations ... as well as the processes challenging institutionalized power relations are increasingly shaped and decided in the communication field."³

One of the benefits of the introduction of new ICTs is that it enhances the ability of organizers to recruit new members or at least encourage support for a particular cause. Indeed, theorists have long noted that social networks, relational ties, and friendships are an invaluable resource by serving as a conduit of information and as a channel through which to recruit people to a cause, and especially for high-risk protest movement actions.⁴ Other research has found that an invitation through a personal (preexisting) tie is one of the strongest predictors of individuals' engagement in activism, which in turn fosters a sense of collective identity.⁵ New ICTs expand the potential of these networks to develop and mutate exponentially, and especially through weak ties across diffuse networks and among individuals who might not receive this information through any other communicative format.⁶

Contrary to what some theorists feared, that the advent of digital information communication technologies would replace collective identity and weaken the capacity for collective behavior in real communities, mediated forms of communication often *complement* those based on face-to-face interaction and have a positive effect on political participation and activity.⁷ The instantaneous peer-to-peer sharing also allows technologically enabled networks to serve as hybrids in that they do not result in mere "clicktivism" but rather encourage viewers of information to engage in contentious politics.

New media technologies also substantially shift the way that activists can create, distribute, and consume information, which broadens the public sphere

of communication and allows organizers to quickly and cheaply reach a critical mass, in contrast to the one-to-many flow of information through mainstream media.⁸ This is also demonstrative of what Alberto Melucci refers to as the “intermediate public space” through which individuals can politicize issues through dialogue outside of the authorities.⁹

Additionally, Zeynep Tufekci argues that new digital technology and social media can facilitate the development of community in spite of physical distance, creating virtual public spheres and encourage new organizational structures of social movements.¹⁰ New communication tools and mobile technological devices enable citizens to share their stories, break out of their isolation, raise awareness of the issues that concerned them, and to take their rage onto the streets in a collective cause. This new media ecology, and its virtual infrastructure, therefore helps to build networks of coordinated action that are loosely articulated, decentralized, egalitarian and pluralistic.

Shelley Boulainne’s findings, for example, illustrate that the dissemination of information, peer-to-peer through electronic mediums increases the likelihood of participation in protest activity, and what Henry Jenkins calls the “spillover effect.”¹¹ Jeffrey Juris further develops this line of theorizing and refers to these links between new media and activism as “aggregation,” highlighting the importance of community building, or inclusion, through horizontal flows of information in both virtual and physical spaces.¹² Social media, he argues, contributes to the logic of aggregation by facilitating the means through which people from diverse backgrounds can be brought together in physical space and build and sustain solidarity. Furthermore, Juris also acknowledges the impact that independent reporting and media outlets can have on activism as this can threaten the authorities’ ability to control situations that unfold during outbreaks of mass direct action and enables social movement actors to control the narrative of reporting.

In other words, these new types of media potentially offer a mode of communication that is resistant to regulation by authorities. This reduces elites’ capacity to repress the distribution of political communication and enhances a new type of civic engagement at the grassroots level.¹³ Movement activists also have a new source of leverage in political struggles because they can document and circulate instances of excessive force that authorities might use against protesters, and therefore hold them accountable for their actions, which can play a key role in the recruitment of new members to the cause.

THE USE OF ICTs TO SUPPORT SOCIAL JUSTICE ISSUES

Some of the early examples of the relevance of the Internet to social movement campaigns include the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, in 1994, the Students Against Sweatshops campaign in the mid-1990s fighting for corporate social responsibility, the 1999 Battle of Seattle protests against the World Trade Organization in the United States, and the reemergence of the international peace movement following the 9/11 attacks. More recently, social media

has exacerbated the relevance of new digital tools in social movement struggles. The Indignados outbreak of protest activity in Western Europe and Mexico, the Arab Spring uprisings, and the Occupy Wall Street movements are all good illustrations of this.¹⁴

The Zapatista Rebellion

The Zapatistas (armed indigenous Mexicans) which formed the EZLN (Zapatista National Liberation Army) in Chiapas, Mexico declared war on the Mexican government, taking over seven cities in Chiapas in 1994. The next day, however, the Mexican army retaliated and the Zapatistas retreated into the Lacondan jungle.¹⁵ Armed clashes ended on January 12, 1994, with a ceasefire brokered by the Catholic diocese in the capital city of San Cristobal. The uprising coincided with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which threatened their livelihood and sovereignty of the indigenous population in Chiapas.

The Zapatistas were able to utilize the Internet, email, listservs, and various websites to reach an international audience who then mobilized to successfully pressure the Mexican government to adhere to a ceasefire.¹⁶ This struggle demonstrated not only the effectiveness of online communication and organization, but also the symbiotic relationship between alternative and mainstream media. It's not that the Mexican peasants had laptops in the remote jungle. Rather, members of the EZLN passed on hand written statements that were prepared as communiqués for the mass media to supporters. These were mainly Canadian and US activists and reporters who had typed and/or scanned the messages for distribution over the Internet and to be made available for international reporters.¹⁷ The EZLN also assembled widespread supporters in two subsequent intercontinental meetings to promote its sovereignty from the Mexican government. The first was held in Chiapas in 1996 and the second in Spain the following year. Thousands attended from over 40 countries and 5 continents. What was to be discussed, the agenda, and the logistical arrangements were all done through email.

The Zapatistas and their comrades also helped form the Peoples' Global Action Movement (later called the Global Justice Movement) during the 1996 global summit. This facilitated the coordination of international grassroots social movements to work in solidarity to combat other neoliberal policies. For example, the Multilateral Agreement of Investment Treaty (which sought to liberalize cross-border investment and trade restrictions, and therefore greatly expanding the role of investors at the expense of national governments, workers, and the environment) was leaked over the Internet by nongovernmental organizations and disseminated over various listservs leading to international protest and criticism.¹⁸ Also out of this summit came collective organizational strategies to mobilize against the World Trade Organization when it convened in Seattle in 1999 and "days of action" were heavily publicized over the Internet.

The Battle of Seattle

In November 1999 this spillover resulted in the three-day "Battle of Seattle," which was a coalescence of grassroots organizations that mobilized over the Internet globally to successfully shut down the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings. Local police force and public officials were caught off guard as the mobilization was organized exclusively through digital and alternative media. Leading up to the protest, in which over 500,000 activists from all over the world participated, actions were electronically organized via email, bulletin boards, chat rooms, cell phones, and alternative media outlets.¹⁹ Previous to the protests activists created the Independent Media Center (IMC), a world-wide network of Internet activist sites that serves as both news media and a forum for grassroots mobilization under the umbrella of Indymedia.²⁰ The IMC enabled the rapid dissemination of text images, video, audio, and regular updates about the situation in Seattle as they unraveled in real time.

The web also facilitated global and simultaneous protests to coincide with the Seattle disruptive actions. Demonstrations were held in over 80 locations in dozens of countries.²¹ These were organized through the website (<http://www.seattlewto.org/N30>), which put out action alerts and calls for action in ten different languages to provide information regarding how potential participants could contact local directors all over the world to get involved. These protests set a pattern that was followed by demonstrations organized by the Global Justice Movement at nearly every major summit over the next few years that targeted powerful economic/political entities, proposed treaties, regulatory agencies, and trading blocks.

Locally, nationally, and even internationally, nongovernmental organizations, labor unions, faith-based and students groups, and anarchists began organizing and planning well before the action on the street took place.²² The flexible coalition of groups that emerged through wired connections and represented a wide range of interests, from environmental protection, to unfair global trade deals, to labor rights, and consumer rights and protections. Many of these groups meshed under the Direct Action Network (DAN) that had a strategic plan to not only disrupt the meetings but, more importantly, to prohibit the WTO delegates access to the conference site by blocking pivotal streets and intersections. Most activists engaged in nonviolent civil disobedience, though others used violent tactics such as confrontations with the police and destroying property.²³ As the various groups coalesced in a united front on the streets the police were unprepared for the large amount of protesters (estimates are that about 40,000 people participated in the street activity).

The police resorted to violence, firing pepper spray and tear gas at protesters who were blocking intersections but were unsuccessful in dispersing the crowds. As a result, the meetings were canceled. In response, for the next days' meetings the National Guard was called in to assist law enforcement and constructed a no-protest zone preceding the arrival of the protesters. The authorities arrested over 500 people.

The Arab Spring

The Arab Spring, which broke out across parts of the Middle East and North Africa in 2010, took the world by storm. Entrenched dictators who had oppressed their citizens for decades suddenly were under siege and a few were removed from power in a democratic wave that (at least temporarily) hit the region. These uprisings were originally greeted with great optimism throughout the world, yet what we have learned from the Arab Spring is that democracy is not an easy thing to accomplish. To the contrary, in some cases protest has led to the revival of extremist Islamic groups striving to grasp political power, the transfer of political power from one authoritarian form of government to another, or protracted civil war, as is the case in Syria. The long-term outcomes of the Arab Spring revolutions are uncertain, but what is clear is that new media platforms played a significant role (albeit complementary to traditional methods) in the planning and mobilization efforts that brought people onto the streets and posed serious challenges to existing political systems.

Henry Giroux emphasizes the importance of the communication field, and consequently the political environment, in motivating contentious politics. He summarizes, "Alternative newspapers, progressive media, and a profound sense of the political constituent elements of a vibrant, critical formative culture within a wide range of public spheres that have helped nurture and sustain the possibility to think critically, engage in political dissent, organize collectively, and inhabit public spaces in which alternative and critical theories can be developed".²⁴ In essence, he argues that it is the media ecology that can either accelerate or impede serious political discussions and debate, and ultimately facilitate displays of collective behavior.

The Arab Spring social movements highlight the way the digital revolution has greatly expanded the parameters within which groups and individuals can voice concerns, share information, and organize the protest activities. Innovative communication outlets have given social movement actors access to a political terrain within which they can discuss grievances and collectively make demands. The uprisings also require us to modify theories and conceptualizations of collective behavior. The resources, organizational processes and structure, and sources of connectivity and communication that activists rely on are different than they were in earlier eras, as new ICTs and other web-based tools have made self-organizing and flexible grassroots networks possible. Arab Spring helps us to evaluate the role of public and traditional forms of organizing in conjunction with web-based strategies and tactics.

The Arab Spring took place in a region notorious for a lack of institutional mechanisms to identify, take up, and respond to popular demands in a timely manner. In many of these countries, authoritarian regimes have ruled for decades without transparency and with little respect for rule of law, civil rights, or the formal realm of political processes. Thus, when their increasingly agitated and disaffected populace began to scrutinize and make demands of these dictatorial regimes, they were met with violent repression. In cases where the

opposition was able to overthrow the regime, there was little political or civil infrastructure to make for a smooth democratic transition, and most of these countries are still trying to fill the political vacuum.

In each of the cases we discuss, repressive regimes managed to sustain political power in large part through censorship or limiting access to news and information via state-run media.²⁵ Under these circumstances there were few, if any, public channels for citizens to openly discuss grievances or dissent or to resist the ideological control that the political dynasties maintained through their monopoly on traditional media. Therefore, digital media and social networking sites played a critical role in bringing decade-old grievances to light in virtual and public displays of collective behavior. The more visible, or acknowledged, initial campaigns began through wired activism as citizens started to circulate among themselves information that was critical of the government, which enhanced the realm of public discussion, debate, and communicative action through the grassroots distribution of information. In fact, during the protests in Egypt and Tunisia (there is very little aggregate data available for Libya and Syria on the use of new ICTs), most citizens who participated in the Arab Spring reported that they received their information about the revolutions from social media sites (88 percent in Egypt and 94 percent in Tunisia). Of those, 56 percent in Egypt and 59 percent in Tunisia said it had a positive effect in motivating them to sustain their participation in the social movement events. Almost 90 percent of Egyptians and Tunisians surveyed (again, of those who participated in the Arab Spring) in March 2011 said they were using Facebook to organize protests or spread awareness about them.²⁶ As the Dubai School of Government reported, the most popular Twitter hashtags in the Arab region during the first three months of 2011 (when the Arab Spring erupted) were “Egypt,” “Jan 25,” “Libya,” “Bahrain,” and “protest,” all of which provided information and updates about the growing revolutionary fervor across the region.²⁷ There was an international component of the digital activity as well. For example, an analysis of more than 3 million tweets that contained some of the most widely used hashtag codes pertaining to the Arab revolts, such as #Egypt and @sidbouzid, found that the major spikes in usage were driven by tweeters living outside of the Middle East.²⁸

The Arab Spring revolutions, though incomplete, originated from what John Pilger refers to as the “theatre of the impossible.”²⁹ The social, political, and economic contexts of each country are of course distinct, and results of the revolutionary activity in each will take years to discern. What they all demonstrate, however, is that at least initially digital media—a new and critical resource—provided new venues of communication for expressing grievances, an activity that was previously unimaginable in these relatively shielded and oppressed societies. New web-based outlets significantly enhanced the public communication sphere for citizens and led to combative forms of collective behavior that helped sustain the insurgencies. Young people in particular found a safe and anonymous platform for political conversation and discussion in cyberspace, which permitted them to collectively challenge the political and

economic structures and take to the streets *en masse*, where they gained recognition and sympathy and were able to alter public opinion, both nationally and internationally, in their favor.

Occupy Wall Street

Arab Spring has proven to be globally contagious and eventually spread to the United States and provided a springboard for what would become Occupy Wall Street. In a precursor to Occupy Wall Street (OWS), New York Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, stated: “You have a lot of kids graduating college, can’t find jobs. That’s what happened in Cairo. That’s what happened in Madrid. You don’t want to have those kinds of riots here.”³⁰ The members of OWS did not riot in the United States, but they did organize, as tens of thousands orchestrated and sustained protests, demonstrations, and encampments spread across the country in the fall of 2011.

The occupy movements are made up of an assortment of activists; many young, many foreclosed on; many unemployed or underemployed. Under the rubric of the “We are the 99%” campaign, activists began to have genuine discussions about the essential nature of the political and economic systems that they participated in and thus helped legitimize.³¹ There was also increasing awareness that the United States has the largest concentration of wealth since 1928 and is the most unequal of any industrialized country.³² Occupy swept across the country with hundreds of occupations in various forms, the first being the occupation of physical spaces, be they parks, plazas, or outside of Federal buildings. These forms of nonviolent civil disobedience have resulted in over 7,000 arrests in 114 cities across the United States.³³

It only took a few months (in some cases weeks) however, for most tents to be forcibly removed by the police. Then, Occupy 2.0 got underway. The encampments, which originated in New York City, were initiated by the Canadian magazine, *Adbusters* (which is critical of consumerism and the capitalist system in general), when the editors put out a call to Occupy Wall Street in their July edition. The ad asked: “WHAT IS OUR ONE DEMAND? #OCCUPYWALLSTREET SEPTEMBER 17TH. BRING TENT.”³⁴ The same message was sent to the 900,000 “culture jammers” on its listserv. It also sent out an email that read: “America needs its own Tahrir,” and on July 4 it tweeted: “Dear Americans, this July 4th dream of insurrection against corporate rule.” On August 30 the hacktivist group, Anonymous, released a video in support of the call by *Adbusters*. It called its members to “flood lower Manhattan, set up tents, kitchens, peaceful barricades and Occupy Wall Street”.³⁵

[Tumblr.com](#) was instrumental in sparking the protests. It was on this site that the “We are the 99 percent” blog was publishing personal stories of lost jobs, lost homes due to foreclosure, crippling student debt, and a lack government support or accountability to regular citizens.³⁶ This site was key because the shared stories provided citizens with a sociological imagination—understanding

their personal problems as rooted in social issues and structural flaws in the economic and political systems. There were also dozens of wikis and web pages where citizens could further engage in the discussions and planning of OWS. Two of the most popular were OccupyWallst.org (which raised thousands of dollars from dozens of groups and hundreds of individuals who supported the activists in terms of providing food, shelter, and gas mask protection) and howToOccupy.org.³⁷ To organize the various protests, activists also used Meetup.com and Foursquare, two location services that people can download and use on their cellular devices to track schedules of marches, location changes, and alternative routes.³⁸

Following *Adbuster's* call to (nonviolent) arms, on September 17, about 1000 people gathered to occupy the financial district in New York City. One week later they undertook an unpermitted march that began at Zuccotti Park (renamed Liberty Plaza by the occupiers), and the number of participants soared to more than 2500 marchers as it weaved its way through the streets of Lower Manhattan.³⁹ Riot police met the demonstrators, and in the first incident of police violence, a commander was filmed pepper spraying women in the face who were standing on a public sidewalk after being kettled along with many others. The video of the women falling to the ground and screaming in pain went viral, giving the mobilization a boost in terms of recruitment, sympathy, and media coverage. Two days later, the hacker group, Anonymous, leaked the name of the officer.⁴⁰

On November 16, in the middle of the night, police moved in and cleared Zuccotti Park. Reporters were kept blocks away under the guise of security reasons (their own personal safety). In addition to the Occuypstream.com site which provided links to streams following OWS and protests abroad that enabled people worldwide to discuss debate and share information, there were also over 700 Occupy-related channels, with 70 percent of the livestreaming content created on mobile phones, and 89 percent of it viewed on mobile phones.⁴¹

Throughout the encampments, NYC organizers also continuously updated Livestream news in the form of videos and photos onto their Twitter account, #OccupyWallST. It had over 90,000 followers and was liked by over 300,000 worldwide on Facebook.⁴² More than 100 accounts on Twitter existed with tens of thousands of followers that collaborated under the hashtag #OWS. The main account, @occupywallstnyc, had over 100,000 followers. #Occupy and #occupywallstreet hashtags organized events through websites such as Occupy together.⁴³ YouTube also helped to keep OWS sustainable. There were 1.7 million YouTube videos, viewed 72 million times that were tagged with the keyword "occupy" in YouTube's news and politics section.⁴⁴ There were also over 400 Facebook pages for Occupy, and 2.7 million fans around the world.⁴⁵

Authorities have also proven to be savvy in their use of new technology in counter actions. For instance, during the Occupy Oakland protests, they collected photos of occupiers at demonstrations and then identified these individuals at subsequent protests, and specifically ones with prior arrests to

threaten them. On January 4 Occupy Oakland media committee photographer Adam Katz, who was arrested while filming the raid of the disencampments and charged with obstruction of justice, was singled out by the police at a later demonstration. He contended, "Officers who knew my name, and knew that I took pictures, deliberately went after me and arrested me under completely false pretenses."⁴⁶ In another instance, during a January 15 General Assembly in the plaza, police approached an occupier and showed him his photo in a book they had, informing him that they knew he was on probation.⁴⁷

In light of the massive arrests in NYC and Oakland, tech-savvy activists have come up with yet another innovative device to counter police repression. There is now an app called, "I'm getting Arrested" which allows users to send messages immediately to friends, family, and a lawyer by creating a custom message beforehand with a set of contacts already established.⁴⁸ As individuals are arrested, they can tap the bull's-eye on the app to notify those contacts regarding their whereabouts.

The Black Lives Matter and #MeToo Social Movements

Below we use two more contemporary case studies that demonstrate how online activity can increase awareness about social justice issues, help recruit supporters, offer nuanced organizational structures, and result in the spillover effect by serving as a hybrid between online and offline activism.

The #MeToo social movement exploded over the last year. However, this is not an all-of-a sudden spontaneous outbreak of protest activity advocating for an end to assault, harassment, and other gendered forms of discrimination in the work force. In fact, it started in 2006 as an advocacy group to address sexual violence through the perspective of victims as a challenge to the impunity that male sexual predators are often granted.⁴⁹ Expanding on the groundwork that was already set, Alyssa Milano tweeted, on October 15, 2017, "If you've been sexually harassed or assaulted write 'me too' as a reply to this tweet."⁵⁰ The hashtag reached 1.2 million Twitter users in the next four days, and later was picked up and used by Facebook and Instagram users. Globally, the hashtag resulted in 1.7 million tweets across 85 countries.⁵¹

In 2017 *Time Magazine* awarded the Person of the Year award to "The Silence Breakers," recognizing individuals who shared their stories of sexual harassment and assault, and helped to grow a nationwide social movement.⁵² Not covered in the mainstream press originally, as gatekeepers and payoffs silenced women's voices, it took online organizing for victims to break free of their isolation and build solidarity through shared stories. As a result, in all industries and spheres of social life, powerful men have been brought down. This started with media mogul Harvey Weinstein which had a domino effect; some of the most notable to be fired or forced into resignation are Matt Lauer of the Today Show, talk show host Charlie Rose, and Senator Al Franken.

The power of the online activism through the shared hashtag, #MeToo supports Marco Giungi's contention that the ability of weak ties across diverse

networks of people and groups, many of whom receive the information through online sources that they would not likely receive through another venue, was a key resource in galvanizing this issue and support for the victims.⁵³ This intermediate public space, which Alberto Melucci points to allowed the women and their supporters to politicize the issue of systematic sexual discrimination and harassment outside of formal outlets through their ability to subvert authorities who control the mainstream media and other institutions.⁵⁴

The Black Lives Matter social movement was also initiated by females in 2013. Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi set the movement in motion and caught momentum through the online organizing and journalism of Mojos. The grievances were the large and growing number of unarmed black males being shot and killed by police officers and the lack of accountability for police forces. The hashtag #BlackLivesMatter took off after George Zimmerman, accused of shooting unarmed African American teen Trayvon Martin, was acquitted of the crime. Through the hashtag, organizers planned vigils, street protests, demonstrations, and rallies.⁵⁵ Numerous websites and blogs were also established for survivors, relatives, and friends of victims to share their stories. Thus, the organizers moved beyond traditional forms of online activism such as electronic petitions through sites such as Change.org and aggressively used mediums that included Twitter, Tumblr, Facebook, and a website they created to organize the public demonstrations. Between 2013 and 2016, the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter was shared over 11.8 million times on Twitter.⁵⁶

The first concrete form of protest took place in August of 2014 when Black Lives Matter participants organized a Black Lives Matter Freedom Ride to Ferguson, MO to engage in civil disobedience. This followed the death of Michael Brown who was unarmed and shot and killed by a police officer. What made the killing so dramatic to many was that Mojos, using their cellphones captured images of Brown who was dead and left on the street for hours before his body was recovered and taken to the morgue. These images were globally shared through Twitter and Facebook, and invigorated support for the movement as tens of thousands of activists protested across the country, capturing the attention of the mainstream press. In response to the huge outcry of the activists and their supporters, the US Department of Justice has been forced to investigate police misconduct in several major cities across the United States, and in 2014 the US Congress introduced and passed a bill that requires states to document and report all shootings and fatalities by police officers that “occur in the process of arrest.”⁵⁷

These organizational strategies and tactics are illustrative of how mediated forms of communication often complement, rather than replace collective identity and diminish collective behavior in public spaces as Victoria Carty and also Shelley Boulainne contend.⁵⁸ Oftentimes peer-to-peer sharing enables online networks to serve as hybrids in that they encourage receptors of online information to engage in contentious politics on the street as Henry Jenkin’s research suggestions.⁵⁹ These strategies further support Zeynep Tufekci’s assertion that digital technology can foster community despite physical distance by

creating virtual public spheres and enabling new organizational structures for social movement participants.⁶⁰ These cases demonstrate how new digital tools allow citizens to share their stories, raise awareness of issues that are important to them, and collectively protest, which Jeffery Juris refers to as “aggregation” by building inclusion, solidarity, and community in physical spaces despite distinct geographical locations.⁶¹

A very recent occurrence as this book goes to press, which further supports these findings is the March for Our Lives demonstrations that took place on March 24, 2018. In Washington, D.C. alone the estimates are that 800,000 people participated in the massive demonstrations that took place few hundred yards from the capitol building, mostly by students and young people. There were hundreds of other rallies and protests across the country and the world, that were organized both online and by word of mouth. These demonstrations are part of what activists are calling the “Never Again Movement,” a struggle to call out politicians to go beyond the “thoughts and prayers” rhetoric after mass school shootings and to actually change the gun laws, and it is the first generation that is vehemently taking on the National Rifle Association (NRA’s) roll in electoral politics. Calling the massive demonstrations just the beginning of this movement, students have begun voting registration drives to encourage young people to vote once they are 18, and to consider where politicians stand on gun control, and money that they receive from the NRA, a focal point of their voting decision.

Social Media as a Tool of White Supremacists

The Internet and social media are also fueling recruitment strategies, new organizational structures, and fundraising techniques as critical resources among hate groups. Indeed, new ICTs serve as a perfect tool for the spread of racist and otherwise hateful ideas among individuals who take advantage of the anonymity of online tools, social media, and messaging boards. For example, between 2014 and 2015, the number of “likes” on hate group tweets and comments tripled, and between 2015 and 2016, they once again tripled, demonstrating how they are exponentially gaining traction among supporters, if not membership and participation in public, street-based demonstrations.⁶²

The Southern Poverty Law Center estimates that there are over 900 hate groups currently active in the United States, and most of the individuals who participate in online discussions and activity are not necessarily affiliated with any one group.⁶³ This gives us some insights into how the organizational structure of social movements is affected by new ICTs. Some refer to these new structures as “social movement communities” as opposed to the traditional organizational style of social movement organizations in that they are fluid and malleable and do not require formal membership, dues, or attendance in meetings as traditional types of social movement organizations did.⁶⁴

In terms of recruitment and organizing, the alt-right movement uses websites such as Stormfront, 4chan, Reddit, Patreon, and even Twitter to radicalize people, and young white males in particular. The design of the various sites

through messages, videos, and chat rooms is intended to convince or reinforce the feeling that white males are victims in the current cultural environment that embraces diversity, multiculturalism, and gender equality. They also engage in direct action to protect their white and cultural heritage and identity. The Southern Poverty Law Center highlighted a significant increase in hate crimes during the 2016 presidential campaign, and another large spike after Donald Trump was elected president.⁶⁵ Given the racist and misogynist rhetoric that Trump used while campaigning and continues to use in office—his insistence on building a wall to keep Mexican “rapists” and “criminals” out, his attempted ban on immigrants coming from Muslim majority countries, and the denigration of women is emboldening groups that hold similar bigoted attitudes to express and act on their beliefs assuming that this is acceptable and legitimate in the new political and cultural terrain.

Another online tool that white supremacist groups and individuals are utilizing are crowdfunding sources.⁶⁶ Alt-right members (e.g., the founder of the term alt-right, Sean Spencer) receive donations through sites such as Patreon, PayPal, GoFundMe, and several others. However, many websites are beginning to disarm portals and subjects in reaction to accusations of enabling propaganda to spread on their sites with hate speech, offensive content, and misinformation. When administrators of these platforms started to monitor and close out some of their campaigns, members of the alt-right created Hatreon, a site that blatantly espouses a neo-Nazi agenda, among several others that attempt to branch out to the wider culture of white supremacy.

Another online website called Gab posted this message to try to recruit members and frames its message in an unequivocal manner by declaring: “We refuse to be shunned and shamed for our core values and beliefs ... We fight to defend the freedom that you are putting in jeopardy of sake of faux diversity, control and political correctness ... The rise of nationalism, populism, and patriotism around the world is in response to the failed policies of the globalist agenda ... The free speech tech revolution has begun.”⁶⁷

“Roadshow” protests are another outgrowth of online recruitment and organizational strategies in the white supremacist movement. These are planned online in an attempt to bring outside agitators to support white nationalist rallies in local communities while making sure there is a clear strategy and script to follow. For example, on the website Occidental Dissent, organizers give specific recommendations of what to wear (khakis and polo shirts so as to look respectable), chants to use such as “you will not replace us” and “blood and soil,” and advice on what kinds of signs/symbolic imagery to use.⁶⁸ The roadshows accomplish two goals. Through the spillover effect—organizing online and using public spaces to demonstrate in large numbers—a united and committed gathering of white nationalists may be perceived by the larger community as a legitimate social movement. Second, the role of outsiders can provide cover for locals who support the cause, but do not want to be seen at these kinds of protest activities in their own communities for fear of reprisal. One of these forms of retribution is the online tactic of doxing, which will be discussed in the next section.

What is very interesting about the alt-right and white nationalist groups is that they turn some of the analyses of how social movements can be enabled by new technologies in struggles for social justice on their head by exposing the dark side of the Internet and new ICTs. As the literature on social movements affirms, activist groups form social networks, and their relational ties, established and sustained through mediated forms of communication, serve as an important recruitment tool. This is certainly what white nationalist groups are doing, and doing well. They also perfectly illustrate the spillover effect, particularly with the popularity of the roadshows instigated and planned in the intermediate public space through online tools.

Furthermore, as Jeffery Juris and Lance Bennett and Shanto Iyengar argue, independent reporting can threaten authorities' ability to control situations on the ground and to control the narrative of reporting through the work of Mojos, thus resisting the regulation of authorities and elites' ability to repress the distribution of political communication and civic engagement.⁶⁹ With the alt-right, in the name of freedom of speech, supporters of the online dialogue are similarly dodging the monitoring attempts by abandoning more traditional websites and creating their own in an attempt to control the narrative. Therefore, they are confronting elites and gatekeepers of information not for the purpose of exposing injustice but in order to enable and reinforce it through rhetoric and public demonstrations based on a hateful platform and ideology.

HACKTIVISM AND OTHER FORMS OF ELECTRONIC ACTIVISM

Hactivism is a form of cyber activism and in the broadest sense, typically refers to individuals breaking into information systems and compromising data.⁷⁰ Cyberterrorism (the most aggressive and destructive form of hactivism) consists of illegal attacks or threats of sabotage against computers, networks, and stored data to intimidate or coerce a government, business, or individual to further a political or social objective.⁷¹ Spamming refers to the illegal use of electronic messaging systems to send unsolicited bulk messages. These are often sent through zombie networks—meaning the networks are infected with a virus that originated with a particular computer and can spread rapidly.⁷² Email bombing is another tactic which refers to sending emails with large file attachments to the target's email address to flood the server.

Some forms of hactivism include electronic forms of civil disobedience such as virtual sit-ins, whereby occupation/blockading takes place in the virtual sphere rather than in a particular building or public space.⁷³ By repeatedly reloading a website at the same time activists generate a vast amount of traffic and cause technical problems for the server and can ultimately crash a target's website. Unlike traditional forms of civil disobedience, anyone can partake in virtual blockades from wherever they have access to a computer, and the target may be located anywhere. Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) is one of the leading online groups that organize these kinds of virtual sit-ins by publicly distributing an app called FloodNet that reloads requests to the targeted website

every few seconds. FloodNet is an engine that uses software that automates the repeated simultaneous multiple keystrokes, effectively blocking a website. This was used successfully during the Battle of Seattle demonstrations in 1999 and effectively shut down the meetings in the streets.

Other hackers create fake websites (or website parodies), copying the graphic design of the original but altering the content. Successful mock websites often employ a similar domain name (or URL) to cause confusion among people trying to access the legitimate site.⁷⁴ What makes these perpetrators hard to thwart or to prosecute is the use of zombie networks to hide their identity. Other hackers spread memes, which are ideas, actions, or styles that spread through a culture in a manner analogous to genes in a biological system. Individuals who spread memes are often called culture jammers, thriving on symbolic forms of protest and resistance. They typically consist of loosely organized networks of friendships or random groups of activists who operate alone.

One of the most advanced among these types of hackers is a group called the Yes Men. Participants in this group create parody websites that are particularly critical of corporations and governmental entities that they view as corrupt. They have impersonated the United States Chamber of Commerce, the leadership of the World Trade Organization, and dozens of other government and corporate officials.⁷⁵ They temporarily drove millions of dollars off Dow Chemical Company's stock value by posting a false news report on a faked *BBC World News* site that Dow was taking responsibility for the 1984 Bhopal disaster (a major gas leak at one of their Indian facilities, which was classified as one of the worst industrial catastrophes) that killed over 15,000 people and would compensate the families affected.

Another very popular hacking group is called Anonymous. This is an enigmatic, leaderless, decentralized global online entity which is energized by a host of causes. On its website it states that it "is committed to freedom of information and the right of people to be informed about what the government is doing in their name." It is an amalgamation of people who are drawn together through a shared affinity for pranks (trolling) to affect social and political change. Any individual who tags him- or herself "Anonymous" can carry out an attack in its name.⁷⁶ Anonymous first gained recognition in 2008 when it confronted the Church of Scientology.

On January 14 of that year a promotional video (produced by the church) featuring actor Tom Cruise was posted without church authorization on YouTube and other social networking sites and quickly became a popular meme. The church asked that the video be taken down from YouTube as well as the various other sites which reported it and threatened legal action for copyright infringement. This backfired as the video proliferated across many more sites with continuous repostings defended under the Fair Use Doctrine. The church claimed the video was posted through pirated means.⁷⁷ Subsequently, YouTube was forced to remove it under the threat of litigation, but the website Gawker.com, loosely associated with Anonymous, refused to give in to threats and further circulated the video.⁷⁸

Hacktivism and other forms of cyber activism is also challenging traditional forms of journalism and redefining the act of whistleblowing. For example, Lulz Security or LulzSec is a global hacker collective that released many “data-dumps” and goes beyond mere pranks to expose what members perceive to be fundamental flaws in economic, political, and legal systems. In one instance, it targeted authorities in the state of Arizona for being a “racial-profiling, anti-immigrant police state.” Participants released private intelligence bulletins, training manuals, personal email correspondence, names, phone numbers, addresses and passwords that belonged to members of the Arizona State law enforcement.⁷⁹

This is very similar to doxing. The use of doxing originated as a slang term among hackers for posting private documents and information on a forum to harass and condemn certain actions and ideas.⁸⁰ Current occurrences such as Charlottesville redirected this tool of doxing by tainting the alt-right. Several of the participants in the Charlottesville riot, or the “Unite the Right” weekend, were outed through doxing. This was initiated by a Twitter user @YesYoureRacist who sent out a tweet asking for viewers of the message to identify “Nazis marching in Charlottesville.”⁸¹ It included photos and videos of the protest. The “shaming” campaign was successful as thousands responded to the tweet (and other Internet users mimicked this campaign on their own), though inevitably there were many people who were misidentified as being at the rally and faced a public backlash.

WikiLeaks is another leaderless and now well-known organization that was established in 2006 when a handful of anonymous individuals associated with the group published classified information and demanded more transparency regarding government policy. It has redefined whistleblowing by gathering secrets and then releasing them instantly and globally. It first distributed thousands of restricted US diplomatic cable wires on its own website and then made them available in its archives for download through peer-to-peer sharing.⁸² Its disclosure of thousands of US government documents showed hackers that they could use their skills to participate in a new way in the public sphere, serving as a driving force in the transformation of journalism in the digital age. One of the most revealing reports was a classified video that depicted US troops shooting civilians (including two Reuter’s reporters) in Iraq from an Apache helicopter in July of 2007, and then celebrating the attack. The video was published online on April 5, 2010. Chelsea (formerly known as Bradley) Manning, the US officer who leaked the government documents, uploaded around 700,000 classified US military and diplomatic documents to WikiLeaks, which then made them available to a select few news outlets.

WikiLeaks also caused a stir during the 2016 presidential campaign in the United States. Affiliates of the Russian Government hacked into the Democratic National Committee’s servers in July of 2016 and obtained then-candidate Hillary Clinton’s emails and sent this information to WikiLeaks in the hopes that it would be distributed to the mainstream press.⁸³ Indeed, during the campaign Donald Trump publicly encouraged Russians to hack and release

Clinton's emails. This has come back to haunt the now elected President Trump in light of the Special Council and two Congressional investigations into potential collusion with the Russian Government.

CONCLUSION

The arsenal that activists have in their repertoire of contention is a key component to any social movement. The Internet and social media have greatly enhanced the tool kit that activists have at their disposal. Although access to mainstream media is by no means insignificant for today's forms of collective behavior, it is no longer the most important ingredient in making for a successful campaign in terms of increasing awareness about an issue, getting recognition, influencing public sentiment, achieving legitimacy, and recruiting new supporters.

The newly arrived digital media platforms provide a new source of political energy and communicative action as they create distinct ways for individuals to engage in political discussion in virtual public spheres and to organize collectively. Because the communication field is vastly expanding, sources of connectivity among activists now evolve through diffuse networks of peer-to-peer information sharing and commentary. These innovative forms of communication in this new technological landscape also result in new kinds of journalism and whistleblowing. New digital capabilities allow for novel terrains within which to capture and leak sensitive information to the public, something that the mainstream press is often unwilling to do, or incapable of doing.

As the highly visible movement mobilizations utilizing social media and new technologies that led to the protests and rebellions of the early twenty-first century (e.g., the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street), the various roles these new technologies of digital media have played demonstrate that the social movements of the future will increasingly facilitate greater awareness of the social bases of oppression. It is around these issues that movement activists and their organizations will act to mobilize large numbers of affected populations in participating in mass actions to fight against all forms of oppression in their struggle for social justice.

NOTES

1. Brian Stelter, "Upending Anonymity, These Days the Web Unmasks Everyone," *The New York Times* (2011). <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/us/21anonymity.html>.
2. Jennifer Earl, "The Dynamics of Protest-related Diffusion on the Web," *Information, Communication and Society* (2010), pp. 209–225.
3. Manuel Castells, *The Information City: Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban Regional Process* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
4. Sidney Verba, Kay Sclozman and Henry Brady, *Voice and Inequality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

5. Roger Gould, "Collective Action and Network Structure," *American Sociological Review* (1993), pp. 182–196.
6. Marco Giugni, "Was it worth the effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology*. (1998), pp. 371–393.
7. Mathew Hindman, "Open-Source Politics Reconsidered: Emerging Patterns in Online Political Participation." In Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and David Lazer (eds.), *Governance and Information Technology: From Electronic Government to Information Government* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), pp. 143–170. Tim Jordan and Paul Taylor, *Hactivism and Cyberwar: Rebels with a Cause?* (New York: Routledge, 2004). Victoria Carty, *Social Movements and New Technology* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2015). Shelley Boulainne, "Does Internet Use Affect Engagement: A Meta-Analysis of Research," *Political Communication* (2009), pp. 193–211.
8. Richard Kahn and Kellner Douglas, "Internet Subcultures and Oppositional Politics." In David Muggleton (ed.), *The Post-subcultures Reader* (London, UK: Berg Publishers, 2003), pp. 299–314.
9. Alberto Melucci, "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach," *Social Science Information* (1980), pp. 199–226.
10. Zeynep Tüfekçi, "New Media and the People-powered Uprisings," *MIT Technology Review*. (2012). <http://www.technologyreview.com/view/425280/new-media-and-the-people-powered-uprisings>.
11. Boulainne, *Political Communication* 26 (2) (2009), pp. 193–211. Henry Jenkins, *Convergence Culture* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2006).
12. Jeffrey S. Juris, "Embodying Protest: Culture and Performance within Social Movements." In Britta Baumgarten, Priska Daphi, and Peter Ullrich (eds.), *Conceptualizing Culture in Social Movement Research* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 227–246.
13. Lance W. Bennett and Shanto Iyengar, "A New Era of Minimal Effects? The Changing Foundations of Political Communication," *Journal of Communication* (2008). pp. 707–731.
14. Carty, *Social Movements and New Technology*.
15. Harry Cleaver, "The Zapatista Effect: The Internet and Rise of an Alternative Fabric." *Journal of International Affairs* (1998), pp. 621–640.
16. Maria Garrido and Alexander Halavais, "Mapping Networks of Support for the Zapatista Movement: Applying Social-Networks Analysis to Study Contemporary Social Movements" In Martha McCaughey and Michael Ayers (eds.), *Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice* (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 165–184.
17. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror," *The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999).
18. Stephen Kobrin, "The Clash of Globalizations," *Foreign Policy*. (1998). pp. 97–109.
19. David Kidd, "Indymedia: A New Communications Commons." In McCaughey and Ayers, *Cyberactivism*, pp. 47–69.
20. Howard Rheingold, *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution*. (Cambridge, MA: Basic Books, 2002).
21. Rheingold, *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution*.

22. John Berg, "1999 Seattle WTO Protests," on Revolvy.Com. *LLC Revolvy*. (2003). <https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=1999>. Seattle WTO protests&item_type=topic.
23. Berg, "1999 Seattle WTO protests" on Revolvy.Com. *LLC Revolvy*.
24. Hemy Gioux, *Disposable Youth: Racialized Memories and the Culture of Cruelty* (New York: Routledge, 2012).
25. Muzammil Hussain and Philip Howard, *Democracy's Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
26. Carol Huang, "Facebook and Twitter key to Arab Spring Uprisings: Report." (2011). <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/facebook-and-twitter-key-to-arab-spring-uprisings-report-1.428773>.
27. Arab Social Media Report, (2011). <http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/home/index.aspx/News/description.aspx?NewId=11&Primenodid+15&mn o=Pri>.
28. Ekaterina Stepanova, "The Role of Information Communication Technologies in the 'Arab Spring': Implications Beyond the Region." *PONARS Eurasia policy memo no. 159*. (2011). http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_159.pdf.
29. John Pilger, "The Egyptian Revolt is Coming Home." *johnpilger.com*. (2011). <http://johnpilger.com/articles/the-egyptian-revolt-is-coming-home>.
30. Adam Goodman, "Undocumented and Unafraid," *Salon* (2012). http://www.salon.com/2012/03/29/immigration_activists_announce_theyre_undocumented_and_unafraid/.
31. Bob Herbert, "Occupy Wall Street's Cry of the Heart," *The Nation*. (2011). <https://www.thenation.com/article/bob-herbert-occupy-wall-streets-cry-heart-2/>.
32. Peter Dreier, "Organizing in the Obama Years: A Progressive Moment or a New Progressive Era?" *COMM-ORG: The On-Line Conference on Community Organizing and Development*. (2007). <http://comm-org.wisc.edu/papers2009/dreier.htm#ntroduction>.
33. *All Occupy Arrests*. (2014). <https://www.stpete4peace.org/occupyarrests>.
34. Mattathias Schwartz, *Pre-Occupied*. (2017). <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/11/28/pre-occupied>.
35. Michael Saba, "Twitter #occupywallstreet Movement Aims to Mimic Iran." *CNN*. (2011) http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-16/tech/tech_social-media_twitter-occupy-wall-street_1_social-media-protest-campaign-financial-district?s=PM:TECH.
36. Adam Weinstein, "We Are the 99 Percent," *Creators Revealed*. (2017). <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/10/we-are-the-99-percent-creators/>
37. Jennifer Preston, "Occupy Video Showcases Live Streaming." *The New York Times*. (2011). <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/business/media/occupy-movement-shows-potential-of-live-online-video.html>.
38. James Glanz and John Markoff, "U.S. Underwrites Internet Detour Around Censors." *The New York Times* (2011). <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/12/world/12internet.html?pagewanted=all>.
39. Colin Moynihan, "Scores Arrested as the Police clear Zuccotti Park," *The New York Times*. (2012). <http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/arrests-made-as-protesters-mark-occupy-wall-streets-six-month-anniversary/?gwh=C02DE6828ECC37418434AE2A7F1C67A4>.

40. Jennifer Preston, "Movement Began With Outrage and a Facebook Page That Gave It an Outlet," *The New York Times*. (2011). <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/middleeast/06face.html?pagewanted=all>.
41. Ben Berkowitz, "From a Single Hashtag, a Protest Circled the World," *Brisbane Times*. (2011). <http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/technology/technology-news/from-a-single-hashtag-a-protest-circled-the-world-20111019-1m72j.html>.
42. Saba, "Wall Street Protesters Inspired by Arab Spring Movement." *CNN*.
43. "Free Speech and the Internet." *The New York Times – Editorial*. (2011). <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/opinion/04mon3.html>.
44. "Global May Manifesto: Statement from International Activists with Occupy, Other Groups." *AlterNet*. (2012). <http://www.alternet.org/newsandviews/article/928183/>.
45. "Global May Manifesto': Statement from International Activists with Occupy, Other Groups." *AlterNet*.
46. Susie Cagle. "'Empty Buildings are the Crime': Occupy SF Commune Evicted After One Day," *Truthout* (2012). <http://truth-out.org/news/item/8294-occupy-sf-commune>.
47. Cagle, "Empty Buildings are the Crime," *Truthout*.
48. Aylin Zafar. "Occupy Wall Street Inspires 'I'm Getting Arrested' Android App." *TIME*. (2011). <http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/10/17/occupy-wall-street-inspires-im-getting-arrested-android-app/>.
49. Lauren Gambino. "Women's March and #MeToo Leaders see Progress—but We're in a Hell of a Fight." (2017). <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/29/womens-march-tamika-mallory-feminism-2017>.
50. Jen Gerson. "Jen Gerson: I mean no disrespect When I say that I Have a Problem with #MeToo." (2017). <http://nationalpost.com/opinion/jen-gerson-the-problem-with-metoo-it-holds-the-wrong-people-responsible-for-sex-assault>.
51. Nick Buxton. "Ten Amazing Social Movement Struggles in 2017 that Gave us Reason to Hope." *Truthout*. (2017). <https://www.commondreams.org/views/2017/12/20/10-amazing-social-movement-struggles-2017-give-us-reason-hope>.
52. Lindsey Bever and Abby Ohlheiser, "Time's Person of the Year: 'The Silence Breakers' for Speaking out against Sexual Harassment," *The Washington Post*. (2017). https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/12/06/times-person-of-the-year-the-silence-breakers-for-speaking-out-against-sexual-harassment/?utm_term=.a38d092abc20.
53. Giugni, "Was it Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology*, pp. 371–393.
54. Alberto Melucci, "Collective Action and Discourse." *Challenging codes* (1996). pp. 348–360. <http://voidnetwork.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Challenging-Codes-Collective-Collective-action-in-the-information-age-by-Alberto-Melucci.pdf>.
55. Niraj Chokshi, "How #BlackLivesMatter Came to Define a Movement," *New York Times* (2016). <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/us/how-black-livesmatter-came-to-define-a-movement.html>.
56. Monica Anderson and Paul Hitlin, "The Hashtag #BlackLives Matter Emerges: Social Activism on Twitter" (2016). <http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/08/15/the-hashtag-blacklivesmatter-emerges-social-activism-on-twitter/>.

57. Josh Hafner, "How Michael Brown's Death, two Years Ago, Pushed the #BlackLivesMatter into a Movement," *USA Today*. (2016). <https://www.usa-today.com/story/news/nation-now/2016/08/08/how-michael-browns-death-two-years-ago-pushed-blacklivesmatter-into-movement/88424366/>.
58. Boulainne, *Political Communication* 26 (2) (2009), pp. 193–211. Carty, *Social Movements and New technology*.
59. Henry Jenkins, Katie Clinton, Ravi Purushotma, Alice J. Robinson, and Margaret Weigel, "Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media Education for the 21st Century." (2006). [http://www.digitallearning.macfound.org/atf/cf/%7B7E45C7E0-A3E0-4B89-AC9C-E807E1B0AE4E%7D/JENKINS WHITE PAPER.PDF](http://www.digitallearning.macfound.org/atf/cf/%7B7E45C7E0-A3E0-4B89-AC9C-E807E1B0AE4E%7D/JENKINS%20WHITE%20PAPER.PDF).
60. Tüfekçi, "Social Media," *Journal of Communication*.
61. Juris, "Embodying Protest," pp. 227–246.
62. Madelaine Eversley, "Hate Groups Explode on Social Media," *USA Today* (2017). <http://www.wtsp.com/news/nation-now/hate-groups-explode-on-social-media/413846089>.
63. Southern Poverty Law Center (2018). <https://www.splcenter.org/>.
64. Eva Wollenberg, Marcus Colchester, and Tom Griffiths, "Linking Social Movements: How International Networks Can Better Support Community Action About Forests," *International Forestry Review* (2006). pp. 265–272.
65. Southern Poverty Law Center (2018). <https://www.splcenter.org/>.
66. Kali Holloway, "White Communities Need to Do More to Ferret Out Terrorists in their Midst," *AlterNet* (2017). <https://www.alternet.org/right-wing/white-communities-need-do-more-ferret-out-terrorists-their-midst>.
67. Alan Blinder, "A Roadshow of Hate: Supremacist Rallies Fueled by Travelers from Afar," *New York Times*. (2017). <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/us/white-supremacists-rallies.html>.
68. Jennifer Earl, Katrina Kimport, Greg Prieto, Carly Rush and Kimberly Reynoso, "Changing the World One Webpage at a Time: Conceptualizing and explaining 'Internet Activism'," *Mobilization*. (2010), pp. 425–446.
69. Juris, "Embodying Protest," pp. 227–246; Bennett, et al., "A New Era of Minimal Effects," *Journal of Communication*, pp. 707–731.
70. Dorothy Denning. "Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy." in Hohn Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (ed.) *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2010), pp. 239–288. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/MR1382.ch8.pdf.
71. Sandor Veigh, "Classifying forms of Online Activism: The case of Cyber Protests against the World Bank," in McCaughey, M. and Ayers, M. (ed.), *Cyberactivism* (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 71–96.
72. Stefan Wray, "On electronic Civil Disobedience," *Peace Review* (1999), pp. 11–91, 107–111.
73. Kalle Lasn, *The Culture Jam: The Uncooling of America*. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1999).
74. Lasn, *The Culture Jam*.
75. Douglas Britt, "The Yes Men Infiltrate Diverse Networks," *Houston Chronicle*. (2010). <http://www.chron.com/entertainment/article/The-Yes-Men-infiltrate-diverseWorks-1712890>.

76. Somini Sengupta, "The Soul of the New Hacktivist," *The New York Times*. (2012). <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/sunday-review/the-soul-of-the-new-hacktivism.html>.
77. Dan Warner, "'Anonymous' Threatens to 'Dismantle' Church of Scientology via Internet," *APC Magazine*. (2008). http://apcmag.com/anonymous-threatens_to_dismantle_church_of_scientology_via_internet.htm.
78. Gerald Himmelein, "Anonymous vs. Scientology: Tom Cruise," *Heise Online*. (2009). <https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Anonymous-vs-Scientology-Tom-Cruise-signiert-Maske-748264.html>.
79. Adam Estes, "LulzSec Document Release Targets Arizona Law Enforcement," *The Atlantic Wire* (2011). <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/fbi-says-lulzsec-hacker-kingpin-was-informant/330907/>.
80. Nellie Bowles, "How Doxing Became a Mainstream Tool in the Culture Wars," *New York Times* (2017). <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/technology/doxing-protests.html>.
81. Avi Selk, "A Twitter Campaign is Outing People who Marched with White Nationalists in Charlottesville," *The Washington Post* (2017). https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesvilletimeline/?utm_term=.e3d86208e31.
82. Agence France Presse, "Tens of Thousands Throng to London to Protest Iraq War. (2012). <http://rense.com/general58/prorot.htm>.
83. Steve Eder, "We Need to Clean This Up: Clinton Aide's Newly Public Email Shows Concern," *New York Times* (2016). <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/politics/wikileaks-hillary-clinton-emails.html>.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, Monica, and Paul Hitlin. 2017. The Hashtag #BlackLives Matter Emerges: Social Activism on Twitter. <http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/08/15/the-hashtagblacklivesmatter-emerges-social-activism-on-twitter/>. Accessed 1 Dec 2017.
- Bever, Lindsey, and Abby Ohlheiser. 2017. Time's Person of the Year: 'The Silence Breakers' for Speaking out against Sexual Harassment. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/12/06/times-person-of-the-year-the-silence-breakers-for-speaking-out-against-sexual-harassment/?utm_term=.a38d092abc20. Accessed 22 Dec 2017.
- Blinder, Alan. 2017. A Roadshow of Hate: Supremacist Rallies Fueled by Travelers from Afar. *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/us/white-supremacists-rallies.html>. Accessed 20 Dec 2017.
- Boulainne, Shelley. 2009. Does Internet Use affect Engagement: A Meta-Analysis of Research. *Political Communication* 26 (2): 193–211.
- Bowles, Nellie. 2017. How Doxing Became a Mainstream Tool in the Culture Wars. *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/technology/doxing-protests.html>. Accessed 30 Nov 2017.
- Buxton, Nick. 2017. Ten Amazing Social Movement Struggles in 2017 that Gave us Reason to Hope. *Truthout*. <https://www.commondreams.org/views/2017/12/20/10-amazing-social-movement-struggles-2017-give-us-reason-hope>. Accessed 27 Dec 2017.
- Carty, Victoria. 2015. *New Technology and Social Movements*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- Castells, Manuel. 1989. *The Information City: Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban Regional Process*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Chokshi, Niraj. 2016. How #BlackLivesMatter Came to Define a Movement. *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/us/how-blacklivesmatter-came-to-define-a-movement.html>. Accessed 7 Nov 2017.
- Denning, Dorothy. 2010. Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy. In *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror*, ed. Hohn Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/MR1382.ch8.pdf. Accessed 4 Aug 2013.
- Earl, Jennifer, Katrina Kimport, Greg Prieto, Carly Rush, and Kimberly Reynoso. 2010. Changing the World One Webpage at a Time: Conceptualizing and Explaining 'Internet Activism'. *Mobilization* 15 (4): 425–446.
- Earl, Jennifer. 2010. The Dynamics of Protest-related Diffusion on the Web. *Information, Communication and Society* 13 (2): 209–225.
- Eder, Steve. 2016. We Need to Clean This Up: Clinton Aide's Newly Public Email Shows Concern. *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/politics/wikileaks-hillary-clintonemails.html>. Accessed 23 Nov 2017.
- Estes, Adam. 2011. LulzSec Document Release Targets Arizona Law Enforcement. *The Atlantic Wire*, Jun 23. <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/fbi-says-lulzsec-hacker-kingpin-was-informant/330907/>. Accessed 2 Jan 2018.
- Eversley, Madelaine. 2017. Hate Groups Explode on Social Media. *USA Today*. <http://www.wtsp.com/news/nation-now/hate-groups-explode-on-social-media/413846089>. Accessed 2 Jan 2018.
- Gambino, Lauren. 2017. Women's March and #MeToo Leaders See Progress – But We're in a Hell of a Fight. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/29/womens-march-tamika-mallory-feminism-2017>. Accessed 31 Dec 2017.
- Garrett, K. 2006. Protest in an Information Society: A Review of Literature on Social Movements and New ICTs. *Information, Communication and Society* 9: 202–224.
- Giugni, Marco. 1998. Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements. *Annual Review of Sociology* (98): 371–393.
- Gould, Roger. 1993. Collective Action and Network Structure. *American Sociological Review* 58: 182–196.
- Hindman, Mathew. 2007. Open-Source Politics Reconsidered: Emerging Patterns in Online Political Participation. In *Governance and Information Technology: From Electronic Government to Information Government*, ed. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and David Lazer. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Himmelein, G. 2009. Anonymous vs. Scientology: Tom Cruise. *Heise Online*, January 9. <http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Anonymous-vs-Scientology-Tom-Cruise-signiert-Maske-748264.html>. Accessed 31 May 2012.
- Holloway, Kali. 2017. White Communities Need to Do More to Ferret Out Terrorists in their Midst. *AlterNet*. <https://www.alternet.org/right-wing/white-communities-need-do-more-ferret-out-terrorists-their-midst>. Accessed 31 Nov 2017.
- Ioffe, Julia. 2017. The Secret Correspondence between Donald Trump Jr. and WikiLeaks. *The Atlantic*. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/the-secret-correspondence-between-donald-trump-jr-and-wikileaks/545738/>. Accessed 3 Dec 2017.
- Jenkins, Henry. 2006. *Convergence Culture*. New York, NY: New York University Press.

- Jordan, T., and P. Taylor. 2004. *Hactivism and Cyberwar: Rebels with a Cause?* New York: Routledge.
- Kahn, Richard, and Douglas Kellner. 2003. Internet Subcultures and Oppositional Politics. In *The Post-Subcultures Reader*, ed. D. Muggleton. London, UK: Berg Publishers.
- Landers, C. 2008. The Internets Are Going to War. *Baltimore City Paper*. <http://blogs.citypaper.com/index.php/2008/01/the-internets-are-going-to-war/>. Accessed 31 May 2012.
- Lasn, Kalle. 1999. *The Culture Jam: The Uncooling of America*. New York: William Morrow and Company.
- Melucci, Alberto. 1980. The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach. *Social Science Information* 19: 199–226.
- Savage, C. 2013. Cryptic Overtures and a Clandestine Meeting Gave Birth to a Blockbuster Story. *The New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/us/how-edward-j-snowdenorchestrated-a-blockbuster-story.html>. Accessed 30 Aug 2014.
- Schleibs, M. 2008. Internet Groups War on Scientology. <http://www.news.com.au/technology/internet-groups-war-on-scientology/story-e6frfro0-1111115399994>. Accessed 2 Jul 2012.
- Selk, Avi. 2017. A Twitter Campaign is Outing People who Marched with White Nationalists in Charlottesville. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-timeline/?utm_term=.e3d86208e31. Accessed 2 Jan 2018.
- Sengputa, Somini. 2012. The Soul of the New Hactivist. *The New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/sunday-review/the-soul-of-the-new-hactivism.html>. Accessed 5 Jul 2012.
- Stelter, Brian. 2011. Upending Anonymity, These Days the Web Unmasks Everyone. *The New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/us/21anonymity.html>. Accessed 8 Sep 2017.
- Tüfekçi, Zeenep. 2012. “New Media and the People-powered Uprisings.” *MIT Technology Review*. <http://www.technologyreview.com/view/425280/new-media-and-the-people-powered-uprisings>. Accessed 4 Sep 2014.
- Veigh, S. 2013. Classifying Forms of Online Activism: The Case of Cyber Protests Against the World Bank. In *Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice*, ed. Martha McCaughey and Michael Ayers. New York: Routledge.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. *Voice and Inequality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Warner, C. 2008. ‘Anonymous’ Threatens to ‘Dismantle’ Church of Scientology via Internet. *APC Magazine*. http://apcmag.com/anonymous_threatens_to_dismantle_church_of_scientology_via_internet.htm. Accessed 31 May 2012.
- Wollenberg, E., G. Colchester, and T. Griffiths. 2006. Linking Social Movements: How International Networks Can Better Support Community Action About Forests. *International Forestry Review* 8 (2): 265–272.
- Wray, S. 1999. On Electronic Civil Disobedience. *Peace Review* 1191: 107–111.



System Change, Not Climate Change: Radical Social Transformation in the Twenty-First Century

John Foran

The world as we know it is crashing around us. The signs are evident, and they are everywhere: intense, extreme storms, floods, drought, heat, rain, fire, and winds—nothing is as it was. Politicians don't know what to do, and the actions of so many of them seem downright cruel, vacuous, or incompetent. The devastation of war, military operations, policing, lethal drones, and physical attacks roll over populations entirely innocent of any crime. The slow grind of debt, privation, and daily exploitation wears on more than half of Earth's human inhabitants. Non-human creatures are dying out in record numbers as Earth's systems are polluted, contaminated, and wracked by the endless extraction of fossil fuels, minerals, and the loss of healthy soil and water.

The good news is that millions—perhaps billions—of us know the score, and are ready to rise or already rising to the call. Transition initiatives, intentional communities, networks of educators, activists, and ordinary people, social movements large and small, streets of neighbors, and here and there political groupings have all emerged in recent years, determined both to block the machinery of death and to restore and create anew the means of life.

It is to these beginnings of hope that we should now turn our attention. To continue with business as usual is to slowly sink into chaos. The time is now and the agents are us, and those around us, in every corner of the Earth. To turn away is to go extinct. We must rise.

J. Foran (✉)

Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

e-mail: foran@ucsb.edu

© The Author(s) 2019

B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_17

NAMING THE ENEMY

A sober look at the root causes of the present crisis points unambiguously to the “normal” workings of global capitalism as an economic system and a way of life as a (and perhaps *the*) prime reason for the interconnected ills that beset us. Underlying this, we find the patriarchal and racial hierarchies that capitalism’s elites thrive on, the history of their colonial plunder and the dysfunctional operation of neoliberal globalization, and the militarism, violence, and lack of participation that permeate and poison our cultures. On top of it all, the climate crisis, made by the endless search for profit over people, the planet, and life itself, now condemns us to a future of extreme weather in ecosystems that will not recover for an eternity of generations to come. To be clear, it is the interconnected nature of the economic, political, and cultural crises of our times with the climate crisis that is at the root of our predicament in this century.

What is more, the governments and the economic elites of the world do not have this steadily worsening crisis under control. The Paris Agreement signed by 195 nations of the world in December 2015 offers no chance of containing global warming under the thresholds that science suggests must not be passed.¹ The Agreement is weak because it is not legally binding, and the pledges, even if all met, would still raise global temperatures in this century by around three degrees Celsius, well past the “extremely dangerous” two-degree threshold. The refusal of the wealthy nations of the Global North to pay their climate debt with generous financing of the renewable energy revolution required by the under-resourced countries of the Global South greatly magnifies the problem.

Meanwhile, the proven reserves of the fossil fuel corporations and oil-exporting countries propel a business model that entails burning more than *five times* the amount of fossil fuels that the Earth can handle. If one wants to hold to the more stringent, far safer limit of 1.5 degrees, and have a better than 80 percent chance (Russian roulette odds) of staying under that, as of 2016, we had less than nine years at the current level of at current emissions levels left before the planet runs the risk of passing the tipping points that may trigger runaway climate chaos.²

What could the solution be to all of this?

POLITICAL CULTURES OF OPPOSITION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Let’s step back for a moment and look at the broad course of radical social transformation in the twentieth century. After promising beginnings, the great revolutions of the century—in Mexico, Russia, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and in many former colonies—all fell short of realizing the dreams and visions of those who made them. These were led by revolutionaries who fought by means of armed insurrection. Two fatal (if arguably necessary) flaws in the construction of new revolutionary states were the limitations placed on speech

and the lack of accountability to the people they ruled. This is not to deny that great material gains were made in some countries, with notable improvements in the lives of millions of people. Nor is it to minimize the daunting challenges of providing a decent life in societies ravaged by colonial and imperialist domination, often threatened with force of arms by global powers like the United States. In the one place where the left came to power through elections, under the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970, the “Chilean path to socialism” was ruthlessly crushed by the military and the United States. The list of interventions by the United States between 1945 and the present includes several dozen instances of such fatal meddling, as attempts at radical social transformation were everywhere met by overwhelming force over the course of the twentieth century.³

If we return to the original impulse that animated these grand attempts at deep social change, and ask what drove them, against all the odds, we see in every case strong and vibrant *political cultures of opposition and resistance*⁴ that proved capable of bringing diverse social groups to the side of social movements. As Fig. 17.1 depicts, these political cultures originated in people’s experiences and emotions and were expressed in complex mixtures of popular, everyday ways of articulating grievances—whether in terms of the cultural idioms of fairness, justice, dignity, or freedom—and more consciously formulated radical ideologies such as socialism, nationalism, liberation theology, and anti-imperialism.

In any given society, there usually exist multiple political cultures of opposition, for people do not necessarily share the same experiences, speak similar idioms, or respond as one to the call of formal ideologies. The most effective revolutionary movements in history found ways to tap into whatever political cultures emerged in their society and to bridge the gaps between them, often through the creation of a clear and concise common demand such as “the regime must step down” or “the foreign powers must leave.” When this happens, a movement’s chances of growth and success are considerably increased.

The forging of a strong and vibrant political culture of opposition is thus an accomplishment, carried through by the actions of many people, and, like revolutions themselves, such cultures have been relatively rare in human history.

POLITICAL CULTURES OF CREATION: A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE PRESENT

Those who would bring about deep social transformation in the present century have proceeded in some crucially different ways from their forerunners in the twentieth century, above all by their stress on non-violence and deeper, less hierarchical forms of participation. The most encompassing of these include the global justice movement, the Arab Spring, the Occupy movements across the world, the Pink Tide in Latin America, and today’s global climate justice movement. Today, a vast, loose network of movements involves many thousands of local initiatives, movements, and campaigns.⁵




Fig. 17.1 The making of political cultures of opposition in twentieth century revolutions

In the twenty-first century, movements for radical social change⁶—a term more suited for purpose to this century’s great social movements than revolution—have themselves changed, “as activists, reformers, dreamers, and revolutionaries globally have increasingly pursued nonviolent paths to a better world, intending to live and act as they would like that world to be. That is, the ends of justice are no longer held to justify the means of violence, but the means of non-violent resistance reflect and guarantee the ends that they seek. In this, they embody and illustrate the virtues of ‘prefigurative politics’ and in particular horizontalist ways to realize them.”⁷

Today’s movements, in addition to political cultures of opposition and resistance, also place strong emphasis on what might be called *political cultures of creation*. This recognizes that movements become even stronger when they add a positive vision of a better world to a widely felt culture of opposition and resistance, thus providing an alternative to strive for that could improve on or replace what exists.⁸ In this sense, some of the differences between old and new movements for radical social change include the attempt to get away from the hierarchical organizations that made the great revolutions of the twentieth century and move in the direction of more horizontal, deeply democratic relations among participants; the greater expressive power of popular idioms than appeals to ideology; visionary new narratives and compelling stories using all manner of media; the growing use of civil disobedience and militant non-violence; the building of intersectional coalitions as networks that include diverse outlooks; and the salience of political cultures of creation alongside political cultures of opposition and resistance. And to be sure, the great social revolutions also possessed political cultures of creation, in their own fashion, more aligned on ideologies of socialism, nationalism, and anti-imperialism (Fig. 17.2).

THE GREAT MOVEMENTS FOR RADICAL SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

There have already been a number of great social movements across the world attempting to effect radical social change in the early twenty-first century. These include the Zapatistas, the global social justice movements, the Arab Spring, Occupy, and others that have sprung up even more recently. In this section, I take up each of these movements and discuss them briefly.

The Zapatistas

As far as revolutions go, the twenty-first century started six years early, on January 1, 1994, when an indigenous guerilla force, calling itself the Zapatista National Liberation Army took and held the largest towns of the Mexican state of Chiapas. Coming in the first hours of New Year’s Day, the attack was timed to coincide with the opening of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiated by the United States with Canada and Mexico. The




Fig. 17.2 The emergence of "new" political cultures of opposition and creation in the twenty-first century. Notes: Dotted lines indicate relationships that are more loosely connected. The Zapatistas, Occupy, the Arab Spring, and the Global Justice Movement are bolded so as to stand out from the italicized Pink Tide of elected left governments in Latin America and elsewhere, with commonalities in plain text

Zapatistas have remained in control of a portion of Chiapas to this day, peacefully governing their communities independently of the central government, with indigenous leadership (the well-known non-indigenous guerilla leader Subcomandante Marcos explicitly holding the rank of *sub*-commander in the army) and elevating the position of women in the political life of their territories.⁹

Though the economic basis of the indigenous communities in Chiapas remains agricultural and their material resources and income might seem meager by capitalist standards, the Zapatistas have shown impressive forms of cooperative production, the maintenance of cultural practices, and the sophistication of both the political structure of the communities and the international messaging of the movement through their communiqués and the publications of Marcos, which did much to galvanize the global justice movement as activists were invited to several big *encuentros* (encounters) to engage in dialogues

whose lessons were taken back to Europe and North America, among other locations.

The problem, if there is one, is that the Zapatistas, while undefeated and intact on their own land, have not directly challenged the Mexican state which surrounds them with military bases. Though the long-ruling Party of the Institutional Revolution (the PRI) which they challenged by their very existence did in fact fall from power in the 2000 elections, it has been the Mexican right that has alternated in governance with them ever since, rather than the left. As the radical theorist John Holloway avers in his classic *Change the World Without Taking Power*, the Zapatistas have done precisely that, but they have thus far only changed their own world rather than the wider one in which they lie enmeshed.¹⁰

The Global Justice Movement

Springing from diverse sources and definitely inspired by the Zapatistas, what came to be known as the Global Justice Movement had its origins in the 1990s as well, and was a network of movements around the world devoted to issues ranging from labor to women to indigenous peoples to the environment, agriculture, and peace. These social and economic sectors all found themselves threatened as neoliberal capitalist globalization took hold under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO). By removing obstacles to the unfettered movement of global capital and putting financial pressure on cash-strapped governments, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) required the cutting of social services and the privatization of state enterprises in exchange for loans.¹¹

The highpoint of the movement, at least in North America, was the successful shutdown of the meetings of the WTO in Seattle, Washington, in late 1999, when 60,000 people from many walks of life used direct-action tactic to prevent delegates from meeting on the first day of the summit, and when talks broke down when representatives from the Global South pushed back against the terms of the negotiations. Labor, environmentalists, and anti-capitalist currents converged to score a signal symbolic victory, telling the forces of neoliberal capitalist globalization a resounding collective “NO!”¹²

Subsequent gatherings at elite summits also fielded many tens of thousands of activists through 2009 and beyond, but when ten million people on the streets proved no impediment to the government of George Bush invading and occupying Iraq in March 2003, much of the movement’s momentum was diverted into a defensive posture of ending a war that it could not. The unique gathering of activists, held almost annually since 2001, known as the World Social Forum, characterized by a resolute barring of political parties, even of the left and the Greens, continued to carry the spirit of the global justice movement through hard times, until a better balance of forces and an even more acute set of global crises has seen it resurface in a younger generation that has animated the Occupy, Arab Spring, and global *climate* justice movements.¹³

The Pink Tide

Meanwhile, a new path to political power arose in Latin America at the end of the twentieth century, initiated by the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998, followed by Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador in 2007.¹⁴ Taking advantage of the dismantling of dictatorships and the openings provided by the end of the Cold War, and the attenuation and overstretch of US power in the Middle East, all three governments mobilized the working classes, indigenous populations, young people, and peasants in a project aptly named “Twenty-First Century Socialism” by Chávez and carried by the MAS—Movement Toward Socialism—party in Bolivia. The new constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia enshrined the principle of *buen vivir*—living the right way—an ecological model of development based on the recognition of the diversity of “nations” inside a plurinational framework.¹⁵

Remarkable gains were registered in all three countries in terms of reducing the number of people in extreme poverty, raising the quality of life through state-provided health clinics and opening the educational system, and state spending on social services. All three governments won multiple elections, and Morales is still in power in Bolivia today (as would Chávez likely be in Venezuela had he not succumbed to cancer in 2013). The Venezuelan people and army even reversed a US-backed coup in Venezuela in 2003 which actually held Chávez prisoner for a long weekend.

The Achilles heel of each of these experiments with radical social change has proven to be the extractivist nature of their economies, long deformed by colonial and imperialist powers into machines for the export of oil, natural gas, tin, and other raw materials. When the price of oil and natural gas surged up until about 2008, the state had the resources to carry out social projects that raised living standards and extended the life span of their people, but in recent years a combination of lower prices, external pressure, the death of Chávez, the passing of power from Correa in Ecuador to a new leader from his own political coalition, and the refusal of the people of Bolivia to change the constitution to allow Morales a fourth term have impeded forward progress, and the model of the Pink Tide is slowly ebbing on the historical stage.

The Arab Spring

An unprecedented number of significant and inventive movements for radical social change shook the world in 2011.¹⁶ In January and March, long-entrenched dictators fell to popular uprisings in Tunis and Cairo, and newly elected political leaderships offered greater hope for positive social change than had existed in the region in decades. This came about through massive occupations of public space by broadly based social forces that resolutely resisted state repression with non-violent, ongoing, and creative direct action. In both Tunisia and Egypt—unlike elsewhere in the greater Arab Spring, as in Libya, Syria, and Bahrain—the regimes they faced and the armies that supported them gave way to popular demands and stepped aside. The United States scrambled

from stubborn disbelief and compromise maneuvers to withdrawing its support for the dictatorships of Zayn al-Abidine Ben Ali and Husni Mubarak, who then ceded power. After these clear targets were sent into exile or prison, the movements faced the structural obstacles of old regimes of the economic and (especially in Egypt) military elites and quickly (in Tunisia) or slowly (in Egypt) pushed them into elections that cemented these non-violent political revolutions.¹⁷

It is possible to make sense of these revolutions in terms of the patterns of the great revolutions of world history, and the model of social revolutions put forward in my book *Taking Power: On the Origins of Revolutions in the Third World*.¹⁸ Namely, a political economy of dependent, neoliberal capitalist development sharpened the grievances of populations living with high and rising levels of unemployment, the highest in the world in fact for women and for youth under 25.¹⁹ That this is a globalization story is suggested by the fact that it was the youth generation of 2010 that made the revolts, not that of the early 1990s, the dawn of globalization's effects in the region.

The regimes that ruled both countries were classic cases of the type of personalist dictatorships most vulnerable to revolutions historically: amassing riches while excluding the majority of the population from a meaningful vote and repressing dissidents ruthlessly. This meshing of the economic and political elite made the dictators in each case a clear target of popular wrath.

The conjunctural elements of revolutionary outbreaks were also present by the end of 2010: the effects of a teetering global economy on already desperate populations fueled the economic downturns (again, a question of timing: 2010, not 2007 before the crisis). The interconnectedness of global crises meant that one could "read the world in a loaf of bread," as Christian Parenti put it: the hot summer of 2010 devastated the Russian grain harvest, raising the cost of the Egyptian people's staple later in the fall and bringing many to the point of rebellion.²⁰

The international conjuncture was also critical to the movements' success. This is most obvious in the case of Libya, where NATO's intervention stopped Qadhafi's counter-offensive just short of Benghazi, then crippled his air force and the movement of heavy armor out of Tripoli. In the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, the timing of the revolutions owed much to favorable turns in the world system: the events in Tunis moved so swiftly that neither France nor the United States could react to them before Ben Ali was gone, while in Egypt, the United States wavered in its support of Mubarak, and ultimately decided to cast him to the winds while trying to maintain its influence on the army, which wisely stood aside to protect its own interests and stay on the winning side. In Syria and Bahrain, rebels enjoyed no equivalent geopolitical opening.

A coalition of young people and labor formed the backbone of the Arab Spring. Class and generation combined to create the nucleus of broad popular movements that provided both the numbers and the slogans that animated the political cultures in play. The Arab Spring revolts were driven less by appeal to any ideology than by tapping into popular idioms of everyday concern. These

were concentrated in the slogans chanted by crowds, in the first instance against the dictatorships: in Egypt, “We won’t leave until *he* leaves.”²¹ In Tunisia, “Bread, water, and no Ben Ali” adroitly capture the twinned economic and political demands of the movement.²² It is no surprise that the uprising in Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010, heard the words “Employment is a right, you band of thieves!”, echoing an earlier uprising of miners in 2008, or that the French Revolution’s “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” was transposed into “Work, Liberty, National Dignity.”²³

The originality of this approach to overthrowing dictators suggests that yet another path to radical social change has opened up in the twenty-first century: the sustained occupation of public space followed by the struggle for a more open democratic polity, a kind of third way between taking national power through elections and re-making power by wresting communities from global capitalism’s clutches. Where the Arab Spring fell short was with the challenge of turning the political revolutions into social ones, and for the voices of workers, youth, and women to make themselves heard after they brought down the dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt (or of bringing down the governments in Bahrain and Syria at all).

Occupy Everything

The second half of the year witnessed the rise of an equally improbable challenge at the heart of the system. Occupy Wall Street succeeded against all the historical and cultural odds to electrify ordinary Americans in the fall of 2011. It drew on some of the threads of resistance that we have traced since 1968: discussion-based decision making, occupations of the commons, non- or post-ideological ways of speaking, affinity groups dedicated to addressing particular issues and sustaining the encampments—in sum, new yet not-so-new ways of doing a creative politics. Its makers tapped the Arab Spring’s techniques of struggle and the liberating public festivals of occupation in Spain, the street confrontations and creative actions in austerity-hammered Athens, and the temporary occupations in the English and Chilean student movements over the course of 2010.²⁴

To these, the Occupy movement added its own versions of General Assembly and a brilliant discursive attack on the political and economic elites, seen as “the one percent” responsible for the deteriorating lives of “the ninety-nine percent.” The process and the message resonated widely across the United States, spreading quickly from New York to other major metropolitan areas (Los Angeles, Boston, Oakland, Chicago, Detroit), smaller cities and towns, and educational institutions such as the University of California. An immense national discussion on the crisis was held, knocking the American political and economic establishments off balance for a time. By mid-autumn, there were occupations in motion across the globe.

The system struck back in late fall with a police offensive coordinated by US mayors across the country, using strong arm tactics to force Occupy to abandon most of its public spaces. The movement then merged into many smaller,

local forms in the course of 2012 (including Occupy the Hood, Occupy Debt, and Occupy Sandy in the wake of the disastrous hurricane of November 2012), with the occupiers discussing and acting on the ways to do this most effectively in the new conjuncture.²⁵ Sociologist Keith Kahn-Harris has termed the movements of 2011 as “the movement without a name,” the expression of “a trend, a direction, an idea-virus, a meme, a source of energy that can be traced through a large number of spaces and projects. It was also a way of thinking and acting: an agility, an adaptability, a refusal to accept the world as it is, a refusal to get stuck into fixed patterns of thought.”²⁶ In sum, it marked the further growth of political cultures of creation as it trained a new generation of radical youth. Several million of them formed the backbone of Bernie Sanders’s bid for power in 2016, and have founded new organizational outlets after his defeat, spurred on by the outrages of the Trump administration.

The obvious political question is: *Can* all our new political cultures of opposition and creation produce—or at least contribute to—the type of global transformation that is needed to deal with a world in crisis? Twenty-first century movements for radical social change have shown an ability to move beyond ideology in favor of the strengths of popular idioms and powerful, strategic memes demanding social justice (e.g. Black Lives Matter! and Water is Life!). But how to fashion large-scale popular spaces for democracy, and how to articulate the discourses that will bring together the broadest coalitions ever seen onto a global stage constitute great challenges.

The left has achieved state power in an important set of Latin American countries, but it has not possessed the will, internal support, or in some cases the global room for maneuver to decisively redirect resources to the poorest sectors of society and at the same time not contribute to bringing the planet to ruin. The desultory experiences of Obama and the European Center-Left have shown all too clearly the limited room for maneuver and the dimming prospects for significant reform, domestically or globally, through these parties, locked as they are inside the straitjacket of neoliberal capitalist globalization. The Zapatistas have registered dramatic communal gains on a local level, but they have not been so successful at generalizing these accomplishments beyond Chiapas. The global justice movement raised significant opposition to neoliberal institutions like the World Trade Organization in Seattle, but it was unable—perhaps understandably—to reverse the tide of neoliberal capitalism, especially after the US invasion of Iraq forced much of it to evolve into a peace movement.

What, then, is to be done?

WHAT WE MIGHT TRY: A PROPOSAL

What lies in fact between or beyond direct action, prefigurative communities, and meaningful elections? One idea is to combine electing some as yet unknown kind of “progressive” government and forging social movements to push it from below and alongside to make good on its promises, and for the new kind

of parties that would lead such governments to make links with other movements, nations, and organizations everywhere.²⁷ In other words, rather than the dichotomous choice between seeking to change the world through elections versus building a new society from the bottom up, the future of radical social change may well lie at the many possible *intersections* of deeply democratic social movements and equally diverse and committed new types of parties and political coalitions.

Existing Models

To be sure, *the political parties of the future* don't yet exist, but we can catch glimpses of them and hopefully learn from such experimental forerunners as the political movement that grew up in Iceland after the great crash of 2008, and the electoral foibles and fortunes of Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain (one could reference the Labour Party in Britain under Jeremy Corbyn²⁸ as trending in the direction we wish, and also the much-heralded political experiment under way in Rojava, in northern Syria). Meanwhile, as we have already seen, in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, the Latin American Pink Tide has also been working near this intersection. Other struggles that point toward this include the decades-long movement for radical reforms in Kerala, India, and the rather checkered experiences of the world's Green parties. Each of these, and perhaps most of all, Podemos, suggests or hints at a new kind of political entity or party, without yet *being* that party.

In Kerala, for example, over the past 50 years, a series of elected Marxist governments led by the Communist Party of India (CPI-M) have raised the quality of life—whether measured by nutrition, health, life span, access to food and shelter, or literacy education—to standards that are superior to elsewhere in India and would be the object of envy in most of the world. They have done this despite a lack of monetary resources, a low per capita GNP, and even with deep structural unemployment, because they have been pushed from below by strong, independent social movements in civil society, of workers, women, and lower castes. This synergetic relationship has succeeded in forging and maintaining relatively equitable, more participatory conditions of life for the more than 35 million people who live there, with reforms remaining intact even in periods when the left has not been in power.²⁹

The world's Green parties also embody a new political culture of creation, sometimes themselves acting to bridge the divide between those who seek to take state power and those who seek to transform the very nature of power. Though far from power in the United States and United Kingdom, and having made truly invidious compromises when in government as in Germany, they also hint at the powerful combination of social movement dynamism from below and a new kind of party organization. Moreover, they are transnational in vision and organization in a way that other parties, including those on the left, are not.

Iceland undertook a hopeful political experiment dubbed the “Saucepan Revolution” when the raucous banging of pots and pans in well-attended street protests in January 2009 forced the right-of-center government responsible for the precipitous collapse of Iceland’s banks to yield power to a new governing coalition of socialists, democrats, greens, and the left, who were affirmed in a general election in April 2009. In the face of a horrific economic crisis, the creative actions of the Left-Green Movement and Social Democratic Alliance government, and the many networks that pressured and supported them produced solutions such as the 2009 referendum in which 98 percent of the population rejected the previous government’s agreement to repay the foreign debt of the failed banks, another indication of this new political culture’s power.³⁰ The fragility of the new situation, however, was laid bare in the April 2013 elections which returned the center-right to power and scuppered the promise of the then newly drafted but to this day still unratified crowd-sourced People’s Constitution.

For all their limits, these experiments provide real-world instances of the new political cultures of opposition and creation, and none of the underlying social movements—including the Arab Spring and Occupy Everywhere—is “over,” in the sense that most of their participants are not permanently lost to activism. As one activist put it: “When the Indigenous resistance against the Dakota Access pipeline was ended, one of the activists, White Eagle said: ‘Just because we’re being removed from that area doesn’t mean it’s over. We just have to continue to work together as a whole for this common cause, which is the protection of Mother Earth’.”³¹

What Comes Next?

Instead of these halting if promising precursors, though, what we need is some excitingly *new and original* kind of party (or network, or coalition) that in each country or case comes out of the social movements that would bring it to power and can then be held strictly accountable by them as it turns the ship around. Such a “party” (and the term, though problematic in the eyes of many, is also apt for the convivial connotations it holds) will be the patient, challenging, loving product of the actions of many people, and it will embrace the multiple, richly diverse threads of the new political cultures of opposition and creation.

What if we could harness the people power, radical imagination, and boundless energy of all of these new actors of the recent past and the future that lies ahead, perhaps starting by facilitating discussions among the new *social movements*, then brainstorming how to fashion some *new kind of party* to take power where that is possible and in the process beginning to support and enable all the emerging *transition initiatives* to co-create radical social transformation from the local to the national level? It sounds simplistic and unrealistic, too good to be practicable. But what have we got to lose? We aren’t winning at present. We need to try something different, something we haven’t really tried

before, but which has predecessors in Chile in the 1970s and the Latin American Pink Tide in this century, even though all have been contained by the great countervailing economic and political power of the global one percent, not to mention their own limitations and mistakes.

So let's think about these pieces. *The social movements* have been introduced above. Not just the Arab Spring and Occupy, but their brilliant, short-lived predecessor, the global justice movement,³² and their offspring in Black Lives Matter, Standing Rock, and many, many other rising voices, the vast majority of them not yet well known.

Meanwhile, *transition initiatives*, whether by that name or (more often) some other, have sprouted and are being nurtured in multiple locations today, from Totnes³³ in the United Kingdom to the ZAD³⁴ in the woods and fields of France. The US Transition Towns Gathering³⁵ in the summer of 2017 brought together people engaged in this work from all parts of the country. The French film *Demain* and the accompanying book in English *Tomorrow* capture the vibrancy and possibility of these movements, across a global space that runs from urban gardens in Detroit, to a zero-waste processing plant in San Francisco; local currency in Bristol, England; a paper factory in France run on the principles of the circular economy; organic farming with solar panels on La Réunion in the Indian Ocean; and a refreshing experiment with village democracy in Kuthambakkam, India.³⁶

And if it isn't clear now, or yet, we are striving to eventually build a future without *this* system, without capitalism, without endless growth, without obscene inequality, without the violence of militarism, and with democratic participation from bottom to top and back to the bottom again.

A valuable recent approach to the problem of making change in the midst of diversity and chaos is that heralded in the title of adrienne maree brown's 2017 book, *Emergent Strategy: Shaping Change, Changing Worlds*. This approach counsels activists to work from the bottom up in an inclusive way to generate a collective analysis that enables all present to focus on articulating their desires and most sought-after outcomes. After starting with an assessment of the current state of relevant issues, an emergent strategy moves on to a visioning exercise to identify our ideal state; follows this with a "change analysis" stage, which outlines what needs to change in order to achieve those visions; and ends with an "action" exercise to identify the projects that group members are most passionate about, with the potential to be put into motion.

The perspective is based on:

strategies for organizers building movements for justice and liberation that leverage relatively simple interactions to create complex patterns, systems, and transformations—including adaptation, interdependence and decentralization, fractal awareness, resilience and transformative justice, nonlinear and iterative change, creating more possibilities.

and now it's like ... ways for humans to practice being in right relationship to our home and each other, to practice complexity, and grow a compelling future

together through relatively simple interactions. Emergent strategy is how we intentionally change in ways that grow our capacity to embody the just and liberated worlds we long for.

and maybe, if I'm honest, it's a philosophy for how to be in harmony and love, in and with the world.³⁷

If this sounds more evocative than prescriptive, that's because it's about attending to process, cultivating relationships, maximizing our diversity, and staying open to learning and deciding in uncertain, unfolding situations, which are skills much more useful to social movements than any step-by-step list of activities to check off.

LINKING ARMS: A US SCENARIO

Let us end with a speculative future set in the United States, ground zero of capitalism.³⁸ In the 2016 elections, the dissatisfaction of Americans with their political system was manifest, with tens of millions more eligible voters choosing not to register or vote than the number of ballots either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton received. While I am all too aware of the lack of formal organization or recognizable leadership in many of the movements foregrounded here, as well as the perhaps too glib, easier said than done call for "leader-full" movements, it remains the case that the movements of radical social change of the future need to be far less hierarchical than all political parties to date if they are to win. It is beyond the scope (not to mention the capacity or desire) of the author to prescribe what organizational forms are going to pull off the degree of deep social transformation of the kind the crisis calls for. But let us all keep asking as we move forward, *caminando preguntamos*, Zapatista style.

What if a future election in the United States featured candidates emerging from the young activists of the social movements and the older ones in the transition initiatives, allied with those members of the Green and other progressive parties that were willing to share the stage, disaffected Sandernistas, and committed and passionate individuals everywhere, from all across the country?

Who would run for office in this scenario? The urban gardener in Detroit, the young indigenous activist in Standing Rock, a newly turned 18-year-old student anti-violence activist in Parkland, Florida, perhaps, the women leading Black Lives Matter in St. Louis and many other places, the local community leaders everywhere—teachers, community organizers, daycare providers, activists, and organizers, many of them much younger than the bland batch of candidates put forward by today's Democans and Republicrats.

A number of "blueprints" for a radical governmental policy of the future already exist. Let's consider one of the better ones, that of Ian Angus and Simon Butler, who have written: "In every country, we need governments that break with the existing order, that are answerable only to working people, farmers, the poor, indigenous communities, and immigrants—in a word, to the

victims of ecocidal capitalism, not its beneficiaries and representatives.”³⁹ They continue by suggesting some of the first measures such ecosocialist governments might take:

- Rapidly phasing out fossil fuels and biofuels, replacing them with clean energy sources such as wind, geothermal, wave, and, above all, solar power;
- Actively supporting farmers to convert to ecological agriculture, defending local food production and distribution, working actively to restore soil fertility while eliminating factory farms and polluting agribusinesses;
- Introducing free and efficient public transport networks, and implementing urban planning policies that radically reduce the need for private trucks and cars;
- Restructuring existing extraction, production, and distribution systems to eliminate waste, planned obsolescence, pollution, and manipulative advertising, placing industries under public control when necessary, and providing full retraining to all affected workers and communities;
- Retrofitting existing homes and buildings for energy efficiency, and establishing strict guidelines for green architecture in all new structures;
- Ceasing all military operations at home and elsewhere, transforming the armed forces into voluntary teams charged with restoring ecosystems, and assisting the victims of floods, rising oceans, and other environmental disasters;
- Ensuring universal availability of high-quality health services, including birth control and abortion;
- Launching extensive reforestation, carbon farming, and biodiversity programs.⁴⁰

Each of us will have their own list, and mine would add free lifelong education to the above, along with some kind of guaranteed income or provision of basic needs such as food and shelter. Other basic socialist points include eradicating the exploitation of labor, abolishing sweatshops, ending class domination and its wealth and income inequality, as well as racism and the oppression of women. Undoubtedly, many conversations lie ahead in which such lists are compared and synthesized into the powerful manifesto that we may one day craft.

Going Global

What if those of us in the United States pulled off something spectacular like this? That would surely alter the global balance of power for the better. And this would only be strengthened if others carried some version of it that made sense in their own contexts. Were such a government to come to power in the United States—against all odds, admittedly—it could work with others in the Global North to honor their collective obligations to (1) degrow their own wasteful and harmful economies and their carbon footprints, (2) cancel the

debt of the Global South, (3) transfer technology and other assistance to supply clean, abundant energy to all global citizens, (4) pay or make reparations for colonial and imperialist exploitation, (5) de-militarize down to the bone, and (6) guarantee fair and scientifically sustainable shares of the atmosphere and all resources to all.

The powerholders of capitalism scoff at the idea of such a movement, though in their words one can hear the faint stirring of fear that it might come to pass. Lawrence Wittner, Professor of History emeritus at SUNY/Albany, has assembled some striking examples.

Using her Conservative Party conference to rally support for leaving the EU, British Prime Minister Theresa May declared contemptuously: "If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere."...

Following his surprise election victory, Trump told a rally in December 2016: "There is no global anthem. No global currency. No certificate of global citizenship. We pledge allegiance to one flag and that flag is the American flag." After wild cheering from the crowd, he added: "From now on it is going to be: America First. Okay? America first. We're going to put ourselves first."⁴¹

But consider this history of a global identity also presented by Wittner:

Indeed, over the centuries cosmopolitan values have become a strong current in public opinion. They are usually traced to Diogenes, a philosopher of Classical Greece, who, asked where he came from, replied: "I am a citizen of the world." The idea gained increasing currency with the spread of Enlightenment thinking. Tom Paine, considered one of America's Founding Fathers, took up the theme of loyalty to all humanity in his *Rights of Man* (1791), proclaiming: "My country is the world." Similar sentiments were expressed in later years by William Lloyd Garrison ("My country is the world; my countrymen are all mankind"), Albert Einstein, and a host of other globalist thinkers.⁴²

And this rich data he provides from the present moment:

A poll of more than 20,000 people in 18 countries, conducted by GlobeScan for the BBC World Service from December 2015 through April 2016, found that 51 percent of respondents saw themselves more as global citizens than as citizens of their own countries. This was the first time since tracking began in 2001 that a majority felt this way.⁴³

Globally, *the climate justice movement* might now be the name for the network of these movements all in the service of radical climate justice, in the broadest, most intersectional understanding of the term. Its sustaining meme is one that young climate justice activists carried literally on a banner through the frosty streets of Copenhagen on the occasion of the ill-fated Conference of the Parties (COP) 15 negotiations in December 2009, demanding "System Change Not Climate Change."⁴⁴ Let us all exercise our right to imagine new names for our movements, "parties," and their key demands.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

We are going to have to leverage the strength and power and beauty of our many movements and ideas into a new kind of entity—a completely new kind of party—that can take political power away from those who hold it, in place after place. In time, these experiments with the unknown would be able to support each other and link themselves together to find and co-create the pathways to the future we want. The new entities that come out of our movements must be made to live up to their promise and to enact our dreams by *us*, their only possible guarantors.

Such new parties, if they emerge, and the broader, diverse social movements that *must* drive and hold them accountable, will need to link arms firmly with existing transition initiatives and the many more projects of creation that will need to be built everywhere. And they must synergistically support each other's efforts to fashion the collective power we need for global governance. *Then* we would see a people's COP articulate a "FAB" (fair, ambitious, and binding) universal climate treaty. *Then* we would be able to tax and legislate the fossil fuel corporations out of business. *Then* we would be able to take on the legacy of inequality and genocide that the United States has been built on. And *then*...

As the Zapatistas, those un-professionals of hope, often say, "We want a world where many worlds fit." That world, containing somehow our many worlds, will be created and constructed by all of those who are willing to seek it, to do the hard work (which, let's not forget, also brings so much joy and purpose), and to embrace hope, imagination, and heart, in equally abundant measure.

This chapter is offered in the hope of generating further participation and passionate commitment among readers and the millions of ordinary people who must rise to our common occasion. Else, nothingness awaits us after extreme and unimaginable suffering, which, however likely, is simply not acceptable.

The path will be long, hard, dangerous, and difficult, so let's get going!

NOTES

1. See John Foran, editor, *The First Draft of History: Thirty-Four of the Best Pieces on the Paris Agreement at COP 21* (2016). <http://www.resilience.org/stories/2016-01-06/the-first-draft-of-history-an-annotated-guide-to-thirty-four-of-the-best-pieces-on-the-paris-agreement-at-cop-21/>.
2. Roz Pidcock, "Analysis: What Global Emissions in 2016 Mean for Climate Change Goals" (November 15, 2016). <https://www.carbonbrief.org/what-global-co2-emissions-2016-mean-climate-change>.
3. William Blum, "A Brief History of U.S. Interventions: 1945 to the Present. Z Magazine (June 1991). http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blum/US_Interventions_WBlumZ.html.
4. I have worked with this concept such my master's thesis on Iran in 1980. Its most complete expositions can be found in John Foran, "Discourses and Social

- Forces: The Role of Culture and Cultural Studies in Understanding Revolutions,” pp. 203–226 in John Foran, editor, *Theorizing Revolutions* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), and Jean-Pierre Reed and John Foran, “Political Cultures of Opposition: Exploring Idioms, Ideologies, and Revolutionary Agency in the Case of Nicaragua,” *Critical Sociology* 28 (3) (October 2002): 335–370.
5. Recall the second page of Paul Hawken’s classic *Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming* (New York: Viking/Penguin, 2007), where after trying to count the social movements for a better world, the author eventually came to an estimate of one to two million, and then had to give up!
 6. “Movements for radical social transformation (or change)” are characterized by actions which move in the direction of greater economic equality and deeper democratic participation. This is thus an umbrella term covering *both* the great social revolutions of the twentieth century and the movements of this century which concern us here.
 7. This passage, and some of this argument about political cultures of opposition/ resistance and creation, can be found in John Foran, “Beyond Insurgency to Radical Social Change: The New Situation,” in *Studies in Social Justice*, 8 (1) (2014), pp. 5–25. <http://brock.scholarsportal.info/journals/index.php/SSJ/article/view/1036/1006>.
 8. This is an argument increasingly being made: by Naomi Klein in *No is Not Enough: Resisting Trump’s Shock Politics and Winning the World We Need* (Chicago: Haymarket, 2017), Charles Derber in *Welcome to the Revolution: Universalizing Resistance for Social Justice and Democracy in Perilous Times* (New York: Routledge, 2017), George Monbiot in *Out of the Wreckage: A New Politics for an Age of Crisis* (London: Verso, 2017), and Kate Raworth in *Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st Century Economist* (White River Junction: Chelsea Green, 2017), not to mention Paul Raskin’s *Journey to Earthland: The Great Transition to Planetary Civilization* (Boston: Tellus Institute, 2016), as well as the work of The Next System Project at <https://thenextsystem.org/>.
 9. Classic works on the Zapatistas, on which I have drawn for this general sketch, include John Ross, *Rebellion from the Roots: Indian Uprising in Chiapas* (Monroe: Common Courage, 1994), George Collier, with Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello, *Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas*. Third edition (Oakland: Food First, 2005), Jeff Conant *The Poetics of Resistance: The Revolutionary Public Relations of the Zapatista Insurgency* (Oakland: AK Press, 2010), Kara Dellacioppa, *This Bridge called Zapatismo: Building Alternative Political Cultures in Los Angeles, Mexico City, and Beyond* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), and Christopher Gunderson, “The Provocative Cocktail: Intellectual Origins of the Zapatista Uprising, 1960–1994” (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, New York University, 2013).
 10. See John Holloway’s *Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today* (London: Pluto Press, 2002). I discuss this work in John Foran, “Let Us Change the World without Taking Power Violently,” *Journal of Classical Sociology* 12 (2) (May), pp. 240–247. www.iicat.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Foran.Change-the-World-Without-Taking-Power-Violently-JCS-2012.pdf.

11. The best accounts of the global justice movement remains that of Amory Starr, *Global Revolt: A Guide to the Movements against Globalization* (London: Zed Books, 2005) and Paul Kingsnorth, *One No, Many Yeses* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003). A comprehensive sociological interpretation is offered by Geoffrey Pleyers, *Alter-Globalization: Becoming Actors in the Global Age* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010).
12. The film *This is What Democracy Looks Like* (Big Noise, 2000) gives a vivid account of the battle in the streets of Seattle.
13. On the World Social Forum, see Jai Sen and Peter Waterman (eds.), *World Social Forum: Challenging Empires*, Second Edition (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2009).
14. This account draws on some of the best scholarship on the “Pink Tide,” including Jeffrey Webber, *Rebellion to Reform in Bolivia: Class-struggle, Indigenous Liberation and the Politics of Evo Morales* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2010), Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar, *Rhythms of the Pachakuti: Indigenous Uprising and State Power in Bolivia*, translated by Stacy Alba D. Skar (Chapel Hill: Duke University Press, 2014), Gregory Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The History and Policies of the Chavez Government* (London: Verso, 2006), Richard Gott, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela* (London: Verso, 2011), and Marc Becker, *¡Pachakutik!: Indigenous Movements and Electoral Politics in Ecuador* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011). Works that treat the Pink Tide as a whole include Raúl Zibechi, *Dispersing Power: Social Movements as Anti-State Forces*, translated by Ramon Ryan (Oakland: AK Press, 2010), Gary Prevost, Carlos Oliva Campos, and Harry E. Vanden (eds.), *Social Movements and Leftist Governments in Latin America: Confrontation or Co-optation?* (London: Zed, 2012), Roger Burbach, Michael Fox, and Federico Fuentes (eds.), *Latin America’s Turbulent Transitions: The Future of Twenty-First Century Socialism* (London: Zed Books, 2014), and Steve Ellner (ed.), *Latin America’s Radical Left: Challenges and Complexities of Political Power in the Twenty-first Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).
15. See the article and discussion around Pablo Solón, “Vivir Bien: Old Cosmovisions and New Paradigms” (February 2018), Great Transition Initiative, <http://greattransition.org/publication/vivir-bien>.
16. This section, and a few other passages in this essay, are condensed directly from my 2014 essay, “Beyond Insurgency to Radical Social Change: The New Situation.” *Studies in Social Justice*, 8 (1), pp. 5–25.
17. Kevin Anderson, “Arab Revolutions at the Crossroads” (April 2, 2011), <http://www.internationalmarxisthumanist.org/articles/arab-revolutions-crossroads-kevin-anderson>, Kevin Anderson, “Year Two of the Arab Revolutions,” *Logos* (Spring-Summer 2012), http://logosjournal.com/2012/spring-summer_anderson/.
18. John Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Revolutions in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
19. Gilbert Achcar, “The Bouazizi Spark: The Beginning of a Long Revolutionary Process” (January 2012), <http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/bouazizi-spark-beginning-long-revolutionary-process>, Jack Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies,” *Foreign Affairs* 90 (3) (May–June 2011), pp. 8–16, and Joel Beinin, “Working-class Revolutions?” *The Nation* (September 12, 2011), pp. 26–27.

20. Christian Parenti, "Reading the World in a Loaf of Bread—Soaring Food Prices, Wild Weather, Upheaval, and a Planetful of Trouble" (July 19, 2011), <http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175419>, James Gelvin, *The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 21–23.
21. Ashraf Khalil, *Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011), p. 5.
22. Anderson, "Arab Revolutions at the Crossroads."
23. Achcar, "The Bouazizi Spark."
24. The best overview is that of Paul Mason, *Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions* (London: Verso, 2012). Fine works on Occupy include Lenny Flank (ed.), *Voices from the Ninety-Nine Percent: An Oral History of the Occupy Wall Street Movement* (St. Petersburg, Florida: Red and Black, 2011), Todd Gitlin, *Occupy Nation: The Roots, the Spirit, and the Promise of Occupy Wall Street* (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), Sarah van Gelder and the staff of YES! Magazine (eds.), *This Changes Everything: Occupy Wall Street and the 99% Movement* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2011), and Astra Taylor, Keith Gessen et al. (eds.), *Occupy! Scenes from Occupied America* (London: Verso, 2011).
25. Nathan Schneider, "Occupy, after Occupy," *The Nation* (September 24, 2012), <http://www.thenation.com/article/169761/occupy-after-occupy>, Rebecca Solnit, "The Sky's the Limit: The Demanding Gifts of 2012" (December 23, 2012), http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175632/tomgram%3A_rebecca_solnit_2013_as_year_zero_for_us_-_and_our_planet/.
26. Keith Kahn-Harris, "Naming the Movement" (June 22, 2011), <https://www.opendemocracy.net/keith-kahn-harris/naming-movement>.
27. See Micah White's excellent *The End of Protest: A New Playbook for Revolution* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2016).

The devastating impact of the Trump administration has spurred a slew of exciting books about social movements, organizing, elections, and resistance generally in the United States since late 2016: Sarah Jaffe, *Necessary Trouble: Americans in Revolt* (New York: Nation Books, 2016); Jonathan Matthew Smucker, *Hegemony How-To: A Roadmap for Radicals* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2017); Dennis Johnson and Valerie Merians (eds.), *What We Do Now: Standing Up for Values in Trump's America* (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2017); Becky Bond and Zack Exley, *Rules for Revolutionaries: How Big Organizing Can Change Everything* (White River Junction: Chelsea Green, 2016), and the special Fall 2016 issue of *Jacobin*, "The Party We Need."

Some excellent work on the topic came out even before: Mark Engler and Paul Engler, *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Nation Books, 2016); Patrick Reinsborough and Doyle Canning, *Re-Imagining Change: How to Use Story-based Strategy to Win Campaigns, Build Movements, and Change the World*, updated and expanded second edition (Oakland: PM Books, 2017 [2010]); L. A. Kauffman, *Direct Action: Protest and the Reinvention of American Radicalism* (London: Verso, 2017).

Some has come from non-US sources: Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movement in the Internet Age*, second edition (Cambridge: Polity, 2015) and Srdja Popovic and Matthew Miller, *Blueprint for Revolution:*

- How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and Other Non-violent Techniques to Galvanise Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change the World* (Melbourne: Scribe, 2015).
28. The always perceptive Hilary Wainwright makes the case here: "A Movement Preparing for Power" (October 3, 2017), <https://zcomm.org/znetarticle/a-movement-preparing-for-power/>.
 29. Richard Franke and Barbara Chasin, *Kerala: Radical Reform as Development in an Indian State* (San Francisco: The Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994); Patrick Heller, *The Labor of Development: Workers and the Transformation of Capitalism in Kerala, India* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
 30. Christophe Chataigne, "Iceland and the Saucepan Revolution." *Socialist Review* (March 2009), <http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=10735>; Paul Krugman, "The Path not Taken" *New York Times* (October 27, 2011), <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/opinion/krugman-the-path-not-taken.html>, Andri Snaer Magnason, *Dreamland: A Self-help Manual* (London: Citizen-Press, 2009); Rebecca Solnit, "News from Nowhere: Iceland's Polite Dystopia" *Harper's Magazine* (October 2008), <http://harpers.org/archive/2008/10/news-from-nowhere/>; Robert Wade and Silla Sigurgeirsdóttir, "Lessons for Iceland" *New Left Review* (65) (September-October 2010), pp. 5–29.
 31. Kosha Joubert and Leila Dregger, "Global Ecovillage Network | Sacred Activism," *Kosmos Journal*, September 19, 2017, Newsletter, <http://www.kosmosjournal.org/news/global-ecovillage-network-sacred-activism/>.
 32. It is useful to observe that the global justice movement wasn't defeated or ran out of steam but rather that it was forced to morph into a kind of more fractured global peace movement with the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, only to rise up again in many places at once in 2011 and after.
 33. Transition Town Totnes website: <https://www.transitiontowntotnes.org/>.
 34. Zone À Défendre website: <https://zad.nadir.org/?lang=en>.
 35. Nils Palsson, "Initial Report on the Transition National Gathering and Movement Strategy Session" (September 15, 2017), <http://www.transitionus.org/blog/initial-report-transition-national-gathering-and-movement-strategy-session>.
 36. See the film trailer for *Demain*, directed by Cyril Dion and Mélanie Laurent (2017) at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUN0QxRB7e0>; the book is by Cyril Dion, *Tomorrow: All Over the Globe, Solutions Already Exist* (Paris: Actes Sud, 2017).
 37. adrienne maree brown, *Emergent Strategies: Shaping Change, Changing Worlds* (Oakland: AK Press, 2017), pp. 23–24.
 38. The doyen of politically relevant climate-fiction has been and remains Kim Stanley Robinson, and his 2017 book *New York 2140* (New York: Orbit) offers a scenario where people's refusal to make payments crashes the financial system and a progressive government then nationalizes and gains control over the financial sector, enabling the making of a world that provides for the basic needs of all people. He also traces out such a scenario in an essay, "Climate Change Forces Post-Capitalism," his contribution to the forthcoming *Climate Futures: Re-imagining Global Climate Justice*, edited by Kum-Kum Bhavnani, John Foran, Priya Kurian, and Debashish Munshi (Berkeley: UC Press/Luminos), and a talk he gave on this topic can be found at the website devoted to the nearly

- carbon neutral conference “The World in 2050: A Nearly Carbon-Neutral Conference,” http://chc.english.ucsb.edu/?page_id=14895. The talk was transcribed by Krystal Baca and edited by John Foran, and can be found here: http://chc.english.ucsb.edu/?page_id=13544.
39. Ian Angus and Simon Butler, *Too Many People? Population, Immigration, and the Environmental Crisis* (Chicago, IL: Haymarket, 2011), p. 198.
 40. Ian Angus, *Facing the Anthropocene: Fossil Capitalism and the Crisis of the Earth System* (New York: Monthly Review, 2016), chapter 12, citing Ian Angus and Simon Butler, *Too Many People? Population, Immigration, and the Environmental Crisis* (Chicago: Haymarket, 2011), pp. 198–199.
 41. Lawrence Wittner, “World Citizenship Is More Popular Than You Might Think” (September 17, 2017), <http://portside.org/2017-09-19/world-citizenship-more-popular-you-might-think>.
 42. Wittner, “World Citizenship Is More Popular Than You Might Think.”
 43. Wittner, “World Citizenship Is More Popular Than You Might Think,” citing BBC World Service, “Global Citizenship a Growing Sentiment among Citizens of Emerging Economies: Global Poll” (April 27, 2016), <https://www.globescan.com/news-and-analysis/press-releases/press-releases-2016/383-global-citizenship-a-growing-sentiment-among-citizens-of-emerging-economies-global-poll.html>.
 44. This is also the name and acronym astutely adopted by a small but feisty network of North American ecosocialists with whom I am engaged, and whose analyses and discussions can be found on their website: <https://systemchangenotclimatechange.org/>.

REFERENCES

- Achcar, Gilbert. 2012. The Bouazizi Spark: The Beginning of a Long Revolutionary Process. January. <http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/bouazizi-spark-beginning-long-revolutionary-process>.
- Anderson, Kevin. 2011. Arab Revolutions at the Crossroads. April 2. <http://www.internationalmarxisthumanist.org/articles/arab-revolutions-crossroads-kevin-anderson>.
- . 2012. Year Two of the Arab Revolutions. *Logos*. Spring–Summer. http://logosjournal.com/2012/spring-summer_anderson/.
- Angus, Ian. 2016. *Facing the Anthropocene: Fossil Capitalism and the Crisis of the Earth System*. New York: Monthly Review.
- Angus, Ian, and Simon Butler. 2011. *Too Many People? Population, Immigration, and the Environmental Crisis*. Chicago: Haymarket.
- BBC World Service. 2016. Global Citizenship a Growing Sentiment Among Citizens of Emerging Economies: Global Poll. April 27. <https://www.globescan.com/news-and-analysis/press-releases/press-releases-2016/383-global-citizenship-a-growing-sentiment-among-citizens-of-emerging-economies-global-poll.html>.
- Becker, Marc. 2011. *¡Pachakutik!: Indigenous Movements and Electoral Politics in Ecuador*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Beinin, Joel. 2011. Working-Class Revolutions? *The Nation*. September 12.

- Blum, William. 1991. A Brief History of U.S. Interventions: 1945 to the Present. *Z Magazine*. June. http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blum/US_Interventions_WBlumZ.html.
- Bond, Becky, and Zack Exley. 2016. *Rules for Revolutionaries: How Big Organizing Can Change Everything*. White River Junction: Chelsea Green.
- brown, adrienne maree. 2017. *Emergent Strategies: Shaping Change, Changing World*. Oakland: AK Press.
- Burbach, Roger, Michael Fox, and Federico Fuentes, eds. 2014. *Latin America's Turbulent Transitions: The Future of Twenty-First Century Socialism*. London: Zed.
- Castells, Manuel. 2015 [2012]. *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movement in the Internet Age*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity.
- Chataigne, Christophe. 2009. Iceland and the Saucepan Revolution. *Socialist Review*. March. <http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=10735>.
- Collier, George. With Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello. 2005. *Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas*. 3rd ed. Oakland: Food First.
- Conant, Jeff. 2010. *The Poetics of Resistance: The Revolutionary Public Relations of the Zapatista Insurgency*. Oakland: AK Press.
- Dellacioppa, Kara. 2009. *This Bridge Called Zapatismo: Building Alternative Political Cultures in Los Angeles, Mexico City, and Beyond*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Derber, Charles. 2017. *Welcome to the Revolution: Universalizing Resistance for Social Justice and Democracy in Perilous Times*. New York: Routledge.
- Dion, Cyril. 2017. *Tomorrow: All Over the Globe, Solutions Already Exist*. Paris: Actes Sud.
- Ellner, Steve, ed. 2014. *Latin America's Radical Left: Challenges and Complexities of Political Power in the Twenty-First Century*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Engler, Mark, and Paul Engler. 2016. *This Is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt Is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books.
- Flank, Lenny, ed. 2011. *Voices from the Ninety-Nine Percent: An Oral History of the Occupy Wall Street Movement*. St. Petersburg, FL: Red and Black.
- Foran, John. 1997. Discourses and Social Forces: The Role of Culture and Cultural Studies in Understanding Revolutions. In *Theorizing Revolutions*, ed. John Foran, 203–226. London and New York: Routledge.
- . 2005. *Taking Power: On the Origins of Revolutions in the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2012. Let Us Change the World Without Taking Power Violently. *Journal of Classical Sociology* 12 (2): 240–247. www.iicat.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Foran.Change-the-World-Without-Taking-Power-Violently-JCS-2012.pdf.
- . 2014. Beyond Insurgency to Radical Social Change: The New Situation. *Studies in Social Justice* 8 (1): 5–25. <http://brock.scholarsportal.info/journals/index.php/SSJ/article/view/1036/1006>.
- , ed. 2016. *The First Draft of History: Thirty-Four of the Best Pieces on the Paris Agreement at COP 21*. <http://www.resilience.org/stories/2016-01-06/the-first-draft-of-history-an-annotated-guide-to-thirty-four-of-the-best-pieces-on-the-paris-agreement-at-cop-21/>.
- Franke, Richard, and Barbara Chasin. 1994. *Kerala: Radical Reform as Development in an Indian State*. San Francisco: The Institute for Food and Development Policy.
- Gelvin, James. 2012. *The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Gitlin, Todd. 2012. *Occupy Nation: The Roots, the Spirit, and the Promise of Occupy Wall Street*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Goldstone, Jack. 2011. Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies. *Foreign Affairs* 90 (3). May–June, 8–16.
- Gott, Richard. 2011. *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela*. London: Verso.
- Gunderson, Christopher. 2013. The Provocative Cocktail: Intellectual Origins of the Zapatista Uprising, 1960–1994. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, New York University.
- GutiérrezAguilar, Raquel. 2014. *Rhythms of the Pachakuti: Indigenous Uprising and State Power in Bolivia*. Trans. Stacy Alba D. Skar. Chapel Hill: Duke University Press.
- Hawken, Paul. 2007. *Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming*. New York: Viking/Penguin.
- Heller, Patrick. 1999. *The Labor of Development: Workers and the Transformation of Capitalism in Kerala, India*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Holloway, John. 2002. *Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today*. London: Pluto Press.
- Jaffe, Sarah. 2016. *Necessary Trouble: Americans in Revolt*. New York: Nation Books.
- Johnson, Dennis, and Valerie Merians, eds. 2017. *What We Do Now: Standing Up for Values in Trump's America*. Brooklyn: Melville House.
- Joubert, Kosha, and Leila Dregger. 2017. Global Ecovillage Network|Sacred Activism. *Kosmos Journal*. September 19, Newsletter. <http://www.kosmosjournal.org/news/global-ecovillage-network-sacred-activism/>.
- Kahn-Harris, Keith. 2011. Naming the Movement. June 22. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/keith-kahn-harris/naming-movement>.
- Kauffman, L.A. 2017. *Direct Action: Protest and the Reinvention of American Radicalism*. London: Verso.
- Khalil, Ashraf. 2011. *Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation*. New York: St. Martin's.
- Kingsnorth, Paul. 2003. *One No, Many Yeses*. London: Simon & Schuster.
- Klein, Naomi. 2017. *No Is Not Enough: Resisting Trump's Shock Politics and Winning the World We Need*. Chicago: Haymarket.
- Knickmeyer, Ellen. 2011. The Arab World's Youth Army. *Foreign Policy*. January 27. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/27/the-arab-worlds-youth-army-2/>.
- Krugman, Paul. 2011. The Path Not Taken. *New York Times*. October 27. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/opinion/krugman-the-path-not-taken.html>.
- Magnason, Andri Snær. 2009. *Dreamland: A Self-Help Manual*. London: Citizen-Press.
- Mason, Paul. 2012. *Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions*. London: Verso.
- Monbiot, George. 2017. *Out of the Wreckage: A New Politics for an Age of Crisis*. London: Verso.
- Palsson, Nils. 2017. Initial Report on the Transition National Gathering and Movement Strategy Session. September 15. <http://www.transitionus.org/blog/initial-report-transition-national-gathering-and-movement-strategy-session>.
- Parenti, Christian. 2011. Reading the World in a Loaf of Bread—Soaring Food Prices, Wild Weather, Upheaval, and a Planetful of Trouble. July 19. <http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175419>.

- Pidcock, Roz. 2016. Analysis: What Global Emissions in 2016 Mean for Climate Change Goals. November 15. <https://www.carbonbrief.org/what-global-co2-emissions-2016-mean-climate-change>.
- Pleyers, Geoffrey. 2010. *Alter-globalization: Becoming Actors in the Global Age*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Popovic, Srdja, and Matthew Miller. 2015. *Blueprint for Revolution: How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and Other Non-violent Techniques to Galvanise Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change the World*. Melbourne: Scribe.
- Prevost, Gary, Carlos Oliva Campos, and Harry E. Vanden, eds. 2012. *Social Movements and Leftist Governments in Latin America: Confrontation or Co-optation?* London: Zed.
- Raskin, Raskin. 2016. *Journey to Earthland: The Great Transition to Planetary Civilization*. Boston: Tellus Institute.
- Raworth, Kate. 2017. *Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st Century Economist*. White River Junction: Chelsea Green.
- Reed, Jean-Pierre, and John Foran. 2002. Political Cultures of Opposition: Exploring Idioms, Ideologies, and Revolutionary Agency in the Case of Nicaragua. *Critical Sociology* 28 (3): 335–370.
- Reinsborough, Patrick, and Doyle Canning. 2017 [2010]. *Re: Imagining Change: How to Use Story-based Strategy to Win Campaigns, Build Movements, and Change the World*. Updated and Expanded 2nd ed. Oakland: PM Books.
- Robinson, Kim Stanley. 2017. *New York 2140*. New York: Orbit.
- Ross, John. 1994. *Rebellion from the Rots: Indian Uprising in Chiapas*. Monroe: Common Courage.
- Schneider, Nathan. 2012. Occupy, After Occupy. *The Nation*. September 24. <http://www.thenation.com/article/169761/occupy-after-occupy>.
- Sen, Jai, and Peter Waterman, eds. 2009. *World Social Forum: Challenging Empires*. 2nd ed. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Smucker, Jonathan Matthew. 2017. *Hegemony How-To: A Roadmap for Radicals*. Oakland: AK Press.
- Solnit, Rebecca. 2008. News from Nowhere: Iceland's Polite Dystopia. *Harper's Magazine*. October. <http://harpers.org/archive/2008/10/news-from-nowhere/>.
- . 2012. The Sky's the Limit: The Demanding Gifts of 2012. December 23. http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175632/tomgram%3A_rebecca_solnit_2013_as_year_zero_for_us_and_our_planet/.
- Solón, Pablo. 2018. Vivir Bien: Old Cosmovisions and New Paradigms. February, Great Transition Initiative. <http://greattransition.org/publication/vivir-bien>.
- Starr, Amory. 2005. *Global Revolt: A Guide to the Movements Against Globalization*. London: Zed Press.
- Taylor, Astra, Keith Gessen, et al., eds. 2011. *Occupy! Scenes from Occupied America*. London: Verso.
- van Gelder, Sarah, and The Staff of YES! Magazine, ed. 2011. *This Changes Everything: Occupy Wall Street and the 99% Movement*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
- Wade, Robert, and Silla Sigurgeirsdóttir. 2010. Lessons for Iceland. *New Left Review* 65: 5–29.
- Wainwright, Hilary. 2017. A Movement Preparing for Power. October 3. <https://zcomm.org/znetarticle/a-movement-preparing-for-power/>.
- Webber, Jeffrey. 2010. *Rebellion to Reform in Bolivia: Class-Struggle, Indigenous Liberation and the Politics of Evo Morales*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

- White, Micah. 2016. *The End of Protest: A New Playbook for Revolution*. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada.
- Wilpert, Gregory. 2006. *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The History and Policies of the Chavez Government*. London: Verso.
- Wittner, Lawrence. 2017. World Citizenship Is More Popular Than You Might Think. September 17. <http://portside.org/2017-09-19/world-citizenship-more-popular-you-might-think>.
- Zibechi, Raúl. 2010. *Dispersing Power: Social Movements as Anti-State Forces*. Trans. Ramor Ryan. Oakland: AK Press.



Global Social Movements and World Revolutions in the Twenty-First Century

Christopher Chase-Dunn and Sandor Nagy

Social movements and revolutions are characterized as actions by excluded collectivities that use non-institutional strategies and tactics in sustained campaigns for social change.¹ David A. Snow and Sarah Soule also define social movements as collective actions that either challenge or defend existing structures or systems of authority.² It is important to address several assumptions that are often made in the social movement literature, especially when analyzing social movements in a global perspective. Most of the social movement literature focuses on exclusively modern movements that are characterized as “proactive” and ignores or dismisses the study of so-called reactive movements that were carried out by “primitive rebels.”³ This distinction implies that the peasant revolts and revolutions that were legitimated in religious terms are outside the domain of the field. Recent work on revolutions recognizes that popular revolts like modern political upheavals were already occurring in Bronze Age Egypt,⁴ and it is now claimed that collective behavior and rudimentary social movement-type activity are likely to have played an important role in social change since the Stone Age.⁵

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND REVOLUTIONS IN WORLD-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The institutional changes that have occurred with the rise and fall of the hegemonic core powers over the past four centuries have constituted a sequence of forms of world order that evolved to solve the political, economic, and techni-

C. Chase-Dunn (✉) • S. Nagy
Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside, CA, USA
e-mail: chriscd@ucr.edu; snagy001@ucr.edu

© The Author(s) 2019
B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements,
Revolution, and Social Transformation*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_18

cal problems of successively more global waves of capitalist accumulation. The expansion of global production required accessing raw materials to feed the new industries, and food to feed the expanding populations.⁶ As in any hierarchy, coercion is a very inefficient means of domination, and so the hegemons sought legitimacy by proclaiming leadership in advancing civilization and democracy (the Gramscian side of hegemony). But the terms of these claims were also employed by those below who sought to protect themselves from exploitation and domination. And so the evolution of hegemony was produced by dominant groups and nation-states competing with one another in a context of successive powerful challenges from below. The world orders of the Europe-centered system have been contested and reconstructed in a series of world revolutions that began with the Protestant Reformation.⁷

The idea of world revolution is a broad notion that encompasses all kinds of acts of resistance to hierarchy, regardless of whether they are coordinated with one another, but that occur relatively close to one another in time. Usually the idea of revolution is conceptualized on a national scale as an overthrow of a regime and the reorganization of social relations within a national society. Several changes are required in order to use the concept of revolution at the world-system level. There is no global state (yet) to take over. But there is a global polity, a world order, or what Immanuel Wallerstein calls the “geoculture.”⁸ World orders are those normative and institutional features that are taken for granted in large-scale cooperation, competition, and conflict. It is the world polity that is the arena of contestation within which world revolutions have occurred and restructured.

Terry Boswell and Christopher Chase-Dunn focused on those constellations of local, regional, national, and transnational rebellions and revolutions that have had long-term consequences for changing world orders.⁹ Designation of world revolutions employs years that symbolize the totemic events that indicate the nature of the complex event that is a world revolution. For the modern world-system, the world revolutions after the Protestant Reformation are symbolized by the years 1789, 1848, 1917, 1968, and 1989.¹⁰ Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins, and Immanuel Wallerstein analyzed the world revolutions of 1848, 1917, 1968, and 1989.¹¹ They observed that the demands put forth in a world revolution do not usually become institutionalized until a later consolidating revolt has occurred. So, the revolutionaries appear to have lost in the failure of their most radical demands, but enlightened conservatives who are trying to manage hegemony end up incorporating the reforms that were earlier radical demands into the current world order in order to cool out resistance from below. It is important to tease out the similarities and the differences among the world revolutions to be able to accurately assess the contemporary situation and to learn from the past. The contexts and the actors have changed from one world revolution to the next.

Before local and regional social movements began communicating with and aiding one another, they were indirectly linked through the hierarchical structures of the world-system—mainly the colonial empires of the core powers.

Though local rebels in the far-flung colonies of the British Empire did not know about one another, the Home Office did, and when such local rebellions grew large in the same time periods, the policies and activities of the colonial statesmen and businesses reacted.

This view of the modern world-system as constituting an arena of political struggle over the past several centuries implies that global civil society has existed all along.¹² Global civil society includes all the actors who consciously participate in world politics. In the past it has consisted primarily of statesmen, religious leaders, scientists, financiers, and the owners and top managers of chartered companies such as the Dutch and British East India Companies. This rather small group of people already saw the global arena of political, economic, military, and ideological struggle as their arena of contestation.¹³ There has been a “Global Left” and transnational social movements involving non-elite actors since the world revolution of 1789.¹⁴ While global civil society is still a small minority of the total population of the earth, the falling costs of communication and transportation have enabled more and more people to become transnational political actors.

Our discussion below focuses on what has been called the New Global Left and compares it with earlier incarnations of the Global Left.¹⁵ This is part, but not all, of global civil society. Other important contemporary actors are the forces organized around the World Economic Forum, the new right-wing populist and neo-fascist movements and parties, the BRICs, and the jihadists.¹⁶

We are in the midst of another world revolution at present. Christopher Chase-Dunn and R. E. Niemeyer have called it the world revolution of 20xx (because it is not yet clear what the key symbolic year should be); they claim that it began with the anti-International Monetary Fund riots in the 1980s and the Zapatista revolt in Southern Mexico in 1994.¹⁷

World revolutions are hard to study and difficult to compare with one another because they are complex constellations of events. The time periods and places to include (and exclude) are hard to judge. They each have had different mixes of social movements, rebellions, and revolutions, including reactionary movements, and have occurred unevenly in time and space. What have been the actual and potential bases for cooperation and competition across the progressive (antisystemic) movements? How did some of the movements affect the others? And how did they relate to the similar and different terrains of power and economic structures in the world-system at the time that they emerged? And how have they affected the struggles among elites in their efforts to maintain their positions or gain new advantages? Sandor Nagy contends that there has been an important interaction between conservative and reactionary world movements and egalitarian and progressive ones since the French Revolution.¹⁸ Dani Rodrik contends that the different regional consequences of neoliberal globalization explain why left-wing populism emerged in the Latin American Pink Tide and right-wing populism emerged in Europe.¹⁹ Christopher Chase-Dunn and Jennifer S. K. Dudley compare the contemporary right-wing populist and neo-fascist movements and parties with twentieth-century wave of fascist and authoritarian movements.²⁰

The World Revolution of 20xx

It is difficult to pick a symbolic year that expresses the main characteristics of the current world revolution because it is still in formation and it is not clear which characteristics to pick. The wave of protests that began with the Arab Spring in 2011 demonstrated some coherence regarding their local and global causations, and so some have concluded that 2011 is a good choice. The Arab Spring was followed by an anti-austerity summer in Greece and Spain and then the Occupy movement in the Fall. But it is probably too soon to pick a symbolic year for the current world revolution.

Some claim that the anti-International Monetary Fund riots of the 1980s were the first skirmishes of the revolts and rebellions against neoliberal global capitalism.²¹ The Zapatista rebellion of 1994 was the first to name global capitalism as the enemy. The “Battle of Seattle” in 1999 brought the “antiglobalization movement” to the attention of large numbers of people. The founding of the World Social Forum (WSF) in 2001, a response to the exclusivity of the World Economic Forum held in Davos, Switzerland, since 1971, provoked the coming together of a movement of movements focused on issues of global justice and sustainability. The social forum process spread to all the regions of the world despite, and because of, the events of September 11, 2001, and subsequent military adventures carried out by the neoconservative George W. Bush presidency in the United States.

Many of the participants in the recent global justice movement were unaware, or were only vaguely aware, of the historical sequence of world revolutions. But others are determined not to repeat what are perceived to have been the mistakes of the past. The charter of the World Social Forum does not permit participation by those who attend as representatives of organizations that are engaged in, or that advocate, armed struggle. Nor are governments or political parties supposed to send representatives to the WSF.²² There is emphasis on diversity and on horizontal, as opposed to hierarchical, forms of organization. And the wide use of the Internet for communication and mobilization has made it possible for broad coalitions and loosely knit networks to engage in collective action projects. The movement of movements at the World Social Forum engaged in a manifesto/charter-writing frenzy as those who sought a more organized approach to confronting global capitalism and neoliberalism attempted to formulate consensual goals and to put workable coalitions together.²³

One continuing issue has been whether the WSF itself should formulate a political program and take formal stances on issues. The Charter of the WSF explicitly forbids this, and a significant group of participants strongly supports maintaining the WSF as an “open space” for debate and organizing. A survey of 625 attendees at the WSF meeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2005 asked whether the WSF should remain an open space or should take political stances. Exactly 50% of the respondents favored the open space idea.²⁴ So trying to change the WSF Charter to allow for a formal political program would be very divisive.

But this is not necessary. The WSF Charter also encourages the formation of new political organizations. So those participants who want to form new coalitions and organizations are free to act, as long as they do not do so in the name of the WSF as a whole. In social forum meetings at the global and national levels, the Assembly of Social Movements and other groups have issued calls for global action and political manifestoes. At the end of the 2005 meeting in Porto Alegre, a group of 19 notable intellectuals and activists issued a statement that was purported to be a consensus of the whole meeting. At the 2006 “polycentric” meeting in Bamako, Mali a somewhat overlapping group issued a manifesto entitled “the Bamako Appeal” at the beginning of the meeting. The Bamako Appeal was a call for a global united front against neoliberalism and United States neo-imperialism.²⁵ And Samir Amin, the famous Egyptian Marxist economist and one of the founders of the world-systems perspective, wrote a short essay entitled “Toward a Fifth International?” in which he briefly outlined the history of the first four internationals.²⁶ Peter Waterman proposed a “Global Labor charter,” and a coalition of women’s groups meeting at the WSF has produced a feminist global manifesto that tries to overcome divisive North/South issues.²⁷

There has been an impasse in the global justice movement between those who want to move toward a global united front that could mobilize a strong coalition against the powers that be and those who prefer local prefigurative, horizontalist actions that reject formal organizations and refuse to participate in “normal” political activities such as elections and lobbying. Horizontalism repudiates hierarchical organization and prefers flexible networks without formal organization.²⁸ Prefiguration is the idea that individuals and small groups can willfully constitute more humane and egalitarian social relations in the present. It has a long history as utopian socialism and communes and was an important component of the Occupy movement’s construction of face-to-face participatory democracy, which has strong support in the social forum process.²⁹ Some of this horizontalism and prefiguration was inherited from similar tendencies in the world revolution of 1968. Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein pointed out that the New Left of the 1960s embraced direct democracy, attacked bureaucratic organizations, and was itself resistant to the creation of new formal organizations that might act as instruments of revolution.³⁰ These organizational predilections were understood to be the important lessons learned from earlier waves of class struggle and decolonization.

In later years many 68ers joined prefigurative communes or formed new Leninist organizations, some which have survived.³¹ The resistance to politics as usual, especially competing for state power, has been very salient in the world revolution of 20xx. These proscriptions are based on the critique of the practices of earlier world revolutions in which labor unions and political parties became bogged down in short-term and self-interested struggles that then reinforced and reproduced the global capitalist system and the interstate system. This repudiation of formal organizations and participation in institutionalized political competition is strongly reflected in the constitution of the

World Social Forum as discussed above. And the same elements were robustly present in the Occupy movement as well as in several other popular revolts, including the Arab Spring.³²

Journalist Paul Mason spent the last decade doing ethnographic immersion in the wave of protests that occurred in the Middle East, Spain, Greece, Turkey, and the Occupy movement.³³ His sympathetic analysis of the current world revolution contends that the social structural basis for horizontalism and anti-formal organization, beyond the reaction to the reformist outcomes of earlier efforts of the Left, is due to the presence of a large number of middle-class students in the protests that were building in the first decade of the twenty-first century.³⁴ Of course, the world revolution of 1968 was also composed of an activist element within the large stratum of college students who had emerged on the world stage with the global expansion of higher education since World War II.³⁵

Precariat Fractions

Mason makes an interesting comparison of the recent protest wave with the world revolution of 1848, in which a large number of the activists were also educated, but underemployed, students.³⁶ He notes that the participants in the recent wave of protests were heavily composed of highly educated young people who were facing the strong likelihood that they will not be able to find jobs that are commensurate with their skills and certification levels. Many of these “graduates with no future” have gone into debt to finance their education, and they are alienated from politics as usual and enraged by the failure of global capitalism to continue the expansion of highly skilled jobs. Mason notes that the urban poor, especially in the Global South, and workers whose livelihoods have been attacked by globalization have also been important constituencies in the protests. And he points to the significance of the Internet, social media, and cell phones for allowing disaffected digital youth to organize large protests. He sees the netizens’ “freedom to tweet” as an important element in a strong desire for individual freedom that is an important driver of those graduates who have enjoyed confronting the powers that be.³⁷ This embrace of individuality may be another reason why the movements have been reticent to develop their own formal organizations and to participate in traditional organized political activities.

Guy Standing has undertaken a broad consideration of how the neoliberal globalization project has affected global class relations and the nature of work.³⁸ Standing does not focus on the nature of the recent protest wave, but his observations and claims overlap with, and in some ways diverge from, those of Paul Mason. Standing claims that the reorganization of production that David Harvey has called “flexible accumulation” has produced the recent rise of what he calls “the precariat.”³⁹ Standing sees the rise of precarious labor as constituting a new class, the precariat, which is significantly different from the proletariat. Employment is increasingly temporary and workers have little identification with their jobs or the firms that pay them. The increasing power of capital, deindustrialization of the core, and attacks on labor unions have produced a reorga-

nization of the global class structure around precarious work. Standing notes that there are important differences between different sectors of the precariat. The slum dwellers in the informal sector in megacities of the Global South have long been exposed to precarious labor. This group has expanded as a result of the neoliberal industrialization of agriculture. The over-educated, underemployed, are young people from middle-income working-class backgrounds who also face a precarious livelihood, but with rather different tastes and interests from the folk of “the planet of slums.” They are individualistic and difficult to organize using the methods that worked for the industrial proletariat.

Standing wants to forge political alliances among these different groups to press for workers’ rights and greater protections from states, but he recognizes that this effort faces very difficult obstacles. He also has a very different attitude toward the “freedom to tweet” than does Mason. He believes that the short attention span produced by constant exposure to electronic communications makes it difficult for the young to develop an understanding of the larger historical context in which the precariat is emerging.⁴⁰ Standing is significantly less sympathetic with the social media addiction of the millennials than is Mason, but they agree that these are important characteristics that need to be taken into account in projects that seek to build larger alliances in order to fight for workers’ rights and a more egalitarian society.

THE MULTICENTRIC NETWORK OF LEFTIST MOVEMENTS

Just as world revolutions in the past have restructured world orders, the current one might also do this. But for this to happen, a significant number of activists who participate in the New Global Left would need to agree on several contentious matters:

- the nature of the most important contemporary problems,
- a vision of a desirable future, and
- judgments about appropriate tactics and forms of movement organization.

The Transnational Social Movements Research Working Group at the University of California, Riverside, performed a network analysis of movement ties based on the responses to a survey of attendees that was conducted at the 2005 World Social Forum meeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil.⁴¹ This study examined the structure of overlapping links among movement themes by asking attendees about their involvement in eighteen movement themes. The choices of those attendees who declared that they were actively involved in two or more movement themes were used to indicate the overlaps among movements. The results show a multicentric network of movement links.⁴²

All the movements had some people who were actively involved in other movements. The overall structure of the network of movement linkages revealed a multicentric network organized around five main movements that served as bridges linking the other movements to one another: peace, antiglo-

balization, global justice, human rights, and environmentalism. These were also the largest movements in terms of the numbers of attendees who professed to be actively involved. While no single movement was so central that it linked to all the others, neither was the network structure characterized by separate cliques of movements that might be easily separated from one another.

Chase-Dunn and Kaneshiro compared the movement network results found at the 2005 Porto Alegre meeting with the results of a very similar survey carried out at the World Social Forum meeting in Nairobi in 2007.⁴³ Their findings show a few changes, but the main network structure was very similar to that found in Porto Alegre. This suggests that the New Global Left contains a rather stable global network structure of movement interconnections that is largely independent of the location of the meetings. Rather similar network structures were also found at meetings of the U.S. Social Forum in Atlanta in 2007 and in Detroit in 2009 indicating that the network links among movements seem to be quite similar at the global and national levels, at least for the case of the United States.⁴⁴

This structure means that the transnational activists who participate in the World Social Forum process share many goals and support the global justice framework asserted in the World Social Forum Charter. It also means that the network of movements is relatively integrated and is not prone to splits. A global justice united front that is attentive to the nature of this network structure could mobilize a strong force for collective action in world politics. But there are some obvious problems that need attention.

GLOBAL NORTH/SOUTH CHALLENGES

The focus on global justice and North/South inequalities and the critique of neoliberalism provide strong orienting frames for the transnational activists of the New Global Left.⁴⁵ But there are difficult obstacles to collective action that are heavily structured by the huge global inequalities that exist in the contemporary world-system, and these issues must be directly confronted.⁴⁶

Our survey of the attendees of the 2005 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre found several important differences between activists from the core, the periphery, and the semiperiphery.⁴⁷ Those from the periphery were proportionately fewer, older, and more likely to be men. In addition, participants from the periphery were more likely to be associated with externally sponsored NGOs, rather than with self-funded Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) or unions. NGOs have greater access to travel funds and were able to bring more representatives from the peripheral countries. Survey respondents from the Global South (the periphery and the semiperiphery) were significantly more likely than those from the Global North (the core) to be skeptical about creating or reforming global-level political institutions and were more likely to favor the abolition of existing global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.⁴⁸

This skepticism probably stems from the historical experience of peoples from the non-core with colonialism and global-level institutions that claim to be operating on universal principles of fairness, but whose actions have either not solved problems or have made them worse. These “new abolitionists” pose strong challenges to both existing global institutions and to efforts to reform or replace these institutions with more democratic and efficacious ones.

George Monbiot’s *Manifesto for a New World Order* is a reasoned and insightful call for radically democratizing the existing institutions of global governance and for establishing a global peoples’ parliament that would be directly elected by the whole population of the earth.⁴⁹ Monbiot also advocated the establishment of a trade clearinghouse (first proposed by John Maynard Keynes at Bretton Woods) that would reward national economies with balanced trade and that would use some of the surpluses generated by those with trade surpluses to invest in those with trade deficits.⁵⁰ And Monbiot proposed a radical reversal of the World Trade Organization regime, which imposes free trade on the non-core but allows core countries to engage in protectionism—a “fair trade organization” that would help to reduce global development inequalities. Monbiot also advocated abolition of the U.N. Security Council and shifting its power over peacekeeping to a General Assembly in which representatives’ votes would be weighted by the population sizes of their countries.

Monbiot also noted that the current level of indebtedness of non-core countries could be used as formidable leverage over the world’s largest banks if all the debtors acted in concert. This could provide the muscle behind a significant wave of global democratization. But for this to happen the global justice movement would have to organize a strong coalition of the non-core countries that would overcome the splits that tend to occur between the periphery and the semiperiphery. This is far from being a utopian fantasy. It is a practical program for global democracy.

The multiple local, regional, and largely disconnected human interaction networks of the past have become strongly linked into a single global system. The treadmill of population growth has been stopped in the core countries and is slowing in the non-core. The global human population is predicted to peak and to stabilize in the decades surrounding 2075 at somewhere between 9 and 12 billion. Thus, population pressure will continue to be a major challenge for at least another century, increasing logistical loads on governance institutions. The exit option is blocked off except for a small number of pioneers who may move out to space stations or try to colonize Mars. Thus, a condition of global circumscription exists. Malthusian corrections may not be only a thing of the past, as illustrated by continuing warfare and genocide. Famine has been brought under control, but future shortages of clean water, good soil, non-renewable energy sources, and food might bring that old horseman back.

As we have already noted above, immense global inequalities complicate the collective action problem. First world peoples have come to feel entitled, and non-core people want to have their own cars, large houses, and electronic gadgets.

The ideas of human rights and democracy are still contested, but they have become so widely accepted that existing institutions of global governance are illegitimate even by their own standards. The demand for global democracy and human rights can only be met by reforming or replacing the existing institutions of global governance with institutions that have some plausible claim to represent the will and interests of most of the world's people. That means democratic global state formation,⁵¹ although most of the contemporary protagonists of global democracy do not like to say it that way.

A GLOBAL UNITED FRONT?

As mentioned above, Paul Mason stressed the importance of unemployed, but educated, youth in the world revolutions of 1848 and 20xx.⁵² Of course scholars of social movements have long known that oppressed people are usually led by disaffected members of the privileged professional middle or upper classes who have some education and resources that can be devoted to the tasks of movement leadership. But is there more than this to Mason's claim? He notes that many middle-class radicals in earlier world revolutions turned against the urban poor and workers when they posed a strong and radical challenge to the existing order. He attributes part of the defeat of the revolutionaries in 1848 to the students' betrayal of the radical workers in European cities and contends that one reason why the radical youth in the current wave of global protest have mainly kept their radicalism is because the urban poor and workers have been relatively quiescent, at least so far.

We may also wonder how the differences between now and 1968 will affect the politics of radical students today. Perceptions of the availability of future well-paying professional jobs have changed greatly. Most of 68ers were able to find such jobs if they wanted them, whereas the current crop of highly educated youth is facing a much more constrained job market as well as mountains of debt incurred in getting their degrees. Some see this as a cause of activism, but others surmise that the prevailing precarious conditions may undermine rebellious courage. Nonetheless, the potential exists for renewed social activism that may give rise to a global united front in response to new economic crises, global environmental disasters, and the rise of neo-fascism.

In the social forum process, a related approach could involve a greater willingness to collaborate with progressive regimes such as that in Bolivia. Some have called for the radicals to engage in the political system to attain power within existing institutions. Arguably this is what is suggested the New Global Left must do if it is to have an important impact on the future of humanity. But this could be done without completely abandoning some of the concerns of the 68ers and the current generation of social activists. Thus, the new wave of individual activism and participatory democracy could be embraced while also inventing or reinventing more humane and sustainable forms of collectivism and new modes of participation in institutional politics. The enhanced ability to swarm, using social media and the Internet, is a tactic that appeals to the

millennials and that could be coordinated with more populist forms of participation in electoral politics.

The wave of protests that built up in the last few decades peaked in 2011 and has declined somewhat since then.⁵³ The protest intensity measure assembled from web sources by GDELT shows successive waves of global protests from 1979 to 2014.⁵⁴

The partial decline since 2011 is probably due, in part, to the gradual recovery of the global economy since the crash of 2008 and the policies of the Trump administration as businesses increase investments in the climate of lower taxes and less regulation. But the decline in protest activity probably also reflects the debacles that have ensued since the Arab Spring, which have understandably reduced the enthusiasm of idealistic democracy protestors in war zone countries. The Green Revolution in Iran was suppressed. The tragic events in Egypt and Syria have been especially disheartening. Horizontalism and prefiguration seem to presume a Habermasian world of legitimate and protected political discourse that does not exist in many regions of the world. Military coups and contending mass parties like the Muslim Brotherhood leave little room for the protests of the precariat to influence political discourse. All world revolutions go through cycles of activism and quiescence and this one is no exception.

The protests mounted by the global justice and anti-austerity movements changed the political discourse about inequality. The U.S. presidential election campaign of 2016 saw a major candidate (Bernie Sanders) advocating a crack-down on Wall Street. Podemos, an anti-austerity party in Spain led by former autonomist Pablo Iglesias Turrion, developed a wide following and gained important representation in the Spanish election of December 2015. But the debacle of Syriza in Greece, concluding an austerity compromise despite a popular mandate to stand up against global finance capital, presented an object lesson for those who have preached the dangers of institutional politics. A valuable opportunity was missed in Greece to show that indeed there are progressive alternatives to neoliberal capitalist globalization.

Will the current world revolution eventually attain enough muscle to challenge neoliberal capitalism and to provoke the progressive forces to usher in a new era of global social justice that is more sustainable and less polarizing than the capitalist globalization project? Or will a perfect storm of environmental disaster, hegemonic decline, mass migrations, inter-imperialist rivalry, ethnic violence, and neo-fascism produce so much chaos that a united front of the New Global Left will have an opportunity within the next few decades to fundamentally transform the capitalist world-system into a democratic and collectively rational global commonwealth? Both options would require a united front that brings progressive social movements, parties, and regimes together in order to liberate humanity from exploitation and oppression and prevent social, economic, political, and ecological calamity in the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. Sidney Tarrow (ed.), *Power in Movement*, Third Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
2. David A Snow and Sarah Soule, *A Primer on Social Movements* (New York: Norton, 2009), p. 6.
3. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1978); Eric Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels* (New York: Norton, 1959); Ho-Fung Hung, *Protest With Chinese Characteristics: Demonstrations, Riots and Petitions in the Mid-Qing Dynasty* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
4. Jack Goldstone, *Revolutions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
5. Christopher Chase-Dunn 2016 "Social Movements and Collective Behavior in Premodern polities" IROWS Working Paper #110 <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows110/irows110.htm>.
6. S. G Bunker and P.S. Ciccantell, "The Economic Ascent of China and the Potential for Restructuring the Capitalist World-Economy" *Journal of World-Systems Research* 10 (2004).
7. Terry Boswell and Christopher Chase-Dunn, *The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism: Toward Global Democracy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 53–64; Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon, 2000). The most obvious example of restructuring of the world order by world revolutions was the extension of the European system of sovereign states to the non-core that was caused by waves of decolonization movements that began with the American Revolution of 1776.
8. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System, Volume 4: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789–1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
9. Boswell and Chase-Dunn, *Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism*.
10. World revolutions probably also occurred in earlier regional world-systems. Attention is turning to the synchrony of rebellions that occurred in China, Japan, Korea and adjacent regions in the early modern period.
11. Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins, and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Antisystemic Movements* (London: Verso, 2011); Colin J. Beck, "The World Cultural Origins of Revolutionary Waves: Five Centuries of European Contestation," *Social Science History* 35 (2) (2011); Sandor Nagy, "The evolution of revolution: a comparative analysis of world revolutions from 1789 to 2011" (Honors Thesis, University of California-Riverside, 2016). Arguably 1955, the year of the Bandung Conference, should be included to represent the great wave of decolonization that occurred after World War II.
12. Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society* (Malden: Polity Press, 2003).
13. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Ellen Reese, "Global Party Formation in World Historical Perspective" in Katarina Sehm-Patomaki and Marko Ulvila (eds.), *Global Party Formation* (London: Zed Books, 2011), pp. 53–91.
14. Immanuel Wallerstein's Volume 4 of *The Modern World-System* tells the story of politics in the geoculture since the French Revolution (2011).
15. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *The Rise of the Global Left* (London: Zed Books, 2006).

16. Perry Anderson, *Spectrum* (New York: Verso, 2005); Patrick Bond (ed.), *Brics in Africa: Anti-imperialist, Sub-imperialist or in Between?* (Durban: University of Kwa-Zulu-Natal, 2013); Valentine M. Moghadam, *Globalization and Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism and the Global Justice Movement* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009). See also Immanuel Wallerstein, "Political Construction of Islam" in Immanuel Wallerstein, *The World-System and Africa* (New York: Diasporic Africa Press, 2017).
17. Christopher Chase-Dunn and R. E. Niemeyer, "The world revolution of 20xx" in Mathias Albert et al. (eds.), *Transnational Political Spaces* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2009); Paul Mason, who also compares the current global justice movement with earlier world revolutions, sees it as having begun with the Arab Spring and anti-austerity movements in 2011. *Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions* (London: Verso, 2013).
18. Sandor Nagy 2018 "Global Swings of the Political Spectrum: Cyclically Delayed Mirror Waves of Revolutions and Counterrevolutions" IROWS Working Paper #124 available at <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows124/irows124.htm>.
19. Dani Rodrik 2017 "Populism and the economics of globalization" John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
20. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Jennifer S.K. Dudley 2018 "The global right in the world revolutions of 1917 and 20xx" in Jerry Harris, *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* Brill.
21. John Walton and David Seddon, *Free markets and food riots: the politics of global adjustment*, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994. World revolutions have become more frequent and so they now seem to overlap one another. The anti-IMF riots occurred during what some have called the World Revolution of 1989, which was also a rebellion against one-party rule in Russia, Eastern Europe and China. These rebellions allowed Reagan and Thatcher to declare that the West had won over collectivism and that there was no alternative to the neoliberal globalization project. But the rebels of 1989 also asserted the importance of political rights, and this was not lost on the emerging New Global Left. See Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*.
22. The World Social Forum Charter of Principles is at <http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/ecology/wsfcharter.pdf>.
23. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The World Social Forum: from defense to offense," modified 2007. <http://www.sociologistswithoutborders.org/documents/WallersteinCommentary.pdf>.
24. Christopher Chase-Dunn et al. "North-South Contradictions and Bridges at the World Social Forum" Pp. 341–366 in *North and South In the World Political Economy*, ed. Rafael Reuveny and William R. Thompson. Blackwell, 2008.
25. Jai Sen et al. *A Political Programme for the World Social Forum?: Democracy, Substance and Debate in the Bamako Appeal and the Global Justice Movements* (Durban: Indian Institute for Critical Action: Centre in Movement (CACIM), New Delhi, India & the University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society (CCS), 2007).
26. Samir Amin, "Towards the fifth international?" Pp. 121–144 in *Democratic Politics Globally* ed. Katarina Sehm-Patomaki et al. (Tampere: Network Institute for Global Democratization, 2006).
27. Peter Waterman, "Toward a Global Labor Charter Movement?" Modified 2006. http://wsfworkshop.openspaceforum.net/twiki/tiki-read_article.

- [php?articleId=6](#) and Valentine M. Moghadam, *Globalizing Women*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.
28. However, see Jo Freeman, "The tyranny of structurlessness," 1970. <http://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm>.
 29. Frederick Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, Chicago: Charles Kerr, 1918. David Graeber, *The Democracy Project: A History, A Crisis, A Movement*, New York: Spiegel and Grau, 2013. Jeffrey S. Juris, *Networking Futures: the Movements Against Corporate Globalization*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2008. Geoffrey Pleyers, *Alter-Globalization*, Cambridge: Polity, 2010.
 30. Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein, *Antisystemic Movements*, 37–38.
 31. For example, Revolutionary Communist Party, *Constitution for the New Socialist Republic in North America*, Chicago: RCP Publications, 2010.
 32. Mason, *Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere*.
 33. Mason, *Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere*.
 34. Ruth Milkman, Stephanie Luce, and Penny Lewis, "Changing the Subject: A Bottom-up Account of Occupy Wall Street in New York City" (Paper, CUNY: The Murphy Institute, 2013); Michaela Curran et al. "The Occupy Movement in California" in Todd A. Comer (ed.), *What Comes After Occupy?: The Regional Politics of Resistance* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014).
 35. John W. Meyer (2009) explains the student revolt of the 1960s as analogous to earlier waves of expansion and incorporation into the political process. Men of no property and women had protested and been incorporated into the formal processes of democracy (suffrage) in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After World War II higher education was greatly expanded across the world, creating a large, but politically unincorporated, interest group—college students.
 36. Mason, *Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere*.
 37. Mason, *Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere*.
 38. Guy Standing, *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class* (London: Bloomsbury, 2011).
 39. Standing, *The Precariat*. His reference to David Harvey's "flexible accumulation" is to be found in David Harvey, *The Condition of Post-modernity* (London: Blackwell, 1989).
 40. Standing, *The Precariat*.
 41. The survey and other results are available at <http://www.irows.ucr.edu/research/tsmstudy.htm>.
 42. Chase-Dunn et al. "North-South Contradictions," 8, Fig. 1.
 43. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Matheu Kaneshiro, "Stability and Change in the Contours of Alliances Among Movements in the Social Forum Process," in David Fasenfest (ed.), *Engaging Social Justice* (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
 44. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Ian Breckenridge-Jackson, "The Network of movements in the U.S. social forum process: Comparing Atlanta 2007 with Detroit 2010," Institute for Research on World-Systems, 2013. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows71/irows71.htm>.
 45. Scott C. Byrd, "The Porto Alegre Consensus: Theorizing the Forum Movement" *Globalizations* 2 (1) (2005); Manfred Steger, James Goodman and Erin K. Wilson, *Justice Globalism: Ideology, Crises, Policy* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013).

46. J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley Parks, *A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North/South Politics and Climate Policy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007).
47. Chase-Dunn et al. "North-South Contradictions."
48. Chase-Dunn et al. "North-South Contradictions."
49. George Monbiot, *Manifesto for a New World Order* (New York: New Press, 2003); Ulrich Beck's call for "cosmopolitan realism" supported the formation of global democratic institutions. Ulrich Beck, *Power in the Global Age* (Malden: Polity Press, 2005).
50. The current U.S. trade deficit might qualify it for global welfare, but the balance of payments and ability to print world money would also need to be taken into account.
51. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Hiroko Inoue, "Accelerating democratic global state formation." *Cooperation and Conflict* 47 (2) (2012). <http://cac.sagepub.com/content/47/2/157>.
52. Mason, *Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere*.
53. Savan Savaş Karataşlı et al. "Class Crisis and the 2011 Protest Wave: Cyclical and Secular Trends in Global Labor Unrest" in Immanuel Wallerstein et al. (eds.), *Overcoming Global Inequalities* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2015); Thomas Carothers and Richard Youngs, *The Complexities of Global Protests* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015).
54. GDELT Project. <http://gdeltproject.org/> Kalev Leetaru, "Did the Arab Spring Really Spark a Wave of Global Protests?" *Foreign Policy*, May 30, 2014, accessed June 1, 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/30/did-the-arab-spring-really-spark-a-wave-of-global-protests/?wp_login_redirect=0 GDELT's measure of "protest intensity" is calculated as the number of protests in a given month divided by the total number of all events recorded that month. GDELT's event coding methodology has been criticized for double-counting, but it is not known how much variation there is in this measurement error over time. If double-counting is constant, the trends would still be fairly accurate.

REFERENCES

- Amin, Samir. 2006. Towards the Fifth International? In *Democratic Politics Globally*, ed. Katarina Sehm-Patomaki and Marko Ulvila. Tampere, Finland: Network Institute for Global Democratization (NIGD Working Paper 1/2006).
- Anderson, Perry. 2005. *Spectrum*. New York: Verso.
- Arrighi, Giovanni. 1994. *The Long Twentieth Century*. London: Verso.
- . 2006. *Adam Smith in Beijing*. London: Verso.
- Arrighi, Giovanni, and Beverly Silver. 1999. *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World-System: Comparing Hegemonic Transitions*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Arrighi, Giovanni, Terence K. Hopkins, and Immanuel Wallerstein. 2011 [1989]. *Antisystemic Movements*. London and New York: Verso.
- Beck, Ulrich. 2005. *Power in the Global Age*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Beck, Colin J. 2011. The World Cultural Origins of Revolutionary Waves: Five Centuries of European Contestation. *Social Science History* 35 (2): 167–207.
- Bello, Walden. 2002. *Deglobalization*. London: Zed Books.

- Benjamin, Medea, and Andrea Freedman. 1989. *Bridging the Global Gap: A Handbook to Linking Citizens of the First and Third Worlds*. Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press.
- Bond, Patrick. 2012. *The Politics of Climate Justice: Paralysis Above, Movement Below*. Durban, SA: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- , ed. 2013. *Brics in Africa: Anti-imperialist, Sub-imperialist or in Between?* Centre for Civil Society, University of Kwa-Zulu-Natal.
- Bornschier, Volker. 2010. On the Evolution of Inequality in the World System. In *Inequality Beyond Globalization: Economic Changes, Social Transformations and the Dynamics of Inequality*, ed. Christian Suter. Zurich: LIT Verlag.
- Boswell, Terry, and Christopher Chase-Dunn. 2000. *The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism: Toward Global Democracy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Byrd, Scott C. 2005. The Porto Alegre Consensus: Theorizing the Forum Movement. *Globalizations* 2 (1): 151–163.
- Carothers, Thomas, and Richard Youngs. 2015. *The Complexities of Global Protests*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Castells, Manuel. 2012. *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 2016. *Social Movements and Collective Behavior in Premodern Politics*. IROWS Working Paper #110. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows110/irows110.htm>.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Ian Breckenridge-Jackson. 2013. The Network of Movements in the U.S. Social Forum Process: Comparing Atlanta 2007 with Detroit 2010. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows71/irows71.htm>.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Jennifer S.K. Dudley. 2018. The Global Right in the World Revolutions of 1917 and 20xx. In *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, ed. Jerry Harris. Leiden: Brill.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Hiroko Inoue. 2012. Accelerating Democratic Global State Formation. *Cooperation and Conflict* 47 (2): 157–175. <http://cac.sagepub.com/content/47/2/157>.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Matheu Kaneshiro. 2009. Stability and Change in the Contours of Alliances Among Movements in the Social Forum Process. In *Engaging Social Justice*, ed. David Fasenfest. Leiden: Brill. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows44/irows44.htm>.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Bruce Lerro. 2014. *Social Change: Globalization from the Stone Age to the Present*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm. <https://www.routledge.com/products/9781612053288>.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and R.E. Niemeyer. 2009. The World Revolution of 20xx. In *Transnational Political Spaces*, ed. Mathias Albert, Gesa Bluhm, Han Helmig, Andreas Leuttsch, and Jochen Walter. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows35/irows35.htm>.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Ellen Reese. 2011. Global Party Formation in World Historical Perspective. In *Global Party Formation*, ed. Katarina Sehm-Patomaki and Marko Ulvila. London: Zed Books. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows33/irows33.htm>.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Christine Petit, Richard Niemeyer, Robert A. Hanneman, and Ellen Reese. 2007. The Contours of Solidarity and Division Among Global Movements. *International Journal of Peace Studies* 12 (2): 1–15. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows26/irows26.htm>.

- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Ellen Reese, Mark Herkenrath, Rebecca Giem, Erika Gutierrez, Linda Kim, and Christine Petit. 2008. North-South Contradictions and Bridges at the World Social Forum. In *North and South In the World Political Economy*, ed. Rafael Reuveny and William R. Thompson. Boston: Blackwell. <http://www.irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows31/irows31.htm>.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Roy Kwon, Kirk Lawrence, and Hiroko Inoue. 2011. Last of the Hegemons: U.S. Decline and Global Governance. *International Review of Modern Sociology* 37 (1): 1–29. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows65/irows65.htm>.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, James Fenelon, Thomas D. Hall, Ian Breckenridge-Jackson, and Joel Herrera. 2015. *Global Indigenism and the Web of Transnational Social Movements*. IROWS Working Paper #87.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Joel Herrera, John Aldecoa, Ian Breckenridge-Jackson, and Nicolas Pascal. 2016. *Anarchism in the Web of Transnational Social Movements*. Presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 16–19, IROWS Working Paper #104. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows104/irows104.htm>.
- Cohn, Norman. 1970. *The Pursuit of the Millennium*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Collins, Randall. 2013. The End of Middle-Class Work: No More Escapes. In *Does Capitalism Have a Future?* ed. Immanuel Wallerstein, Randall Collins, Michael Mann, Georgi Derlugian, and Craig Calhoun. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Conway, Janet M. 2013. *Edges of Global Justice: The World Social Forum and Its Others*. London: Routledge.
- Crosby, Alfred W. 2007. Infectious Diseases as Ecological and Historical Phenomena, with Special Reference to the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919. In *The World System and the Earth System: Global Socioenvironmental Change and Sustainability Since the Neolithic Age*, ed. A. Hornborg and C. Crumley. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.
- Curran, Michaela, Elizabeth A.G. Schwarz, and Christopher Chase-Dunn. 2014. The Occupy Movement in California. In *What Comes After Occupy?: The Regional Politics of Resistance*, ed. Todd A. Comer. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows74/irows74.htm>.
- Davis, Mike. 2005. *Monster at Our Door: The Global Threat of Avian Flu*. New York: New Press.
- . 2006. *Planet of Slums*. London: Verso.
- Denemark, Robert. 2008. Fundamentalisms as Global Social Movements. *Globalizations* 5 (4): 571–582. GDELT Project <http://gdeltproject.org/>.
- Engels, Frederick. 1918. *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. Chicago: Charles Kerr.
- Evans, Peter B. 2009. From Situations of Dependency to Globalized Social Democracy. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44: 318–336.
- . 2010. Is It Labor's Turn to Globalize? Twenty-First Century Opportunities and Strategic Responses. *Global Labour Journal* 3 (1): 352–379.
- Freeman, Jo. 1970. The Tyranny of Structuralessness. <http://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm>.
- Galtung, Johan. 2009. *The Fall of the U.S. Empire—And Then What? Successors, Regionalization or Globalization? U.S. Fascism or U.S. Blossoming?* Oslo: Kolofon Press.

- Gill, Stephen. 2000. Toward a Post-modern Prince? The Battle of Seattle as a Moment in the New Politics of Globalization. *Millennium* 29 (1): 131–140.
- Goldstone, Jack. 2014. *Revolutions*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Grimes, Peter E. 1999. The Horsemen and the Killing Fields: The Final Contradiction of Capitalism. In *Ecology and the World-System*, ed. Walter L. Goldfrank, David Goodman, and Andrew Szasz. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. <http://irows.ucr.edu/grimes/horsemen.htm>.
- Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2012. *Declaration*. New York: Argo Navis Author Services.
- Harris, Kevan, and Ben Scully. 2015. A Hidden Counter-Movement?: Precarity, Politics and Social Protection Before and Beyond the Neoliberal Era. *Theory and Society* 44 (5): 415–444.
- Harvey, David. 1989. *The Condition of Postmodernity*. London: Blackwell.
- Heinberg, Richard. 2004. *Powerdown*. Gabriola Island, BC: Island Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. 1959. *Primitive Rebels*. New York: Norton.
- Hung, Ho-Fung. 2011. *Protest With Chinese Characteristics: Demonstrations, Riots and Petitions in the Mid-Qing Dynasty*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Juris, Jeffrey S. 2008. *Networking Futures: The Movements Against Corporate Globalization*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kaldor, Mary. 2003. *Global Civil Society*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Karatasli, Savan Savas, Sefika Kumral, Ben Scully, and Smriti Upadhyay. 2015. Class Crisis and the 2011 Protest Wave: Cyclical and Secular Trends in Global Labor Unrest. In *Overcoming Global Inequalities*, ed. Immanuel Wallerstein, C. Chase-Dunn, and Christian Suter, 184–200. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publisher.
- Korotayev, A.V., and J.V. Zinkina. 2011. Egyptian Revolution: A Demographic Structural Analysis. *Entelequia, Revista Interdisciplinar* 13: 139–170.
- Kuecker, Glen. 2007. The Perfect Storm. *International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, and Social Sustainability* 3 (5): 1–10.
- Leetaru, Kalev. 2014. Did the Arab Spring Really Spark a Wave of Global Protests? *Foreign Policy*. May 30. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/30/did-the-arab-spring-really-spark-a-wave-of-global-protests/?wp_login_redirect=0.
- Lindholm, Charles, and Jose Pedro Zuquete. 2010. *The Struggle for the World*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Linebaugh, Peter, and Marcus Rediker. 2000. *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic*. Boston: Beacon.
- MacPherson, Robert. 2014. Antisystemic Movements in Periods of Hegemonic Decline: Syndicalism in World-Historical Perspective. In *Structures of the World Political Economy and the Future of Global Conflict and Cooperation*, ed. Christian Suter and Christopher Chase-Dunn. Zurich: LIT Verlag.
- Mann, Michael. 2004. *Fascists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Markoff, John. 2013. Democracy's Past Transformations, Present Challenges and Future Prospects. *International Journal of Sociology* 43 (2): 13–40.
- Martin, William G., et al. 2008. *Making Waves: Worldwide Social Movements, 1750–2005*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- Mason, Paul. 2013. *Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions*. London: Verso.
- McKinnon, Susan. 2005. *Neoliberal Genetics: The Myths and Moral Tales of Evolutionary Psychology*. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press.
- Meyer, John W. 2009. *World Society*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Milkman, Ruth, Stephanie Luce, and Penny Lewis. 2013. *Changing the Subject: A Bottom-Up Account of Occupy Wall Street in New York City*. CUNY: The Murphy Institute. http://sps.cuny.edu/filestore/1/5/7/1_a05051d2117901d/1571_92f562221b8041e.pdf.
- Moghadam, Valentine M. 2005. *Globalizing Women*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Moghadam, Valentine. 2012. Anti-systemic Movements Compared. In *Routledge International Handbook of World-Systems Analysis*, ed. Salvatore J. Babones and Christopher Chase-Dunn. New York: Routledge.
- . 2013. *Globalization and Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism and the Global Justice Movement*. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Monbiot, George. 2003. *Manifesto for a New World Order*. New York: New Press.
- Nagy, Sandor. 2018. *Global Swings of the Political Spectrum: Cyclically Delayed Mirror Waves of Revolutions and Counterrevolutions*. IROWS Working Paper #123.
- Paxton, Robert O. 2004. *The Anatomy of Fascism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Piketty, Thomas. 2014. *Capital in the 21st Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Pleyers, Geoffrey. 2010. *Alter-Globalization*. Cambridge, MA: Polity.
- Podobnik, Bruce. 2006. *Global Energy Shifts: Fostering Sustainability in a Turbulent Age*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Reitan, Ruth. 2007. *Global Activism*. London: Routledge.
- Revolutionary Communist Party. 2010. *Constitution for the New Socialist Republic in North America*. Chicago: RCP Publications.
- Roberts, J. Timmons, and Bradley Parks. 2007. *A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North/South Politics and Climate Policy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Robinson, William I. 2004. *A Theory of Global Capitalism*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 2014. *Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2017. Populism and the Economics of Globalization. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
- Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. 2006. *The Rise of the Global Left*. London: Zed Books.
- Schaefer, Robert K. 2014. *Social Movements and Global Social Change: The Rising Tide*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Sen, Jai, and Madhuresh Kumar with Patrick Bond and Peter Waterman. 2007. *A Political Programme for the World Social Forum? Democracy, Substance and Debate in the Bamako Appeal and the Global Justice Movements*. Durban, South Africa: Indian Institute for Critical Action: Centre in Movement (CACIM), New Delhi, India & the University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society (CCS). <http://www.cacim.net/book/home.html>.
- Silver, Beverly. 2003. *Forces of Labor*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Jackie, and Dawn Weist. 2012. *Social Movement in the World-System*. New York: Russell-Sage.
- Smith, Jackie, et al. 2014. *Global Democracy and the World Social Forums*. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Snow, David A., and Sarah A. Soule. 2009. *A Primer on Social Movements*. New York: Norton.
- Standing, Guy. 2011. *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. London: Bloomsbury.
- . 2014. *A Precariat Charter: From Denizens to Citizens*. London: Bloomsbury.

- Starr, Amory. 2000. *Naming the Enemy: Anti-corporate Movements Confront Globalization*. London: Zed Books.
- Steger, Manfred, James Goodman, and Erin K. Wilson. 2013. *Justice Globalism: Ideology, Crises, Policy*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 2011. *Power in Movement*. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- . 2007. *Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1984. The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World-Economy. In *Current Issues and Research in Macrosociology, International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology*, ed. Gerhard Lenski, vol. 37. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- . 2003. *The Decline of American Power*. New York: New Press.
- . 2004. *World-Systems Analysis*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- . 2007. The World Social Forum: From Defense to Offense. <http://www.sociologistswithoutborders.org/documents/WallersteinCommentary.pdf>.
- . 2011. *The Modern World-System, Volume 4: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789–1914*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 2017. Political Construction of Islam. In *The World-System and Africa*, ed. Immanuel Wallerstein. New York: Diasporic Africa Press.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel, Randall Collins, Michael Mann, Georgi Derlugian, and Craig Calhoun. 2013. *Does Capitalism Have a Future?* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Walton, John, and David Seddon. 1994. *Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Waterman, Peter. 2006. Toward a Global Labor Charter Movement? http://wsfworkshop.openspaceforum.net/twiki/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=6.



Conclusion: Socialism in Our Time? The Prospects for Socialism in the Twenty-First Century

Berch Berberoglu

The history of social movements and revolutions surveyed in this Handbook provides ample evidence that an oppressed and exploited people who become conscious of their oppression and unite to overcome their predicament will persist in their struggle and prevail to set themselves free, as in the chant “¡el pueblo unido jamás será vencido!”—“the people united will never be defeated!”. This has become the slogan of millions of oppressed people throughout the world who have voiced these words in many languages, and the feeling has been the same—that for true human freedom to occur, people must come together and fight for their liberation. This process has evolved over the course of history through the formation and development of social movements and revolutions on a world scale.

Social movements have emerged in many societies across the world throughout history. The great slave rebellions in Ancient Rome, the peasant wars in Germany and across the continent in Medieval Europe, the mass proletarian uprisings and insurrections against the bourgeois regimes (as in the case of the Paris Commune), as well as many protracted struggles of the oppressed that have resulted in rebellions and revolutions in Mexico, Russia, China, Cuba, and elsewhere are all the outcome of determined struggles of the masses throughout history. These struggles, waged by various social movements well into the twentieth century, were led by segments of society that suffered the

B. Berberoglu (✉)

Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, NV, USA

e-mail: berchb@unr.edu

© The Author(s) 2019

B. Berberoglu (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Movements, Revolution, and Social Transformation*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92354-3_19

oppressive conditions that drove them to confront the powers that be in the form of the labor movement, the suffrage movement, the civil rights movement, and many others in the United States and other countries around the world, which are discussed at length throughout this Handbook.

The recent mobilization of large numbers of people in new waves of social movements in the early twenty-first century that included numerous affected groups across the globe culminating in the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, Me-Too, Marching for Our Lives, and others that could become part of the global justice movement have established (or are in the process of establishing) the parameters of the popular movements of the early twenty-first century that set the stage for new and more diverse movements yet to come.

The leading class force of the struggles of oppressed and exploited peoples throughout modern history since the eighteenth century has been the working class. From the struggles of workers in Europe under the leadership of the International Workingmen's Association with which Marx was associated, to the struggles of workers who fought for the eight-hour day in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century, to the great sacrifices of the organizers and leaders of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)—Mother Jones, Joe Hill, William “Big Bill” Haywood, and others—in the early twentieth century, to the radical labor organizers in US trade unions, such as the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), who taught a generation of rank-and-file unionists the importance of a class-conscious working class to assume the leadership of a revolutionary workers' movement to rise up against capitalism and the capitalist state, the labor movement in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere around the world has always been in the forefront of the struggle against capitalism when led by revolutionary leaders who clearly understood the dynamics of the class struggle under capitalism. It is this centrality of the working class in taking up the leadership of the movement against capitalism in the United States that set the stage for the intensification of the class struggle between labor and capital until the entry of the United States to the Second World War.

The post-war balance of class forces favoring capital, however, led to the weakening of the labor movement through the McCarthyist witch-hunts in the United States from which labor never recovered. But the ensuing struggles led by the civil rights movement from the late 1950s through the 1960s and beyond, coupled with the myriad of social movements of the 1960s linking the Black Power, student, anti-war, peace, women's, environmental, and other similar movements, set the stage for yet newer and more unified social movements to emerge in subsequent decades, culminating in the global social justice movements of the early twenty-first century organized around the World Social Forum and similar organizations around the globe. While these new social movements in the United States and across the world are surely the continuation of struggles of various oppressed groups throughout the world, which at an earlier period were part of the anti-imperialist national liberation movements in the Third World that led to the many victories won by the masses the world over—from Algeria to the rest of Africa to Cuba and Central and South

America to Vietnam and beyond—the legacy of revolution and social transformation inherited from these former protracted struggles of the people across many lands place us on a revolutionary trajectory for the coming period that is critical for the popular struggles for socialism in the twenty-first century.

Given the rich and diverse experiences of the people's movements of the past several decades, built on the many victories they have won over the past century, it is very gratifying to live in a time of great revolutionary fervor and enthusiasm to lead society to greater victories for working people and the oppressed everywhere who will in the end win the struggle for socialism to build a more equitable and democratic society in the years ahead. While this effort will certainly be based on the great masses of the people across many groups who have been oppressed and exploited throughout human history, it is under the class-conscious leadership of the global working class that humanity will be able to achieve a just society through the implementation of socialist principles that will be ushered in via a people's revolution led by the working class against global capitalism. It is only then that the abolition of capitalism and of private property, hence the enormous wealth of a small segment of the people in advanced capitalist society, will be returned to the rightful owners of the planet—first and foremost wage-labor, who together with all other dispossessed peoples of the world will share the wealth in a workers' commonwealth to build a community of nations based on peace, abundance, equity, and human happiness that will have put an end to exploitation and oppression of one class by another and build a new and prosperous global society. It is to this end that all progressive social movements have been struggling, and it is this great egalitarian world that they will win in the end, as we usher in a new democratic (socialist) society across the globe in the twenty-first century.

Clearly, such an enormous task as revolution, that brings a major social transformation in its wake, is not an easy one by any measure, as the forces of repression will be busy at work to disrupt and derail any effort by the people's movements in this direction, and doing so in their attempt to impose authoritarian regimes to halt the march of history toward social equality. But such reactionary and counterrevolutionary efforts of dominant class forces will not be able to stop the people's revolutionary spirit and determination to take on the powers that be and transform society through protracted struggles that will inevitably lead to the clash of opposing class forces that will fight it out for supremacy over the state and society. Such conflict and struggle among the contending classes in advanced capitalist society, and in less developed ones as well around the world, is a manifestation of the *decisive struggle*, that is, the struggle between *labor and capital*. And while the dominant capitalist class and its political arm the capitalist state have succeeded to rule over society for many decades without facing a serious challenge to their supremacy until recently, the rising class consciousness of the working class the world over, led by its revolutionary leadership informed by the strategy and tactics of social revolution, provides a new challenge to the system that has managed to remain in power despite its repressive nature and actions to keep the system in place.

Something has to give, a triggering event of global proportions—such as another global economic crisis, a major military confrontation, or a catastrophic societal breakdown, leading to civil war (as in Syria, but now elsewhere, perhaps in Europe or the United States)—which may in fact lead to the emergence of a revolutionary situation that carries with it a contentious response by a crumbling ruling class desperate to stay in power, resorting to repressive authoritarian measures to impose a dictatorship and in the process threaten the basis of bourgeois democracy as we have come to know it. It is in response to such an eventuality that the capitalist ruling class may resort to that would provide us the warning signs for the working class to rally its forces to save humanity from an impending catastrophe. While this dark side of capitalist class rule, which has occurred in the past time and again (in Germany, Italy, and Spain, as well as Japan and elsewhere in advanced capitalist society), the only force that can prevent such an eventuality is a class-conscious working class armed with Marxist theory, revolutionary strategy and tactics, and determination to defeat capitalist rule and transform the capitalist state into a genuine workers' state—one that can only be achieved by genuine proletarian socialist democracy (a workers' state that fulfills the collective aspirations of working people and the oppressed to become the rulers of the world). Will such an eventuality become a reality so that working people the world over can enjoy the fruits of their labor and live in peace with equity in a just society based on cooperation among people of diverse backgrounds, setting aside racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, and other differences that have divided humanity for so long? And who will lead the people to victory against those who have kept them down over the course of history?

Traditionally, the leading force in the struggle against capitalism and the capitalist state has been the Communist Party. The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia was led by the Bolshevik (Communist) Party; the New Democratic Revolution in China was likewise led by the Communist Party of China. While the Cuban revolution was initially led by committed leftist revolutionaries, the subsequent reorganization of the Cuban state and society in its fight against “Yankee Imperialism” was through the efforts of the Cuban Communist Party that secured the support of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union against US aggression during the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba intended to overthrow the revolutionary government. The protracted struggles of the Vietnamese people against US imperialism was also led by the Communist Party of Vietnam, supported by the Communist Parties of both the Soviet Union and China which led to the final victory of the Vietnamese people against the United States to establish socialism in a unified socialist Vietnam. Thus, time and again, the genuine workers' movements struggling against feudal and capitalist exploitation and oppression over the past century have invariably been led by Communist Parties guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology, strategy, and tactics true to their working-class base in their struggle for liberation. Inspired by the integrity of these workers' movements led by communist leadership, many other popular movements around the world,

including Third World anti-imperialist national liberation movements, indigenous people's movements, labor and trade union movements, civil rights and social justice movements, and numerous others have invariably sought out the support of progressive and communist organizations, as they have been indispensable in terms of the guidance and leadership that they have often provided. Thus, clearly, notwithstanding any sectarian differences among various communist organizations that may be leading the revolutionary struggle against global capitalism, it is generally recognized among revolutionaries that a solid communist leadership in the form of a disciplined workers' party based on Marxist-Leninist principles and ideology is essential for a successful socialist revolution that would help bring the working class to state power. It is for this very reason that capitalist states have fought tooth and nail every communist party organization to prevent the potential overthrow of capitalist states, and it is for this reason that all communist organizations have been viewed with disdain by every capitalist state in the world throughout the course of modern history.

Once it is established that it is the working class that is the driving motive force of socialist revolution and the transformation of capitalist society to socialism and eventually to communism, and once it is understood that it is by definition the organized revolutionary movement of the working class in the form of its chief organ the Communist Party that leads the struggle against capitalism to secure victory to establish the rule of the working class through a worker's state, the dynamics of the class struggle under capitalism becomes quite clear, and the necessary strategy and tactics for the workers' victory against the capitalists, hence the victory of socialism over capitalism, to start the process of social transformation, becomes ever more evident.

While Marxist ideology and communist leadership have been indispensable in the major social movements and revolutions of the twentieth century, it is important to understand that it is not the party that makes a revolution succeed; it is the working people who actually do. Thus, for a workers' movement to succeed under the leadership of a workers' party, which involves the mobilization of millions of workers and their allies joined in opposition to the capitalist system, one must take into consideration the overall environment, especially the level of class consciousness of the working class, to determine whether or not they are aware, ready, and willing to take on their class enemy in a life-and-death revolutionary struggle to overthrow the dominant capitalist state. While workers' organizations play a crucial role in raising the level of class consciousness through their political and ideological work among members of the working class within trade unions and other political organizations, through agitation, protest, mobilization, and other forms of resistance to raise class consciousness to the next level of struggle against the system, it is in the end the material conditions of life under capitalism that will compel workers to develop an understanding of the nature, dynamics, and contradictions of the system under which they have been living, experiencing its effects, and realizing the necessity to replace it. The mobilization of workers in this struggle to

tip the balance of class forces in favor of the working class under conditions that shape the thinking of workers in becoming conscious of the oppressive and exploitative nature of capitalism may thus lead to the adoption of an ideology and a political program to eradicate its stranglehold over society. The fusion of labor's political work with the unfolding crisis-laden conditions of capitalism will propel the working class to take political action against the system, and in the process demonstrate that the working class is the only viable agent of revolution and social transformation under capitalism.

Given the realities of contemporary advanced capitalism in the age of globalization and its inherent contradictions that affect directly not only the working class but other classes and groups as well that find themselves in a similar predicament, what are the pathways to success in the struggle against capitalism that may propel workers to forge an alliance of social forces that is essential to generate the popular support that it needs in the fight against capitalism—one that will make a lasting contribution to the long-term victory of socialism in the twenty-first century?

It is this potential future reality of the unfolding situation today that has motivated the contributors to this Handbook to explore the political dynamics of not only the belief that "another world is possible" but the call to action that demands "another world is necessary" if humanity is to survive the current predicament it is in at the moment. Thus, with all the various struggles and mobilizations in support of a people's movement coming together from different quarters in its broadest sense that includes first and foremost the working class and other oppressed classes and groups that are in alliance with workers, fighting for their rights and for a just and egalitarian society.

The big question remains: how will the progressive social forces forge together elements of the global justice movements to combine their efforts into a viable social and political force to achieve justice and equity for all that can become the hallmark of the kind of social revolution that is being envisioned to construct socialism in the twenty-first century? Will this approach of a multitude of social forces and movement organizations led by labor make socialism possible in our time? And what will it take to assure the people that such a movement and society will be democratic, inclusive, acceptable to broad segments of the population, and egalitarian in nature through its practical actions in building the basis of a future socialist society? Clearly, it is only through such a collaborative popular-democratic project that the masses will be able to develop their trust and confidence in the possibility of the construction of a new equitable and just society that they will be able to embrace to serve humanity in the twenty-first century.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Achcar, Gilbert. 2012. The Bouazizi Spark: The Beginning of a Long Revolutionary Process. January. <http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/bouazizi-spark-beginning-long-revolutionary-process>.
- African Development Bank. 2018. African Economic Outlook 2018, Abidjan. January 18. <https://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/publications/african-economic-outlook/>.
- Africans Rising. 2016. The Kilimanjaro Declaration, Arusha. August 24. <https://www.africans-rising.org/www/the-kilimanjaro-declaration/>.
- . 2017. Homepage, Arusha. <https://www.africans-rising.org/www/>.
- Aguilar, Luis. 1972. *Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution*. London: W. W. Norton.
- Alexander, P., C. Runciman, and B. Maruping. 2016. The Use and Abuse of Police Data in Protest Analysis. *SA Crime Quarterly* 58: 9–21. <http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/sacq/n58/02.pdf>.
- Almeida, Paul, and Allen Cordero Ulate, eds. 2015. *Handbook of Social Movements Across Latin America*. New York: Springer.
- Althusser, Louis. 1978. What Must Change in the Party. *New Left Review* 109 (May–June).
- Amedee, George L. 2013. Movements Left and Right: Tea Party and Occupied Wall Street in the Obama Era. *Race, Gender & Class* 20 (3/4): 33–39.
- Anderson, Kevin. 2011. Arab Revolutions at the Crossroads. April 2. <http://www.internationalmarxisthumanist.org/articles/arab-revolutions-crossroads-kevin-anderson>.
- . 2012. Year Two of the Arab Revolutions. *Logos*. Spring–Summer. http://logosjournal.com/2012/spring-summer_anderson/.
- Anderson, Monica, and Paul Hitlin. 2017. The Hashtag #BlackLives Matter Emerges: Social Activism on Twitter. <http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/08/15/the-hashtag-blacklivesmatter-emerges-social-activism-on-twitter/>. Accessed 1 Dec 2017.
- Andor, Laszlo, and Martin Summers. 1998. *Market Failure: A Guide to the East European “Economic Miracle”*. London: Pluto Press.
- Andrews, Kenneth. 2004. *Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and Its Legacy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Aptheker, Herbert. 1978. *The Unfolding Drama: Studies in U.S. History*. New York: International Publishers.
- Arce, Moisés. 2015. Protest and Social Movements in Peru. In *Handbook of Social Movements Across Latin America*, ed. Paul Almeida and Allen Cordero Ulate. New York: Springer.
- Aronowitz, Stanley. 2014. *The Death and Life of American Labor*. New York, NY: Verso.
- Arrighi, Giovanni. 1994. *The Long Twentieth Century*. London: Verso.
- Arrighi, Giovanni, Terence K. Hopkins, and Immanuel Wallerstein. 2011 [1989]. *Antisystemic Movements*. London and New York: Verso.
- Ash, Robert. 1972. *Social Movements in America*. Chicago, IL: Markham Publishing Company.
- Avendaño, Ana, and Jonathan Hiatt. 2012. Worker Self-Organization in the New Economy: The AFL-CIO's Experience in Movement Building with Community-Labour Partnerships. *Labour, Capital and Society/Travail, Capital et Société* 45: 66–95.
- Bailyn, Bernard. 1992. *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Balagopal, K. 2006. Maoist Movement in Andhra Pradesh. *Economic and Political Weekly* 26: 3183–3187.
- Balibar, Etienne. 1977. *On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. London: NLB.
- Ballard, R., A. Habib, and I. Valodia. 2006. *Voices of Protest*. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- Banerjee, Samanta. 1984. *India's Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising*. London: Zed Books.
- Barker, Colin. 2008. *Revolutionary Rehearsals*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Barker, Colin, Laurence Cox, John Krinsky, and Alf Gunvald Nilsen, eds. 2014. *Marxism and Social Movements*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Barrett, Patrick S., Daniel Chávez, and César A. Rodríguez Garavito, eds. 2008. *The New Latin American Left: Utopia Reborn*. London: Pluto.
- Basu, Pradip, ed. 2010. *Discourses on Naxalite Movement, 1967–2009: Insights into Radical Left Politics*. Kolkata: Setu Prakashani.
- Beams, Nick. 1998. *The Significance and Implications of Globalization: A Marxist Assessment*. Southfield, MI: Mehring Books.
- Beard, Charles, and Mary Beard. 1930. *The Rise of American Civilization*. New York: Macmillan.
- Beck, Colin J. 2011. The World Cultural Origins of Revolutionary Waves: Five Centuries of European Contestation. *Social Science History* 35 (2): 167–207.
- Becker, Marc. 2011. ¡Pachakutik!: *Indigenous Movements and Electoral Politics in Ecuador*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Beinin, Joel. 2011. Working-Class Revolutions? *The Nation*. September 12.
- Belden, Jack. 1975. *China Shakes the World*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Bell, Daniel. 1964. *The Radical Right*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
- Bello, Walden. 2014. Military Suspends Class Conflict in Thailand. *Telesur*, August 8.
- . 2017. “Rodrigo Duterte: A Fascist Original,” in Nicole Curato, ed., *A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte's Early Presidency* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2017), pp. 77–91.
- Bench Marks Foundation. 2018. *Empowering Communities, Turning the Tide*. Johannesburg: Booklet.

- Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 611–639.
- Benski, Tova, Lauren Langman, Ignacia Perugorria, and Benjamin Tejerina. 2013. From the Streets and Squares to Social Movement Studies: What Have We Learned? *Current Sociology* 61 (4): 541–568.
- Berberoglu, Berch. 1987. *The Internationalization of Capital: Imperialism and Capitalist Development on a World Scale*. New York: Praeger.
- . 1999. *Turmoil in the Middle East: Imperialism, War, and Political Instability*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- . 2003. *Globalization of Capital and the Nation State*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- . 2007. *The State and Revolution in the Twentieth Century: Major Social Transformations of Our Time*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- . 2009. *Class and Class Conflict in the Age of Globalization*. Lanham, MD: Lexington.
- , ed. 2012. *Beyond the Global Capitalist Crisis: The World Economy in Transition*. New York: Routledge.
- . 2013. *Political Sociology in a Global Era*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- , ed. 2014. *The Global Capitalist Crisis and Its Aftermath*. New York: Routledge.
- . 2017. *Social Theory: Classical and Contemporary: A Critical Perspective*. New York: Routledge.
- Berman, N., M. Couttenier, D. Rohner, and M. Thoenig. 2017. This Mine Is Mine! *American Economic Review* 107 (6): 1564–1610.
- Bernstein, Irving. 2010. *The Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933–1940*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Bevington, Douglas, and Chris Dixon. 2005. Movement-Relevant Theory: Rethinking Social Movement Scholarship and Activism. *Social Movement Studies* 4 (3): 185–208.
- Bianco, Lucien. 1971. *The Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bina, Cyrus, and Chuck Davis. 2002. Dynamics of Globalization: Transnational Capital and the International Labor Movement. In *Labor and Capital in the Age of Globalization*, ed. Berch Berberoglu. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Biney, A. 2013. Is Africa Really Rising? *Pambazuka News*, July 31 and September 4. <http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88748>. Accessed 4 June 2017.
- Biondi, Martha. 2012. *Black Revolution on Campus*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Blaut, James. 1987. *The National Question: Decolonizing the Theory of Nationalism*. London: Zed Books.
- Bohler-Muller, N., B. Roberts, J. Struwig, S. Gordon, T. Radebe, and P. Alexander. 2017. Minding the Protest. *SA Crime Quarterly* (62): 81–92.
- Bond, Patrick. 2005. Gramsci, Polanyi and Impressions from Africa on the Social Forum Phenomenon. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29 (2): 433–440. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2005.00596.x/full>.
- . 2012. *The Politics of Climate Justice: Paralysis Above, Movement Below*. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- . 2014. *Elite Transition*. London: Pluto Press.
- . 2015. Disconnecting the Minerals-Energy-Climate Dots. *Counterpunch*. March 13. <https://www.counterpunch.org/2015/03/13/disconnecting-the-minerals-energy-climate-dots/>.

- Bond, Becky, and Zack Exley. 2016. *Rules for Revolutionaries: How Big Organizing Can Change Everything*. White River Junction: Chelsea Green.
- Bond, Patrick, and S. Mottiar. 2018. Terrains of Civil and Uncivil Society in Post-Apartheid Durban, *Urban Forum*.
- Borge, Tomas, and Daniel Ortega. 1985. *Nicaragua: The Sandinista People's Revolution*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Borras, S., Jr., J. Franco, S. Gomez, C. Kay, and M. Spoor. 2012. Land Grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39 (3–4): 845–872.
- Boswell, Terry, and Christopher Chase-Dunn. 2000. *The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism: Toward Global Democracy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Boulainne, Shelley. 2009. Does Internet Use Affect Engagement: A Meta-Analysis of Research. *Political Communication* 26 (2): 193–211.
- Boyer, Richard, and Herbert Morais. 1980. *Labor's Untold Story*. 3rd ed. New York: United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America.
- Branch, A., and Z. Mampilly. 2015. *Africa Uprising*. London: Zed Books.
- Brandes, N., and B. Engels. 2011. Social Movements in Africa. *Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien* 11: 1–15.
- Braverman, Harry. 1974. *Labor and Monopoly Capital*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Brecher, Jeremy. 1997. *Strike!* Boston: South End Press.
- Brecher, Jeremy, Tim Costello, and Brendan Smith. 2000. *Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
- Brimner, Larry Dane. 2014. *Strike! The Farm Workers' Fight for Their Rights*. Calkins Creek. <http://ufw.org/1965-1970-delano-grape-strike-boycott/>.
- Brown, Dee. 2009. *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*. New York: Sterling Publishing Co.
- Buechler, Stephen M. 1995. New Social Movement Theories. *The Sociological Quarterly* 36: 441–464.
- Buechler, Steven. 2000. *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural Construction of Social Activism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Bunyan, James, and H.H. Fisher. 1974. *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1918*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Burbach, R. 1994. Roots of the Postmodern Rebellion in Chiapas. *New Left Review* 205 (May–June): 113–124.
- Burdick, J., P. Oxhorn, and K.M. Roberts, eds. 2009. *Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America? Societies and Politics at the Crossroads*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Buxton, Nick. 2017. Ten Amazing Social Movement Struggles in 2017 that Gave Us Reason to Hope. *Truthout*. <https://www.commondreams.org/views/2017/12/20/10-amazing-social-movement-struggles-2017-give-us-reason-hope>. Accessed 27 Dec 2017.
- Byrd, Scott C. 2005. The Porto Alegre Consensus: Theorizing the Forum Movement. *Globalizations* 2 (1): 151–163.
- Callinicos, Alex. 1988. *Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- . 2006. *The Resources of Critique*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Cameron, M., and E. Hershberg, eds. 2010. *Latin America's Left Turns: Politics, Policies, and Trajectories of Change*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Carmichael, Cathie. 2002. *Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: Nationalism and the Destruction of Tradition*. New York: Routledge.

- Carothers, Thomas, and Richard Youngs. 2015. *The Complexities of Global Protests*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Carr, Edward Hallett. 1958–1959. *Socialism in One Country*, vols. 1 and 2. London: W. W. Norton.
- . 1966. *The Bolshevik Revolution*, vols. 1 and 2. London: W. W. Norton.
- Carroll, William. 2017. *Expose, Oppose, Propose*. London: Zed Books.
- Carty, Victoria. 2015. *New Technology and Social Movements*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Castells, Manuel. 1983. *The City and the Grassroots*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 2010. *The Rise of Network Society*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
- . 2015. *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Salvatore Balbones, eds. 2006. *Global Social Change: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Ian Breckenridge-Jackson. 2013. The Network of Movements in the U.S. Social Forum Process: Comparing Atlanta 2007 with Detroit 2010. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows71/irows71.htm>.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, James Fenelon, Thomas D. Hall, Ian Breckenridge-Jackson, and Joel Herrera. 2015a. *Global Indigenism and the Web of Transnational Social Movements*. IROWS Working Paper #87.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Matheu Kaneshiro, James Love, Kirk Lawrence, and Edwin Elias. 2010. *Neoliberalism, Populist Movements and the Pink Tide in Latin America*. IROWS Working Paper #58. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows58/irows58.htm>. Accessed 19 Apr 2017.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Alessandro Morosin, and Alexis Álvarez. 2015b. Social Movements and Progressive Regimes in Latin America. In *Handbook of Social Movements Across Latin America*, ed. Paul Almeida and Allen Cordero Ulate. New York: Springer.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and R.E. Niemeyer. 2009. The World Revolution of 20xx. In *Transnational Political Spaces*, ed. Mathias Albert, Gesa Bluhm, Han Helmig, Andreas Leutzsch, and Jochen Walter. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows35/irows35.htm>.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Christine Petit, Richard Niemeyer, Robert A. Hanneman, and Ellen Reese. 2007. The Contours of Solidarity and Division Among Global Movements. *International Journal of Peace Studies* 12 (2): 1–15. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows26/irows26.htm>.
- Chesneaux, Jean. 1968. *The Chinese Labor Movement 1919–1927*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- . 1973. *Peasant Revolts in China, 1840–1949*. London: W.W. Norton.
- Chester, Thomas. 2014. *The Wobblies in Their Heyday: The Rise and Destruction of the Industrial Workers of the World During the World War I Era*. Santa Barbara, CA: Levellers Press.
- Chibber, Vivek. 2006. On the Decline of Class Analysis in South Asian Studies. *Critical Asian Studies* 38 (4): 357–387.
- Claudin, Fernando. 1976. *The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Cochran, Bert. 1977. *Labor and Communism: The Conflict that Shaped Labor Unions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Cohen, Robin, and Shirin M. Rai, eds. 2000. *Global Social Movements*. London: Athlone Press.
- Collier, George. With Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello. 2005. *Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas*. 3rd ed. Oakland: Food First.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. 2008. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and Empowerment*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Conant, Jeff. 2010. *The Poetics of Resistance: The Revolutionary Public Relations of the Zapatista Insurgency*. Oakland: AK Press.
- Conlin, Joseph Robert. 1969. *Big Bill Haywood and the Radical Union Movement*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Conway, Janet M. 2013. *Edges of Global Justice: The World Social Forum and Its Others*. London: Routledge.
- Cox, Laurence. 2014. Movements Making Knowledge: A New Wave of Inspiration for Sociology? *Sociology* 48 (5): 954–971.
- Cox, Laurence, and Alf Gunvald Nilsen. 2014. *We Make Our Own History: Marxism and Social Movements in the Twilight of Neoliberalism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Curran, Michaela, Elizabeth A.G. Schwarz, and Christopher Chase-Dunn. 2014. The Occupy Movement in California. In *What Comes After Occupy?: The Regional Politics of Resistance*, ed. Todd A. Comer. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows74/irows74.htm>.
- Dabashi, Hamid. 2012. *The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism*. London: Zed Books.
- Dasgupta, Biplap. 1974. *The Naxalite Movement*. Bombay: Allied Publishers.
- Davis, Mike. 2006. *Planet of Slums*. London: Verso.
- Defronzo, James. 2011. *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*. 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- della Porta, Donatella, ed. 2007. *The Global Justice Movement: Cross-National and Transnational Perspectives*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- della Porta, Donatella, and Sidney Tarrow, eds. 2005. *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Dellacioppa, Kara. 2009. *This Bridge Called Zapatismo: Building Alternative Political Cultures in Los Angeles, Mexico City, and Beyond*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Dembélé, Demba Moussa. 2007. Struggles Against Neoliberal Policies in Africa. In *The State of Resistance: Popular Struggles in the Global South*, ed. François Polet. London: Zed Books.
- Derber, Charles. 2017. *Welcome to the Revolution: Universalizing Resistance for Social Justice and Democracy in Perilous Times*. New York: Routledge.
- Deutscher, Isaac. 1977. Maoism: Its Origins and Outlook. In *Revolution and Class Struggle*, ed. Robin Blackburn. London: Harper Collins.
- Draut, Tamara. 2016. *Sleeping Giant: How America's New Working Class Will Transform America*. New York, NY: Doubleday Press.
- Dubofsky, Melvin. 1969. *We Shall Be All: A History of the IWW*. New York, NY: Quadrangle Press.
- Duiker, William. 1976. *The Rise of Nationalism, 1900–1941*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Duncan, J. 2016. *Protest Nation*. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- Dwyer, P., and L. Zeilig. 2012. *African Struggles Today*. Chicago: Haymarket Press.
- Earl, Jennifer. 2007. The Cultural Consequences of Social Movements. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 508–530. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

- . 2010. The Dynamics of Protest-Related Diffusion on the Web. *Information, Communication and Society* 13 (2): 209–225.
- Earl, Jennifer, Katrina Kimport, Greg Prieto, Carly Rush, and Kimberly Reynoso. 2010. Changing the World One Webpage at a Time: Conceptualizing and explaining ‘Internet Activism’. *Mobilization* 15 (4): 425–446.
- Edwards, Richard. 1979. *Contested Terrain*. New York: Basic Books.
- EJAtlas. 2018. *Environmental Justice Atlas* ‘Blockadia’. <https://ejatlas.org/featured/blockadia>.
- Ekine, S. 2011. Defiant in the Face of Brutality. *Pambazuka News*, 532. June 2. <http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/73738>.
- Ekine, S., and F. Manji. 2012. *African Awakening*. Oxford: Fahamu Books.
- Elder-Vass, Dave. 2010. *The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Ellner, Steve. 2014. *Editor, Latin America’s Radical Left: Challenges and Complexities of Political Power in the Twenty-First Century*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Elteren, Van Mel. 2011. *Labor and the American Left*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co.
- Engels, Frederick. 1972. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. In *Selected Works*, ed. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. New York: International Publishers.
- Engler, Mark, and Paul Engler. 2016. *This Is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt Is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books.
- Environmental Monitoring Group. 2018. EMG’s Guide to the Cape Town Drought, Cape Town. January. <http://www.emg.org.za/programmes/water-and-climate-change/215-emg-s-guide-to-the-cape-town-drought-december-2017>.
- Euromonitor. 2017. Income Inequality Ranking of the World’s Major Cities, London. October 31. <https://blog.euromonitor.com/2017/10/income-inequality-ranking-worlds-major-cities.html>.
- Evans, Mike, and Paul Kingsbury, eds. 2010. *Woodstock: Three Days that Rocked the World*. New York: Sterling.
- Eyerman, Ron, and Andrew Jamison. 1991. *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Fanon, Frantz. 1963. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove.
- . 1967. *Toward the African Revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Farsoun, Samih, and Christina Zacharia. 1997. *Palestine and the Palestinians*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Fernandes, Sujatha. 2015. Urban Social Movements in Venezuela. In *Handbook of Social Movements Across Latin America*, ed. Paul Almeida and Allen Cordero Ulate. New York: Springer.
- Feurer, Rosemary, and Chad Pearson, eds. 2017. *Against Labor: How US Employers Organized to Defeat Union Activism*. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Flacks, Richard. 2005. The Question of Relevance in Social Movement Studies. In *Rhyming Hope and History: Activists, Academics, and Social Movement Scholarship*, ed. D. Croteau, W. Hoynes, and C. Ryan, 3–19. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Flank, Lenny, ed. 2011. *Voices from the Ninety-Nine Percent: An Oral History of the Occupy Wall Street Movement*. St. Petersburg, FL: Red and Black.
- Fominaya, Christina Flesher. 2010. Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates: Collective Identity in Social Movements. *Sociology Compass* 4 (6): 393–404.

- . 2014. *Social Movements and Globalization: How Protests, Occupations, and Uprisings Are Changing the World*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 2015. Debunking Spontaneity: Spain's 15-M/Indignados as Autonomous Movement. *Social Movement Studies* 14 (2): 142–163.
- Foner, Philip S. 1965a. *History of the Labor Movement in the United States: Industrial Workers of the World*. Vol. 4. New York, NY: International Publishers.
- . 1965b. *The Case of Joe Hill*. New York, NY: International Publishers.
- , ed. 1983. *Mother Jones Speaks: Speeches and Writings of a Working Class Fighter*. New York, NY: International Publishers.
- . 1994. *History of the Labor Movement in the United States*. Vol. I–X. New York: International Publishers.
- Foran, John. 2005. *Taking Power: On the Origins of Revolutions in the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2014. Beyond Insurgency to Radical Social Change: The New Situation. *Studies in Social Justice* 8 (1): 5–25 <http://brock.scholarsportal.info/journals/index.php/SSJ/article/view/1036/1006>.
- Forbath, E. William. 1991. *Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Fox-Piven, Frances. 2006. *Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Frank, Andre Gunder. 1969. *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Franke, Richard, and Barbara Chasin. 1994. *Kerala: Radical Reform as Development in an Indian State*. San Francisco: The Institute for Food and Development Policy.
- Gaborone Declaration. 2012. Gaborone Declaration for Sustainability in Africa, Gaborone. May 12. <http://www.gaboronedeclaration.com/>.
- Galtung, Johan. 2009. *The Fall of the U.S. Empire – And Then What? Successors, Regionalization or Globalization? U.S. Fascism or U.S. Blossoming?* Oslo: Kolofon Press.
- Gambino, Lauren. 2017. Women's March and #MeToo Leaders see Progress – But We're in a Hell of a Fight. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/29/womens-march-tamika-mallory-feminism-2017>. Accessed 31 Dec 2017.
- Garrett, K. 2006. Protest in an Information Society: A Review of Literature on Social Movements and New ICTs. *Information, Communication and Society* 9: 202–224.
- Gelvin, James. 2012. *The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Geoghegan, Thomas. 2014. *Only One Thing Can Save Us: Why America Needs a New Kind of Labor Movement*. New York, NY: The New Press.
- Gitlin, Todd. 1993. *The Sixties: Years of Hope Days of Rage*. Revised ed. New York: Bantam.
- . 2012. *Occupy Nation: The Roots, the Spirit, and the Promise of Occupy Wall Street*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Giugni, Marco. 1998. Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements. *Annual Review of Sociology* (98): 371–393.
- Glezerman, G. 1979. *Classes and Nations*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Göçek, Fatma Müge, ed. 2002. *Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Goldenberg, Suzanne. 1994. *Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder*. London: Zed Books.

- Goldstein, Justin Robert, ed. 2014. *Little Red Scares: Anti-Communism and Political Repression in the US, 1921–1946*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 1991. *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- . 2002. *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*. 3rd ed. New York: Cengage.
- Goldstone, Jack. 2011. Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies. *Foreign Affairs* 90 (3): 8–16.
- Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goodwin, Jeff, and James Jasper. 2015. *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts*. 3rd ed. Malden, NJ: Wiley Blackwell.
- Gott, Richard. 1970. *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*. New York: Doubleday Anchor.
- . 2011. *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela*. London: Verso.
- Gould, Roger. 1993. Collective Action and Network Structure. *American Sociological Review* 58: 182–196.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1971a. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers.
- . 1971b. *Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers.
- . 2000. In *The Antonio Gramsci Reader – Selected Writings, 1916–1935*, ed. D. Forgacs. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Greenhouse, Steven. 2009. *The Big Squeeze: Tough Times for the American Worker*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Grimshaw, Allen D., ed. *Racial Violence in the United States*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing.
- Grover, Vrinda. 2018. The Adivasi Undertrial, A Prisoner of War: A Study of Undertrial Detainees in South Chhattisgarh. In *Contesting Justice in South Asia*, ed. Deepak Mehta and Rahul Roy. New Delhi: Sage Publishing India.
- Grugel, Jean, and Pia Riggirozzi. 2012. Post Neoliberalism: Rebuilding and Reclaiming the State in Latin America. *Development and Change* 43 (1): 1–21.
- Guerin, Daniel. 1945. *Fascism and Big Business*. New York: Monad Press.
- Guevara, Che. 1968. *Episodes of the Revolutionary War*. New York: International Publishers.
- Gundersen, Christopher. 2013. The Provocative Cocktail: Intellectual Origins of the Zapatista Uprising, 1960–1994. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, New York University.
- Gupta, Bhabani Sen. 1972. *Communism in Indian Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gurney, Joan Neff, and Kathleen J. Tierney. 1982. Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research. *The Sociological Quarterly* 23: 33–47.
- Gutiérrez Aguilar, Raquel. 2014. *Rhythms of the Pachakuti: Indigenous Uprising and State Power in Bolivia*. Trans. Stacy Alba D. Skar. Chapel Hill: Duke University Press.
- Haas, Mark L., and David W. Lesch, eds. 2012. *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1975. *Legitimation Crisis*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- . 1981. New Social Movements. *Telos* 49: 33–37.

- Hall, Thomas, and James Fenelon. 2009. *Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: Resistance and Revitalization*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Hamel, Pierre, Henri Lustiger-Thaler, Jan Nederveen Pieterse, and Sasha Roseneil, eds. 2001. *Globalization and Social Movements*. New York: Palgrave.
- Hampton, Henry, and Steve Fayer. 1991. *Voices of Freedom: An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement from the 1950s Through the 1980s*. Reissue ed. New York: Bantam.
- Harlow, Summer. 2011. Social Media and Social Movements: Facebook and an Online Guatemalan Justice Movement that Moved Offline. *New Media & Society* 14 (2): 225–243.
- Harris, John. 2011. What Is Going on in India's 'Red Corridor'? Questions About India's Maoist Insurgency—Literature Review. *Pacific Affairs* 84 (2): 309–327.
- Harvey, David. 2004. The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession. *Socialist Register* (40): 63–87.
- . 2011. *The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis of Capitalism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, Neil. 1998. *The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Hawken, Paul. 2007. *Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming*. New York: Viking/Penguin.
- Hawkesworth, Mary. 2006. *Globalization and Feminist Activism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Healey, Richard, and Sandra Hinson. 2005. Movement Strategy for Organizers. In *Rhyming Hope and History: Activists, Academics, and Social Movement Scholarship*, ed. D. Croteau, W. Hoynes, and C. Ryan, 57–78. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Heller, Patrick. 1999. *The Labor of Development: Workers and the Transformation of Capitalism in Kerala, India*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Ho, Chi Minh. 1977. *Selected Writings, 1920–1969*. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Press.
- Holloway, John. 2002. *Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today*. London: Pluto Press.
- Horton, Lynn. 2015. Women's Movements in Latin America. In *Handbook of Social Movements Across Latin America*, ed. Paul Almeida and Allen Cordero Ulate. New York: Springer.
- Howard, Andrew. 2005. Global Capital and Labor Internationalism: Workers' Response to Global Capitalism. In *Globalization and Change: The Transformation of Global Capitalism*, ed. Berch Berberoglu. Lenham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Huberman, Leo, and Paul Sweezy. 1960. *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Hunt, Scott A., and Robert D. Benford. 2007. Collective Identity, Solidarity, and Commitment. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 433–548. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Ignazi, Piero. 2003. *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Jaffe, Sarah. 2016. *Necessary Trouble: Americans in Revolt*. New York: Nation Books.
- Jasper, James. 1999. *The Art of Moral Protest*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 2014. *Protest: A Cultural Introduction to Social Movements*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Johnson, Chalmers. 1962. *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

- Johnson, Dennis, and Valerie Merians, eds. 2017. *What We Do Now: Standing Up for Values in Trump's America*. Brooklyn: Melville House.
- Johnston, Hank, and Paul Almeida, eds. 2006. *Latin American Social Movements*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Jordan, T., and P. Taylor. 2004. *Hacktivism and Cyberwar: Rebels with a Cause?* New York: Routledge.
- Joubert, Kosha, and Leila Dregger. 2017. Global Ecovillage Network | Sacred Activism. *Kosmos Journal*. September 19 Newsletter. <http://www.kosmosjournal.org/news/global-ecovillage-network-sacred-activism/>.
- Juris, Jeffrey S. 2008. *Networking Futures: The Movements Against Corporate Globalization*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Juris, Jeffrey S., et al. 2014. Movement Building and the United States Social Forum. *Social Movement Studies* 13 (3): 328–348.
- Kauffman, L.A. 2017. *Direct Action: Protest and the Reinvention of American Radicalism*. London: Verso.
- Kayakiran, F., and Van Vuuren. 2015. Community Acceptance Is the Mother Lode of Mining, *Business Day*. March 30.
- Kecmanovic, Dusan. 2001. *Ethnic Times: Exploring Ethnonationalism in the Former Yugoslavia*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Keeran, Roger. 1980. *The Communist Party and the Auto Workers' Union*. New York: International Publishers.
- Kenner, Martin, and James Petras, eds. 1969. *Fidel Castro Speaks*. New York: Grove.
- Kimeldorf, Howard. 1999. *Battling for American Labor: Wobblies, Craft Workers and the Making of the Union Movement*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- King, Leslie. 2008. Ideology, Strategy and Conflict in a Social Movement Organization: The Sierra Club Immigration Wars. *Mobilization: The International Quarterly* 13 (1): 45–61.
- Klehr, Harvey. 1984. *The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade*. New York: Basic Books.
- Klein, Naomi. 2017. *No Is Not Enough: Resisting Trump's Shock Politics and Winning the World We Need*. Chicago: Haymarket.
- Knapp, Peter, and Alan J. Spector. 2011. *Crisis and Change Today: Basic Questions of Marxist Sociology*. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Knickmeyer, Ellen. 2011. The Arab World's Youth Army. *Foreign Policy*, January 27. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/27/the-arab-worlds-youth-army-2/>.
- Kolko, Gabriel. 1968. *The Politics of War*. New York: Random House.
- Kolko, Gabriel, and Joyce Kolko. 1976. *The Limits of Power*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Koopmans, Ruud. 2007. Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. S.A. Snow, D.A. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 19–46. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Kotz, Daniel. 2015. *The Rise and Fall of Neoliberal Capital*. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Krinsky, John. 2014. Marxism and the Politics of Possibility: Beyond Academic Boundaries. In *Marxism and Social Movements*, ed. C. Barker, L. Cox, J. Krinsky, and A. Gunvald Nilsen. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Kucinkas, Jaime. 2015. Spontaneity: An Important and Neglected Topic in Social Movements. *Mobilizing Ideas*. <https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2015/02/05/spontaneity-an-important-and-neglected-topic-in-socialmovements/>. Accessed 5 Feb 2015.

- Kumbamu, Ashok. 2010. Farewell to Imperialism? A Critical Sociological Study of Empire. In *Imperialism, Crisis and Class Struggle: The Enduring Verities and Contemporary Face of Capitalism. Essays in Honour of James Petras*, ed. Henry Veltmeyer. Leiden: Brill Publishers.
- Lange, G., Q. Wodon, and K. Carey, eds. 2018. *The Changing Wealth of Nations 2018*. Washington, DC: World Bank. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1046-6>.
- Langman, Lauren. 2005. From Virtual Public Spheres to Global Justice: A Critical Theory of Internetworked Social Movements. *Sociological Theory* 23 (1): 42–74.
- . 2016. Political Economy and the Normative: Marx on Human Nature and the Quest for Dignity. In *Constructing Marxist Ethics*, ed. Michael Thompson. Leiden: Brill.
- . 2017. From Great Refusals to Wars of Position: Marcuse, Gramsci, and Social Mobilization. In *The Great Refusal: Herbert Marcuse and Contemporary Social Movements*, ed. Andrew Lamas, Todd Wolfson, and Peter Funke. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Langman, Lauren, Douglas Morris, and Jackie Zalewski. 2002. Globalization, Domination, and Cyberactivism. In *The 21st Century World-System: Systemic Crises and Antisystemic Resistance*, ed. Wilma A. Dunaway. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Lascano, Sergio Rodriguez. 2018. Confronting the Capitalist Hydra: Zapatistas Reflect on the Storm That Is Upon Us. In *The Essential Guide to Critical Development Studies*, ed. Henry Veltmeyer and Paul Bowles. New York: Routledge.
- Laslett, John H.M. 1970. *Labor and the Left: A Study of Socialist and Radical Influences in the American Labor Movement, 1881–1924*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Lause, Mark. 2015. *Free Labor: The Civil War and the Making of an American Working Class*. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Leach, Darcy K. 2013. Culture and the Structure of Tyrannylessness. *The Sociological Quarterly* 54 (2): 181–191.
- Lenin, V.I. 1905. The Struggle of the Proletariat and the Servility of the Bourgeoisie. *Proletary* (6). <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1905/jul/03.htm>. Accessed 21 May 2016.
- . 1971a. *The State and Revolution*. In *Selected Works*, ed. V.I. Lenin. New York: International Publishers.
- . 1971b. The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism. In *Selected Works in One Volume*, ed. V.I. Lenin. New York: International Publishers.
- . 1974. *The State*. In *On Historical Materialism*, ed. Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, and V.I. Lenin. New York: International Publishers.
- . 1975. *The State and Revolution*. In *Selected Works in Three Volumes*, ed. V.I. Lenin, vol. 2. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- . 1977 [1899]. *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Lentin, Alana. 2004. *Racism and Anti-Racism in Europe*. London: Pluto Press.
- Lertchoosakul, Kanokrat. 2016. *The Rise of the Octobrists in Contemporary Thailand*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.
- Leung, Parry P. 2015. *Labor Activists and the New Working Class in China: Strike Leaders' Struggles*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Levenstein, Harvey A. 1981. *Communism, Anti-Communism and the CIO*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

- Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth Roberts, eds. 2011. *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Levy, Peter B. 1994. *The New Left and Labor in the 1960s*. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- . 2018. *The Great Uprising: Race Riots in Urban America During the 1960s*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewin, Moshe. 1968. *Lenin's Last Struggle*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- . 1975. *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power*. London: W. W. Norton.
- Liebman, Marcel. 1975. *Leninism Under Lenin*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Lim, Merlyna. 2012. Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004–2011. *Journal of Communication* 62: 231–248.
- Lindio-McGovern, Ligaya. 1997. *Filipino Peasant Women: Exploitation and Resistance*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- . 2012. *Globalization, Labor Export and Resistance: A Study of Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers in Global Cities*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Lindio-McGovern, Ligaya, and Isidor Wallimann, 2012 [2009]. *Globalization and Third World Women: Exploitation, Coping and Resistance*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Locke, Hubert G. 2017. *The Detroit Riot of 1967*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.
- Lodge, T., and T. Mottiar. 2017. South Africa's 'Unrest' or 'Rebellion'. In *Southern Resistance in Critical Perspective*, ed. M. Paret, C. Runciman, and L. Sinwell. London: Routledge.
- Loeb, Paul Rogat, ed. 2004. *The Impossible Will Take a Little While. A Citizen's Guide to Hope in a Time of Fear*. New York: Basic Books.
- Luxemburg, Rosa. 2008. *The Essential Rosa Luxemburg: Reform or Revolution and the Mass Strike*. Ed. H. Scott. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Lynd, Staughton. 2015. *Solidarity Unionism: Rebuilding the Labor Movement from Below*. Oakland, CA: PM Press.
- MacPherson, Robert. 2014. Antisystemic Movements in Periods of Hegemonic Decline: Syndicalism in World-Historical Perspective. In *Structures of the World Political Economy and the Future of Global Conflict and Cooperation*, ed. Christian Suter and Christopher Chase-Dunn. Zurich: LIT Verlag.
- Magri, Lucio. 1970. Problems of the Marxist Theory of the Revolutionary Party. *New Left Review* 60 (March–April).
- Maguwu, F., and C. Terreblanche. 2015. We Need a Real 'Alternatives to Mining' Indaba. *Pambazuka*. February 12. <https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/we-need-real-%E2%80%9CAlternatives-mining%E2%80%9D-indaba>.
- Main, Charles. 2017. *SEZs and Value Extraction from the Mekong: A Case Study on the Control and Exploitation of Land and Labor in Cambodia and Myanmar's Special Economic Zones*. Bangkok: Focus on the Global South.
- Maitan, Livio. 1976. *Party, Army, and Masses in China: A Marxist Interpretation of the Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath*. London: New Left Books.
- Malcolm, X., Alex Haley, and Attallah Shabazz. 1992. *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*. New York: Ballentine Reissue.
- Mampilly, R. 2013. Urban Protests and Rural Violence in Africa: A Call for an Integrated Approach. African Futures Forum, Social Science Research Council, New York. <http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2013/02/04/urban-protests-and-rural->

- [violence-in-africa-a-call-for-an-integrated-approach/#sthash.4KB0d0vO.dpuf](#). Accessed 4 June 2017.
- Mandel, Ernest. 1975. *Late Capitalism*. London: New Left Books.
- . 1977. The Leninist Theory of Organization. In *Revolution and Class Struggle*, ed. Robin Blackburn. New York: HarperCollins.
- Manji, F., and S. Ekin. 2012. *African Awakening*. Oxford: Fahamu Books.
- Martin, William G., et al. 2008. *Making Waves: Worldwide Social Movements, 1750–2005*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- Marx, Karl. 1847. *The Poverty of Philosophy*. Marx/Engels Internet Archive. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ch02e.htm>. Accessed 20 May 2016.
- . 1972. *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. In *Selected Works*, ed. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. 1972. Manifesto of the Communist Party. In *Selected Works*, ed. Marx and Engels. New York: International Publishers.
- Mason, Paul. 2012. *Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions*. London: Verso.
- Matanga, Frank Khachina. 2007. Social Movements and Democratization in Kenya. In *The State of Resistance: Popular Struggles in the Global South*, ed. François Polet. London: Zed Books.
- Matebesi, S. 2016. *Civil Strife Against Local Governance*. Leverkusen: Barbara Budrich Publishers. <http://weiterlesen.de/Leseprobe/Civil-strife-against-local-governance/9783847411345/pdf>.
- Maxwell, Sarah. 2009. *Success and Solitude: Feminist Organizations Fifty Years After the Feminine Mystique*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Mbeki, T. 2015. *Track It! Stop It! Get It! Illicit Financial Flow, Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa*. Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission on Africa. <http://www.uneca.org/iff>.
- McAdam, Doug, et al. 2003. Dynamics of Contention. *Mobilization* 8 (1): 109–141.
- McAlister, John T., Jr. 1970. *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- McDonald, Kevin. 2006. *Global Movements*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- McNally, David. 2013. University of the Diverse: Working-Class Formations and Popular Uprisings from Cochabamba to Cairo. In *Marxism and Social Movements*, ed. Colin Barker, Lawrence Cox, John Krinsky, and Alf Gunvald Nilsen. Leiden: Brill.
- Melucci, Alberto. 1980. The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach. *Social Science* 19: 199–226.
- Meyer, David S. 2006. Claiming Credit: Stories of Movement Influence as Outcomes. *Mobilization: An International Journal* 11: 201–218.
- Meyer, David S., and Suzanne Staggenborg. 1996. Movements, Counter-Movements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity. *American Journal of Sociology* 100: 1628–1660.
- Milkman, Ruth, Stephanie Luce, and Penny Lewis. 2013. *Changing the Subject: A Bottom-up Account of Occupy Wall Street in New York City*. CUNY: The Murphy Institute. http://sps.cuny.edu/filestore/1/5/7/1_a05051d2117901d/1571_92f562221b8041e.pdf.
- Miller, Norman, and Roderick Aya. 1971. *National Liberation Revolution in the Third World*. New York: The Free Press.

- Milton, David. 1982. *The Politics of US Labor: From the Great Depression to the New Deal*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
- Moghadam, Valentine M. 2005. *Globalizing Women: Gender, Globalization, and Transnational Feminist Networks*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 2012. Anti-Systemic Movements Compared. In *Routledge International Handbook of World-Systems Analysis*, ed. Salvatore J. Babones and Christopher Chase-Dunn. New York: Routledge.
- . 2013. *Globalization and Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism and the Global Justice Movement*. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Monbiot, George. 2017. *Out of the Wreckage: A New Politics for an Age of Crisis*. London: Verso.
- Moody, Kim. 1977. *Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy*. London: Verso.
- . 1993. *An Injury to All: The Decline of American Unions*. New York, NY: Verso Press.
- Morris, Aldon, and Naomi Braine. 2001. Social Movements and Oppositional Consciousness. In *Oppositional Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of Social Protest*, ed. J. Mansbridge and A. Morris, 20–37. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Morris, Aldon D. 1986. *Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*. New York: Free Press.
- Morris, Aldon. 1999. A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks. *Annual Review of Sociology* (25): 517–539.
- Mottiar, S., and P. Bond. 2012. The Politics of Discontent and Social Protest in Durban. *Politikon* 39 (3): 309–330. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589346.2012.746183>.
- Myrdal, Jan. 2012. *Red Star Over India*. Kolkata: Setu Prakashani.
- Nagaraj, R., and Sripad Motiram, eds. 2017. *The Political Economy of Contemporary India*. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.
- Naples, Nancy, and Manisha Desai, eds. 2002. *Women's Activism and Globalization*. New York: Routledge.
- Navlakha, Gautam, and Aish Gupta. 2009. The Real Divide in Bastar. *Economic and Political Weekly* 44 (33): 20–23.
- Nelson, Lowry. 1950. *Rural Cuba*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Neumann, Franz L. 1944. *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Newsinger, John. 2012. *Fighting Back: The American Working Class in the 1930s*. London: Bookmarks Publications.
- Ngwane, T. 2017. 'Amakomiti' as 'Democracy on the Margins'. PhD thesis, University of Johannesburg Department of Sociology, Johannesburg. <https://ujcontent.uj.ac.za/vital/access/manager/Repository/uj:22963>.
- Nilsen, Alf Gunvald. 2009. 'The Authors and the Actors of Their Own Drama': Towards a Marxist Theory of Social Movements. *Capital & Class* 33 (99): 109–139.
- Olson, Robert, ed. 1996. *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990*. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky.
- Orr, Martin. 2005. The Struggle Against Capitalist Globalization: The Worldwide Protests Against the WTO. In *Globalization and Change: The Transformation of Global Capitalism*, ed. Berch Berberoglu. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Ortiz, David G. 2015. State Repression and Mobilization in Latin America. In *Handbook of Social Movements Across Latin America*, ed. Paul Almeida and Allen Cordero Ulate. New York: Springer.

- Paret, M. 2015. Violence and Democracy in South Africa's Community Protests. *Review of Political Economy* 42 (143): 107–123.
- Paret, M., C. Runciman, and L. Sinwell, eds. 2017. *Southern Resistance in Critical Perspective*. London: Routledge.
- Park, Robert. 1934. Collective Behavior. In *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. New York: Macmillan.
- Pathamanand, Ukrist. 2016. Network Thaksin: Structure, Roles, and Reaction. In *Unequal Thailand: Aspects of Income, Wealth, and Power*, ed. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker. Singapore: NUS Press.
- Pavkovic, Aleksandar. 2000. *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Petras, James. 1978. Toward a Theory of Twentieth Century Socialist Revolutions. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (3).
- Petras, James, and Henry Veltmeyer. 2006. Social Movements and the State: Political Power Dynamics in Latin America. *Critical Sociology* 32 (1): 83–104.
- . 2011a. *Social Movements in Latin America: Neoliberalism and Popular Resistance*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 2011b. *Beyond Neoliberalism: A World to Win*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- . 2017. *The Class Struggle in Latin America: Contemporary Dynamics*. London: Routledge.
- Pizzolato, Nicola. 2011. Transnational Radicals: Labour Dissent and Political Activism in Detroit and Turin (1950–1970). *International Review of Social History* 56 (1): 1–30.
- Pleyers, Geoffrey. 2010. *Alter-Globalization: Becoming Actors in the Global Age*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Polakoff, Erica, and Ligaya Lindio-McGovern. 2011. *Gender and Globalization: Patterns of Women's Resistance*. Whitby, ON: de Sitter Publications.
- Polet, François, ed. 2007. *The State of Resistance: Popular Struggles in the Global South*. London: Zed Books.
- Polletta, Francesca, and James M. Jasper. 2001. Collective Identity and Social Movements. *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 283–305.
- Pool, James, and Suzanne Pool. 1978. *Who Financed Hitler: The Secret Funding of Hitler's Rise to Power, 1919–1933*. New York: Dial Press.
- Popovic, Srdja, and Matthew Miller. 2015. *Blueprint for Revolution: Hot to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and Other Non-Violent Techniques to Galvanize Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change the World*. Melbourne: Scribe.
- Pradella, Lucia. 2016. *Globalization and Critique of Political Economy*. New York: Routledge.
- Rabinowitch, Alexander. 1976. *The Bolsheviks Come to Power*. New York.
- Raleigh, C. 2017. Climate Violence? Lecture to the Oxford Martin School, Oxford. May 11. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y90WzN5wGq8>.
- Rasilimali, Haki. 2017. Position on Presidential Committees' Reports on Mineral Exports. Dar es Salaam. June 16. <http://www.policyforum-tz.org/hakirasilimali-position-presidential-committees-reports-mineral-exports>.
- Ray, Rabindra. 1988. *The Naxalites and Their Ideology*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Reinsborough, Patrick and Doyle Canning. 2017 [2010]. *Re-Imagining Change: How to Use Story-Based Strategy to Win Campaigns, Build Movements, and Change the World*. Updated and expanded 2nd ed. Oakland: PM Books.
- Reuss, Alejandro. 2013. *Labor and the Global Economy*. Boston: Economic Affairs Bureau.

- Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. 2016. *Final Program Report on Climate Change and African Political Stability*. Austin: University of Texas.
- Robinson, William I. 2014. *Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Robinson, William, and Xuan Santos. 2014. Global Capitalism, Immigrant Labor, and the Struggle for Justice. *Class, Race and Corporate Power* 2 (3): 1–16.
- Robles, W., and H. Veltmeyer. 2015. *The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Brazil: The Landless Rural Workers Movement*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Roggeband, Conny, and Bert Klandermans. 2010. Introduction. In *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines*, ed. Bert Klandermans and Conny Roggeband. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
- Ross, John. 1994. *Rebellion from the Rots: Indian Uprising in Chiapas*. Monroe: Common Courage.
- Rosset, Peter, María Elena Martínez-Torres, and Luis Hernández-Navarro. 2005. Zapatismo in the Movement of Movements. *Development* 48 (2): 35–41.
- Roy, Arundhati. 2011. *Broken Republic: Three Essays*. New Delhi: Penguin Group.
- Runciman, C. 2016. The Ballot and the Brick. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 34 (4): 419–436 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2017.1287347?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=cja20>.
- Sale, Kirkpatrick. 1973. *SDS: The Rise and Development of the Students for a Democratic Society*. New York: Vintage.
- Sanderson, Stephen K. 2010. *Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to Social and Political Contention*. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Schaefer, Robert K. 2014. *Social Movements and Global Social Change: The Rising Tide*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Schneider, Nathan. 2012. Occupy, After Occupy. *The Nation*. September 24. <http://www.thenation.com/article/169761/occupy-after-occupy>.
- Schurmann, Franz. 1973. *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schwartz, Benjamin. 1971. *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schweitzer, Arthur. 1964. *Big Business and the Third Reich*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Scott, James C. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Selden, Mark. 1974. *The Yen'an Way in Revolutionary China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sen, Jain. 2017. *The Movement of Movements*. Oakland, CA: PM Press.
- Sen, Jai, and Peter Waterman, eds. 2009. *World Social Forum: Challenging Empires*. 2nd ed. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Shah, Alpa. 2013. The Tensions Over Liberal Citizenship in a Marxist Revolutionary Situation: The Maoists in India. *Critique of Anthropology* 33 (1): 91–109.
- . 2017. Humaneness and Contradictions: India's Maoist-Inspired Naxalites. *Economic and Political Weekly* 52 (21): 52–56.
- Shah, Alpa, and Dhruv Jain. 2017. Naxalbari at Its Golden Jubilee: Fifty Recent Books on the Maoist Movement in India. *Modern Asian Studies Journal* 51 (4): 1165–1219.
- Shepard, Benjamin. 2012. Labor and Occupy Wall Street: Common Causes and Uneasy Alliances. *Working USA: The Journal of Labor and Society* 15 (March): 121–134.

- Shivji, I. 2006. The Silences in the NGO Discourse. *Africa Development* 31 (4). http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/2-_Shivji.pdf.
- Silva, E. 2009. *Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Silva, Eduardo. 2015. Indigenous People's Movements, Development, and Politics in Ecuador and Bolivia. In *Handbook of Social Movements Across Latin America*, ed. Paul Almeida and Allen Cordero Ulate. New York: Springer.
- Smith, Jackie, and H. Johnston, eds. 2002. *Globalizing Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Smith, Jackie, and Dawn Weist. 2012. *Social Movement in the World-System*. New York: Russell-Sage.
- Smith, Jackie, et al. 2014. *Global Democracy and the World Social Forums*. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Smucker, Jonathan Matthew. 2017. *Hegemony How-To: A Roadmap for Radicals*. Oakland: AK Press.
- Snow, Edgar. 1941. *Red Star Over China*. New York: Garden City Publishing Company.
- Snow, David A., and Dana M. Moss. 2014. Protest on the Fly: Toward a Theory of Spontaneity in the Dynamics of Protest and Social Movements. *American Sociological Review*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122414554081>.
- Snow, David, and Sarah Soule. 2010. *A Primer on Social Movements*. New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company.
- Solnit, Rebecca. 2012. The Sky's the Limit: The Demanding Gifts of 2012. December 23. http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175632/tomgram%3A_rebecca_solnit,_2013_as_year_zero_for_us_-_and_our_planet/.
- Solón, Pablo. 2018. Vivir Bien: Old Cosmovisions and New Paradigms. February, Great Transition Initiative, <http://greattransition.org/publication/vivir-bien>.
- Spector, Alan. 2013. *SDS, the 1960's and Educating for Revolution*. Cultural Logic.
- Sponk, Susan. 2018. Class Struggle and Resistance in Latin America. In *The Essential Guide to Critical Development Studies*, ed. Henry Veltmeyer and Paul Bowles. New York: Routledge.
- Standing, Guy. 2011. *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. London: Bloomsbury.
- . 2012. The Precariat: Why It Needs Deliberative Democracy. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/guy-standing/precariat-why-it-needs-deliberative-democracy>.
- . 2014. *A Precariat Charter: From Denizens to Citizens*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Starr, Amory. 2000. *Naming the Enemy: Anti-Corporate Movements Confront Globalization*. London: Zed Books.
- . 2005. *Global Revolt: A Guide to the Movements Against Globalization*. London: Zed Press.
- Stedile, João Pedro. 2008. The Class Struggles in Brazil: The Perspective of the MST. *Socialist Register* 44: 193–216.
- Steger, Manfred, James Goodman, and Erin K. Wilson. 2013. *Justice Globalism: Ideology, Crises, Policy*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Stavis, Dimitris, and Terry Boswell. 2008. *Globalization and Labor: Democratizing Global Governance*. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Stewart, Charles, Craig Smith, and Robert Denton. 2007. *Persuasion and Social Movements*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
- Sundar, Nandini. 2013. Reflections on Civil Liberties, Citizenship, Adivasi Agency and Maoism: A Response to Alpa Shah. *Critique of Anthropology* 33 (3): 361–368.
- . 2016. *The Burning Forest. India's War in Bastar*. New Delhi: Juggernaut Books.

- Szymanski, Albert J. 1978. *The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class*. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop.
- . 1981. *The Logic of Imperialism*. New York: Praeger.
- . 1983. *Class Structure: A Critical Perspective*. New York: Praeger.
- Tabb, William K. 2004. Neoliberalism and Anticorporate Globalization as Class Struggle. In *What's Class Got to Do with It? American Society in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Michael Zweig. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
- Tandem, Teresa S. Encarnación. 2007. Philippine Social Movements Face the Challenges of Democracy. In *The State of Resistance: Popular Struggles in the Global South*, ed. François Polet. London: Zed Books.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 2005. *The New Transnational Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Astra, Keith Gessen, et al. 2011. *Occupy! Scenes from Occupied America*. London: Verso.
- Terzani, Ti-ziano. 1976. *Giai Phong: The Fall and Liberation of Saigon*. New York: The Book Service.
- Thabchumpon, Naruemon, and Duncan McCargo. 2011. Urbanized Villagers in the 2010 Thai Redshirt Protests: Not Just Poor Farmers? *Asian Survey* 51 (6). November–December.
- Thomas, Raju G.C., ed. 2003. *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination Intervention*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Tien Dung, Van. 1977. *Our Great Spring Victory*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Trotsky, Leon. 1967. *The History of the Russian Revolution*, 3 vols. London: Sphere Books.
- Tufekci, Zeeenep. 2012. New Media and the People-powered Uprisings. *MIT Technology Review*. <http://www.technologyreview.com/view/425280/new-media-and-the-people-powered-uprisings>. Accessed 4 Sept 2014.
- Udovicki, Jasminka. 1995. Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Former Yugoslavia. In *The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Berch Berberoglu. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- van Gelder, Sarah, and The Staff of YES! Magazine, ed. 2011. *This Changes Everything: Occupy Wall Street and the 99% Movement*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
- Veigh, S. 2003. Classifying Forms of Online Activism: The Case of Cyber Protests Against the World Bank. In *Cyberactivism*, ed. M. McCaughey and M. Ayers. New York: Routledge.
- Veltmeyer, Henry. 1997. New Social Movements in Latin America: The Dynamics of Class and Identity. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 25 (1, October).
- . 2007. Neoliberalism and Imperialism in Latin America: Dynamics and Responses. *International Review of Modern Sociology*, 33, Special Issue.
- , ed. 2012. *Imperialism, Crisis, and Class Struggle: The Enduring Verities and Contemporary Face of Capitalism*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Veltmeyer, Henry, and J. Petras. 2000. *The Dynamics of Social Change in Latin America*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Veltmeyer, Henry, and James Petras. 2014. *The New Extractivism*. London: Zed Books.
- Venugopal, N. 2013. *Understanding Maoists: Notes of a Participant Observer from Andhra Pradesh*. Kolkata: Setu Prakashani.

- Vergara-Camus, Leandro. 2018. Peasant Alternatives to Neoliberalism. In *The Essential Guide to Critical Development Studies*, ed. Henry Veltmeyer and Paul Bowles. New York: Routledge.
- Wainwright, Hilary. 2017. A Movement Preparing for Power. October 3. <https://zcomm.org/znetarticle/a-movement-preparing-for-power/>.
- Wales, Nym. 1945. *The Chinese Labor Movement*. New York: Ayer Co. Pub.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2003. *The Decline of American Power*. New York: New Press.
- . 2004. *World-Systems Analysis*. Durham, NC: Duke University.
- . 2007. The World Social Forum: From Defense to Offense.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel, Randal Collins, Michael Mann, Heorgi Derluguian, and Craig Calhoun. 2013. *Does Capitalism Have a Future?* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Waterman, Peter. 1998. *Globalization, Social Movements, and the New Internationalisms*. London: Marshall.
- Webber, Jeffrey. 2010. *Rebellion to Reform in Bolivia: Class-Struggle, Indigenous Liberation and the Politics of Evo Morales*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Weil, Robert. 2011. Is the Torch Passing? The Maoist Revolution in India. *Socialism and Democracy* 25 (3): 1–81.
- Wengraf, L. 2018. *Extracting Profit*. Chicago: Haymarket Press.
- West, Louis. 1997. *Militant Labor in the Philippines*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- White, Fiona. 2007. Social Movements in South Africa. In *The State of Resistance: Popular Struggles in the Global South*, ed. François Polet. London: Zed Books.
- White, Micah. 2016. *The End of Protest: A New Playbook for Revolution*. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada.
- Williams, Eric. 1966. *Capitalism and Slavery*. New York: Capricorn.
- Williams, Juan. 2013. *Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954–1965*. Reprint ed. New York: Penguin.
- Wilpert, Gregory. 2006. *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The History and Policies of the Chavez Government*. London: Verso.
- Wolf, Eric. 1999. *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Women in Mining. 2015. Women Stand Their Ground Against Big Coal. Women in Mining Declaration, Johannesburg. January 22. <http://www.ngopulse.org/press-release/women-stand-their-ground-against-big-coal-southern-african-exchange>.
- Wright, Erik Olin. 2014. *Alternatives to Capitalism: Proposals for a Democratic Economy*. Kindle ed. Brooklyn, NY: Verso.
- Yates, Michael. 2009. *Why Unions Matter*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
- Zeitlin, Maurice. 1967. *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Zibechi, Raúl. 2010. *Dispersing Power: Social Movements as Anti-State Forces*. Trans. by Ramor Ryan. Oakland: AK Press.
- . 2012. *Territories in Resistance: A Cartography of Latin American Social Movements*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
- Zinn, Howard. 2003. *A Peoples History of the United States: 1492–Present*. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers.
- . 2013. *SNCC: The New Abolitionists*. Chicago, IL: Haymarket.

INDEX¹

A

Activist, 35–46, 48, 50–53
 Adivasi, 233–243
 Africa, 213–226
 African Americans, 274, 278
 African National Congress (ANC),
 221, 222, 224
 African Social Forum (ASF), 213, 216
 Aggregation, 376, 385
 Agrarian revolution, 233
 Alternative development, 190
 American Dream, 328, 333,
 337, 340
 American Federation of Labor (AFL),
 124–130, 132, 135, 136, 138,
 142n11, 143n17, 144n21
 American Revolution, 121, 122,
 139n1, 140n3
 Anti-austerity movements, 437, 439n17
 Anti-globalization movement, 430, 433
 Anti-privatization Forum, 222
 Anti-systemic movements, 53
 Anti-war Movement, 152, 157,
 160–162, 164–167, 170
 Arab Spring, 1, 8, 10, 303, 310,
 312, 314, 318, 321n22, 327,
 330, 374, 377, 379–381, 390,
 401, 403–408, 411, 412, 430,
 432, 437, 439n17

Asian Migrants Coordinating Body
 (AMCB), 364
 Authoritarianism, 249–263

B

Bastar, 234–236, 238–243
 Batista, Fulhencio, 88, 100
 Battle of Seattle, 374, 376, 378, 388
 Black Liberation Movement, 152–155,
 157, 159, 170
 Black Lives Matter, 303, 310, 315–318,
 383–385, 409, 412, 413
 Black Muslims, 154
 Black Panther Party, 165
 Black Power Movement, 157
 Bolivia, 178, 180–183, 186, 190,
 195–199, 201, 204n16,
 207n59, 208n62

C

Cabet, Etienne, 19
 Cambodia, 249–253, 260, 262
 Cambodian People's Party (CPP),
 250, 252
 Capital, 68, 70–73, 76–80, 178,
 191–197, 199–203, 206n38,
 208n62, 208n70

¹ Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.

- Capital accumulation, 193, 199
 - Capitalism, 68, 70–73, 75–80, 177–179, 191, 192, 194, 196, 197, 200, 202, 203, 206n38, 207n59, 208n70, 430, 432, 437
 - Capitalist development, 178, 183, 189–193, 199, 202, 203, 206n41
 - Capitalist state, 69–72, 75, 77, 78, 80
 - Carino brutal, 260
 - Castro, Fidel, 88
 - Chávez, Hugo, 406
 - Che Guevara, 111n5
 - Cheap labor, 354, 360, 367
 - Chiapas, 9
 - China, 85–110
 - Chinese Revolution, 85–110
 - CIA, 162, 163, 167, 168
 - Civil rights, 240, 241, 243
 - Civil Rights Movement, 153, 154, 160–162, 167, 168
 - Class, 1–8, 10, 11, 12n11
 - Class consciousness, 4, 97, 98, 100
 - Class struggle, 65–74, 77, 79, 178, 179, 188–200, 202, 203, 206n41, 270–274, 291–294
 - Climate change, 399–416
 - Climate justice movement, 401, 405, 415
 - Collective behavior, 374, 375, 379, 380, 384, 390
 - Collective identity, 39, 52, 374, 375, 384
 - Collective identity theory, 27–29
 - Collectivism, 436, 439n21
 - Colorblind racism, 338, 340
 - Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, 95, 107
 - Communist leadership, 450, 451
 - Communist Party, 86, 87, 94, 101, 102, 105, 106, 108, 109, 450, 451
 - Communists, 119, 120, 124, 127–133, 141n7, 143n14, 143n15
 - Community, 177–180, 186, 190–196, 198–201, 203, 208n62
 - Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 120, 127–133, 135, 136, 138, 143n14, 143n15, 143n16, 143n17, 144n20, 144n21
 - Contention, 37, 39–43, 52
 - Contentious politics, 357
 - Corruption, 331, 334, 335
 - Counter Cultural Movement, 170–171
 - Counter-insurgency, 358–360, 362
 - Counterrevolution, 253–254, 256–257, 262
 - Critical realism, 48
 - Cuba, 85–110
 - Cuban Revolution, 85–110
 - Cyber activism, 373–390
- D**
- Della Porta, Donatella, 311
 - Democracy, 71–73, 75, 76, 331, 333, 336, 340–342, 345n44
 - Democracy movements, 48, 53
 - Depression, 118, 126, 127, 130, 131, 142n13, 143n14, 143n18
 - Detroit, uprising in, 155
 - Dictatorship, 249, 250, 253, 254, 258, 263
 - Dictatorship of the proletariat, 450
 - Digital technology, 373, 376, 384
 - Dimensions of struggle, 36–46, 51
 - Doxing, 374, 386, 389
 - Drugs, 258, 260–262
 - Duncan, Jane, 222, 223, 228n22
 - Durkheim, Emile, 20, 22
 - Duterte, Rodrigo, 249, 253, 258–263, 358, 359
- E**
- Eastern Europe, 274, 279–282, 285, 290–291, 297n69
 - Ecosocialism, 414, 421n44
 - Ecuador, 178, 180, 190, 195, 201, 207n59, 207n60, 208n62
 - EDSA Uprising, 258
 - Education, 331, 333, 334, 338, 340
 - Egypt, 225, 226, 406–408
 - Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT), 387
 - Elite theory, 18–20
 - Emotions, 303–305, 311, 316
 - Enclosure of the commons, the, 242, 243
 - Enlightenment, 18
 - Equitable, 329, 332, 338, 341

Ethnic conflict, 274–275, 279, 281,
291–292, 294
Exploitation, 2, 3, 8, 11, 66, 68–73,
76–79
Expropriation, 242, 243
Extractive capital, 191–193, 195, 199,
238–243
Extractive capitalism, 355, 365
Extractivism, 217, 220

F

Facebook (FB), 328–332, 334–338,
345–346n44, 346n45
Fanon, Frantz, 213
Farmers' Federation of Thailand
(FFT), 254
Fascism, 250, 262, 266n40, 283,
287, 288
FBI, 154, 155
Finance capital, 117, 120, 134–137,
144n19, 145n26
Financial crisis of 2008, 328
Fossil fuels, 399, 400, 414, 416
Fourier, Charles, 19
Framing, 303, 310
Framing theory, 29–30
French Revolution, 18, 19, 22, 32n1

G

General assemblies, 331, 338, 345n44
General Assembly Binding Women for
Reforms, Integrity, Equality,
Leadership, and Action
(GABRIELA), 356–361, 369n29
Global capitalism, 325–342, 354,
362–363, 365, 367, 400, 408
Global civil society, 429
Global democracy, 435, 436
Global economy, 326, 332
Global feminism, 431
Global governance, 435, 436
Global inequality, 434, 435
Globalization, 76–79, 303, 306–307,
309, 310, 315, 318, 452
Global justice movements, 301–320
Global North, 434–436
Global South, 432–436

Global united front, 431, 436–437
Goodwin, Jeff, 35
Gramsci, Antonio, 39, 41, 42, 69,
70, 80n10
Great Recession, 325, 328, 334
Green parties, 410

H

Habermas, Jürgen, 305
Hacktivism, 374, 387–390
Haywood, William “Big Bill,” 8
Hegemonic decline, 437
Hegemony, 428
Hill, Joe, 8
Horizontal leadership, 328
Horizontalism, 431, 432, 437
Hun Sen, 249–253, 258, 260, 262, 263

I

Ideological hegemony, 69–70, 80n10
Ideology, 213, 216, 222, 224–226,
325–332, 338, 340, 341
Imperialism, 272, 273, 275, 276, 282,
285, 286, 289, 450
Indigenous communities, 354, 355, 365
Indigenous peoples, 338, 339
Indigenous Peoples Human Rights
Defenders Network (IPHRD), 365
Indigenous women's transnational
resistance, 365–367
Indignados, 330, 377
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW),
7, 8, 124, 141n7, 448
Information communication technologies
(ICT), 373, 375–387
Institutional exclusion, 118, 119,
121–129, 132, 134, 136, 139,
139n2, 140n4, 141n6, 141n7,
142n11
Intellectuals, 90, 91, 97, 103, 105, 109
International Domestic Workers
Federation (IDWF), 364
International Labor Organization (ILO),
363, 364
International Migrants Alliance
(IMA), 364
International solidarity, 361, 370n29

International Women's Alliance (IWA),
361, 369n29
International Workingmen's Association
(IWA), 448
Internetworked social movements,
308, 309
Intersectionality, 28
Iran, 277, 286, 287
Iraq, 277, 286

J

Jal, jangal, jameen, 239, 241, 243
Janathana Sarkar, 236
Jasper, James, 305

K

Kent State University, 166, 170
Kerala, 410
Keynesianism, 326
Khmer Rouge, 250
King, Dr. Martin Luther, Jr., 154, 156,
164, 173n4
Kuo Ming Tang (KMT), 86, 87, 98, 101
Kurds, 277

L

Labor anti-Communism, 120, 129–135,
141n7, 142n12, 143n16,
143n17, 144n19
Labor insurgency, 168–170
Labor migration, 355, 363
Labor movement, 47, 152, 153, 168
Labor repression, 118–121, 123–132,
134–137, 139, 140n4, 141n9,
142n12, 142n13, 144n22,
144–145n25, 145n26
Labor resistance, 117–139
Labor unrest, 121, 122, 124–128, 130,
131, 140n4, 142n13, 143n16
Landless Peoples Movement (LPM), 222
Landlords, 91–93, 96, 108
Latin America, 177–203
Leaderless social movement, 327, 331
League of Revolutionary Black Workers
(LRBW), 157, 169
Legitimation crises, 304, 305, 311

Lenin, V. I., 65, 67, 71–74, 87, 104,
233, 238
Liberal democracy, 258–259, 262,
263, 266n41
Libya, 225
Luxemburg, Rosa, 41, 44

M

Making history, 45
Malcolm X, 154, 155, 173n13, 173n14
Mandela, Nelson, 228n24
Mao Tse-tung, 86
Maoists, 234–243
Marcos dictatorship, 359
Marcos, Ferdinand, 253, 258, 259, 263
Marikana Massacre, 220
Marx, Karl, 19, 20, 22, 23, 65, 67–73
Marxism, 66, 97, 450, 451
Marxist-Leninist ideology, 450, 451
McCarthyist witch-hunts, 448
Me too, 303, 310, 316–318
Mexican Americans, 274, 278
Michels, Robert, 19
Middle East, 1, 10
Migrant domestic workers,
362–365, 368
Millennials, 433, 436
Minerals, 238, 239
Mobilization, 1, 4, 5, 8–11
Mobilizations for dignity, 311
Morales, Evo, 406
Mosca, Gaetano, 19
Mother Jones, 8, 448
Movement Against Tyranny,
359, 369n20
Movement building, 36–48, 50–53
Movement coalitions, 435
Movement organizations, 355, 356,
358, 366
Movement waves, 35–53
Mugabe, Robert, 225
Multicentric network, 433–434

N

Narrative, 325, 329, 330, 332, 336, 337,
339, 341
Nation, 269–272, 274, 291–294

National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), 125, 128
Nationalism, 254, 269–294
Nationalist movements, 269–294
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 118
National liberation, 269, 273, 274, 277, 279
National liberation movements, 448, 451
National Organization for Women (NOW), 167
National question, 277–279
Native Americans, 274, 275, 278, 279
Naxalites, 233–243
Nazism, 287, 288
Neoconservative, 430
Neo-fascism, 436, 437
Neoliberalism, 177–203, 213–226, 235, 238–243, 269–294, 306–307, 313, 316, 321n25, 325–342, 430, 431, 434
New Deal, 120, 127, 129, 130, 135, 142n13, 143n16, 145n27
New Global Left, 429, 433, 434, 436, 437, 439n21
New Left, 152
New People's Army, 358, 362
New social movements, 17, 27–29, 31
New world order, the, 178, 189, 201, 202
The 99%, 330–333, 335–339, 341, 342
No to Cha-Cha Movement, 359, 369n21
Non-violence, 401, 403
North Africa, 225, 226
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 9

O

Objective conditions, 3, 4
Occupy, 401, 403–405, 408–409, 412
Occupy movement, 430–432
Occupy Wall Street, 7, 10, 50, 310, 312, 314
Old Left, 152
The 1%, 330, 332–337, 339, 340
One Billion Rising, 366, 367, 371n50

Operation Green Hunt, 241
Oppression
 gender, 3, 4
 racial, 3, 4, 7

P

Palestinians, 274, 277
Pareto, Vilfredo, 19
Paris Commune, 447
Peace Movement, 153, 162
Peasant Women's Movement, 359
Peasantry, the, 181, 182, 185, 191, 195, 199, 208n70
Peasants, 86–89, 91–96, 99–102, 107, 109, 110
People Power I, 359
People's Climate Summit 2017, 366
Period of struggle, 42, 51
Peripheral capitalism, 177
Petty bourgeoisie, 272, 273, 282, 284, 285
Philippine neoliberal state, 355, 357, 358
Philippines, the, 249, 250, 253, 258–259, 262, 263
Pink Tide, 401, 404, 406, 410, 412
Podemos, 410
Police brutality, 159, 172
Political cultures of creation, 401–404, 409
Political cultures of opposition and resistance, 401, 403
Political economy, 303, 304, 308, 310, 311
Political opportunity structure, 303
Political opportunity/process theory, 23, 26–27
Political power, 66–68, 70, 74
Political process, 303
Post-neoliberal regimes, 178, 195, 208n62
Praxis, 36, 37, 44–45, 52
Precariat, 432–433, 437
Prefiguration, 431, 437
Proletarian socialist democracy, 450
Protests, 79
Protracted People's War, 233

R

Ramaphosa, Cyril, 220, 221, 224
 Rebellions, 428–430, 438n10, 439n21
 Red scare, 120, 126, 129, 130,
 141n7, 143n16
 Relative deprivation, 17, 23, 24, 27,
 30, 31
 Repression, 213–226
 Resistance, 214–224, 226
 Resistance (forces of), 178, 180, 181,
 193–196, 200, 201, 203, 208n62
 Resistance identities, 304
 Resource mobilization, 303
 Resource mobilization theory, 23–25, 29
 Reuther, Walter, 133
 Revolutionary alliance, 101–103
 Revolutionary movements, 53
 Revolutionary party, 86, 88, 99, 100,
 103–107
 Revolutions, 1–11, 35, 36, 41, 46, 48,
 53, 65–80
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 127–131,
 143n16
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 18
 Rural labor, 87, 90–96, 100–102, 108
 Russia, 85–110
 Russian Revolution, 7, 8, 85–110

S

Saint-Simon, Henri de, 19
 Salwa Judum, 239, 240
 Sanders, Bernie, 409
 Saucepan Revolution, 411
 Seattle, 405, 409, 418n12
 Selden, Mark, 87
 Semi-proletariat, 177, 180
 Shah, Alpa, 236, 237
 Sherman, Howard J., 5
 Shivji, Issa, 216
 Simmel, Georg, 20, 21
 Social media, 328, 329
 Social movements, 53, 65–80, 427–437
 Socialism, 75, 76, 86, 110, 431,
 447–452
 Socialist democracy, 450
 Socialist revolution, 85–110

South Africa, 215, 217, 220–225
 Southeast Asia, 249–263
 Soviet Union, 274, 279–283, 285,
 290–291, 297n69
 Spillover effect, 376, 383, 386, 387
 State, the, 65–67, 69–80
 Strain theory, 23
 Strategic hamletting, 239
 Strategy, 2, 4, 6, 7
 Strikes, 71, 79, 119, 120, 123–128,
 130–133, 135, 136, 143n16,
 144n20, 144n24
 Student movement, 157, 164, 166
 Student Non-violent Coordinating
 Committee (SNCC), 154, 157,
 160, 173n7
 Students against sweatshops, 376
 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS),
 159, 161–167, 174n45,
 174n47, 174n49
 Subjective conditions, 1, 4
 Sundar, Nandini, 234–242
 Supreme Court, 117, 124, 136,
 138, 141n8
 Surplus value, 68, 70, 76, 80n8
 Szymanski, Albert J., 5, 6, 271, 272

T

Tactics, 2, 4, 6–7
 Terrains of struggle, 36, 37, 42, 44, 46,
 51, 52
 Thai middle class, 253, 254, 263
 Thailand, 249, 250, 253–254, 256, 263
 Thaksin Revolution, 254–256
 Third World, 270, 272, 275–277, 282,
 283, 285–287, 289, 291, 448, 451
 Transition initiatives, 399, 411, 412, 416
 Transnational resistance, 361, 365–367
 Transnational social movements, 429
 Transnational women's movements,
 353–368
 Trotsky, Leon, 304
 Trump, Donald, 409, 413,
 415, 419n27
 Tunisia, 225, 226, 406–408
 Twenty-First Century Socialism, 406

U

Ultranationalist movements, 280,
 282–285, 287, 288, 290, 291
 Unionization, 360
 United Automobile Workers (UAW),
 129, 143n14
 United Farm Workers of America
 (UFW), 169
 Uprisings, 35, 36, 39, 40, 46, 48, 51, 52
 Urban labor movement, 178
 Urban rebellions, 155–159, 164
 Utopian socialism, 18–20

V

Venezuela, 178, 185, 190, 197
 Vietnam, 85–110
 Vietnamese Revolution, 85–110
 Violence, 234, 238, 241–242
 Violence against women, 358, 359,
 366, 367
 Virtual public spheres, 308, 312

W

Wage labor, 68
 Waves of contention, 40
 Web 2.0, 327–329, 332, 341, 374

Weber, Max, 20, 21

White supremacist activism, 385–387

WikiLeaks, 389

Wobblies, 71

Women's Earth and Climate Action
 Network (WECAN), 371n49

Women's Liberation Movement, 159, 167

Worker-peasant alliance, 102, 103

Working class, 68–71, 73–79, 86, 88–90,
 97–110, 448–452

World Economic Forum (WEF),
 429, 430

World revolutions, 427–437

World Social Forum (WSF), the, 9,
 309–311, 430–434

Y

Yugoslavia, 275, 280–283, 290

Z

Zapatista National Liberation Army, 9

Zapatistas, 303, 308, 328, 403–405,
 409, 413, 416, 417n9, 429, 430

Zimbabwe, 225, 226

Zuccotti Park, 314

Zuma, Jacob, 220, 221, 224, 225