STRATEGIC COOPERATION

OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS OF GLOBAL ANARCHY

MICHAEL O. SLOBODCHIKOFF

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LEXINGTON BOOKS
Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

Published by Lexington Books
A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.rowman.com

10 Thornbury Road, Plymouth PL6 7PP, United Kingdom

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Slobodchikoff, Michael O.
Strategic cooperation : overcoming the barriers of global anarchy / Michael O. Slobodchikoff.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-7391-7880-5 (cloth : alk. paper)—ISBN 978-0-7391-7881-2 (ebook) 1. International cooperation. 2. International relations. 3. Power (Social sciences) I. Title.
JZ1308.S57 2013
327.1'7—dc23

2013001163

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Dedication

To my BFF and son, Kolya, in the hope that I can always strive to be the omniscient daddy that you now believe me to be.

Contents

Figures

Tables

Preface

Having grown up in a family of Russian origin, I always felt an affinity to the Russian language and culture. My grandparents were very knowledgeable about Russian literature and music, and my grandfather was director of the Museum of Russian Culture in San Francisco. My grandfather would often take me onto his knees and tell me stories about Russian history, and my favorite stories would often center around the battle of Borodino where the Russians defeated Napoleon and forced his withdrawal from Russia. He would often remind me of the fact that it was never smart to try and invade Russia during the winter, but even more important was that he would often talk about the power of the Russian Empire and its influence over the areas under its control. He often lamented the Russian Revolution and the ensuing civil war, yet never lost his love of Russians or the Russian culture.

It wasn't until 1990 that I was able to visit the Soviet Union for the first time. Visiting Leningrad was truly an amazing experience. I stayed in an apartment overlooking a grocery store. I would often look out the windows, and if I saw a line develop in the store, I would rush downstairs to stand in the line. The reason for this was that the grocery stores were often empty of necessary supplies, and lines would develop when an important good was available at the grocery store. I remember once standing in a line that ran twice around the grocery store. By the time I got to the front of the line, I was able to buy two bottles of Pepsi. Those two bottles were the best bottles of Pepsi that I have ever tasted!

I didn't realize it at the time, but I was witnessing first-hand the last days of the Soviet Union. The next time I visited the country, in 1992, the country would be Russia, and would no longer be the Soviet Union. A state that was once feared globally self-destructed with very little violence. While this book develops a theory of how states use treaty networks to overcome power asymmetry and mistrust, nevertheless I develop this theory by examining the former Soviet space in great detail. Therefore it is important to understand the rise and fall of Soviet power and specifically the role of Russia within the Soviet Union to understand many of the dynamics involved in Russia's relations with the former Soviet republics.

The Rise of Soviet Power

Much of the second half of the twentieth century involved a bilateral struggle between two global powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Both states

had emerged from the aftermath of World War II as the preeminent global powers. The Cold War ensued between the two powers, in a global competition between two very different ideologies. The United States championed Capitalism and liberal democracy, the Soviet Union championed Communism.

As Soviet ideology evolved during the twentieth century, Marxist and Leninist theory expressed that there should be conflict between Capitalist ideals and those of Communism. The Soviet Union ideologically believed that Communism was the ideal towards which it was striving, and that Capitalism would eventually destroy itself and lead toward Communism. Thus, the Soviet Union tried to spread Communism throughout the world.

After World War II, the Soviet Union spread its influence in Europe. All of the states that fell under Soviet control following World War II adopted Communism, and were controlled in large part by the Soviet Union. Western Europe, in contrast, turned toward the United States for assistance in ensuring that they would not be taken over by the Soviet Union. Both blocs of states, those under the sphere of influence of the United States, and those in the Soviet bloc, formed two pacts for mutual defense. The Western states formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Soviet bloc formed the Warsaw Pact. Both pacts were formed for defensive purposes.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States continued to compete with each other militarily, and although they never fought each other directly, they fought each other through proxy wars. This period became known as the Cold War, and involved proxy wars such as the Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan and the United States' war in Vietnam.

Vast amounts of resources were needed to sustain the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. This was especially true once the Soviet Union and the United States entered the "Space Race." While the Soviet Union had shocked the world by putting the first satellite, Sputnik, into space, the United States responded to the challenge by sending manned space flights to the moon.

In addition to competing over space, both the Soviet Union and the United States competed heavily with each other with nuclear weapons. The United States had a strategic advantage early in the nuclear era since they had missiles based in Turkey that could reach the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union at that time did not have the capability to hit targets in the United States with nuclear missiles. This lack of nuclear capabilities led to the Soviet Union trying to base nuclear missiles in Cuba. These nuclear weapons would then have the ability to reach the United States, thus negating the strategic advantage of the United States.

In 1963, a US U2 spy plane photographed the preparations for the nuclear weapons in Cuba, and in October 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union stood on the brink of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis, as this period is referred to, showed the world what such intense competition with nuclear weapons could lead to. For several days, it was not clear whether a nuclear war would ensue or not. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States wanted to back down. The United States held a naval embargo on Cuba, while the Soviet navy was trying to break through the blockade. Through a series of top secret negotiations, the Soviet Union eventually backed down and a nuclear war was averted.

The Cuban Missile Crisis became one of the defining moments of the Cold War. It was the point where the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States almost led to another world war. Even had both sides refused to use nuclear weapons, the casualties of another world war would have been catastrophic. While both John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, and Nikita Khrushchev, Premier of the Soviet Union, declared that neither side wanted war, nevertheless war had been imminent, and both sides continued to build up military weapons with the intent of being able to defeat the other side.

The advent of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) allowed both sides the freedom of not having to station nuclear missiles within close geographical proximity to each other, but instead developed the ability to destroy each other from their own territory. Each state developed a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons which should war occur, would ensure mutually assured destruction of both states.

The nuclear competition continued between both states, and both the Soviet Union and the United States continued to support states that threatened the power of either state. Such was the case in the war in Vietnam, where the Soviet Union supported the North Vietnamese in the war against the United States, and the war in Afghanistan where the United States supported the Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union.

It was very costly for both states to continue to compete with one another militarily. The military industrial complex for both states grew tremendously for both countries which was difficult to sustain. This was especially true for the Soviet Union, which had economic efficiency problems, and the cost of maintaining such a military would eventually become untenable. However, both states continued competing militarily and the situation between both states remained hostile yet stable until 1984, when Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was selected by the Communist Party to lead the Soviet Union.

Perestroika and Glasnost: Rebuilding the Soviet Union

The selection of Gorbachev to lead the Soviet Union was a dramatic departure for the Communist party elites of the Soviet Union. Prior to that point they had often chosen leaders who were very old and would continue the policies of the previous leaders. In fact, the previous leader of the Soviet Union, Konstantin Chernenko, had been so old and sick that he died just six months after assuming the leadership role. However, the Communist party decided that new leadership was necessary, and chose Gorbachev as its new leader.

Gorbachev brought a new style of governance to the Soviet Union. While he believed in the goals of Soviet ideology, he no longer believed that conflict was inevitable between the Soviet Union and Western Capitalism. In fact, he started to approach the leaders in the West about trying to lessen the tensions between the Soviet Union and the West. He was able to reach out to the West, leading to then Prime Minister of Britain's famous quote, "I like Mr. Gorbachev, we can do business together."

While Gorbachev's international reforms and approach to other states were an enormous departure from previous policy, his internal reforms would fundamentally change the Soviet Union. He strongly believed in the goals of Communism, but believed that the Soviet Union needed to drastically change its approach to both its own people and its state structure including significantly changing its economic approach.

One of Gorbachev's fundamental beliefs was that many people had been mistreated during the era of repression under Stalin. Many people had either been killed or imprisoned, causing widespread fear among the populace. People were scared to say too much for fear of reprisals, and were very wary of others informing on them to the governmental authorities. Moreover, the government had strict control over the press, and the press could only report news that had been sanctioned by the government. Gorbachev worked quickly to give people a voice, and the freedom of speech. This reform was referred to as "glasnost'," coming from the Russian word "golos," which means voice.

He believed that the prior economic structure of the Soviet Union was untenable and needed to be reformed, naming these reforms "perestroika," which means rebuilding, indicating that the Soviet Union needed to be rebuilt. The only way in which the Soviet Union could survive would be if the reforms were successful.

Gorbachev believed that a command economy where the government determined how many goods would be produced at any time was inefficient. He thought that many of the problems with the economy started with the productivity of Soviet workers. Specifically, he believed that alcohol and alcoholism were extremely detrimental to productivity, and decided to mount a campaign against alcoholism. One of the most significant steps that Gorbachev took to combat alcoholism and the productivity of Soviet workers was to limit the number of bottles of vodka that people could buy. People were allotted a certain number of talons that they could use to buy alcohol, which severely limited the demand for alcohol.

One of the byproducts of the Soviets investing so many resources in competing militarily and scientifically with the United States was that there was little investment in consumer goods. As such, in the 1980s, there often were deficits of consumer goods in the state stores in the Soviet Union. While goods were more widely available in large metropolitan centers such as Moscow and Leningrad, consumer goods were scarce outside of the metropolitan areas. However, by the middle of the 1980s consumer goods became scarce even in the metropolitan areas. Communist party officials and foreigners were allowed to shop in exclusive stores where there was no scarcity of goods, but ordinary citizens of the Soviet Union were forced to cope with the scarcity.

Gorbachev thought he would be able to reform the Soviet economy to both create more productive workers and address the scarcity of goods. However, by the middle of the 1980s the quality of even those consumer goods that were produced in the Soviet Union was vastly inferior to those produced in the West. In the tradition of liberalizing the Soviet economy, Gorbachev allowed more Western produced consumer goods into the Soviet Union, and the inferiority of Soviet-produced consumer goods became apparent to many common citizens of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev's internal reforms were highly unpopular within the Soviet Union. Reformers wanted more reforms instituted at a faster pace while supporters of the Soviet system believed that his reforms went too far and should be repealed. He became a highly unpopular leader, and for the first time in the Soviet Union, critics could openly criticize him.

Gorbachev's reforms were heralded by the West. He was looked upon as a trustworthy leader who could truly achieve change within the Soviet Union. However, leaders in the Warsaw Pact countries could not count on Gorbachev and the Soviet Army to protect their interests anymore. Gorbachev openly stated that many of the Communist leaders in Europe would not be able to count on Soviet support to quell demonstrations and protect the government in the same

way that the Soviet Union had done in the past. Thus, in 1989, a demonstration in Berlin began, and demonstrators ended up at the Berlin Wall. The demonstrators continued to tear down the wall, and were not stopped by soldiers or police. Within hours, news services around the world were heralding a new era and the collapse of the iron curtain between the West and the Soviet bloc. Not only did Berlin become one, but the East German Communist government collapsed, which led to more demonstrations in Eastern Europe. Those demonstrations were successful, and by 1990, the only Communist country left in Eastern Europe was the Soviet Union. Even the Baltic Republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were openly talking about trying to secede from the Soviet Union, and were looking to the West for support in trying to secede.

Both the internal reforms within the Soviet Union and the changes in Eastern Europe further fostered dissent within the Soviet Union. In 1990, people began to openly challenge the Communist Party. Several politicians openly renounced their membership in the Communist Party. The mayor of Leningrad even burned his Communist party identification card in an address on television to show his disdain for the Communist party. Further, Boris Yeltsin, then President of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) was openly criticizing Gorbachev and the speed of the reforms.

Gorbachev tried to stop the criticism from his opponents, and openly admonished Yeltsin. In the past, an open admonishment from a Soviet leader would have been enough to completely ruin a person's career in politics and within the Communist party, by 1990 the admonishment only served to bolster Yeltsin's popularity with many of the citizens of the Soviet Union, and in particular Russia.

Another initiative that Gorbachev proposed to try and quell dissent among the Soviet republics was to try and draft a New Union Treaty. This new treaty would take the place of the Soviet constitution, and would create more of a confederation of republics where the republics would have more autonomy than they had under the Soviet system. The republics would be responsible for self governance over internal affairs, while the Soviet government would be responsible for the military and foreign affairs. While the initiative was well received by the leaders of some of the Soviet republics, other republics such as the Baltic republics insisted on their goal to secede from the Soviet Union, and refused to be a part of the new treaty.

Despite opposition to the new treaty by a few of the republics, a referendum was held in the Soviet Union, and it passed. However, the Soviet Union collapsed before the treaty was ever signed by the leaders of the republics.

The Aftermath of the Collapse of the Soviet Union

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev found himself to be a president without a country. His one-time political rival, Boris Yeltsin, as the president of the RSFSR stood to become president of the new Russian Federation, while the leaders of each of the former Soviet republics became leaders of newly independent states. An empire that had once been a super power in the world had collapsed. Where the Soviet Union had once been able to dictate policy to world leaders in countries far away, now none of the newly independent states (except Russia) had the power to dictate policy even in the post Soviet space. Even the most powerful state in the region, Russia, had to completely rebuild its economy and focus on domestic rather than foreign policy.

Yeltsin found that he needed to convert a non-productive and stagnant command economy into a private and productive market-driven economy. He believed that privatization through shock therapy was the only way in which an economic reform would be effective. Thus, he removed many of the subsidies that Russians were used to, and privatized state enterprises. Individuals were given vouchers for state enterprises that were supposed to serve as stock in the newly privatized companies. However, many people who did not have access to wealth and were struggling for survival in post Soviet Russia sold their shares for money. Those people with access to capital and who understood the potential of running former state-run enterprises bought up the shares to gain control.

Individuals with no access to wealth and ties to the government found that the social net that they could rely on during Soviet times was no longer available to them. Many people had to work several jobs to survive, often waiting months to receive the salaries that were due to them. Inflation was a constant problem, and people could not save money or work towards a financial future. Many people had to survive by planting gardens filled with vegetables and berries. This was especially true outside of the metropolitan areas. While the situation was difficult for individuals in Russia, it was even worse for many individuals in the former Soviet republics.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, what was formerly domestic politics and policy within the Soviet Union became international politics. Russia had to build its relationships with the former Soviet republics. Many of the former republics were wary of Russia's intentions, power capabilities, and coercive nature. Russia needed cooperation from the former republics to maintain or regain its great power status, as well as for economic reasons. The former republics also needed to cooperate with Russia to achieve their own strategic security and economic needs. The president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, found it difficult to not

only rebuild his own country from within, but also to rebuild relationships with the other republics.

Yeltsin was faced with many problematic issues that had to be solved through careful diplomatic negotiations and treaties. One of the first issues that had to be solved was how to truly dissolve the Soviet Union. One of the solutions that Russia and several other former republics came up with was to create a new multilateral institution, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which would help to resolve issues involving the former Soviet Union such as how to divide up the foreign assets of the Soviet Union, how to divide up the military forces, etc. None of these issues were easy to resolve, yet the CIS provided a means through which these states could resolve such issues. While the CIS provided a means of handling the distribution of Soviet assets among the former Soviet republics, it also served a purpose of building relationships between the former republics. Over time, the CIS evolved, and encouraged the growth of new multilateral institutions in the post-Soviet space that were more effective such as the Customs Union.

Beyond multilateral institutions, Russia needed individual cooperation from the former Soviet republics. Therefore, it used an approach of pursuing bilateral cooperation from each of the former republics. As such, it pursued the signing of treaties with each state to build a new relationship. However, it was impossible to pursue a single strategy of gaining cooperation. Different states responded differently to Russia's desire to cooperate, with some states being relatively open to cooperation, while other states were a lot more wary about cooperating with Russia. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that not all of the former republics were similar. For example, several of the republics to the west of Russia were European, and shared similar cultural and religious beliefs. In contrast, the former republics in Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, were mainly Muslim, and did not share the same cultural history that other former republics shared with Russia.

In addition to different cultures and religious backgrounds, many of the newly independent states changed their national languages from Russian to their own native languages. In some schools Russian was no longer even taught. Since there were many ethnic Russians living in the newly independent states, the fact that the schools were no longer taught in Russian put them at a serious disadvantage. Ethnic Russians who did not speak the ethnic language sometimes could not even become citizens of the new state in which they lived. In addition, many ethnic Russians no longer felt welcome to live in the newly independent states even though they had lived there for many years or even in many cases

were born in that state. Thus, many Russians left their homes and returned to Russia, causing an influx of immigrants and economic problems.

While the Russian government worked to solve many of these issues, they were hindered by problems of power asymmetry and mistrust. Russia was much more powerful than any other newly independent state in the region and very few of the new states trusted Russia to follow through on any international agreements.

While I have attempted to provide a *brief* history of the fall of the Soviet Union to provide context for this book, the real aim of this book is to develop a theory for how states can cooperate given constraints to cooperation. Specifically, I develop a theory for how states cooperate given power asymmetry and mistrust. I develop this theory using individual treaties and examining treaty networks. Some scholars believe that treaties are not important to study due to the fact that the international system is anarchic and that many of the treaties are not enforceable. However, states not only sign treaties, but they also enforce the treaties. They use these treaties as mechanisms to indicate intent, set overarching goals, and resolve specific situations. Treaties are the fundamental building block of international law, and most states' legal systems give preeminence to international law over domestic law. For example, the Constitution of the Russian Federation specifically states that international law has preeminence to domestic law. Thus, treaties are an important foundation for developing a theory for how states build cooperative relationships. For the purposes of this book, Russia and the post-Soviet space provides a perfect regional location in which to develop and test this theory, but this theory should be applicable to other regions as well.

However, this book would not have been possible without the help of certain people that have been extremely generous with their time and expertise in helping to understand the complex topic of interstate cooperation and the problems in developing a cooperative relationship. Specifically, I would like to thank Dr. Keijo Korhonen, the former Foreign Minister of Finland. Dr. Korhonen was very gracious with his time, and we spent several hours over the course of several meetings discussing the role of treaties in bilateral relationships along with how states approached treaty and relationship building was instrumental in molding my approach to this project. He was not only gracious with his time, but also with his hospitality, as he invited me to his home to share his immense knowledge and experience with me. I am very touched and grateful to him for his help and support.

I wish to specifically acknowledge my advisor, John P. Willerton, as he has gone far beyond the role of just an advisor. He has become a mentor to me, and

has helped shape my approach to the discipline of political science. I have learned from him both intellectually through working with him directly on research, as well as pedagogically by watching his approach to teaching and mentoring students. I have borrowed many of his techniques, and am very thankful for his help in allowing me to mature and grow in my own pedagogical and intellectual pursuits. Specifically, he helped me understand Russian foreign policy, and provided excellent feedback on all of my writing. Through working with him on articles, I have learned that I still have a lot more evolution to do in my writing style to reach his prowess at writing. Perhaps I can strive to reach that one day.

I have been very fortunate to have worked on projects together with Dr. John P. Willerton and Dr. Gary Goertz. They have been instrumental in guiding me through the process of conceptualizing the relationships between treaties and what that means for the overall relationship between states. Additionally, Charles Ragin has been instrumental in helping me methodologically, and challenging me to really examine treaty relationships and bilateral relationships through the use of fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). I am very grateful to all of them for pushing me intellectually and giving me the means to complete this study.

I also wish to thank my family for all of their advice and support. My father has been supportive in guiding me through the publication process and urging me to not worry about rejection and instead work hard to get this book published. I especially wish to thank my wife, Tanya, as she has been such an important part of helping me finish this study. Not only could I discuss some of my ideas with her to get her viewpoint, but also she would always be available for me to consult with about translating difficult wording in treaties whenever I became stuck. She always believed in me finishing, and her support has helped me tremendously. Finally, I would like to thank my son, Nicholas, who always kept me grounded by showing me that there is a life away from this study. He allowed me to get away from the constant pressure of this project, which in turn helped me to be more productive in completing it. He also believed that I was omniscient, which although far from true, helped me realize that any complicated issue could indeed be resolved.

Chapter 1

Impediments to Cooperation

On July 2, 1990, the 28th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was convened. At this conference, President Mikhail Gorbachev introduced a new proposal to the Communist Party. This idea was a radical reformation of the Soviet Union by creating more of a confederation of Soviet republics. While there would still be a central government and a president that would be responsible for conducting foreign and military policy, the republics would have much more control over their own internal affairs. This proposal became known as the New Union Treaty and would have taken the place of the 1922 Treaty on the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. While his proposal was well received by some of the republics, other republics such as the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) didn't want to create a confederation of republics, but rather wanted to gain freedom from the Soviet Union.

Over the next several months, a treaty was drafted, and the treaty was put to a referendum in the Soviet Union. On March 17, 1991, the referendum on the treaty was held, and the people approved the New Union Treaty. Hailed as a victory by Mikhail Gorbachev as a way of reforming the Soviet Union, a special signing ceremony was to be held in Moscow on August 20, 1991. However, the treaty was not signed.

On August 19, 1991, tanks rolled through central Moscow, and a group of collaborators took control of the government in a coup. President Gorbachev was arrested while on vacation, and the leaders of the coup gained control of the military and KGB. Those who had plotted the coup were concerned that the New Union Treaty would lead to more of the republics demanding freedom from the Soviet Union, and they felt that it was necessary to act to prevent this. Ironically, the coup hastened the end of the Soviet Union, as over the next few days, people rose up and protested.

Eventually the coup failed, and the Soviet Union imploded. People who had spent their lives working within the Soviet system found themselves facing totally new realities on how they must live and provide for their families. While those who were born in the Soviet Union during the twilight of Soviet power were able to adapt to new realities quickly, those people who were born post Stalin at the height of Soviet power found themselves lost in translation. This new reality prompted President Putin to state, "Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain."

For Russians, the collapse of the Soviet Union was very difficult to confront. They had been one of the world's strongest powers, and yet they collapsed so quickly. Russians living in former Soviet republics soon found themselves living in different countries whose new leaders had been unhappy with the former Soviet power structure. New laws regarding citizenship were established that made it very difficult for Russians to live and become citizens in those new states (Slobodchikoff 2010). Many Russians found that they had to move back to Russia, uprooting their lives and returning to a state that was not welcoming to an influx of immigrants.

For citizens of the former Soviet republics, initial euphoria at gaining independence soon led to desperation as the economies of those states collapsed. However, despite the problems facing individuals in the new post Soviet states, the new governments faced even greater hurdles in rebuilding their states and relationships following the collapse of the Soviet Union. First of all, Russia was by far the most powerful of the newly independent states, and was the regional hegemon. All of the other newly independent states were much less powerful than Russia. Further, the actions of those individuals who planned the coup in 1991 showed the newly independent states that in addition to Russia's overwhelming power in the region, that it could not be trusted. They were worried that Russia would be willing to use force to protect its interests vis à vis the other newly independent states, or that they would even be willing to use force to recreate the Soviet Empire should the opportunity present itself. Thus, as the newly independent states began to build their relationships with each other following the collapse, they had to contend with both power asymmetry and mistrust. In this book, I develop a theory and test how states can build successful cooperative relationships given the constraints of power asymmetry and mistrust. However, it is important to first understand some of the basic aspects of cooperation before understanding how states form cooperative relationships.

Interstate Cooperation

Scholars have often had difficulty explaining social cooperation. Game theoretic models have been used to try and explain cooperation among individuals. One of the most used game theoretic models is the Prisoner's Dilemma. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, two prisoners are separated from each other and given two options. The first option is to get a reduced sentence by admitting to a crime and becoming a witness against the other prisoner. This means that while the prisoner who became a witness against the other prisoner receives a reduced sentence, the other prisoner receives the maximum sentence possible. The second option is to not admit any involvement in the crime, and thus be set free due to a lack of evidence against the prisoners. By far the best outcome for both prisoners is to cooperate with each other and remain silent. They would each be set free then due to the lack of evidence against them. The problem is that each of the prisoners cannot trust that the other prisoner will not become a witness against the

other prisoner. Since betraying the other prisoner has a higher reward than being betrayed by the other prisoner, both prisoners will choose to betray each other instead of cooperating with one another. It should be noted that the Prisoner's Dilemma forces each individual to choose less rather than more because of the uncertainty of what the other will do. Each prisoner ends up with an undesired outcome.

While the Prisoner's Dilemma is successful in highlighting the difficulty of cooperation a single time, the Prisoner's Dilemma becomes more problematic if individuals must choose whether or not to cooperate multiple times. For example, Axelrod (1985; 2006) argues that the most successful strategy in a Prisoner's Dilemma with multiple iterations is not to defect, but rather to use a strategy of tit-for-tat, where the basic strategy should be to cooperate in the initial iteration, and then to mirror the strategy of the other individual in the next iterations. In other words, if the other individual also cooperates, then cooperation in the next iterations becomes a viable strategy, whereas if the other individual does not cooperate in the first iteration, then the strategy becomes not to cooperate on any of the next iterations.

Some scholars have argued that the Prisoner's Dilemma is too simple a game for adequately capturing the complexities of cooperating (Skyrms 2001). Instead, Skyrms (2001) proposes using the Stag Hunt game, where a group of hunters can cooperate to kill a stag. The meat from the stag would feed all of the hunters. However, as the hunting party is sneaking up on the stag, a hare appears. Each hunter is faced with a decision. If the hunter goes after the hare, there is just enough meat for that hunter, and the stag will be scared away, thus resulting in the fact that the other hunters will go hungry. Skyrms (2001) argues that this is a more appropriate game, because there are two acceptable outcomes. Either a hunter gets the hare or the stag. The appropriate strategy depends on a projection of how the other hunter will behave. If each of the hunters believes that the other will continue to cooperate in hunting the stag, then it is logical to do so. However, if one of the hunters believes that the other might try to hunt the hare, then it is a more logical strategy to try and kill the hare.

Ultimately, each of the games used by game theorists to explain cooperation relies on trust. While the Prisoner's Dilemma has only one equilibrium, and thus leads to non-cooperation, both tit-for-tat and the Stag Hunt have two equilibria, thus allowing cooperation. However, in both cases, trust is a major component to achieving cooperation. Further, if one individual has more power than the other individual, then it is likely that there will be even less trust between the two individuals, thus making it even less likely that the individuals will cooperate.

Each of the cooperation games discussed in this chapter has focused on individuals, not states. Interstate cooperation has often been defined as "when actors adjust their behavior through a process of policy coordination" (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 226). In other words, states modify their own behavior to achieve agreement between states. Cooperation can be even more difficult to achieve for states than for individuals. The reason for this is systemic anarchy,

here there is no world-wide government that can easily resolve disputes. While some international organizations have dispute settlement provisions, there is no international monopoly on the use of force, and therefore no way to enforce any dispute settlement. Either individual states must ensure compliance through the use of force, or the cost of not adhering to the settlement must be sufficiently high for states to adhere to their cooperative agreements. While I discuss this difficulty in depth later in this book, suffice it to say that it is incredibly difficult for two states who have a high level of trust between them to build cooperative relationships, and it is even more difficult for power asymmetric states with a small degree of trust to build cooperative relationships. I will develop a theory of how states can achieve cooperative relationships given these significant constraints to cooperation.

Prior to developing a theory of how states can build successful cooperative relationships given power asymmetry and mistrust, it is important to clearly examine what I mean by both power asymmetry and mistrust. I now turn to a discussion of these two concepts and how they hinder cooperation between states.

Power Asymmetry and Mistrust

While power has often been defined as the ability to influence an actor to act in a way that the actor would not normally act (Morgenthau 1948), much of the scholarship on power has focused on the power structure at the system level. Specifically, neorealists have been concerned with polarity and how much relative power states had at the system level (Waltz 1979). To determine relative power, neorealists operationalized power as the relative capabilities of each state within the system, where a state's power capabilities could be determined as the capabilities of each state as a proportion of the total power at the system level (Mearsheimer 1995; Waltz 1979; Wohlforth 1994).

It should be clear that the concept of power has to do with the overall systemic structure. This is due to the fact that neorealists argue that there is no system level government, meaning that there is a constant state of global anarchy. The state of global anarchy requires that states pursue power to ensure their own survival, and therefore all interactions are zero-sum games, where cooperation entails that one state would receive more relative gains than another state. The anarchic system was the driving force in determining states' behaviors. Those states that maximized their own security by gaining power were rewarded, while those states that did not were corrected by the rules of the system. The system is thus a self-staining system that molds the behavior of all states within it.

Since neorealists were focused on the systemic architecture of power, they were concerned with which states had the most power. They were concerned that power should be appropriately balanced between strong states in the world system. In other words, they argued that there should be power symmetry between the strongest powers, and that this would promote global stability (Walt 1985).

In contrast to neorealists, hegemonic stability theory argues that the most stable global system is one in which there is power asymmetry. In fact, hegemonic stability theorists argue that the system requires a hegemonic power that is able to set the rules of behavior for all other states in the system (Gilpin 1988; Keohane 1980; Volgy and Imwalle 2000; Webb and Krasner 1989). Hegemonic stability theory believes that the hegemon sets the systemic rules of behavior for all other states, and that as long as the relative systemic power structure remains constant, that those rules will remain in effect. Specifically, hegemonic stability theory grew out of the stability of the economic regime developed by Great Britain as the global hegemon during the nineteenth century. Great Britain established the rules of a liberal economic system, and the rest of the states in the system had to follow those rules.

The key to hegemonic stability theory is that the systemic power structure cannot change. In other words, the systemic rules remain in effect providing that the hegemon can enforce them. If there is a change in the systemic power structure, where the hegemon loses the ability to enforce the rules that it has established, then the system becomes more anarchic and thus unstable. It is important to note that hegemonic stability is in direct conflict with neorealism in that hegemonic stability theory argues that the global system is most stable under a unipolar system, whereas neorealism argues that the global system is most stable under a bipolar system. However, it is natural to question what happens as the global hegemon begins to lose its share of power in the systemic power structure.

The answer to the question of what happens as a hegemonic state loses relative power in the systemic power structure is addressed by power transition theory. Specifically, power transition theorists argue that as the global hegemon loses power relative to other states in the system, that conflict is more likely (DiCicco and Levy 1999; Organski and Kugler 1984; Organski 1958). It is important to note that power transition theory identifies the hegemon and a contending state. The contending state must be dissatisfied with the status quo and the rules established by the global hegemon. Not only must a contending state be dissatisfied with the status quo and the systemic rules of behavior, but a state must increase its power relative to the global hegemon.

Similar to hegemonic stability theory, power transition theory argues that the most stable global system is unipolar. For example, power transition theorists would argue that the United States was the undisputed global hegemon immediately after World War II, and that the Soviet Union was a dissatisfied state that wished to challenge the United States' hegemonic status (Wohlforth 1994). In fact, some scholars have noted that the Soviet Union was never in fact a bipolar power (ibid), and others have found that the most stable and peaceful periods during the Cold War were where there was a higher level of hegemonic power than during periods of relative power parity (Volgy and Imwalle 1995).

Central to power transition theory is the operationalism of power symmetry, or parity. According to this theory, there is stability when there is power asymmetry at the systemic level, and instability when there is systemic power parity.

Traditionally, scholars have used an arbitrary figure of twenty percent of capabilities between a challenger and a hegemon (Lemke and Werner 1996).

While one of the major components of power transition theory consists of systemic power symmetry, there is a second major component, that of dissatisfaction with the system hierarchy established by the global hegemonic power. If another state is within twenty percent of the hegemon's capabilities, yet is not dissatisfied with the hierarchical system of rules established by the hegemon, then there should be no conflict between the hegemon and other state that is at power symmetry. This is the justification by power transition theorists as to why there was no war between the United States and Great Britain when the United States overtook Great Britain to become the global hegemonic power. The United States was satisfied by the global rules and structure established by Great Britain, and peacefully assumed the responsibility of maintaining those rules globally.

Dissatisfaction with the hierarchical system of rules is often caused by mistrust of the hegemon. For example, one of the explanations for the cause of World War I according to power transition theorists is that Germany was dissatisfied by the hierarchical system of rules that had been established by Great Britain, the global hegemon of that period. Germany did not trust Great Britain to provide the necessary structure to achieve its strategic goals, and therefore it began building up its navy and military forces to be able to challenge the hegemonic power of Great Britain. As Germany's capabilities increased to the point of parity with those of Great Britain, then war became inevitable between the Great Powers.

Fundamentally, trust in the hegemon must come from trusting that the hierarchical rules include respect for a state's sovereignty. If the hegemon cannot protect and respect the sovereignty of the states within the system, then it leads to dissatisfaction with the global system, with states trying to develop the capabilities to replace the hegemon. While it is difficult to develop the capabilities to be able to challenge the hegemonic power, it is possible to do so, often by cooperating with other states to try and balance the power asymmetry of the global system.

One of the severe limitations of power transition theory is that it is focused on the systemic level, and thus power transitions are very rare. However, Lemke (2002) extends the systemic level of power transition theory to regional hierarchical structures. He argues that regional power structures mirror the systemic level power structures in that there is a regional hegemon that sets the rules for the region. For example, in the post Soviet space, Russia is the regional hegemon. It sets the hierarchical rules of behavior and interactions for the states within its regional sphere of influence.

Even though Lemke (2002) extends power transition theory to regions, his theory is still a very structural theory of international relations. It looks at the regional level of international relations, and not at the interstate level of international relations.

In this book, I examine bilateral cooperation given the regional structural constraints of power asymmetry and mistrust of the regional hegemon. I now turn to a discussion of how cooperation between states is possible given the presence of power asymmetry and mistrust.

To Cooperate or Not: Bilateral Cooperation with Structural Constraints

While many international relations scholars have focused on the stability of the system when there is strong systemic or regional power asymmetry, few scholars have examined what effect power asymmetry has in bilateral relations. For example, while the regional hegemon may be able to enforce regional rules and structures, this is due to the hegemon's power capabilities, which can make bilateral relationships with weaker states more difficult to accomplish.

Weaker states must be constantly aware of the power asymmetry when interacting with the hegemonic power, and must be worried about coercion. Moreover, the weaker state must be concerned with the fact that nothing requires the hegemonic state to abide by any agreements between the hegemon and weaker state. If the weaker state can trust the hegemon to abide by their bilateral agreements, then there is little reason not to cooperate with the hegemon. However, if the weaker state does not trust the hegemon, then cooperation with the hegemon becomes more difficult. While realists would argue that cooperation should not occur between states where there is a high degree of power asymmetry and mistrust (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996), liberals would argue that cooperation would be possible in certain issue areas such as trade (Keohane and Martin 1995).

Ultimately states must decide whether or not cooperation is within their strategic interests given the structural constraints. While it is certainly possible for a weaker state not to cooperate with a hegemonic state, by not cooperating, a weaker state misses out on all gains it could have at present and in the future by refusing to cooperate with the hegemon. Thus, the opportunity cost of refusing to cooperate with a hegemon is high.

If a weaker state determines that it is within its strategic interests to cooperate with a regional hegemon, it must then develop a strategy for managing the structural constraints that make cooperation difficult to achieve. Specifically, the weaker state must work towards being able to trust that the hegemon will abide by cooperative agreements that both states have agreed to. Certain scholars have argued that it is possible to build trust between stronger and weaker powers through signing minor non-contentious agreements first, and eventually building up enough trust to cooperate on more important and contentious issues (Kydd 2005; Kydd 2000a, 2000b, 2001). A good example of building trust over time between a hegemonic power and weaker state is the relationship between the United States and Canada. Goldstein (1996) and Goldstein and Gowa (2002)

state that Canada was at first wary of cooperation with the United States, and was concerned about trade liberalization between the states. However, both states began to build trust in small increments that eventually developed into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

In this book, I ask how states are able to build cooperative bilateral relationships given the structural constraints of power asymmetry and mistrust. I argue that it is not necessarily trust that is being built between states, but rather an expectation of certain future behaviors and outcomes. In other words, it is possible to trust that a state will not violate a given agreement, even if the weaker state does not fully trust the hegemon. For example, Cook, Hardin and Levi (2007) argue that it is possible to achieve cooperation without trust, stating that "many interactions in which there is successful coordination or cooperation do not actually involve trust" (Cook, Hardin and Levi 2007, 8). I argue that instead of building trust, states enter into agreements and through the use of careful institutional design, create a relationship where they can develop certain behavioral expectations and effectively manage power asymmetry and mistrust.

To answer the dilemma of how states are able to build these relationships given power asymmetry and mistrust, I examine the former Soviet Union, specifically Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member states. I examine this region for three main reasons. First of all, Russia is the clear regional hegemon. No other state in the region is close to parity in terms of capabilities in the region. Second, due to the history of the Soviet Union and the building of the Soviet Empire (as well as the Russian Empire prior to the Soviet Empire), there is deep mistrust of Russia among the former Soviet republics (newly independent states). Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union creates a unique opportunity of examining the formation of bilateral relationships and cooperation from a set starting point to see how newly independent states are able to form cooperative bilateral relationships given power asymmetry and mistrust.

In this book, I first develop a theory of international cooperation given power asymmetry and mistrust. In the theoretical chapter (chapter 2) I discuss my theoretical assumptions. Specifically, I discuss how states cooperate through the use of treaties, and develop an understanding for the institutional design of a treaty network that relies on certain lodestone or foundational treaties that develops a cooperative relationship. It should be noted that these treaty networks facilitate cooperation partially by constraining both the hegemon and weaker state from violating individual treaties, thus ensuring that agreements are abided by both states.

In chapter 3 I show the causal mechanisms of the theory developed in chapter 2 by examining the relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland. This case is an excellent example of how states are able to build a cooperative relationship given power asymmetry and mistrust. I examine the historically strained relationship between the two states, and show how both states were able to achieve strategic goals through cooperation. Despite the fact that the Finns were constantly mistrustful of the Soviet Union and wary of its overwhelming

power, nevertheless they were able to strategically cooperate and successfully pursue a policy of neutrality in the Cold War, which allowed Finland to pursue its own strategic objectives. Ultimately, the relationship benefitted both Finland and the Soviet Union, and both states achieved important benefits that they wouldn't have achieved had cooperation not taken place.

Ultimately chapter 3 is an illustrative case study and overview of a relationship that was built given power asymmetry and mistrust. Moreover, although the case study is historical and predates the collapse of the Soviet Union, nevertheless there are important aspects of this case study that illuminate the practical aspects of building a cooperative relationship as well as the benefits of doing so.

In chapter 4 I examine why former Soviet states would want to cooperate given the power dominance and mistrust of the regional hegemon, Russia. While I have argued earlier that a safe assumption is that states cooperate due to strategic interests and gains, chapter 4 looks at some of the specific strategic interests that drive the former Soviet states to want to cooperate. In addition, I argue that there are certain issues that cannot be overcome for states to want to cooperate. Using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), I find that in states where Russia has peacekeeping troops, that those states do not build cooperative bilateral relationships with Russia. The reason for this is that stationing peacekeeping troops within the borders of a weaker state breeds mistrust due to hegemonic coercion, and even using treaty nesting and creating treaty networks cannot mitigate the mistrust of the hegemonic power. Thus, even though there may be a high opportunity cost of not cooperating with Russia, the cost of cooperating with severe mistrust is even higher. Therefore weaker states that have Russian peacekeeping forces within their borders are not willing to build a cooperative bilateral relationship with Russia, and are more likely to experience military conflict with Russia.

Chapters 5 and 6 are closely related chapters, with chapter 6 building directly off of chapter 5. In fact, chapters 5 and 6 make up a chapter network, with chapter 5 nested in chapter 6. While chapter 3 illustrates an overview of the building of a cooperative relationship, chapter 5 delves deeper into the institutional design of bilateral treaty architecture. I do this by using network analysis to examine the relationship between treaties. I specifically examine four case studies, and examine their treaty networks to determine how cooperative their bilateral relationships are with Russia. In the case studies, I examine not only the individual treaties, but the linkages between the treaties through treaty nestedness. It is apparent that not only is treaty nesting an extremely important design feature in bilateral relationships, but also that the number of linkages between treaties combining to make a very strong and dense treaty network is extremely important in developing a cooperative bilateral relationship.

In chapter 6, I directly build upon the case studies in chapter 5 and develop a measure of a cooperative bilateral relationship. I argue that this new measure is a better measure of predicting conflict or the absence of conflict than the traditional measure of joint IGO membership, and should be utilized in the liberal peace theory.

While joint IGO membership is an easier measure of cooperation, it is a thin measure that does not adequately capture cooperation. The new measure developed in chapter 6 is a thicker and more robust measure that more adequately measures cooperation, and is therefore a better measure to be used in predicting the onset of conflict.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Approaches to Cooperation

In the early days of George H. W. Bush's administration in 1989, strategic reviews were initiated by the National Security Council. The point of the strategic reviews was to reexamine existing policy and goals by each region. On March 14, 1989, the strategic review on the Soviet Union (NSR-3) was given to the President, but the review was so broad that Condoleeza Rice, then director of Soviet and Eastern European affairs of the National Security Council, was tasked with creating a Soviet "think piece" with recommendations on determining US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union (Inderfurth and Johnson 2004, 240). The strategy recommended by Condoleeza Rice became a four-part approach towards the Soviet Union. First, the US should focus domestically on strengthening the image of its foreign policy as being driven by clear objectives. Second, the US had to signal to the Soviets that relations with its allies were its first priority. Third, the US should be willing to expand its influence in Eastern Europe and take advantage of Gorbachev's decreased influence over Eastern Europe. The idea was that Eastern European states would be eager to cooperate with the United States to gain better economic security. The final recommendation was to cooperate with the Soviet Union on regional stability. Policy makers felt that both states could help create institutions that would lead to regional stability in such regions as Afghanistan and southern Africa (Inderfurth and Johnson 2004, 240). Little did the policy makers know that in just a few short years, the Soviet Union would cease to exist and that the United States would be faced with trying to rebuild relations with fifteen new states. While some of the states were more sympathetic to the United States, others were more hostile. Moreover, mistrust and power asymmetry were issues that had to be overcome. Finally, the United States had to wait to see how Russia, as the regional hegemon, would be able to build its relationship with the former Soviet republics. The United States had to wait to see whether regional institutions would be formed to stabilize a formerly stable region. This was especially important in the former Soviet space, as the power relations among the former republics had not fully become clear.

It is not an accident that US policy makers were looking to create regional institutions that could help to stabilize troubled regions around the world. Even after the start of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, US policy makers were convinced that individual states could not bring stability alone, and that regional institutions were the most effective way of stabilizing troubled regions (Berger et al. 2005, 36). Despite the acceptance by influential US policy makers on the

importance of institutions in creating global stability, one controversial debate among international relations scholars centers on whether or not institutions matter. Realists argue that institutions reflect the power of the member states, and therefore are irrelevant for understanding international relations (Mearsheimer 1994, 1995), whereas liberal institutionalists argue that institutions are very important for understanding international relations (Keohane and Martin 1995; Keohane 2002). They argue that institutions not only cut transaction and information costs for the member states, but that the institution is holistic in that it is more than just a reflection of the interests of the member states. Moreover, liberal institutionalists claim that institutions can effectively solve problems and disputes that states would not be able to solve on their own. I want to bridge the two approaches—both sides seem to me to have merit.

Cooperation

One important debate among international relations scholars is why states would choose to cooperate. Realists are focused on the anarchic nature of the world system, which means that individual states must be responsible for their own security. Specifically, they see this anarchic system as being responsible for creating a zero-sum game in any interaction between states, where if one state gains any power in the system, that other states must lose power relative to the state that gained power. Thus, all interactions between states are competitive in nature, with each state looking to maximize its own power interests while trying to minimize the amount of power that any other state could gain through the interaction (Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993). The competitive nature of each interaction being viewed as a zero-sum game has often been referred to in international relations literature as relative gains. Relative gains further typify a zero-sum game in that any interaction between states is viewed as a competition and game where there can only be one state that wins. Thus, it is not beneficial to any state to cooperate with any other state, even if both states might benefit from that cooperation, because each state should be worried about how much other states benefit in comparison to the amount that the state would benefit by cooperating at all. Those scholars who view the world system in this fashion are thus very skeptical about any chance of cooperation between states on any issues, and that true cooperation is almost impossible to achieve. This is a very pessimistic view of states' abilities or desires to cooperate on any issue area. It is important to note that scholars that view the world through this spectrum view every interaction as power-based, and thus all interactions must be examined through an understanding of the changing power-dynamics that each interaction brings.

Liberal institutionalists, however, argue that states view interactions between states as a positive-sum game, where multiple states can benefit from the interaction. According to this view, states find it easier to cooperate, since states

are less concerned about the power dynamics between states, and are seeking to maximize their own benefit while not worrying about the relative benefit that any other states that they are interacting with are receiving (Robert O. Keohane and Martin 1995; Snidal 1991). It should be noted that liberal institutionalists do not view every interaction as being power-driven, and often discount the relative power dynamics between states. Interactions between states are able to be mutually beneficial, which allows cooperation between states. Interestingly, while realists consistently argue that cooperation in security matters is very difficult to realize among states, liberal institutionalists focus on showing that cooperation is possible between states involving trade. Thus, although the two theoretical perspectives seem diametrically opposed to one another, they actually may not be. It could be that cooperation between states is merely more difficult when states are addressing security issues, whereas issues of trade might be much less contentious, and more easily lead to cooperation between states.

Although realists have mostly argued that states are concerned with relative gains which make cooperation difficult, states nonetheless cooperate in many issue areas. States have continued to build both bilateral and multilateral relationships, which has led to increased cooperation. Liberal institutionalists have noted that cooperation often occurs in the area of trade, since all states involved in the relationship benefit (Robert O. Keohane 2002). While realists insist that cooperation is only a reflection of the power interests of the most powerful state in the relationship, liberal institutionalists argue that cooperation between states is vital to forming a relationship which in turn constrains state behavior. It is important to indicate that although realists note the power dynamics among states in their relationships, they don't believe that the relationships are constraining on any of the states involved in a relationship. In contrast, liberal institutionalists note the constraining aspect of relationships, while ignoring the power dynamics between states. Liberal institutionalists often do not take into account that powerful states can coerce less powerful states and force them to cooperate in certain issue areas such as trade. For example, after World War II and throughout the Cold War period, the Soviet Union's hegemonic power forced neighboring Finland to engage it in a multifaceted relationship, despite the fact that Finland had fought the Soviet Union, was hostile, and was suspicious of Soviet intentions (Korhonen 2010). My discussion will draw on the Soviet-Finnish relationship as it exemplifies the dynamics of power asymmetry in cooperation among states despite lingering hostilities. In other words, cooperation not only is possible, but rather is necessary between rival states in an asymmetric power relationship.

Ultimately, states must decide whether or not to cooperate with other states. It is a strategic decision that they must make, where they can achieve gains that they would otherwise not have been able to achieve by not cooperating. However, they must be careful in how they cooperate. This is especially true in situations of power asymmetry and mistrust, where states cannot be certain that other states will adhere to agreements on cooperation, and thus cannot rely on those states. States must use a cost/benefit analysis and decide whether or not to coop-

erate with a more powerful state. On the one hand, they stand to gain by cooperation, while also having to be wary of the more powerful state's ability of not abiding by previous agreements. On the other hand, by not cooperating, states miss out on all future gains that cooperation with a stronger state would bring. Therefore, weaker states must make a careful and strategic decision on whether or not to cooperate. If they decide that cooperation is preferable to not cooperating, then states must try to manage power asymmetry and mistrust if they are to develop a cooperative bilateral relationship with a much stronger state.

In this book I argue that cooperation can occur among states in all issue areas, including trade and security. I adopt the liberal institutionalist approach that relationships constrain the behavior of states involved in the relationship, while also adopting the realist approach that power dynamics are extremely important in determining the type of relationship built between states. While many scholars examine a relationship between states as a static institution, I examine both bilateral and multilateral relationships as dynamic institutions that are constantly changing and evolving. Although I adopt the liberal institutionalist approach that cooperation between states in many different issue areas is possible, I also take into account that more powerful states can utilize coercion to force cooperation from a weaker state. Theoretically, if states in a relationship have power symmetry, then they are able to cooperate with each other as equals, whereas in cases where one of the states is clearly more powerful than all of the others, coercion and force enter into play to ensure cooperation among the states. Thus, I argue that the power dynamics are an extremely important aspect of relationships between states. I mainly examine the relationship between states in power asymmetry, where one of the states is much more powerful than the others. I examine the evolution of these relationships keeping in mind that each agreement affects the institutional relationship between states, which serves to further constrain states within the relationship.

International Actors

Traditional scholars of international relations have often argued that domestic politics and international relations are two completely separate entities, and thus should be examined separately (Putnam 1988; Walt 1985; Waltz 1979). More recently, scholars have argued that domestic politics and international relations are inexorably linked (J. Goldstein and Gowa 2002; J. Goldstein 1996; Henisz and Mansfield 2004; Milner 1999; Moravcsik 1997; Putnam 1988). For example, Moravcsik (1997) argues that there is a two-level game between domestic constituencies and the elite that create foreign policy. He states that domestic constituencies fight over preferences, and when the preferences are set domestically, foreign policy will reflect those agreed-upon preferences. National elites will recognize domestic preferences, and try to achieve those goals that most adequately reflect the domestic preferences. According to Moravcsik (1997), a

state's foreign policy is thus constrained by the domestic preferences of the state.

An alternative argument to Moravcsik (1997) is provided by Putnam (1988). Putnam (1988) argues that there is a two-level game between domestic politics and foreign affairs. National elites must satisfy their domestic constituency to achieve their goals. Specifically, elites can use foreign affairs to satisfy their domestic constituency while also being constrained in their international relations by the domestic constituency.

Interestingly, national elites can utilize international relations to push their domestic agenda. For example, Goldstein (1996) states that the Reagan administration really wanted to push an agenda that included trade liberalization. Although it faced domestic opposition to liberalizing trade, it was able to construct treaties with Canada that ensured free trade between Canada and the United States. By signing these treaties, the Reagan administration was able to push its agenda through Congress in a way that allowed Congress to approve these measures without overly upsetting their domestic constituency. Once the agreements had been reached, domestic industries were told that the United States could not use protectionist measures to safeguard industries since the United States had to abide by its treaty obligations.

From the Canadian perspective, Canada was happy to sign free trade agreements with the United States because it was worried that US companies were receiving preferential treatment from the US government and that Canadian companies would not be able to compete with companies in the US (Goldstein 1996). It is important to note that despite the fact that the treaties sometimes came in conflict with US preferences, the US has upheld its agreements with Canada. Even though it would have been beneficial for US businesses and US interests to violate the treaties, the US felt constrained by the Canadian treaties (Goldstein 1996).

The fact that the United States was constrained by its treaties with Canada is extremely important, and is certainly not a unique case. In fact, the US has often been constrained by international treaties and has abided by them despite the fact that it would be more beneficial not to abide by the treaties (Mattli and Büthe 2003). Mattli and Büthe (2003) argue that the United States is often at a disadvantage when making agreements over standards with the Europeans, and that they often are constrained by agreements that are less advantageous to the US than they could be. They state that this is surprising since prevailing theories of power relations in international relations would expect that the United States as a global hegemon would be able to benefit the most from agreements with the European Union over standards. Even more surprising is the fact that the US would abide by all of the provisions of the treaty even if adhering to the treaty was against US interests.

The fact that a more powerful state is constrained by its agreements runs counter to many realist arguments against treaties. For example, (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996) argue that the reason that there is a high rate of compliance with international agreements has to do with the fact that powerful states want to

comply with specific treaties. If they didn't want to comply with a treaty, they wouldn't. In fact, a powerful state could try to convince other states not to comply with a treaty as well. For example, under George W. Bush, the US tried to get states to agree to sign bilateral nonsurrender agreements, where states would never turn over Americans to the International Criminal Courts (Kelley 2007). According to Kelley (2007), the United States was unhappy with the fact that American soldiers could be tried by the International Criminal Court, and tried to pressure other states to sign nonsurrender agreements. However, the US was forced to abandon its pressure on other states as most of its allies refused to sign the nonsurrender agreements. Ultimately, Kelley (2007) finds that even with extreme hegemonic pressure, international agreements are not only abided by, but also constrain behaviors of states that do not wish to adhere to the agreement. Although Kelley (2007) argues that the reason that many of the US allies did not sign the nonsurrender agreements is because they value the norms of universal justice, there could just as easily be another explanation that would equally explain the fact that they did not sign the nonsurrender agreements.

Looking at the data provided by Kelley (2007), it is very apparent that all of the states that did sign the nonsurrender agreements were relatively weak states. There were no strong states or great powers that signed the nonsurrender agreements. Further, those states that did sign the nonsurrender agreements were those states that needed the support of the US. For example, Poland signed a nonsurrender agreement with the US, as it stood to benefit from the Missile Defense System, which was to be placed in Poland. Therefore, in the case of the nonsurrender agreements, the US was able to ensure cooperation on nonsurrender agreements from those states in which there was a large degree of power asymmetry, but not ensure cooperation on nonsurrender agreements from those states in which there was a lesser degree of power asymmetry with the US.

Ultimately all states must interact or cooperate with each other in some way. It is how states choose to interact with one another that is of vital importance. States must balance the benefits that cooperation brings with the fact that they will not fully achieve their goals. Rather, cooperation inherently involves active negotiation between states. Negotiation becomes even more important when there is power asymmetry in the relationship, as the weaker side must be very careful not to lose power, while the stronger state wishes to achieve its goals with minimal cost. In my book I am concerned with how states interact or cooperate where there is power asymmetry in the relationship. I now turn to a discussion of the core instruments of cooperation that states can choose to utilize in their bilateral relations.

The Institutional Design Features of Cooperative Bilateral Relations

The fact that both stronger and weaker states believe that cooperation is in their best interest does not ensure their cooperation. In fact, the states must develop

certain strategies for overcoming power asymmetry and mistrust. Two of the most important strategies for overcoming these hindrances to cooperation are legalization and treaty nesting.

The concept of legalization has become very important as many scholars have noted that since the 1990s there has been an increase in the use of laws to govern the interaction between states (Goldstein et al. 2000). Although legalization closely mirrors institutionalization, legalization is a particular type of institutionalization (Abbott et al. 2000, 401). Specifically legalization requires three basic components: obligation, precision and delegation. Obligation is where states are bound by international rules and laws, precision is where the international rules unambiguously define expected conduct, and delegation is the ability of the states to grant third parties the ability to resolve disputes and make further rules (Abbott, R. Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, and Snidal 2000, 401).

The presence of the three components of legalization can be used by states to ensure that states will adhere to their agreements. Since much of international relations is characterized by mistrust, states often begin to cooperate on small issues and slowly build trust (A. Kydd 2000a, 2000b, 2001). As states fulfill and adhere to prior agreements, states can begin to cooperate on more complex issues. As states move to cooperate on more complex issues, they often choose to further legalize new agreements, tying them back to prior agreements through nesting, which further reinforces legalization and thus makes these instruments harder to violate.

In addition to legalization, states can also use treaty nesting as a design feature to overcome power asymmetry and mistrust in cooperation. While I discuss both treaty nesting and treaty networks in depth later in this chapter, it should be understood that treaty nesting is a strategy used by states to tie treaties together to make treaties stronger than they would be individually. Specifically, treaty nesting entails one treaty specifically referencing a prior treaty in its text (Willerton, Slobodchikoff, and Goertz 2012; Willerton, Goertz, and Slobodchikoff 2011). Violating a treaty that is nested within another treaty is paramount to violating both treaties.

While these design features of bilateral relationships are extremely important in overcoming the constraints of power asymmetry and mistrust, they both require the use of treaties. Legalization refers to the constraints and requirements that individual treaties place upon the states that sign the treaty, and treaty nesting refers to the linkages between the treaties themselves. I now turn to a discussion on treaties and agreements, to further illustrate the methods that states use to overcome the constraints to cooperation.

Core Instruments of Cooperation

I accept the argument that states are interested in absolute gains. States will cooperate if it is in their own best interest, especially since states are rational actors. It is logical to assume that no state, even a hegemon, can maintain an inter-

national presence or reach without cooperation from other states. Former Finnish Foreign Minister Keijo Korhonen has observed, that "even the most powerful state in the world cannot protect all of its citizens without the help of other states; cooperation is a necessity for all states who wish to have an international presence'' (Korhonen 2010).

Core instruments of cooperation such as treaties and agreements need to be defined clearly as this study proceeds. In terms of international law, a treaty refers to any written agreement between states (Carter, Trimble, and Weiner 2007). However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets forth a comprehensive set of rules on treaty construction, interpretation, and termination of treaties (ibid). The Convention defines a treaty as any legally binding written agreement between states (Sinclair 1984). States also sign other agreements such as memoranda of understanding, but unless it is a legally binding agreement, I do not include it in my analysis.

By establishing the fact that treaties are legally binding agreements, the next issue that arises is why states use treaties. If treaties are legally binding and can constrain states, then treaties could impinge upon a state's sovereignty. Moreover, in cases where treaties contain dispute settlement mechanisms, states are giving up the right to be the final arbiter over relations with other states. Answering this question is much more complicated, and goes back to the debate between realists and liberal institutionalists over absolute versus relative gains mentioned earlier in this study.

Ultimately, legally binding treaties establish a set of rules for cooperation between states. They are a necessary component of international relations by which both strong and weak states must abide. For weak states, treaties provide protection from stronger states, while still providing the opportunity to cooperate with stronger states. For example, in 1948 the Soviet Union insisted on developing a friendship treaty with Finland. Moscow was interested in being able to both station Soviet troops in Finland and to make Finland a satellite state much like Hungary and Romania. However, although the Finns realized that they had to engage the Soviets, they also realized that they could use the treaty to codify the way in which the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union would develop. Thus, the Finns insisted on using specific language in the treaty with the Soviet Union to ensure that they would not become satellite states to the Soviet Union (Korhonen 2010). The Soviet Union, however, realized that it could not just station troops in Finland without an agreement, and it strove to develop an agreement that would allow Soviet troops to be stationed in Finland. Thus, stronger states see treaties as a necessary component of international relations that must be used to ensure cooperation with other states. Stronger states also recognize that adherence to treaties establishes a pattern of behavior on which other states rely. Therefore, even if an individual treaty is no longer advantageous to a powerful state, it will most likely still adhere to that treaty. The reason for this is that the reputational cost to a state of not complying with a treaty is greater than the cost of complying with a disadvantageous treaty. The 1948 Friendship Treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland was codified

where the two states compromised on the specific wording of the treaty, where the Soviets offered military assistance to the Finns should there be a threat to Finland from the West. Specifically, the Finns insisted upon wording that ensured that the Soviet Union would help the Finns only should the Finns not be able to defend themselves. Thus, although the Soviets argued that Soviet troops needed to be stationed in Finland to protect the Finns, the Finns argued that they could protect themselves, but would call upon Soviet help should it be needed. This way, Finland, as the weaker state, was able to insist on specific language which protected the Finns from Soviet aggression. The Soviet Union, as the hegemon, realized that a friendship treaty with Finland was necessary to ensure cooperation in the future. Thus, the Soviet Union was willing to agree to certain specific language in the treaty while keeping in mind that the existence of the treaty was of paramount importance.

Since cooperation is necessary among states and as treaties are the main tools that states use to cooperate, it is necessary to understand the specific design of treaties and what they accomplish. It is necessary to establish a theoretical approach to the study of treaties, as well as to understand the logic of their design, and the approach that both strong states and weaker states use toward treaty construction. I now turn to a theoretical approach to treaties and groups of treaties.

Treaties as Institutions

Traditional scholars of international relations have argued that each individual treaty is its own institution (Koremenos 2005; Koremenos 2002; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Koremenos 2009). Thus, each individual treaty is considered on its own, without taking into account prior treaties or groups of treaties. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001) focus on the rational design of treaties by arguing that each treaty is a rational institution constructed by rational agents. They argue that international actors design treaties to maximize their own preferences, and that treaties are therefore a reflection of their interests. Specifically, they examine the institutional design of treaties and identify specific characteristics such as membership, scope and flexibility. The authors argue that actors are goal-oriented, and as such will choose specific treaty characteristics that will maximize their ability to achieve their goals.

Since states are rational actors who are goal-oriented, they will construct treaties with the idea that treaties should be finite. Treaties should allow states provisions to either let the treaty expire through a finite time limit or allow states the ability to withdraw from the treaty itself (Koremenos 2005). By using rational choice theory to explain a state's willingness to construct a treaty with other states, Koremenos (2005) argues that states would not be willing to sign a treaty unless there were specific provisions that allowed them flexibility in case of changing circumstances. States are then less constrained by individual treaties

and are thus willing to sign and abide by the treaty (institution) that they have constructed.

Although the work of scholars focusing on individual treaties as institutions is important to understanding the institutional design of international agreements, the problem with such studies is that they do not take into account the fact that treaties are not created in a vacuum. Treaties build upon previous treaties; each treaty is constrained by previous treaties. A state is thus constrained by all of the treaties that it has signed, especially those signed within a given bilateral or multilateral relationship. Therefore it is logical to examine individual treaties as institutions, but also to understand that groups of treaties constitute an institution. A bilateral relationship between states is an institution in the same way that a bilateral treaty between states is an institution. I now examine the ways in which treaties can be grouped to form an institutional relationship between states.

Groups of Treaties as Institutions

The fact that institutions are not created in a vacuum has been noted by many scholars in different disciplines. The term used by most of these scholars is nested institutions (Aggarwal 1998). Scholars identified institutions that either constrained or built upon previous observations. They argued that these institutions were nested within prior institutions. Despite the fact that scholars determined that institutions, or in this case treaties, are more complex than individual treaties, the importance of treaty nestedness was not immediately apparent.

The concept of nestedness has been used in many different disciplines such as computer science, and statistical modeling (Aggarwal 2006). In political science, there are three commonly used approaches to the concept of nestedness, those of nested systems (specifically nested games) (Heckathorn 1991; Schedler 2002; Shubik 1984; Tsebelis 1990) nested regimes or institutions (Aggarwal 2006; Aggarwal 1998; Alter and Meunier 2006; Alter and Meunier 2009), and nested treaties (Willerton, Slobodchikoff, and Goertz 2012; Willerton, Goertz, and Slobodchikoff 2011). In this section, I review the literature on nestedness, examining nested institutions and treaty nestedness, and examine some of the measures of nesting. I specifically examine complementary and competitive nesting, and then make recommendations on how to use treaty nestedness to determine how to group treaties into institutions.

Nested Regimes/Institutions

One of the difficulties in studying the literature on nestedness in international relations is the fact that there are many different terms that are used to discuss similar concepts. For example, most of the early literature on nestedness refers to nested regimes as opposed to nested institutions. However, the two terms are

interchangeable. Thus, although I refer to nested regimes in this section to maintain consistency with prior studies of nestedness, it should be understood that nested regimes and nested institutions are the same concepts.

The concept of nested regimes is a hierarchical structure. Instead of examining each regime as a separate entity, scholars examine regimes in relation to prior regimes. In general, there is an overarching regime which is usually a multilateral regime that has general rules. This overarching regime, called a meta regime by Aggarwal (1998), sets the standards for nested regimes which are formed under the umbrella of the meta regime. In other words, nested regimes must follow the rules which were established by the meta regime (see Figure 2.1). It should be noted that Figure 2.1 shows a simplistic form of nested regimes. In theory, there could be a meta regime and then nested regimes that are nested within the nested regimes, and then more nested regimes nested within other nested regimes (see Figure 2.2). In fact, this nested regime structure can continue through many iterations of nested regimes until there is no need for more nested regimes under the meta regime. However, it should be noted that the meta regime constrains all nested regimes.

One important aspect of nested regimes is that regimes can be nested in more than one regime (Figure 2.2). In Figure 2.2, Nested Regime 2 is nested within both Nested Regime A and Nested Regime B. In practice, it is possible for a regime to be nested within many different regimes at the same time. This is called multiple nesting. It should be noted that nested regimes that are nested in multiple regimes are constrained by all of the regimes in which they are nested. Thus, they must share the same norms as the regimes in which they are nested.

The importance of multiple nesting is that it illustrates the importance of multiple treaties for a bilateral relationship. Often several treaties serve as lodestone treaties in a bilateral relationship, and multiple nesting can help identify which treaties serve as the lodestone treaties. In addition to multiple nesting, Figure 2.2 shows familial nesting. For example, Nested Regime 1 is nested in Nested Regime A, which in turn is nested in the Meta Regime. By being nested in Regime A, Nested Regime 1 is not only showing the importance of Regime A, but since Regime A is nested in the Meta Regime, Nested Regime 1 illustrates the importance of the Meta Regime. One important caveat is that familial nesting only works in cases of formal nesting, which will be discussed further later in this chapter.

One of the most interesting aspects of Aggarwal's (1998) explanation of nested regimes is the inherent tension between the meta regime and the nested regimes. He argues that the nested regime will always be constrained by the meta regime, but that nested regimes will always try to compete with the meta regime due to changing circumstances over time. Although the nested regimes share the norms of the meta regime, the nested regimes continuously compete with the meta regime and begin to undermine the meta regime in subtle ways. Thus, each successive nested regime will erode the meta regime until the point that a new meta regime must be established to replace the prior meta regime. This was the case with the World Trade Organization (WTO) replacing GATT

as the meta regime as well as the European Union (EU) replacing the European Community (EC), which had previously replaced the European Coal and Steel Community.



Figure 2.1. Complex Nesting



Figure 2.2. More Complex Nesting

A good example of a meta regime is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT is a meta regime in that it establishes certain conditions for trade interactions among states. Thus it constrains what lesser regimes such as textile regimes can accomplish. When establishing textile regimes under GATT, states had to try not to undermine the norms of GATT, had to bring in as many of GATT's norms as possible into textile regimes, thereby constraining the textile regimes (Aggarwal 1998). It is important to note in this example that GATT is the meta regime and the textile regimes are the nested regimes. Moreover, in this case, the meta regime should be multilateral in nature, while the nested regimes can either be bilateral or multilateral. This is called standard nesting. However, nested regimes can also occur in the opposite direction. In other words, a bilateral regime can become a meta regime, and then multilateral regimes can be nested within the meta regime. This is called precedent nesting (Willerton et al. 2006).

One example of precedent nesting is the European Union. European states are nested within the European Union, which in turn is nested within the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Alter and Meunier 2006). Thus, according to Aggarwal's (1998) structure, the WTO is the meta regime, and the European Union is the nested regime. Further, the European Union becomes a meta regime for each of the EU member states. However, this type of analysis is problematic because if one closely examines this structure hierarchically, then the EU member states should be nested within the WTO, and that is not necessarily the case. Thus, Alter and Meunier (2006) argue that Aggarwal's (1998) hierarchical structure approach to nesting should be reconceptualized. They argue that nestedness is actually a set-subset relationship, where the meta regime is the set, and nested regimes are the subsets. Thus, nested regimes can often be shown using Venn diagrams.

Conceptualizing nestedness in a set theoretic model is an interesting approach, however it is also problematic. For example, the set approach works perfectly if the nested regime is entirely a subset of the meta regime. In other words, the nested regime would not only have the same norms as the meta regime, but it would be refine an aspect of the meta regime while addressing only aspects addressed by the meta regime. Thus, the nested regime is completely constrained by the meta regime, which one would expect according to Aggarwal (1998).

However, Alter and Meunier (2006) argue that nested regimes or institutions can be overlapping. In other words, the nested regime is not a complete subset of a single meta treaty (see Figure 2.3). In fact, it is possible that a nested treaty can be nested within several different meta treaties while also not being a complete subset of any of the meta treaties. This makes it very difficult to determine and measure regime nestedness.

Alter and Meunier's (2006) issue with overlapping regimes raises a fundamental issue with measuring nestedness. If a nested regime overlapping into different meta regimes, then how is it classified? Is it nested within one meta regime over another? Or is the nested regime nested in all of the meta regimes?

Theoretically, according to Aggarwal (1998), a nested regime should have the same norms as its meta regime. If two meta regimes have differing norms and share a nested regime, then the regime structure becomes even more difficult to classify.

One possible solution to this dilemma raised by Alter and Meunier (2006) is to examine nestedness at the interstate level of analysis as opposed to the systemic level (Willerton, Slobodchikoff, and Goertz 2012; Willerton, Goertz, and Slobodchikoff 2011). Therefore, one could examine the content of both bilateral and multilateral treaties to determine nestedness. For example, Willerton, Slobodchikoff and Goertz (2012) examine the content of both multilateral and bilateral treaties among states belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). They find that many of the states have large amounts of nested treaties, and find examples of both multilateral and bilateral treaty nesting. Willerton, Slobodchikoff and Goertz (2012) distinguish between nesting treaties (meta regimes) and nested treaties (nested regimes).

Although both Aggarwal (1998) and Alter and Meunier (2006) argue that nested regimes should inherently compete with meta regimes and carefully erode the meta regime, I argue that the vast majority of nested treaties are complementary to the nesting (meta) treaty (Slobodchikoff 2009). In fact, the nested treaties expand upon the nesting treaties, and do not undermine the nesting treaties. This finding raises the question of whether there is something fundamentally different between nested treaties and nested regimes. Certainly, the expectation would be that there would be competition between nested treaties and nesting treaties, but this expectation is not realized.



Figure 2.3. Overlapping Regimes

I propose that nestedness should be examined when determining how to group treaties into institutions. However, the question remains how to identify nestedness. The questions that are raised by Alter and Meunier (2006) are certainly important ones, but not impossible to overcome. Specifically, treaties identify themselves as being part of a larger institution. They do this by specifically mentioning a prior treaty within the text of another treaty. I call this type of nesting formal nesting. It is important to note here that treaties should be grouped into larger institutions based upon the fact that they self-identify as part of that institutional grouping through formal nesting.

A logical question that arises when examining nested treaties is how often formal nestedness is used in treaty construction. If it is not used often, then it might not be an effective way of grouping treaties, whereas if formal nestedness is used often, it might provide an effective method of grouping treaties. To determine whether or not treaty nestedness is common, I have chosen to examine three bilateral relationships in the former Soviet space. The reason the former Soviet space was chosen is that after 1991, all of the former Soviet republics had to completely rebuild their relationships within a short time period. Scholars can examine the former Soviet space to study the logic of rebuilding relationships, and study the types of relationships these states have built. In addition, it is important to choose cases that exemplify three different types of diversity, namely geographical diversity (representing Europe, Central Asia and Asia), diversity in size (large and small) and diversity in the quality of the historical relationship with Russia (cooperative or hostile). Thus, to determine the prevalence of nesting, I have chosen to examine Russia's bilateral relationships with Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Since Russia is the regional hegemon and there is power asymmetry between each of these states and Russia, it is logical to examine each of these states' relationships with Russia. Since this is only an example to determine whether or not formal nestedness is used by states, I only examine security treaties between these states from 1991 to 2005.

As we can see by the results in Table 2.1, formal nestedness is widely used in all three bilateral relationships examined. In fact, the majority of bilateral treaties in these relationships use formal nesting. In this book, I will examine precisely why states would choose to use formal nestedness. For now it is important to note that formal nestedness is widely used and that it is a good way of creating institutional groupings of treaties.

Table 2.1. Security Treaties and Nesting for Select Bilateral Relationships (1991-2005)

Bilateral Relationship	A Bilateral Treaties (N)	B Nested Treaties (N)	A/B % Nested Treaties
Russia-Kazakhstan	95	75	79%
Russia-Ukraine	75	64	85%
Russia-Uzbekistan	34	28	84%

Ultimately, whether institutions are formed by one treaty or groups of treaties, the logic of the institutional design outlined by Koremenos (2005) remains the same. These institutions are designed by rational actors who are looking to maximize their own goals through the use of institutions. Thus, the design of these institutions becomes of paramount importance for these actors to maximize their goals.

Since individual and groups of treaties are examined as institutions, it is natural to ask how these institutions are designed. Specifically, how are individual and groups of treaties designed to create a bilateral relationship and ensure cooperation. Since negotiators are involved in crafting and negotiating specific treaties, it is important to note that certain treaties or groups of treaties might be more important to the bilateral relationship than other treaties. In this way, treaties are like building blocks to a bilateral relationship. Each individual treaty is important, yet some treaties are more important to the relationship. Some of these treaties may be lodestone treaties, which are fundamental to the relationship, whereas other treaties might only serve a specific interest of both states at any given moment during their relationship. It is important to understand the interplay between these treaties and how they interact to form a complex bilateral relationship. I now turn to a discussion of how treaties become the architecture of bilateral relations between states.

From Treaty to Treaty Architecture

Certain treaties are fundamental in building a relationship between two states. For example, following the Cold War, the Soviet Union signed Friendship and Cooperation treaties with many states in Eastern Europe as well as with Finland. In the case of Eastern Europe, the Friendship and Cooperation treaties allowed the Soviet Union to station troops in those states as well as manipulate the domestic politics of those states. The Friendship and Cooperation treaty (FCMA) between Finland and the Soviet Union was very different. The FCMA treaty became the lodestone treaty for relations between the two states. In contrast, the two states also signed the Agreement on the Division of Areas of Jurisdiction of the Soviet Union and Finland in Respect to Fisheries in the Gulf and Northeastern Part of the Baltic Sea in 1980. Although the latter treaty was important to the relations between both states, it is not of paramount importance to the bilateral relationship the way the FCMA treaty is. In short, not all treaties are equal in importance. Certain treaties are fundamental to a relationship, while others address specific concerns and stand alone. Yet traditional approaches to the study of treaties in relationships would assume that each treaty is of equal importance. This approach allows scholars to count specific treaties and make broad generalizations about the relationships based on those counts. For example, between 1991 and 2005, there were 198 bilateral treaties signed between Belarus and Russia, while there were 217 bilateral treaties signed between Ukraine and Russia. While Belarus and Russia created an economic union, Ukraine and Russia

were very concerned with splitting up the Black Sea Fleet. By just examining the number of treaties signed, scholars would interpret that Russia had a better relationship with Ukraine than it did with Belarus. However, this is not necessarily the case. Thus, a count approach can be misleading.

Nesting again becomes important in this case. The lodestone treaties are identified through the use of nesting. They are the treaties that are specifically referenced in later treaties. It is important to note that the lodestone treaties should be consistently referenced by later treaties. Moreover, familial nesting can occur, which further shows the importance of the lodestone treaties. In the case of familial nesting, later treaties are nested within lodestone treaties or the family of the lodestone treaties. Familial nesting further increases the importance of the lodestone treaties to the bilateral relationship.

As I am interested in the relationship of treaties it is logical to examine treaties as being part of a social network. In this analysis I do not assume that each treaty is an individual actor, but rather I am interested in the relationship between treaties within bilateral relationships. A social network analysis allows me to identify the various networks of treaties that make up each bilateral relationship. I posit that these treaty networks combine to create a supranetwork, which forms the bilateral relationship. Since the networks are constantly changing due to the fact that new treaties are being constructed, the supranetwork should not be considered static, but is rather constantly evolving. Finally, a social network analysis allows me to determine which treaties serve as the foundation treaties of each treaty network. Ultimately I understand treaty networks to be the relationship between treaties, and we use treaty nesting to determine the relationship between treaties, which helps identify bilateral treaty networks as well as understand the supranetwork.

A basic understanding of the social network approach to treaties is that certain treaties are more central to a network than others. These treaties are what I have called lodestone treaties (see Figure 2.4). For example, in Figure 2.4, there is a central lodestone treaty (called basic treaty in this example) that serves as the foundation for the network. It is possible to calculate the degree centrality of each treaty to determine the lodestone treaties, which is shown in Figure 2.4. Ultimately this is a simple network, and is made much more complicated by the fact that each bilateral relationship is made up of numerous treaty networks (see Figure 2.5).

In Figure 2.5, there are two networks that make up the supranetwork. There are two lodestone treaties in this example, which serve as the lodestone treaties not only of their respective treaty network, but also they serve as lodestone treaties of the supranetwork. Thus, in this example, the supranetwork is made up of two separate treaty networks.

Of course, the treaty supranetworks are more complicated than either Figure 2.4 or Figure 2.5 have shown. For example, Figure 2.6 shows the bilateral relationship between Russia and Tajikistan. I have again calculated the degree centrality for all of the treaties, and have set the size of the treaty nodes based on their degree centrality. Although in this example the treaties are numbered and I

have not provided any information about the titles and substance of the treaties, a few interesting conclusions can nevertheless be reached. First of all, the bilateral relationship between Russia and Tajikistan is composed of four networks of varying density.[1] For example, the network containing the lodestone treaty, Treaty #22 (a friendship and cooperation treaty), is much denser than the network of treaties 30 (a currency treaty) and 41 (a currency treaty) (found on the left-hand side of Figure 2.6). Further, there are individual treaties that are part of the supranetwork but are not part of any network. These are isolate treaties that are not nested within any other treaty. The isolates can be found along the left side of Figure 2.6. Ultimately, a social network analysis allows researchers examining treaties and cooperation to identify the lodestone treaties in a bilateral relationship, and understand the nature of cooperation in a bilateral relationship. In a future chapter, I will examine a couple of individual bilateral relationships as case studies using social network analysis to determine how treaties are used as instruments of building cooperative bilateral relationships and how treaty networks can be used to solve the problems of power asymmetry and mistrust.



Figure 2.4. Simple Treaty Network

It is important to realize that states can have multilateral as well as bilateral approaches to foreign policy. Scholars have often argued as to which approach is used more often by hegemonic powers. I now turn to a discussion of multilateral versus bilateral approaches to hegemonic foreign policy, and argue that it is

not appropriate to examine the approaches separately, but rather examine a hegemonic state's ability to use both multilateral and bilateral approaches in tandem when crafting its foreign policy.

Figure 2.5. Simple Treaty Networks



Figure 2.6. Russia-Tajikistan Bilateral Treaty Networks

Multilateral versus Bilateral Approaches to Hegemonic Foreign Policy

One of the great debates among neoinstitutionalists in international relations is between multilateralists (Ruggie 1993; Ruggie 1994; Weber 1991; Keohane 1989) and bilateralists (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Okawara and Katzenstein 2001). Multilateralists argue that although there is one hegemon in the world system, it is to the benefit and stability of the world that other states are treated as equals (Ruggie 1993). Multilateralists state that organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are proof that the United States uses multilateralism to achieve its goals of world stability according to its world order (Ruggie 1993). Bilateralists argue that although NATO is an example of multilateralism, the relationship between the United States and NATO is the exception rather than the rule (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). They state that the US mainly uses bilateralism as its approach to international relations. According to bilateralists, the United States uses multilateralism only in the circumstances where the norms and shared culture are similar, and uses bilateralism with regional powers to achieve its goals when a shared sense of culture and norms are not present (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002).

John Ruggie has been one of the most influential scholars to highlight multilateralism as a novel idea of diplomacy in the latter part of the twentieth century. Ruggie (1993, 1994) studies Europe, and more specifically focuses on NATO. He asserts that multilateralism is the US's method for ensuring its global hegemonic status for two reasons. First, by treating many countries as equal and working together to achieve goals, great powers such as the European Union member states remain satisfied with the current world order. Second, Ruggie states that multilateralism mirrors the domestic structure of the US in that the federal government must work with the states to maintain effective governance, and that the states are treated as more-or-less equal partners in governance.

It should be noted that Ruggie's (1993, 1994) approach to US foreign policy presumes that the US must choose either a multilateralist or bilateralist approach to all of its diplomatic interactions with states. Although Ruggie (1993, 1994) makes a compelling argument as to why the US would prefer to use multilateral principles, a problem arises in that they are not able to explain why in some cases such as NATO the US uses multilateralist principles, whereas in other cases such as its approach to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), it uses more of a bilateral approach. According to his hegemonic theory, the US should simply use multilateralist principles in all of its foreign policy, especially with other multilateral organizations it is a member of such as SEATO instead of using multilateralist principles in some of its foreign policy, and bilateralist principles with others.

A second perspective of multilateralist principles argues that a unipolar world system is inherently unstable and that the most stable world system is multipolar (Weber 1991). Weber (1991) asserts that by using multilateralist

principles in Europe, the United States is actually trying to establish an independent center of power that is not reliant upon the power of the US. By creating an independent center of power, the United States is creating a multipolar system, which in turn leads to increased stability. However, Weber's (1991) theory about the creation of a multipolar system doesn't explain why multilateralism is not more evident in other regions besides Europe or the North Atlantic. Multilateralist principles should be evident in other regions of the world like Asia, where the US mostly focuses on bilateral principles of diplomacy.

Bilateralists argue that the multilateral approach to NATO is the exception rather than the rule. Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) assert that multilateralism is very difficult to accomplish in that it requires a shared sense of collective identity among all of the parties. They argue that this was possible in Europe—because of shared history and a sense of equality—but not possible in Asia. Moreover, they argue that the NATO collective security article which states that an attack on any NATO member is the same as an attack on all member states, and this led to the use of multilateralist principles, whereas SEATO's collective security agreement states that an attack on any member of SEATO is a threat to peace and safety. By examining SEATO, they argue that the US mostly tried to organize SEATO through bilateral agreements with Japan instead of using multilateralist principles with all of the member states. Instead of having an independent power base consisting of all SEATO members, the US instead wanted to establish Japan as the power base within SEATO, with the rest of the members relying on Japan's leadership and power.

It should be noted that the argument between bilateralists and multilateralists pertains to a systemic level hegemon. Specifically, many of their arguments are specifically focused on the United States as the global hegemon. However, Lemke (2002) argues that systemic hegemonic arguments pertain to regional hegemons as well as to systemic hegemons. Thus, it is appropriate to examine the debate between bilateralists and multilateralists in regional contexts where there is a regional hegemon that guides the international relations between regional states. For example, Russia is a regional hegemon that strongly influences interstate relations in the post-Soviet region. It is thus appropriate to examine bilateralist and multilateralist approaches to international relations in the post-Soviet region.

A New Approach: Combining the Two Approaches in Foreign Policy

One of the biggest problems with both multilateralist theory and bilateralist theory is that it is an arbitrary approach to the study of diplomacy and does not allow for flexibility in explaining the approaches that states use in their diplomacy. Both of the theories argue that the hegemon either uses multilateralist principles or bilateralist principles, but never a combination of both. This belief stems

from the fact that most scholars see treaties as individual entities without examining a set of treaties as an institution. Thus, to most scholars it is logical to count the number of bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties and compare them. If the number of bilateral treaties is greater than the number of multilateral treaties, than a hegemon is using bilateralist diplomacy and vice versa. This assumes that there is no connection between treaties, and that each individual treaty can be analyzed as completely distinct from any other treaty.

Recently some scholars have begun to examine groups of treaties as institutions. For example, Verdier (2008) argues that bilateralism and multilateralism are not opposites. Instead, bilateral treaties are an important component of multilateral institutions. He also states that hegemons are able to utilize both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in tandem to achieve their goals. Even though this approach seems like common sense, Verdier (2008) is one of the first scholars to combine multilateralist and bilateralist approaches. This approach recognizes the flexibility that states have in their diplomacy and complements the idea that states are rational actors and will pick an approach to diplomacy that most effectively accomplishes their goals.

Verdier's (2008) argument is very applicable to the post-Soviet region, where Russia has utilized a combination of both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to achieve its goals (Slobodchikoff 2009; Willerton, Slobodchikoff, and Goertz 2012; Willerton, Goertz, and Slobodchikoff 2011). His argument is even made stronger when one takes into account treaty nestedness in the analysis in the post-Soviet region. Russia has used a combination of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy by nesting bilateral treaties within multilateral treaties (Slobodchikoff 2009).

Ultimately it is important to examine bilateral, multilateral, and the combination of both approaches to diplomacy to understand relations between states. It is especially important to do this in light of power asymmetry where a regional hegemon tries to guide international relations, and weaker states try to use treaties to constrain the power of the regional hegemon. Even though this book examines bilateral relations between the states of the Former Soviet Union and Russia, it is nonetheless important to realize that many of the bilateral relationships also have lodestone treaties that are multilateral, and need to be considered in the analysis.

One way to examine the interaction between bilateral and multilateral treaties and their relative importance in a bilateral relationship is to again use social network analysis. For an example of this, I again turn to the bilateral relationship between Russia and Tajikistan between 1991 and 2005 (see Figure 2.7). In this example, the supranetwork is again the bilateral relationship, and it is again made up of several smaller networks. The main difference in this example, though, is that multilateral treaties are included in the supranetwork. In Figure 2.7, the multilateral treaties are identified by text, whereas the bilateral treaties are numbered. Although I will analyze the supranetwork in more detail in another chapter, there are some important differences from the supranetwork in Figure 2.6. As with the previous supranetwork, I have assigned the size of the nodes

according to the degree centrality of each treaty. The lodestone treaties are the largest nodes. Although most of the lodestone treaties in the bilateral supranetwork are bilateral treaties such as Treaty #22, other multilateral treaties such as the CIS Collective Security Treaty, the Helsinki Act, and the Economic Union, are also lodestone treaties in the bilateral supranetwork. The relationship between the bilateral and multilateral treaties creates a denser network, which also serves to lessen the number of isolate treaties that are not part of any network. It is important to understand that while examining individual treaties can help understand how states are able to solve the dilemma of power asymmetry and mistrust, it is also important to understand what state-level factors lead to cooperation between states. I now turn to a discussion of what factors might contribute to more or less cooperation.

Up until this point, this chapter has focused on treaties as being the building blocks of bilateral relations between states. I have examined treaties and groups of treaties as institutions. It should be noted that the bilateral relationship between two states is also an institution, and should be examined as such. Thus, although examining treaties is important, state-level factors influence how states use treaties as the building blocks of relationships. I now build off the prior discussion about the states being rational actors and examine how states approach relationship-building through the use of treaties and what factors need to be present to build a stable bilateral relationship, especially in a situation of power asymmetry.



Figure 2.7. Russia-Tajikistan Bilateral and Multilateral Treaty Networks

From Treaty Architecture to the Institutional Design of the Bilateral Relationship

Although it sounds obvious, there must be two states willing to cooperate in a bilateral relationship. Unless both parties are willing to cooperate, there will not be a bilateral relationship. More importantly, the level of dedication of both parties towards a bilateral relationship dictates the number of treaties signed as well as the number of issue areas addressed by the treaties. It is important to note that in situations of power asymmetry, each party has different interests that it pursues through interaction. Thus, the motivation for the hegemonic power is very different than the motivation for the weaker power. For example, following World War II, the Soviet Union wanted to cooperate with Finland to ensure its security and make sure that its borders were secure. Whereas, Finland realized that it had to interact and build a relationship with the Soviet Union in order to maintain its sovereignty. Although I examine the details of the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union in another chapter, it's nevertheless important to understand two important facets of the relationship between the two states. First of all, the Soviet Union had strategic interests in developing a relationship. The Soviet Union, as the hegemonic state, could use force if necessary to achieve its goals, but realized that it would be too costly. Rather, it was much easier to achieve those goals through cooperation. Finland, on the other hand, realized that it had to cooperate with the Soviet Union, yet also realized that it could benefit from cooperation. Thus, it cautiously cooperated with the Soviet Union, yet nonetheless cooperated.

Ultimately, when there is power asymmetry, the hegemonic state must have strategic interests in cooperating with a weaker state. The relationship cannot work unless there is strategic interest from the hegemonic power. There are many causes for strategic interests in cooperation, and I now turn to examining several of those interests.

Geographical Proximity

One of the most important causes of conflict is territorial disputes. Specifically, states that are contiguous to one another are more likely to have conflict than states that are not contiguous (Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Vasquez 1995; Vasquez 2000). More important for this paper, however, are the ideas proposed by Most and Starr (1984), who argue that states are concerned with opportunity and willingness in international relations. Specifically they argue that states are able to interact with other states providing that they have the opportunity and the willingness to interact. In this case, it means that they are able to enter into a relationship (opportunity) and that there is some strategic incentive to being involved in a relationship (willingness).

Opportunity has often been examined by scholars as a state's ability to enter into conflict with another state (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). Specifically, scholars have argued that states do not have infinite reach and thus cannot have the opportunity to have relations (usually conflictual) with other states. Instead, they have argued that a state's ability to reach another state decreases over geographical distance (Boulding 1962; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Lemke 2002). In other words, they have argued that the ability of a state to interact with another depends on the distance from one state's capital to another state's capital, taking into account how quickly military forces can travel, to determine whether or not those states have the ability to interact.

Presuming that distance from capital to capital can account for the opportunity of states to interact, then it is much harder to determine willingness. One way of determining willingness is to assume that willingness is another way of saying strategic interest. Thus, the willingness of one state to interact with another depends on level of strategic interest that state has in cooperating with the other state. A state's level of strategic interest in cooperating with another state can come in many forms. One state may have a strategic interest in cooperating with another state to ensure its own security, whereas another state may have an economic strategic interest in building trade relations with another state.

It is important to note the importance of trade as a strategic goal, and future trade as being an important aspect of willingness to enter into a bilateral relationship with another state. Many liberals have discussed the fact that trade benefits both states through absolute gains (Robert O. Keohane and Martin 1995; Snidal 1991). Scholars have noted that one of the areas in which states cooperate is in natural resource management (Dinar 2009; Tir and Ackerman 2009). For example, Dinar (2009) argues that although most scholars would expect very little cooperation between states in situations of power asymmetry related to natural resources management, most states cooperate to effectively manage those resources, and that both states benefit from this cooperation. Further, Tir and Ackerman (2009) note that treaties are vital in promoting cooperation over these issues, as they set up a formal nature to the cooperation between states.

While Russia has access to many natural resources, it can not only benefit economically by trading with contiguous states, it also needs to cooperate with those states to deliver natural resources such as oil and gas to states that rely on those resources (Jackson 2003). Thus, Russia needs to establish a bilateral relationship with states in which there are pipelines for natural gas and oil to ensure that other states (especially in Western Europe) can receive those natural resources in trade.

Another possible way to account for the willingness of a state to interact with other states is through ethnicity. For example, Buhaug and Gates (2008) have shown that civil war is more likely to spread to contiguous states if the contiguous states have a similar ethnic population. Even more central to this book is the fact that one of Russia's major foreign policy concerns was the treatment of ethnic Russians in former Soviet states (Jackson 2003). Jackson (2003) argued that Russia was very interested in how ethnic Russians were

treated in the former Soviet states, and that this concern motivated a lot of Russian foreign policy. In fact, one of the big problematic issues between the Baltic States and Russia prior to the Baltic States joining the European Union had to do with the treatment of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States (Slobodchikoff 2010).

Ultimately, there must be both opportunity and willingness present for both the hegemonic state and the weaker state to develop a bilateral relationship. While the hegemonic power certainly must set the agenda for cooperation, the weaker powers negotiate so that there is a mutual advantage for both parties. This is how a bilateral relationship begins. However, the question arises then as to what an effective bilateral relationship is, and what is the most appropriate way to determine the effectiveness of a bilateral relationship.

Effective versus Ineffective Bilateral Relationships

From a utilitarian perspective, an effective bilateral relationship is one in which there is cooperation. For example, Finland saw the relationship with the Soviet Union as effective, because it was able to maintain its own sovereignty in the relationship. Thus, the question becomes the degree of effectiveness of a bilateral relationship. Again, the case of the bilateral relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union is very illustrative. Initially the agreements between the two states was in a focused issue area (security). Although this was still an effective relationship, the relationship became much more effective over time as more issue areas were addressed in the bilateral relationship. Eventually, the relationship had quite a large amount of issue area diversity.

The Finnish case shows that a relationship can move from being effective to being more effective, and the question is how to define the degree of effectiveness of a bilateral relationship. I propose that the treaty network provides the best way of determining the effectiveness of the relationship. If a bilateral relationship has a very strong and dense treaty network, then the states are able to cooperate effectively. By utilizing treaty nesting and creating a strong treaty network, states are able to ensure that agreements will not be violated and that commitments will be adhered to. While this is not the same as trust between states, a strong treaty network ensures that states will be able to predict future behaviors by the other state, and thus be able to build a cooperative relationship. In the next chapter I will examine the bilateral relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union as being illustrative of the theory built in this chapter.

Notes

1. The more interconnected the networks making up the bilateral relationship, the denser the supranetwork.

Chapter 3

Soviet-Finnish Relations

Ambassador (Soviet Ambassador to Finland) Stepanov is a good man. He is just sometimes forgetful. He forgets that Finland is an independent and sovereign state.[1]
General Vladimirov, KGB Rezident in Helsinki

Soviet power may ebb and flow, but it is still plenty powerful for Finland.[2]
Juho Paasikivi, Former President of Finland

The Note Crisis: The End of Finland's Sovereignty?

On October 30, 1961, Finland was on the brink of an international crisis. The Soviet Union had just presented Finland with a note declaring that military consultations were needed. The Soviet Union had become concerned with West Germany's joining NATO in the 1950s as well as the possibility of NATO placing nuclear weapons in Denmark and Norway. Although the weapons were not placed in either country due to domestic pressure, agreements between Denmark and West Germany ceding the use of certain naval bases in the Baltic Sea in addition to having joint military cooperation. In addition, in 1961, the Joint Baltic Command was established, which further linked the Norwegian and German military. The Soviet Union was concerned with what it saw as a growing ability of the Federal Republic of Germany to influence NATO, and was concerned that this ability to influence NATO would lead to increased aggression toward the Soviet Union in the Nordic countries. They saw the actions of the Federal Republic of Germany as a threat to the stability of the Nordic countries and determined that these actions had to be countered. Thus, they decided that they had to work with Finland to halt the increasing aggression of the Germans by sending an official note invoking Article 2 of the Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) treaty.

The note that the Soviet Union presented to Finland threatened Finland's long-standing foreign policy of neutrality, as the Soviet Union could force Finland into military consultations on the basis of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the Soviet Union (FCMA). By forcing Finland into military consultations, Finland would not have been able to remain neutral, as it would be forced into being a solid member of the Soviet Bloc, and thus no longer a neutral state (Roy Allison 1985; Hamalainen 1986;

Lukacs 1992; Ruddy 1998). However, by December of 1961, the Soviet Union dropped its demands for military consultations, and Finland was able to maintain its neutrality in its foreign policy, and thus maintain its sovereignty over international relations. This crisis became known as the Note Crisis.

The Note Crisis of 1961 illustrates an interesting puzzle in international relations. First of all, how was Finland, a small and relatively weak state able to maintain its neutrality given its proximity to the Soviet Union, a hegemonic power even in a crisis as big as the Note Crisis? This question is especially puzzling given the fact that much of Eastern Europe became part of the Soviet Bloc and had to give up much of its sovereignty. Moreover, Finland had been a part of the alliance with Germany against the Soviet Union and allowed Germany to attack the Soviet Union through Finland, which meant that the Soviets had reason to fear for their security along the Soviet-Finnish border as well as distrust Finland. In short, there were many reasons that the Soviet Union should have pushed Finland to become a satellite state along the lines of much of Eastern Europe, yet Finland was able to alleviate many of the Soviet fears while maintaining strict neutrality.

Although Western states initially thought that Finland would lose its sovereign foreign policy at the end of World War II, they came to understand that although Finland had to accept certain terms in their foreign policy with the Soviet Union, Finland was nevertheless able to retain a strict neutral foreign policy that did not benefit one polar alliance over the other. In fact, when the Soviet Union first approached Finland about having a conference of European states for peace in Europe, Finland was able to bring together both the Soviet Union and the United States into the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which led to the formation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Maude 1998). Despite being dismissed by the West as a minor player that was too close to the Soviet Union, Finland was able to retain its own neutral foreign policy and play a major role in Cold War Europe.

Much as with the Note Crisis, the successful implementation of the Helsinki Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe illustrates an interesting puzzle for international relations scholars. Namely, how is a weak state able to not only retain its own policy in foreign policy, but more specifically, how is a weak state able to balance the interests of more powerful states while achieving its own goals in foreign policy. Moreover, Finland was able to achieve many of its goals despite the interests of more powerful states. Thus, it is logical not to just examine what the weaker state achieves through interactions with stronger states, but also what more powerful states are able to achieve through interactions with the smaller states. There must be some payoff for the stronger states as well, or else they would not wish to interact with the weaker states. To understand these puzzles, one must first examine the case of Finland and its foreign policy. In this chapter I first discuss Finnish-Soviet Relations, examine certain key events and treaties in the relationship, and then use Finnish-Soviet Relations to illustrate the theory on the formation of relations between power asymmetric states developed in the last chapter.

Initial Relations between Finland and the Soviet Union

Although Lenin recognized Finland's independence from the Soviet Union on January 3, 1918, relations between the two neighbors was strained from the very beginning. Although technically independent, there were still 40,000 Russian troops stationed in Finland. The reason the Russian troops were stationed in Finland was because the Bolshevik government could not control the forces stationed there. However, the presence of the Russian troops only served to divide the Finns, and on January 28, 1918, civil war broke out between Red Finns (Communists) and White Finns.

As the civil war began, the Red Guards formally took control of Helsinki and established a government. However, the White Guards, under the leadership of General Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, a former General in the Tsarist Russian Army, soon disarmed the 40,000 Russian troops stationed in Finland. The White Guards were much better equipped and better organized than the Red Guards, and with the help of the Germans, the White Guard was able to defeat the Red Guard, and the civil war came to a swift conclusion on May 16, 1918, with the leaders of the Red Guard fleeing to Russia.[3]

The war of 1918 in Finland was technically a civil war, but most Finns celebrate it as a war of independence from Russia. This meant that the Finns blamed the Soviets for the civil war, and were openly hostile towards it. At this time romantic notions had arisen in Finland about the destiny of Finns to defend civilization from the godless hordes of Russia (Singleton 1989). Thus, many Finns wanted to gain control of the border regions of Karelia from the Russians since those living in Karelia spoke Finnish and were ethnic Finns. With the Bolshevik government fighting its own civil war to gain full control over the former Russian empire, Finland saw a chance to join in the fight with the Russian White Army against the Bolsheviks. However, the White Army generals who were fighting in the Russian Civil War did not want to give Russian land to Finland, and so Finland did not take an active part in the Russian Civil War. The Finnish government did, however, permit volunteers to go to Eastern Karelia to fight in the Russian Civil War.

By 1920, the Bolshevik government had essentially defeated the White Guard, and thus won the Civil War. Finland saw this as an opportunity to finally make peace with its neighbor. After four months of negotiation, the Treaty of Tartu (Dorpat) was signed, which not only officially ended the state of war, it also ceded the port of Petsamo and part of the Fisherman's Peninsula on the Arctic coast to Finland.

Although technically at peace after the Treaty of Tartu, neither side viewed the other as trustworthy. The Soviets were concerned that another German attack could come through Finland at Petrograd, and the Finns believed that the only

real enemy that they had to be wary of was the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1930s, General Mannerheim consistently requested more weapons to defend Finland from a possible Soviet attack, and often argued that the Soviets had more sophisticated weapons such as artillery and tanks (Tillotson 1996). The Finnish politicians were more concerned with a lack of money and did not heed General Mannerheim's requests. While there was a constant state of tension between the Soviet Union and Finland, Finnish politicians believed that their most pressing concerns were domestic, and thus they did not need to build up a strong defense. However, General Mannerheim did convince a lot of other Finns that their major enemy was the Soviet Union, and that Finland needed to develop a defense plan that could be quickly enacted once an attack materialized. It should be noted that Finland did pursue two major foreign policy initiatives during this time period. Specifically, they pressured other nordic states to develop a "Nordic Neutrality" with Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. Also, they signed a non-agression pact with the Soviet Union in 1932. However, this did not ease the tensions with the Soviet Union.

In 1939, the Soviet Union attacked Finland as part of what became known as the Winter War. The reason for the attack was that the Soviet Union feared attack from Germany, and wanted to expand their defenses away from Leningrad. Although Finland was not occupied by the Soviets during the Winter War, they suffered heavy casualties and signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union in 1940 to end the war in Moscow. The terms of the peace treaty greatly benefitted the Soviet Union as Finland had to cede over 12 percent of Finnish territory to the Soviets.

Following the Treaty of Moscow, an uneasy peace settled between Finland and the Soviet Union. However, the losses inflicted at the hands of the Soviets coupled with the war in Europe allowed the Finns to try to get their revenge on the Soviet Union by siding with the Germans. The Germans used Finnish territory[4] to invade the Soviet Union in 1941, and the Finns saw the war against the Soviet Union as a chance to establish a greater Finland and annex not only the territory that they had lost during the Winter War, but also annex all of the Karelian peninsula (Singleton 1989, 134).

By 1944, Finland realized that it could not continue to wage war against the Soviet Union, and signed an armistice with the Soviets which were later included in the Paris Peace Treaties signed in 1947. The terms of the armistice dictated that Finland's borders would return to those prior to 1940, that Finnish soldiers had to expel all of the German soldiers from Finnish territory, and that Finland would lease the Porkkala peninsula as well as cede the territory of Petsamo to the Soviets. In addition, Finland would have to pay $300 million in reparations to the Soviet Union over a six-year period. In all, it is estimated that Finland lost over two percent of its population in addition to vast amounts of territory and wealth (Singleton 1989, 139). In short, World War II was extremely costly for Finland, yet the post-war realities facing Finland meant that they had to forge a new relationship with their former Soviet enemies. However, Finland was not occupied by Soviet troops, and retained its territorial integrity.

Forging a Cautious Engagement

Despite having fought three wars in the span of half a century, Finland realized very quickly that it had to engage the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had legitimate security interests in preventing attacks from the West, and sought to create a buffer from those attacks. In Eastern Europe, the Soviets created satellite states that would serve to insulate them from possible attacks from the West, whereas in Finland the Soviet Union sought to protect Leningrad from possible attack through Finland. For this reason, the Porkkala peninsula was extremely important to Soviet security policy.

From a geopolitical standpoint, Finland was contiguous to a new great power. With the looming Cold War, Finland was at the epicenter and mercy of the conflict between the great powers, and thus had to develop policy in an uncertain environment. Thus, its future depended on the outcome of the conflict between the two major superpowers, but also its future depended on its ability to both hug and keep the Soviet Union at arm's distance (J. M. Hanhimäki 1997, 18).

To ensure cooperation from the new satellite states, the Soviet Union developed friendship and cooperation agreements that were signed by both the satellite states and the Soviet Union. The friendship and cooperation agreements were signed between 1943 and 1948 and essentially allowed the Soviet Union the right to help protect their new satellite states from German aggression, and ensured that the Soviet Union would be militarily involved in all of those states (Triska and Slusser 1962).

The most important aspect of the friendship and cooperation agreements was usually found in the first article, and pledged "mutual assistance to prevent Germany or any other state that joined Germany from preparing a new aggressive war" (Triska and Slusser 1962, 239).[5] It is extremely important to note the fact that the agreements stressed the word "preparing." In this case, the interpretation of what preparing a new aggressive war is left open for interpretation, which provided the Soviet Union with the justification to have Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. Moreover, these treaties essentially created military alliances with the Soviet Union, and required that the satellite states would have to mutually assist the Soviets with defending socialism and the Communist bloc (Korhonen 1973).

Although Finland also signed an agreement on friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, the agreement that Finland signed was just a little different from those signed by the Eastern European countries. The agreement was different enough that it allowed Finland to pursue a very different foreign policy than any of the Eastern European states.

The Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance

On April 6, 1948, Finland and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA). Immediately this treaty became the basis for the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union. Although Article 1 of this treaty resembles many of the other treaties of friendship and cooperation, it is different in a couple of fundamental ways. Article 1 states:

> In the eventuality of Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, becoming the object of an armed Attack by Germany or any state allied with the latter, Finland will, true to its obligations as an *independent state* [emphasis added], fight to repel the attack. Finland will in such cases use all of its available forces for defending its territorial integrity by land, sea and air, and will do so within the frontiers of Finland in accordance with obligations defined in the present treaty and, *if necessary* [emphasis added], with the assistance of, or jointly with the Soviet Union.

It is important to note that there were several major differences between the friendship and cooperation treaties between the Eastern Bloc states and the friendship treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union. First of all, the first article stressed the fact that Finland was an independent state. This statement reinforced Finland's right to sovereignty, and bestowed legitimacy upon the Finns to conduct their own foreign policy.

A second important difference in the Finnish friendship and cooperation treaty was that it put the onus of defense from an invasion from Germany or its allies upon the Finns and not the Soviet Union. This is an extremely important point. Although the article stated that the Soviet Union will assist Finland should it become necessary, the treaty did not define when it was necessary for the Soviet Union to assist in defending Finland. Thus, not only was the onus on Finland to defend itself, but the Soviet Union could not just station troops in Finland to protect against an attack. Specifically, the Soviet Union would only be able to use force to help defend Finland in the event that Finland would be overwhelmed by an attack. In other words, the Soviet Union would not be justified in stationing their troops in Finland to guard against such an attack, which was not the case with many of the states within the Soviet sphere of influence.

The fact that Article 1 in the Finnish friendship treaty was different from many of the other friendship and cooperation treaties was no accident. The Finns recognized early that the Soviet Union was negotiating from a position of strength, yet they also realized that they could negotiate a decent outcome to the treaty. Although Stalin had requested a treaty with Finland that was similar to those that had already been concluded between the Soviet Union with Hungary and Romania, the Finns realized that they had to approach the negotiations with a firm understanding that although they must accommodate the Soviets, that

they also could get very important concessions. The key in the negotiations would become which concessions the Soviets would agree to (Hanhimäki 1993).

Throughout the negotiations, the Finns remained steadfast in arguing that they must be responsible for their own security. The way in which they were able to get the Soviets to agree to this provision was that they agreed that if the Finns were not able to provide for their own security, that the Soviet Union would assist in the defense of Finland, which made the Soviet Union more secure from an attack through Finland. Thus, the stronger state achieved its security goals through Article 1, while the weaker state was able to ensure that it would be able to maintain its sovereignty as well as the ability to conduct its own foreign policy.

While Article 1 laid the foundation for the defensive nature of the FCMA, Article 2 was equally important. Article 2 stipulated that should there be a threat of an attack from Germany and her allies, that military consultations would be conducted between Finland and the Soviet Union. In proposing this, the Soviet Union tried to ensure there security as well as their influence over Finland. Although Article 1 allowed Finland to conduct its own foreign policy, Article 2 ensured that Finland would still maintain a close relationship with the Soviet Bloc.

Although conducting military consultations does not seem overly important in the post Cold War environment, should Finland and the Soviet Union have held military consultations with the Soviet Union, it would have been paramount to declaring a military alliance with the Soviet Union against the West. While many Western states decried the FCMA precisely because of this treaty on the basis that Finland would become a pawn of the Soviet Union, Finland saw this article as being a necessary part of the FCMA treaty (Hanhimäki 1993). The problem with this article according to the Finns was that Article 2 was open to interpretation. Moreover, the Finns worried that the Soviets could manufacture an incident that would force consultations, which would then effectively put Finland into the Soviet Bloc. However, the Finns saw that they had no choice in the matter, and would have to accept the article with the express understanding that they would have to literally interpret the FCMA treaty and limit the ability of the Soviets to broadly interpret the treaty. Ultimately it was this article that led to the Note Crisis of 1961, yet the Finns were able to convince the Soviets that there was not a true threat of attack, and the crisis was diffused.

Although Stalin and the Soviets were mainly concerned with the first two articles of the FCA treaty which laid out the military responsibilities for each state, the following articles were equally important in the FCMA (Korhonen 1973). In fact, Article 4 of the treaty served as the basis for Finland's policy of neutrality (Hanhimäki 1993). Article 4 specifically prohibited either party from being in any alliances that were against the other party. In other words, Finland was unable to join NATO based on this article, as NATO was specifically formed as an alliance against the Warsaw Pact. While Finland could not join

Western military alliances, it also did not want to join any military alliances that were against the West. This was mostly due to the fact that Finland was a small capitalist country that shared a democratic system of government that was very similar to those in the West. Thus, Article 4 of the FCMA led to Finland's unique policy of neutrality towards the superpowers during the Cold War (Väyrynen 1972). It was this policy that became known as Finlandization, where Finland gave up its right to choose sides in the Cold War in exchange for retaining its sovereignty.

Despite skepticism of the FCMA in the West, the treaty became the foundation for relations between a small and relatively weak capitalist state and a contiguous non-capitalist hegemonic power. Although neither party fully achieved all of the goals that each pursued during the negotiations of the FCMA, it nevertheless became a treaty that was heralded by both parties as a resounding success. In fact, every year on the anniversary of the signing of the treaty, a celebration would be held by the parties together to celebrate the achievement of such a treaty and what it meant for relations between the two states (Korhonen 2010).

The Effect of the FCMA on Finland's Foreign Policy of Neutrality

Finland took its obligations under the FCMA treaty very seriously and crafted a policy of neutrality. It understood that it must maintain a working relationship with the Soviet Union, and yet it also knew that it must maintain the status quo in regards to not joining any military alliance. Thus, it had to keep both the West and the Soviet Union at arm’s length, yet needed the cooperation of both parties to ensure peace and stability.

Finland's policy of neutrality became so successful, that it was approached by the Soviet Union to elicit ideas on how to promote peace and stability in Europe (Roy Allison 1985). The Soviets wanted to organize a conference of European states. Their goal was to gain international recognition of the status quo in Europe, and more specifically to gain recognition of East Germany (DDR) as a state. Finland used this opportunity to not only invite European states, but also invite all states who were responsible for peace and stability in Europe, including the United States and Canada (Maude 1998, 46).

Although the West was initially hesitant about the Finnish initiative of organizing a conference on European security and stability, the success of Finland's policy of neutrality finally convinced them of the necessity of attending such a conference. The Finns were able to organize the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and to get the participating states to sign the Helsinki Act in 1975. Interestingly, the Helsinki Act was seen as a significant lessening of the tensions of the Cold War by applying many of the same principles of neutrality that Finland espoused. Specifically, the Final Act established principles to guide the interactions between participating states such as a mutual

respect for sovereignty and the inviolability of frontiers as well as non-interference in foreign affairs of participating states. In other words, the Final Act was very similar to the values espoused in the Finnish policy of neutrality.

Finno-Soviet Treaties

It is natural to question how a state that came so close to losing its sovereign integrity in 1961 was able to establish the principles for peace and stability in Europe in just fourteen years. The success of Finland's policy of neutrality was not an accident, but rather took years of hard negotiation to maintain. Although the seeds for the policy of neutrality were set with the FCMA treaty in 1948, the Finns were always cognizant of the fact that they consistently had to reinforce their right to sovereignty through their policy neutrality. One of the ways in which they achieved this was through bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union.

It is important to note that Finland signed three types of bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1991. Specifically, they were security, economic and integration treaties. Security treaties dealt with issues that specifically impacted either state's security such as military forces, border issues, etc. Economic treaties dealt with trade and transportation issues, and integration treaties dealt with setting standards, cultural exchanges, diplomatic regulations, etc. During this time frame, Finland and the Soviet Union signed sixteen security treaties, eleven economic treaties, and six integration treaties. Although more treaties dealt with security than the other issue areas, nevertheless there was a broad range of issues covered in the bilateral treaties.

One of the important aspects of the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union was that it was initially focused on security. The Soviet Union wanted to ensure its own security, and this was the driving force in the initial relationship between the two states. Thus, many more security treaties were signed at the beginning stages of the relationship (see Figure 3.1). Moreover, as the relationship evolved, the two states signed more economic treaties, and the focus of cooperation became economic as opposed to security.

However, it is important to carefully examine the bilateral treaties that Finland and the Soviet Union signed. Not only did they sign bilateral treaties to achieve specific objectives, but they also signed bilateral treaties that directly referred to the FCMA treaty. This phenomenon is called nesting, where a treaty is nested within the framework of a prior treaty. In fact, half of all of the bilateral treaties between Finland and the Soviet Union are nested within the FCMA (see Table 3.1). Further, 70 percent of the bilateral treaties have a direct relationship to the FCMA.[6]

The benefit of nesting a treaty within a prior treaty is that it gives the prior treaty additional significance and underscores the importance of the prior treaty. By nesting treaties within the FCMA treaty, Finland was able to reiterate its

sovereign rights to protect itself from any attack from Germany and its allies. Moreover, each time a treaty referred back to the FCMA treaty, it legitimized Finland's policy of neutrality in the eyes of the Soviet Union, which only served to further institutionalize not only the FCMA treaty, but also institutionalize the neutrality policy further. In other words, by nesting subsequent bilateral treaties within the FCMA, Finland was able to establish a pattern of thought and behavior which subsequently made it more and more difficult to violate its sovereignty and neutrality, to the point that violating the FCMA treaty or Finland's policy of neutrality became too costly for the Soviet Union and thus inconceivable.

It should be noted that when a treaty specifically cites a previous treaty, this is called 1st generation nesting. In other words, it is directly nested within the previous treaty, making it like the child of the previous treaty. When a treaty is nested within a treaty that is nested within the prior treaty, this is called 2nd generation nesting. This relationship is much like a genealogical relationship, where treaties are related to one another through the use of nesting. By specifically referencing a previous treaty, negotiators institutionalize and legitimize the previous treaty. However, the original treaty is further institutionalized and legitimized when treaties refer back to treaties that have referred to the original treaty. In this way it is possible to identify familial relationships between treaties, which is also shown in Table 3.1.

Further, it is important to note that all three types of treaties (security, economic and integration) were nested within the FCMA (see Table 3.2). The fact that these different types of treaties shows that the FCMA was indeed a fundamental treaty in the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union, and that it served as a starting point to all future negotiations between the two states. In fact, the FCMA was such a fundamental treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union that the treaty was renewed well in advance of the end of the duration of the treaty. Ultimately, the FCMA served as a basis for Finnish foreign policy, Finland's policy of neutrality, and Finland's relationship with the Great Powers. However, the treaty was finally dissolved in 1992, with the collapse of the Soviet Union.



Figure 3.1. Types of Treaties by Decade

Table 3.1. Treaties Related to FCMA

Number of Treaties Directly Nested Within FCMA Treaty (1st Generation)	10
2nd Generation of Treaties Nested Within FCMA Treaty	4
Total Treaties Nested Within FCMA Family of Treaties (%)	14 (70%)
Total Number of Nested Treaties	20

Words are Important: the Case of the Next Ivan the Terrible

Prior to President Urho Kekkonen's last official visit to the Soviet Union in 1980, Finland sent a delegation to Moscow to negotiate a communiqué about the upcoming state visit. The communiqué was supposed to contain language about the FCMA treaty. In fact, the same formulaic language had been used for many of the communiqués related to Finno-Soviet relations. One of the main Finnish negotiators was the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Keijo Korhonen. President Kekkonen had personally picked Keijo Korhonen as the person that should report directly to the President, thus bypassing both the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister. Everyone understood that Keijo Korhonen reported directly to President Kekkonen, and that he was there to certify negotiations on the communiqué that had already occurred.

The main negotiator for the Soviets was Ivan Zemskov, the vice foreign minister in the Soviet Ministry of International Affairs (MID). A draft of the communiqué had already been accepted by both the Finnish delegation and the Soviet delegation, and all that remained was to adopt the draft. At this point Ivan Zemskov, who came to be known as “Ivan Groznyi” (Ivan the Terrible) by the Finnish delegation, officially reprimanded the Soviet delegation and demanded that negotiations begin anew. Ivan Zemskov was especially interested in changing the language in the communiqué dealing with Finland's policy of neutrality based upon the FCMA treaty. Traditionally all communiqués for official visits between the Finns and the Soviets stressed good neighborly relations, Finland's policy of neutrality, and the FCMA treaty as the basis of relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. Zemskov wanted the language citing the FCMA treaty to supersede reference to Finland's policy of neutrality vis-á-vis the rest of the world (Korhonen 2010).

The main issue for the Finnish delegation was that by having language referring to the FCMA treaty supersede the mention of Finnish neutrality in the communiqué, that sections of the FCMA treaty such as Article 1 and 2 would receive more prominence than Article 4 which is the basis for Finnish neutrality. The Finnish delegation was concerned that since the West already thought that Finland was under the control of the Soviet Union, that the absence of any mention of Finland's policy of neutrality would further solidify this view and further undermine their neutrality policy. Zemskov recognized this, and wanted to get the credit from the Soviet government that he was able to undermine the officially stated position of Finnish neutrality.

Table 3.2. Treaties Nested in FCMA

Security	Integration	Economic
Agreement between the USSR an Finland on the Denial of the Soviet Union of the Right to Use the Porkkala-Odd for a Naval Base and the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from the Territory 09/19/1955	Treaty between the USSR and Finland on the Legal Protection and Legal Assistance in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters 08/11/1978	Treaty between the USSR and Finland for the Rental of the Saimaa Canal and the Island of Small Vysotsky by Finland from the Soviet Union 09/27/1962
Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the Republic of Finland on the Border of Marine Waters and the Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Finland 05/20/1965	Protocol between the USSR and Finland on the Extension of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of the 6th of April, 1948 06/06/1983	Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the Republic of Finland on Maritime Navigation 04/03/1974
Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the Republic of Finland on the Border of the Continental Shelf between the Soviet Union and Finland in the Northeastern Part of the Baltic Sea 05/05/1967		Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of Finland on the Delimitation of Economic Zones, Fishing Zones, and the Continental Shelf in the Gulf and Northeastern Part of the Baltic Sea 02/05/1985
Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the Republic of Finland on the Division of Areas of Jurisdiction of the Soviet Union and Finland in Respect to Fisheries in the Gulf and Northeastern Part of the Baltic Sea 02/25/1980		Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the Republic of Finland on the Division of Areas of Jurisdiction of the Soviet Union and Finland in Respect to Fisheries in the Gulf and Northeastern Part of the Baltic Sea 02/25/1980
		Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the Republic of Finland on the Elimination of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income 10/06/1987

The Finns insisted that the draft language of the communiqué be used, and Zemskov insisted on trying to renegotiate the language of the communiqué. Korhonen then broke off the negotiations with Zemskov and returned to Helsinki. Upon his return to Helsinki, he appealed to the KGB Rezident in Helsinki, General Viktor Vladimirov, asking for his intervention in the negotiations. General Vladimirov understood that the Finns would not yield on the language of the communiqué, and that it was not in the best interest of the Soviet Union to have an open quarrel with Finland. Thus, General Vladimirov called the Kremlin directly, bypassing the Ministry of International Affairs, and strongly suggested that the Kremlin accept the draft of the communiqué as it had been, and not how Zemskov recommended it be changed. Within two days, General Vladimirov called Korhonen, and informed him that Zemskov had been overruled by the Kremlin, and that the language of the communiqué had been agreed to by the Soviets (Korhonen 2010).

Although most scholars assume that language in communiqués and treaties are often formulaic and meaningless, the wording of these agreements is actually very important. In the case of the negotiations over this specific communiqué, talks broke down over the specific wording, because Finland believed very strongly in its policy of neutrality, and was not going to agree to any wording that would not stress their policy in the communiqué. Thus, negotiations over wording and language in treaties is exceedingly important, and the final language of a treaty should be understood as not just formulaic language, but rather the language that was agreed upon by both parties, which is extremely meaningful. It should also be noted that the Soviet Union traditionally held communiqués of state visits as equally important to regular treaties. They found communiqués of state visits to be politically binding if not legally binding. That's why this argument over the wording in the communiqué was of paramount concern to both the Finnish delegation and to Zemskov himself.

From Words to Treaties to Treaty Architecture: Building the Relationship

Although much of the prior discussion has focused on what Finland was able to accomplish through the FCMA, it is important to also understand the role that the Soviet Union played in building the relationship with Finland. Following the defeat of the Germans in World War II, the Soviets were determined that they would not be invaded again by Germany. Thus, security became a driving force in Soviet foreign policy. To this extent it focused its policy towards Eastern Europe and developing the Soviet Bloc.

Although Finland was extremely important to its security interests (especially ensuring that Leningrad could not be invaded through Finland), Finland was not as important to Soviet security interests as the rest of the Baltics and

Eastern Europe. Despite the fact that Stalin originally wanted a friendship treaty that was similar to those with the Eastern European states, he was willing to allow Finland a little more flexibility in their negotiations. While some have speculated that this was because of the fact that Finland earned Stalin's respect by fighting off the Soviets for so long and the Soviets did not actually have troops occupying Finland (Allison 1985), others have argued that it was because Finland was a free Capitalist state, and as such differed from the occupied states of Eastern Europe (Ruddy 1998). Ultimately, even though the exact reason for allowing the difference can be debated, Finland was still able to negotiate a treaty that allowed it to retain its sovereignty and thus develop its policy of neutrality.

Finland understood early during the negotiations of the FCMA that it would have to cede a lot of their interests to the Soviet Union. They were the weaker state, and knew that the Soviet Union was much more powerful. Recognizing this, they nevertheless approached negotiations with the idea that there were certain points which they would not agree to relinquish. Thus, their bargaining area was fairly small but firm. Further, the bargaining range was much closer to the Soviet preferred outcome than it was to the Finnish preferred outcome.

Although the bargaining range was small and favored the Soviets, Finnish negotiators recognized that they could still gain certain important concessions from the Soviets since although Finland was strategically important to the Soviets, it wasn't the top strategic priority. Thus, they were able to use the bargaining range to their advantage. Further, by connecting subsequent treaties back to the FCMA, they were able to solidify the bargaining range and even shift it a little towards the Finnish side.

As the security situation began to improve for the Soviets and the threat of attack from the West through Finland began to ease, the Soviets understood that their relationship with Finland was shifting. Rather than being focused on security, the Soviet Union realized that having a strong relationship with Finland was extremely important since it showed that the Soviet Union could maintain a good relationship with a Capitalist state. This provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to show to the rest of the world that it could be a trusted partner of those capitalist states that were not part of an alliance with the United States.

The fact that the Soviet Union was interested in using its relationship with Finland as a signal to the rest of the world meant that Finland would further be able to influence the bargaining range and achieve its strategic goals in negotiations with the Soviet Union. Finland was able to go from being at a severe disadvantage in negotiations on treaties with the Soviet Union to being able to negotiate from more of a position of strength. Although the bargaining range still favored the Soviet Union, the bargaining range had distinctly moved farther toward the Finnish side than it had been at the time of the signing of the FCMA.

As the relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland evolved, security treaties became much less important. While security treaties were the focus at

the beginning of the relationship, by the 1970s and early 1980s, much of the focus of the relationship between the two states was on economic cooperation. This had the added benefit of converting many of the negotiations on treaties from a zero sum game to a positive sum game. Both parties benefitted greatly from increased economic cooperation.

In fact, in the 1980s, Finland was second only to West Germany among the capitalist trading partners of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union needed Finnish imports, specifically goods that contained western components. For Finland, trade with the Soviet Union accounted for about 20 to 22 percent of Finland's foreign trade (Korhonen 2010). Most of the trade was in oil, cars, and heavy machinery.

The End of the Cold War: The End of the Relationship?

Up until the fall of the Soviet Union, Finland and the Soviet Union maintained an active relationship. In fact, between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the Soviet Union, five bilateral treaties were signed. Interestingly, none of those treaties specifically mentioned the FCMA treaty. Instead, many of those treaties dealt with specific economic and security issues without referencing the FCMA treaty. The reason for this is that both states had moved beyond the FCMA treaty. Articles 1 and 2 were no longer applicable to the post Cold War world, and Finland and the Soviet Union had achieved a relationship that didn't need to be based on Cold War realities. Finally, in 1992, the FCMA treaty was retired in favor of a new friendship treaty with Russia.

The relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland was very effective. Finland's policy of neutrality allowed Finland to pursue its own interests[7] and stay out of the conflict between great powers. Further, the policy allowed Finland to focus on domestic issues, which led to economic growth that rivaled that of Sweden (Figure 3.2).[8] In fact, as Figure 3.2 shows, Finland's growth in GDP was always positive. Even more striking is that Finland's GDP growth between 1970 and 1990 is greater than that of Sweden in all but one year. It is not an accident that Finland's GDP growth mirrors the growth in the number of economic treaties signed by Finland and the Soviet Union between 1970 and 1990 (Figure 3.1). Finland's policy of neutrality ensured that once it could cooperate with the Soviet Union on more than security issues, that it could focus on trade and the domestic economy, ensuring tremendous economic growth and prosperity.

Although Finland realized that it would have to build a relationship with the Soviet Union and that it would have to build a relationship on Soviet terms, Finland also realized that by focusing on individual treaties and restrictive wording, that it could manage the hegemonic control that the Soviet Union was able to exert on other states in Eastern Europe, and that it could benefit from the relationship even if it had to agree to certain Soviet requirements. The relationship

between the Soviet Union and Finland benefitted both parties despite the fact that both parties consistently distrusted of one another. Finally, the relationship ended with the breakup of the Soviet Union, when Russia and Finland had to begin a new relationship. Between 1992 and 2005, Russia and Finland continued to actively engage one another.[9] They built upon the Finnish-Soviet relationship, and signed 38 bilateral treaties. Although most of the treaties were economic, all three of the treaty areas (security, economic, and integration) were covered during this time span.

Despite the fact that Russia assumed the obligations of the Soviet Union, it nevertheless had to begin many of its relationships anew. Much as the Soviet Union had to begin to build a relationship with Finland following World War II, Russia had to begin to build its relationships with all of the former Soviet republics. Since Russia was the successor state to the Soviet Union, many of the former republics had animosity toward Russia that was similar to Finnish animosity towards the Soviet Union following World War II. Thus, the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union can help develop a theory of relationship building through the use of treaties in the post Soviet space.



Figure 3.2. GDP Growth Rates for Finland and Sweden (1970-1990)

The Architecture of a Bilateral Relationship: The Importance of Treaties

In the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union, Finland was an important priority. It was important at the beginning of the relationship because of security concerns to prevent an attack from the West. However, Finland also became an important priority in terms of showing the rest of the world that the Soviet Union could interact well with a capitalist state. Considering the power asymmetry between the two states, it was extremely important that the Soviet Union had strategic interests in Finland, and thus was willing to engage Finland in a relationship. Further, it was extremely important that Finland was not such an overwhelming strategic interest to the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union would want it to cede its sovereignty like it had with many of the Eastern European states. Thus, in cases of power asymmetry, it is important that there is a strategic interest for the hegemonic power to cooperate with the weaker power, yet not have such an overwhelming strategic interest that the hegemonic state would be willing to use force to achieve its strategic interests.

It is important to note that in the case of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland, the strategic interest for the Soviet Union was initially to secure its own border since Finland was contiguous to the Soviet Union. Thus, contiguity can be a very important part of determining a hegemonic state's strategic interest. However, contiguity is not the only factor in determining whether or not the hegemonic state has a strategic interest in cooperating with the weaker state. The strategic interest can be on the basis of security or economic cooperation such as needing to have a military base in the weaker state or needing access to natural resources. However, whatever the source of the strategic interest for the hegemonic state, there must be a strategic interest for a relationship to develop. Further, it is important to note that the strategic interest must come from the hegemonic power, and not from the weaker state. For example, Albania might have strategic interests and want to cooperate with the United States, but unless the United States has strategic interests in wanting to cooperate with Albania, a bilateral relationship will not develop and evolve.

The level of cooperation between the hegemonic state and the weaker state will depend on the nature and level of the strategic interest of the hegemonic state. For example, in the case of Finland, the initial strategic interest of the Soviet Union was in security, and thus it is not surprising to find that many of the initial treaties between Finland and the Soviet Union dealt with security issues. However, over time the strategic interest of the hegemonic state may evolve. The strategic interest of the Soviet Union toward Finland was initially security, yet it evolved into economic cooperation over time as the security threat diminished.

While the level of cooperation and the strategic interest in cooperation depends on the hegemon, much of the specifics of treaties will depend on the

weaker state. While the hegemonic power determines whether there will be a relationship and in what areas, the weaker power will be able to guide the process through treaties. The reason for this is that each treaty is a negotiation, so while the general necessity of the treaty and cooperation in specific areas is initiated by the hegemon, the specific negotiations and specific wording will often be controlled by the weaker state. The negotiation over the communiqué between Finland and the Soviet clearly illustrates this point, where the Soviet Union wanted President Kekkonen to make an official state visit, and Kekkonen knew that he had to officially visit the Soviet Union, yet the Finnish negotiators were able to insist that there would be no changes to the official communiqué, and the Soviet negotiators ended up agreeing to the Finnish negotiating position. It should be noted, however, that the Soviets were able to achieve their goal of having Kekkonen visit, yet only had to acquiesce on the wording of a communiqué. However, the wording of the communiqué for Finland was of vital national interest since it had to maintain its official policy of neutrality.

Cooperation cannot be one-sided. Both parties must want to cooperate. The way that states are able to develop the rules of cooperation is through treaties. Treaties are the rules that both parties must obey, and they set out expectations about the expected behaviors of both parties. Although it is possible to not abide by a specific treaty, the cost of doing so could be high. Such was the case with Finland during the 1961 Note Crisis. Rather than face having to decide whether or not to hold military consultations with the Soviet Union, which would have destroyed Finland's policy of neutrality, President Kekkonen flew to Novosibirsk to meet with Khrushchev privately to try and convince him not to invoke Article 2 of the FCMA treaty. Although Finland is the weaker power in this example, some scholars have noted that the hegemonic power often adheres to treaties despite the fact that the treaty may no longer benefit the hegemonic power (Mattli and Büthe 2003). These scholars argue that the hegemonic state does not want to lose its future chances of cooperation, so is ready to accept the terms of an unfavorable treaty knowing that its reputational cost would be much higher if it violated the treaty. Thus, treaties are very important. The important question then is how treaties are important, and how states in power asymmetry approach treaty and relationship construction.

The Finnish case shows the importance of certain treaties that become important architectural lodestones in a bilateral relationship. The FCMA treaty was clearly the most important treaty signed between Finland and the Soviet Union, and served as the basis for Finland's whole foreign policy of neutrality. Despite the fact that Finland was forced to negotiate the FCMA treaty with the Soviet Union, it nevertheless was able to use the FCMA to its advantage in developing its foreign policy. Moreover, subsequent treaties were tied to the FCMA through treaty nesting, which gave further prominence to the FCMA treaty. It should be noted that the FCMA treaty was exceedingly important to the relationship for all of the prior reasons mentioned in this book, yet it also provided a clearly estab-

lished channel of communication between the hegemonic and weaker power to solve problematic issues between the two states when the need arose.

Although the number of bilateral treaties that are signed can show how actively engaged two states are in their relationship, the number of bilateral treaties neither shows the importance of the treaties nor the health of the relationship. Theoretically it would be possible to have many treaties dealing one specific issue area that is of strategic importance to both states, yet the relationship does not evolve into cooperation in other issue areas. Thus, the health of a bilateral relationship should be determined on the basis of the number of treaty areas that are covered by treaties in the bilateral relationship. A cooperative bilateral relationship would have treaties dealing with a diversity of issues, whereas a cautious bilateral relationship would have treaties dealing with a limited number of issues. For example, the Finnish case shows that the overwhelming impetus for a relationship in the beginning was focused on security issues, yet the relationship evolved to include cooperation in economic and integration issues as well. The diversity of issue areas addressed in treaties should reflect the overall level of cooperation between states and thus the quality of their bilateral relationship.

Applicability of the Finnish Case towards a Theory of Cooperation through Treaties

The Finnish case cannot explain cooperation between all states. The Finnish case specifically explains how states that are not on friendly terms can cooperate in a power asymmetric relationship. The hegemonic state wanted to build a relationship with the weaker state to ensure its security goals, and thus initiated an invitation to cooperate. In turn, the weaker state needed some guarantees that the hegemonic power would not take away its fundamental right of sovereignty. Treaties were the tools that both parties used to accomplish this goal. The hegemonic power needed legitimate cooperation from the weaker power, while the weaker state needed certain guarantees from the hegemonic power. While it is possible that the hegemonic power could violate an individual treaty, doing so would cost the hegemon greatly in terms of future cooperation with the weaker states and with other states as well. A state is only as trustworthy as its reputation says, and if a state abides by its treaties, then the state will gain the reputation of being a trustworthy partner, yet if a state violates its treaties, other states will not want to cooperate with the untrustworthy state. Thus it is in the interest of both parties to abide by the treaties that they sign.

The Finnish relationship with the Soviet Union shows the process that states use to build relationships. This can in turn be applied to the case of the Former Soviet Union, where Russia had to rebuild its relationship with all of the former Soviet states. While I have focused on the bilateral relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union in this chapter and what the relationship can teach about

the importance of treaties and relationship building in general, subsequent chapters will focus on further testing the theory developed in chapter 2 and illustrated in the Finnish case. I will test the theory using a complete set of bilateral treaties from 1991 to 2005 between former Soviet states and Russia. I specifically focus on examining bilateral treaties between each former Soviet republic and Russia since I am concerned with how bilateral relationships are formed in instances of power asymmetry.

Notes

1. This quote was told to Keijo Korhonen, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, on a fishing trip with General Vladimirov, KGB Rezident in Helsinki.

2. Finnish President Juho Paasikivi (quoted by Keijo Korhonen).

3. Russia did not become the Soviet Union until 1922, when the Bolsheviks defeated the White Army in the Russian civil war.

4. Lapland.

5. See ("Czechoslovakia-Soviet Union: Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Collaboration" 1945) as an example of the Friendship and Cooperation treaties.

6. This refers to the fact that a treaty can either be directly nested within the FCMA, or can be a direct descendant meaning that it is nested within a treaty that is nested within the FCMA. In the latter case, the FCMA is like the grandparent treaty.

7. Such as trade with both the West and the Soviet Union.

8. Source: World Development Indictors.

9. Time period examined for this book.

Chapter 4

State Motivations for Cooperation

> Competition has been shown to be useful up to a certain point and no further, but cooperation, which is the thing we must strive for today, begins where competition leaves off.
>
> Franklin D. Roosevelt

> At the beginning of the new century, it is the common aspiration of the peoples of the two countries to deepen mutual understanding, enhance trust, develop friendship and strengthen cooperation.
>
> Li Peng

Power inequalities and mistrust have characterized many interstate relationships. Yet most international relations theories do not take into account power and mistrust when explaining cooperation. While some scholars argue that power relations inhibit cooperation between states, other scholars expect interstate cooperation regardless of the power relations and level of trust. I argue that although states benefit from cooperation, they are also wary of the power relations between states, making cooperation difficult. Successful and cooperative bilateral relationships are formed between strong and weak states that are power asymmetric and have mistrust of one another, but they are built in such as way as to overcome the problem of power asymmetry and distrust.

The question of why and how states are able to build cooperative bilateral relationships given power asymmetry and mistrust is one that is very difficult to answer. In chapter 2, I have stated that cooperation must begin with the more powerful state providing that there is strategic interest for the powerful state to cooperate. However, the weaker state must also have a strategic interest in cooperating with the stronger state for there to be any cooperation between the two states. It should be noted that strategic interests of both states can be for security reasons or for economic reasons, or a combination of both. However, the theory developed in a prior chapter is clear that there must be some kind of strategic interest to build a cooperative bilateral relationship. In fact, while it is clear that states will choose to cooperate in favor of the gains that cooperation affords them, and will choose not to cooperate if they determine that the obstacles to cooperation are just too great to overcome.

While the theoretical assumption of when states will cooperate is an important one, it is important to understand levels of cooperation. In other words,

which strategic interests drive states to higher levels of cooperation, especially in the post-Soviet region, where states are wary of Russian strategic goals. In this chapter, I use fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to examine and build upon the theory developed in the theory chapter. It should be clear that this chapter examines only the causal conditions for levels of cooperation. A later chapter will examine **how** states are able to overcome power asymmetry and mistrust to build cooperative bilateral relationships providing the causal conditions for cooperation are present.

Building a Bilateral Relationship

Power inequalities and mistrust have characterized many interstate relationships. Yet most international relations theories do not take into account power and mistrust when explaining cooperation. States must build a relationship with other states in the global system to achieve their own strategic goals. Although relationships among states are constantly evolving, it is rare that several states must start bilateral relationships from scratch. However, after periods of civil war or revolution, new states emerge that must begin to forge new relationships with the other states in the system. One example of this is the post colonial era, where many former colonies became independent states and had to forge new relationships with the other states in the global system.

One of the best examples of building bilateral relationships from scratch occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union, where all of the former Soviet republics became newly independent states. They had to forge new relationships with each other not only to ensure their survival, but also to split up the Soviet Empire. Although historically the collapse of a great empire has often led to wars between the new independent states, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a relatively peaceful transition from a powerful Empire to fifteen newly independent states. As Russia had been the most powerful Soviet republic, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became the undisputed regional hegemon. Moreover, because of its history of first being the Russian empire and then its Soviet past, the states that comprised the former Soviet Union (FSU) did not trust Russia or its intentions. The FSU states mainly saw Russia as an aggressive regional hegemon who was not to be trusted to abide by their newly found sovereignty. Thus, all of the states of the FSU found themselves faced with a situation of power asymmetry and mistrust of the regional hegemon. Therefore they had to choose whether or not they were willing to cooperate with Russia. The purpose of this chapter is to determine which strategic interests should be present for states in the post Soviet region to want to cooperate, and which strategic interests would ensure that states would not want to cooperate with the regional hegemon.

Levels of Bilateral Cooperation

While I discuss bilateral relationships and levels of bilateral cooperation in this chapter, I have not been clear about how to conceptualize either term. First of all, it should be understood that a bilateral relationship should be understood more as a continuous variable than a dichotomous one. For example, the bilateral relationships between Cuba and the US and Canada and the US are very different. While both are bilateral relationships, the relationship between Cuba and the US is not a cooperative one. The United States recognizes Cuba as a sovereign state, yet maintains an economic embargo against Cuba. They have very few bilateral treaties between them. Thus, the bilateral relationship between the US and Cuba is a low level of bilateral cooperation.

The relationship between the US and Canada is a very positive bilateral relationship. They have a tremendous number of bilateral treaties between them, and the two states cooperate on many different issue areas. For example, some scholars have found that the US relationship with Canada has been very effective and has even helped to influence US domestic policy in addition to creating a very cooperative bilateral relationship (J. Goldstein and Gowa 2002; J. Goldstein 1996). Despite the fact that Canada has been challenged by the hegemonic status of the US, the two states have had a very positive, cooperative, bilateral relationship with high levels of cooperation.

Theoretically, if states have strategic interests in cooperating, then they will cooperate. States will focus on signing bilateral treaties that will ensure that their strategic interests. Therefore it is possible to determine which strategic interests are driving a large number of cooperative agreements and treaties. While the number of treaties signed between two states is not indicative of the quality of cooperation, or even the quality of the bilateral relationship, nevertheless the number of treaties signed is indicative of the level of cooperation as well as which strategic interests drive cooperation. Specifically, a single treaty is an attempt at cooperation, while a large number of treaties signed indicate a lot of attempts at cooperation. Therefore, certain strategic interests by both the regional hegemon and the weaker states should lead to larger numbers of treaties being signed. Table 4.1 shows each CIS member state and the number of bilateral treaties that they have signed with Russia.[1]

Table 4.1. Number of Bilateral Treaties Signed

Bilateral Relationship	Bilateral Treaties
Russia-Ukraine	217
Russia-Kazakhstan	203
Russia-Belarus*	198
Russia-Armenia	145
Russia-Kyrgyzstan	126
Russia-Uzbekistan	109
Russia-Tajikistan	93
Russia-Moldova	92
Russia-Georgia	92
Russia-Azerbaijan	78
Russia-Turkmenistan	77

*Treaties are only bilateral treaties, not economic union treaties

Cooperation between States

Much of the literature on cooperation between states focuses on absolute gains versus relative gains in relations between states. One of the main issues in this debate is why states would choose to cooperate at all. Realists are focused on the anarchic nature of the world system, which means that individual states must be responsible for their own security. Specifically, they see this anarchic system as being responsible for creating a zero-sum game in any interaction between states, where if one state gains any power in the system, that other states must lose power relative to the state that gained power. Thus, all interactions between states are competitive in nature, with each state looking to maximize its own power interests while trying to minimize the amount of power that any other state could gain through the interaction (Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993). The competitive nature of each interaction being viewed as a zero-sum game has often been referred to in international relations literature as relative gains. Relative gains further typify a zero-sum game in that any interaction between states is viewed as a competition and game where there can only be one state that wins. Thus, it is not beneficial to any state to cooperate with any other state, even if both states might benefit from that cooperation, because each state should be worried about how much other states benefit in comparison to the amount that the state would benefit by cooperating at all. Those scholars who view the world system in this fashion are thus very skeptical about any chance of cooperation between states on any issues, and that true cooperation is almost impossible to achieve. This is a very pessimistic view of states' abilities or desires to cooperate on any issue area. It is important to note that scholars that view the world through this spectrum view every interaction as power-based,

and thus all interactions must be examined through an understanding of the changing power-dynamics that each interaction brings.

Liberal institutionalists, however, argue that states view interactions between states as a positive-sum game, where multiple states can benefit from the interaction. According to this view, states find it easier to cooperate, since states are less concerned about the power dynamics between states, and are seeking to maximize their own benefit while not worrying about the relative benefit that any other states that they are interacting with are receiving (Robert O. Keohane and Martin 1995; Snidal 1991). It should be noted that liberal institutionalists do not view every interaction as being power-driven, and often discount the relative power dynamics between states. Interactions between states are able to be mutually beneficial, which allows cooperation between states. Interestingly, while realists consistently argue that cooperation in security matters is very difficult to realize among states, liberal institutionalists focus on showing that cooperation is possible between states involving trade. Thus, although the two theoretical perspectives seem diametrically opposed to one another, they actually may not be. It could be that cooperation between states is merely more difficult when states are addressing security issues, whereas issues of trade might be much less contentious, and more easily lead to cooperation between states. In fact, some scholars argue that regional economic institutions have evolved from providing merely economic benefit to also providing economic and security benefits to member states as the states have developed a more cooperative relationship (Powers and Goertz 2006; Powers and Goertz 2009).

Liberal institutionalists argue that since cooperation between states can bring great gains to individual states, that states should be willing to cooperate providing that they can build enough trust to do so (Kydd 2000a; Kydd 2000b; Kydd 2001; Kydd 2005). For example, Kydd (2000a) argues that mistrust is a fundamental hindrance to cooperation, and that the way that states must approach this problem is to first build trust through small cooperative gestures, and then to begin to build a cooperative relationship. Another way in which states can overcome the issue of mistrust is to join IGOs. These multilateral organizations often signal a state's willingness to abide by international rules and cooperate with other states (Volgy, Fausett, Grant, and Rodgers 2008). Thus, my first hypothesis is:

H_1: States that have a high number of IGO memberships should have a high level of cooperation with Russia.

Mistrust of a hegemonic power can also be exacerbated by geographical distance. For example, if a state is geographically close to a hegemonic power, the weaker state will generally be more cautious in cooperating with the hegemonic power, since it must be careful of the hegemonic states' ability to project its power. Conversely, cooperation is easier to achieve on many different issues if both the stronger and weaker states are geographically close together. States will

find it more difficult to cooperate if they are not in geographical proximity to one another. Thus, my hypotheses on geographical distance are as follow:

*H_{2A}: States that are geographically close to the hegemonic power will have a relatively **low** level of cooperation with Russia*

*H_{2B}: States that are geographically close to the hegemonic power will have a relatively **high** level of cooperation with Russia.*

Ultimately, despite hindrances to cooperation, both states must be interested in cooperating in order to overcome the issue of mistrust. In other words, it must be in their strategic interest to cooperate. I now turn to a discussion of what strategic interest might drives states to want to build a cooperative relationship.

Strategic Interests in Building Cooperative Relationships

Understanding the strategic interest of a state is vital in understanding its needs in building a cooperative relationship. States invariably have complex interests and must engage with other actors. For example, Belarus has no natural gas reserves. It is completely reliant upon natural gas imports. Thus, for Belarus, one of its strategic interests is to cooperate with natural gas producers to import natural gas. Russia, on the other hand, has an abundance of natural gas, and can use the natural gas to achieve its strategic interests (Goldman 2010; Åslund 2009; Åslund and Kuchins 2009).

Although liberal institutionalists argue that cooperation often is achieved through economic issues, strategic interests in security can also lead to cooperation. For example, in an earlier chapter on the bilateral relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union, I discuss the fact that the Soviets were interested in cooperating with Finland because of their strategic interests in protecting their borders from German invasion. Since the Soviet Union did not have any troops stationed in Finland, they were naturally concerned with an attack by Germany through the Nordic states. For this reason, cooperation with Finland in security issues was paramount for the Soviet Union immediately after World War II. I now turn to a discussion of possible strategic interests in security and economic issues especially in the FSU that could be causal conditions that lead to cooperative relationships.

Security Interests

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, security became one of the paramount strategic interests of each of the fifteen newly independent states. While the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) were able to look to

the West to support their sovereignty and security interests, the other FSU states had to rebuild their relationships with the other former republics, including with the regional hegemon, Russia. While other FSU states were wary of Russia's intentions, the Russian Federation had to work to rebuild the power structure and its influence with the former Soviet republics. Although Russia was still the regional hegemon, it was forced to begin relationships anew, and relied on treaty construction and treaty networks to achieve this goal. No other state has initiated as many bilateral and multilateral treaties as Russia, and this treaty activism covers a wide range of issue areas (J. Willerton, Vashchilko, K. Powers, Beznosov, and G. Goertz 2006). Although Russian strategies evolved over the last two and a half decades, one of the driving forces behind Russian treaty activism was its desire to reestablish its sphere of influence in what it referred to as the "near abroad."

One of Russia's first acts after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was to declare itself the successor state to the Soviet Union (Åslund and Kuchins 2009). In doing this, Russia sent a signal to all of the other states that it was the regional hegemon. Russia possessed the necessary infrastructure and capability to assume that role, whereas the other states did not.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union also presented many challenges to Russia. First, a newly independent Russia possessed a complex set of security concerns. One of the security concerns had to do with the borders of the new Russian Federation. During the Soviet period, borders between the republics did not need to be patrolled as vigorously as the external borders of the Soviet Union. Moreover, although Soviet military troops were stationed within the borders of Russia, many soldiers were stationed in outer republics closer to the external borders of the Soviet Union. With Russia declaring itself the successor state to the Soviet Union, technically all of the troops became Russian troops. However, they became Russian troops stationed in newly independent states.

Further complicating the issue of military forces was that the newly independent states needed militaries of their own. The former Soviet military could not just be dismantled with each state getting the rights to the military that was stationed on its territory. To dismantle the military in that fashion would have placed Russia at a tremendous disadvantage relative to the former republics. Moreover, since the Soviet military was composed of soldiers from all of the former republics, citizens of one newly independent state might find themselves serving in a defunct state's army while stationed in a different sovereign territory.

In short, to address security concerns, Russia had to address the issue of the status of military forces with the other FSU states. It had to first determine to whom the military belonged and then determine whether or not the troops would remain stationed in the new independent state. With vital security interests in different areas coupled with a lack of infrastructure to barrack a military of that size, it was in Russia's interests to ensure that portions its military could remain stationed in the former Soviet republics. Thus, Russia wanted to station Russian troops in states in which it had strategic security interests. However, it was not

necessarily in the interest of the former republic to have Russian troops stationed within its borders. The need to address the issue of military forces leads to my next hypothesis:

H_3: States that have Russian troops stationed within their borders will have a high level of cooperation with Russia.

In addition to the status of forces being one of the major security issues that Russia needed to resolve, Russia also wanted to resolve the question of the status of nuclear weapons. It was not in Russia's interest that many states in its region would become nuclear powers, and thus wanted to ensure that nuclear weapons remained Russian possessions. In fact, at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, three states in addition to Russia had nuclear weapons, specifically, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Thus, nuclear security was of paramount importance to both Russia and the FSU states. With the additional concerns from the West about rogue states or terrorist organizations getting nuclear weapons, nuclear security became especially important, which leads to the next hypothesis:

H_4: States that possess nuclear weapons will have a high level of cooperation with Russia.

While Russia was concerned about the security situation immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was also concerned with how to maintain its regional power as well as to gain great power status universally (M. Olcott, Aslund, and S. W. Garnett 1999). One of its main strategic concerns was the ability to utilize its military bases in former Soviet republics. For example, all of the Soviet Union's naval bases on the Black Sea were in Ukraine and not Russia. If Russia wanted to retain the Black Sea Fleet and not lose control of a vital part of its naval forces including ships, weapons, and troops, it had to find a way to cooperate with Ukraine and not lose access to those vital security structures. To relinquish them would have been a tremendous loss of strategic power. Although Russia did have naval ports in Arkhangelsk and St. Petersburg in the North and Khabarovsk and Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean, the Black Sea Fleet was vital for maintaining interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

For Russia to once again gain great power status, it had to be concerned with its security infrastructure. The decline and collapse of the Soviet system had wreaked havoc with state production. Factories were not functioning at capacity, and there was a shortage of products available in the marketplace. In addition, one of the biggest problems facing Russia regarding its security infrastructure was that the Soviet government had spread vital infrastructure among its republics (Hewett 1988). For example, steel that was necessary to produce rockets was produced in Magnetogorsk (central Siberia), rocket fuel was produced in Armenia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, and rockets were assembled and sent to outer space from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. This system

of spreading vital infrastructure among the republics was extremely inefficient during the Soviet period, but became virtually unworkable once the republics gained their freedom.

Although Russia was the regional hegemon, it did not have the power to unilaterally dictate policy to other FSU states. FSU states saw a decrease in Russian capabilities, and wanted to ensure that they were able to keep Russia from regaining too much power. Thus, they determined that it was in their best interests to have good relations with Russia and to codify agreements with Russia and other FSU states through legal treaties (S. Garnett and D. Trenin 1999). Further, by legalizing and creating treaty networks the FSU states were able to try and build a cooperative relationship while building trust. This ensured that the FSU states were important regional actors rather than vassals the way they had been under the Soviet system. By signing treaties with Russia, FSU states were also protecting themselves. The treaties could constrain Russia and clearly establish spheres of influence and protection. In addition, since treaty networks have relations among their constituent treaties, which could further constrain the regional hegemon, it was in the interest of FSU states to use treaty networks as a means of constraining Russian hegemonic power. This strategy would not work with an inflexible regional power with the capabilities to unilaterally set regional policy, but with Russia's decreased capabilities, Russia was forced to become a flexible regional power willing to use different methods to achieve its objectives (S. Garnett and D. Trenin 1999).

Although Russia did not have the capabilities to unilaterally dictate policy to other FSU states, it nevertheless wanted to retain its status as a great power that could manage relations within its own region. Like the regional hierarchical structure proposed by Lemke and Werner (1996) and Lemke (2002), Russia sat at the top of the regional hierarchy and wished to control and manage regional relations. One of the ways in which it could do this was to try and manage regional conflicts. Since there had been an increase in civil wars and interstate conflicts at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Gayoso 2009; Jackson 2003; King 1999; Kolstø and Malgin 1998; Lynch 2002), Russia needed to ensure that it had a military presence in many of the FSU states through having military bases. Most of Russia's military bases in other FSU states either were acquired by leasing it from the host state, or by other form of agreement.

Specifically, Russia had air bases in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, radar stations in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kazakhstan, ground bases in Tajikistan, Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, a Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, and a naval base in Ukraine (Klein 2009). Russia did not have troops stationed in Uzbekistan. In short, Russia’s security interests drove Russia to seek to station military troops in the “near abroad.” However, not all of the states had strategic interests in having Russian troops stationed within their territories. Specifically, states that had internal conflicts and civil wars were wary of Russian efforts to “manage” the conflicts.

One of the ways in which Russia could try to manage conflict was by sending peacekeeping troops to try and manage internal conflicts in FSU states. For

example, Russia sent peacekeeping troops to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, the Transnistria region in Moldova, as well as other conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan as well as Tajikistan (Klein 2009). While Russia maintained that it was protecting ethnic minorities and preventing severe civil war, the peacekeeping troops had the unintended consequence of creating defacto states, especially in Moldova and Georgia (Gayoso 2009; Jackson 2003). FSU states saw Russia's peacekeeping troops as further proof of Russia's hegemonic intent to control the region, which caused many of them to further mistrust Russia. They saw Russia as using coercive power to influence the internal politics and sovereignty that they achieved following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This mistrust of Russia further dampened bilateral cooperation among some of the FSU states and Russia, which leads to my next hypothesis:

*H_5: States that **do not** have Russian peacekeeping forces stationed within their borders will have a high level of cooperation with Russia.*

While security interests were important to Russia and the other FSU states, economic strategic interests were equally as important to all of the states. I now turn to a discussion of the economic strategic interests of Russia as well as the other FSU states.

Economic Interests

At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, very few of the Soviet republics besides Russia could be self sufficient economically. Perhaps the one exception was Ukraine, which some scholars thought would be able to prosper (Anders Åslund and M. B. Olcott 1999). However, the reality was that the economies of the FSU states were tied to Russia. Similar to the way in which the security infrastructure was interconnected among the former Soviet republics, so too was their economic infrastructure (Hewett 1988). For example, much of the fruit that had been available during Soviet times was grown in Kazakhstan and Kyrgizia, while much of the wine was produced in Georgia and Moldova. Wheat was produced in abundance in Russia and Ukraine. While these are just a few agricultural examples of products that were produced in the Soviet Union, independence from the Soviet Union meant that new agreements had to be made between the new FSU states about the transport of these goods as well as others. Also, agreements had to be made regarding tariffs, trade, currency, etc.

One of the most important strategic economic interests for the new FSU states was energy. Russia held vast oil and natural gas reserves that it could export to FSU states that were dependent on oil and gas and had no reserves of their own. For those FSU states that did possess oil and gas reserves, most of the pipelines that could deliver the oil and gas went through Russia. Therefore, all of the FSU states were dependent on Russia in terms of energy. In terms of

power politics, this made Russia extremely powerful, and gave Russia unique abilities to achieve their strategic goals (Goldman 2010). It should be noted, however, that despite Russia's regional energy hegemony, it nevertheless needed to cooperate with other FSU states to export oil and natural gas to those states. It needed agreements on how much oil and gas would be exported, the price of the oil and gas, which state was responsible for maintaining the pipelines, etc. Thus, those states that imported energy (meaning that they did not have enough of their own reserves) had more strategic interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship with Russia, and since Russia could benefit from exporting energy to those states that needed oil and natural gas, Russia too had a strategic interest in building a cooperative relationship with FSU states that imported energy. This leads to my next hypothesis:

H_6: States that are either large energy importers or exporters will have a high level of cooperation with Russia.

Finally, with the increase in Russia's wealth due to its energy exports, Russia was also able to lend money to FSU states that needed to borrow money. Russia was able to lend money to FSU states while many Western lenders were wary of trusting that the debt would be repaid. Thus, many FSU states with low GDPs were eager to build a cooperative bilateral relationship with Russia so that it would in turn invest in their infrastructure. Russia, in turn, received not only interest on its loans, but also received agreements for lower priced goods in exchange for the loans. In addition, by lending money to many of these states, Russia was able to build good will among the FSU states. This leads to my final hypothesis:

H_7: States that have a lower GDP will have a high level of cooperation with Russia.

Ultimately, liberalists argue that it is much easier to cooperate on economic issues than security issues. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed the whole economy of each of the former Soviet republics including Russia. Although Russia was able to rebuild its economy faster than many of the other FSU states, cooperation was necessary to achieve this. While I have briefly examined some of the possible motivations for building a cooperative bilateral relationship in this strategic interest section, I will now examine these causal conditions using fsQCA to determine which causal conditions lead to building a cooperative bilateral relationship.

Methodology

The data used for this analysis are taken from all bilateral treaties between Russia and each of the FSU states (not including the Baltic states) between 1990 and 2005. The data constitute a systematic and complete set of bilateral treaties among the CIS member states. It should be noted that since the focus of this study is on the relationship between the regional hegemon and the other states in the region, the bilateral treaties examined are those between Russia and each of the other states in this study. For example, bilateral treaties between Russia and Ukraine are examined, whereas bilateral treaties between Ukraine and Uzbekistan are not examined in this study. In addition, since this study examines state-level causal conditions, the unit of analysis in this study is the degree to which the bilateral relationship is a cooperative bilateral relationship.

State-level conditions in this analysis come from the World Development Indicators (WDI) maintained by the World Bank Group. This data set contains economic information for all of the FSU states including Russia. The conditions used in this analysis from this data set include GDP, energy imports as a percent of GDP and energy exports as a percent of GDP. In addition to the WDI data set, causal conditions dealing with distance from the regional hegemon were calculated as the capital to capital distance between Moscow and the capital of each of the other FSU states. Also, the data on IGO membership comes from the Correlates of War data set, where each of the FSU states has the number of IGOs of which it is a member. Finally, data on Russian military forces such as in which states Russian peacekeeping forces were stationed, in which states Russia had military bases, and which states had nuclear weapons were adapted from (Klein 2009).

Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)

While the majority of political science papers use methods that are based on correlations (quantitative methods), fsQCA is a method that allows researchers to conduct research that bridges the divide between case studies (small-n research) and quantitative methods (which require large-n research) (Ragin 2000; Ragin 1989). One of the main differences between quantitative methods and fsQCA is that fsQCA is not based on correlations. It is rather based on a set-theoretic approach to social science, where researchers ask to what degree a given item belongs in a particular set known as the outcome of interest.

One of the benefits of fsQCA is that both outcomes and causal conditions that lead to outcomes are calibrated. In other words, causal conditions and outcomes are coded as continuous variables from 0-1 based on how closely they are within a specific set. In the case of this book, the outcome of interest is the degree to which the bilateral relationship is a cooperative bilateral relationship. If one defines the set (outcome of interest) as a high number of bilateral treaties

signed between two states, then the outcome of interest can then be calculated for each bilateral relationship. A number higher than .5 indicates that a given observation is more within the set than out of the set, whereas a number lower than .5 indicates that a given observation is less within the set than out of the set. This is called calibration.

In addition to the benefit of calibration, fsQCA also allows for more than one causal condition to lead to a given outcome. There may be several conditions that lead to a given outcome. The example of a cake is often used, where there are several ingredients that need to be combined to create a cake. FsQCA allows researchers to examine the different recipes that are used to lead to a given outcome. While recipes often give specific measurements of how much of a specific ingredient is needed to bake a cake, fsQCA analyzes the presence and absence of causal conditions in leading to a given outcome. For example, one recipe might call for the presence and absence of certain causal conditions leading to a given outcome, while another recipe might require the presence and absence of different causal conditions leading to the same outcome. Thus there is usually not one set of causal conditions that lead to a given outcome. It should be noted that in the analysis, the presence of a causal condition will be noted by just the name of the causal condition, while the absence of a causal condition is noted with a ~ in front of the causal condition.

Outcome of Interest

The outcome of interest in this analysis is the level of cooperation between the hegemonic state and a weaker state. The way to measure this outcome is to determine the set of bilateral relationships that have a high number of bilateral treaties signed. In this case, I calibrate the outcome into a continuous variable from 0-1, with 0 signifying not at all in the set of those bilateral relationships that have strategic interests in cooperating, and 1 signifying that a bilateral relationship is extremely interested in cooperating. I do this using the number of treaties signed between two states as the proxy for the degree of cooperation and calibrating the fuzzy set scores for each bilateral relationship (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2. Level of Attempted Cooperation Fuzzy Set Scores

Bilateral Relationship	Bilateral Treaties (N)	Fuzzy Set Score
Russia-Ukraine	217	.95
Russia-Kazakhstan	203	.93
Russia-Belarus	198	.91
Russia-Armenia	145	.63
Russia-Kyrgyzstan	126	.44
Russia-Uzbekistan	109	.23
Russia-Moldova	92	.1
Russia-Georgia	92	.1
Russia-Azerbaijan	78	.05
Russia-Turkmenistan	77	.05

Causal Conditions

The causal conditions that I use in this analysis are based upon both security and economic strategic interests that might lead to cooperation (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). The first causal condition that I examine is IGO membership. Since IGO membership indicates reliability on the part of the state, those states that have a high degree of IGO membership should be able to build a cooperative bilateral relationship. I determined the average number of IGO memberships over the years 1991-2005 for each of the FSU states, and then calibrated the results. Although Russia had the greatest number of IGO memberships at 73, I used the weakest link principle proposed by (Dixon 1993) to calibrate the variable.[2] Thus, Ukraine had the greatest average number of IGO memberships over the period of the study at 45, while Tajikistan had the lowest average number of IGO memberships at 28.

The second causal condition that I examine is distance (miles). Since contiguity has been shown to lead to both cooperation and conflict, and major power reach (based on capabilities) has also been shown to influence conflict, I created a calibrated causal condition based on distance. I first determined the distance from Moscow to the capital of each FSU state except the Baltic states. I then calibrated those distances on a scale from 0-1, where 1 would be the distance from Moscow to Moscow, and 0 would be 1,862 miles, which is the farthest distance between the capitals, from Moscow to Dushanbe (the capital of Tajikistan). The other distances fall between 0 and 1 on a continuous scale.

Next I calculate the security strategic interests to create the security causal conditions. Each of these security causal conditions are dichotomous conditions. The first is whether or not there were nuclear weapons (nukes) in the weaker state during the period of study. Thus, the bilateral relationships between Russia and Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus were coded as 1, while all of the other bilateral relationships were coded as 0. Similarly, I coded whether or not the

Russian military had a presence in the weaker state (rusmil) as a dichotomous security causal condition, as well as the presence of Russian peacekeeping troops (pk) as a separate dichotomous security causal condition.

Table 4.3. Security Causal Conditions

Weaker State	IGO Membership	Miles	Military Troops	Nuclear Weapons	Peacekeepers
Armenia	.11	.61	1	0	0
Azerbaijan	.5	.54	1	0	1
Belarus	.39	.95	1	1	0
Georgia	.39	.69	1	0	1
Kazakhstan	.71	.11	1	1	0
Kyrgyzstan	.57	.05	1	0	0
Moldova	.71	.87	1	0	1
Tajikistan	.05	.05	1	0	1
Turkmenistan	.11	.17	0	0	0
Ukraine	.95	.94	1	1	0
Uzbekistan	.57	.08	0	0	0

Table 4.4. Economic Causal Conditions

Weaker State	GDP	Imports	Exports
Armenia	.06	.85	.05
Azerbaijan	.15	.05	.5
Belarus	.58	.92	.05
Georgia	.86	.76	.05
Kazakhstan	.74	.05	.63
Kyrgyzstan	.05	.64	.05
Moldova	.05	.95	.05
Tajikistan	.05	.53	.05
Turkmenistan	.09	.05	.95
Ukraine	.95	.58	.05
Uzbekistan	.53	.05	.07

The next causal condition that I examine is GDP. A high GDP is important both for economic and security reasons. A high GDP means that a state is doing well economically, and can therefore afford improvements to both economic and security infrastructures as well as afford to have a large military. For the coding of this condition, I again used the weakest link principle since Russia had the highest average GDP over the years 1991-2005. Therefore, I calculated the average GDP over the years 1991-2005, and calibrated the condition. Ukraine again had the greatest average GDP over the time period at $53,254,165,231,

while Tajikistan had the lowest average GDP over the time period of the study at $1,476,319,250.

Finally, I examine energy imports and energy exports (imp and exp). Both of the import and export conditions are taken from the WDI data set, which is calculated according to the percent of energy that's imported or exported of a state's total energy use. A positive number is an energy importer and a negative number is an energy exporter. The average highest percent of imports over the period of study was Moldova at 98 percent, while the lowest average percent of imports over the period of study were all of the energy exporters, which were at 0 percent. Similarly, the highest average percent of exports over the period of study was Turkmenistan at 215 percent export, while the lowest average percent of exports over the period of study were all of the energy importers. I then calibrated the condition of imports and exports separately.

Data and Analysis

Running a fsQCA analysis with the level of cooperation as the outcome yielded the following results (see Table 4.5).[3] There are two causal paths that lead to a high level of cooperation.[4] It is clear that this analysis yields different results according to whether or not the weaker state is dependent upon Russia for energy. Therefore, I will look at the causal paths according to the weaker state's energy dependence on Russia.

Table 4.5. fsQCA Results Level of Cooperation

	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
Imp*rusmil*~pk	.58	.55	.86
Exp*rusmil*gdp*igo*~miles*nukes*~pk	.16	.13	1.0

Solution Coverage: .71
Solution Consistency: .88
First Recipe Cases: Belarus (.92, .91), Armenia (.85, .63), Kyrgyzstan (.64, .44) Ukraine (.58, .95)
Second Recipe Case: Kazakhstan (.63, .93)

Energy Dependence

States that are energy dependent on Russia must be energy importers. As stated earlier in this chapter, a state's energy dependence is calculated by the WDI database as being the percent of net energy consumed that is imported. While some

of the FSU states are almost entirely dependent on energy from Russia, other states do not rely on Russia for any of their energy needs (see Table 4.6).

Table 4.6. FSU Energy Importers (1991-2005)

State	Avg Imported Energy (%)
Moldova	98
Belarus	87
Armenia	73
Georgia	62
Kyrgyzstan	51
Ukraine	46
Tajikistan	42
Uzbekistan	0
Azerbaijan	0
Kazakhstan	0
Turkmenistan	0

The causal path for energy importers is that they must have a Russian military presence on their territory and do not have Russian peacekeeping troops on their territory. The cases covered by this are Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine. Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan, although they are energy importers, had Russian peacekeeping troops stationed on their territory, and thus did not have a high level of cooperation with Russia. In other words, energy importers must be strategically important to the hegemonic power, and the hegemonic power cannot be overly coercive by imposing peacekeeping forces on the weaker state. The hegemonic power must want to initiate cooperation, and the weaker power must be convinced that the hegemonic power will not be overly coercive.

Interestingly, the causal path for energy importers is very straightforward. None of the variables such as distance from Moscow and IGO membership were relevant to this causal path. Perhaps the reason for this is that the states are so dependent on Russia for energy that they need a cooperative bilateral relationship to survive. However, in the cases where Russian peacekeeping troops were stationed on the weaker states' territory, Russia becomes much more threatening as a power, and thus threatens their sovereign rights. In this case even their energy dependence is not enough of a factor to ensure that they create a cooperative bilateral relationship.

While the causal path for energy importers to develop a cooperative bilateral relationship with Russia is straightforward, the causal path for energy exporters is much more complicated. I now turn to an examination of the causal path for energy exporters to develop a high level of bilateral cooperation with Russia.

Energy Independence

Energy exporters in the FSU are much more economically stable than energy importers. Much like those states that imported their energy, energy exporters vary widely in the percent of energy that they export as a percent of energy use (see Table 4.7).

Table 4.7. FSU Energy Exporters (1991-2005)

State	Avg Exported Energy (%)
Turkmenistan	215
Kazakhstan	69
Azerbaijan	40
Uzbekistan	6
Kyrgyzstan	0
Ukraine	0
Tajikistan	0
Moldova	0
Belarus	0
Armenia	0
Georgia	0

The causal path for energy exporters indicates that states that have a Russian military presence on their territory, have a high GDP and IGO membership, are far away from Moscow, have nuclear weapons, and *do not* have Russian peacekeeping troops on their territory, are more likely to have a high level of cooperation with Russia. This causal path applies to Kazakhstan, since none of the other states that have nuclear weapons during this time period are energy exporters. In both paths for energy importers and energy exporters, an important causal condition is that there be an absence of peacekeeping forces. This is to be expected, since most of the FSU states were wary of Russia as the regional hegemon and they didn't want Russia interfering in their internal conflicts.

One surprise in this analysis is that I expected that a shorter distance from Moscow to the capital of other FSU states would lead to a high level of bilateral cooperation. However, in cases where the FSU state is an energy exporter, the farther the capital is from Moscow, the more likely that state is to have a high level of bilateral cooperation with Russia. This finding should not be surprising considering that most of the highest importers of Russian energy are located close to Moscow while energy exporters are located farther away from Moscow. Thus, geography is mostly to blame for this finding. I now turn to an examination of probabilistic necessary conditions in this analysis.

Probabilistic Necessary Conditions

Both causal paths indicate that there are two probabilistic necessary conditions, meaning that there must be the presence or absence of two conditions in all cases for there to be a high level of cooperation (see Table 4.8). Specifically, these are the presence of Russian military troops on the territory of an FSU state and the absence of Russian peacekeeping forces on the territory of an FSU state. Upon first glance, this would seem to be a surprising result, as Russian peacekeeping troops are Russian military troops. However, there is a significant difference between the presence of the Russian military and the presence of Russian peacekeeping forces. The first difference is that peacekeeping forces are deployed to areas of conflict, whereas the presence of regular Russian forces could be in a relatively stable and peaceful area. The second major difference is that Russia most likely leases and has the agreement of the FSU state that houses its military bases. For example, Russia leases the bases for the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine. Thus, to have a military presence on the territory of one of the other FSU states, Russia must gain the consent of the host state and agree to pay for that right. Ultimately, the fact that there are Russian military troops on the territory of an FSU state is more indicative of the fact that the weaker state is strategically important to Russia and Russian security. If the weaker state were not of strategic importance, then Russia would not assume the expense of stationing troops on the territory of the weaker state. Thus, it is probabilistically necessary for the hegemonic power to have a strategic interest involving the weaker state for there to be a high level of cooperation. However, even if the hegemonic power has a strategic interest involving the weaker state, if the hegemonic power is too coercive, there will be a low level of cooperation. In this study the coercive power of the hegemon is evidenced by the deployment of peacekeeping forces.

Table 4.8. Probabilistic Necessary Conditions

	Consistency	Coverage
Russian Military Troops	.94	.47
~ Peacekeeping Troops	.92	.59

It Takes Two to Tango

Although the fsQCA has highlighted which strategic interests are important to build a high level of cooperation in the former Soviet space, the most important point is that both states should possess strategic interests in building such a relationship. For example, the reason that the presence of Russian troops on the territory of other FSU states is important is because Russia felt that it was strategi-

cally important to its security to station troops there. They were willing to negotiate to lease bases, sign agreements dealing with military transportation, etc. In other words, it was important enough to Russia's strategic interests that they were willing to cooperate in other areas.

The weaker state should not be taken lightly in this analysis either. It takes two states wanting to cooperate to build a cooperative bilateral relationship. The fact that the absence of any peacekeeping troops on the territory of the FSU states leading to a cooperative bilateral relationship indicates that trust is a major factor in contributing to cooperation. FSU states need to be convinced that Russia will respect their sovereignty and not dictate how they resolve their domestic crises. By interfering in their internal affairs, Russia was sending a message that it could not be trusted not to meddle in the internal affairs of other FSU states. In turn, despite Russia having strategic security interests in resolving the civil conflict, the FSU states refused to cooperate with Russia, ensuring that a cooperative bilateral relationship would not be built.

It is natural to question how generalizable these results are to the world system as a whole. After all, I examined only the population of FSU states minus the Baltic states. However, this study shows the motivations for any states to build cooperative bilateral relationships. For example, South Sudan recently voted for its independence from Sudan. It is being recognized by the world community, and will have to build bilateral relationships from scratch. Since South Sudan possesses large oil reserves, many states will look to build cooperative relationships with South Sudan. This study shows the different causal paths that can lead to building those cooperative relationships.

Although I have examined the FSU in this analysis and shown how states can build cooperative relationships from scratch, it should be noted that states that already have bilateral relationships with other states can rebuild cooperative relationships providing that they have sufficient strategic interests in doing so. For example, the United States has rebuilt its relationship with Vietnam despite the deep mistrust that both states had towards each other following the Vietnam War. For many years there was no relationship between the two states, yet during the Clinton Administration, the US was willing to recognize and rebuild a relationship with Vietnam. Considering the fact that the two states were involved in such a traumatic war, it is astounding that the states are able to build a bilateral relationship at all. The results of this study should shed light on the process that moved the two states from being bitter enemies to one in which they built a mutually beneficial bilateral relationship. Moreover, the results of this study should be applicable to other situations where states are rebuilding their bilateral relationships.

Ultimately, strategic interests are extremely important in forming cooperative bilateral relationships. They provide the willingness for states to want to cooperate. However, the presence of strategic interests alone cannot overcome the problem of hegemony and mistrust. One must look beyond strategic interests at the state level and look at the level of individual treaties to see how states are able to overcome these issues to build cooperative bilateral relationships. In the

next chapter I examine the complete set of bilateral treaties between Russia and FSU states (not including the Baltic states), and use network analysis to show how treaties and treaty networks can overcome issues of power asymmetry and mistrust.

Notes

1. This table only includes those states that are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For the purposes of this study, the Baltic states are not included, as they are significantly different than the other FSU states.

2. The weakest link principle is often used in literature testing dyadic democratic peace theory. A single measure of level of democracy is calculated by examining the level of democracy of each state in the dyad, and using the lower level of democracy as the dyadic level of democracy. The reasoning for this is that the less democratic state cannot become more democratic, thus it is more useful to use the measure of the level of democracy for the less democratic state. I use this principle for calculating the dyadic measure of IGO membership.

3. I report the fsQCA intermediate solution, as the parsimonious solution does not adequately capture the complexity of the solution, while the complex solution makes too many difficult counterfactual assumptions.

4. The assumptions for this analysis are the following: peacekeeping forces (absent), nuclear weapons (present), military troops (present), exports (present), imports (present), distance (present or absent), GDP (present), and IGO Membership (present).

Chapter 5

Treaty Networks

The question of why and how states cooperate given power asymmetry and lack of trust is one that is still not readily answered. In the previous chapter on state motivations, I addressed why states would choose to cooperate given power asymmetry and lack of trust. I found that states wish to cooperate with each other due to strategic interests. These strategic interests urge states to want to cooperate, yet do not convince states to cooperate by themselves. For example, if there are strategic interests for a state to cooperate yet the problems of power asymmetry and lack of trust are not managed, then states will not be able to cooperate or build a cooperative bilateral relationship. Therefore the states must not only have a strategic interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship, but must also try to effectively manage the problems of power asymmetry and lack of trust. In this chapter, I answer *how* states are able to manage these problems to build a cooperative bilateral relationship. I argue that states create dense treaty networks tying together treaties through nesting. In doing so, states increase the cost of violating a single treaty because violating a single treaty is the same as violating all of the other treaties that are connected to the violated treaty in the treaty network. Thus, the cost of violating treaties for either state is increased to the point that neither state wants to violate an important treaty, thus increasing a state's ability to predict another state's behavior in relation to a treaty. In short, dense treaty networks create an expected pattern of behavior and allows cooperation even in cases of power asymmetry and in situations without trust.

While the previous chapter focused on state-level indicators that would lead states to want to cooperate, the method of cooperation should be examined at the treaty level. Each individual treaty is a form of cooperation and is indicative of the level of cooperation in the bilateral relationship. Although individual treaties on their own are elements of cooperation, it is important to examine groups of treaties and the treaty networks to achieve a more accurate perspective on the level of cooperation in the bilateral relationship.[1] In this chapter and the next chapter, I examine treaty networks and the relationship between treaties with the end goal of finding a good measure of the quality of a bilateral relationship. Specifically, I examine treaty networks and the relationship between treaties in this chapter, and in the next chapter I define a measure of the quality of a bilateral relationship and test its ability to predict the occurrence of conflict.

Treaty Activism in the FSU

The Russian Federation (RF), between 1991 and 2005, was very active in signing both bilateral and multilateral treaties. It tried not only to reestablish its great power and regional hegemonic status, but genuinely had to cooperate with former Soviet states to achieve its strategic goals. Other FSU states similarly had to cooperate with Russia to achieve their own strategic goals. One of the major strategic interests that FSU states shared was either importing or exporting energy. Russia was a central actor for states that both needed to import and export energy since most of the energy pipelines went through Russia. In addition, Russia was a large energy exporter in its own right, so many of the states that relied on energy imports had to import from Russia, whereas many FSU states that wanted to export energy had to export their energy through Russian pipelines. In short, Russia was the central actor in the FSU region regarding energy, and the other FSU states needed to engage Russia through treaties to achieve their strategic interests (Table 5.1)

Table 5.1. Energy Trade Reliance and Bilateral Treaties with Russia

Bilateral Relationship	Import*	Export*	Bilateral Treaties (N)
RF-Ukraine	46%	-	217
RF-Kazakhstan	**-**	**69%**	**203**
RF-Belarus	**87%**	**-**	**198**
RF-Armenia	73%	-	145
RF-Kyrgyzstan	51%	-	126
RF-Uzbekistan	-	6%	109
RF-Tajikistan	42%	-	93
RF-Moldova	**98%**	**-**	**92**
RF-Georgia	62%	-	92
RF-Azerbaijan	-	40%	78
RF-Turkmenistan	**-**	**215%**	**77**

*Imports and Exports are percent of Energy Consumption[2]
Note: Energy Import and Export Data from WDI dataset

While Table 5.1 does not assume any correlation between energy imports and exports and the number of treaties that each CIS member state has signed with Russia, nevertheless, states with a high percentage of energy imports or energy exports should have strategic interests in cooperating with Russia.[3] Yet at first glance there seems to be no correlation between energy imports or exports and the number of treaties signed with Russia. Although it would be easy to explain this problem away by stating that some states are more willing to overlook power asymmetry and are more trusting of Russia, the fact is that there is always

a strong level of mistrust among FSU states as well as a high level of power asymmetry. Accordingly, we must look further for a better explanation as to how some of the states are able to develop a cooperative relationship with Russia while others are not.

Table 5.1 shows that the top energy importing state (Moldova) and the top energy exporting state (Turkmenistan) have a relatively small number of bilateral treaties signed with Russia, while the second largest energy importing state (Belarus) and the second largest energy exporting state (Kazakhstan) have a relatively large amount of bilateral treaties signed with Russia. It is precisely this set of cases that should be examined in more detail. I will first examine those states that have a large number of signed treaties with Russia and then those that have a small number of signed treaties with Russia.

Active Engagement

Although Belarus and Kazakhstan are different in terms of their energy needs, both had nuclear weapons stationed on their territory at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and both are contiguous to Russia. Both states have actively engaged in multilateral institutions in the post Soviet space such as the CIS for both states and the Eurasian Economic Cooperation (EvrAzEs) for Kazakhstan. More recently, both states joined the multilateral Customs Union. While both states have actively engaged in multilateral organizations within the post Soviet space, they also have actively engaged Russia bilaterally despite issues of mistrust and power asymmetry on a large number of issue areas spanning the security, economic and integration treaty types. For example, both Belarus and Kazakhstan signed many security treaties dealing with the military forces as well as border security and territorial integrity. In addition, they signed many trade and currency treaties. Ultimately, they were not only interested in energy, but were interested in actively engaging Russia in a wide variety of issue areas. I now turn to a focused discussion on each of these two cases to examine how they actively engaged Russia.

Russia-Belarus Relations

Although Belarus was never a buffer state during the Soviet period, it became one following the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the Baltic states looked toward Europe and the West, Belarus had more difficulty in choosing its orientation. This became even more difficult as the Baltic states joined the EU, and Belarus became a border state between the EU on its western boundary, and Russia to the East. While some in the West have seen Belarus as only cooperating with Russia and turning its back on Europe, others have argued that Belarus has had a pragmatic approach towards both the East and the West while not

turning its back to either side (R. Allison, White, and M. Light 2005). In fact, Belarus signed a friendship and cooperation agreement with Poland in 1992, and joined the Central European Identity in 1994 (Burant 1995). In contrast, Belarus only signed a friendship and cooperation agreement with Russia in 1995. In other words, Belarus seemingly engaged both East and West, yet first engaged Europe before engaging Russia.

Despite engaging Europe, the Belarussian leadership knew that it had to engage Russia, and cautiously engaged Europe. Belorussian politicians even publicly acknowledged that although they wanted to engage Europe, they were concerned with the fact that they were dependent on Russia for oil and gas, and they did not want to hurt their relationship with Russia (Burant 1995). The West was concerned with Belarus' reliance upon Russian oil and gas as well, and thought that Russia would use this to force Belarus to cede sovereignty to Russia (R. Allison, White, and M. Light 2005; Burant 1995; Cameron and Domański 2005; Dahl Martinsen 2002; Kanet, Miner, and Resler 1992; Oldberg 1997; Wallander 2007).

Although Belorussian President Alexander Lukashenko initially tried to manage relations with both East and West, his authoritarian policies began to frustrate the EU. Increasingly, the EU marginalized relations with Belarus, which forced him to more actively engage Russia. While Lukashenko found Russian President Boris Yeltsin to be a very cooperative partner initially, the relationship began to change under Russian President Vladimir Putin. In fact, Putin became very cautious of engaging Lukashenko, and was not happy with the level of integration that had occurred between Belarus and Russia during the Yeltsin years (Burant 1995). Ultimately, both Russia and Belarus sought to engage one another and build a successful cooperative relationship. I now turn to a discussion of how Russia and Belarus built their successful relationship.

Russia-Belarus Bilateral Treaty Networks

An analysis of the relationship between Belarus and Russia indeed shows that the two states were very actively engaged with one another (Figure 5.1). It should be noted that Figure 5.1 does not show the isolate treaties in the bilateral relationship. Isolate treaties are those that are not nested in any other treaty, nor do they serve as nesting treaties. Generally isolate treaties are treaties that are required to solve a single issue and are not intended to serve as foundations for future cooperation.

More important than the issue of the isolates is the examination of those treaties that are central to the bilateral relationship between Belarus and Russia. In this case, Figure 5.1 shows that the most central treaties to the relationship are those that establish the bilateral union between Russia and Belarus.[4] Specifically, these are the Charter of the Bilateral Union, the Treaty on the Bilateral Union, and the Treaty on the New Bilateral Union. However, these aren't the only important treaties in the relationship. For example, on the left hand side of Fig-

ure 5.1, the establishment of a monetary union between the two states figures prominently and is developed out of the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation.



Figure 5.1. Russia-Belarus Bilateral Treaty Network

Figure 5.1 also the interconnectedness of bilateral treaties. While most of the economic treaties are located on the left of the Figure and the security treaties such as the Strategic Forces Agreement as well as the Agreement on Military Cooperation are located on the bottom right of the Figure, they are still connected through ties between treaties. Especially interesting is the fact that these treaties are often connected through integrative treaties such as the Bilateral Union treaties.

Further examination of Figure 5.1 shows that the Belarus-Russia bilateral treaty networks are fairly cohesive, meaning that there are few networks that are

separated from the main treaty network. One notable exception is the network in the bottom left quadrant of Figure 5.1 that deals with the effects of the Chernobyl disaster and its after-effects. However, most of the networks are tied together into one main network.

It is important to also analyze the bilateral treaty networks over time. Striking is the fact that there is a pattern in those treaties that are signed over time. In the early stages of the relationship, Belarus and Russia are building their relationship and focusing on treaties such as the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1995). In addition, both states focused on developing trade relations as well as military cooperation. The level of cooperation far exceeds the mere reliance on Russian energy that one would expect given the fact that Belarus imports 87 percent of its energy from Russia. In fact, more treaties address trade and currency than the import and export of natural gas and oil.

The second stage of the relationship between Russia and Belarus (1995-2000) focused on building the union between Russia and Belarus. Many of their treaties were directly related to the bilateral union. In fact, on the upper right side of Figure 5.1, it is evident how central the union treaties are to the relationship, and how closely tied many of the bilateral treaties signed during this time period are to the union treaties.

Finally, in the third stage (2001-2005), the relationship focused on fine tuning issues related to the bilateral union. Few new substantive issue areas needed to be addressed during this period, as so many issues had already been addressed. In other words, the critical time period for building the treaty networks was the first ten years. Interestingly, this coincides with the period where some scholars have noted that Russian President Putin became very hesitant to engage Lukashenko (Burant 1995). However, it is logical to question how much more integration and cooperation was necessary since so much had already been accomplished by 2000.

It is important to note that even though I have focused on the bilateral relationship in this study, that Belarus also engaged Russia through multilateral means such as the CIS (Figure 5.2). Interestingly, when bilateral and multilateral treaty networks are included the treaty networks look very different. One example is that in the Figure 5.1, the treaty network dealing with Chernobyl (bottom of Figure 5.1) is its own treaty network that is not connected to the main bilateral treaty network. However, in Figure 5.2, the treaty network dealing with Chernobyl (right side of Figure 5.2) is now connected to the main treaty network through the CIS Agreement on Chernobyl. In fact, Figure 5.2 shows that there aren't any treaty networks that are not connected to the main treaty network. All of the networks are tied tightly together through treaty ties, making the bilateral treaty network even stronger. Although Figure 5.2 is very complex and difficult to discern, suffice it to say that Belarus signed many important treaties such as the multilateral Customs Union treaty and the multilateral Economic Union treaty that allowed for important levels of economic integration and trade. In fact, the most central multilateral treaty to the bilateral relationship between Russia and Belarus was the multilateral Customs Union treaty (Middle of Figure 5.2).

These multilateral and bilateral agreements allowed for a tremendous growth in trade between both states (Table 5.2).

Additionally, Belarus signed many security treaties such as the CIS Collective Security treaty and the CIS Strategic Forces treaty of 1992. While Belarus was very active multilaterally, nevertheless its main focus was on developing a strong and cooperative bilateral relationship with Russia.



Figure 5.2. Russia-Belarus Bilateral and Multilateral Treaty Networks

Finally, it is important to note in all of these figures that the ties that bind each treaty node are important. The number of ties between the treaties is an important way of examining the strength of the network. Those treaty networks that have the most ties are stronger than networks that are more ad hoc without the ties since violating a treaty that is tied to other treaties has the effect of violating all of the treaties to which it is tied. Additionally, treaties that are tied to other treaties often deepen and expand upon prior treaties, thus increasing bilat-

eral cooperation. Therefore it is telling to examine the number of ties in a bilateral relationship to determine the strength of the treaty network and therefore the bilateral relationship. We can examine the number of ties each year within a treaty network to see how strong the treaty network is. In addition, it is possible to compare the number of ties and the number of treaties. If a state has a large number of treaties, but few ties between the treaties, the network is not as strong as if all of the treaties are tied to one another. In the case of Belarus, the number of ties evolves over time, and by 1995 overtakes the number of treaties (Table 5.3). By 2005, the end of this study, the number of ties far exceeds the number of treaties, indicating that the treaty network between Belarus and Russia is extremely strong.

Table 5.2. Russia-Belarus Trade

Year	Imports*	Exports*
1992	0	1837.16
1993	0	1137.8
1994	2092.6	1873.75
1995	1956.7	3088.93
1996	2694.73	3522.12
1997	4627.1	4631.35
1998	4513.8	4670.39
1999	3236	3766.73
2000	3764.2	5604.69
2001	0	5437.89
2002	4069.01	5922.3
2003	4899.85	7601.92
2004	0	11142.6
2005	4614.12	10118.2

Figures in Current US Millions of Dollars
*Imports are Russian Imports from Belarus, Exports are Russian Exports to Belarus
Source: Correlates of War Trade Data

Ultimately, Russia and Belarus created a strong treaty network. This is evinced by the ties between treaties. Individual treaties were linked to the treaty network through these ties, which created a strong legal standing for their bilateral relationship. Further, the linking of the treaties into a strong network allowed both states to expect certain behaviors vis à vis one another, which further allowed them to develop a cooperative relationship. Despite the fact that they have developed close ties, few scholars would now predict that Belarus will be assimilated into Russia. Instead, Belarus has solidified its sovereignty and de-

veloped a cooperative bilateral relationship with Russia through the creation of a strong treaty network.

Much like Belarus signed many treaties with Russia, so too did Kazakhstan. Yet Russia did not immediately recognize the strategic importance of developing a solid relationship with Kazakhstan. For example, in creating the CIS, Russia first signed agreements with Ukraine and Belarus. The Central Asian states only joined the CIS after the original three had created the CIS (M. B. Olcott 1991). However, Russia soon realized the importance of developing a strong bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan. I will now examine the evolution of the relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan.

Table 5.3. Bilateral Treaty Ties and Treaties (Russia and Belarus)

Year	Number of Ties to Treaties	Number of Treaties
1991	0	1
1992	12	26
1993	30	49
1994	57	70
1995	123	105
1996	161	121
1997	184	135
1998	235	151
1999	277	167
2000	308	176
2001	332	182
2002	338	188
2003	348	190
2004	352	196
2005	356	198

Russia-Kazakhstan Relations

In December 1991, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine met in Minsk and created the CIS. None of the Central Asian states had been invited to join. Yet the leaders of the newly independent Central Asian states met in Ashkhabad (the capital of Turkmenistan) and decided that despite the fact that they were not initially invited, that joining the CIS would be the best way to transition to independence (M. B. Olcott 1991, 2009). The next meeting of the CIS was then held in the Kazakh capital of Alma-Ata, where the former Soviet republics were declared sovereign states responsible for their own sovereignty, which included being responsible for their own natural resources. This was an extremely important beginning for

the new sovereign state of Kazkhstan, as it had incredible natural resources within its borders, and stood to profit tremendously from this.

The Caspian Sea region has tremendous wealth in both oil and natural gas. Of these states, Kazakhstan had the largest energy reserves, with the potential of producing sixty five billion barrels of oil per year, second only in the region to Russia, which had the potential of producing ninety nine billion barrels of oil per year (Kalicki 2001). These vast energy reserves urged Western businesses, policy makers, and scholars to urge the United States to develop closer ties with Kazakhstan to try and lessen Western reliance on Russian energy (Alexandrov 1999; Allison 2004; Bahgat 2002; Macfarlane 2004). Despite the fact that many Western companies bought interests in some of the oil wells in Kazakhstan, the United States was largely unsuccessful in convincing Kazakhstan to lessen Russia's influence in the region by building pipelines that bypassed Russia. Instead, Kazakhstan was interested in actively engaging Russia and largely keeping the status quo by using pipelines going through Russia.

It should be clear that although the West was mainly interested in Kazakhstan for its energy sources, Russia had more diverse interests in maintaining a cooperative bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan. Russia had security interests in Kazakhstan such as the Baikonur Cosmodrome, where all of the rockets for the space program were launched during Soviet times. While Russia could have built the infrastructure to maintain their space program and launch rockets from within Russia, the investment would have been extremely costly in terms of time and resources. Since the infrastructure was already intact in Kazakhstan, it was within Russia's strategic interests to maintain a cooperative relationship that would allow Russia to continue to have access to that vital infrastructure. In addition, Kazakhstan had nuclear weapons, and Russia was interested in ensuring their removal from Kazakhstan to Russia.

Finally, Kazakhstan was extremely important to Russia from a geopolitical standpoint. Kazakhstan borders many Islamic states, and is not far from Afghanistan. Its important strategic location creates a buffer zone from terrorism, and Russia had strategic interests in ensuring that the volatile situation south of Kazakhstan does not spread to Russia. Thus, Russia had strategic interests in creating and maintaining a cooperative bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan. I now examine how they created a cooperative bilateral relationship.

Russia-Kazakhstan Bilateral Treaty Network

An analysis of the relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia shows that they indeed were very actively engaged (Figure 5.3). Figure 5.3 shows that some important treaties are central to the relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia. Specifically the Friendship and Cooperation treaty is the most central treaty in the relationship. Contrary to Belarus, which signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with Russia in 1995, Kazakhstan signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in May, 1992. Moreover, a great many treaties that followed the treaty

constantly were nested within the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, giving it paramount importance in the relationship.

In addition to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Figure 5.3 shows the importance of the Baikonur Cosmodrome to the bilateral relationship. Two important treaties dealing with Baikonur are central to the relationship. The first, labeled as Baikonur General in Figure 5.3 lays out the conditions of Russian forces using the cosmodrome for launching rockets and as a center for Russia's space program. The second central treaty dealing with Baikonur is labeled as Baikonur Rental in Figure 5.3. This treaty details the conditions and the amount of rent that Russia must pay to Kazakhstan to maintain control of the Baikonur Cosmodrome.



Figure 5.3. Russia-Kazakhstan Treaty Networks

A further examination of Figure 5.3 shows how treaties addressing different issue areas fit into the treaty networks. For example, in addition to the treaties addressing Baikonur on the left of Figure 5.3, financial agreements related to military forces and the Agreement on Military Cooperation are also on the left side of the figure. On the right side of Figure 5.3 (closer to the bottom right) are a subset of the treaty network addressing trade treaties such as the Free Trade Treaty and the Agreement on Foreign Trade Activities. These treaties deal with minimizing tariffs on trade and addressing imports and exports between Kazakhstan and Russia. The Agreement on Foreign Trade Activities deals with how each state approaches trade in terms of third parties, specifically CIS member states, in addition to agreeing how to address third party products that come through either Russia or Kazakhstan before being imported into either one of the two states.

In the upper right corner of Figure 5.4 are treaties that address transportation. While the trade treaties in the lower right of the figure discussed transportation of goods for import and export, the transportation treaties in the upper right of the figure specifically addressed not only transportation of goods, but also transportation for citizens. For example, the Treaty on Air Transportation addressed issues of air space and allowing civilian airlines access to transport goods and people between the two states.

The importance of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia cannot be understated in this analysis. The treaty is not only the most central treaty to this bilateral relationship, but it also is the lodestone treaty that allows the deepening and extending of cooperation in different issue areas. Each of the major issue areas (economic, security, and integrative) are connected by treaty ties through the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation.

Similar to the relationship between Belarus and Russia, the bilateral relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia was extremely active early following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most of the central treaties of the relationship were signed in the first five years of the relationship. The fact that most of the central treaties in the relationship were signed in the first time period indicates that Kazakhstan and Russia had built a cooperative bilateral relationship by 1995, and that they were able to address issues within the framework of the cooperative relationship by linking new treaties to the treaty network. Moreover, the critical period for building a cooperative relationship was certainly within the first two time periods, meaning that a cooperative relationship had been developed within the first decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Despite the fact that Kazakhstan was not one of the founding members of the CIS, Kazakhstan was very active multilaterally as well as bilaterally with Russia. Kazakhstan actively engaged both the CIS and other multilateral institutions (Figure 5.4). Specifically, Kazakhstan engaged the Economic Union and the Customs Union as well as the multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Among the CIS treaties that Kazakhstan linked to its bilateral relationship with Russia was the CIS Collective Security Treaty, the CIS Agreement on Oil Transport, the CIS Strategic Forces Agreement, and the CIS Agreement on the

Exchange of Information as well as many other CIS treaties. In addition to the CIS, Kazakhstan was also an active member of EvrAzEs (Eurasian Economic Cooperation), and actively engaged Russia and other member states through its multilateral structure.

Finally, it is important to examine the treaty ties among the bilateral networks between Kazakhstan and Russia. Similar to Belarus, the number of treaty ties far exceeds the number of treaties. By 2005, the number of ties is roughly double the number of treaties (Table 5.4). The number of treaty ties overtakes the number of treaties in 1994 between Kazakhstan and Russia, whereas the number of treaty ties in the relationship between Belarus and Russia overtook the number of treaties in 1995. Although this difference is only one year, it speaks to the fact that Russia and Kazakhstan actively pursued a relationship that was built on the rule of law and that was grounded in prior treaties. In other words, their relationship was very much built upon treaties that are strongly interconnected into a strong treaty network.



Figure 5.4. Russia-Kazakhstan Bilateral and Multilateral Treaty Networks

Ultimately both the Russia-Belarus and Russia-Kazakhstan relationships show active engagement through treaty construction. Even though Russia was interested in having cooperative relations with both states for different reasons, both Belarus and Kazakhstan realized that they had to engage Russia to achieve their strategic interests. Both of these bilateral relationships show the importance of not only engaging Russia, but also the importance of creating strong treaty networks. By creating the strong treaty networks, a pattern of behavior emerges for all parties that can be relied upon by state actors. Despite the fact that there is power asymmetry and varying levels of mistrust in these relationships, the strength of the bilateral treaty networks show that states can be expected to follow the patterns of behavior established by these treaties and allow for cooperation in the future. In addition, expanding the bilateral treaty networks to include multilateral treaties only serves to strengthen the relationship and thus the ability of states to predict another state's future behavior.

Table 5.4. Bilateral Treaty Ties and Treaties (Russia and Kazakhstan)

Year	Number of Ties to Treaties	Number of Treaties
1991	0	2
1992	20	34
1993	50	59
1994	106	88
1995	201	117
1996	240	131
1997	258	141
1998	310	163
1999	324	168
2000	337	175
2001	341	181
2002	357	184
2003	357	185
2004	381	194
2005	421	203

Up to this point I have examined two cases that have actively engaged Russia. I examined these two cases precisely because each of the states in question either imported a large amount of energy or exported a large amount of energy. Specifically, each of these states either imported or exported the second largest amount of energy. Thus, their level of engagement with Russia should not be a surprise. They needed Russia in both cases. Belarus needed Russia to provide energy, and Kazakhstan needed Russian infrastructure to export its oil and natural gas. Although the relationship between these states is far more complex than just energy, nevertheless examining these relationships based upon their need to

strategically engage Russia is a natural starting point. At first examination, it seemed clear that these states actively engaged Russia because of the number of treaties that they signed with Russia. However, upon closer examination, it became clear that not only the number of treaties matter, but also the number of ties between treaties that make up the treaty network are important to creating a cooperative bilateral relationship. It should be noted that the importance of treaty ties is clear for states who have signed a large number of treaties with Russia, but the question remains as to whether the importance of treaty ties holds true for states who have signed a small number of treaties with Russia. I now turn to an examination of two cases that have signed a small number of bilateral treaties with Russia.

Passive Engagement

The next two cases that I examine in this chapter are states that should have strategic interests in actively engaging Russia, yet have signed a relatively small number of bilateral treaties with Russia. The first case I examine is Turkmenistan, which exports 215 percent of its energy use, and then Moldova, which imports 98 percent of its energy use. In both cases, each state is the largest importer or exporter of energy in the CIS. Both of these states need to cooperate with Russia. In Moldova's case, it is dependent upon Russian energy exports to survive. It is in a similar position to Belarus. In contrast, Turkmenistan is in a similar position to Kazakhstan, where it needs access to Russian infrastructure to export its energy resources to other states. I will first examine the case of Turkmenistan, since it has many similarities to the case of Kazakhstan, and then I will examine the case of Moldova, which is a case that should be more similar to Belarus.

Russia-Turkmenistan Relations

Turkmenistan is a state that is much like Kazakhstan. It is located in the Caspian Sea region, and has an abundance of resources. Turkmenistan, like Kazakhstan, was not one of the original members of the CIS, yet was quickly convinced of its utility. In fact, following the establishment of the CIS, Turkmenistan held a summit in Ashkhabat with other Central Asian states over how to engage the CIS. It was decided that the Central Asian states should join the CIS and become active members (Olcott 1991).

Although Turkmenistan has fewer possible oil and natural gas wells than Kazakhstan, nevertheless Turkmenistan has tremendous reserves and is able to export large amounts of energy (Kalicki 2001). Despite pressure on Turkmenistan to try to build pipelines that bypass Russia, Turkmenistan chose to cooper-

ate with Russia rather than anger Russia by choosing to engage Western interests over cooperating with Russia.

While Russia had many security interests in Kazakhstan such as maintaining access to the Baikonur Cosmodrome, Russia did not have the same level of security interests in Turkmenistan. There was no Russian military base within Turkmenistan's borders, and Turkmenistan wasn't as geographically strategically important to Russia as Kazakhstan. While Kazakhstan was central to Russian security and economic strategy, Turkmenistan was only important to Russian strategic economic interests. Thus, it should be no surprise that there are less treaties in the bilateral relationship between Russia and Turkmenistan than there are between Russia and Kazakhstan.

Turkmenistan also wanted to be cautious toward Russia. While it wanted to maintain a relationship with Russia, it also wanted to be very independent of Russia's influence. Turkmenistan wanted to be seen as a "neutral" regional actor, where it could engage its neighbors on necessary issues, but not get entangled in any arrangements that were not of its own choosing. It was not hostile to any of its neighbors, but nevertheless had more of an isolationist mentality than Kazakhstan. In other words, Turkmenistan wanted to cautiously engage and cooperate with Russia, but it wanted to do so on its own terms. It could achieve selective cooperation in areas that it needed to cooperate without becoming over engaged.

Russia-Turkmenistan Bilateral Treaty Networks

While there are relatively few bilateral treaties between Turkmenistan and Russia, there are nevertheless some strong networks (Figure 5.5). It is interesting to note that Figure 5.5 shows that the most central treaty in this relationship is the bilateral treaty which states that Russia assumes the debts and becomes the successor state to the Soviet Union. In the two previous case studies, the most central bilateral treaties have been broad and cooperative treaties that lay out the future relations between the states. In this case, the most central bilateral treaty has to do with assuming debt.

Similar to the previous case studies where there was active engagement of Russia, it is possible to see the different issue areas addressed by the bilateral treaties in Figure 5.5. For example, at the bottom right side of Figure 5.5 are treaties addressing the status of the Russian military forces in Turkmenistan and supplying them. In the bottom middle section of the figure are treaties which address economic issues such as free trade and cooperation in the oil and gas sectors. On the top of the figure are treaties that address human rights and the status of refugees. In addition, there are two treaty networks that are not associated with the main treaty network. One of the treaty networks addresses citizenship issues, while the other network addresses specific issues of debt and repayment of that debt between the two states.

Despite the fact that there are relatively few treaties, they are connected by treaty ties that serve to deepen and expand upon treaties as well as strengthen specific treaties. However, one big difference between this case and the other case studies examined in this chapter is that the most central treaties are not friendship and cooperation treaties, but rather treaties that address debt inheritance in the post-Soviet period. While this is puzzling upon first examination, in reality it is consistent with Turkmenistan's approach to foreign policy. Turkmenistan is interested in cautiously engaging regional actors on its own terms and not get involved in entanglements that would serve to force it to behave in a specific way. The debt inheritance treaties clearly establish the separation and sovereignty of states and their post-Soviet responsibilities whereas friendship and cooperation treaties are usually broad and set the tone for future cooperation. Thus it is not surprising that Turkmenistan and Russia have chosen to have the Agreement on Debt Inheritance of the Soviet Union as the most central treaty in their relationship.



Figure 5.5. Russia-Turkmenistan Bilateral Treaty Networks

Interestingly, most of the treaty construction took place during the first time period (1991-1995). The most central treaties in this relationship were all constructed and signed during this period. However, it should be noted that there is still connectedness between all of these treaties. There are merely fewer treaties than in the other two case studies examined. However, it should not be assumed that since there are fewer treaties in this relationship, that this bilateral relationship is any less cooperative than the previous two case studies. The reason for this is that despite the small number of treaties, there is still a significant amount of treaty nesting occurring in this bilateral relationship. This indicates that there is not an ad hoc approach to the relationship that merely resolves issues on an issue-by-issue basis as opposed to building a cooperative relationship. The evidence points to a building of a cooperative relationship even if the number of treaties signed don't suggest that is the case.

The fact that Turkmenistan and Russia have a cooperative bilateral relationship is further bolstered by examining the number of treaty ties in their bilateral relationship (Table 5.5). Like the previous case studies, the number of treaty ties exceed the number of treaties. In fact, the number of treaty ties exceed the number of treaties by 1992, whereas the number of treaty ties overtook the number of treaties later in the relationships examined earlier in this chapter.

Table 5.5. Bilateral Treaty Ties and Treaties (Russia and Turkmenistan)

Year	Number of Ties to Treaties	Number of Treaties
1991	0	1
1992	20	19
1993	42	35
1994	44	37
1995	86	67
1996	88	68
1997	88	69
1998	88	69
1999	96	71
2000	96	71
2001	96	71
2002	100	74
2003	110	77
2004	110	77
2005	110	77

Finally, Turkmenistan not only engaged Russia bilaterally, but also engaged the CIS multilaterally (Figure 5.6). Again, the overall number of treaties is less than in the previous case studies examined, but nevertheless there is evidence of creation of strong treaty networks. Whereas the other case studies examined in this chapter have had broad multilateral treaties such as the Economic Union and

Customs Union as being central to their treaty networks, Turkmenistan and Russia do not. In fact, while they have CIS treaties as being parts of the network, the CIS treaties are specific treaties like the CIS Convention on Legal Aid to Citizens and the CIS Agreement on the Debt Inheritance of the USSR.

Even though Turkmenistan did not sign as many treaties with Russia as either Belarus or Kazakhstan, I would hesitate to claim that their relationship with Russia was not a cooperative relationship. In fact, I would argue that the reason for less treaties was that both states achieved their strategic goals from the relationship, and did not need more treaties. The fact that Turkmenistan had a cooperative bilateral relationship with Russia despite the fact that it signed the lowest number of treaties with Russia means that the number of treaties signed is a questionable measure of a cooperative bilateral relationship. Ultimately, Turkmenistan should not be placed in the category of passive engagement. It actively engaged Russia on the issues that both states needed addressed, and both states created a treaty network that allows future cooperation rather than pursuing relations on an ad hoc and issue oriented approach. In contrast to the relationship between Turkmenistan and Russia, the relationship between Moldova and Russia is much more problematic. Despite the fact that Moldova and Russia have signed more bilateral treaties over the time period of study than Turkmenistan and Russia, their relationship has been much more problematic. I now turn to an examination of the relationship between Moldova and Russia to try and explain this discrepancy.



Figure 5.6. Russian-Turkmenistan Bilateral and Multilateral Treaty Networks

Russia-Moldova Relations

The relationship between Russia and Moldova has always been problematic. Geographically, Moldova was a perfect buffer state between the East and the West, and for centuries, western Moldova was constantly being fought over by both the Romanian Empire in the West, and the Russian Empire to the East. Western Moldova constantly changed hands between the two empires despite the fact that its culture and language more closely resembled Romanian than any Slavic language (King 1994, 1998, 1999). Being fought over by two empires caused the Moldovans to distrust empires and view them as expansionistic (Löwenhardt, R. J. Hill, and Margot Light 2001). However, following annexation by Russia in 1812, Moldova remained a part of the Russian Empire until 1918 when it again became a part of Romania. Moldova became a part of the Soviet Union in 1940 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and remained a Soviet republic until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is important to note that modern day Transnistria was always a part of the Russian Empire and was not fought over as had been western Moldova.

Relations between Russia and Moldova reached new lows just before the breakup of the Soviet Union. In 1989 Moldova passed a law which made Romanian the state language and replaced the Cyrillic letters with Roman letters. This law had the effect of signaling to both Moscow and Moldovan citizens that there was a strong ethnic tie between Moldova and Romania. Indeed, there was a strong suggestion that Moldova might seek to unify with Romania. A cleavage developed along the boundary between east and west Moldova: between what is now the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria.

During the period 1989-1991, two significant events occurred. First, what began as a protest in 1989 by those living in Transnistria rapidly evolved into a revolt (1990), and a full separatist movement (1991), leading to a civil war between Transnistria and the Republic of Moldova.[5] Before 1991, the Soviet Union had been setting up bank accounts for the Transnistrians and also supplying them with weapons to help with their secessionist efforts (Kaufman and Bowers 1998; Kaufman 1996). In fact, the Transnistrians pushed into Moldova across the Dniester river and took control of Moldovan villages; an event dismissively called the “silent putsch” by Romanians (Chinn and Roper 1995). Second, in spring 1990, elections were held for the Moldovan parliament, with the pro-Romania Popular Front party defeating the Moldovan Communist Party. One of the Popular Front's main issues was for Moldova to become a part of Romania (Jackson 2003).

Both the revolt in Transnistria and the elections of 1990 significantly cooled relations between Moscow and Moldova, and at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, both of the newly independent states were slow and reluctant to form a relationship. While Romanian nationalism in Moldova had transformed into Moldovan nationalism by 1992, there was a continuing deep mistrust of Russian intentions toward Moldova. However, Moldova was still eco-

nomically dependent on Russia, and when Russia threatened to stop trading with Moldova if it did not join the CIS Economic Union, Moldova had no choice but to reluctantly join the CIS Economic Union.

Russia's Interests in Moldova

Jackson (2003) identifies three issues that drive Russia's interest in Moldova: threat of Moldovan unification with Romania; the status and interests of the Russian-speaking diaspora; strategic interest; and economic interests. Even though the threat of Moldovan unification with Romania passed in 1992, Russian elites had continuing concerns. Russia's influence would completely erode if Moldova were to unify with Romania, and they were also very worried about the precedent that would be set by having the first non-Baltic former republic join the new "West."

One of the stated goals of the new post-Soviet Russian government was to provide support for ethnic Russians living in the former Soviet republics. With many ethnic Russians living in Transnistria, Russia wanted to ensure that they would not be treated as badly as their counterparts in the Baltic states. To ensure that ethnic Russians would be well-treated, Russia passed a new law governing the procedure for accepting new territories into the Russian Federation in 2001 (either contiguous or non-contiguous). The law was specifically drafted with Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in mind (Gayoso 2009) so that if ethnic Russians were mistreated and request unification with Russia, Russia could absorb the territories into the Russian Federation.

Although Moldova was economically dependent on Russia, Russia was not economically dependent on Moldova. In fact, a greater percent of trade with Russia occurred between Russia and Transnistria than occurred between Russia and Moldova. While Transnistrian production was valued in Soviet times, it became negligible during the post-Soviet period. Transnistria needed Russia for economic assistance, and could not function without it, and Russia wanted to maintain its relevance as a regional economic power, and thus wanted to maintain economic relationship with both Moldova and Transnistria.

Arguably the most important interest that Russia had in Moldova at the beginning of their relationship was strategic. Although Russia had lost its influence on many of the new independent states of Eastern Europe, Russia still wanted to be a major power player in the region if not a global major power. In Moldova, Russia could still retain its position as a major power player. Moscow believed that Russia was needed to solve ethnic and political conflicts within its regional sphere of influence. Since ethnic conflicts were beginning in the former Yugoslavia and in Moldova itself, Russia saw the need to maintain a military and economic presence in Moldova.

Moldova's Civil War and Russian Intervention

Before the collapse of the USSR, the Soviet 14th Army was stationed in Moldova. These forces were stationed in what is now Transnistria, with many allowed to settle there. In fact, with many of the soldiers finding kinship with Transnistrians, there developed increasingly strong bonds with citizens.

By 1991, Transnistria was in the throes of a civil war with Moldova. Although Russia's official policy was one of neutrality, the 14th Army provided weapons and logistical support. Many officers helped form and served in the Transnistrian Army even though they were already serving in the Russian military. Indeed, General Aleksandr Lebed, the commander of the 14th Army, ran for and won a position in the new Transnistrian government (Jackson 2003).

Officially, Russia remained neutral, and pushed for a quick resolution to this crisis. President Yeltsin helped broker a cease fire between Transnistria and Moldova granting de facto independence to Transnistria (1992). In exchange, Yeltsin agreed to remove the 14th Army from Moldova and use Russian peacekeeping troops to maintain the peace. The Duma rejected this treaty, further complicating the bilateral relationship. Moreover, with the 14th Army still stationed in Transnistria, Transnistria had no incentive to settle its dispute with Moldova and was pleased to settle for the de facto independence that the Russian Army was willing to give them (Kaufman and Bowers 1998; Kolossov and O'Loughlin 1998; Lynch 2002). It was not until the 1999 Istanbul Conference that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was able to bring together all of the interested players to resolve the conflict. The first troops of the Russian 14th Army began to withdraw from Transnistria in 2000 (W. Hill 2002), and between 2000 and 2003 the bilateral relationship improved as the relationship between Moscow and Transnistria worsened. However, the bilateral relationship once again began to deteriorate in 2003 with Moldova's refusal to sign the Kozak memorandum, which would have provided a resolution to the conflict. Instead, Moldova signaled its intent to try and have the EU fully resolve the conflict than have to rely on Russia for resolution (Melikova 2003; Tolkacheva 2006). Moldova's refusal to sign the Kozak memorandum immediately led to increased hostility between Moscow and Moldova (Tolkacheva 2006).

Moldova and the CIS: Reluctant Acceptance

Although Moldova wanted to look to the West for assistance, it was not forthcoming. With Moldova being economically reliant upon Russia, it had no choice but to give significant attention to that relationship. With Russia threatening to cut off trade if Moldova did not join the CIS Economic Union, Moldova joined. President Micea Snegur, in his address announcing Moldova's decision to join the CIS Economic Union, specifically stated that Moldova was doing this not to

develop closer ties with Russia, but rather to maintain trade relations with the other CIS member states (Jackson 2003).

During the immediate post-Soviet period, the bulk of the CIS security treaties that were signed by Moldova only tangentially involved Moldova. Specifically, Moldova signed treaties that set broad policies, addressed crime, addressed trafficking, etc. However, Moldova did not sign any treaty that addressed issues such as borders or weapons. In other words, Moldova only passively engaged the CIS in order to honor its obligations, but was very wary of becoming too closely involved. Interestingly, the bulk of the CIS treaties signed by Moldova were signed during the first years of the CIS. Indeed, during the early post-Soviet period, Moldova failed to sign all of the treaties dealing with the CIS's fledgling collective security arrangements. While many of the CIS security treaties of the years 1992-93 entailed administrative-infrastructural arrangements (roughly 45 percent of the total), Moldova was a party to only around one-third of them.

This pattern of careful and reluctant engagement of the CIS by Moldova continued throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Moldova was an active party to agreements on focused security policy concerns of a secondary nature (e.g., organized crime, drugs, natural disasters, and terrorism) however, continued throughout this period to be very wary of signing any CIS treaty addressing the primary security interests of Moldova, specifically addressing borders, troop locations, and Transnistria. Moldova reluctantly engaged Russia bilaterally in addressing its primary security interests, and tried to resolve the situation in Transniestrovia with Russia's assistance.

Moldova's Even More Reluctant Acceptance of Russia

One of the most interesting aspects of the relationship between Russia and Moldova is that it does not follow the normal pattern of development in bilateral treaty formation. Many of the other bilateral treaties between Russia and the other members of the CIS involve laying the foundation for relations between the two states, signing treaties of mutual understanding and friendship, and then beginning to address substantive issues. Although the first bilateral treaty between Russia and Moldova involves a mutual declaration of sovereignty, it is not until 2001 that the first friendship treaty between Russia and Moldova is signed (Figure 5.7). Most of the bilateral treaties involved substantive issues, and very few of the treaties showed any signs of treaty nestedness. In fact, in 2001, Russian-Moldovan relations improved as Russian-Transnistrian relations deteriorated.

Despite the fact that the overall number of bilateral treaties between Russia and Moldova declined after 2000, relations between the two states actually improved. There was more of an effort to maintain a dialogue, and both states seemed to be content with maintaining the status quo in Transnistria. With the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia, there is renewed interest in the status of

Transnistria. In fact, in September, 2008, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, reiterated to the Moldovans that as long as the status quo was maintained in Transnistria and that Moldovan forces would not move into the disputed territory, that Moldova had nothing to fear from Russia.

It should be noted that Figure 5.7 is very different from any of the figures for the previous bilateral relationships that have been examined in this chapter. First, there are numerous different networks that are small. There seem to be networks dealing with individual issue areas, but there seems to be no comprehensive approach to building a relationship. Rather, only treaties that specifically address a specific issue area are linked with no cumulation. This approach would indicate more of an ad hoc or issue specific approach to relations as opposed to building a cooperative bilateral relationship.



Figure 5.7. Russia-Moldova Bilateral Treaty Networks

Indeed, when the same bilateral relationship between Russia and Moldova is examined over time, there seems to be very little evidence of building a relationship the way there was in the relationships between Russia and Kazakhstan and Belarus. In fact, there seems to be virtually no evolution of the relationship.

An analysis of Moldova's engagement of multilateral institutions as well as Russia shows that Moldova was extremely cautious in its approach to the institutions of the post-Soviet space (Figure 5.8). This is especially noticeable in Figure 5.8 because it is easier to identify the individual treaties in this figure than has been the case for the other relationships examined. In this figure, CIS trea-

ties are identified by circles, bilateral treaties with Russia are identified by squares, and non-CIS multilateral treaties are inverted triangles. It should be noted that there are very few prominent CIS treaties that are important in the treaty network. Rather the central multilateral treaties are the Economic Union, the Helsinki Act, and the UN Charter. This further confirms Moldova's reluctance to engage Russia either unilaterally or multilaterally. It seems as though Moldova is still looking toward the West and hoping to more actively engage Western institutions than those in the post-Soviet space.



Figure 5.8. Russia-Moldova Bilateral and Multilateral Treaty Networks

Finally, an examination of the number of ties compared to the number of treaties reinforces the conclusion that the relationship between Russia and Moldova is not cooperative, but is rather grounded in the issue-oriented approach to bilateral relations (Table 5.6). Interestingly, the number of ties never exceeds the number of treaties. In the other cases examined, the number of treaty ties exceeded the number of treaties in the relationship. However, this is not the case in the relationship between Moldova and Russia. This is the best indication that Moldova and Russia did not have a cooperative bilateral relationship.

While the section examining Moldova has been more detailed than the other case studies, this has been necessary due to the fact that the case of the relationship between Moldova and Russia is not a cooperative bilateral relationship whereas the other relationships are cooperative. Originally the case studies examined in this chapter were chosen because two of the cases seemed obviously cooperative while two seemed obviously uncooperative. They were chosen according to the number of treaties signed and the fact that based on their energy imports and exports that they should all be cooperative relationships. Indeed, after analyzing the cases carefully, three out of the four are actually cooperative relationships. The outlier is Moldova. The reason for this lies in the problematic relations with Russia over the civil war in Transnistria. While Moldova would have strategic interests in developing a cooperative relationship with Russia due to its energy needs, the situation in Transnistria outweighs its strategic interests in cooperating with Russia.

One of the benefits of case studies is that they can provide nuanced information about theories and variables that are used to test theories. In this chapter, I originally used the number of treaties signed as a proxy measure for a cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the relationship between Turkmenistan and Russia showed that the number of treaties signed is a poor proxy measure for a cooperative relationship. Turkmenistan and Russia had the lowest number of treaties signed, yet had a cooperative relationship whereas Moldova and Russia signed more treaties yet did not have a cooperative relationship. These case studies have shown the need for a better proxy measure for a cooperative bilateral relationship.

Table 5.6. Bilateral Treaty Ties and Treaties (Russia and Moldova)

Year	Number of Ties to Treaties	Number of Treaties
1991	0	1
1992	0	6
1993	4	28
1994	10	39
1995	16	48
1996	24	63
1997	24	66
1998	26	73
1999	26	78
2000	26	80
2001	30	86
2002	35	88
2003	38	92
2004	38	92
2005	38	92

The Importance of Treaty Networks

While the previous chapter focuses on why states would choose to develop a cooperative relationship, this chapter's focus is on how states develop a cooperative bilateral relationship given power asymmetry and mistrust. I argue that states create treaty networks that allow them to build relationships. These networks allow states to predict future behaviors of other states since violating a treaty that is tied to other treaties is equivalent to violating all of the treaties tied to the original treaty. This greatly increases the cost of violating treaties, and ensures cooperation even without trust. In three out of the four relationships examined in this chapter, the treaty networks have been extremely important. Certain treaties have been fundamental lodestone treaties, and have served as the central treaties of the bilateral relationship. In addition, the ties between the treaties have been extremely important to the relationships, as they have strengthened the bilateral relationship and made it possible to cooperate despite issues of power asymmetry and lack of trust.

The four case studies in this chapter were chosen according to the fact that each of the four cases should have cooperative bilateral relationships with Russia given their varying energy needs. Although there are more strategic needs than merely importing or exporting energy, nevertheless, analyzing states' relations with Russia given their strategic energy needs is a good starting point. The fact that there was little correlation between a states' energy needs and their relationship with Russia was problematic, and the in-depth case studies were illuminating as to why this was the case.

Although I first examined two relationships that were presumed to be cooperative and then two relationships that were assumed to be non-cooperative, the case studies illustrated that there was a problem with the measure of cooperative bilateral relationships. Specifically, it was problematic to use the number of treaties signed between two states as a measure of a cooperative relationship. The reason it is so problematic is evident in the relationship between Turkmenistan and Russia. Turkmenistan and Russia had the lowest number of bilateral treaties signed, yet had a cooperative relationship, whereas Moldova and Russia signed more treaties yet did not have a cooperative relationship. These case studies have shown the need for a better proxy measure for a cooperative bilateral relationship. According to the theory in this book, the more cooperative the bilateral relationship, the less likely there is to be conflict even given situations of power asymmetry and mistrust because the cost of violating connected treaties is so high. In the next chapter, I use the information gained from these case studies to construct a more appropriate measure of cooperative bilateral relationships, and then I will use it to test whether cooperative bilateral relationships lead to less conflict. This hypothesis will be tested using Militarized Interstate Dispute (MIDs) data.

Notes

1. A more detailed explanation of the difference between individual treaties and treaty networks is provided in chapter 2 of this book.

2. It should be noted that the import and export figures reported in Table 5.1 are a percentage of total energy consumption. For example, Moldova imports 98 percent of its energy consumption, whereas Turkmenistan exports 215 percent of its total energy consumption.

3. It should be noted that the number of bilateral treaties signed indicates the attempts at cooperation. In a later chapter I develop a different measure that shows actual institutionalization of cooperation, which better measures actual cooperation. However, for the purposes of this example, the measure showing attempts at cooperation indicates the intent of states to cooperate, thereby being an adequate proxy for this chapter.

4. It should be noted that none of the treaties and agreements that came from the bilateral union are used in this analysis once the system of governance for the bilateral union was accepted. Thus, the treaties in this analysis are those signed by the governments of Belarus and Russia and not by the governing body of the bilateral union, which is a separate entity.

5. Although there were many ethnic Russians living in Transnistria, there were many ethnic Russians living in other parts of Moldova as well. Moreover, there was a significant population of ethnic Moldovans living in Transnistria as well. This leads some scholars to argue that the Transnistrian conflict is a political, not an ethnic, conflict (Kolstø and Malgin 1998).

Chapter 6

The Necessity of Cooperation

Each of the chapters in this book has addressed different aspects of bilateral relationships. For example, the earlier chapter on state motivations examined why states would want to build cooperative bilateral relationships. In short, states are guided by strategic goals, and providing both states meet strategic interests in developing relationships, they will. However, that chapter focused on why states would be motivated to build a cooperative bilateral relationship, and not how states build cooperative relationships even given a lack of trust and power asymmetry. The next chapter examined how states could build a cooperative relationship. In that chapter I argued that states use treaty networks to build cooperative bilateral relationships, and that they create tight networks of treaties that are tied together. I argued that the cost of violating a single treaty is not high, but if a treaty is tied to other important treaties, that the cost of violating such a treaty is equivalent to violating each treaty that it is tied to. This increases the cost of violating treaties tremendously, and essentially means that if treaties are sufficiently tied together in a tied network, that the cost of violating those treaties is so high that no state (including the hegemon) is likely to violate the treaty. In short, a cooperative bilateral relationship should lead to an absence of conflict.

The case studies in the previous chapter validated the assertion that treaty networks are important, and that cooperative bilateral relationships create tight treaty networks that are the skeleton of the bilateral relationship. However, the case studies also illuminated the fact that previous measures for cooperative bilateral relationships are flawed, and that a new measure must be developed. Further, once a new measure is developed, it is possible to then test the relationship between cooperative bilateral relationships and the absence of conflict. In this chapter I will first propose a new measure for cooperative bilateral relationships, and then test it to see if there is a relationship between cooperative bilateral relationships and conflict, and finally test it in a model using control variables to see the effect of cooperative bilateral relationships on conflict providing that there is a relationship.

Toward a Measure for Cooperative Bilateral Relationships

Instead of focusing on the number treaties as being indicative of a cooperative bilateral relationship, a new measure is needed. The four cases examined have

shown the importance of treaty ties over the number of signed treaties. This was especially the case in the relationship between Turkmenistan and Russia where there were the least number of signed treaties yet there was strong evidence to show that the relationship was a cooperative one.

It is possible to rank the bilateral relationships according to how cooperative they are. The first way to rank the bilateral relationships would be according to the number of treaties signed with Russia (Table 6.1). However, the case studies show that this is a very problematic measure. The bilateral relationship between Turkmenistan and Russia show that it is a cooperative bilateral relationship, yet is ranked last according to this measure. Moreover, the relationship between Moldova and Russia was shown to be uncooperative, yet would be ranked higher than Turkmenistan according to this measure. The reason for this problematic measure is that the number of bilateral treaties signed is indicative of *attempts to cooperate*, and does not necessarily indicate successful cooperation. In fact, it is possible to sign a high number of bilateral treaties, and not institutionalize that cooperation. Thus, ranking bilateral relationships based on the number of bilateral treaties signed without taking into account the institutionalized level of cooperation does not adequately reflect successful cooperation.

Table 6.1. Number of Bilateral Treaties with Russia

Bilateral Relationship	Number of Treaties
Russia-Ukraine	217
Russia-Kazakhstan	203
Russia-Belarus	198
Russia-Armenia	145
Russia-Kyrgyzstan	126
Russia-Uzbekistan	109
Russia-Tajikistan	93
Russia-Moldova	92
Russia-Georgia	92
Russia-Azerbaijan	78
Russia-Turkmenistan	77

The case studies also show the importance of treaty ties. It is thus possible to rank the relationships according to treaty ties to determine whether this is the best measure of a cooperative bilateral relationship (Table 6.2). This measure seems to be better as Turkmenistan is no longer ranked last and thus is no longer the least cooperative bilateral relationship with Russia. Indeed, the relationship between Moldova and Russia is now ranked below that of Turkmenistan and Russia. The number of treaty ties indicate the level of institutionalization of cooperation, where each tie further institutionalizes a given treaty, thus institutionalizing cooperation. However, this measure is still problematic. The reason that this measure is problematic is that it doesn't take into account the number of

treaties that were signed, which makes a comparison difficult. While this measure is better than using the number of treaties to measure cooperative relationships, it nevertheless makes it difficult to compare which cooperative relationship is more cooperative. For example, is Kazakhstan's bilateral relationship with Russia really more cooperative than Belarus' bilateral relationship with Russia? After all, a high number of treaty ties could be a reflection of the high number of treaties signed. The case studies reinforce the fact that both of these relationships are cooperative, yet it is hard to determine which is more cooperative. However, the case studies do show that the number of treaty ties in the relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia do overtake the number of treaties signed one year earlier than the relationship between Belarus and Russia. While this is not evidence that the relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia is more cooperative than that of Belarus and Russia, it is important to take into account both the number of treaty ties and the number of treaties. This is underscored by the fact that the number of treaty ties between Moldova and Russia never exceeded the number of treaties. Thus, a better measure of cooperative bilateral relationships would take into account both the number of treaty ties and the number of treaties, which reflects both the attempts at cooperation (number of bilateral treaties signed) and the degree of institutionalization of cooperation (number of treaty ties) (Table 6.3).

Table 6.2. Number of Treaty Ties with Russia

Bilateral Relationship	Number of Treaty Ties
Russia-Kazakhstan	421
Russia-Belarus	356
Russia-Ukraine	331
Russia-Armenia	267
Russia-Kyrgyzstan	217
Russia-Uzbekistan	160
Russia-Tajikistan	122
Russia-Turkmenistan	110
Russia-Georgia	55
Russia-Azerbaijan	78
Russia-Moldova	38

Ultimately, using the number of treaty ties divided by the number of treaties (———) is the best measure of cooperative bilateral relationships. The reason for this is that it establishes a range so that it is easier to interpret which bilateral relationships are more cooperative than others. Specifically, a score greater than 1 indicates a cooperative relationship, while a score of less than 1 indicates a non-cooperative relationship. In addition, the scale is meaningful because the rankings indicate which relationships are more cooperative than others. This assertion is further bolstered by the fact that in the chapter on state motivations,

one of the biggest findings was that states that had Russian peacekeeping troops were inhibited from developing a cooperative bilateral relationship with Russia, and the four lowest ranked cooperative relationships are those that had Russian peacekeeping forces stationed within their borders (Tables 6.3 and 6.4).

Table 6.3. Measure of Cooperative Bilateral Relationship with Russia

Bilateral Relationship	Ties (N)	Treaties (N)	———
Russia-Kazakhstan	421	203	2.07
Russia-Armenia	267	145	1.84
Russia-Belarus	356	198	1.80
Russia-Kyrgyzstan	217	126	1.72
Russia-Ukraine	331	217	1.53
Russia-Uzbekistan	160	109	1.47
Russia-Turkmenistan	110	77	1.43
Russia-Tajikistan	122	93	1.31
Russia-Georgia	55	92	.60
Russia-Azerbaijan	44	78	.56
Russia-Moldova	38	92	.41

Table 6.4. Russian Peacekeeping Forces in FSU

Host State	**Conflict**
Azerbaijan	Nagorno-Karabakh
Georgia	Abkhazia / South Ossetia
Moldova	Transnistria
Tajikistan	Civil War

Note: See Klein (2009) for specifics about these conflicts

Table 6.3 shows a dichotomization between non-cooperative bilateral relationships, which are less than 1, and cooperative bilateral relationships, which are greater than 1. There is a third category, which is where a relationship is equal to 1, which is neither cooperative nor non-cooperative. Thus, it is possible to code three categories of cooperation. Further, using these three categories, it is possible to examine whether there is a relationship between these categories of cooperation and conflict.[1]

Using MIDs as the dependent variable, it is possible to see if there is a relationship between the level of cooperation and conflict. According to the theory established in this book, there should be an inverse relationship between cooperative bilateral relationships and the occurrence of MIDs. Indeed, as Table 6.5 indicates, there is a strong relationship between cooperative bilateral relationships and MID occurrence.[2] In fact, there is only one case of a MID in the cooperative bilateral relationship category. In other words, creating a dense treaty

network where the number of treaty ties is greater than the number of treaties leads to an absence of conflict.

Table 6.5. Cross Tab with MID Occurrence

	No Mid	MID
Cooperative Bilateral (>1)	50	1
Neutral (=1)	4	0
Non-Cooperative Bilateral (<1)	56	10

It is also possible to examine the relationship between cooperative bilateral relationships and MIDs by not trichotomizing the variable but rather using a continuous variable. The relationship holds the same as the trichotomized variable, again showing the strength between the two variables (Figure 6.1). While this result is expected given the relationship examined in the previous cross tab, nevertheless the graph is striking in that it clearly shows that there is only one MID that is located within the range of where the cooperative bilateral relationship measure is positive, and even that one MID is in the lower range of the measure. In short, the stronger the treaty network, the less likely it is for a MID to occur.

While these sets of descriptive statistics show a strong relationship between a strong treaty network and the lack of MIDs, it is also important to test this relationship using other control variables that have often been used in the conflict literature. Ultimately I argue that there is an inverse relationship between a strong treaty network and the occurrence of a MID, meaning that as a treaty network becomes stronger (the number of treaty ties increase in relation to the number of treaties signed), the likelihood of MID onset should decrease. I now turn to a test of this hypothesis.

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

Figure 6.1. Cooperative Bilateral Relations and MID Occurrence

Research Design and Data

The theoretical hypothesis established in this book is that the stronger the bilateral treaty network, the less likely it will be to have conflict between those states. The reason for this is that violating an individual treaty that is tied to other treaties in the network is the equivalent of violating all of the treaties to which that individual is tied. Thus, the cost of violating a treaty that is tied to many other treaties is high, while the cost of violating a treaty that is not tied to other treaties is relatively low. There is an incentive to build a cooperative bilateral relationship through a strong treaty network to ensure that there are no dyadic conflicts. To test the relationship between the strong treaty network and the use of militarized force, I use the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) (Bremer, Ghosn, and Palmer 2004) database along with the World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank Group.

The unit of analysis is the dyad-year in the post-Soviet region, where each dyad must be composed of the regional hegemon, Russia, and one of the other

states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The dependent variable in this analysis is whether there is a MID in each dyad in any given year between 1991 and 2001. The reason this time frame is chosen is that the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 creating each of these independent states, and that the critical time period for creating a cooperative bilateral relationship is within the first decade of the relationship. There are 110 observations in this analysis.

The main independent variable in the analysis is the strength of the bilateral treaty network. This variable is calculated for the dyad by dividing the number of ties between treaties by the number of treaties signed. The variable is calculated annually for each dyad.

In addition to the main independent variable of interest in this test, I also include five control variables in the empirical model: relative capabilities, peace days, geographical distance, democracy, and joint IGO membership. Capabilities are calculated using Correlates of War (COW) national capabilities data. Each state's share is calculated as its percentage share of the total system capabilities according to military, economic and demographic dimensions. A relative capabilities measure is created by creating a ratio of one state's capabilities to another. I expect that this measure will be positive because stronger states will start a conflict if they have a clear power advantage (Bennett and Stam 2000; Leeds 2003).

Peace days is another important control variable that accounts for time. Peace days is calculated as the number of days since the states in the dyad last fought a militarized dispute beginning in 1991. I expect that as the number of days increases, the probability of a militarized dispute occurring decreases (Raknerud and Hegre 1997; Reed 2000).

Distance is calculated as the distance in miles between capital cities of the dyad. I expect that the greater the distance between capitals, the less likely there is to be a militarized dispute. This is due to the fact that contiguity has been shown to cause conflict due to territorial issues (Vasquez 2000; Vasquez and Henehan 2001) and that states are more easily able to project power over small distances (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Lemke and Werner 1996).

The evidence for democratic peace at the dyadic level of analysis has been shown to be incredibly robust. Democracies have been shown to avoid militarized conflict with one another and also are more likely to settle conflicts peacefully should they arise (Russett and Oneal 2001). Thus, there must be some control for democracy in this analysis. Due to the fact that all of the dyads are composed of Russia and one other state, it is impossible to have a joint democracy variable. I use two variables to control for the dyadic findings of the democratic peace. One is the Polity IV democracy score for Russia, while the second variable is the Polity IV democracy score for the second dyad in the analysis. These scores are calculated annually.

Finally, a control for joint IGO membership is included in the statistical model. Joint IGO membership has been shown to decrease conflict (Volgy, Fausett, Grant, and Rodgers 2008). The variable is calculated as a sum of the number of IGOs in which both members of the dyad are members. I expect that

the higher the number of joint IGO membership, the lower the probability of a militarized dispute in the dyad.

Empirical Analysis

To determine the relationship between a strong treaty network and the onset of conflict, I use a pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis. In Table 6.6, I present the results of a logistic regression using odds ratios, with MID occurrence as the dependent variable and relative capabilities, democracy, peace days, distance, joint IGO membership as the control variables. I also include the variable of interest developed earlier in this chapter referred to in Table 6.6 as the variable Strong Treaty Network.

Table 6.6. Model Results for MID Occurrence

Variable	Odds Ratio	Robust Standard Error
Strong Treaty Network	.054**	.07
Capability Ratio	.992	.008
Democracy (Not Russia)	.667**	.136
Democracy (Russia)	1.21	.161
Peace Days	1.459	.474
Distance	.995**	.002
Joint IGO	.986	.009

Note: n=110; MID = Militarized Interstate Dispute
Wald (7)=22.14 (p=.0024); Pseudo =.330
*p<.10, **p<.05

The results in Table 6.6 confirm my theoretical expectations regarding the variable of interest.[3] The strong treaty network is likely to decrease conflict by 95 percent for each unit that the strong treaty network increases. This is significant at the .05 level, which is very important given the fact that there are only 110 observations. These results should be even more significant with a larger-n.

The results for the independent variable of interest are even more striking using predicted probabilities and setting the other independent variables at their means (Figure 6.2). Figure 6.2 shows that there is a steady drop in the probability of conflict until the point where the institutionalization of cooperation and attempts at cooperation are equal, at which point the probability of conflict decreases to almost 0.

The relatively low number of observations affects several of the control variables. For example, the capability ratio, democracy (Russia), peace days, and joint IGO variables are not significant. This is partially due to the fact that there are relatively few observations. While I have included many of the control vari-

ables that are typically found in traditional conflict studies, this model and research design is not typical for conflict studies. First of all, the number of observations is small. In typical conflict studies, the number of observations is very large. Second, this study is regional specific instead of being a systemic-level analysis. Third, this study is conducted over the ten year critical period for forming cooperative bilateral relations (1991-2001) as opposed to most conflict studies that typically examine the period between 1816 and 2001. Finally, this study has included Russia as one of the members of each dyad since Russia is the regional hegemon, whereas typical conflict studies have more variation in both members of the dyad. Each of these differences from typical conflict studies explain why not all of the control variables are significant and in the proper direction.



Figure 6.2. Predicted Probabilities for MID Occurrence Given a Strong Treaty Network

Two of the control variables are strongly significant and in the proper direction. First, the democracy (not Russia) variable which is the level of democracy of the member of the dyad that is not Russia. This variable is strongly significant and in the proper direction according to theory, where conflict is likely to decrease by 34 percent for each unit increase in the level of democracy of the non-Russian member in the dyad.

The second control variable that is strongly significant and in the proper direction is the distance variable, where conflict is likely to decrease by .01 percent for each mile that the capital of the second member of the dyad is located from Moscow. This finding is consistent with much of the traditional literature on conflict.

Ultimately, while not all of the control variables are significant and in the proper direction, the most important finding has to do with the variable of interest. The strong treaty network is very important for decreasing conflict. In the cases where there was a MID between Russia and one of the other CIS member states, there was not a very strong treaty network between the two states. To further examine whether a strong treaty network decreases the chance of conflict, I look to two cases where there were conflictual relations between states, yet in one case conflict occurred (Georgia), and in another case where conflict was avoided (Ukraine). I will first examine the case of Georgian-Russian relations, and then turn to a case study of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

Perhaps the most famous conflict between Russia and another FSU state was the war between Russia and Georgia that occurred in 2008. Although this conflict takes place after the critical time period of this study, it is possible to examine the critical first years of independence for both states and determine whether the theory that a strong treaty network decreases the chance of conflict is plausible.[4] I now turn to a brief examination of this relationship and examine the number of treaties signed and the treaty network in the bilateral relationship.

The 2008 War

On August 7, 2008, Georgian military forces began shelling the capital of the South Ossetian region, Tskhinvali, and several other villages in South Ossetia. At that time, there were Russian peacekeeping forces stationed in Tskhinvali. According to Georgia, they were targeting South Ossetian military installations, and had launched a military strike to regain control over the break-away South Ossetian region. Moreover, they stated that several of their peacekeeping troops had been killed by South Ossetian militias, and that Russia had moved non-peacekeeping troops into South Ossetia.

The shelling by artillery continued through the night, and on August 8, 2008, the Georgian Army invaded South Ossetia. A period of four days of fierce fighting between Russian troops and the Georgian Army ensued. Russia proceeded to invade a part of Georgia, and the Georgian Army retreated. Under the initiative of President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, the European Union got involved in negotiating a cease fire between the two states.

While many Western observers were quick to state that the war between Georgia and Russia was an example of Russia imposing its will and might on the FSU states, the situation was much more complicated. The conflict between the states had been building for many years prior to the breakout of the war in

2008. Specifically, the seeds of the conflict had been planted following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, where Georgia fought a civil war with the break away regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

The civil war concerned Russia and many other CIS member states, and the CIS agreed to send peacekeeping troops to both regions. While Georgia accepted the fact that there were peacekeeping forces stationed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Georgians resented the fact that the regions became de facto independent even though they were never officially recognized. Following the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, when President Mikheil Saakashvili came to power, relations between Russia and Georgia began to deteriorate even further due to the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Both sides became increasingly wary of one another. In fact, treaty activism between the two states, while never active, became extremely rare following the Rose Revolution (Table 6.7). To further examine the bilateral relationship between Georgia and Russia, I now turn to an examination of the bilateral treaty network between the two states.

Table 6.7. Bilateral Treaty Ties and Treaties (Russia-Georgia)

Year	Ties	Treaties	_____
1991	0	0	-
1992	0	3	0
1993	18	32	.56
1994	30	56	.54
1995	36	65	.55
1996	40	72	.56
1997	47	78	.60
1998	47	79	.59
1999	49	81	.60
2000	49	83	.59
2001	53	86	.62
2002	55	88	.63
2003	55	91	.60
2004	55	91	.60
2005	55	92	.60

Lack of a Strong Treaty Network: the Case of Georgia and Russia

Between 1991 and 2005, Georgia and Russia signed 92 bilateral treaties. Many of these treaties addressed issues such as loans from Russia to Georgia as well as other issues such as the presence of Russian troops on Georgian territory (Figure 6.3). Similar to the case of the bilateral relationship between Moldova and Russia, there is an ad hoc approach to managing bilateral relations. Each network

within the bilateral relationship addresses a different issue area, with no links between the issue areas. For example, on the bottom left of Figure 6.3, there is a network of treaties addressing the legal status of Russian forces on the territory of Georgia. All of these treaties address specific Russian forces that are present in Georgia such as Russian naval forces etc, Russian monetary support for these forces, jurisdiction over Russian soldiers, and Russia's ability to legally fly over Georgian air space. It is important to note that despite the fact that each of these treaties are linked to the legal status of Russian forces treaty, they are not linked to the other treaty networks in the bilateral relationship.



Figure 6.3. Russia-Georgia Bilateral Treaty Networks

While Figure 6.3 shows some support for the fact that the approach between Georgia and Russia to their bilateral relationship was issue driven and thus relatively ad hoc, there is more support for this argument by examining the number of treaty ties in relation to the number of treaties. Using the new measure developed in this chapter for a strong bilateral treaty network, it is evident that throughout the time period of study that Russia and Georgia have not had a cooperative or strong bilateral treaty network (Table 6.7). Despite the fact that there was some cooperation in certain issue areas, they did not build a cooperative relationship that would have increased the cost of violating certain treaties, and would have prevented a conflict. Instead, they addressed issues in an ad hoc

manner, signing bilateral treaties as issues arose instead of looking to build a relationship where future behavior could be predicted.

While the lack of a strong bilateral treaty network between Russia and Georgia was not the direct cause of the war between the two states, it certainly made conflict more likely. Had there been a stronger treaty network, disagreements between the states probably would have been managed peacefully as opposed to militarily. The reason for this is that if the cost of violating prior treaties was higher, then conflict would not have been a good option for either state.

The war with Georgia is the exception rather than the rule for bilateral interactions among post Soviet states. While very few of the former Soviet states were on friendly terms with Russia, they still recognized the need to cooperate with Russia to achieve their strategic goals. One state that was fairly hostile towards Russia was Ukraine. They had deep issues of mistrust of Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and had many important and complex issues that needed to be resolved with Russia that could have led to conflict had they not properly been managed. This is not to say that there was no effort at conflict management between Russia and Georgia (John P. Willerton, Michael O. Slobodchikoff, and Gary Goertz 2012), but rather that they were never able to create a cooperative bilateral relationship. I now turn to a discussion of Ukrainian-Russian relations in relation to the findings in this chapter.

Russian-Ukrainian Relations

Relations between Russia and Ukraine have always been complex and problematic. While Russians have often looked to Ukraine (especially Kiev) as the cradle of the Slavic civilization, Ukraine has often looked upon Russia as a dominant and untrustworthy neighbor. Thus, while Russians have regarded Ukrainians as Slavic brothers and part of one ethnic group, Ukrainians have remained skeptical of Russian intentions.

During Soviet times, Russia and Ukraine were often antagonistic to each other, with many Russians assuming a condescending attitude towards Ukraine. Ukrainians, on the other hand, experienced considerable domestic political-cultural suppression throughout the Soviet era. The fact that Nikita Khrushchev, an ethnic Ukrainian, was First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1953-64) did nothing to improve Russian-Ukrainian relations. In fact, Khrushchev awarded Ukraine territory in the Black Sea region that was traditionally Russian, which only served to inflame bad relations between the two republics.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, animosity between Russia and Ukraine was extremely high. Ukraine was extremely mistrustful of Russian intentions, and tried to turn to the West for support, which would allow it to become less dependent on Russia. In fact, during the early years of Ukraine's independence, one of the biggest concerns of Western observers was that Ukraine might have

difficulty maintaining its sovereignty, especially as Russian policy makers wanted to create a union between Russia and Ukraine (Balmaceda 1998; Bremmer 1994; Burant 1995; Mroz and Pavliuk 1996; Rumer 1994; Dmitri Trenin 2007). Some scholars even questioned whether Russia wouldn't just force Ukraine to join Russia (Bremmer 1994; Rumer 1994). In short, the deep mistrust that characterized Russian-Ukrainian relations continued, and became even more public, following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Despite the mistrust between Russia and Ukraine, several pressing security and economic issues needed immediate attention and resolution: Russian military forces were stationed in Ukraine, Ukraine possessed nuclear missiles, and there was no resolution about control over the Black Sea Fleet. Also, Ukraine was almost totally reliant upon Russian natural gas and oil for its energy needs. Although the gas crisis of 2006 takes place after the critical time period of this study, it is possible to examine the critical first years of independence for both states and determine whether the theory that a strong treaty network decreases the chance of conflict is plausible. I now turn to a discussion of the Ukraine Russia gas crisis and how militarized conflict was avoided.

Russian and Ukrainian Gas Crisis of 2006

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia, one of the main suppliers of natural gas to Europe, had to determine how to price gas exports to the world. While Western European countries paid full market price for natural gas, several former Soviet states including Ukraine were given special discounted rates for importing Russian natural gas. However, 80 percent of Russia's natural gas exports to the European Union were transported through Ukraine.

In 2005, negotiations between Gazprom, the company responsible for exporting natural gas from Russia, and the Government of Ukraine began over a new price for natural gas beginning in 2006. Gazprom was pushing Ukraine to accept a higher price for natural gas than it had been previously paying. The Government of Ukraine agreed to pay a higher price for gas in principle, however it insisted that the price increase would have to take place gradually. Gazprom and the Ukrainian company, Naftogaz, negotiated intensively over 2005, yet failed to reach an agreement on the price and supply of natural gas that Ukraine would receive from Russia.

On January 1, 2006, Gazprom began reducing the pressure in the gas pipelines between Russia and Ukraine. Gazprom indicated that European deliveries of natural gas should continue as scheduled, but that supplies to Ukraine should be reduced. However, Ukraine began syphoning off gas from the pipelines that were to deliver natural gas to Western Europe, causing widespread concern among Western European governments and the European Union that its reliance upon Russian natural gas was extremely problematic and that Russia could not be counted on as a reliable energy partner.

The decrease in the supply of gas enraged the Europeans, and ultimately led to the Russian Government and the Government of Ukraine trying to negotiate a settlement of the dispute. Both Russia and Ukraine were able to come to a preliminary agreement on resolving the dispute with Ukraine agreeing to pay the increased cost of gas, and the supply of natural gas returned to its normal levels on January 4, 2006.

Interestingly, observers in the West pointed out that the gas crisis was a way for Russia to assert its hegemonic tendencies of control and further indicated to many observers that Russia was not to be trusted, and would use its economic power to bully the states that rely on Russian energy exports (Goldman 2010). Although they stated that this gas crisis was resolved peacefully, many argued that it was only a matter of time before Russia could use force to resolve future disputes. I now turn to a discussion of the bilateral treaty network between the two states to determine the likelihood that a dispute would become violent between the two states.

Presence of a Strong Treaty Networks: Ukraine and Russia

Between 1991 and 2005, Ukraine and Russia signed 217 bilateral treaties. These treaties covered all three issue areas: security, economic, and integration (Figure 6.4). As Figure 6.4 shows, the bilateral relationship between Ukraine and Russia was not solely focused on one major issue area. Although more economic issues were addressed than other issue areas, nevertheless, Ukraine and Russia addressed a wide range of issue areas in their bilateral relationship. In contrast to the relationship between Georgia and Russia, Ukraine and Russia did not address their bilateral relationship in an ad hoc fashion (Figure 6.5). Figure 6.5 shows how interconnected the bilateral relationship between Ukraine and Russia is. Specifically there are two major treaty networks, one encompassing most of the bilateral relationship, and one dealing with matters of free trade between the two states (located at the bottom center of Figure 6.5).

Of paramount importance to the bilateral relationship between Ukraine and Russia is the fact that the two most contentious issues between the two states are located within the main treaty network. Specifically, the main treaties addressing the Black Sea Fleet are located on the left side of the bilateral treaty network, and treaties dealing with natural gas and energy are located on the right side of the main treaty network. Located between each of these contentious issues are treaties such as the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, which serve as lodestone treaties for the bilateral relationship.

While Figure 6.5 provides evidence for the fact that the bilateral relationship was not ad hoc, and was rather a deliberative effort to create a strong bilateral relationship through the use of treaty networks, there is more support for this argument by examining the number of treaty ties in relation to the number

of treaties. Using the new measure developed in this chapter for a strong bilateral treaty network, it is evident that throughout most the time period of study that Russia and Ukraine have had a cooperative and strong bilateral treaty network (Table 6.8).



Figure 6.4. Russia-Ukraine Bilateral Treaty Issue Areas (1992-2005)

Table 6.8 shows that until 1994, there were more treaties than ties between treaties, indicating that the bilateral relationship was not very strong. This is most probably due to the fact that many issues involving the dissolution of the Soviet Union had to be resolved by the two states, and they had to approach the early part of the relationship in an ad hoc manner. Specifically, both states agreed that they should handle easier issues first, and begin to develop a relationship before addressing more contentious issues. In fact, in 1992, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine issued a joint declaration which stated that although the Black Sea Fleet was an important issue of contention between the two states, that they would use the strategy of neutralization and address the issue at a later time. In other words, they would agree to disagree on the issue of the Black Sea Fleet until a time when the relationship had evolved enough to be able to resolve the dispute. It was not until 1995 that any new agreements on the Black Sea

Fleet were agreed upon. It is not coincidence that an agreement was not reached until the number of ties equaled the number of treaties, thereby indicating a bilateral relationship that was not too weak to address contentious issues. However, it should be noted that the agreement on the Black Sea Fleet of 1995 also stated that there were many more issues that remained to be resolved at a later time regarding the Black Sea Fleet.



Figure 6.5. Russia-Ukraine Treaty Networks

It wasn't until May, 1997, that the major agreements on resolving issues regarding the Black Sea Fleet were signed. These agreements culminated intense negotiation and resolution to a very difficult set of issues. The fact that the two states could not resolve this contentious issue prior to 1997 again is no accident, as it wasn't until 1997 that the number of treaty ties were substantially larger than the number of treaties. Specifically, both states had to be able to expect that neither state would violate any agreement on the division of the Black Sea Fleet, and neither side could be sure that a violation would not occur until the cost of violating these treaties had been increased to the extent that neither state would want to violate the treaty through the use of treaty ties and treaty networks.

It should be noted that I have not argued that either Ukraine or Russia needed to build enough trust to be able to resolve either the Gas Crisis or the division of the Black Sea Fleet. Rather, I have argued that treaty linkages increased the cost of violation to the point that it was expected that neither state would violate

a treaty. In other words, each state might continue to mistrust the other state, but both states can expect that the agreements that they have signed will be adhered to.

Table 6.8. Bilateral Treaty Ties and Treaties (Russia-Ukraine)

Year	Ties	Treaties	———
1991	0	1	0
1992	18	29	.62
1993	48	73	.66
1994	86	93	.92
1995	120	120	1
1996	136	131	1.04
1997	172	150	1.15
1998	190	161	1.18
1999	206	166	1.24
2000	244	179	1.36
2001	256	184	1.39
2002	272	191	1.42
2003	303	206	1.47
2004	327	214	1.53
2005	331	217	1.53

Ultimately, the bilateral relationship between Ukraine and Russia continues to be incredibly complex and full of mistrust. Politicians in both Ukraine and Russia continue to accuse each other of not wanting to cooperate and trying to influence the domestic politics of each state. Moreover, there are a lot of contentious issues between the states that will need to continue to be resolved. However, despite these problems, the bilateral relationship between Ukraine and Russia is strong enough that the disputes between the two states should not lead to armed conflict or war. Ultimately, the bilateral relationship is strong enough that they should be able to resolve all of their contentious issues peacefully, which has important foreign policy implications for all states. I now turn to a discussion of the foreign policy implications of strong treaty networks.

Foreign Policy Implications for Strong Treaty Networks

The findings in this chapter as well as the illustrative case studies on the relationship between Georgia and Russia as well as the relationship between Ukraine and Russia show that building a treaty network is important to managing possible conflict between states. A strong treaty network decreases the

chance of conflict occurring. That is not to say that a strong treaty network leads to no disagreements between states, but rather that those disagreements can be resolved legally and peacefully through negotiations and treaty construction. A strong treaty network allows policy makers the ability to address new issues that require agreements between states while allowing policy makers to expect certain behaviors and outcomes from the other state. For example, the treaty network between Russia and Ukraine was strong enough that even serious disagreements over issues like the Black Sea Fleet did not lead to war, but rather were resolved legally and peacefully even over such a contentious issue. I expect that future disagreements between the two states would be able to be resolved in similar fashion. However, the relationship between Russia and Moldova is such that it would not be surprising if there were a militarized conflict between the two states, especially over the issue of Transnistria.

While it is unlikely that foreign policy makers would actively try to achieve more treaty ties than specific treaties during their negotiations, intuitively foreign policy makers understand the importance of creating treaty networks. For example, in an earlier chapter on the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union, I discussed the importance of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Most of the subsequent treaties were nested within this treaty, and were thus tied to this treaty. The treaty became revered by both sides, and the relationship began to epitomize that treaty. Thus, while foreign policy makers were not actively trying to create a strong treaty network, nevertheless they achieved one by linking subsequent treaties to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.

This chapter has focused on the post Soviet region. While I expect that the results will hold in a systemic analysis, this should be tested globally. It could be first tested in different regions to see if the effects of the strong treaty network are similar in different regions.

Notes

1. While the case studies in the previous chapter examined the bilateral relationship between Russia and various states over the period 1991-2005, the MID dataset (Bremer, Ghosn, and Palmer 2004) only goes to 2001. This is not problematic for this analysis because the case studies clearly showed that the first ten years were the critical period of building the bilateral relationship.

2. The data for this cross tab are between 1991 and 2001, and are calculated annually.

3. In this model, I report odds ratios, which show the incremental change on the dependent variable for every unit increase of the independent variable.

4. Even though this book has focused on the time period between 1991 and 2005, Georgia and Russia only signed one bilateral treaty beyond the time period examined. This bilateral treaty was signed in 2006. Between 2006 and 2008 no additional bilateral treaties were signed. Therefore, while there is a period of three years between the end of the time period examined in this book and the outbreak of war between Georgia and Russia, no significant change occurred in the bilateral treaty networks.

Chapter 7

Implications of Treaty Networks

On July 9, 2011, the state of South Sudan became an independent state. It became independent as the result of a civil war. It was recognized by the most powerful states in the world, and became a member of both the United Nations and the African Union. During these first years of its independence it must develop bilateral relationships with world and regional powers. Specifically, it must start to rebuild its relationship with Sudan, from which it gained its independence.

One of the most pressing issues that must be resolved in building a relationship with Sudan is the distribution of oil revenues. While most of the oil fields are located in South Sudan, most of the infrastructure, oil pipelines, and the oil refineries are located in Sudan. While there has been a tenuous agreement about revenue sharing from the oil revenues, the current agreements must be renegotiated. Sudan is currently trying to negotiate for 50 percent of the oil revenues, while South Sudan would like to renegotiate for more favorable terms.

Although the theory and evidence for this book comes from the post Soviet region, the theory proposed in this book is very applicable to the situation in South Sudan. The government of South Sudan has clear strategic interests in developing strong bilateral relations, yet, coming out of a civil war, there are still profound issues with mistrust. It is very possible that the situation could deteriorate, and a new civil war could develop. The question facing the government of South Sudan, therefore, is how to achieve their strategic goals of gaining profit from their oil revenues, while working under the constraints of the infrastructure being located in Sudan.

According to the theory that I have laid out in this book, the South Sudanese government should be interested in developing a strong bilateral relationship with Sudan. The government should not approach the relationship in an ad hoc manner, but rather should begin to build a relationship through treaty nesting and treaty networks. It should negotiate agreements that are nested within prior agreements and work to create a strong bilateral treaty network. Moreover, it should tie multilateral treaties such as certain African Union treaties as well as other important regional and global multilateral treaties to increase the cost of violating bilateral treaties that are nested within other treaties. By doing so, South Sudan will not have to trust Sudan, but rather will be able to predict future behaviors Sudan in relation to those treaties. In creating these treaty networks, South Sudan will be able to get past the problems of power asymmetry and mistrust that would inhibit cooperation with Sudan.

It is not an accident that I use the timely example of South Sudan in this concluding chapter of my book. One of the criticisms of this study and theory

will be the portability to other regions of the world. While the theory applies well to the post Soviet space, how well does it apply to the rest of the world? While I argue that this theory travels well to other regions of the world, I have not tested it in other regions, yet. This is only the first stage of a greater research project. The logical next step in this study is to test the theory on different regions to see how other states use treaties. While I expect that treaty nesting and treaty networks are used in similar ways in the rest of the world, especially given the legalistic nature of the United States and other great powers, this assertion should be adequately tested in future studies.

While there is much that remains to be done in terms of further testing the theory presented in this study, this study itself has evolved tremendously since it began. I now turn to examining how this study has evolved, and then will examine some of the implications that one can draw from the evolution of this study for future research.

Evolution of the Study

I first got involved in coding for a project involving the CIS and the use of nested treaties at the University of Arizona. While I found nested treaties to be fascinating, I was very much at a loss as to how to explain the importance of treaty nesting. I found myself arguing that the use of treaty nesting was important because it showed how complex international cooperation could be, and that most measures of international cooperation were too thin to adequately account for the complex nature of international interaction and cooperation. I argued then that it was impossible to account for international cooperation by looking at individual treaties alone without taking into account the relationship between treaties themselves.

At a very basic level, this explanation is fine. Yet it is still not fulfilling. I kept getting pressed on this point by many scholars, especially while I was working on my Master's thesis on the interaction of bilateral and multilateral approaches to international cooperation through the use of treaty nesting. I found it very interesting how Russia combined both multilateral and bilateral approaches to international relations through the use of treaty nesting, which runs contrary to how most scholars have approached a hegemon's approach to international cooperation. Most scholars have argued that the hegemonic power chooses to mostly approach cooperation either bilaterally or multilaterally, but not a combination of the two.

Despite the fact that treaty nesting allowed states to combine bilateral and multilateral approaches to international cooperation, I was still hard pressed to easily explain why treaty nesting was important not just a tool, but specifically what treaty nesting could accomplish. I knew that treaty nesting was important, I just couldn't explain how. While the faculty members working on the project involving treaty nesting could clearly conceptualize why treaty nesting was im-

portant, I was at a loss to do so. I felt like a student in one of my classes who when pressed to defend an assertion stated that his point was correct because she knew it to be correct. So, too, did I know that treaty nesting was extremely important, I just did not know precisely **how** or **why**.

It was not until I met with Keijo Korhonen, the former Foreign Minister of Finland, that I began to piece together in my mind how treaty nesting was important. He and I spent hours considering why states would choose to cooperate, and how states would cooperate. Fundamentally, he stated that all states need to cooperate, yet they cannot often trust one another. Each negotiation was like a small war. Each side would enter the negotiation with a set of objectives that it needed to achieve for its own strategic interests. The negotiations were not for the faint of heart, and certainly would often get heated.

Ultimately he stated that states must cooperate yet overcome the problem of mistrust. Even more problematic is cooperation between states when one state has much more power than another state. Utilizing the Finnish example of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Finland, he stated that the two sides never fully trusted one another, yet they got to the point in the relationship that they could expect certain behaviors from one another even without trust. In other words, they developed a cooperative relationship without trust.

One interesting aspect of the Finnish relationship with the Soviet Union that interested me greatly was why there was such an emphasis on the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty. Every year, both sides would celebrate the anniversary of this treaty, and it truly became a revered document in their relationship. Yet, some would argue it was a broad treaty with little substance. While these perspectives on the treaty would seem at odds, in fact they are not. A broad treaty that has little specific requirement of each party can set the tone of the relationship. It can serve as a lodestone treaty that helps to define the direction and the status of the relationship. By tying future treaties to the original friendship treaty, both the Finns and the Soviets strengthened both subsequent and the original friendship treaties, and in this way were able to develop certain expectations in regards to future behavior from both states.

It was this observation on the importance of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance that began to mold a deeper understanding on the relationship between treaties and how those treaties can create the architecture of a bilateral relationship. The use of treaty nesting, therefore, became a conscious tool of policy makers to increase the cost of violating specific treaties, trying to increase the cost of violation to the point that the other state would not violate the treaty. This would in turn insure that states could predict future behaviors from other states, thus allowing their own state to pursue future gains. In other words, the prospect of gains induced cooperation between states, yet for true cooperation to occur, states have to be certain that cooperative agreements will be honored. To ensure that the agreements will be honored, states will increase the cost of defection to the point that defection is very improbable, and they do so by using treaty nesting.

While the use of treaty nesting is an important tool that policy makers can use to ensure predicted behavior, the question then becomes how to study the use of nesting. It is possible to examine a bilateral relationship and determine the number of treaties that are nested and to then compare that measure with other bilateral relationships. However, the use of network analysis allowed me to identify three important aspects of the bilateral relationship. First of all, network analysis allowed me to identify the key treaties in the bilateral relationship. They were the lodestone treaties, and therefore those upon which the bilateral relationship was built.

Second, network analysis allowed me to visualize the treaty networks and how all of the treaties were interconnected. It was possible to see the growth of the treaty networks over time, and to see how different issue areas that needed to be addressed in the bilateral relationship were addressed. It should be noted that the links between the treaties indicated treaty nesting, so it was possible to incorporate treaty nesting into the network analysis.

Finally, network analysis provided the key measure for determining how cooperative a bilateral relationship is. This measure is thicker than previous measures of interconnectedness between states, and I argued that the measure was a better way of determining conflict than previous measures used in conflict literature. I argued that the more interconnected states are, the less likely they are to experience conflict.

When I originally started writing my book, I thought that I would not need to use network analysis. Rather, I thought that a better measure of interconnectedness was the degree to which there was a high level of each of the three main issue areas addressed in the bilateral relationship. In other words, I thought that for a bilateral relationship to be cooperative, that the bilateral relationship had to possess a large number of treaties that addressed economic, security and integrative issues. However, I realized early on that this was a problematic measure of interconnectedness. First of all, how does one address the fact that not all states have the same strategic interests, and therefore might not need to possess a large number of treaties across each of the three main issue areas? Would states that have narrower strategic interests not be able to develop a cooperative bilateral relationship? Instead, I have come to view the importance of treaty networks in determining how cooperative a bilateral relationship is.

I chose to examine the former Soviet space for several reasons when trying to determine how states are able to control power asymmetry and mistrust to actually build a cooperative bilateral relationship. First of all, the collapse of the Soviet Union provided a starting point from which it was possible to effectively examine how relationships were built. Second, Russia is the regional hegemon, and thus there is consistently power asymmetry in each of the bilateral relationships between Russia and each of the former Soviet states. In addition, the former Soviet space has several multilateral institutions, with the most well-known being the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

While scholars of Russia and the former Soviet Union tend to believe that the CIS is an extension of Russia's hegemonic ambitions, the CIS actually is part

of a unique regional governance system. It is true that Russia is one of the biggest players in the CIS, and thus helps to determine the direction of the CIS. However, the CIS is also a tool for managing power asymmetry and mistrust in the post Soviet region. Specifically, weaker states have influence over key treaties and helping to set the tone of relations in the region. They can draft them and negotiate gains through the CIS that they would normally not be able to achieve. In addition, they can utilize CIS treaties through nesting when negotiating bilateral treaties with Russia. This strategy helps to maintain a relatively even approach by Russia when cooperating with other states in the region.

Many foreign policy analysts are quick to point out Russia's hegemonic interests in the region and are quick to call Russia a neighborhood bully. While Russia has indeed been pursuing its strategic interests, it also has been much more nuanced in its approach to regional cooperation. It has utilized a combination of multilateral and bilateral means to achieve its interests. Weaker states, on the other hand, have used a combination of multilateral and bilateral agreements to achieve their own interests, while also constraining the regional from violating these agreements. While it is true that the bargaining range between two states in power asymmetry might be based more upon the interests of the hegemonic power, nevertheless weaker states have a unique ability to constrain the hegemon and achieve their own interests within the specific bargaining range. In other words, building regional cooperative relationships between the states by the former Soviet states is not a zero sum game. While it may be interesting to characterize relationships in terms of zero sum games, the reality of the situation is much more complex. States that cooperate do achieve gains, the main issues that they have to overcome are how to mitigate power asymmetry and mistrust, and those are not easy issues to resolve. I now turn to a discussion of what I have argued in this study, and then end this conclusion with a discussion on future directions for research given this study.

May I Have this Dance? Or do I Have Two Left Feet?

International relations scholars have often compared states to billiard balls and noted the conflictual nature of interaction. However, I have argued that interaction need not be so conflictual. I liken interaction and cooperation to ballroom dancing, where one state must ask another to dance. Specifically in this study, the hegemon must want to cooperate with the weaker state. Much like one partner must initiate an invitation to dance, so too must the hegemon want to cooperate with the weaker state due to strategic interests.

The cooperative partner also has an important role to play as to whether or not to accept the invitation to cooperate. A boorish and obnoxious individual who does not respect another person's integrity and space will not have a proposal to dance accepted by another individual. Similarly, a hegemonic state that is too aggressive and bullying and does not respect the sovereignty of other

states will not be able to convince a weaker state to cooperate. This is why the findings in chapter 4 of this study have found that the presence of Russian peacekeeping troops on the territory of the weaker state severely limit cooperation. This is true even when both sides would be able to achieve great gains through cooperation. In other words, the presence of peacekeeping forces on the weaker state's territory made it effectively impossible to manage power asymmetry and mistrust because the level of mistrust was so high that it could not be effectively managed.

In keeping with the poor dancing metaphor, the dance partners must be aware of their own feet as well as the placement of his or her feet. Indeed, in the case of bilateral relations, both states must be very aware of prior treaties, current negotiations of treaties, and the future direction of the bilateral relationship. It is not an accident that so many treaties are nested within other treaties. It is a conscious decision made by policy makers to tie treaties to previous treaties. They are trying to create expected future behaviors to ensure that they can continue to receive present and future gains through cooperation.

While it would be wrong to argue that policy makers plan out their relationship in exacting detail as to how treaties should be linked and the fact that they are linked will ensure the absence of conflict, I argue that policy makers intuitively understand the importance of linking treaties together. By linking them, they create a stable behavioral pattern by both states, which in turn leads to the absence of conflict.

One of the questions that this study might raise is the issue of endogeneity. I have argued in this study that policy makers create treaties, use treaty nesting to create a strong bilateral relationship, which in turn leads to the absence of conflict. However, it is possible to argue that a good relationship and the absence of conflict leads to a more positive relationship, which in turn leads to increased levels of cooperation. However, the cases studies in this study have presented evidence that there is no issue of endogeneity. First of all, in the post-Soviet region, there is the presence of both power asymmetry and mistrust. Varying degrees of mistrust is present in all of the relationships in the post-Soviet region. Specifically, in the case of Ukraine, there are extremely high levels of mistrust which would normally lead to conflictual relations. Yet, in most of the cases examined, power asymmetry and mistrust have been managed to create varying levels of cooperation.

Some states have been more successful than others at creating cooperative relations. As I have just argued, Ukraine is a good example of a state that has a high level of mistrust of Russia, yet has developed a positive and cooperative relationship with Russia. I doubt that the two states will ever trust each other, yet they have built a relationship where both states can expect a certain behavior from each other. However, not every state in the FSU has been able to overcome the high level of mistrust of Russia. For example, both Georgia and Moldova have not been able to overcome the high levels of mistrust. That is not to say that there have not been efforts of conflict management between the states, because there have. Rather, there has not been a sustained effort to create a coop-

erative relationship with Russia. The difference is that both Georgia and Moldova have engaged Russia to try and manage crises and in an ad hoc manner rather than trying to build a cooperative and long term relationship with Russia.

There is no denying the fact that Russia is the strongest actor in the region, and all of the states in the region must determine how best to engage Russia. While some states choose to cooperate with Russia because there is little alternative, other states choose to engage Russia because it is the least costly method of achieving their strategic interests. Further, there is no denying that Russia has influenced the direction of regional governance in the post Soviet region. At times it has used coercion, while at other times it has persuaded. However, it would be naive to assume that Russia has achieved all of its strategic objectives at the expense of the weaker states in the region. Russia has had to compromise on many of its objectives, including allowing itself to be constrained through treaty nesting, and having to adhere to agreements that might not be in its best interests. In short, Russia has actively negotiated the regional governmental structure of the post-Soviet region. It is a structure that allows cooperation and gains for both the hegemon and the weaker states while ensuring predictable future behavior and stability. I now turn to a discussion on the direction of future study beyond this current research project.

Future Research

Within the post Soviet space, future studies should examine the regional government structures by combining bilateral and multilateral institutions to gain a more nuanced perspective of the regional government structure. For example, one of the directions for future study would be to examine the bilateral agreements of the weaker states alone without considering those agreements that Russia has signed. It would be interesting to determine whether there is a different approach to relationship and cooperation building in power symmetry as opposed to power asymmetry. This approach would be one way of determining whether or not there is a difference.

Another direction for future study of the regional government structures would be to examine not only the interactions between bilateral and multilateral treaties among the CIS, but also examine how other multilateral institutions in the region are involved in the regional government structures. For example, one of the multilateral institutions that plays an important part in the region is the Eurasian Economic Cooperation (EvrAzEs). Russia also plays an important part in this multilateral institution.

If one is interested in examining the role of powerful state actors in regional government structures (especially multilateral government structures), then future research could take the form of examining the differences between different multilateral institutions. Specifically, one could examine the differences between the CIS, where there is one regional hegemon member state, GUAM, where

there is no regional hegemon member state, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where there are two regional hegemonic member states. What are the benefits of each multilateral institution, and how do they impact regional governance? Moreover, one could ask if there is forum shopping among the stronger regional actors when deciding which institution is most appropriate for different types of agreements.

In short, this study is just the first step in examining how states cooperate given power asymmetry and mistrust. There is much more work to be done at the system level as well as at the regional level. I have outlined several directions that are on my research agenda from here, but there is much more than I have even listed here.

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Index

About the Author

Michael Slobodchikoff has a Bachelor of Sciences degree in Language from Georgetown University, where he majored in Russian and International Relations, an MBA degree in International Management from Thunderbird, The American Graduate School of International Management, and both MA and PhD degrees from the University of Arizona. Michael Slobodchikoff has taught several courses in Comparative Politics and International Relations at the University of Arizona and is currently teaching undergraduate and graduate courses on Russian foreign policy and security. His interest in Russia developed early and led to extensive travel in Russia and the former Soviet Union. His first trip to the Soviet Union was in 1990, where he witnessed the devolution of the Soviet State, and he made several trips to Russia and the former Soviet states in subsequent years. He saw how Russian foreign policy evolved in the post-Soviet years, and this ignited a desire to systematically study the evolution of Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet period.