an introduction to the philosophy of

Gilles Deleuze

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continuum

Introduction to the Philosophy
of Gilles Deleuze

to P. G.
truly an event

Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze

JEAN KHALFA

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Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

A Thousand Plateaus (TP) (tr. Brian Massumi; London: Athlone Press, 1988)
Anti-Oedipus (AO) (tr. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane; London: Athlone Press, 1984)
Bergsonism (B) (tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam; New York: Zone, 1988)
Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (MI) (tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam; London: Athlone Press, 1992)
Cinema 2: The Time-Image (TI) (tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta; London: Athlone Press, 1989)
Dialogues (D) (tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam; London: Athlone Press, 1987)
Difference and Repetition (DR) (tr. Paul Patton; London: Athlone Press, 1994)
Empiricism and Subjectivity (ES) (tr. Constantin V. Boundas; New York, Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1991)
Essays Critical and Clinical (ECC) (tr. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997)
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (EP) (tr. Martin Joughin; New York: Zone Books, 1990)
Foucault (F) (tr. and ed. Seán Hand; London: Athlone Press, 1988)
Francis Bacon: logique de la sensation (FB) (Paris: La Différence, 1981)
Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (K) (tr. Dana Polan; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986)
Kant's Critical Philosophy (KCP) (tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam; London: Athlone Press, 1983)
Masochism (M) (tr. Jean McNeil; New York: Zone Books, 1989)
Negotiations (N) (tr. Martin Joughin; New York, Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1995)
Nietzsche (N) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965)
Nietzsche and Philosophy (NP) (tr. Hugh Tomlinson; London: Athlone Press, 1983)

'One Less Manifesto' (*OLM*) 'Un manifeste de moins', in Carmelo Bene et Gilles Deleuze, *Superpositions* (Paris: Minuit, 1979). Tr. Eliane dal Molin and Timothy Murray in *Mimesis, Masochism & Mime: The Politics of Theatricality in Contemporary French Thought*, ed. Timothy Murray (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997)

Périclès et Verdi, la philosophie de François Châtelet (PV) (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1988)

Proust and Signs (PS) (tr. Richard Howard; London: Athlone, 2000)

Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (SP) (tr. Robert Hurley; San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988)

The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (LB) (tr. Tom Conley; London: Athlone, 1993)

The Logic of Sense (LS) (tr. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale; London: Athlone Press, 1990)

What is Philosophy? (WP) (tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell; New York: Columbia Unversity Press, 1994)

Note: Translations have been slightly modified in some places

Introduction

Talking about the philosophers he admires, Deleuze often uses the image of a breath or gust of air (*un courant d'air*). Thus 'it was on Spinoza', he writes, 'that I have worked the most seriously by the norms of the history of philosophy, but he more than any other gave me the feeling of a gust of air … '.[1] The image recurs frequently, in connection with Spinoza and Foucault,[2] or Sartre, of whom Deleuze says:

> At the Liberation, we were still strangely stuck in the history of philosophy. … Sartre was our Outside, he was really the breath of fresh air from the backyard … . Among all the probabilities of the Sorbonne, he was the unique combination able to give us the strength to tolerate the new restoration of order. And Sartre has never stopped being that, not a model, a method or an example, but a little fresh air, a gust of air … (*D*, p. 12)[3]

When Deleuze started to write, in the years immediately after World War II, the French intellectual terrain was divided into camps: on one side the human sciences presented themselves as a type of knowledge which would make philosophy redundant, on the other, a highly scholarly but purely historical discourse on philosophy relegated it to the museum. Both thus equally supposed the death of philosophy as creative thought. More generally, hopes for a true intellectual renaissance in the wake of the Liberation had been crushed. Apart from important but marginal thinkers such as Sartre,[4] of course, but also, later on, Gilbert Simondon, or Raymond Ruyer for instance, nothing new seemed possible within the dominant philosophical production. An atmosphere particularly stale to a philosopher who said, retrospectively, that he had always opposed (naively even) the idea of the end of philosophy as a creative activity, judging creative thought to be, on the contrary, more urgent than ever.[5] It is certainly in this capacity that his philosophy has met with the exceptional audience that it enjoyed very

early on. In the conformist ambiance of the late 1960s it too had the effect of a breath of fresh air.

But there is also something deeply Deleuzian in this image of a breath of air as applied to a philosophy. Like a stream in the ocean, a breath of air is not, properly speaking, a body, but rather a complex series of local events, affecting different masses of air and producing effects on certain bodies, a door or a face for instance. In 'breath of air' we should hear a kind of impersonal verb: 'it breathes' rather than a substantive. We could compare it to a nerve impulse in the brain, often imagined as a unified, complete pathway, starting out from a localizable centre of decision or intention and then passing along to a centre controlling movements and thus actions. But what happens is a discrete sequence of local events, activations of synapses, which should be represented in three dimensions and with feedback loops, since the thickness and the folds in the brain are essential – without it being possible to postulate a hidden orchestra conductor coordinating all this activity, since the same question would arise in connection with what would have to be called its brain. Even though 'it' usually follows likely directions or 'paths' which have been determined by evolution and development, the impulse is not a line, nor even a route on a map, but a series of events of a geological kind, rather like an earth tremor.[6] Thus one must understand the creativity of philosophical thought as a similar play or event in the order of received thoughts, opinions and established systems.

This image of the breath of air used to characterize philosophy takes us straight to the concept of the *event*, discussed in particular in *The Logic of Sense*, where Deleuze examines the notion of the 'incorporeal', which led the Stoics to base their physics on a logic of events, not of things and predicates, and on a grammar of verbs, not of attributes of nouns, thus opposing the substantialism of the Platonists.

> . . . what we mean by 'to grow', 'to diminish', 'to become red', 'to become green', 'to cut', and 'to be cut', etc., is something entirely different. These are no longer states of affairs – mixtures deep inside bodies – but incorporeal events at the surface, which are the results of those mixtures. The tree 'greens' . . . [7]

In itself this idea is not new. Since the time of Galileo and then Newton, the general view has been that a knowledge of physical reality is a knowledge of laws linking incorporeals, that is, events. But what Deleuze insists on is that thought itself should also be thought of as an event. This is paradoxical, since this imperative of reflection implies that reflection (as thought, and therefore event) cannot be the object of an imperative, a classical problem in the

philosophy of mind. 'The true Entities,' he writes, 'are events, not concepts. It is difficult to think in terms of the event. All the harder since thought itself becomes an event. Scarcely anyone other than the Stoics and the English have thought in this way' (D, p. 66). This perspective requires a different style of thinking and being. These 'English' are the great British empiricists, especially Hume, who advocated a Newtonian study of the human mind and whose philosophy was the subject, in 1953, of Deleuze's remarkable study *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, which ends with the claim that 'philosophy must constitute itself as the theory of what we are doing, not as a theory of what there is'.[8] Whitehead too, whom Deleuze compares to Leibniz in his discussion of the relation between event, individuation and creation ('What is an event?', *LB*, Ch. 6). But also novelists who, like Thomas Hardy, characterize the individual as a flow of events and not as a person: ' ... the unique chance that this or that combination has been drawn. Individuation without subject.'[9]

So the notion of event, as we can already see, leads to a second notion, equally essential to this philosophy: that of *individuation*. In a celebrated paper on musical time delivered in 1978, at IRCAM, the avant-garde centre for musical research in Paris,[10] Deleuze remarked, in connection with the individuation of a musical phrase in time, that there are individuations which are not necessarily those of a form (something) or of a subject (someone), 'the individuation of a landscape, or of a day, or of an hour in the day, or else of an event. Midday–Midnight, Midnight the hour of crime, what a terrible five o'clock in the evening, the wind, the sea, energies, are individuations of this type'. And, speaking of his collaboration with Félix Guattari: 'We are not at all sure we are persons: a breath of air, a wind, a day, a time of day, a stream, a place, a battle, an illness all have a nonpersonal individuality. They have proper names. We call them 'haecceities' ' (*N*, p. 141).

Anyone wishing to study Deleuze's thought in a Deleuzian way must thus consider it as a series of philosophical events much more than as a doctrine to be extracted, unfolded and commented on, and must refuse to treat the philosopher as a personality, a sage or a guru, the guardian of a profound meaning. When he speaks of thought as a series of events, and not as the act of a unifying subjectivity, what Deleuze is criticizing is the very idea of a *content*, of an interiority of thought relative to the text or the utterance supposed to *express* it. He replaces this contrast of interior and exterior with the idea of a machinery, an arrangement or, in the case of an philosophy, an 'assemblage' (*agencement*) of relations a text maintains not only with other texts but also with other realities.[11] So there is no question of *representing* the thought of a philosopher who has so many doubts about the very idea of representation, and about the correlative distinction between the interiority

of the subject and the exteriority of the object, a problem made twice as difficult when this object itself is a thought. Does that mean that the myth of the wise man, of thought as the absolute master of itself, must been replaced by that of the madman and that this work must be regarded simply say as the symptom of its troubled time? It is true that paradoxes and nonsense, impossibilities of thinking deriving from the nature of language play a central role here, as they did in the writings of the Stoics, of Neitzsche, Lewis Carroll, Artaud or Beckett. But when studying the totality of Deleuze's work, which covers 50 years, one is struck by its real, if original, coherence: concepts do not so much develop in breadth or depth, as duplicate and multiply, forever reappearing in new guises, defining a whole variety of domains,[12] and if, as is the case with many original thinkers, his references are often chance encounters more than any exhaustive corpus, there is always clear evidence of a thorough mastery of the relevant corpus. From the first book to the last, whether the subject is animal behaviour, literature, cinema, psychoanalysis or politics, it is always the same thing, but the sense of each concept is each time changed by its new context, its 'assemblage', its articulation in the midst of a network of thought which it thereby reorganizes. In this sense, the concepts are immanent to the work in question.

This can be seen in the case of the notion of immanence itself, which appears not only in discussions on metaphysics, but also in most of the texts Deleuze devotes to the notion of a work or oeuvre, in particular when dealing with the ideas of author and topic. For instance in the preface to *A Thousand Plateaus*:

> A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very different dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations. It is to fabricate a beneficent God to explain geological movements. In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification. (p. 3)[13]

The notion of an author results from a desire for transcendence. The point of exploring the geological metaphors at the core of the notions of immanence and transcendence is to eliminate the idea that relations, of whatever type, can take place between an exterior and an interior. What seemed interior, hidden, is simply a matter of plateaus, of strata, of folds and recesses: there is no absolute interior and the idea of an author, taken in this sense of a singular intention or thought, behind the complexity of a text, is unnecessary.

Now, if there is no content of a book which a commentator could in turn extract, comment on and interpret, studying a philosophy cannot mean summarizing it or reconstructing it into a system that would finally be coherent (why would it never be coherent in the first place if coherence was the only purpose?[14]). It must, rather, follow the way its main concepts evolve depending on the contexts in which they intervene. Indeed of each of his monographs on philosophers Deleuze once wrote that their aim was to correct a mistake, to restore what had been forgotten and to construct at least one concept.[15] In his own case, it seems to me that the *mistake* is to label him as a 'post-x' thinker: post-structuralist, post-modern, post-Spinozist or post-Nietzschean, or more recently, post-utopian or neo-mystical, on the basis of an interpretation of his later thought as a renunciation, precisely the type of reading he adamantly rejected when reviewing the critical literature on Foucault. This taxonomic drive is, of course, inherent in the sort of academic studies which he denounced, with their relentless plotting of hasty digests onto the map of 'current thought'. The co-ordinates of these graphs invariably originate in the cosy interiority of an institutional (and sometimes national) 'us', be it sympathetic or antagonistic, and their effect is often to grant permission not to read or think further. But when reading Deleuze one is always reminded that philosophical thought occurs in the present: whether dealing with authors (Chrysippus, Spinoza, Hume, Kant …), concepts (time, difference, individual …), creation (filming, painting, writing …), his method is always to construct, under and before the layers of history, criticism and interpretation, the problem itself in its own life, as it develops in that particular thought or activity. Not to produce one more 'doctrine' or 'opinion', one more ready-made to encumber the museums of modern thought.

What is *forgotten*, thus, is that Deleuze always claimed to be a philosopher, in the most untimely (but not anachronistic) sense and that, accordingly, in all his books he constructed philosophical *concepts*. When he studies Proust, Bergson or cinema, he writes on signs, movement and time; when he writes on Dickens, Melville or Lawrence, his aim is to construct a concept of life. He did not set out to provide tools for specialized domains of the human sciences, such as literary analysis, art criticism, psychology or the history of ideas, even though this very independence, and the originality of his analysis, make it difficult to look again at what he has written about as one did before reading his work. An introduction cannot generate the feeling of immediate or innocent enjoyment in the process and power of one's own thought that is so striking when one drops the commentaries to return to his texts themselves. But by looking at the working of his concepts for themselves,

explaining their origins and clarifying their assemblages, it can make this (Spinozist) joy easier to reach.

The *concepts* one ideally ought to consider are numerous. They all define, in a sense, what Blanchot called *la pensée du dehors*: a thought that attempts to reformulate the problems we usually end up solving by means of a transcendence – whether in psychology, ethics, politics, history or aesthetics, without recourse to an interiority, a beyond, a totality, an end or a meaning. In other words, the fundamental concept we want to construct here is that of immanence. Deleuze may have failed in this endeavour, and it would be important to analyse some of the criticism that has been addressed to such an attempt, in particular by contemporary German philosophers, wary of its Nietzscheanism. But one must first understand it, which requires clarifying some essential notions and references and providing the background knowledge required for their understanding.

We concentrate here on three essential domains of Deleuze's thought: philosophy, art and life. The first group of texts deal with the idea of a plane of immanence, starting with the nature and beginning of philosophy as instituting such a plane (Bento Prado), and then analysing the crucial notions of speed and intensity (Juliette Simont), force and will (Jonathan Philippe), and individuation (Jean Khalfa). Concepts here are developed in relationship and tension with those of philosophers to whom Deleuze gave special attention (in particular Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche and Bergson). The next section looks at concepts which are constructed through an analysis of artistic creation: time, becoming, animality and territory, sense and sensation, through film (Alain Ménil), literature (Mary Bryden), music and theatre (Ronald Bogue) and painting (Claude Imbert). The final section concerns Deleuze's main ethical notions, life and shame. We reproduce the last of the texts Deleuze published, a very dense meditation on the meaning of *a* life when defined as immanence. This text is introduced by Giorgio Agamben's reflection on the significance of the equation of immanence with life in contemporary thought.

I

Philosophy

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The Plane of Immanence and Life[1]

Bento Prado Jr

Philosophy is a constructivism, and constructivism has two qualitatively different complementary aspects: the creation of concepts and the laying out of a plane. Concepts are like multiple waves, rising and falling, but the plane of immanence is the single wave that rolls them up and unrolls them. The plane envelops infinite movements that pass back and forth through it, but concepts are the infinite speeds of finite movements that, in each case, pass only through their own components. (*WP*, pp. 35–6)

I

The text quoted above is, at least at first sight, enigmatic, for how can ideas like 'infinite movements'[2] or 'infinite speeds of finite movements', which originally have a *physical* meaning, apply to notions like 'the plane of immanence' and 'concept', which are clearly metaphysical? My aim in this chapter is to try to elucidate this text. If we succeed, though only tentatively, we may also shed some light on Deleuze's conception of philosophy, on its relation with the history of philosophy and with pre-philosophy, and, perhaps most important of all, on its relation with non-philosophy.

I will limit my discussion to the analysis of a short text, the second chapter of *What is Philosophy?* – 'The Plane of Immanence' – and proceed in two stages. Firstly, I will discuss the way in which Deleuze defines the idea of the 'plane of immanence'; secondly, I will evaluate the most important effects of his conception of a philosophical 'instauration'.[3] To do this we will need to adopt a perspective which is both comparative and contrasting. This point of view is external to the work of Deleuze, and situates itself within a triangle defined by three proposals at varying distances from Deleuze's: phenomenology (considered in very general terms and disregarding many different ways in which it has been formulated), Foucault's archaeology and

the grammatical analysis of the later Wittgenstein. If the first two comparisons seem necessary and are often made – as contrast and similarity, respectively – the third may seem both arbitrary and startling. Nonetheless, it is precisely from this comparison that I hope to arrive at the most interesting and fruitful results of this investigation.

Perhaps the best unifying thread is Deleuze's claim that philosophy is essentially *constructivist* in style. Among the many different ways in which this notion can be understood, I believe Deleuze has in mind the meaning it has been given in the intuitionist philosophy of mathematics, in its battle against logicism and Platonism, dominant in the French tradition since Poincaré.[4]

For Deleuze there is no such thing as a concept *in itself*. A concept is always the result of work on a matter,[5] or, in the words of *Difference and Repetition*, 'In every respect, truth is a matter of *production*, not adequation.'[6] Obviously the idea of construction (if indeed it has something in common with the use of this term in the philosophy of mathematics) is given a considerably broadened sense, and in a certain way returns to its common intuitive basis (that of the relation between the plan – the diagram – of a house and the bricks which will give it material form). But it is also clear that such an idea activates connections with the idea, which is properly philosophical, of 'constitution'.

All these perspectives should be kept in mind, above all because although Deleuze defines the plane as a diagram, he has also previously defined it as both *horizon* and as *ground*.[7] That is, the plane of immanence is essentially a *field* in which concepts are produced, circulate and collide with one another. It is successively defined as an *atmosphere* (almost like Jaspers' 'Encompassing', which Deleuze rejects[8]), as something formless and fractal, as a horizon and reservoir, and as an indivisible medium. Together all these features of the plane of immanence seem to make Deleuze's philosophy a 'field philosophy' – in a sense similar to that in which one speaks of 'field psychologies', such as *Gestaltpsychologie*. But we should not forget that an infinite field (or an infinite horizon) is virtual.[9]

This field, wherein concepts are constructed and circulate, is not, however, thinkable by itself. It can only be defined and mapped with reference to the concepts which populate it. If concepts need a prior virtual field, the plane does not subsist without the concepts which inhabit it and wander in it like nomads in the desert, or which mark it like the islands of an archipelago in the ocean. But to avoid being misled by metaphors, let us not forget that there can be an uninhabited desert, and that oceans need not have their surfaces dotted with islands. Thus, once again, if there are no concepts without a plane, there is no plane without concepts which may inscribe

surfaces and volumes in this fluid and virtual element, which may mark it as series of events, and which may cover it with countless paving stones, and in this way may stretch this indivisible medium.

We have still not completely left the field of metaphors. Perhaps we can throw some conceptual light on this image by means of two external points of reference which correspond to two essential dimensions of the plane of immanence: Kant and Foucault. Indeed, it is as if there were a certain parallel between the *Instauratio Philosophiae* according to Deleuze, and the instauration of science in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The plane of immanence is, among other things, a kind of intuitive ground whose 'infinite movements' are fixed by 'co-ordinates' constructed by the finite movements of the concepts. The plane of immanence, unpopulated by concepts, is blind (in the limit it is pure chaos); concepts, removed from their intuitive 'element' (in the sense of atmosphere), are empty. I would add that just as Kant attributes the function of mediation to the transcendental imagination,[10] which allows an intuition to be subsumed under a concept, so Deleuze introduces the intermediate instance of 'conceptual personae', in the passage from the 'diagrammatic traces' of the plane to the 'intensive co-ordinates' of the concept.

But this comparison can lead to a misunderstanding. If, in the first case, we are trying to provide a foundation for scientific, mathematical or physical knowledge, in the determination of the matter of intuition in the field of possible experience, in the second we are trying to describe the institution of philosophy (or of philosophies) in the field of real experience – the *fact* of the philosophies of Plato, Descartes, Kant, etc. And above all we are not dealing with knowledge, but with thought. The question 'What is philosophy?' is identical with the questions 'What does it mean to think?', 'What is it to find one's way in thought?'. Thus, the investigation of the idea of the plane of immanence does not lead us to the field of epistemology, but to relations of philosophy with its history, with pre-philosophy, and with non-philosophy. As we shall see, these relations intertwine in a single knot. Here it is necessary to correct our perspective through a twofold reference: on the one hand to the phenomenological tradition, and, on the other, to the archaeology of Foucault, in particular to *The Order of Things*.

Has not phenomenology always been concerned with the 'ground' of thought? Does not this ground end up being defined as a pre-predicative sphere to which all conceptual constructions must, ultimately, be referred? Is not this ground the 'earth which does not move', that is, the earth as an element of immanence of the *Lebenswelt*, *Urdoxa*?[11] (And let us not forget that the Earth is an idea of fundamental importance in the thought of Deleuze.) Just as the determination of essence refers back to the pre-predicative, the construction of concepts refers back to the pre-philosophical field of the

plane of immanence. But this superficial approximation conceals a deeper divergence. Although phenomenology obscurely glimpsed the plane of immanence, it lost sight of it right from the start, and turned it into an ego-centred field,[12] introducing the transcendent into its very heart in the form of communication or intersubjectivity. The Universal of Communication opens a breach, in the very heart of the plane of immanence, through which immanence empties out in an uncontrollable haemorrhage, pouring onto the transcendent, of which the plane becomes a mere predicate – repeating the process of confiscation carried out in the past by the Universals of Contemplation (Plato) and of Reflection (Kant).[13]

The parallel with the Foucault of *The Order of Things* is different. There the *episteme* is also a kind of pre-theoretical and pre-philosophical ground which, in its implicit diagrams, underlies and prefigures the forms of knowledge which can only be understood from the perspective of this anterior field. Moreover, Foucault's archaeology has no epistemological ambitions, all the more so because the suspension of the truth-values of discourse is an integral part of its method. Furthermore, just as it cannot be identified with the *Urdoxa* of Husserl,[14] so also this *socle* cannot be identified with any form of *doxa*, in the traditional style of the history of ideas. This kind of basic 'unthought' is not the fact of an ideology, a *forma mentis*, a mentality, for even if we are immersed in the facticity of history (of given thought), our investigation is always guided by the question *quid juris?*[15]. In the form of a new question we can ask: why can I no longer think *like this*? What can I think now, in the light of the future? Today how does the thinkable stand out at its extreme limit, where it comes into contact with the unthinkable?

Is the plane of immanence a new avatar of Foucault's *episteme*? Various texts seem to suggest this, above all when Deleuze points out that various philosophies may share the same plane of immanence (*WP*, p. 57). But such points of convergence in strategy should not blind us to important differences. At no point in Deleuze's description of the *Instauratio Philosophicae* is there a suspension of truth-values, and the style of his 'philosophizing' history of philosophy never reaches the almost ethnographic perspective of *The Order of Things*. Deleuze is perhaps closer to Heidegger's history of metaphysics than Foucault, and while he does not insist on the *topos* of the forgetting of Being, he does not forget to mention the deformation of the plane of immanence. Does not the confusion between Being and existents bear some similarity to the confusion between the plane of immanence and the Universals which lead it back to Transcendence? Is not the new philosophy of difference founded on the thought of difference, a close relative of 'ontological difference'?[16] This at least is my impression, and this idea could perhaps be tested by comparing the different uses each of these three phi-

losophers – Deleuze, Foucault and Heidegger – makes of the works of Nietzsche.

It is this 'slight' difference in relation to Foucault which raises a difficulty for Deleuze that Foucault not only ignores, but neither should nor needs to confront. Let me quote Deleuze:

> But if it is true that the plane of immanence is always single, being itself pure variation, then it is all the more necessary to explain why there are varied and distinct planes of immanence that, depending upon which infinite movements are retained and selected, succeed and contest each other in history. The plane is certainly not the same in the time of the Greeks, in the seventeenth century, and today (and these are still vague and general terms): there is neither the same image of thought nor the same substance of being. The plane is, therefore, the object of an infinite specification so that it seems to be a One-All only in cases specified by the selection of movement. This difficulty concerning the ultimate nature of the plane of immanence can only be resolved step by step.[17]

One notes that the similarity between the two projects, and the alliance between the two philosophers, cannot hide a fundamental difference. What creates a problem for Deleuze is unproblematic for Foucault; indeed, it is the starting point of his work (and here, as always, I only have in mind the Foucault of *The Order of Things*). Perhaps we can undo this knot, if it is not imaginary, by paying attention to the different ways in which these two philosophers answer the question 'What is it to think?' – although both connect this question to a reflection on what is *radically unthinkable.*

Foucault's archaeology, on the one hand, has a character which is, so to speak, propaedeutic (it corresponds to a kind of *Prolegomena to all Future Thought which does not wish to retain the Onto-Theo-Anthropological Style*). It suspends the truth-values of discourse, and confines itself to opening a space for thought which is 'other' or future. On the other hand, Deleuze's analysis of the instauration of philosophy already understands itself as thought in action, and the question of the essence of philosophy is already its own answer (simultaneously compass and magnetic pole). In other words, a style which is critical and reflexive is contrasted with a style which wishes to be immediately metaphysical and dogmatic (without attributing any pejorative sense to these terms).

It is perhaps this vertiginous, Nietzschean, impatience of thought which constitutes the most central feature of Deleuze's philosophy, this desire to plunge, through the thousand sheets of the plane of immanence (this pre-philosophical dimension which nevertheless only comes to be with the

instauration of philosophy), in the direction of the chaos which is cut and filtered by these sheets, there to coincide with thought and its limit, its absolute outside. Let us emphasize that despite Deleuze's battle against dialectic, Hegel had already said that in order to become Reason, simple Understanding must 'dive into the Dionysiac delirium of Substance'.[18] In short, a path which takes philosophy from its seduction by the un-thought towards its fascination with the unthinkable. The plane of immanence, in Deleuze's words, 'is, at the same time, that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the non-thought within thought. It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane that does not succeed in thinking it. It is the most intimate within thought and yet the absolute outside.' [19]

We have taken a first step towards an understanding of Deleuze's concept of the plane of immanence, but are still far from grasping its full meaning. Our next step must be to examine the relation between the plane of immanence and chaos.

II

Let us begin with the following crucial text:

> The plane of immanence is like a section of chaos and acts like a sieve. In fact, chaos is characterised less by the absence of determinations than by the infinite speed with which they take shape and vanish. This is not a movement from one determination to the other, but, on the contrary, the impossibility of a connection between them, since one does not appear without the other having already disappeared, and one appears as dis-appearance when the other disappears as outline. Chaos is not an inert or stationary state, nor is it a chance mixture. Chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite. The problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without losing the infinite into which thought plunges (in this respect chaos has as much a mental as physical exis-tence).[20]

In our earlier discussion of the plane of immanence and its relation to the idea of a concept, we already encountered the idea of chaos. We saw that chaos and the plane of immanence are, so to speak, 'contemporaries', since one cannot be instituted without the other – that is, the definition of the plane of immanence as a reservoir or continent should not lead us to think of it as 'anterior' to the concepts which pass through it, or like a saucepan into

which the sauce has not yet been poured, or, again, like the logical space of the *Tractatus* which can be thought of without the states of affairs which fill it. 'Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs. This space I can imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the space.' (2.013); and it is precisely here that the opposition between Deleuze's idea of the *virtual* and the classical idea of the *possible* is located, an opposition described so well in Bergson's metaphor of the anterior *canevas du vide* on which Being itself will be embroidered.[21] Without the concepts which inscribe on it a spinal column and bone structure, the plane would dissolve into pure flux without consistency, and at the limit it would dissolve into pure chaos.

What we must do now is to situate the connection between the plane of immanence and chaos. We know that there are various planes of immanence, and that they are superimposed in strata and may even intersect and partially communicate. In any case we speak of them in the plural, although Deleuze also speaks, and in capital letters, of a kind of ultimate plane – *LE plan* – of which the others are merely variations or specifications, and even of a 'best' plane of immanence, the freest from any kind of reference to transcendence, incarnated in the history of philosophy by Spinoza, the prince, or Christ of philosophers.[22]

With reference to chaos, Deleuze always speaks of the plane of immanence in the plural. It matters little, at least for the time being, what we understand by chaos. It is sufficient that we remember, since almost all these metaphors are spatial, that the plane of immanence cannot cover or superimpose itself on chaos (even if one assumes that its horizon is infinite). Deleuze says that the plane of immanence is a 'section' through chaos (like a plane which cuts a cone). 'To section' can only mean to capture (define, or retain) a 'slice', so to speak, of a chaos which remains free (and infinitely so) in all other directions or dimensions. Otherwise thought could not have this 'outside' which we are told is inseparable from it. But, as well as a 'section' through chaos, the plane is also a sieve – to cut is to select and fix – in a word, to determine, to contain the river of Heraclitus or the world ocean, of which one can also say that it is *'comme la mer toujours renouvelée'*.

Here we have already encountered a problem. In describing the plane of immanence in this way are we not projecting outside or beyond the plane of immanence a new transcendent universal, which is certainly not Plato's One, the Christian God, the subject of reflection or of communication, but something which is dangerously similar to the classical *Omnitudo Realitatis* – the Real World or Nature-in-itself, which are older than thought itself, privileged candidates to fulfil the role of the Transcendent *par excellence*, left vacant with the successive demises of God, the Soul and the Subject?

We shall deal with this question later and spend some more time on the schematic relation which has just been sketched. As by doing this, we may be able to prepare an answer to the problem. Deleuze addresses this question by means of the distinction between science and philosophy – two quite different ways of reacting in the face of chaos. If the plane of immanence cuts chaos or if philosophy plunges into it, it does so, as we know, giving it consistency, without however *'losing anything of the infinite'*.[23] It is this achievement of philosophy which Deleuze emphasizes here in contrast with science (or with the manner in which science dives into chaos, for it also does so). What does science do? It 'provides chaos with reference points, on condition of renouncing infinite movements and speeds, and of carrying out a limitation of speed first of all. Light, or the relative horizon, is primary in science.'[24] And here it is impossible not to be reminded of Bergson. For if philosophy gives consistency to chaos without losing any of its infinity or of 'becoming', science sacrifices Becoming (or Duration) to give a place to reference – in other words, to the fixation of states of affairs. Bergson duly brought up to date. In place of the old opposition between intuition and intelligence, or between duration and space, we find the opposition between the non-referential and referential uses of language, between the self-positioning of the concept and a propositional function essentially linked to its truth-values; and, at the object level, the opposition between 'happenings', on the one hand, and facts or states of affairs, on the other. Note that *événement* does not translate *'Tatsache'* well; *Tatsache* is related to *'Sachver-halt'*,[25] and, more directly, to *Sache*, whereas for Deleuze *événement* has little to do with states of affairs, and perhaps more to do with history – at least as understood by Charles Péguy, Bergson's best disciple, especially in his *Clio*.[26]

This is where we can bring into play the counterpoint with Wittgenstein mentioned earlier, which is not as surprising as it might appear (and I imagine would have seemed to Deleuze himself). In fact J. C. Pariente had already made an illuminating comparison between Bergson and Wittgenstein in 1969, insisting, of course, on the difference between the two conceptions of language and of space, but pointing out something like a 'logical apparatus' which is common to the two philosophers and consists in the same 'threefold division of statements into nonsense [*unsinnig*], meaningful statements, and those without sense [*sinnlos*]'.[27] Now, this approximation can be somewhat extended, via Bergsonism, though now with Wittgenstein and Deleuze in mind, towards the 'metaphysical apparatus' which, for both, appears to link 'philosophy' and 'chaos' (an apparatus reminiscent of the 'historic-metaphysical' apparatus Schopenhauer/Nietzsche, to which we will return later).

It is in order to better understand the Deleuzian intersection between the

plane of immanence and chaos that we begin by recalling a sentence of Wittgenstein's, written in 1948, from *Culture and Value*: 'When you are philosophising you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.'[28] The metaphor is the same; however, I believe that we are not dealing *only* with a metaphor (or as J. C. Pariente put it when comparing the metaphors of Bergson and Wittgenstein, 'You will say that we are only dealing with a metaphor; but then why *this* metaphor?'). What does 'chaos' mean for Wittgenstein? Nothing but a kind of 'experience' that is not supported by a system of rules (and at the limit plunges into madness, which is defined, in contrast with both error and illusion, as a 'blindness to rules'). Do we not encounter, once again, a complicity between thought and madness? Deleuze says, when defining the means of thought, '[the plane of immanence] implies a sort of groping experimentation, and its layout resorts to measures that are not very respectable, rational or reasonable. These measures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and excess'.[29] This seems to echo another remark of Wittgenstein's: 'In the midst of life we are surrounded by death, so too in the health of the intellect we are surrounded by madness.'[30]

I do not emphasize such texts out of any enthusiasm for romantic or para-romantic *pathos*. What interests me is whether Wittgenstein's idea of a rule or a system of rules can or cannot shed light, by some kind of isomorphism, on the relation which Deleuze establishes between the ideas of chaos and the plane of immanence.

As is well known, for Wittgenstein the idea of a rule can only be understood in the context of the ideas of *language-game* and *form of life*. The idea of a language-game has all the characteristics of the celebrated 'empirico-transcendental doublets' of Foucault's *The Order of Things*.[31]

Here the 'very general facts of nature' and the logical and grammatical conditions of meaning or of the use of language meet, and it is here, therefore, that life, language, action and work intersect. It is an intersection, it should be added, where the undeniable 'factuality', explicitly affirmed, does not imply any ordinary form of empiricism, but something like a 'transcendental empiricism'. As has been aptly put by Bouveresse, 'Wittgenstein's position on this point is ... that certain facts may make our language-games impossible or without interest, but that none of the facts which we can mention or verify makes them necessary.'[32] Each of the many language-games (and here we should speak in the plural, as in the case of *planes* of immanence) is a practico-symbolic set (rather, an agglomeration) which, in its symbolic dimension, is distributed between propositions and pseudo-propositions, between bipolar and polar propositions. Polar propositions, which are neither true nor false, serve as a base; they demarcate the

space which will be populated by certain tribes of genuine propositions, and prohibit the entry of any other tribe. In sum: the basic pseudo-propositions (that is, that base which ignores the distinction between the true and the false) stand to genuine propositions as the plane of immanence stands to the concepts which circulate in it. And we may add that each language-game, to the extent that it creates the space in which propositions can become meaningful (or simply become *propositions*), cuts chaos according to its particular plane, and functions like a sieve, by transforming events into states of affairs. Once again, the basic pseudo-propositions of the base set up a net which, when cast on chaos, may give it consistency.

But, if the parallel between the plane of immanence and the pseudo-propositions of the base is to reveal its full scope, it is necessary to emphasize how Wittgenstein articulates them when *doing* philosophy. For it is exactly in relation to them – as well as to science and art – that Wittgenstein situates philosophy and the tension between philosophy and common sense. To understand this parallel fully we need to make a distinction between *Weltbild*[33] (world-image) and *Weltanschauung* (world-view), which, far from being synonymous, refer to completely different horizons.

What is a *Weltbild*? It is that amalgam of pseudo-propositions crystallized at the base of a language-game which, at one and the same time, precedes the distinction between true and false and opens up the space for its arrival. In a word, it is the plane in which concepts circulate and collide.[34] Common sense spontaneously supports itself on the *Weltbild*, and appears to do so by taking it as 'truth', thus conflating *Weltbild* and given knowledge. This does not mean that it is completely mistaken, since such an illusion is necessary for the course of everyday life. But the 'philosophy of common sense' cannot appeal to this alibi, and it leads to ill-conceived enterprises – G. E. Moore's, for example, which ends up turning the *Weltbild* into a *Weltanschauung*, or providing a *foundation* for common sense in rational certainty. In Deleuzian terminology, Moore confuses the plane of immanence with concepts. Moreover, *all* philosophers – Plato, Kant and Husserl – transform the *Weltbild* (which is a foundationless foundation, a *grundlösige Grund* which does not go beyond a provisional and arbitrary halt in the infinite flux of chaos) into the most solid of *Archai*, making room for a universalist theory capable of dominating the *Omnitudio Realitatis* through knowledge. After all, philosophy and common sense share the same illusion, but only philosophical illusion has disastrous effects for thought, and, above all, for life itself.

A *Weltbild*, it is worth repeating, is a net cast over chaos, which arrests its infinite flux, choosing and fixing certain points which define a plane, or even a way of life. But there are as many *Weltbilder* as language-games and forms of life, and thus thousands of ways in which chaos can be cut or in which the

movements that criss-cross it can be slowed down. We also find these fluvial, Heraclitean metaphors in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*: he writes, for example, 'The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thought may shift . . . '[35] And we may put the same question to Wittgenstein that Deleuze puts to himself concerning planes of immanence: can there be one *Weltbild* which is better than all the others? Wittgenstein's answer will be negative, which has led many commentators to make the mistake of attributing to him some form of relativism, taking us in the direction which Deleuze wishes to avoid at all costs. These relativist interpretations of the multiplicity of *Weltbilder* have also led to an opposing 'universalist' interpretation (put forward by authors like Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas in Germany, and José Arthur Giannotti in Brazil),[36] which seems to me equally mistaken, as I have tried to show elsewhere.[37]

We shall limit ourselves, for the time being, to a comparison between Wittgenstein's description of the proliferation of *Weltanschauungen* on the basis of *Weltbilder* and Deleuze's description of the instauration of philosophy on the plane of immanence. In both cases, what is being denounced is a kind of original sin inscribed at the heart of traditional philosophy, and what is being heralded is a new path that will allow us to redeem this sin without giving up philosophy.

Combining the two diagnoses, and in the different vocabularies of these two philosophers (for could it be that behind the same metaphors we find the same diagnosis?), we can say that the sin of traditional philosophy, which degrades it into a mere *Weltanschauung*, is to understand itself as a Theory or Representation, and to understand the *Weltbild*, or the plane of immanence, as a set of propositions which refer to transcendent objects or states of affairs, in the regime of *Übereinstimmung* or *Adaequatio*, and not as a *doing*, or as a constructive practice, which introduces a minimum of consistency into chaos and which expresses the immanent form of 'a life'. Here I am not inventing anything, nor making an arbitrary combination. This can be seen from the splendid §559 of *On Certainty* where Wittgenstein says, 'You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there – like our life.' And bearing in mind the title, though much more than the title, of Deleuze's last work, 'L'Immanence: Une Vie . . . ',[38] this is no small claim. In fact, it is only within a language-game, in all its brute factuality, that concepts in general, and the idea of rationality in particular, which is never denied, make sense. With the *Grundlösigkeit* of language-games, endowed with that same facticity which affects our anonymous everyday life, it is the very idea of rationality which is found to be subordinated to a kind of 'principle of contingent reason',[39] as was just mentioned with respect to

the philosophy of Deleuze. Moreover, a language-game is not merely contingent, 'like our life', it is the expression or unfolding of this life or of this form of life. We might say that in its dimension, which is at the same time symbolic and practical, a language-game is the work of a life which folds back on itself.[40]

But there still remains the question of the multiplicity of language-games. It is clear that in Wittgenstein there is an idea which almost approaches that of a single 'ground', underlying the multiplicity of language-games, like the ultimate plane of immanence which varies and becomes specific in a thousand sheets. It is the idea of a *humanitas minima*, a concept which has been investigated in detail by José Arthur Giannotti,[41] or a kind of interface between man and animal. Like Deleuze, and I have in mind those who talk of his cultural relativism,[42] the later Wittgenstein, though maintaining the transcendental style that characterized the *Tractatus*, is little concerned with purely 'anthropological' properties, and is unafraid of the ill repute of 'naturalism'.

What is important is the comparative evaluation of different language-games and different forms of life. Let us repeat Deleuze's question: is there a best plane of immanence? Or, to put it another way, who is Wittgenstein's Spinoza, Frege, Kierkegaard, or ... ? (Kierkegaard[43] also figures in Deleuze's family album) Such teasing, however, will not take us far, nor in the right direction. Perhaps what matters is to fix two lines of thought and consider their possible convergence: (1) the constructivism of Wittgenstein's conception of language and knowledge; (2) the idea of chaos (or of a world without rules, which occupies the place that was once reserved for the sphere of the mystical); and, finally, (3) perspectivism, the philosophy which seems to emerge from the combination of (1) and (2). Or, better, 'perspectivism without relativism', to use the lapidary phrase of Luíz Henrique Lopes dos Santos. But what could such a position be, perspectivism without relativism?

Does this not immediately refer us back to Nietzsche? In any case, such an idea seems to become apparent in Deleuze's definition of the plane of immanence as a very special kind of horizon: ' ... but the plane is the horizon of events ... not the relative horizon that functions as a limit, which changes with an observer and encloses observable states of affairs, but the absolute horizon, independent of any observer, which makes the event as concept independent of a visible state of affairs in which it is brought about'.[44]

The non-relativist nature of Wittgenstein's perspectivism has to be reconciled with the prohibition of any kind of value judgement, which is not without paradox. For how can Wittgenstein describe, as he does, the con-

temporary form of life, or techno-scientific-industrial civilization, as 'deca-dent', because it is impregnated with that 'terrible evil – our disgusting soapy water science',[45] and at the same time say that he is not making a value judgement?

It does not seem unreasonable to try and resolve this question by an appeal to what Wittgenstein says about the relation between genius and the simple honest man (anticipating the comparison between forms of life of equal value). Wittgenstein writes: 'There is no more light in a genius than in any other honest man – but he has a particular kind of lens to concentrate this light into a burning point.' [46] And what goes for individuals goes for forms of life. Without explicitly setting down forms of life in a hierarchy (they have the same 'amount of force and authenticity', just as the genius and the honest man who have the same 'quantity of thought'), Wittgenstein cannot prevent himself from making the comparison, and indicating his preference for that which is most congenial to him: that which does not prohibit us from throwing ourselves insanely against the limits of language, even knowing full well that they are limits, and thus creating the space for ethics, art and religion. These invite us 'to dive down into primordial chaos and feel at home there',[47] to bring back some seashells, some traces, despite the absolute – that is, the logico-grammatical – impossibility of bringing back propositions. This is an operation which is ethical, aesthetic, and religious, but it is also the *telos* of philosophy, when it renounces the condition of theory or of representation and becomes a vision of its own limits and of the limits of the world or of life – the famous *Übersichtlichkeit*,[48] at once a vision that is mute, perspicuous and synoptic – or when it approaches music or poetry. No one ignores the importance of the first master of Nietzsche[49] in the genesis of Wittgenstein's thought, from his first writings to his last.

III

To conclude we need to explore the importance of the articulation between philosophy and life, for only this investigation can give us a more precise measure of the use of the notion of the plane of immanence. Let us consider the ethical dimension of this notion. In trying to do this we are following a path foreshadowed by Foucault concerning one of Deleuze's works, though we are applying it to his oeuvre as a whole. Foucault wrote, in the preface to the English translation, 'I would say that *Anti-Oedipus* (may its authors forgive me) is a book of ethics',[50] and remember that there Foucault also writes 'one might say that *Anti-Oedipus* is an *Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life*' (*ibid.*).

Let us return to the last pages written by Deleuze, *'L'Immanence: Une Vie ... '*. What is of interest here is the idea of *a life*, qualified as it is with the indefinite article. After describing the plane of immanence as an instance which precedes and institutes subject and object as transcendent, he defines it as *a life*: 'we shall say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE and nothing more. It is not immanence *in* life, but immanence which is not *in* anything, and is itself a life'.[51] If it were immanence in life it would immediately lose its essential *aseitas*[52] and plunge into *abalietas*, it would be diluted in life *qua* transcendent – as an object of biology, for example. What is necessary is to *think life as transcendental*.

A scandalous idea? No more paradoxical than proposition 6.42 (and its context) of the *Tractatus*: 'ethics is transcendental'. But let us not be over-hasty. We do not need to harp back to Wittgenstein in order to meet again this articulation, which has a tradition in the history of philosophy, from Fichte to Husserl. As always, Deleuze, somewhat hostile to the phenomeno-logical tradition, stresses that *even* Husserl arrives at the idea that all transcendence 'only constitutes itself *in the life of consciousness* as inseparably linked to this life'. But note that Fichte had already meant by 'life' an unobjectifiable precondition of objectivity, incapable of being assimilated to a fixed *res*. We stress that for Fichte, as for Husserl, the meanings of 'transcendental' and of 'life' superpose themselves on those of temporality and the Absolute (a living and restless Absolute).[53]

Deleuze, though supporting himself in this way on the tradition of German philosophy, distances himself from it, in order to define his own conception of immanence and life. And the 'non-German' element, so to speak, in his thought consists precisely in the identification of immanence and the transcendental with the *purely empirical*, in a line extending from Hume, Maine de Biran, William James and Bergson. Perhaps the best description would be a philosophy that is *transcendental but not Kantian*.[54] What, then, was Kant's mistake? It is as if he had simultaneously discovered the dimension of the transcendental and then covered it up again. Deleuze's criticism is the following: the Kantian construction of the transcendental in effect duplicates the level of the empirical. Deleuze confronts Kant as Aristotle confronts Plato: once the *hiatus* between the empirical and the transcendental has opened up, the infinite and desperate task of mediation imposes itself – a task of syntheses of syntheses of syntheses – and the Third Man argument resurfaces. Just as for Aristotle the potentiality/act structure dissolves the Platonic *aporia* of participation, it is the virtual/actual structure (found in Bergson) which allows Deleuze to remodel Kant's transcendental aesthetic and analytic, avoiding the problem of the synthesis of the manifold of sensibility. The sensible, no longer understood in the manner of 'simple

empiricism' as simple sensation, is given under the form of a 'singular essence'.

What could this expression – a 'singular essence' – mean? Recalling a story by Dickens, Deleuze writes in his last text:

> A good-for-nothing, universally scorned rogue is brought in dying, only for those caring for him to show a sort of ardent devotion and respect, an affection for the slightest sign of life in the dying man. Everyone is so anxious to save him that in the depths of his coma even the wretch himself feels something benign passing into him. But as he comes back to life his carers grow cold and all his coarseness and malevolence return. Between his life and death there is a moment which is now only that of a life playing with death. The life of the individual has given way to a life that is impersonal but singular nevertheless, and which releases a pure event freed from the accidents of inner and outer life; freed, in other words, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: *Homo tantum* with which everyone sympathizes and which attains a soil of beatitude. This is a *haecceity*, which now singularizes rather than individuating: life of pure immanence, neutral and beyond good and evil since only the subject which incarnated it in the midst of things rendered it good or bad. The life of such an individuality effaces itself to the benefit of the singular life that is immanent to a man who no longer has a name and yet cannot be confused with anyone else. Singular essence, a life ... [55]

It is just this maximum approximation between the empirical and the transcendental, as well as the inclusion of the term 'life' in the lexicon of the transcendental, which we meet again in Wittgenstein, from the *Tractatus* on, though it is transformed in his later writings. In the *Tractatus*, too, the ternary structure of the *Critique of Pure Reason*[56] is avoided, and the necessity of a *tertium* to guarantee the application of the understanding to the sensible is removed. In propositions 1 to 1.21, with the circumscription of the facts of logical space, pure contingency accommodates itself immediately in the *épure* of the necessary. Moreover, in states of affairs the 'participation' of things does not require any intermediate term, since they are joined together 'like the links in a chain'. Once again we are freed from the Third Man argument, and we need not allow the hierarchy of types of entity to proliferate indefinitely heavenwards. Above all, this articulation between logic and the empirical (projection or picturing) implies a new vision of the subject and of life as essentially *transcendental*. The subject, for its part, cannot be thought as *mundane*, and situates itself at the limit of the world or of language ('Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You

may say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do *not* see the eye. And nothing *in the visual field* allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.' *Tractatus*, 5.633). The world, for its part, is, as a limited totality, *my* world – the correlate of *my* life. But this *singular* life, because it is *mine*, has nothing to do with the 'accidents of either internal or external life'; it is not personal or individual, since this 'I' has no psychological substance. This can be seen clearly from propositions 5.621 and 5.63, where Wittgenstein writes, 'The world and life are one. I am my world. (The microcosm.).' A singular essence?

Hence, for Wittgenstein, life is precisely a transcendental field or a plane of immanence, but viewed *sub specie aeternitatis* in the *Tractatus*. It is an absolute, like life according to Deleuze, but stripped of the dimension of time. We must wait until the crisis of logical atomism and the reworking of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning for temporality to become an essential subject of his thought.[57] The logical and the empirical are always combined, but now follow the flow of time. 'Words have meaning only in the stream of life',[58] and reason becomes contingent like life. In other words, in the new conception of meaning language-games are essentially linked to forms of life, and as Von Wright observes: 'Because of the interlocking of language and ways of life, a disorder in the former reflects a disorder in the latter. If philosophical problems are symptomatic of language producing malignant outgrowths which obscure our thinking, then there must be a cancer in the *Lebensweise*, the way of life itself.'[59] By philosophy we must free the flow of life and expand its sphere. We must remember that Wittgenstein saw in Frazer's theoretical blindness the expression of a limited form of life.[60] Philosophy is a kind of *ars* of the dismantling of systems of power which individualize us and which paralyse thought in a narrow form. Thus Wittgenstein considered Ramsey a 'bourgeois thinker' because he wanted to provide foundations for the state in its singularity, and for mathematics also, in opposition to the 'Bolshevism' of Brouwer.[61]

In the same way, philosophy for Deleuze only has meaning when provoked by life or by the world. Recall the celebrated phrase of *DR*: 'Something in the world forces us to think' (p. 139). This kind of violence requires an answer which is a kind of 'clinic of the self'. It is the *ethical* aspect emphasized by Foucault, which makes philosophy closer to *poiesis* or *ars*, than *theoria*. Following Bergson's critique of classical metaphysics, here philosophy is the dissolution of false theoretical problems, the invention of new problems or proliferating paradoxes which make the classical conception of 'sense' implode, by means of a 'dramatization of logic' and of the concept of 'the expressed', which is no longer an undefined mist between the proposition and the state of affairs. Before *LS*, which develops this drama system-

atically, we find in *DR* Ch. III, pp. 198–213, the basis of this critique of the postulate of the privileged role of designation, which as in Wittgenstein's move from logic to grammar, or from the world of eternal 'things' to temporal forms of life, returns sense to the flux of 'living thought'. Declaring war on all forms of foundationalism in a spirit which is both anarchontic and nomadic,[62] and recalling Hume's splendid phrase about the sceptic who has 'no fixed station or abiding city, which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged to defend',[63] let us never transcend the plane of immanence – let us slide about on its surface, *nihil absconditum* – be it heaven or hell. To think is not to subsume the sensible under the concept of recognition, or determining objects – this task, which transforms the plane of immanence into a system of states of affairs, belongs to science. To think is to throw oneself against the limits of representation and to subvert it, and, again, to free the flow of life and expand its sphere.

In a word, to think the idea of the plane of immanence is to call philosophy back to life, or, and this is the same thing, to bring life back to philosophy.

Intensity, or: the 'Encounter'

Juliette Simont

THE PHILOSOPHER, A MAN UNDER PRESSURE

'It's difficult: one can't understand it, yet it's beautiful': so remarks a philosophy professor to his students while explicating Hölderlin and Kant. Meanwhile we, the readers, laugh. In this laughter, one could hear a bitter joy, maybe tinged with resentment: here is some professor or critic who, instead of clarifying his subject, makes it more opaque, vague and aesthetic. In fact, the laughter of the Deleuzian cyber-lector perusing the 'second lesson on Kant' of March 1978 is quite different. It comes from the pleasure of the shortcut, which is to say, of speed.

Often in his lectures, Deleuze goes faster than he might have permitted himself in a book. But inasmuch as his books define speed as one of the constitutive factors, perhaps the constitutive factor, of philosophy, the speed of a seminar cannot be explained by the urgency of a moment nor construed as a form of disrespect. In *WP*, speed appears at three different levels. First, the speed of chaos, of the dark depth where everything is constantly differentiating, the speed of infinite chaos into which the philosopher plunges to re-emerge, giving a shape to the inchoate: 'Chaos is characterized less by the absence of determinations than by the infinite speed with which they take shape and vanish' (*WP*, p. 42). Next, speed of the plane of immanence, 'a sieve stretched over the chaos' (*WP*, p. 43), by which the philosopher decides, pre-philosophically, what is worthy of thought – the infinite speed of this infinite movement through which the philosopher unwinds his net, running back and forth, laying out the double horizon of being and thought. 'We head for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and we return with bloodshot eyes, yet they are the eyes of the mind ... Take Michaux's plane of immanence, for example, with its infinite, wild movements and speeds' (*WP*, p. 41). And finally the speed of the concepts with which the philosopher populates and structures the plane; infinite speed of a finite movement

articulating the features or parts of a concept, finite in number, the concept itself being nothing other than their infinitely rapid flight. The concept 'is infinite through its survey [*survol*] or its speed but finite through its movement that traces the contour of its components' (*WP*, p. 21). As soon as he encounters chaos, the philosopher has to work bravely and hastens to 'arrive as quickly as possible at mental objects determinable as real beings' (*WP*, p. 207).

Why this affinity between philosophy and speed? There are many other ways of envisaging the practice of thought, as the tranquil contemplation of Ideas or as the 'patience of the concept' for example, the gnawing labour of the negative, or yet again as a meditative opening to the word of being. Most frequently philosophical depth is associated with a slow labour.

In the beginning was chaos; the philosopher never ceases to pursue its speed, first to capture it without immobilizing it, to distribute it while mapping the plane, then to tame it without neutralizing it, preserving it in the vibration of concepts. Many philosophers never encounter this speed, this chaos. Are they true philosophers? For Deleuze they are mostly dogmatists, those led by a 'dogmatic image of thought'. Certainly Deleuze, as much as Kant, has his own dogmatists, just as Hegel his thinkers of the understanding, Plato his sophists, Nietzsche his Christ and his Priest. Far from feeling themselves lost in these unheard of velocities, shipwrecked in *terrae incognitae* where they would have to scout out new territory and sketch a provisional cartography, dogmatists believe in the eternal affinity of thought and truth. They believe it sufficient to demonstrate good will, to entrust the human faculties with natural reliability. Owing to this presupposed complicity between philosophy and truth, it is not a matter of catching up with some chaotic evanescence or creating concepts able to grasp it, but of *recognizing* things that have always already been thought by thought, which therefore display the eternal identity of substantial and essential forms. 'I' (the subject) am the happy concord of my faculties, when they apply, with full necessity, to an object supposed to be the same. It is this which Deleuze calls 'common sense', this which ensures the *form* of sameness. Common sense, always paired up with 'good sense', orients the faculties in dealing with an empirically qualified object and assures the direction of time's arrow, permitting prediction and preventing the dispersal of sense in all directions as in dreams or paradoxes. If then, buttressed by common sense and good sense, philosophy fails to think, it is because it fails in its most heartfelt project: to liberate itself from dogma. Doubtless, it can rise above this or that empirical dogma, this or that dogmatic prejudice, above unthinking obedience to preceptors or undue faith in the certainty of immediate perception. It can even apply itself to the most 'hyperbolic' feats

of doubting, yet, as with the evil spirit of Descartes' *Metaphysical Meditations*, it will no less retain the form of received wisdom, its general structure. From the point of view of common sense, this consists in *conformity*: 'Thought is thereby filled with no more than an image of itself, in which it recognises itself the more it recognises things' (*DR*, p. 138). In the words of the *Meditations*, thought is 'one and the same "I" who is now doubting almost everything, who nonetheless understands some things, who affirms that this one thing is true, denies everything else, desires to know more, is unwilling to be deceived' (*Metaphysical Meditations* [*AT*, VII, p. 29]). Let us say as well that this *sameness*, which is thought, knows itself as such because it knows by mental inspection that the *same* wax underlies all its subsequent transformations, independently of this 'sweetness of honey, this odour of flowers, this whiteness, this shape, this sound etc.' (*AT*, VII, p. 30). From the point of view of good sense, we find the unassailable strategic orientation of thought – its tactical opportunism, this 'purpose' [*dessein*] to cite the *Meditations* again – fixed by Descartes, and which he assures the 'Dean and Doctors of the sacred Faculty of Theology' he has never lost sight of, however radical his sceptical enterprise: to demonstrate God and the soul's existence by 'natural reason' (*AT*, VII, 1). Thus common sense and good sense are the two pillars of doxa. By simplifying somewhat the ramifications of Deleuze's thought, we shall try to gather them under the generic term 'recognition', which summarizes the dogmatic image of thought.

Why then, in the face of dogmatism, seek to reclaim the affinity of thought and speed? Speed is the great breath of the external, ripping away the 'umbrellas' (*WP*, p. 202) beneath which recognition hides and sowing the wind in a denuded sky, while differences flare up. Only thus is thought born, not through an eternal self-conformity, revealed by an object considered as self-identical, nor by some orthodox pathway decided well beforehand, but when it is confronted by the mark of the yet unthought, surging with the tempestuous unfamiliarity of an encounter.

VELOCITY AND INTENSITY

Of course in this respect Deleuze does not presume to be the first thinker or the unique witness to chaos. His work traces a select lineage, or rather perhaps a zigzag or a confraternity with the Stoics, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Maïmon, Nietzsche and Bergson: above all Spinoza, 'the prince of philosophers' (*WP*, p. 48), the king of speed. In the *Ethics* 'he attains incredible speeds, such lightning traverses that one can only compare them with music, tornadoes, wind and strings' (*WP*, p. 48). Philosophy,

since Aristotle, had been preoccupied with the stability of forms, these being attributed to subjects by the exercise of definition, by dividing and distributing Being so as to domesticate it for the requirements of knowledge. Spinoza does something else, giving philosophy over to an informal and plastic power, which he names Substance: the entirety of the world, *Deus sive natura*: a present infinity made up of infinitely small material elements in agitation and characterized neither by their form nor function but by degrees of speed and slowness. According to the degrees which specify the elements, these combine and become individuated as extended bodies. Bodies (which Spinoza also calls finite modes) not only have an individuality in extension, an *extensive* individuality, but also an *intensive* individuality, a degree of power, the active and passive power to affect and to be affected. Each mode relates to other modes according to its degree of power, either to modify them if its power to act is stronger, or to be modified if it is weaker.[1] Here extension or length is not, as in Descartes, an essence which guarantees the self-identity of matter (in the famous example of the *Second Meditation*, it is always the *same* wax, whether liquid or solid, it is identical beneath all variation). On the contrary, matter changes by modulating its extension through the respective speed of its constituents: it is unclear from this perspective whether the quickly spreading liquid and the solid at rest are the same body. Similarly with the affects of the body, Spinoza does not first of all attribute them to a subject-substance with the 'ability' to be affected; it is not necessary that there should be, underlying all, something like 'the wax' for us to be able to deal in different ways with its liquidity (say pouring it in a container), or its solidity (shaping it), etc. Rather, the body constitutes itself on the surface of its affects, according to its speeds and slownesses. It is uncertain whether in its liquid form this or that body is closer to oil than to solid wax. As a solid it might be infinitely closer to clay than to solid wax. Or, to use another example from Deleuze, the workhorse has more in common with the ox in the matter of intensive affects than with the racehorse.

No prior identities, no recognizable stabilities, only mobile individuations at the intersection of speeds and slownesses and the intensive affects which correspond to them. The prince of philosophers has taught us this: *intensity* corresponds to speed.

KANT FROM THE REAR

But there are not only princes. There are also all those who have glimpsed chaos, even if only to turn away the quicker. They too are members of this

confraternity despite themselves, since Deleuze fathered a book on each of them, pushed them towards seeing what they preferred not to. Kant, precisely, is one of them.

'It's difficult, one understands nothing ... ' A shortcut, we have said, though between what terms? Between two constitutive dimensions of Kantian thought. On the one hand, on the side of the subject, the assumption of time as the form of internal sense. Henceforth, thought is time. A quite new form of cogito is set up. For Descartes, thought was instantaneous, which is to say, non-temporal. It was a power of determination ('I think'), exercising itself directly over the prior indeterminacy of Being (because 'in order to think one must exist' *DR*, p. 85). And the cogito could then say to itself, simply, 'I think, therefore I am' and 'What am I? A thinking thing.' But since thought is time, in between the indetermination of being and the determination of thought, a third term is introduced, the determinable, or *the condition under which the indeterminate will be determined by thought, that is, time*. It is on condition of time that thought can think what it does think, and this time which it puts to the work of thought forever separates it from itself, so that the Kantian cogito confides to itself, 'I think and the time I take thinking ensures that I don't think what I think, and that I am not what I am, not that I think what I am, nor that I am what I think'. This is what Deleuze calls the 'crack'.

On the other hand, when considering the object, a 'principle of the understanding' which in the sovereign calm of the 'System of all the Principles' burns with a dark and very special kind of fire – 'the anticipation of perception' whose watchword is 'thus every reality in the appearance has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree' (*CPR*, A168/B210). A strange principle, in that it binds the continuity of scale, of degree, its augmentations and progressive diminutions, to this threshold or that rupture, to this apparent instantaneity which a sensation is, when pregnant with its reality.

In both cases 'it's difficult, one understands nothing'. Who is 'one'? The commentators, clearly. For them also time and intensive magnitudes are intractable knots. Is what Kant calls 'schematism' lived time, a subjective and originary time? If so, why does he appeal, in his texts on schematism, to the system of categories which should be derived from it?[2] In the text on the 'anticipation of perception', he is, for Herman Cohen, 'confused and contradictory' (cited by J. Rivelaygue, I, p. 419), for Vuillemin 'obscure' (*Vuillemin*, p. 138) and for Rivelaygue 'difficult' (*ibid.*, p. 420). It is above all for Kant himself that a bizarre opacity exists in these two dimensions of his thought. Imagination: a demoralizing function of the soul? It is 'blind'. Is this schematism a deployment of the *a priori* determinations of time? Is it some 'hidden art' (*CPR*, A141/B180)? What of the anticipation of percep-

tion? In the course of its 'demonstration' it never ceases to feel like a 'strange' problem, 'exceptional', even 'shocking'.

The strength of Deleuze's interpretation is to make of this opacity not the sign of a defect, but something positive. 'It's difficult, one understands nothing', but not because the reasoning is less rigorous or subtle: the fact is that time and the anticipation of perception, even if Kant isn't aware of it, are two windows upon chaos, by which thought begins to think and think accurately, since, having encountered the unthought, it has gone beyond the happy *circularities* of recognition.

For the umbrella is circular, circular like our 'sheltering sky' of former days, with its marvellous planetary regularities measured precisely by time defined as 'the measure of movement' since the Greeks. And time was also circular, since it was conflated with the contents of the universe, whose circumference and limit it traced. But Kant gives time an entirely other definition, even an inverted one: it is no longer time which depends on movement, it is movement which depends on time – 'the concept of alteration and with it the concept of motion (as alteration of place) is only possible through and in the representation of time' (*CPR*, A32/B48). Thus liberated from subordination to its contents, time gains the autonomy of a pure *form*, in which everything changes, but which itself does not change, or time becomes the form of our internal sense, through which everything becomes a phenomenon, but which itself is not phenomenalized ('time cannot be perceived by itself' (*CPR*, A181/B225), a recurrent theme in the Transcendental Analytic). The figure of this formal time which no longer articulates the mundane hours and seasons, which no longer has either origin, anchorage or destination is not the circle but the line, a line which no longer limits anything, but which, on the contrary, given over to itself becomes 'limitless in both directions' (*LS*, p. 165).

At the same time as this new figure of time arrives, the peaceful circularity in which the cosmos was totalized disappears: the antinomies of pure reason are the demonstration and the narrative of this loss, and when Kant looks for the cause of the 'subreption' which provokes them, he encounters a blindness towards time when considered as a series, which is to say a line impossible to end or to curve back on itself. This being said, Kant's critical philosophy furnishes us with a new umbrella, more restrictive but equally circular. This is because the synthetic judgement *a priori* is circular, since its function is to trace the limits around our knowledge and to confirm them, just as, earlier, time had circumscribed the limits of a universe to which we are now forbidden access. A category of the understanding has objective validity, since without it, it is impossible to think anything at all resembling an object. Inside this circle Kant moves like a fish through water. It is at the heart of

the idea of recognition, of thought always already preceding itself in what it thinks. But in the same way that Kant saw the disruption of the circle of time, it seems that the circle of synthetic judgement falls apart at the very kernel of his system. The astonishment he expresses when formulating the 'anticipation of perception' is not surprising, for as far as sensation is concerned, *it should be impossible for thought to anticipate it*, to bring it back to itself, in a circle, because the sensible is *par excellence* what comes to meet thought, which thus dispossess it of itself. Compared to sensation, thought is all passivity, or, as Deleuze would say, the sensible is what thought can only *encounter*. Here, then, something appears to escape from the circle and, as in the case of time as a line, something imperceptible. For just as time cannot be perceived in itself, so tiny sensations or intensive degrees, which are conditions of sensation, are nevertheless imperceptible.

In his demonstration of the 'anticipation of perception', Kant himself made the connection between time and intensive magnitude, in particular in the version presented in Section 26 of the *Prolegomena*. Here he says that if sensation is instantaneous, the instant, however condensed, pertains to the flux of time. But time (as the Transcendental Aesthetic tells us) is a *continuum*. Moreover, it is never 'perceived in itself', or is only perceived through the phenomena for which it is a condition of phenomenalization. If one could say that there has been some time, however small, between the 0 of the absence of sensation and the 1 of sensation, it must be because this time had content, and this content is none other than the tiny sensations which have preceded sensation itself or the infinity of its degrees: degrees of sensation can be estimated 'by their capability of decreasing by infinite intermediate degrees to disappearance, or of increasing from naught through infinite gradations to a determinate sensation, *in a certain time*'.[3]

What sort of link does Kant establish between time and intensive magnitudes? He appeals to the continuity of time in order to counterbalance or dilute the violent, heterogeneous threshold of sensation, so as to see it in terms of degrees and thus make it measurable and calculable. The advantage is considerable. Henceforward everything which seemed impossible to master within the sensible, all that Descartes, in the example of the piece of wax, abandoned to imagination (its heated liquid form, its honey-like aroma), everything becomes, thanks to the idea of a specific degree of sensation, an object of possible knowledge.

THE LAW OF CONTINUITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF INDISCERNIBLES

As for Deleuze, he wishes to relate time and intensity in quite another fashion. It is no longer a matter of diluting the tension between continuity and heterogeneity, but of making evident a paradoxical mode of continuity which does not exclude the cut or 'caesura', but on the contrary implies it. Or, inversely, a method of 'caesura' which is nothing other than the distribution of continuity.

Which leads us to another member of the confraternity, Leibniz. It is because the thought of Leibniz is based on such a paradox that the law of continuity and the principle of indiscernibles never struck him as contradictory: he saw them as mutually implying one another. And Deleuze's commentary on the relation of the two Leibnizian principles tells us at the same time about this 'illegitimate child' he wants to father on Kant.

Everything seems to oppose the law of continuity whose formula is 'all in nature proceeds by degrees, not leaps'[4] to the principle of indiscernibles, which affirms that every individual entity has within itself its own interior difference, and which therefore introduces between one individual and another an essential discontinuity. In any case, for Kant, this law and this principle are not reconcilable. The 'amphiboly of the concepts of reflection' stigmatized the principle of indiscernibles, remarking that though it might have some validity at the level of simple metaphysics, it has none in the phenomenal world, the only world at our disposal. In this world, spatial distinction is a sufficient principle of individuation. Things which appear in two different spaces are thereby double: without this distinction we should have to postulate some internal distinction, whereas by staying within the continuity of space one is spared any unlikely 'intrinsic' individuation, which nothing in our experience confirms. Who, for example, has ever seen the internal difference which separates water droplets?

But it is only in the name of a duality of worlds, the intelligible world and the phenomenal world (the former being forbidden to access), that Kant sees the Leibnizian principle of individuation as purely ideal. This duality is a Kantian postulate, and it is uncertain whether Leibniz can be made to conform to it.

One can understand this better by citing another duality, this time internal to the phenomenal world, a duality intangible for Kant but to which Leibniz does not subscribe either, a duality which goes back to Aristotle: matter and form. With Kant it takes the following aspect: consciousness applies its forms (forms of pure intuition and categories) to a 'manifold' otherwise 'blind' and which, thus informed, becomes an object of knowledge.

This is what Deleuze, following Gilbert Simondon, calls a 'mould': stable and pre-existent forms which configure in a definitive manner a passive material (*LB*, p. 19).[5] For him, Leibniz articulates the relation of the subject-monad and the object-world in a quite different way, so that it is no longer a question of speaking either of the subject or of the object. The continuity of the world is the flexible variation of the multiple, the temporal malleability of a series of little differences. Far from being the receptacle of the action of form, far from waiting to take form inside its imprisoning matrix, this continuum *modulates itself*, *obscurely* it is true, because no awareness has yet managed to bring it to light, but nevertheless distinctly. Leibniz dissociates what, for Descartes, was narrowly related, the clear and the distinct, and associates the clear with the confused and the distinct with the obscure. And this perspective, at first sight surprising, must be read in terms of its coherence with an understanding of the 'subject–object' relation in terms of modulation rather than moulding.

The small differences are perfectly distinct all along the *continuum*, the noise of each wave, or the million tiny snags of unrest which animate any living being: take, for example, the multiplicity of unnoticed lacks which precede hunger (lack of sugar, lack of fats, etc.). The monad, filled with all the dust of the world, individuates itself by the way it 'brings to light' the continuity between distinctness and obscurity. All of a sudden it is clear: the noise of the sea, the hunger which grips my stomach. Is this clarity the result of an additive process, a progressive totalization of little differences which would then be like the microscopic particles of macroscopic perception? No, rather it is the product of a 'caesura', when, from the *ordinariness* of minute differences, the *remarkable* or *notable* takes form. The remarkable is what *stands out* from the dust, what makes the decision: I am hungry, I hear the sea: a perception is *noticed*. This cut is not an interruption of the continuum. On the contrary it is nothing other than the continuum, *illuminated or distributed in a certain manner* (a 'manner' unique to the monad and constituting its identity) in a sort of after-event summarized by Deleuze in the phrase 'so *that's* what it was!'. It was *that*, then, which I wasn't aware of and which I can now perceive! It was the sea then! This is an exclamation of differing, miles from the tiresome repetition of recognition always repeating 'it truly is the same', the same wax in its unchangeable extension under all its transformations, the same unshakeable Cogito, the same substances, the same essences, the same red cinnabar. 'So *that's* what it was!', this is an exclamation of differing because the imperfect hails not only an after-event but also a strange contretemps; it is not simply that my understanding is always belated, may even be too late (in which case my understanding, however late, might still adjust itself to what it comprehends). Rather, it is that from the

very fact that I understand 'clearly', I lose what I understand. For at the moment when 'that' arrives or 'that' becomes *notable*, the *distinction* of little differences is lost and falls into the past because the clear is also inevitably the confused: I only perceive the sea by blocking out the detailed surge of thousands of wavelets, the splashing of a myriad droplets.

From these considerations on the distinct and obscure and the clear and confused, how much should we infer about what differentiates the model of the mould from that of modulation? Let us suppose three steps, the pole of the object, the pole of the subject, and finally their relation. The object: the Kantian manifold was blind and waited passively for categories to inform it. The Leibnizian continuum, howsoever obscure, is nevertheless not blind since it forms itself as it unfolds. It unfolds myriads of differences which are perfectly distinct. The subject, Kantian forms, forms of intuition and categories, were by themselves empty, and thus, without the manifold of experience, lifeless. The Leibnizian subject is in itself a fullness, always already inhabited by all the murmuring of the world. Relationship: in the case of Kant, given the respective characteristics of the manifold and of the forms of the subject (blindness, emptiness), their relationship can only take the form of a necessary complementarity, of a necessary opening of the subject onto the object, which it forms by means of this very opening. One knows the posterity of this correlation which phenomenology will name intentionality. It goes from the dry Husserlian formula 'all consciousness is consciousness of something' to the more existentialist versions of the same relation, the Heideggerian Being-in-the-world, or the nihilation through which the Sartrean For-Itself ensures that it is not an In-Itself. Very different is the relation of monad to continuum, not that of an opening onto but, inversely, of inclusion and closure. It's not the monad which is open to the world, it is the world which is included in the monad. By virtue of this reversal, the question is not, as in Kant, that of a relationship of complementarity between two heterogeneous terms (a heterogeneity which never ceases to embarrass post-Kantianism: how, out of this alterity, is it possible to make a real synthesis?), but of an indissoluble intrication so that 'it is hard to say where the sensible ends and the reasonable begins' (F, p. 66). For as we have seen, the obscure already has its own self-formation, its specific intelligence, at its own level: the distinct. And clarity only gains its consistency by secreting at its own level an opacity, a specific powerlessness: confusion. This intrication cannot be conflated with an interiority of the dialectical type, because what it opposes to the dualities of the Kantian type is not at all the additional synthesis which will be the solution of German idealism, but a manner of multiplying difference. This is the very specialized sense of the 'condition of closure' which characterizes the monad. This famous condition

(doorless, windowless) does not refer, as certain commentators think,[6] to a very classical metaphysics of the *res cogitans*. If the monads are closed, it is so as better to 'give the world the possibility of beginning over and again in each monad' (*F*, p. 26). Opened out, they would all wade through the great unitary motion of being in the world.[7] Closed, yet all including the same world, filled with the same 'ordinary lapping', each one reveals it differently and becomes an additional facet, a mirror where the world multiplies itself. In the process of inclusion it is not the monad which absorbs the world, but, on the contrary, the world which, unfolding its continuum, drafts virtual points of view, positions, perspectives for deciphering, which, once occupied, constitute precisely the individual or the monad. It is like a torsion, the world is *in* the monads, but the monads exist *to* echo the world, to differentiate on other terms its differences, in a finite restaging of their infinity (*F*, p. 26).[8] The monad is the *'dark background'* (*F*, p. 27). Expressed otherwise: it's difficult, one understands nothing. It is also, called for by the world and its undulations, an irreplaceable sequence of partial clarity on the surface of the continuum, a 'reading' equal to no other. And the monads, in their multiplicity, each one reading what the other abandons to obscurity, are like the Grand Book of Mallarmé, a Book so much more a totality for being the sum of fragments, of notes pencilled at the theatre and other circumstantial writings (cf. *F*, p. 31). In other words, it is beautiful, a kaleidoscopic beauty of baroque harmony.

IN THE GRIP OF RECOGNITION

For Kant, there is either the phenomenal world and spatiality, or the intelligible world and the intrinsic individuation of monads; either the law of continuity, or the principle of indiscernibility. Deleuze continually hunts out this line of reasoning by alternation and exclusion. Take for instance, in *Difference and Repetition*, at the most general ontological level, this affirmation: 'either being is full positivity, pure affirmation, but then there is no difference, being is undifferentiated; or being includes differences, it is Difference and there is non-being, a being of the negative' (*DR*, p. 268). Or, when going into further detail regarding the nature of difference, whether 'difference must be understood as quantitative limitation or qualitative opposition' (*DR*, p. 268.) Finally, and even more precisely, concerning the nature of minute differences within differential calculus, there is an additional question, due to the ambiguous character of the differentials. Sufficiently consistent to enter into the calculus, but somehow negligible to the extent of having to disappear in the result, are they real, are there really

infinitely small points, or are they rather fictive elements, a methodological trick (*DR*, p. 231)?

If Deleuze resists these alternatives and the implicit demands they contain, it is because they are nothing other than the jaws or the pincers of recognition, this form of knowing which only accepts as knowledge what is already thought as the same, through the harmonious concourse of the faculties (common sense) and in a preordained direction (good sense).

When one decides in advance on the identity of the object of thought, how else to proceed except by alternatives which implicitly prejudge the final choice? It is the ancient story of the binding and subordination of difference to identity. As soon as there is initial identity, difference can no longer be conceived as a 'disparate' multiplicity, as a free proliferation. Now a framework closes it in, rules over it, totalizes it, so that it can only define itself negatively. This is the sense of the formula, *omnis determinatio negatio*. Difference is stamped out on the background of a prejudicial identity, it negates this identity in the sense that it marks out its limits, negating at the same time 'everything else'. While if the alternative was not exclusive, if the 'either ... or' marked inclusion rather than exclusion, the initial identity would be destroyed.

Now the concept of intensive magnitude has often been criticized on the grounds of this unexamined co-existence, as an alternative not properly worked out. The attempt to reconcile quantity with quality, difference in degree and difference in nature, would have produced a hybrid and unworkable concept. Such an argument has been presented in different guises. Hegel in his *Science of Logic* claims one cannot firmly establish the difference between extensive quantity (faceless infinity, the 'flowing out of itself' of multiplicity, the indifferent overstepping of limits) and intensive quantity (magnitude especially designed to measure qualitative difference).[9] Quantity is the irremediable disappearance of quality. As soon as one moves in this direction, it is vain to try and recover a qualitative interiority: one has to sink into the infinite, whence also will come another sense of infinite relation, consciousness or 'Being-for-Oneself' (*Science of Logic*, I, sect. II, Ch. 2 B: Extensive And Intensive Quantum). Bergson, from a completely different perspective and with a quite contrary project (to preserve the qualitative) also attacks the ambiguity of the concept of intensity, which for him is only intended to dilute true differences in nature in the indifference of the more and the less. Deleuze comments, following Bergson, 'And conceiving everything in terms of more or less, seeing nothing but differences in degree or differences in intensity where, more profoundly, there are differences in kind is perhaps the most general error of thought, the error common to science and metaphysics.' (*B*, p. 20). These differences in nature are expressed

in the 'famous' Bergsonian dualisms: 'duration-space, quality-quantity, heterogeneous-homogeneous, continuous-discontinuous, the two multiplicities, memory-matter, recollection-perception' (*op. cit.*, p. 21).

BAPHOMET, BARTLEBY, ALICE AND THE OTHERS

What then, if identity were not primary? If it did not pre-exist difference? If, on the contrary, difference were primary? Why should it then have to assume the figure of the pincer, of the exclusive disjunction?

If difference were primary, then there would be 'princes' other than Spinoza on the philosophical stage, such as the Baphomet of Klossowski, the diabolical Proteus who reigns over a disjunction no longer exclusive, but *inclusive*. 'God, as the Being of beings, is replaced by the Baphomet, the 'prince of all modifications', and himself modification of all modifications. There is no longer any originary reality. Disjunction doesn't cease to be disjunction, the *either* does not cease to be an *or*. But instead of disjunction meaning that a certain number of predicates are excluded from a thing by virtue of the identity of the corresponding concept, it now means that each thing is opened up to the infinity of predicates through which it passes, on the condition that it lose its identity as concept and as self' (*LS*, p. 296). It is this same diabolically princely God who reigns over neo-baroque modernity. The same one found 'in Joyce, but also in Maurice Leblanc, Borges, or Gombrowicz' (*F*, p. 81) and who, far from choosing *a* world, the richest of all compossibles, commences 'with its unfurling of divergent series in the same world, the irruption of incompossibilities on the same stage, where Sextus will rape *and* not rape Lucretia, where Caesar crosses *and* does not cross the Rubicon, where Fang kills, is killed, and neither kills nor is killed' (*F*, p. 82). This, then, is the first way of refusing to be caught in the trap of representation: making divergent determinations co-exist in so far as they are divergent. There is another still, which consists in letting them crumble and re-combine in a sort of central vacancy of radical insubordination, and here we must cite Melville's Bartleby, who could be called 'the prince of passivity' and who reigns via the 'destructive formula', *I would prefer not to*. Destructive, as Deleuze explains it, because it is not content to exclude the terms it qualifies (that is to say, whatever claim a life of drudgery makes on Bartleby, re-reading copied documents, collating papers, etc.), but it excludes above all else the possibility that there might be anything preferable for the sake of which it would be uttered. Bartleby does not want to do this or that rather than collate or copy, Bartleby wishes only for an absence of will, 'pure

patient passivity'. This 'formula' excludes the figure of choice, of alternatives, of the right course to adopt; it drowns everything in a zone of indiscernability (cf. *ECC*, p. 70 f.).

It is clear that such a hypothesis about the originary character of difference, a difference no longer differing in relation to identity but differing *in itself*, a pure difference, has extreme consequences. As soon as one accepts it, the exclusive force of the 'either ... or' is defused. Deleuze, with Bartleby, *prefers not to* have to choose. With Borges, and with Alice in Wonderland, he walks along a garden of forking paths, where the Mad Hatter and the March Hare inhabit two opposed but indiscernible directions (*LS*, p. 79). As a consequence, the model of recognition, of common or good sense, is dismantled. Deleuze calls the functioning of faculties within recognition their 'empirical exercise'. But they are susceptible to an *encounter*, that is to say, necessarily, an encounter with difference, with this pure and primary difference, the arising of something absolutely new which the faculty in question does not *recognize* (nor would the other faculties which would come to its assistance): this soon makes it unrecognizable to itself. Thus the faculty harbouring a gap which cannot be filled by the concourse of the other faculties is forced into the 'exercise of transcendence'. What is encountered can take an infinity of forms, 'Socrates, a temple or a demon' (*DR*, p. 139). At the most dramatic level it might be, as in Tennessee Williams, in the blazing white oven of Cabeza de Lobo, the ravenous horde of young male prostitutes. Or at the most theoretical level, as with Kant's mild epistemology in the 'System of all principles of pure understanding', the sudden entry of an unfamiliar principle, astounding, scandalous, the 'anticipation of perception', so that the faculties become disorganized, habits fall apart. Sebastian ceases to be young, no longer fills up the blue notebook with summer poems, the white page becomes as immense, as vertiginous, as the white sky, and the poet, formerly a predator, becomes prey. Catherine, at the limits of her memory, combats the unsayable: the heat, the clatter of tin, the sunlit race along white streets, the body dismembered in the jaws of this hellish beach with its savage name. And Kant trembles in amazement, sensing the teetering of the peaceful circularity of synthetic *a priori* judgements on the edge of cracking up, of schism. It is the teetering which Deleuze aims at when he qualifies the anticipation of perception as 'profoundly schizoid' (AO, p. 19). It is true that, most frequently, recognition will suture the crack and eclipse the encounter. Doubtless a cathartic narration will 'cure' Catherine. Kant's astonishment will have no consequences and the transcendental analytic advances sure-footedly towards its goal, following the norms of common sense: complete constitution of objectivity (the first three principles) and subjective reflection on this constitution (the

last one). Subject/object, two identities indissolubly nourishing each other. Still, it remains that, with the invasion of difference, the '*de jure* easy' endlessly evoked by Descartes (cf. *DR*, p. 133: 'it is no exaggeration to say that this notion of ease poisons the whole of Cartesianism') has been dethroned by the 'it's difficult, one understands nothing' of Deleuze. And these words, 'suddenly last summer at Cabeza de Lobo' or yet again '*A las cinco de la tarde*' by Lorca, haunt us for ever, like the funeral march of an existence in the process of tipping over. Still it remains that German idealism, starting with Maïmon, never got through this maze, which Kant barely glimpsed: the strange anticipation of perception.

THE DISCORD OF FACULTIES, THE DISORDER OF ORGANS

Now, keeping alive the disruption of the different requires quite another theory of the faculties, that of 'the transcendent exercise'. This theory no longer circles within sameness, but runs in a zigzag line, a zigzag where each faculty, encountering within the different its own powerlessness and brought to its limit, ignites another faculty, in its turn making it capable of powerlessness and unequal to itself. Thus, to feel is to have experienced sensation itself as difference from what one did not feel, the plenitude of 1 emerging from an imperceptible and enigmatic 0, the origin of sensations. It is this origin which 'minute sensations' or intensive degrees refer to, the insensible genesis of the sensible. But immediately, this limit, this enigma of sensation, this insensible, which is at once an enquiry into the origin of sensation, or into its own being, calls up another faculty, memory, and puts it to a novel use. What it has to remind itself of in order to notice these small sensations is not a former present, not a forgotten sensation, but a *pure past*, which was never lived (since we never gain access to the minute sensations). And what is this past never lived, unremembered, if not an Idea, a pure *noumenon*? This *noumenon* is the limit of memory, where reason in turn ignites. Reason is the theoretical faculty which is no longer content just to *know*, i.e. elucidate an object already identified by categories, but which questions itself on its most essential element: the ideal, the noumenal. Now what about this element where thought evolves, the element of the Idea, at the same time constraining and tenuous, both necessary and impalpable? When reason endeavours to think it, it is led towards the 'differential', towards this 'nothing' which nevertheless has consistency, towards this pure ratio, which is nothing other than a thought, towards this negligible quantity, which within differential calculus must vanish into its result and is nevertheless productive.

Thus understood, the interrelation of faculties is no longer one of concord, but of bifurcation: it is a broken chain of gerundives. First there is the insensible in sensation, which is also *sentiendum*, that which should be felt but cannot be and which calls memory up. Then the pure past, lost to memory, *memorandum*, which calls reason up. Then the differential, the ungraspable thought, *cogitandum* ... Each faculty is produced out of a gaping hole, which the other confronts, and confronts its own in turn, while the exclamation echoes from one to the other: 'So *that's* what it was!' (*F*, p. 116; *AO*, p. 24): it was that, then, which was at stake for the previous faculty. It could only accede to it later, too late, as it loses itself, and from the point of view of another faculty.[10]

When difference is given its due, it is not only another theory of faculties which is established but also another view of the body. For recognition, which is the belief in a model of conformity and harmony, is not content with ruling over theoretical thought. It also inhabits the deepest level of our physiological consciousness, in the way we perceive our body, as a *whole*. Deleuze calls this whole the *organism* and describes it as the organization and support of organs (as the I was the support and control centre of the faculties). Each organ has a very precise function, and, when fulfilling it, contributes to the optimal reproduction of the whole. The thought of difference will substitute for this model an entirely different conception of organs, erratic and unstable, just as it had initiated the discord of faculties.

Attacking the 'dogmatic image of thought' did not imply the suppression of faculties as such (a theory of faculties, says Deleuze, is something 'absolutely necessary for the system of philosophy' (*DR*, p. 186)), but only of the understanding of their relationship as harmonious concord where recognition thrives. In the same way this new view of the body does not imply the rejection of organs as such, but only that of their necessary organization as a harmonious whole. What is attacked, therefore, is not the organs but the organism.

As soon as it accepts this encounter with difference, a 'faculty' is no longer pre-determined and attached to a pre-existing identity of the subject, meant to elucidate an object always supposed to be the same, but a forced movement which will only have gained its full consistency in the after-event, from another faculty ('So *that's* what it was!'). In the same way, the organ is not a fixed and pre-determined centre, but the result or residue of the commerce of two heterogeneous dimensions; thus tissue which has acquired the capacity of capturing light can become 'eye'.

If identity is no longer primary, if difference exists from the beginning, this means that at the level of sense production, the exclusive disjunction, instrument *par excellence* for assigning each determination its place, is no

longer constraining. It is the world of co-existing incompossibles, or of the princely indeterminacy Bartleby radiates. Similarly, for the body, if the global harmony of the organism is no longer in place, then the 'eye' need no longer remain eye in an exclusive way. Now organs are mobile and transitory, capable of unheard of combinations, so why not have a mouth-anus, a polyvalent organ of feeding and defecation (*BLS*, p. 35 – here Deleuze evokes *The Naked Lunch*)? Now organs travel, interpenetrate, rest only provisionally, contract hysterically, as in a Bacon painting which 'places eyes everywhere before us, in ears, in the stomach and in lungs' (*BLS*, p. 37). And in the case of the one who bids farewell to the organism, the schizophrenic, in the vocabulary of *Anti-Oedipus*, moving like Alice and Borges through a system of disjunctions whose purpose is no longer to exclude but to interweave 'a whole network of syntheses': 'Given any two organs, the way in which they are attached to the body without organs must be such that all the disjunctive syntheses between the two amount to the same on the slippery surface. Whereas the "either ... or" of the normal person claims to mark out decisive choices between immutable terms (the alternative: either this or that), the "either" of the schizophrenic refers to the system of possible permutations between differences that always amount to the same as they shift and slide about' (*AO*, p. 12).

WHERE ARE WE?

Where are we? Not a very Deleuzian question, if it is true that Deleuze's inquiry does not aim at some definitive truth, if it is rather found at the crossroads where paths fork, not so much to decide as to trace in thought 'hardly recognisable intensive paths' (*DR*, p. 236). Let us return to this intensity and to our starting point, the relation of a certain notion of 'speed' with two dimensions in Kantian thought, the 'anticipation of perception' (which explicitly deals with intensive magnitude) and time, the form of internal sense (which, as we intend to show, it is also concerned with, if implicitly). Have we not become side-tracked in this attempted flight away from the jaws of the 'alternative', a flight which has already taken us from the question of the compatibility of the principle of indiscernibles with the law of continuity, through a neo-Leibnizian vision where the divergent worlds would cohabit, towards, finally, the discord of faculties, and a body whose organs join and separate, unstable residues, provisional concretions or contractions?

In reality we are not as far away as it might seem from intensity. For what

in fact is this *encounter*, this primary difference, this difference which does not differ in relation to an identity, but *in itself*, a pure difference which defuses the excluding power of disjunction, which introduces discord into the faculties, and distributes the organs to all regions of a fragmented body? That is, precisely, intensity. To feel an intensity is necessarily to have experienced a rupture, a difference, a difference of intensity, a difference between 1 and 0, the perceived and the imperceptible, or between an intensity which has vanished and one coming to birth. All intensity is one (*this* heat, perfectly individuated) and at least two (as felt by its difference with either another intensity or a preceding absence of intensity). 'Every phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned. ... Everything which happens and everything which appears is correlated with orders of differences: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, *difference of intensity*' (*DR*, p. 222).

We remember that sensation, as well as the insensible in sensation (tiny sensations or intensive degrees) fired up the faculties in succession. This is not by chance. As an origin, Deleuze argues, sensation has a 'privilege' (*DR*, p. 144). This is the privilege of intensity. 'On the path which leads to that which is to be thought, all begins with sensibility. Between the intensive and thought, it is always by means of an intensity that thought comes to us' (*ibid*.). This privilege of intensity or sensation is due to the fact that the *encounter* which forces it into the transcendent exercise, pushes it to its own limits, is somehow already itself, itself insofar as it *is* difference itself. On the bodily level, the transitory organs of the schizophrenic flare up from the same intensive origin, forming what Deleuze calls a 'Body without Organs' ('BwO', a body whose organs do not make an organism) that is a pure passage of intensities: 'The BwO causes intensities to pass ... It is non-stratified, unformed, intense matter, the matrix of intensity' (*TP*, p.153).

Given, then, this privileging of intensity, its rumbling, originary force, overthrowing the primacy of identity, both at the level of faculties and their elaboration of sense, as well as that of bodily functions, it is not surprising that it should be intensity first of all which is caught in the jaws of the 'alternative'; quantity or quality, one must choose, an ultimatum which issues from very diverse horizons, from Hegel to Bergson. And it is not surprising either that it should escape this vice by its very nature; quality or quantity, 'the alternative is false' (*DR*, p. 193), because intensity reveals neither quantity nor quality. These two categories for Deleuze are on the contrary a degraded state of intensity, the moment of a degradation through which primary difference, *implicated* within itself, enveloping its 0 and its 1 as intrinsic heterogeneity, *explicates* itself to the outside and annuls its difference by spreading it within representation, taming it into measurable

relations. 'This is why the Bergsonian critique of intensity seems unconvincing. It assumes ready-made qualities and already constituted extensions' (*DR*, p. 239). From the ontological point of view, the intensive substratum is the apex of being, while the superficial assemblage of categories is the nadir. Being unable to maintain this hierarchy is to fall prey to the 'transcendental illusion' inherent in intensive magnitude, an illusion which consists of confusing two types of degradation: the internal degradation of intensity, through which its 1 expends itself and vanishes into the 0, a degradation entirely positive and affirmative, where the heterogeneity proper to pure difference can be seen, and its external degradation, its flattening out inside the categories which both explain and annul it, and which henceforward subordinate difference to the identity of the forms in which it is articulated.

To philosophize, for Deleuze, is to stand at the ontological height of these intensive craters which rage beneath categories, beneath organisms, which is to say to re-appropriate whatever occurs, *in its genetic process*, instead of accepting, at the level of sense 'qualities already constructed, extensions already constituted'[11] and, at the level of the body, laws imposed on the organism.

But there are entirely different ways of transmitting intensity, depending on whether we are on the level of sense, of propositions or of the BwO. The philosopher, because of the nature of the work, opts most readily for the level of sense. He or she will nevertheless have to reflect on the relationship of sense-intensity and bodily intensity, since if intensity is no longer *incarnated* one way or the other, it is histrionic, empty chatter, it 'remains a word as long as the body is not compromised by it' (*LS*, p. 160). Deleuze has reflected on this relation in the light of Stoic thought, which distinguished the physical melange of the bodies, which is the order of causes, and that of effects, which is of an altogether different nature, the order of incorporeal sense. In bodies, intensity *effectuates* itself, deeply, savagely: knife/flesh/wound. To give it a sense, to make of it a sense-intensity, is to extract effects from it, to choose something in this dark melange and transfigure it, conferring on it in a sort of jumping on the spot, a 'splendour' (*LS*, p. 149). In other words it is to 'counter-effectuate' or bring to the surface of the bodies what is incorporeal and beyond the logic of effects, to liberate 'the non existent entity for each state of affairs' (*LS*, p. 221). Thus Bousquet, making himself worthy of what happens to him, taking from his wounds and misfortune 'the immaculate part'.[12] Thus also the *Llanto* of Lorca, rising like a warm spray above a horn gouging flesh, '*a las cinco de la tarde*'. Thus also the Stoic little girl, in Wonderland, slowly abandoning the body, its depths, its warrens, moving towards a flattened universe filled with abstract directions and '*card figures* which have no thickness' (*LS*, p. 9).

There are other ways of stabilizing or destabilizing this distribution into body-causes and sense-effects. 'The entire biopsychic life is a question of dimensions, projections, axes, rotations, and foldings. Which way should one take? On which side is everything going to tumble down, to fold or unfold?' (*LS*, p. 222). A schizophrenic, unphilosophical distribution, as with Artaud, for whom the travels of Alice among the cards are just infantile, for whom language must disappear, sucked into the depths of the body, totally effectuated, totally physical, for whom the poem must be malodorous and 'remain in the uterine being of suffering' (cf. *LS*, p. 83, where Deleuze cites a letter by Artaud devoted to *Jabberwocky*). And there is also a philosophical fascination for these craters in the body, for this dismissal of language – a pre-Socratic fascination like that of Empedocles back into the bowels of the earth, with no more words or propositions, where only the volcano is heard. Conversely, even the schizophrenic has his fulgurant surface, compulsively acting out the philosophical duality which the Stoics tried to implement between the terrifying melange of the body and the 'splendour of the incorporeal'. He contrasts the fluidity of a smooth and amorphous body ('enchanted surface', *AO*, p. 11) with the pestilential disorder of the fragmented body.

Nothing is simple with these axes – projections or rotations where everything teeters. To make oneself a body without organs is eminently dangerous. 'If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of tracing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe' (*TP*, p. 161). On the one hand, what menaces the drug addict, the schizophrenic, the alcoholic or the hypochondriac is mortifying catatonia, when the zero of intensity ceases to be a principle of production and becomes an endless desert. At the other extreme one thinks oneself free of the body while one manages only to elicit a monstrous proliferation of one of its oppressive dimensions; and then a kind of fascist cancer takes over, far worse than normal Oedipal authority over the organism. To be a philosopher can also have its risks. The philosopher always risks being ridiculous through never having taken any real risks. His pretension is to abstract the incorporeal and to place himself at the level of its splendour, where experience is of an intensity comparable to nothing else. 'There arise then aggressions and voracities which transcend what was happening in the depths of bodies; desires, loves, pairings, copulations, and intentions which transcend everything happening at the surface of bodies; and finally powerlessness and deaths that transcend all that could have happened' (*LS*, p. 221). This pretension is always suspect and risks turning into a futile and pompous game when compared with those who ventured their own flesh. The question haunts Deleuze from *Logic of Sense* to *A Thousand Plateaus*: Bousquet, Artaud,

Fitzgerald and Lowry, among others, speak of the incorporeal 'crack up' because they carry this suffering inside the ineffable darkness of their own bodies and derive from it 'an unprescribable right' (*LS*, p. 157). But what of the philosopher? 'What is left for the abstract thinker once she has given advice of wisdom and distinction? Well then, are we to speak always about Bousquet's wound, about Fitzgerald's and Lowry's alcoholism, Nietzsche's and Artaud's madness while remaining on the shore? Are we to become the professionals who give talks on these topics?' (*ibid.*). 'Is it cowardice or exploitation, waiting until others have taken the risk?' (*TP*, p. 286).

Nevertheless, this is the gamble. For the schizophrenic, to stay creative on the crest between the two destructive slopes of the BwO, carefully measuring, experimenting, preserving just enough of the organism 'for it to reform each dawn' (*TP*, p. 160). So that one can do it all over again. And for the philosopher, it becomes a question of reaching this inebriation by personal means, getting drunk on clear water, drugged on virtual substances distilled by the plane of consistency itself.

We shall end by trying to approach the elements of this virtual chemistry by which the philosopher inebriates himself, and by integrating them into our starting point, i.e. speed and temporality in Kant and again, in Kant, the 'anticipation of perception'.

Some dive deep into chaos, inscribing it on their own body, succumbing because they failed to construct their BwO. Others plunge and survive, triumphing through their addiction. They are able to *make use* of their dependency, paranoia, sadism or masochism. The drunkenness of philosophy is a matter of diving in and 'vanquishing chaos': 'And thrice victorious I crossed the Acheron' (*WP*, p. 202) – even when victory is not final, for one should not forget the monster, lose sight of the genetic process, and doze in the dogmatic comfort of recognition. The aim is to defeat chaos on its own ground, to keep up with the infinite velocity of the appearing and vanishing intensive determinations, to capture them and force them to remain, forever intense, suspended forever between 0 and 1, in a work or in concepts, which are centres of vibration, blocks of intensive variations. ('The concept does not have spatio-temporal coordinates, only intensive ordinates', *WP*, p. 21.) What is defeated or defused in chaos is its own inconsistency, that painful form of inconsistency, where all is dismantled even before having taken on form. For the concept is nothing other than the consistency it establishes over its components or intensive traits. What is retained from chaos is its intensity, pure difference, this matrix of all thought, this heterogenesis the dogmatic endeavours not to consider. The name of this victory over chaos, which we could have mentioned already when recalling Deleuze's descent, is 'the event'.

'WHAT A FATEFUL FIVE O'CLOCK!'

The concept 'speaks the event' and is in itself 'pure Event, a hecceity, an entity' (*WP*, p. 21). The event connects all dimensions deployed up to this point. Intensity and the savage heterogeneity which it carries, this power of rupture, caesura, disequilibrium occasion the phrases: Something has happened! This is what happened! It was a sensation! So *that's* what it was! This is the minimal understanding of the event: something has happened, and this manner of referring to the event, in the past tense, in itself shows how related it is to time. But not the circular, the cosmic, divine time, since in it nothing truly happens: the eternal present of divine knowledge locks everything up, past and future become mere illusions. The event only takes place in a linear time, free from all Gods, without origin or destination and which extends infinitely in both directions, past and future.[13] Only along this line is the flight of the event intelligible, as the fissure which changes everything, yet remains inaccessible, an imminence felt through a myriad tiny signs (minute sensations), an already-past only felt retrospectively, as an after-effect. The moment of the event has no presence: what could possibly support such presence? Could God, supporting such present at arm's length, as in the system of Descartes? No, since he has already 'become time' as Deleuze says in the lecture on Kant of 21 March 1978, since God becomes conflated with linearity and its infinite divisibility and no longer has power *over* time. Here Deleuze notes that Hölderlin, too, echoes Kant's understanding of the form of internal sense.[14] Could the 'I' support presence? But the I has 'no other guarantee than the unity of God himself' (*DR*, p. 86). It is its offspring, its earthly habitat. Both collapse together. There remains only the crack, the degree zero, the empty consciousness without substantial content, the simple point of inflexion for the reading and inscription of intensities, ungraspable and divisible along the line of time.

'God became time at the same time as man became a caesura. It's difficult, one understands nothing, but it is beautiful. This is what I wanted to say.' This is a high-speed summary of how the collapse of our stable mental limits (God, the Self, the closed universe, etc.) commits us to those strange *voyages to the limit*, where 'limit' does not designate what comforts us, the implicit harmony of the circle, but rather what constantly escapes us: the instant infinitely sectioned or spread along the line of time, the caesura which turns the 0 into a 1 and exhausts the 1 into a 0. By way of a shortcut, this indicates the double movement through which God and Man part, so that nothing 'rhymes' any longer, neither past with future nor 0 with 1, nor virtual with actual, all separated in sensation by the caesura which indicates inadequacy, after-event, or ineradicable difference. In short, a high-speed

connection, but avoiding 'artificial rapprochements', says Deleuze, of the form of internal sense (time) and the anticipation of perception.

Here, then, is a method for defeating chaos, because now, suspended and retained, the evanescent intensity is raised up into form, along the form of time. Chaos, which was at the origin, is now captive within a form and thus capable of delivering effects: captive intensities will be usable, resounding among themselves as a sort of music, intelligible and, sometimes, beautiful.

The music of paradox replaces the orthodoxy of recognition. Deleuze cites 'A las cinco de la tarde' by Lorca (TP, p. 261). He might also have cited the 'long lazy death' of Bergamín, since we now understand how much it is the same event, at precisely five in the evening, as the murder of the poet. Sameness not in the sense of identity but in the sense that all intensity is the whole of intensity, its maximum, and thus communicate with other intensities.

A mangle of bodies, heat and flies in summer, Castille crazed in the heat: sand, bullhorns, flesh, gangrene. Recognition chronicles thus: 'On 11 August 1934 towards five in the evening, in the ring of Manzanares, the bullfighter Ignazio Sánchez Mejías was gored by the bull named "Granadino" after a pass which left him splayed on the walkway. The fighter refused an operation in the arena, asked to be taken to Madrid and he died the next day of gas gangrene. This tragedy inspired Lorca to write one of the most beautiful elegies ever composed in Spanish, his *Llanto for Ignazio Sanchez Meijías.*' The event, the paradox, the intensity extracted out of bodies: this is the *Llanto*. Its cruel realism, approaching the actual reality of torn flesh (the smell of iodine, quicklime, death 'laying its eggs in the wound'), all this is there to stress by contrast the oniric (incorporeal) power of an impossible instant, to which death has to be nailed, just as Ignacio himself is nailed by the horn. To hold this moment at the height of intensity, catch and retain it one must repeat 'A las cinco de la tarde' no less than twenty-five times, a sign that this five o'clock is no mere temporal marker on the clock face that day, an element in the homogeneous succession, but indicates another time, hetero-geneous, the time of ruptures and catastrophes, *an intensive time*, differing within itself, alone capable of revealing that we do not live in a sempiternal present.[15] In his *La Música Callada del Toreo* (Madrid: Turner, 1981), José Bergamín presents us with the other face of time, whose caesura is ungraspable, always in between the too soon and the too late, formally dilated along the line, strangely static, violently individuated and yet in communication with so many other intensities. True, the horn killed at five in the evening, but death, lazily, took forty hours to kill Ignacio, writes Bergamín, who attended the agony of his dying friend. And the dictatorship which killed the poet who was the friend of his friend the toreo, lasted forty

years and killed many others. He wrote it forty years later, following another lazy but liberating agony, that of Franco.

Suddenly Last Summer: yet another five o'clock in the afternoon, another point of rupture, also infinitely repeated in a narration reaching for the critical moment. Here, too, we learn that this summer does not belong to an historical calendar of the Thirties, but is of a time that is intensive, irritating to our nerves, tearing into our lives: 'Cousin Sebastian left the table. He stalked out of the restaurant after throwing a handful of paper money on the table and he fled from the place, I followed. It was all white outside. White hot, a blazing white hot, hot blazing white, at five o'clock in the afternoon in the city of – Cabeza de Lobo.' Imminence of the event. Later will be too late: 'There wasn't a sound any more, there was nothing to see but Sebastian, what was left of him, that looked like a big white-paper-wrapped bunch of red roses had been *torn, thrown, crushed!* – against that blazing white wall ... '

'What a fateful 5 pm', wrote Lorca. Terrible, as Granadino holds the death of Ignacio between its horns. With Deleuze's shortcut between intensive magnitudes and temporality, we at least understand how philosophy can be abstract without being the contemplation of ideas, formal without being a sequence of logical constructs: how it might focus on non-existent entities, the incorporeal, and nevertheless stick to the most immediate of experience. It can do this when capturing, from chaos, intensity at the peak of its speed and genetic power, and bringing it back into the line of time, to that place where one death englobes many others, where one evening at five enfolds many other decisive hours, where the most singular is also the most collective, where the most dynamic becomes persistent. Where continuity and caesura do not exclude each other; where chaotic inconsistency acquires the consistency of paradox.

Translated by Kevin Nolan and Jean Khalfa

Nietzsche and Spinoza: New Personae in a New Plane of Thought

Jonathan Philippe

NIETZSCHE, SPINOZA, DELEUZE

If the thought of Gilles Deleuze is radically new and original, it is nonetheless peopled by diverse figures from the history of philosophy. Most often he has studied these figures in depth in specific monographs.[1] But they remain aspects of the ambit of Deleuze's own philosophical production rather than simple sources or points or reference: out of them he creates conceptual personae, alive on his own plane of immanence.

In the case of the encounter between Nietzsche and Spinoza – undoubtedly the most notable in Deleuze's philosophy – something deeper is at play than the linkage of elements hitherto heterogeneous. It is not a hybrid thought, fusing Nietzschean and Spinozist inspirations: if both philosophies do share some 'objective' points of convergence, they are still separated by irreducible differences. What then is this *composition* in Deleuze's philosophy of the 'grand identity' between Nietzsche and Spinoza?[2] Much more than a compilation or, even worse, a comparative commentary mirroring one thought in the other, Deleuze's treatment appears as the extension of the thinking of these two authors, as the drawing of a novel plane of thought.

First of all, extension: presenting his work on the history of philosophy (Nietzsche as much as Spinoza and others), Deleuze pictures himself 'as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own child, yet monstrous'.[3] It is not a matter of changing an author to fit one's own wishes and making him say what one would like him to, but of creating something new, and have him say more than in fact he did, provided this is *only what he might have said*.[4] More than a 'reading' or 'interpretation' by Deleuze of Nietzsche or Spinoza, we face a Deleuzian *production* of these writers, who recognize themselves (or *would have recognized themselves*) in their Deleuzian conceptual personae, and find they are connected in a new phi-

losophical space: a new and entirely Deleuzian plane of immanence.[5] The 'grand identity' is no mere resemblance but rather – in a very Deleuzian perspective – an identity *produced* by the novel synthesis of these two philosophies.

We propose to reveal this Deleuzian movement in the course of an exploration of one problem in Nietzsche's thought, which will – as if by internal necessity – also lead us towards Spinoza.[6]

CHAOSMOS: THE WILL TO POWER

Nietzsche presents a world composed of forces, composed *by* forces, 'a sea of forces in a storm, perpetual flux, eternally in the process of change'.[7] Force, whose centrality in the thought of Nietzsche Deleuze underscores, is a radically pluralist concept affirming difference from the outset. In every force there is an essential relation with another force: each force is an intensity and finds itself connected to another force, from which it differs quantitatively: stronger or weaker. Through the experiencing of these relations of forces, some are determined to prevail over others or be dominated by them. Quantitative differences give rise to qualitative relations, of domination or submission. The specific quality of a force is thus understood in terms of its quantitative difference with respect to the other forces involved.

The will to power is thus understood as the genealogical element of force, at the same time differential and genetic.[8] Differential since it determines the production of quantitative difference in the encounter between two forces, genetic in so far as it determines the quality obtained by each force in this relationship. The will to power is thus the principle of the quantitative difference between forces in relation and of the respective quality of these forces.[9] In order to clarify this essential relationship of force with the will to power, Deleuze bases himself on the following extract, 'the *victorious* concept "force", by means of which our physicists have created God and the world, still needs to be *completed*, an *inner will* must be *ascribed* to it, which I designate as "will to power" '.[10] The concept of force is *victorious* then in so far as it implies that a relation of forces is a relation of domination. However it is not, properly, *the force* which wants: this 'victorious concept' requires a complement, a will *internal to it*. It is only victorious by means of this addition – force is that which can, the will to power is that which wants. It adds itself to force as an element internal to its production, allowing its double determination, quantitative and qualitative. It is always by the will to power that a force dominates and commands, or obeys, another force.[11]

If forces in relation can only be understood as wills, if the will to power is

the principle of synthesis between forces in so far as it affirms a difference, it is not a principle whose unity pre-exists what it determines: in each case, the will to power only determines itself together with what it determines. It should never be distinguished from such or such determined forces, their quantity, direction, intensity – 'it is never superior to the determinations it occasions in a relation of forces' [12] – for fear of becoming a unique principle of metaphysical individuation.[13]

Relations of forces, in their complex hierarchical organization of structures of sovereignty (domination/submission – but not negation), arrange themselves into assemblages (*agencements*), into new powers battling to appropriate disparate and antagonistic forces. A new power is produced whose interior *lining* is a will: a new idiosyncrasy of forces, or expression of relations of forces.[14] The struggle and the war applauded by Nietzsche are not a struggle *against*, aiming at reducing to nothing, but a struggle in which a force seeks to win over another force, to make it its own, to attach it to a new will, 'a process by which a force enriches itself by winning over other forces and joining them together in a new combination, in a becoming'. Power enriches what it wins over and the forces it invests by the production of a new will, which one might term a new individual (except that this notion has no necessary anthropomorphic connotation, and applies from microbiology to the formation of social or political bodies). The becoming of individuals is thus posed in terms of struggle, 'determination of degrees and relations of force',[15] which inter-play and recompose endlessly. The vital movement is the encounter of forces and thus the production of wills as a realization of powers.

THE INDIVIDUAL, A CONCLUSION

Forces obey no teleology separate from their own simple exercise – an affirmation of themselves to the end of their capacity. Chaos and chance, the world only acquires sense (only becomes a *cosmos*) in the light of values created within it by individuals in the process of becoming.[16] A will which posits itself as a new idiosyncrasy does so by producing an evaluation. An assemblage of forces organized inside an individual is characterized by a new possibility of life, a new way of separating the good from the bad, a distribution of affects – a new mode of existence.[17] Wherever there is life there is evaluation in the form of the affirmation of difference, pure expression of its principle, the will to power. In the play of forces, in their hierarchical composition, something emerges – a will – for which all is not equal, or equally valued: there is *some* sense, *some* values. A new centre of evaluation is

born, interpreting for itself the action of other forces (selecting the good and the evil . . .) and seeks to impose on them, for themselves, the version by which it wants to be interpreted. 'To live is to evaluate.'[18] This is why the 'will to power', as a process of synthesis of forces and evaluations within a non-teleological becoming, must be understood as *power which wills*.[19] Will to power does not mean the will of an object towards a hegemony or an increasingly larger power, but rather the movement of power in the process of becoming, affirming its difference and affirming itself as the will towards this difference. The production of the will to power by itself in individuals, in the process of individuation, appears as the expression of life as the place of becoming and movement.

Individuals, considered in terms of their Nietzschean genealogy, appear more as the *termini* of encountering forces, compositions of power, than as *subjects* for whom what befalls them could be called *their* action. The identity of the subject is produced, it is 'residual'. The individual 'is not himself at the centre [but is] without a fixed identity . . . forever decentred, the *conclusion* of those states through which it passes. The opposition of attractive and repulsive forces produces an open series of intensive elements, all positive, which never express the final equilibrium of a system, but a limitless number of mutable stationary conditions, through which a subject passes.' [20] The individual is concluded from the 'stationary and mutable conditions' which occur; he *infers himself, interprets himself to be the person to whom this happens*. This interpretive movement, which is the eruption of the individual will, transforms chance into necessity. Out of the chance meeting of forces obedient to their own will, a new will makes *its* necessity. From chance to destiny, from chaos to cosmos, the affirmative movement of the will to power is named *amor fati*. *Amor fati* as the dignity of the event, as raising up to any event which makes us exist, to what happens *to us*.[21]

Deleuze develops the example of the constitution of a world, of a cosmos, with the example of the tick.[22] The tick, in the throng of affects in the forest as much as among the myriad determinations which have brought it into existence, chooses certain elements which, *for it, are going to be of value*. Perched on the tip of a branch, waiting for some passing mammal (which it will have sensed through its body-heat), it lets itself drop onto it so as to find at last, by touch, the least furry region in order to drink its blood. Out of chaos emerges a world – here the world of the tick. To create for oneself a destiny, to make necessity out of chance, this is *amor fati*, the invention of a destiny (*fatum*) and the love of this destiny, immersing oneself entirely within it. Thus the tick has its own *amor fati*, like all individuals it *fixes* a world.[23]

CONSCIOUSNESS, THE CAUSE AND THE EFFECT

Nietzsche, like Spinoza before him, proposed to diagnose an illness – human all too human – in the individuation of mankind. This illness is founded on a problem of interpretation: it is a disease of the will. We shall see, through symptoms such as the devitalizing illusions of causality and free choice, that the focus of criticisms here is morality, with its morbid consequences.

Consciousness, like all other hierarchical formations of sovereignty, arises like the summit (to be understood as the foam on the crest of a wave or the skin on milk: the uppermost layer) of the multiple relations between its constituent forces. It understands itself as a necessity. We have seen that this affirmation of itself as an achieved unity is necessary to the prolongation of becoming. Similarly, Nietzsche tells us, in order to carry out his tasks, a king has to be kept in a certain ignorance of the detailed workings and even of certain disturbances in the community.[24] There is a series of elements that consciousness, so as to be *an* individuality, must ignore.

But human consciousness is 'hypertrophied'[25] and understands itself as the cause of its interpretations and its acts, which it then goes on to call 'its passions', 'its tendencies', 'its inclinations'. Consciousness acquires a habit, which inverts the relation: the difference between forces is thenceforward *signified* out of the coherent unity. The *I*, effect of the individuating process, sets itself up as its foundation at the same time as its terminus. The will, active in the affirming of powers, turns into a reaction when faced with becoming: the individual coalesces, stiffens, comprehends itself as a *substance* within the order of being, to whom accidents happen, which it must fight off so as to remain a self, which is to say *myself*. The reactive man thus only keeps alive by negating powers (*puissances*) and becoming: by destroying powers, by separating them from what they are capable of, so as to remain himself, such as he might be.[26]

Descartes appears as the figure of individual substantialism *par excellence*. The Cartesian individual is a *subject* (subject of his actions), and also a *substance* (distinct from its attributes and prevailing over them logically and ontologically). Descartes institutes individuality by means of the most systematic mechanism for denying singularities ever invented – the Evil Spirit. It negates every event out of which the individual might arise. Only consciousness is preserved, and then only the consciousness of thinking. But even there, while the Cogito emerges out of the singularity of an event again, and as its effect (I think, therefore I am, I exist!), Descartes transmutes it immediately into a substance (and what am I? ... a thinking substance).[27]

Thus the subject is from a Nietzschean perspective a *fiction*, an interpretive line through which one reduces the diversity of intensive states from which

we are concluded to an identity within the same ontological substrate.[28] The individual, understanding himself as a substance, thereby understands himself as the cause of his effects: the conscious intellect, a tool developed by the greater corporeal reason of the Self, a chance result of the battle between powers, maintained by these unseen underpinnings, now seizes on this chance 'nourishment' as necessary for *its* preservation. The subject develops reflexes solely devoted to supporting its activities as consciousness, adopting its body as henceforth its product.[29] The fiction of the subject-as-cause-of-its-affections leads to a third illusion, that of free will. Our volitions are, in the genealogical perspective adopted by Nietzsche, *signs* of the condition of the forces which constitute us: they are *symptoms*, not causes. Similarly, the so-called motives of our actions, supposed to represent the antecedents of an act, in fact conceal them.

Let us note the moral tenor of these interpretations, which explains Nietzsche's ferocity towards them. Free will (will as causality exercised by a substance) is necessary in order to institute the principle of responsibility and humankind's bad conscience towards becoming. For then the 'scandal' of the chasm separating Truth from the pure reign of ends, and the Reality of an immoral world (in which the cost of becoming is suffering and destruction) must be explained by the failure of the human will. Free will is then a moralizing interpretation with morbid consequences, a negation of powers through instilling bad conscience inside the will – a degeneration of the affirmation of the will into a primary negation.

The critique of this triple moral illusion can also be found in Deleuze's presentation of Spinoza.[30] Spinoza proposes a new model for apprehending the individual, both at the bodily and at the spiritual level. The body eludes by a long distance any knowledge which we might have of it, just as thinking eludes the consciousness which we have of it. Their powers escape us: 'one does not know what a body is capable of . . . ' Insisting on the depth of the unknown in the body and of the unconscious in thought, Spinoza denounces consciousness as the site of the illusion of taking causes for effects. The body (just as the spirit, since these finite modes, falling respectively under the attributes of Extension and of Thought, find themselves in a parallelism[31]) is a composition of living parts, themselves composing and decomposing according to complex laws. The order of these compositions is that of causes, and it affects nature as a whole: 'as conscious beings we only ever perceive the *effects* of these composings and decomposings'. Just as with Nietzsche, these effects are only perceived by us in an interpretive movement: some are 'good' in so far as they affect us with joy, by their relation with our ratio of movement and rest, others 'bad' in so far as they affect us with sadness by threatening our own cohesiveness. Perceiving only effects,

consciousness surmounts its ignorance by reversing the order of causes, turning the effect of its encounter with a body into its final cause, and the idea of this effect into the final cause of its own actions; it then takes itself for the first cause of actions of its body, and wherever it cannot consider itself a first cause or an organizer of ends, it imagines a God operating through final causes and free decrees.

We shall see that this denunciation does not deny consciousness all relevance and that here also it is intimately bound up with Morality.

First of all, consciousness is the effect of the encounters we have with other bodies. We meet different bodies which, by their various compositions, affect us and propel us to act differently. These affects cannot be separated from an endless movement between more or less joy or sadness, and consciousness comes to seem like 'the continuous feeling of such movement from more to less, from less to more, a witness to the variations and determinations of the *conatus* as a function of other bodies and other ideas'.[32] Thus consciousness is not to be rejected: it has its place as an indication and unification of conditions which create us as such and such a relation of movement and rest. But it does create a problem when it sets itself up as anterior to them. The same is true of morality: encounters of powers affect us with joy, others with sadness, and these we judge respectively as good or evil. But as Spinoza emphasizes, 'we do not tend towards a thing because we judge it good, but on the contrary we judge it good because we tend towards it'.[33] What we judge to be bad is therefore that which reduces power, an impoverishment of the power to be affected, that which amounts to a deterioration in our ratio of movement and rest. The good is that which composes its power with ours (a food, a friend); the bad that which decomposes us, separates us from our powers (a poison, an enemy). Just as with the example of the tick, this 'ethics' states its closeness to 'ethology' as 'a typology of modes of immanent existence' and its distance from a moral doctrine calling on transcendent values. But the illusion of consciousness combines with the moral illusion: in the ignorance or inversion of the order of cause and effect, consciousness institutes the good and the bad as the principles of action. Good and Evil as moral values appear as fictions due to the ignorance of consciousness: incapable of grasping them as effects and immanent evaluations of the encounters between powers, it projects them into a transcendent twilight zone aimed at controlling its action – which, in Nietzschean terms is then no more than a reaction.[34] The movement of individuation as the creation of new modes of existence and, in consequence, of new evaluations and judgements of value, is blocked, paralysed, corrupted by the institution of transcendent values projected beyond the play of becoming.

One should nevertheless insist on the fact that individual consciousness, if it is a fiction, is nonetheless the only pathway possible for the movement of becoming. Only individuals become, and only in the movement of their individuation. Thus consciousness is not an epiphenomenon one should abandon – it is a tool necessary for the maintenance of newborn identity. Nevertheless it needs to be made clear that this individual identity is less the exteriorization of a substance than the manifestation of a history or the effectuation of a politics. 'To become the progeny of one's own events': *amor fati* as the movement of going beyond the organism so as to put back into play all fixed organization, permitting it to follow the flow of powers which compose it, which is why, rather than considering the individual as a *fiction*, denying its reality, we prefer to call it a *fixion* to designate its empirical and non-originary character, nonetheless very real – the sole site of reality. 'I do not pit *appearance* against *reality*',[35] Nietzsche tells us, 'but on the contrary, I consider appearance as reality, as that which is resistant to all transformation into an imaginary true world.' The individual is a *fixion*, which is to say that it *interprets* itself as an individual, but this fiction is no error – even a useful error – but rather the sole possible effectuation of becoming.[36]

OVERTURE TO BECOMING: AMOR FATI AS THE AFFIRMATION OF RETURN

The path, through which Nietzsche thought the person would free itself from devitalizing metaphysical beliefs – Religion, Morality, Subjectivity, Logic, conceived as so many things in themselves of which we would have to bear the burden – is that of the eternal return. The affirmation of the eternal return can open the individual to the flux of becoming which inhabits him and which he inhabits. 'What would you say if one day, if one night, a demon popped up inside your deepest solitude and said to you: "this life, as you live it right now and have lived up until now, you must live again, once and innumerable times"?' It is in *The Gay Science* that this first presentation of the eternal return appears, as it is first understood by Zarathustra, flummoxed by fear at the idea that 'everything will return'.[37] Thus, from this first presentation, Nietzsche offers us, with the eternal return, a thought experiment: 'imagine that one day ... ' This experiment, thinking that everything will return identically, goes paradoxically to ensure that every-thing will not recur the same. The eternal return is therefore not to be understood as a new ontology, the new determination of some sort of Nietzschean Being, or even as a natural law. It is the experience – or the intuition – of a singular individual, an experience whose importance can be measured in terms of the effects it has on it.

What returns is the incessant play of becoming, the always renewed affirmation of difference, of the will to power. Eternal return of the different, which alone constitutes its unity, its *sameness*. But, thus understood and *assumed* as such, the eternal return appears to be an ultimate cosmic truth, a netherworld on which to lean (however unstable and uncomfortable). The strong man with a stomach capable of digesting the absence of sense ('direction' and 'finality'), capable of bearing *the heaviest weight*, is still the nihilist mule, he who carries on his back the truth of the world and who says yes to his burden only because he can't say no. 'What is the heaviest of tasks, asks the spirit become beast of burden, I shall assume it so as to revel in my force?'[38] The mule is the being which assumes the real, *such as it is* – even if this being is absurdity. But, as Deleuze emphasizes, the *real, such as it is*, is a mulish concept. The *amor fati* as an affirmation of eternal return should thus not be confused with fatalism or with an assumption of responsibility: 'Everything fungible, everything digestible – that's fine for pigs. How to bray out yes or amen on every occasion – that is what mules learn, and those most akin to them.'[39]

The *amor fati* is not an assumption, it is a creation, an act of production; which is to say, a stroke of interpretive force. *'To impose* on becoming the character of being – that is the supreme will to power ... *That everything recurs* is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being.'[40] Instead of being overwhelmed by the nihilistic vision of absurdity to be borne (i.e. passive nihilism), man must give meaning to this meaningless life and assign an aim to chance, that is create life values unknown so far. *Amor fati* is the shaping of chaos into a world, impressing on becoming the character of being, not by proposing it as *being* (the donkey idea) but rather by affirming it *as becoming* and *as returning*. It is the affirmation of becoming *as becoming*, and of chance *as chance*, which constitutes their being and necessity. Being is nothing other than affirmation, the affirmation of becoming as such, as its incessant return, and it is only through his own affirmative conception of returning (presented in the parable of the shepherd and the snake) that Zarathustra recovers from the idea of a cyclical time ('everything will return') as proposed by the buffoon.[41]

The returning of becoming, and the being of becoming as the affirmation of this returning: the eternal return is posed as a test for *selection*. The only thought to be affirmed is that sufficiently worthy of being willed for an eternal re-beginning, bringing with it the bundle of forces which have sustained it. The character of being will only be conferred on these affirmative forms of the will to power which are the affirmation of becoming – and of themselves as such an affirmation.

The *amor fati*, desolating and destructive when understood as a fatalism of the absurd, becomes the liberation and the lightening of powers, once it is understood as an interpretation which precisely opens a path for evaluative powers, confers on them their highest power, raises them to allow them to surpass 'their ultimate power'.[42]

The multiple is not *surpassed* in its affirmation, but contained in it *as a multiple*. At the same time, the affirmation of chance leading to necessity only affirms necessity *of chance*. The eternal return thus does not make everything recur, *nor does it equate everything*; it eliminates all that cannot bear the trial: that which is half-hearted in thought, the half-realized in being. This is why Klossowski speaks – just like Nietzsche – of a *vicious circle*: out of the experience of the return of the same, novelty is created. The affirmation of the eternal return derives its value from its selective effects.

This affirmative moment of *amor fati* is the moment of the Overman's arrival: a movement which we need to look at quite closely. In effect, the individual, by affirming the eternal return, affirms himself as concluded from chance becoming, as an extremity of chaos and as the site of a self-affirmation which surpasses him. 'A sort of strange orgasm in man united with his destiny', one might say with Marguerite Yourcenar. The will to power affirms itself through individual evaluative action. The *destiny created by man* fuses with the chaos which 'precisely, exceeds the will of the subject, *already modifies it,* and thus comes to *menace its stable identity*'.[43] The eternal return is a vicious circle: that which produces it – by the fact that it produces it – finds itself already within as that which permits self-affirmation. 'Ego Fatum!'[44] Thus, selection, and effective transformation, of the affirmative individuality: the Overman is no longer a man, the shepherd 'was no longer a shepherd, was no longer a man – transformed, transfigured, *he laughed*'. The affirmer dislocates himself so as to make room for pure affirmation, man *bursts* out with laughter to make room for the Overman, to 'be no longer anything other than *pure adhesion*'. Zarathustra, announcing the Overman, is equally the herald of man's decline, of the lightning which will annihilate him.[45]

Thus, more than as an ideal to imitate, the Overman appears as the concept of the vital type required by the will to power.

This nevertheless poses a problem, the reverse of the preceding problem: if *amor fati* opens up a path before the individual, away from the sclerosis of the reactive organism, it represents an opposite danger just as important: its own end, pure and simple, a fall back into chaos. In the vitalizing affirmation of the differentiating process of the will to power – bringing it to its *n*th degree of power – the Overman appears as the explosion of any possible body, of any possible effectuation of becoming – the impossible territory of the movement of deterritorialization, a body made monstrous by the movement of decorporation.[46]

In between these visions of individual sclerosis or explosion, there are in Nietzsche openings allowing us to imagine it as the effectuation of becoming inside a body; openings which are only properly developed by truly Deleuzian concepts – such as those of deterritorialization, or line of flight, focusing more on the movement of becoming than on the insane will for a deterritorialized *being*. 'No-one can say where the line of flight will pass: will it let itself get stuck or fall into the other danger, of turning into a line of abolition, annihilation, self-destruction?'[47]

INDIVIDUAL AND POWER

To ascend from the individual to the event, to understand a state of affairs as the *effectuation* in a form of a singular assemblage of forces, this movement Deleuze calls *counter-effectuation* – a movement of the individual which can *incarnate itself as an event* because it has been able to *disincarnate itself as a state of affairs*.[48] Counter-effectuation and *amor fati* are linked inasmuch as understanding oneself as an event equally entails understanding every other individuality as the effectuation of an assemblage, as *conclusions* of intensive states.[49] If the notion of contra-effectuation is interesting in order to deepen our problem, it is because it comprises the concept of its opposite: effectuation. It is precisely these two aspects which we have to consider in the concept of a *fixion*-individual, aware of its status as an interpretive creation, but also of the fact that the chaosmos *is nothing more than the profusion* of these fixions.[50] But how can we think this double necessity of going beyond the organized state of affairs, on the one hand, and of preserving individual integrity on the other? To broach this question it is interesting to confront the positions of those two thinkers of power, Nietzsche and Spinoza, because on this point they start from opposing positions.

Nietzsche, here explicitly against Spinoza, states that 'the really fundamental instinct of life ... aims at *the expansion of power* and, wishing for that, frequently risks and even sacrifices self-preservation'.[51] Whereas for Spinoza, all individuality (or finite mode[52]) is determined as a conatus, which is to say as an effort to persevere in existence. We shall see that Spinoza's thought allows us to consider in detail a number of elements which can – as Deleuze has very well seen (and done) – push further the thought of Nietzsche.

With Nietzsche, as with Spinoza, *power* fuses with the *act*: the will to power is nothing other than the act of its differentiating exercise. Power is act, and is only power in action. It is the same with Spinoza. In the case of finite modes, it expresses itself in the capacity to be affected, which is always necessarily filled by affections which realize this capacity. This power, or

capacity to be affected, determined (by external causes) to pass into existence, turns into the effort to persevere in this existence, that is to maintain the ratio of movement and of rest among its parts. It is therefore important to understand how the individual, in this conception, can escape from the sclerosis of *its* essence, *its* power, *its* capacity to be affected, without disappearing as *that* mode – since *this* essence is both eternal and determined. Power and act are fused, but Spinoza introduces, within power, a new distinction: the power to act and the power to suffer (corresponding respectively to our active and passive affects, of which we are the cause, either adequate or inadequate). As the power to be affected stays invariant – it corresponds to the essence – the powers to act and to suffer vary in inverse proportion: the more we are the adequate cause of our affects, the less we are their inadequate cause.

On the point of maintaining the power to be affected as a constant, Spinoza appears to differ with Nietzsche. However, he is ambiguous and goes further. In other passages in the *Ethics*, the power to act, by itself, expresses the essence – active affects, by themselves, affirm it. The effort intending to augment the active affects as well as the power to act is thus no longer separable from an effort directed to bringing to a peak the power to be affected. It thus only appears constant, as does the essence, within extreme limits. By augmenting its active affections, the mode passes progressively from impotence to power, enters into formal possession of its power, is less and less separated from what it can do: it augments its power to be affected *until the essence itself is affected.*[53]

In Proposition 39 (Part IV), Spinoza states that 'whatsoever brings about a change in the proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually possess, causes the human body to assume another form, in other words (... a point indeed self-evident), to be destroyed, and consequently totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of ways; therefore it is bad'. But in the Scholium which follows this proposition he recognizes the variation (sometimes extreme) in the power to be affected, within the same individual. Some persons change greatly during the course of their existence, not to mention the evolution of the power to be affected during the whole of life, from infancy to old age. Besides, he writes in the preceding Proposition (38) that 'whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways'. For Spinoza, the properly ethical endeavour consists therefore, for a mode, in seeking the augmentation of its power to be affected. It even seems,

according to the scholium of Proposition 39, that it does so even *beyond* the limits of its essence.

Is this to argue that an individual is not a finite mode, or unique being, but a succession of modes? Or rather that the same mode changes its essence according to the evolution of its powers (which preserves the *conatus* as mere persevering in existence)? These different passages seem to affirm it and make us understand also the *eternity* of the essence of finite modes in a manner much closer to the Nietzschean 'untimely' than to the Platonic permanence.[54]

Whatever the case, the *conatus* as the effort of a finite mode, existing in order to persevere in existence is a tendency to increase its power to be affected. This formal possession of power realizes itself in the Third Type of knowledge, that is to say when the mode's ideas become adequate and when it becomes itself the adequate cause of its affects. When the mode only has a minimum of passive affects left, then it can understand itself as an intensive part of the absolute power of God.[55]

It is here, from our point of view, that Nietzsche and Spinoza meet: the individual only augments its power by understanding itself as a fragment of the divine – chaosmic – power. We also find, in Spinoza, that the power of the mode is a part of divine power *to the extent only* that divine power explains itself through the essence of a mode.[56] The same is true with Nietzsche: in order to raise his power to the *n*th degree, the individual must know himself to be an extremity of chaos, that which only exists through the *fixions* which populate it, the actualizations of its power. To repeat one more time, power only exists in act.[57]

Whether it concerns the Nietzschean love for chaosmic becoming, or the Spinozist love for the totality of nature, we are in the presence of a *selective* mode of thought: selection of individualities animated by a full will, capable of affirming this totality, and who are then returned to their movement. The individual, to the extent that he is *such* (*such* a quality, *such* a form) is inseparable from the processes of actualization in which he engages.[58] This determined essence (or individual *to the extent that he is such*) can then cease to incorporate itself while other essences might find the right conditions for their emergence and thus actualize themselves. This is the sense of *grand style*: to actualize difference within the individual without reducing it. Learning to love the real not in so far as it is what it is – the asinine idea! – but as it comes to be within the individuals who make it exist, in the singularities which populate it. *Amor fati* as love: not of the totality of points of view, but an immanent selection of those capable of affirming their singularity and difference, from within their movements. A productive affirmation of 'the most consistent configuration, the curve which will determine

more singularities and potentials ... What is at stake here is life and its prolongation'.[59]

An Impersonal Consciousness

Jean Khalfa

A thought is immanent to the text (or the work) that puts it into action, and thus can only be found in the working of the text itself, the composition of its material, which can come from very different origins. Deleuze has never hidden the fact that the link between all the references and interests in his texts is often contingent, dependant on encounters.[1] And philosophy itself begins precisely at the moment when, faced with reality, one abandons the attitude of hermeneutics, interpretation and commentary, when the sages and priests start to lose their power, to the benefit of thinkers who try to think first and foremost the chaos that the world is, independently of any reference to a meaning, a beyond or a transcendence.

> ... the first philosophers are those who institute a plane of immanence like a sieve stretched over the chaos. In this sense they contrast with sages, who are religious personae, priests, because they conceive of the institution of an always transcendent order imposed from outside by a great despot or by one god higher than the others. ... Whenever there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, there is religion; and there is Philosophy whenever there is immanence, even if it functions as an arena for the *agon* and rivalry. (*WP*, p. 43)

From this point of view, far from being a failing, conflict is essential to philosophical activity.

But the history of philosophy soon turns out to be the history of the difficulties that have to be confronted in instituting such a plane of immanence. Immanence most often ends up being conceived no longer in itself, but simply as a property, an attribute, as when we say 'being immanent to something': this implies there is something else and so the immanence is no longer absolute. Thus, Descartes begins by eliminating all relation of ideas with an exteriority, and, in the celebrated episode of radical

doubt in the first of his *Metaphysical Meditations*, posits a pure field of con-
sciousness, a plane of the immanence of ideas. But consciousness almost
immediately becomes a unity transcendent to the ideas it contains. Who am
I, I who, at this very moment, am thinking these two ideas, namely that I
think and that I am? A thinking thing, he replies. The verb 'cogito', 'I
think', becomes a substantive: 'a thought', no longer in the sense of having a
thought, but of being a thought, a thinking thing. That is why we tradi-
tionally talk of the Cogito to designate subjectivity in the Cartesian sense, as
if the first person were enough to change the verb into a substantive. But this
'thing' is necessarily other than what I had bracketed when I started to
meditate and which I called the 'exterior', bodies and essences, since all of
that remains suspended. The name of a thinking thing is 'soul'. So I am a
soul, and what is more a pure, that is to say incorporeal soul. This, with the
existence of God, is the very object of the *Metaphysical Meditations*.[2] Which
brings us back, right from the start of the second *Meditation*, to a new
metaphysics of transcendence.

The only classical philosopher who, in Deleuze's opinion, absolutely
avoided this relapse into religiosity, and is thus the 'Prince' of philosophers
(Deleuze even calls him, mischievously, 'the Christ of philosophers', perhaps
because the others are in a sense his apostles) is Spinoza, the subject of two of
his books.[3] Among his contemporaries we should also mention, besides
Sartre and Foucault, François Châtelet, a thinker of the institution of the
political, of which Deleuze says that 'no philosophy has established itself
more firmly in a pure field of immanence'. It is Châtelet who, as a theorist of
processes of rationalization rather than as a rationalist, understood most
clearly the way that the Greeks articulated the original link of the philo-
sophical and the political:

> A process of rationalisation is defined, or invented, each time human
> relations are instituted in some material form, in some group, in some
> multiplicity. The act itself, being a relation, is always political. Reason as
> a process is political. It may be in the city, but also in other groups, in
> small groups, or in me, just in me. Psychology, or rather the only tol-
> erable psychology, is a politics, because I always have to create human
> relations with myself. There is not a psychology but a politics of the self.[4]

This strict immanentism entails some of the most important elements in
Deleuze's practice of philosophy: the rejection of the unity of Ideas in favour
of the multiplicity of events; the rejection of the contrast between interior
and exterior or of the idea of meaning as a 'content'; the critique of
the idea of the subject as substance in favour of the analysis of processes

of individuation or subjection; the rejection of any transcendence, of the tyranny of priests, of sages, and, as we shall see, of psychoanalysts; finally, and above all, the institution of philosophy as the opening out of a field of immanence which Sartre had imagined as an a-personal consciousness.

But how does Deleuze, as a philosopher, characterize his own field of immanence, how does this thought without transcendence develop, and what new concepts are created as this activity of liberating thought evolves?

Keeping this question in view, I shall first outline the genealogy of the definition of the plane of immanence as transcendental field without a subject, that is as a field of constitution of objects and the world which does not refer to active syntheses of phenomena (or at least which does not posit the syntheses as requiring an authority, that is, a spontaneity of a higher order). So it is an impersonal consciousness, without any interiority vis-à-vis the phenomena which are organized 'in it', as indeed the image of the breath of air Deleuze associates with Sartre suggested (*D*, p. 12): a breath of air is exteriority coming in. So the first thing is to get rid of the myth of interiority and of psychology. The next step will be to ask how we can think of the individuality of consciousness if it is not based on the unity of a subjectivity. On this point the constant reference is Leibniz and his monadology, i.e. a conception of the individual as expression and no longer as representation of a world. But we will then have to ask why thought always tends to reflect or synthesize its own flow of existence with regard to some transcendence. The answer, of course, is that it is a question of power, and that a process of subjectivation always, in Deleuze's view, risks leading to a subjection, a submission of life. Hence the famous critique of psychoanalysis as one of the last endeavours to hierarchize the mind in the form of a representational system. To counter this, it will be necessary to draw on the properly surrealist attempt to produce, by various means, but especially by art, a 'body without organs', i.e. purely intensive lines of existence, or, in Deleuze's vocabulary, 'a life', consisting solely of degrees of intensity of sensations that are coextensive with the constructions or arrangements that are desires. This is the concept that will be used to counter that of 'faciality' as the transcendent individuation of a person on the surface of the body.

GENEALOGY OF THE SUBJECT

In a striking passage of *WP* Deleuze and Guattari sketch out a brief history of western philosophy from the point of view of the difficulty it has experienced in fully instituting a plane of immanence and its tendency

constantly to reintroduce some form of transcendence ('Example III', pp. 44–9). In the first stage, in Greek philosophy, it is not so important whether philosophers are physicalists or noologists, but it is essential that they should be monists. What counts is the unity of the plane of immanence on which they trace their concepts. Now it soon becomes clear that a division is set up, and hence something transcending the plane. Thus in Plato, despite the fact that he sends the gods packing, beings cannot be explained in their multiplicity except by reference to a superior unity, that of the pure forms or Ideas, and the plane of immanence is then conceptualized as the plane of phenomena, defined as the appearances of the essential realities. From then on, philosophy is contemplation. With Christianity, this first stage comes to a dangerous end, for philosophers are now risking their lives when they try to inject a local dose of immanence into the world or into thought.

The second stage poses the question in terms of subjectivity, since it is inaugurated by Descartes who suspends belief in an object exterior to consciousness and thereby opens up a plane of immanence from which every concept which would presuppose a form of objectivity is initially banished.[5] Thus, when he asks himself what he is, he who thinks and who knows that he exists every time that he thinks, he does not describe himself as a rational animal, for example, since he would already have to know what an animal is. The Cogito is the first certainty because it is based on a knowledge of a pragmatic kind entirely circumscribed within the sphere of the I: I know what it is to think or be by thinking or being. I don't even know what 'I' is other than by pronouncing the word, said Wittgenstein.[6] We have already seen how, in spite of everything, Descartes relapsed, so to speak, into transcendence the minute he distinguished between having a thought and being a thought and attributed to a thinking substance the field of pure consciousness he had just instituted. Kant criticized him on this score and opened up the possibility of a transcendental thought as opposed, precisely, to a thought of transcendence. Deleuze notes that the transcendental subject 'is the subject of the field of immanence of all possible experience from which nothing, the external as well as the internal, escapes' (WP, p. 46). However, if 'Kant objects to any transcendent use of the synthesis, he ascribes immanence to the subject of the synthesis as a new, subjective unity' (ibid.).[7]

Kant criticizes Descartes, pointing out that if the Cogito consists of passing legitimately from a determination, 'I think', to the affirmation of my existence, I can deduce nothing from it about my nature. Whether I think of an object as existing or not existing adds or subtracts no determination to or from that object (as everyone knows, 10 thalers in thought do not turn into 11 thalers by coming into existence). Whatever one does, it is impossible to conceive in what way thinking of a thing as non-existent would differ from

thinking of that thing as existent if the thing is considered merely in itself, whence the celebrated refutation of the ontological argument. Being itself (which is what I am, at this stage of the epoch) is the absolutely undetermined.

If I now want to know what is this being which thinks, I must thus determine this existence, as every other existence, with the help of concepts. But – and this is the fundamental idea Kant took from Hume – an existence cannot be determined by any concept whatever, except within the framework of a prior form of organization of existence, namely time. So it is impossible to determine the existence implied by the I think as the transcendent foundation of a plan of immanence in which phenomena would unfold. I can only be a phenomenon, or an event *in the field* of consciousness, which is a temporal field. This explains the difficulties Descartes had in accepting the very idea of temporality, whose intelligibility he denied ('Descartes could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by reducing the Cogito to an instant and entrusting time to the operation of continuous creation carried out by God' (*DR*, p. 86)). In short, one could say that far from being the operations of a subjectivity that would constitute them, ideas and subjectivity themselves mutually produce each other in a field to which they belong and which subsumes them.

This is exactly the objection brought by Pascal to the very idea of method so dear to Descartes. Pascal wrote: 'Thoughts come at random, and go at random. No device for holding on to them or for having them.'[8]

For Deleuze, Kant's contribution is to have demonstrated that the subject is divided or 'fractured' because it cannot know itself (determine its existence) other than as *passive* or receptive, as a sequence of phenomena subject to the succession of causes and effects in time, while at the same time, in the 'I think', a consciousness of oneself as *spontaneity* repeatedly arises. From then on, this spontaneity is merely represented, not active. This otherness of the I to itself in time, which Kant described as a 'paradox of inner sense' is what Deleuze sees as 'transcendental Difference', i.e. 'an internal Difference which establishes an a *priori* relation between thought and being' (*DR*, p. 86).

> Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the I and a passivity in the self, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican Revolution. (*DR*, p. 86)[9]

That is why Deleuze said of Kant that he objects to the transcendent use of the synthesis, i.e. the bringing together of sense data under pure concepts. If all existence must be determined in time, it becomes impossible to apply the

concepts which organize our knowledge, the categories, to a domain which would be exterior to the plane of consciousness, the sequence of phenomena, now conceived as appearances or events in time.[10] And if, from a Kantian point of view, neither time nor space can be realities within the field of consciousness, it is because they are the very forms of this field, the pure forms of succession and simultaneity.

The problem is that if Kant showed that there can be no transcendent usage of the synthesis that would give us, for instance, a knowledge of God as source of all phenomena, in the idea of an (ultimate) cause of the world, or of the Self as a source of our concrete actions or thoughts, in the idea of a free subject (and in this respect Kant showed that 'the speculative death of God entails the fracture of the I' (*DR*, p. 87)), he recreates a new transcendence, precisely by positing a transcendental subject (one that is neither psychological nor metaphysical) able to perform the empirical synthesis of what appears. Indeed, for Kant, the mere synthesis of representations within a consciousness is not enough to relate these representations to an object. Furthermore, Descartes had already clearly noted this in the famous analysis of the piece of wax (second *Metaphysical Meditation*): imagination is not enough to produce objects but only representations. The manifold of sensibility, under the syntheses of imagination, is not enough by itself to relate to an object. These representations, says Kant, still have to be related to the form of an object in general (= x). Now none of the specific properties of a perceptual object is related to what could be called objecthood in general because none of them is shared by all possible objects.[11] So we must postulate, beyond the field of consciousness, beyond the plane of immanence of phenomena, a superior activity which relates all these representations to an object. This activity is that of the understanding, of a faculty of judgment or of a transcendental subject, whose categories (i.e. the concepts determining any possible object) are simply the means of operation. The table of categories can be traced from the table of the logical functions of judgment[12] and thus, as Deleuze writes, 'The object in general is the correlate of the "I think" or of the unity of consciousness, it is the expression of the Cogito, its formal objectivation.' The I as active synthetic identity, or transcendental subject, thus comes to fill in the temporal fracture which cut across the passive self. The unity of the rational faculty of judgment is reflected in the unity of a self, all of whose representations, says Kant, must always be able to be accompanied by an 'I think'. After the Greek contemplative phase, philosophy thus entered a reflexive phase in which the subject rediscovered transcendence in itself.[13]

But a third phase in the history of the philosophical invention of subjectivity can already be discerned: the phenomenological phase (*WP*,

pp. 46–8). Here, transcendence comes in even later, since it is in phenomena, in the very flux of consciousness, that the form of the world must be found. What is interesting in Husserl is the role that the other, another consciousness, plays in the constitution of my own subjectivity, not only as a being who appears within the field of my own consciousness, but as the condition of the unity of the world, and of everything within the world as I perceive it. What I see in a room is furniture, human beings, and not – to parody Quine – woody agglomerations, successive phases or concretions of humanity. So what I see are layers of meaning that I have received from other subjectivities, in particular through language, and which cover the phenomena. Thus, although they unfold themselves in a single field of consciousness, phenomena are paradoxically always impure. When I see an object as object, and not as a mere modification of my field of consciousness, as a mere perceptual phenomenon for instance, I see in it the potential gaze of another who will necessarily perceive some other aspect of it, depending on his position: I know that he too will see my potential gaze as capable of perceiving this or that aspect that he cannot see – and this 'other' may, moreover, quite easily be myself at another moment of time. In other words, the other, i.e. absolutely anyone, an originary common sense, is so to speak spread out just as much over a table or a chair as over a face and in my very gaze. The world is suddenly populated with Selves, or with subjectivities, and, as Deleuze puts it, 'no longer satisfied with ascribing immanence to something, immanence itself is made to disgorge the transcendent everywhere' (*WP*, p. 47).

This is all quite familiar. One need simply think of Sartre's novel *Nausea*, which describes the experience of a world that at times is emptied of the other, a world of pure matter – but a matter which is repetitive, proliferating with singularities, in which words, and thus concepts, have come adrift from things. We will just note the parallel sketched out in *LS* (p. 98) between Kant's method and Husserl's, 'when he deduces an originary and transcendental "Seeing" from perceptual "vision" '. Deleuze also denounces the 'sleight of hand' (p. 97) of the Husserlian genesis which consists of characterizing the meaning of the proposition as a predicate, as the attribute of some object or another, and not as a verb; as a concept and not an event. From then on, as in Kant, the attributes are related to an object = x. On this point, Deleuze always adopts in contrast the point of view of Leibniz, who gives the name predicate not to an attribute, but to an event (such as 'crossing the Rubicon'). And conversely, if he pays tribute to Husserl, it is because he preserved in his philosophy certain Leibnizian points of view. He thus judges it important that Husserl 'inscribes in the transcendental field centres of individuation and individual systems, monads, and points of view,

and Selves in the manner of Leibniz, rather than a form of the I in the Kantian manner' (*LS*, p. 99).[14]

If Eidetics and Critique were two 'ages of philosophy', corresponding to two philosophical attitudes towards transcendence – contemplation (the Greek point of view) and reflection (the point of view of the philosophers of the Cogito, from Descartes to Kant) – Phenomenology opens up a third, corresponding to communication. In Deleuze's later philosophy one finds a radical critique of communication, as well as a critique of the philosophy of dialogue or of majority democracy, in favour of a theory of the minority, or rather of the becoming-minor, which is an astonishing rediscovery or reinterpretation of Plato's aristocratic stance.

> Rights save neither men nor a philosophy that is reterritorialized on the democratic State. Human rights will not make us bless capitalism. A great deal of innocence or cunning is needed by a philosophy of communication that claims to restore the society of friends, or even of wise men, by forming a universal opinion as 'consensus' able to moralize nations, States and the market.
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> . . . If philosophy is reterritorialized on the concept, it does not find the condition for this in the present form of the democratic State or in a cogito of communication that is even more dubious than that of reflection. We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. (*WP*, pp. 107–8)

This critique of communication is always accompanied by a critique of the historical conception of time, in favour of a Nietzschean, 'untimely' point of view, that of the multiplicity of becomings. That is why, for Deleuze, May 1968 was neither a democratic nor a historical event:

> May 68 was a becoming breaking through into history, and that's why history found it so hard to understand, and why historical society found it so hard to come to terms with.
>
> . . . I became more and more aware of the possibility of distinguishing between becoming and history. . . . Becoming isn't part of history; history lays out merely the set of preconditions, however recent, that one leaves behind in order to 'become', that is, to create something new. This is precisely what Nietzsche calls the Untimely. May 68 was a demonstration, an irruption, of a becoming in its pure state. (*N*, pp. 153, 170 and 171)[15]

THE PLANE OF IMMANENCE AS A FIELD OF IMPERSONAL
CONSCIOUSNESS

At the end of the history of abortive attempts to institute a plane of immanence, there often appear two characters, Sartre and Spinoza. Thus:

> Sartre's presupposition of an impersonal transcendental field restores the rights of immanence.[16] When immanence is no longer immanent to something other than itself it is possible to speak of a plane of immanence. Such a plane is, perhaps, a radical empiricism: it does not present a flux of the lived that is immanent to a subject and individualized in that which belongs to a self. It presents only events, that is, possible worlds as concepts, and other people as expressions of possible worlds or conceptual personae. The event does not relate the lived to a transcendent subject = Self but, on the contrary, is related to the immanent survey of a field without subject; the Other Person does not restore transcendence to an other self but returns every other self to the immanence of the field surveyed. (*WP*, pp. 47–8)[17]

LS referred to 'the decisive article of 1937', and speaks of Sartre's 'decisive objections', in these terms:

> The idea of an 'impersonal or pre-personal' transcendental field, producing the I and the Ego, is of great importance. What hinders this thesis from developing all its consequences in Sartre's work is that the impersonal transcendental field is still determined as the field of a consciousness, and as such it must then be unified by itself through a play of intentionalities or pure retentions.
> ... the question of knowing how the transcendental field is to be determined is very complex. It seems impossible to endow it, in the Kantian manner, with the personal form of an I, or the synthetic unity of apperception, even if this unity were to be given universal extension. On this point, Sartre's objections are decisive. But it is no more possible to preserve for it the form of consciousness, even if we define this impersonal consciousness by means of pure intentionalities and retentions, which still presuppose centres of individuation. (*LS*, pp. 343–4, n. 5, and p. 105)

It is clear that Deleuze defines his own philosophy in relation to the problem raised by this text. And he will continue to do so right up to the end, since in the last text published in his lifetime we read: 'The transcendent is not the transcendental. Without consciousness, the transcendental field would be

defined as a pure plane of immanence, since it eludes any transcendence either of subject or object.'

And, in a note following yet another reference to *The Transcendence of the Ego*: 'Sartre posits a transcendental field without subject, which relates back to an impersonal, absolute, immanent consciousness: with respect to this, subject and object are 'transcendents' ...'[18]

This is not the place to embark on a detailed commentary on the remarkable conclusion of Sartre's article, to which Deleuze refers – on its concepts, the example it studies and the premonitions of Sartre's later work contained in it.[19] I simply wish to point out, not influences, but four singular points of encounter or inspiration which will be essential to Deleuze's work. First of all, the definition of transcendental consciousness as an impersonal spontaneity: 'This transcendental sphere is a sphere of absolute existence, that is to say, a sphere of pure spontaneities which are never objects and which determine their own existence' (*The Transcendence of the Ego*, p. 96). Sartre is here commenting on Rimbaud's famous exclamation in the so-called 'seer's' letter, 'I is an other', to which Deleuze regularly returns. Secondly, this structure means that 'each instant of our conscious life reveals to us a creation ex nihilo. ... At this level man has the impression of ceaselessly escaping from himself, of overflowing himself, of being surprised by riches which are always unexpected' (pp. 98–9). In other words, if consciousness is a nothing, that does not mean that it is a lack. It is fundamentally creative, an idea which is at the heart of Deleuze and Guattari's conception of desire as constructivist. And, of course, this conception implies, thirdly, a critique of the naivety of psychoanalysis which, under the name of the unconscious, merely substantializes or naturalizes that spontaneity. Sartre concludes:

> These psychologists therefore naively imagined that the spontaneous consciousnesses 'come out' of the unconscious where they already existed, without realizing that they had merely deferred the problem of existence, which would have to be formulated sooner or later, and which they had obscured, since the antecedent existence of spontaneities within pre-conscious limits would necessarily be passive existence. (p. 98)

Finally, attention should be drawn to the connection made by Sartre at this early period between his conception of consciousness and an intelligent Marxism (not yet reduced to a simplistic materialism), since from now on the Self is 'an existent, strictly contemporaneous with the world, whose existence has the same essential characteristics as the world' (p. 105). In fact, the Marxism that *The Anti-Oedipus* will claim to follow is Sartre's – his analyses of 'subject-groups and their relations with desire and with causality' (p. 395,

n. 50). The following passage shows a remarkable structural similarity with the passage we have just quoted:

> Sartre's analysis in *Critique de la raison dialectique* appears to us profoundly correct where he concludes that there does not exist any class spontaneity, but only a 'group' spontaneity: whence the necessity for distinguishing 'groups-in-fusion' from the class, which remains 'serial', represented by the party or the State. And the two do not exist on the same scale. This is because class interest remains a function of the large molar aggregates; it merely defines a collective preconscious that is necessarily represented in a distinct consciousness that, at this level, does not even present any grounds for asking whether it betrays or not, alienates or not, deforms or not. The problem is situated there, between unconscious group desires and preconscious class interests. (*AO*, pp. 256–7)

Conversely, as they also do for Freud, Deleuze and Guattari will accuse Althusser of having reduced the discovery of the 'machine' of social production to 'a structural and theatrical representation' (p. 306).

AN EXPRESSIVE BUT NON-REPRESENTATIONAL SUBJECTIVITY

We can now examine Deleuze's question in greater depth: what is an individuality insofar as it is not thought of in terms of transcendence with regard to the field of phenomena, that is, in terms of personality, subjectivity or interiority? Deleuze always thinks of individuality in Leibnizian terms as individuation or becoming, and of becoming as a bundle of lines linking singular points (Sartre's 'spontaneities') which define individuations by vicinity.

> Individuals are constituted in the vicinity of singularities which they envelop; they express worlds as circles of converging series which depend upon these singularities. To the extent that what is expressed does not exist outside of its expressions, that is, outside of the individuals which express it, the world is really the 'appurtenance' of the subject and the event has really become the analytic predicate of a subject. 'To green' indicates a singularity-event in the vicinity of which the tree is constituted. 'To sin' indicates a singularity-event in the vicinity of which Adam is constituted. But 'to be green' or 'to be a sinner' are now the analytic predicates of constituted subjects – namely, the tree and Adam'(*LS*, pp. 111–12).[20]

The main thing is thus that in Leibniz identity is conceived of as a process of individuation, instead of individuality being defined as the intersection of concepts or of pre-existing generalities. In one of their last books, *The Fold:*

Leibniz and the Baroque, Deleuze and Guattari go into this idea in detail, and define the plane of immanence as 'life' or monad. This final return to the history of philosophy long after those philosophical treatises, the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, suggests that it is in Leibniz, perhaps just as much as in Spinoza, that their ontology is to be found.

What is a monad? Everyone knows that what characterizes a Leibnizian monad is the fact that it expresses the world rather than representing it, without in the least communicating with the other monads (it has neither door nor window, without for all that being an interior theatre or a *camera obscura*). A monad expresses the world merely by being what it is, or, more precisely, by becoming what it is, i.e. a particular sequence of events, 'compossible' with an immense number of other convergent sequences which taken all together form a possible world (when the series diverge, we have another world, incompossible with the first). The best of all possible worlds (the real or existing world) is the most productive among the infinity of other possible worlds, i.e. the infinite series of compossible series of events. The fact that Adam commits original sin, that Caesar crosses the Rubicon, these events determine an entire world, and there is another possible world in which neither of them happens. But it is difficult to conceive of a world in which Caesar crosses the Rubicon without Adam having committed original sin, which suggests that they are incompossible and cannot contribute to the establishment of one and the same world. From this point of view, an individual is a flux of events and not an intersection of attributes, and to say that this flux exists is the same as saying that it is compossible with all those which constitute the best of all possible worlds.

In short, every possible monad is defined by a certain number of pre-individual singularities, and thus is compossible with all the monads whose singularities converge with its own, and incompossible with those whose singularities imply divergence or non-prolongation.

But why give the proper name 'Adam' to all those divergent individuals, in incompossible worlds? Because a singularity can always be isolated, excised, cut off from its prolongations: then it no longer matters that the garden in which Adam sins is not the same in which Adam may not sin, the singularity becomes indefinite, it is no longer any more than just one garden, and the primitive predicate is no longer grasped in this or that world, but merely considered *'sub ratione generalitatis'* at the same time as its subject becomes one Adam in general, one Sextus ... One should not draw from this the conclusion that individuation starts from these general predicates, although it may mean specifying them more and more. Individuation does not go from a genus to smaller and smaller species,

following a rule of differentiation, it goes from singularity to singularity, following the rule of convergence or prolongation which relates the individual to this or that world (*F*, p. 64).

That is why, despite being without doors or windows, monads express a world. Of course, finite monads can express only obscurely or unconsciously the infinity of their antecedents, their repercussions and the impossibility of their repercussions, all of which together constitute this world. So the unconscious is nothing other than the presence of the world 'in' me. This is what the famous theory of little perceptions brings out.[21] Consciousness, for Leibniz, is merely the qualitative threshold or the integration of the perception of an infinity of discrete quantities: the world as a distant noise. If the world is without a door or a window, it isn't because it is enclosed in its psychological being, it is because it is exteriority all the way through.[22] The hierarchy of beings is thus simply a hierarchy of degrees of clarity and distinctness. Already the school textbook which Canguilhem commissioned from Deleuze, *Instincts et institutions* (1953), was secretly devoted to tracing a continuous line between beings. All the later texts on animality (Spinoza and the tick, Melville, Kafka and their ways of becoming-animal, etc.) take up this theme. And if one feeling were to sum up Deleuze's ethics, it would be neither pity nor respect, but the shame, at times, of being a man (and here, the reference is always to the work of Primo Levi).

Sartre described pre-war idealism as an 'alimentary philosophy' which reduced things to 'contents of consciousness', and postulated a Spider-Spirit, 'which lured things into its web, covered them with spittle and slowly ingested them, reducing them to its own substance'.[23] If all monads, even the humblest, express the totality of the universe, it is because they do not represent it within any interiority. They express the world simply as a series of points of view, i.e. a line of life traced on a plane of immanence. This idea of the unconscious as the world as I live it, and not as I represent it to myself, was already developed in the book on Proust, *Proust and Signs* (French edn 1964, revised fourth edn 1976).[24] *In Search of Lost Time* can be read as a series of variations on a fundamental theme: the essence of the self is the point of view on the world that it envelops. It is, of course, reminiscence, the tea, the cake and the flowers of folded paper (the concept of the fold is Leibnizian), but we should also think of the repeated experience of the desire of the other as an assemblage within a landscape, or a way towards someone's home (the title of the first volume, *Du côté de chez Swann*, means 'on the way which leads to Swann's home'), or else within an image, as in the case of the Duchess of Guermantes and the windows of the church at Combray. That is why the texts at the end of *Time Regained* always describe the creation of a work of

art as the development of an unconscious essence of the deep self, and, thereby, impose an astonishing retroactive reading of the entire work, as the work precisely makes the unfolding of this critical point of view on creation (the point of view of the deep self, as opposed to the 'biographical' point of view of a Sainte-Beuve) into the source of its own creation.[25] So it is not only feeling but also thought which has to be conceived of as a process of development which depends neither on the good will nor on the decision of a thinker. Thus the first conclusion of the book, 'The Image of Thought', focuses on Proust and philosophical method. And if the metaphor of the spider is repeated in the final conclusion, entitled 'Presence and function of madness. The Spider', it now has a meaning which is the opposite of Sartre's. The emphasis is now not on ingestion, but on the web, i.e. on a body without differentiated organs, a pure sensory surface, perceiving nothing but degrees of intensities of vibrations corresponding to no particular sense organ and thus to no exterior quality. The work is thus the madness of the 'Narrator-spider, whose very web is the Search in the process of being made, of weaving itself with every thread pulled by this sign or that'. And if the self is nothing outside the work, 'a life' can correspondingly be thought of as a work of art or the creation of an art of the self. It is easy to understand why this aesthetics was the subject of a chapter in the book on Foucault ('Enfoldings, or the inside of thought (subjectivation)').[26] There Deleuze is discussing Foucault's final philosophy and the relation between Greek ethics and the aesthetics of the self, but the problem is the same: how can one explain individuations, or subjectivations, without transcendence?

This description of the self as the unconscious integration of the infinity of the world and as a process of creation (or desiring machine) is clearly contrasted by Deleuze and Guattari with the conception of the unconscious as a theatre of representation one finds in psychoanalysis, a conception that they consider, with all its variants, as a new machine of oppression, characteristic of societies which henceforth are not societies of sovereignty or discipline but, as Foucault pointed out at the end of his life, of *control*.[27]

THE UNCONSCIOUS: DESIRING MACHINE AND NOT THEATRE OF REPRESENTATION

Clément Rosset puts it very well: every time the emphasis is put on a lack that desire supposedly suffers from as a way of defining its object, 'the world acquires as its double some other sort of world, in accordance with the following line of argument: there is an object that desire feels the lack of; hence the world does not contain each and every object that exists; there is at least one object missing, the one that desire feels the lack of;

hence there exists some other place that contains the key to desire (missing in this world).

If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. Desire is the set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production. The real is the end product, the result of the passive syntheses of desire as autoproduction of the unconscious. Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression. Desire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine of a machine' (*AO*, p. 26).

Psychoanalysis, which defines desire as a lack, is still an attempt to reintroduce a form of transcendence, the object of desire, instead of conceptualizing the positivity of desire as a production of assemblages. Conversely, Deleuze always insists on what he calls a 'constructivist' conception of desire (to desire is, as it were, to draw in space and in time, he says – for example, synthesizing a thing, a being and a scene or a landscape[28]). The *Anti-Oedipus* could thus have been called *Critique of Pure Desire*. Kant had shown how Reason became entangled in paralogisms when it spoke for example of a supreme cause, or of free will, hypostatizing its own regulative principles into metaphysical objects (the transcendent use of synthesis). This critique, as we have seen, sprang from a radicalization of the initial phenomenalism of Descartes. In the same way, here, desire refers to nothing other than its own operations. When he speaks of passive (non-subjective) syntheses fabricating partial objects, Deleuze contrasts fabricating with organizing: the latter always means, in his work, arranging in a hierarchy so as to facilitate representation.

The subject which psychoanalysis constructs in the family trinity and which it defines as lack – this is what we must free ourselves from. Psychoanalysis flattens out desire and, by so doing, constantly brings it back under the thrall of other authorities than itself, instead of seeing its extraordinary productivity. Psychoanalysis plays thereby a political role, for what is at stake in all this is the formation of the individual within a social field (via family, school and sometimes hospital[29]). So it's a serious matter. Foucault notes this when he writes, on the authors of the *Anti-Oedipus*:

They have tried to show that the well-known Oedipal triangle constitutes, for the analysts who manipulate it in the course of treatment, a certain way of containing desire, of ensuring that desire does not come to invest

itself and spread into the world around us, the historical world – that desire remains within the family and unfolds like an almost bourgeois domestic drama between father, mother and son. (Michel Foucault, 'La vérité et les formes juridiques', 1974, in *Dits et Écrits*, Paris: Gallimard, 1994, II, p. 553)

He proceeds to propose a reading of Sophocles' drama not as expressing 'some essential and fundamental structure of desire' but as a text on sovereignty and on Greek judicial practices. It is a serious matter but it can also be extremely amusing, as can be seen in *Politique et psychanalyse*:[30]

Interpreting, regressing, forcing someone else to regress. Among the most grotesque passages in Freud are those on fellatio: how the penis is in this case the equivalent of a cow's udder and the cow's udder the equivalent of the mother's breast. In other terms, fellatio is when you don't have a cow handy, or you don't have a mother any more, or she has run out of milk. It's a way of showing that fellatio is not a 'real desire', but means something else, conceals something else, conceals another desire. Psychoanalysis has at its disposal a perfect interpretative schema: the true contents of desire are supposedly the child's partial drives; the authentic expression of desire is then the Oedipus complex (there to structure the 'totality'). As soon as desire arranges something, in relation with an Outside, with a Becoming, you undo the arrangement, you smash it up, you show that it refers on the one hand to one of the child's partial mechanisms, and on the other to an overall Oedipal structure. Hence fellatio: an oral drive to suck the breast, plus a structural Oedipal accident (*Politique et psychanalyse*, 1977, np).

If the unconscious is not a theatre of representation, theatre (dramatic art) must not be one either. Much has been written on Deleuze's cinema books without much attention being paid to the fact that he says they are not books on cinema but philosophical books on image, time and movement, which cinema also happens to treat in its own way, as indeed the first film directors such as Jean Epstein thought. On the other hand, *Superpositions* (1979), a work composed with the theatre (and cinema) director Carmelo Bene, contains a meditation on theatre, the author, the actor and the producer. A Leibnizian meditation.[31]

Bene's method is on the one hand a technique of amputation and on the other an operation of constitution.

If you amputate Romeo, you will witness an amazing development, that of Mercutio, who was merely a virtual figure in Shakespeare's play. . . . The play is at first indistinguishable from the fabrication of the character,

his preparation, his birth, his first uncertain steps, his variations, his development. (p. 88)

So what we have here is a quasi-musical theatre, a theatre of variation, much more than one of the representation and unfolding of identities, powers and destinies (p. 113). This leads to an original discussion of the relations between theatre and politics. Bene's theatre is not interested in politics, because these are always already codified, institutionalized in the guise of confrontations between character types belonging to the majority. As such, conflicts are already trapped in the straitjacket of representation and always refer to an Other. What interests Bene, on the contrary, is the presentation of variations, of multiple types:

> This anti-representative function (of modern theatre) would thus consist in outlining, in constituting as it were, a figure of the consciousness of minorities, as the potentiality of each and every person. To make a potentiality present and actual is quite different from representing a conflict. It would no longer be possible to say that art has a power, that it is still a form of power, even when criticizing Power. By forming a minority consciousness, it would address the potential powers of becoming, which belong to a different realm from that of Power and the yardstick of representation (*Superpositions*, p. 125).

The politics of this text is yet again a politics of the 'untimely', of a becoming, and not of a history, of a dream of past or future (p. 95). The theatre, henceforth viewed as presentation, and not representation, is a good means to this end.

BODY WITHOUT ORGANS AND FACIALITY

If Deleuze extols desire, it is not in the sense of Psychoanalysis and its roles, but in the sense of a philosophy of life as variation and creation, in the sense of surrealism, of an extremism of reality – in the words of Artaud, who is a constant and crucial reference point for this philosophy.[32] Literature is then constantly posited as what shatters the limits of the Self:

> Of course, literary characters are perfectly individuated, and are neither vague nor general; but all their individual traits elevate them to a vision that carries them off in an indefinite, like a becoming that is too powerful for them: Ahab and the vision of Moby Dick. ... There is no literature without fabulation, but as Bergson was able to see, fabulation – the

fabulating function – does not consist in imagining or projecting an ego. Rather, it attains these visions, it raises itself to these becomings and powers. (*ECC*, p. 3)

By taking the notion of 'body without organ' from Artaud, Deleuze ultimately defines being as sensation. What makes this notion difficult is the fact that it is most often presented negatively. The organized body is a hierarchical, fixed structure, the end product of an evolution. The body without organ is at first the origin, the egg and its surface, smooth but criss-crossed by zones of potentiality. Now if we study the practices that Deleuze investigates in *Masochism* and (with Félix Guattari) in *A Thousand Plateaus*: masochistic contracts, anorexia, the experiences with drugs of Michaux or Burroughs, Artaud's schizophrenia, etc., what they all have in common is the way they produce, in the body itself, the experience of a 'nomadic', 'deter-ritorialized' desire, a desire unlinked to any object, interior or exterior, a desire that could not be encapsulated as a lack hollowing it out, or as a pleasure that could satisfy it, and so could not be assigned to any organic function or any subjectivity. A desire conceived as the construction of a series of intensities and not as a tendency. Without this, of course, we would see the return of transcendence, of priests and gurus (*TP*, pp. 153–5). So it is not surprising that at this point references to the fifth part of Spinoza's *Ethics*, and to Spinoza's theory of affects and the conatus, appear.[33]

The opposite of this theme, dated in *A Thousand Plateaus* to 28 November 1947, the date of a letter written by Artaud, is the theme of faciality, which is dated to year zero (pp. 167–91) – this is the theme of Christ and an evolution of western civilization in which subjectivation is carried out by the development of a particular device, the face. On this point, Deleuze's thinking has not changed since the 1946 article on 'Le Christ et la bourgeoisie'.

This supposes to begin with that 'the head, even the human head, is not necessarily a face, [that] the face is produced in humanity, but through a necessity which is not that of men and women in general. . . . What counts is not the individuality of the face, but the efficiency of the encoding it makes possible.' So if the abstract machine of faciality (abstract with relation to the head and the body) is put into operation, it is because 'certain arrangements of power need a face to be produced'. Some surprise has been expressed at the analyses on faciality as a process of subjection by the machines of power, a process later linked to the invention of racism as a way of defining as deviant certain differences and replacing the former systems of exclusion. But it is easy to read these analyses as a new critique of philosophies of communication and their correlative notions of the other and alterity. This is confirmed, moreover, from a radically different point of view, by Emmanuel

Levinas' philosophy of the face, which indeed posits the face as transcendence, and sees in it the prime means of access to an ethical order.[34]

But what interests us from the point of view of Deleuze's conception of individuation is the idea that the body without organ is first and foremost a body without face, a body which refuses to display a transcendence. It is perhaps in his discussion of Francis Bacon's painting that Deleuze has most clearly brought out this logic, not of sense, but of sensation, in which the body without organ consists. For what Bacon constantly attempts to do is escape from the domination of representation, to return to a faceless head, a body that effaces itself, or defaces itself, displaying, in negative fashion, the true characteristics of faciality or identity. It detaches itself, thus, from figuration towards the Figure (p. 27), but without ever wanting to pass over into abstraction. Now this path of the Figure, according to Cézanne (followed here by Bacon), is to paint in such a way as to directly produce sensation, the affect of the sensible form being immediately related to the nervous system. Hence the link between Artaud and Bacon (p. 33). Modern painting, driven by photography to liberate itself from representation (an obsessive theme in Bacon) 'sets out directly to bring out the presences beneath representation, beyond representation'. It has even, adds Deleuze, a fundamental relation with hysteria, with the total self-abandonment to presence.[35]

> Interminable presence. Insistence of the smile beyond the face and beneath the face. Insistence of a cry which subsists in the mouth, insistence of a body which subsists in the organism, insistence of the transitory organs which subsist in the distinct organs. And the identity of an already-there and an always too late, in an excessive presence. Everywhere, a presence acts directly on the nervous system and makes it impossible to set up or to keep at arm's length any representation. This is also what Sartre meant when he called himself a hysteric, and talked of Flaubert's hysteria. (FB, p. 36)

This figural painting depicts the dissolution of the transcendence of form over matter. Thus, even the horror of life can be transformed into a very pure and very intense life. Baudelaire had noted the same thing, and he too developed an aesthetic uniting the figure (the preliminary sketch) to the event (Deleuze quotes him, moreover, on p. 80, in connection with Leiris' text on the poem 'Une Charogne' ('A Carcass') which had struck Bacon).

Thus it is not surprising that the final obsession of the paradoxical portrait painter and the singular philosopher should be a becoming-imperceptible. Becoming they also call a 'becoming-Sahara', simultaneously one of pure multiplicity and of infinite individuation.

II

ART

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The Time(s) of the Cinema

Alain Ménil

Fifteen years on from publication, the two books Deleuze devoted to the cinema still occupy a special place in the reception of his work. Hailed by cinephiles on their first appearance, it seems that they have yet to command the same attention from philosophers – a paradoxical situation, leading in one way to marginalizing this rich body of work from the preoccupations which animate the Deleuzian enterprise. Perhaps it is the choice of object – cinema – reputedly a less 'speculative' art than painting, which provokes this mistrust, even though the continuities and echoes with the rest of his work are all apparent. Or perhaps is the interest taken mainly by cinema 'experts' in this work simply a sign of the extreme novelty of Deleuze's contribution to an understanding of cinema?

Yet this also risks misunderstanding: hoping to find in Deleuze a *theory* of the cinema when it is more a high-level reflection on that *thinking about the image* which has haunted the cinema since its birth. In fact what was at stake was never a new theory of the cinema, and not only because Deleuze always refused the act of 'thinking on' (in the course of a lecture at FEMIS, the French film school in 1987 he once remarked on the vanity of supposing that the philosopher thinks for others, by 'thinking on' their actions). Deleuze confronts a much older problematic centred on the possibility of 'a thinking of the cinema': of the work of thought within film which finds therein a manner not of conceptualizing but of experimenting. But there is a further reason, even more primary, perhaps, since it allows him to pursue inquiries conceived much earlier, on the image as a *living image*. 'The image is not an object but a process', he reminds us, in relation to Beckett.[1] This attention to the image is not occasional for Deleuze, nor is it reducible to the cinema volumes alone, not even to that other great work, devoted to the painting of Francis Bacon, the diptych *The Logic of Sensation*.

A life of the image, then, since 'the image is more profound because it frees itself from its object, in order to become a process itself, that is, an

event as "possible" that no longer even needs to be realised in a body or an object: somewhat like the smile without a cat in Lewis Carroll. ... The image is precisely this: not a representation of an object but a movement in the world of the mind. The image is the spiritual life ... '[2] The cinema supplied Deleuze with the means to explore this life of the image in all its manifestations and interconnections, to the extent of leaving us an almost unique taxonomy of filmic images explored both through an analytic (based on the division between movement-image and time-image, and their various division) and a genealogy (developed out of the ultimate element of the filmic image, the shot).[3]

The shot, not the frame, still less the unmanageably vague notion of the image conceived as anything other than mobile, as a movement-image. The Deleuzian approach refused from the outset the classifications of Christian Metz, not merely because these are inherited from linguistics, but because they make the specific nature of film language unthinkable.[4] In this way too we should understand Deleuze's double refusal, both of phenomenology and the linguistic model of Metz's semiology: if the first method conflates cinematic with natural perception, the Metzian approach presents a much greater risk – that of viewing the filmic image simply as an image, excluding movement from its composition.[5] Insofar as Deleuze's critique does not turn simply on the wish to think cinema on its own terms and not through an imported theoretical model or some forced analogy with a given element (e.g. verbal language), it is concerned to underline its blind spot towards one of the essential conditions of the filmic experience: duration. Which is why movement is not an external determination of the filmic image.

Whence then this return to Bergson – so surprising to those ignorant of the philosophical roots of the cinema which, right from its beginning, saw its needs bound up with thought in its highest form. In fact, Deleuze unravelled the most essential thread of a tangled history. In any case it was not so much a question of returning to Bergson as of situating oneself 'in the line of' Bergson, to reconsider the confrontation between thinking and cinema, in order to follow it beyond the point where Bergson effectively abandoned it, by contenting himself with relating the mechanisms of thought to those of the *cinematic illusion*. It was in 1907, in *Creative Evolution*, that Bergson thus named a constant error in thought (and, indeed, philosophy): that of breaking down movement into instantaneous poses (each the analogue for some fixed image); in which cinema would only have led us back to an illusion as old as thought, beginning with Zeno's paradox: the pretence of composing movement itself from a series of false movements.[6] The purpose of re-examining Bergson's diagnosis was to demonstrate how

wrong Bergson was to convict the cinema of an illusion in fact so ancient that it is co-extensive with the entire history of Western thought. Cinematic projection cannot be reduced to the mechanism which makes it possible and the cinematic illusion does not consist in obtaining movement from static poses, a kind of 'snapshot logic'. Bergson's mistake is that he does not see what is specific to the cinema, and which precisely depends on *mobile section*.[7] In one sense then, the Bergsonian paradox of 1907, which consisted in connecting a new invention like the cinema with a tendency of thought as ancient as it was universal, is reversed in 1983 into another paradox – this time Deleuzian – which consisted in using Bergson so as to think, in the line of his thought, a new mode of representation which was also a new mode of perceiving and thinking.

But is Deleuze's reading of Bergson only a new means of betraying him, or a genuinely unique way of reading and taking him seriously? It was necessary to shed light on the fundamental misunderstanding behind Bergson's condemnation of the cinema by showing how it was possible not only to reinvent his analysis but also to demonstrate that it could be truly productive in its suggestion that cinema was a temporal art, but a temporal art purified, disengaged from spatiality and also from a submission to the movement of an object. For this reason, the detour through *Matter and Memory* is instructive, furnishing Deleuze with the concept of the movement-image and permitting him on the one hand to oppose the notion of cut to that of static pose, and on the other to divide these cuts into *instantaneous cuts* (analogous to the abstract instants of modern physics) and *movable cuts*, which only apply to singular and privileged instants rather than to abstract, equidistant ones.[8]

But in order to demonstrate this it was necessary to think nothing less than the entire history of cinema under a philosopheme both vague and precise – *Bergsonism*[9] – another paradox insofar as this meant subsuming a whole art under the concepts of a philosopher who pronounced its most damning condemnation.

THE HISTORY OF CINEMA AND THE THINKING OF HISTORY

Deleuze's work has been subject to question, not so much on account of the uses it makes of the history of cinema as much as to how his distinction between two types of image (movement-image and time-image) can correspond at the same time to a break separating two 'moments' of cinema while

being much more than this periodization. For if the potential of the time-image can be realized with the arrival of modern cinema,[10] its existence must be of an entirely different order, since it was in one sense a constituent of cinema right from the start, and, in another, a constant aim of it. These are not simply problems of reconciling concept with fact but stem from the arguing and composition of the two tasks – thinking of cinema as a totality, and thinking one's way through all cinema. There is thus a tension between the first and second volume. The first, on the movement-image, notably describes certain classic *forms* of film narration – the action-adventure form, western, police thriller, suspense-film à la Hitchcock – but also privileges the *worldviews* of Renoir, Visconti, Buñuel, etc. It is marked by its large-scale reference to the grand classics of the cinema and does not presume to overthrow the cinephiles' tacit canon.

But a notable change is evident by the time of the second volume, on the time-image, marked by a much larger reference to more recent works and more radical kinds of experience – Duras, Garrel, Syberberg, Straub, or Snow – each providing notable ingress to the issues raised in the second volume. Is there any correlation between the chronology of the theory and the chronology of the cinema? Not exactly, since in terms of the argument a film-maker of the classic era may end up the contemporary of a more recent director (for example, in the first volume Dreyer, Bergman, Bresson and Snow co-exist), to such an extent that a director is sometimes only elucidated in terms of the grandest questions that cinema can deal with. Thus the exemplary treatment of crisis in the action image, ending the first volume, stages an encounter between the Marx Brothers, Hitchcock, Lumet, Cassavetes and Altman.

Still, in many respects, Deleuze is playing up the impression that he is following something like a chronicle of cinema linked to its own internal historicity; not merely by the choice of citations in the second volume, but also by the linkage posed explicitly at the end of *The Movement-Image* between the nature of filmic images and the history of cinema. In effect the possibility for the appearance of the time-image is related to a crisis covering all of cinema – a crisis of the action-image, questioning the type of story that makes sensory-motor continuity, as well as a crisis between spectator and image. The visual image and the sound image cease to coincide and a path is opened to the *powers of falsity* explored by directors as different as Lang, Welles, Resnais and Robbe-Grillet. Thus if the distinction between movement- and time-image is a distinction concerning narration just as much as the relation between screen and spectator, it pertains to a taxonomy obedient solely to the law of perception and not to a chronology more or less supplied by the history of cinema. When the movement-image is disengaged from the

terms of natural perception, the analyst can distinguish its varieties on the basis of the immediate properties of the framing, découpage and montage.[11]

The difficulty is real. On the one hand 'is not the cinema, at the outset, bound to imitate natural perception?'[12] And time-image, defined in the first volume as the 'horizon of the movement-image', presents itself 'after' the first volume. The fact that this presentation is not merely consecutive would seem confirmed by the history of an art form which has had to wait for its own 'crisis' to get to that point.

Some cinema historians have thus expressed their doubts about the pertinence of Deleuze's chronology, underlining how many of the analyses in the second volume depend on very recent awareness, perhaps simultaneous with the writing of the book. It is as if there were a hiatus between the second movement of the analysis and the first.[13] Is the articulation between the two volumes chronological or logical, factual (historical) or conceptual?[14] It is all these at the same time, but what is most important for Deleuze is to bypass this distinction and the barriers which it imposes. While it is true that the references in the second volume are mostly to recent cinema, quite often the most experimental, what counts still doesn't depend on a chronology determined by cinema history, or on a psychology, itself perhaps the product of some tardy reflections by Deleuze on contemporary cinema. It is necessary to see a logical sequence in the analysis, since this logic is that of the cinema's own thought.

Our inquiry thus concerns not so much the factual accuracy of Deleuze's theorizing as the articulation between the two main varieties of image, the movement- and time-image, that is to say between all the images which subordinate the exhibiting of time to the narration of an event, and all those which, by inverting the relation of time to movement, permit the appearance of something like time itself, even if out of joint.[15] Such is the condition of this direct presentation of time which has for its particular aim not only making visible the invisible itself (time), but also reversing the relational order between the parts of time, the determinations proper to time.[16]

How should one, then, hear that 'beyond' of the movement-image? Is it some kind of 'beyond' *within* the movement-image? Or is this image self-transcending, moved to a certain destiny once its constituents are in crisis? It seems to me that there is a real difficulty here, not so much in the complexity of Deleuze's thinking or in the novelty of the concepts he introduces, as in the difference in kind between the questions raised. While a sequential history presents this 'beyond' as a mode of succession between two types of image, as if it had been necessary to exhaust all the kinds of movement-image to get to the other side, Deleuze's understanding of cinema sees it as a dimension which has always existed, but owes its actualization to certain

conditions: 'It took the modern cinema to re-read the whole of cinema as already made up of aberrant movements and false continuity shots. The direct time-image is the phantom which has always haunted the cinema, but it took modern cinema to give a body to this phantom.'[17]. *To re-read* and *flesh out*, then: a double operation, which plays in and over the image, and which in terms of filmic perception also requires the spectator to become a *reader*.

This involves grasping that the time-image is not so much a 'beyond' of the movement-image as contained virtually within the primary terms of the movement-image – it is the process of genesis that has to be theorized. The time-image only comes out of or in a 'beyond of the movement-image', because it is not thinkable (or observable) until after the cinema has *exhausted* all the possibilities of the movement-image. Then time returns, but other than in the form of movement. It is necessary for movement to be erratic, so that time appears either under the form of the *Aeon*, dealt with, much earlier, in *The Logic of Sense*, or in the form of *Chronos*. As the conclusion of the work summarizes – 'Time as progression derives from the movement-image or from successive shots. But time as unity or totality depends on montage which still relates it back to movement or to the succession of shots. This is why the movement-image is fundamentally linked to an indirect representation of time, and does not give us a direct presentation of it ... But in modern cinema ... the time-image is no longer empirical, nor metaphysical; it is "transcendental" in the sense that Kant gives this word: time is out of joint and presents itself in the pure state.'[18]

Thus, would not the confinement of analysis to historically attested factors of the time-image commit the error of confusing the possible and the virtual? 'The only danger', writes Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*, 'is that the virtual could be confused with the possible. The possible is opposed to the real; the process undergone by the possible is therefore a "realisation". By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualisation.'[19]

The difference in point of view between the historian of the cinema and the philosopher needs to be made explicit: the first fixes on the analysis of realities, to discern among possibles those capable of realization, while the originality of the philosophical position is to consider the antinomy of virtual and actual.

The danger indicated by Deleuze is, fundamentally, an error resting on a misunderstanding as to the real itself: 'It would be wrong to see here a mere dispute over terms: it concerns the very nature of existence. Each time we pose the problem in terms of the possible and the real, we are forced to conceive of existence as a brute eruption, a pure act or leap which always occurs behind our backs, and is subject to a law of all or nothing.'[20]

The misunderstanding between thought proper to the cinema and the history of cinema may well rest on a simple confusion, not of words but of perspective: the historian, focused on deeds, holds only to those possibilities actually realized, whereas the philosopher dedicates himself to virtualities, even those which could not be effectuated. In one sense, the possible 'denotes the form of identity within the concept while the virtual designates a *pure multiplicity within the Idea*'.[21] As a history of the possible, the history of cinema is, for Deleuze, a long martyrology obliged to sacrifice the virtual on the altar of realism, and the historian's viewpoint is condemned to recognize the concept of cinema inside the forms already historically realized, thus missing the essential aspect – the Idea or essence of cinema, rich in virtualities no less real than the forms actualized, and making of it less an individuality than a multiplicity. This debate leads back in some way to the divorce of the philosopher from the history of philosophy: 'We can only make headway with these questions if we give up the narrowly historical point of view of before and after in order to consider the time rather than the history of philosophy. This is a *stratigraphic* time where "before" and "after" indicate only an order of superimpositions. Certain paths (movements) take on sense and direction only as the shortcuts or detours of faded paths . . . .'[22]

Stratified versus chronological time: this for Deleuze was the difference in viewpoint between philosophy and history. It is at this level that philosophy cannot content itself with history, not even its own. Rather if the history of philosophy is itself a stratified history, then to write this history is to write a philosophy of philosophy. The foreword to *Difference and Repetition* had already exposed this divergence between the history of philosophy and philosophy itself. To record its own course, so particular, is not in itself philosophy, unless it accepts the simultaneity of its varied historical levels. 'The history of philosophy is the reproduction of philosophy itself. In the history of philosophy, a commentary should act as a veritable double and bear the maximal modification appropriate to a double. . . . In this case, the most exact, the strictest repetition has as its correlate the maximum of difference . . . . Commentaries in the history of philosophy should represent a kind of slow motion, a congelation or immobilization of the text: *not only* of the text to which they relate, *but also* of the text in which they are inserted – so much so that they have a double existence and a corresponding ideal: the pure repetition of the former text and the present text *in one another*.'[23]

Deceleration, freezing, immobility: images even more evocative for their lexical consonance with the specificities of filmic perception. If the philosophical point of view induces this flicker in the image of philosophy, it is so as to locate there a profound singularity, where pure repetition and pure difference meet in their own paradoxes. With *The Exhausted* Deleuze returns

to the difficult question of the virtual and actual within the image, even if – for reasons connected to the theme of depletion – it is the lexicon of possibility that Deleuze wants to make intelligible. But for once the distinction between virtual and possible ceases to operate, since it is now a matter of understanding that 'the image remains inseparable from the movement through which it dissipates itself: the face bends, turns away, fades or decomposes like cloud or smoke. The visual image is drawn by the music, sound image rushing towards its own abolition. Both fly towards the end, all possibilities being exhausted.'[24]

Which is to say that in the cinema the viewpoint of the philosopher consists not in having to rediscover forgotten possibilities or hidden realities, but in describing from within the process of the cinematographic image itself, this tension between the virtual and the actual, while conceiving the time-image as a virtuality of the movement-image and not as merely a future possibility, a founding *telos* which would only complete its chronology at some *end*. This is why the time-image is a temptation from the earliest times, and why, in order to evoke or think it, Deleuze never ceases to cross in all directions the line of facts, to set up a dialogue between those films apparently devoted to the contemplation of a simple ray of light (whether this is Snow, Ozu or Mizoguchi) or focused on the pure movement of things (thus, for example, Wenders, but also Visconti, Antonioni, Welles or Mankiewicz – all of whom return, decontextualized in the second volume) and theoretical texts belonging to another age of cinema, such as those of Epstein. For, in the work of this theoretician/film-maker one can observe an interest in the reversal of the relationship of time and movement, and follow there the thread of a desire to make the first independent of the second.

This ostensible teleology in Deleuze is not projected in linear fashion by a careful partitioning of successive facts; it is rather given in all the density of the event, where the event itself, however unruly or untimely, constantly raises the possibility of its inscription as fact, so as to 'become' an event, *become a pure becoming*. One might seek some sense or inspiration behind Deleuze's formulation in a suggestive passage in *What is Philosophy?*: 'becoming is the concept itself. It is born in History, and falls back into it, but is not of it. In itself it has neither beginning nor end but only a milieu. ... What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self-positioning as concept, escapes History.' [25]

In one sense, Deleuze well recognizes with the cinema a problem both philosophical and of one particular art form. Its history is not only inseparable from a thinking of history but can only be discerned if the items studied become themselves objects of a true thinking of the cinema.

Without it, they simply have no existence and the history of the cinema is no more than a succession of undifferentiated works, the understanding of which is reduced to the compiling of filmographies. In this sense, Deleuze is not writing a history of the cinema – rather, he is making its course thinkable. Above all, he makes clear what conditions the cinema's potential must obey – whether it has been actualized or abandoned.

BERGSONISM IN THE CINEMA

At this point we encounter all that is entailed by an unexpected placing of an art under the guidance of a philosophy – here, Bergson's. Deleuze isn't content with seeking out whatever in the cinematic image is compatible with Bergson's thesis on movement. He also characterizes some cinema, or some directors, as Bergsonian, he speaks of a deep Bergsonism in the cinema.[26] Elsewhere is mentioned a 'philosophy of the cinema', a philosophy proper to the cinema. The practical and theoretical range of montages 'was the thought, or the philosophy of cinema, no less than its technique'.[27] Deleuze speaks as well of a 'cinema of philosophy'. Thus the point of such reference to Bergson is dual – not only should Bergson allow us to understand the nature and specificity of the movement-image better than he might ever have suspected, but the cinema also – though totally related to a philosophy which nevertheless condemned it – would only become itself within the themes which this philosophy so richly explores.

However, to speak of Bergsonism in the cinema is not easy. It would be necessary to determine how, under what conditions, the essence of an art can be referred to a particular philosophy. And the very idea of assigning an art to some philosophical directive sits ill with the Deleuzian conception of the relationships of art, science and philosophy. That each one of these domains pertains to thought does not imply an identical mode of relationship with thought. By defining the operation of philosophy as thinking by concept, while art operates by percept and affect, Deleuze breaks in a double sense with the very idea of a philosophy of art. On the one hand the hierarchical subordination of art to philosophy is subverted by assigning an equal dignity to each mode of thought – which philosophy, science and art simply are. From this point of view, too, the philosopher is stripped of the idealistic privilege of pure thinking, which tends too rapidly towards the appropriation of all thought as its sole beneficiary. Not only is he not the only person to think, but he thinks in a very specific way – via the concept, no more elevated than any other means. On the other hand, he short-circuits the philosophical pretension of revealing *ex-cathedra* the truth of which the work

is a mere vehicle, unknown to it. The philosopher of the philosophies of art is always a kind of *deus ex machina* who pronounces over what resides in the work but can only be clearly understood by translation, which is the raising to concepthood of what is given sensuously and by figures (allegorical, symbolic or literal), of what is simply present in and through the material of an art form. Indeed, the philosophy of art supposes that although there is sense in art, the work itself may only contain sense as long as it is reflected in the discourse of truth by the philosopher who reveals it. In this sense Deleuze is a Kantian – if art or beauty provoke so much thought, it is first of all because thought is at play, both in the work itself, and in aesthetic con-templation and judgements of taste. But thought operates then through art and beauty, that is, through percepts and affects.

Yet to interpret Deleuze's work matrix on the cinema as a philosophy of cinema is more than problematic, because such a project belongs to a phi-losophical perspective very alien to the thought of Deleuze. It would require conversion to a philosophy of art, which one never finds with Deleuze (no system of beaux-arts, less still any systematic account of what drew him to literature, painting and cinema each in turn). One should rather at this stage see the relations between cinema and philosophy under the form of a con-junction. Thus the director, the artist, when reflecting on their art, are superior to any professional commentator, though, when reflecting, they think otherwise than when they think as artists. The artist may reflect on his work, either via works and then he thinks via percept and affect, or via concepts and that perhaps is philosophy.[28]

Thus 'Bergsonism in the cinema' – a happax? Another hypothesis is possible, which would consist in understanding the genitive in the 'philo-sophy of cinema' as a subjective genitive – the idea of an immanent philo-sophy of cinema, that which it would produce out of itself, or which would detach itself from its own filmic manifestation. It would not be a matter then of a philosophy which the cinema defends, or expounds (in this sense there is no philosophy of cinema which would be able to oversee the film in all its variety) – rather, it would be a philosophy in which the making of a world of images, and the formation of images that tend to make up a world, would presuppose an implicit understanding of the relation between images and matter as well as of those between image and thought.[29]

But why Bergson? There are two motives: one concerned explicitly to take Bergson's reflection beyond his condemnation of cinema.[30] The second, not stressed by Deleuze, is a part of cinema history already – a polemic well under way in the 1920s between partisans and opponents of the cinema concerning an alleged 'Bergsonism' in cinema. Was cinema Bergsonian, could it explain time in terms of time (and not movement) and could it

empirically confirm, through the physical experience it produces, Bergson's conception of reality as duration?[31]

Here Deleuze links two ignored issues, both somewhat tendentious and polemical. On the one hand Bergson's famed condemnation of cinema, whose presuppositions Deleuze demonstrates admirably.[32] On the other hand the explicit aim of the pioneering cineastes to capture the *essence* or *spirit* of cinema, against the temptation to subordinate it to other models of the image, for example the static image of painting or photography. This bias, evident among French theoreticians in the 1920s, is found in Belá Balazs or Rudolf Arnheim as well.[33] In claiming to resume Bergson's analysis and reverse it, Deleuze recognizes one of the central questions which the *thought of cinema* confronts, and for reasons deeper than the mere contemporaneity of these debates. But how may a form of representation concur with a philosophical thesis? It is here that the thought of these auteurs clarifies not only the cinema they made and dreamed of, but also reminds us of the multiplicities contained within the Idea of cinema. Thus the strategic importance to Deleuze of Epstein – not only a notable director of the French school to which Deleuze devotes some brilliant pages, but also as a penetrating thinker in his own right, whose writings are very often cited in Deleuze's notes independently of his filmic work.

In defining the cinema as 'the first instrument to make us see differences in time, no longer transposed in spatial terms, but represented as values of this time itself',[34] Epstein does not only signal the affinity between his preoccupations and Bergson's. He also invites consideration of a new technique for reclaiming the real, an instrument of knowledge and reflection which requires a certain type of narration, proposes a certain view on the real, and at the same time, makes of some images the central stakes of all film. And in reading Bergson or Epstein today one cannot but be struck by the breadth of ambition they give to film, as a didactic project, a cognitive aim and a speculative point of view.

A didactic project: leading the spectator to accept the cinema on its own terms, so that the thought of these cineastes about film is inseparable from their critique of inauthentic imagery, or false conceptions of the image: a veritable pedagogy of the eye, learning how to 'see otherwise'.

Cognitive aim: this 'inhuman eye', the camera, must help us see differently. To discover what we do not see, to exhibit the living image of reality – social or natural, possible or virtual. Thus the film image cannot be just revelatory but must also be an authentic medium of communication (see, for example, the remarks of Balazs on the 'face of class' revealed by the camera, or the analyses of the Berlin New Objectivity School).

Speculative point of view: the world presented in terms of film gives us an image of our world. Other images are possible, other images are conceivable, and Epstein devotes some amusing arguments to this traditional question of metaphysics, suggesting that our natural perception is itself only the effect of habit, the effect of being accustomed to a certain duration, a certain speed. Acceleration and deceleration become the manifest signs of a relativism ordinarily unnoticed.

On the face of it, we would seem far from questions of cinema, or from a definition of cinema. Perhaps this is the benefit of Bergson's thinking on the image, that it can enhance such thought, or that a 'cinema of philosophy' becomes possible. The first theoreticians of cinema, notably those of the French school, sought to reach what Bergson's tirade against the cinema had revealed to them as the aim of all film representation – the invention of images answerable to the demands of thought, *thought-images*, making cinema not simply the mechanical reproduction of the real, but an investigative apparatus bringing to light a new dimension of the real, hitherto unperceived – an instrument of analysis offering to thought the data for new operations of the intellect.

Even when they do not perceive the cinema as Bergsonian, the thinking of many of these authors is thoroughly impregnated with the philosophy of Bergson. Thus duration, thought of as the substrate of reality and the condition of possibility for time itself: 'this discovery of temporal perspective is the same thing as the comparison, now possible, of different speeds in the succession of events, an experience the cinema elicits and opposes to the average human time. ... In a universe with a unique speed, time would disappear. If we have a notion of time, however confused, it is because, on the one hand, some elements of our universe move at different speeds and, on the other, the relationship between these speeds remains constant, as do the main speeds of reference, the speed of light and that of the earth.'[35] Or yet again, the affirmation of the true importance of filmic representation, 'the universe which we see on the screen shows us duration-volumes in a permanent synthesis of space and time. Cinema presents space-time to us as obvious. ... The screen describes a partial world, endowed with its particular interior time, *which not only differs from ours but can also vary in itself*: accelerated or slowed-down either uniformly or variably. It is clear that it would be illusory to try to find any simultaneity between the events of these worlds and those of ours.'[36]

If this characterization as 'Bergsonist' can be extended to all of the cinema and serve as an heuristic for reading its own history, is it not because what is at stake in Bergsonism is shared by film, since, by its mere mode of existence, it rests on a postulate similar to that beginning *Matter and Memory*? What is the postulate for this thinking of cinema? Nothing less than the world

become image, the world revealed by this image and with which it becomes conflated, to which it can be reduced. But this is precisely the first postulate of *Matter and Memory*: the world considered as the entirety of matter coincides with the totality of images.

The same goes for the film image: it is merely an image of the world. But this image is the world not only *for us*, but for itself, in the same way as reality forms a world. The film image constructs itself out of the means which make of it a world. The being of the image does not oppose itself to some more objective existence, which would be capable of guaranteeing the truth and definition of its object by opposition to the manifest appearance of the image. With film representation, the world is only an image, or, if you prefer, an organized ensemble of mobile images. Differing from photography or painting, which present themselves either as *duplicate* or as *invention*, cinema is the adequation of what is shown to what shows itself. On the screen is unveiled a world in every respect comparable to that we know and which is given along similar determinations. 'The cinema is an experimental device which constructs, i.e. which thinks, an image of the universe. But it is only an idea, and an artificial one, which only contains an ideological or artificial existence, a sort of deceit. However this deceit is very close to the process through which the human mind itself generally constructs its ideal reality.'[37]

It is difficult thus not to see in certain considerations of Epstein the pressure of Bergsonian ideas concerning the relation of categories of thought with reality; inasmuch as they are determined by our means of apprehension of reality: 'thus film introduces us through visual experience, through simple evidence, to a very general relativity. . . . The cinema alone has this ability to play quite freely with a multiplicity of perspectives along the four dimensions of space and time.'[38] What is astonishing is that this henceforward becomes apparent through the intermediary of film. But for this the film image must be so constructed that it becomes a veritable analytical tool, simultaneously the object of a discourse which determines its true nature (in opposition to misunderstandings of the cinema evident when it is assimilated to other forms of images), and the means through which this same discourse gains its sense and effectiveness. Since it offers to thought the *direct* representation of what beforehand was little more than a hypothesis, the film image offers the example of thought coming as it were *into view*. The technical dreams of Epstein aimed to demonstrate what the instrument could explore – not only variable movements, but the variability of movement. Acceleration and slowing down, as well as the inversion of movement, are the simple technical possibilities written into the heart of the machine. But they mock the privileged instrument for an operation which is, before all, theoretically aware 'acceleration and slowing down demonstrate through visual

evidence, that time has no absolute value, that it is a scale of variable dimensions. *This demonstration is extremely convincing since, on the one hand, it directly speaks to sight and, on the other, it produces variations in duration itself.*'[39] Epstein develops these hypotheses to underline the dependence of our categories of thought on a certain constancy of forms and appearance which only naivety, the powers of habit and a utilitarian instinct (three eminently Bergsonian notions) lead us to hypostasize. But he also wants to stress the inhuman character of the camera, the articulation of machine and thought. One understands then that the interest Deleuze had in the 'spiritual auto-maton' of Spinoza[40] would find an echo in this thought of the cinema. It is the same interest in the inhuman aspect of thought Bergson attributes to philosophy: 'Bergson is not one of those philosophers who ascribes a properly human wisdom and equilibrium to philosophy. To open us up to the inhuman and the superhuman (*durations* which are inferior or superior to our own), to go beyond the human condition: this is the meaning of philosophy ... .'[41]

The reasons for a meeting between this philosophy and the thinking of the cinema are now clearer: the affirmation of the narrow link between a constant speed of flow, the permanence of a form and the conception of the idea as stable and fixed. But there is also an interest in that point where thought hurls itself against whatever impels it to think. No surprise then if 'the inhuman eye' of the camera, or of 'machine intelligence' prepares us for a reflection on thought itself: 'from the viewpoint of the fixist orthodoxy, of a faith in the absolute, cinematic representation suffers from major instability and lack of finitude. ... What is for the classical order a defect is the price one has to pay to approach a reality which remains firm when looked at from afar but dissolves in ever looser probabilities as one gets closer. ... The object, which is the supreme postulate, is surrounded by a hypothetical zone which thought can only penetrate by progressively assuming hypothetical characters, by renouncing its caricatural claims, by claiming less and less certainty, by accepting its own value a purely problematic.'[42] In knitting together inside the same language theses of dogmatic inspiration (in the Kantian sense) and remarks which appear to have been thought about by Kant as well (for example, characterizing the object as a postulate) Epstein demonstrates preoccupations close to Bergson and underlines the link between our categories and the degrees of proximity to things. Thus texts that might appear in Epstein can be found in Bergson: *'Instability and immutability* only are abstract views, taken from outside, upon the continuity of real change. These abstractions are then hypostatised by the mind into multiple STATES on the one hand, and THING or substance on the other.'[43]

THE FRAMEWORKS OF THE BERGSONIAN UNDERSTANDING OF IMAGERY

Thus the dialogue between the reflection on an art form in search of its own legitimacy and a thought which indeed owes it nothing. This thought had precisely sought to unravel the conditions under which any spiritual dimension of the image was conceivable: in the terms of the time, the image could not be understood truly except as depth, and as opening. The image only deployed effectively all its richness and complexity when its habitual framework, conceived as a function of represented space, enters a much more essential relation to time, where the spiritual aspect of the image is verified. *Contemplation*, in the sense Bergson gives it, manifests it clearly: he sees in it the standpoint of a self occupied with itself alone, who thus takes of the universe a *view* which is the widest possible, because it is the deepest.[44] What did Bergsonism bring those who wished to think about the cinema? A new understanding of the image, escaping the impasse of classicism (which saw the image as an inferior representation of the concept or idea) and also the limits of the model imported from natural perception. The lecture of 1911 entitled 'The Perception of Change' greatly illuminates the deep affinity of Bergsonian thought with the movement-image and with the possibility of a time-image. Instead of substituting the concept for the percept – the tactic of a philosophical tradition he rejects – Bergson proposes a contrary movement, a matter of 'immersing oneself in perception', of 'enlarging vision'. But in order to do so one must invert the means of understanding imagery. Instead of proceeding by philosophical methods, completing a weak perception with some idea, or of substituting for the ensemble of concrete perceptions one privileged perception which could be surreptitiously converted into an abstract idea, it is more a matter of recognizing heterogeneity, of not damaging the qualitative dimension of reality in retaining from it only the pure quantum. The Bergsonian thesis is in this sense radically opposed to that of the Classics: there is more reality in the image than in the idea and it is the artists who demonstrate this, those whose 'function is to see what *we naturally would not perceive*'.[45]

In opposing two modes of 'a more complete perception of reality', Bergson distinguishes two forms of attention. The first, that of the philosophers, encourages us to flee from practical reality, but in opposing to natural perception an attention directed towards something else they neglect the quality of attention in itself. The error of philosophers is to have thought that educating attention was impossible: 'they have not considered that attention should continue attending to what it attends, not that it should turn towards something else'.[46] Thus there are two directions in attention:

the one that looks towards Ideas, and the artists' direction, *seeing differently*. Bergson's reference to art allows him to bring in a qualitative approach to the image, which can seize pure heterogeneity because it is a mode of giving reality which is adequate to qualitative aspects. It is then that one finds for the first time in Bergson a non-depreciatory reference to the cinema: 'for however little the object or the eye has moved, there has been not one but a hundred or a thousand images, as much and more than on the "film" of cinematography'.[47] Finally then, credited with a qualitative dimension capable of grasping the real, the cinema is shown to be alien to the shrinkage of perception common to practical life and philosophy. It can display the mode of attention proper to artists, it is no longer reducible to the mechanism identified by the term 'cinematic illusion'. A true family of the image becomes thinkable, no longer content to repeat a single concept, as Sartre did in *L'imaginaire*.[48] One then understands how, by comparing his work to a 'natural history' of images, Deleuze credited Bergson with being the only one to have conceived in depth a family of the image.[49]

The intrinsic mobility of the filmic image thus jeopardizes the classical understanding of the image, breaking with its presuppositions. If the fixity of the image implies that it is given in an instant, entirely constituted within the immobility of the plane in which it is given, it could neither contain other images, nor engender new ones. The novelty of the filmic image obliges us to renounce this idea. What is at stake in Deleuze's 'second commentary' on Bergson, is showing that the movement-image is thinkable in terms of power, of the elevation to a particular power. In becoming a movement-image, the image passes to a higher dimension – hence the double relation which the film shot has with its parts and with the whole which it constitutes.[50] In the same way, the diverse varieties of the move-ment-image each explore a power of the image and the exhaustion of the power which causes it to move to a higher level. By this action, taking the reader from one kind of image to another, the passage of the movement-image to the time-image gives the clearest idea that change in the image is not simply due to a technical change (in projection speed or in the movable nature of the shot, etc.) but to a complete reordering of thought about the image.

What is at stake in the question of depth is to lead us towards thinking about the image from the point of view of this dimension and not – fol-lowing the usual logic – towards constituting it from the usual mixture of height, length and width. But this only has meaning through a radicaliza-tion of the liminal thesis of *Matter and Memory* on the equation of matter and image: 'Matter is an ensemble of "images", and by "image" here we understand a certain existence which is more than the idealist's "repre-

sentation", but less than the realist's "thing": an existence mid-way between "thing" and "representation". This conception of matter is simply that of common sense.'[51] The force of Bergson's claim is in the adoption of a point of view radically ignorant of all philosophical subtleties. And Deleuze takes this point completely, as when he observes that 'we find ourselves in fact faced with the exposition of a world where IMAGE = MOVEMENT'.[52]

Depth as a philosophical question, not simply an artistic one: thus we understand Deleuze's frequent references to the late Merleau-Ponty of *Eye and Mind* and *The Visible and the Invisible*. Deleuze praises Merleau-Ponty for stressing the primacy of depth, for viewing it as an original dimension,[53] but only to draw a yet more radical conclusion: that the image is only *alive* when it is from the outset a time-image, even if it takes time for it to appear as such. But this is also to understand why the time-image, even though last in the order of a typology of images, brusquely inverts these perspectives by revealing its own aetiology, as a permanent *temptation* for the cinema since its inception.

What has happened then? From one angle, 'the movement-image has not disappeared, but now exists only as the first dimension of an image that never stops growing in dimensions'.[54] The time-image only exists beyond the movement-image because it requires the former fully to develop its virtualities, realized then to the point of exhaustion, to make appear that which demands only time. But then we must face the consequence: that it is not so much the time-image that is placed "beyond" the movement-image as it is the latter which holds its power in reserve. If it is only at the end of the analysis that the time-image can be discerned, it is not only because it has had to let pass all that the image once contained, it was also a matter of reaching the point of view of depth itself. 'In this freeing of depth which now subordinates all other dimensions we should see not only the conquest of a continuum but the temporal nature of this continuum: it is a continuity of duration which means that the unbridled depth is of time and no longer of space. It is irreducible to the dimensions of space. As long as depth remained caught in the simple succession of parallel planes, it already represented time, but in an indirect way which kept it subordinate to space and movement. The new depth, in contrast, directly forms a region of time, a region of past .... '[55]

It is in this sense that depth, no longer conceived as extent or extension, can be identified with Opening. It is wrongly conceived as a third dimension, since it is primary, and from it the others derive and particularize – this idea was already one of the key motifs of the critique of representation in *Difference and Repetition*. What then does depth – understood as extensive quantity – lack? All the individuations of extension (height, depth, etc.) can

only take place after the creation of extension; this being so, one can lose sight of how they issue from an even deeper source, 'depth itself, which is not an extension but a pure *implex*',[56] and at the same time as one is deceived as to the proper nature of depth (it is intensive) one is deceived as to the form to which it must be related. Depth and thickness are only in space to the extent that they belong also to time. And time is only inscribed upon them to the extent that they issue from it. The mistake, finally, lies in reducing the presentation of time to its representation, so that 'space and time are not presented as they are represented. ... The presentation of the whole grounds the possibility of the parts .... It is empirical intuition which is extensive'.[57]

We know then that Bergson provided the exact framework needed by the first thinkers of cinema: because if he did miss the point of cinema, he had understood the shot, and freed it from extensive determinations, making of it one of the immediate data of consciousness or of thought. If, paradoxically, Bergson conceived the life of the image according to an essentially pictorial model, Bergsonism still uprooted the classical conception of the image by introducing both body and duration. With an awareness of the body the concept of imagery encountered the idea of a *variable centre of indetermination*. And duration made it possible to grasp how images were distinguishable from each other, and entertained between themselves relationships of difference, so that some could become *privileged images*.[58]

This spiritualizing of the shot had one further advantage – it was now thought of as originally Open, not limited and conditioned by the closure of the filmic frame. This is also why it remains to think of the filmic shot as an 'open shot'.[59] Now, Bergsonism shared the filmic demand for a non-centred perception, and for a cut thought of as a mobile section.[60]

These are the determinations, posed as virtualities within the movement-image, which the time-image liberates. There is a need neither for a centre, subject, body or action: just duration and a principle of Opening. 'The movement-image has not disappeared, but now exists only as the first dimension of an image that never stops growing in dimensions. ... while the movement-image and its sensory-motor signs were in a relationship only with an indirect image *of* time (dependent on montage), the pure optical and sound image, its opsigns and audsigns, are directly connected to a time-image which has subordinated movement. It is this reversal which means that time is no longer the measure of movement but movement is the perspective of time: it constitutes a whole cinema of time ... .'[61] Thus time can be perceived and felt, time usually accessible only by means of what it is not, indirectly. In one sense, we must let many images go so that there appears on screen this *direct revelation* of time.

In order for time to become visible, it is necessary to go beyond story,

illustration, drama; at least, to transcend their primacy. Not that stories, actions, movements may no longer occur – rather, that their subordination to time now stands revealed, at the same time that it becomes apparent where all movement, action, and story are born – out of that pure depth where the intensive produces itself as pure duration and where the *fold* unfolds in the act of opening up, where the implicit becomes explicit. What *The Fold* observed in Leibniz and the baroque, Deleuze's analysis had already explored in terms of the cinema: to explicate is to dis-implicate. All of this play around the fold – and here we should include as well the vast question of the complex – is not unrelated to assiduous readings of Michaux or Foucault. Here too a whole dimension of cinema (including classical cinema – for instance what is designated as 'neo-realism') is revaluated in the wake of these reversed perspectives. A new fold in the history of the cinema, of which the historian has yet to take the full measure, and where perhaps Wenders leads us to Rossellini's *Viaggio in Italia*, where the pathways of Antonioni, Ozu and Visconti intersect. So it is that, by this reversal of perspectives – inversion of perspective with respect to time – the subject of film ceases being conflated with the filmed object (which the spectator had to observe) and instead becomes the gaze upon this object. The camera thus becomes the primary subject, it is this which records and determines the course of the narration in such a way that we are also given to see this vision at work. In the same way, the object and its milieu then acquire autonomous reality and force the story to investigate them, and no longer use them as merely the raw material for anecdote, *decor* or *accessories*.

Now one can see how Deleuze's work on the cinema does not simply prolong Bergsonism by trying to be more Bergsonian than Bergson himself, as some have suggested, but in fact follows numerous analyses taken up long before, without the cinema as their necessary point of reference or condition. The difficulties surrounding an approach of time-image approach are not simply a question of the difficulties attending their recognition or identification, but concern the actual *limit* which they represent. Since if the time-image, understood as a *direct* presentation of time, never ceases to elude analysis until the end of the book, this isn't so much due to its rarity or singularity as to the need to disengage from every false image of time constituted by standard representations of time (flash-backs, memory-images, etc.). This is also why perception knocks up against the limits of what can be perceived and felt, since this image is of an intensive nature.[62] In which matter Deleuzian thought is remarkably constant: 'intensity is simultaneously the imperceptible and that which can only be sensed'.[63] Since depth is too often implied within the perception of extension, one must doubtless let it detach itself. But in the movement from implicit to explicit,

in the raising of the implied to its own proper power, the spectator must for his part confront his own *perplexity* when faced with works which do not so much intend to demonstrate as simply show – and show in such a way that the showing is never made obvious but aims at fusing with the object which they seek to apprehend with the least possible affectation. Thus: singular works, tenuous and fragile, as fleeting as they are difficult, if it is true that in allowing Time to appear by itself, they must face up to Appearing as such.

Translated by Kevin Nolan and Jean Khalfa

Deleuze and Anglo-American Literature: Water, Whales and Melville

Mary Bryden

Literature, for Gilles Deleuze, is not just another epistemological resource, an adjunct discipline to his own. Neither is it simply a serviceable exemplifier of his thinking, for this would be to imply that its role is primarily that of representation. Even to talk of its 'role' is to imply that literature is merely a participant in the theatre of something running alongside it, called 'life', or 'experience'. Literature is an ally to Deleuze's thinking, and even a privileged one, since fiction is a zone favourable to the exposure of the illusion of transcendence.

In the Deleuzian perspective, literature begins with intensities of affect. More than that, it need presume no prior set of variables, no 'givens'; it provides ever-renewable resources for the creation of new affects, new diversities of becomings. Thus, literature is not a canon of texts, an object of study, and Deleuze is not a literary critic. He is a reader, and, moreover, the kind of reader who will allow texts to spiral outwards, to accelerate or proliferate. As he told students in one of his seminars at Vincennes: 'You must trust the author you are studying. Grope your way through.'[1]

This is not to say that Deleuze is an undiscriminating reader. He is a highly selective one. For, while literature may favour the passage of becomings, it may also resist them. Works of literature may be formulaic, mired in allegory, anchored in predetermined expectations of outcome. Deleuze's literary attentiveness rests where it will; we should not look to him for close readings, accumulations of textual evidence to support his macro-textual perceptions. Deleuze is, nonetheless, a careful reader. He is, above all, highly attuned to intensities. To read his analysis alongside a selected literary text is almost invariably to discover that a more detailed reading confirms rather than subverts the flows or tendencies which Deleuze has already observed.

The Anglo-American novel, for Deleuze and Guattari, incarnates a radically different dynamic from that which they discern in the French literary tradition. In *TP*, they write:

> The French novel ... can only conceive of organized voyages .... It spends its time taking stock, plotting points, instead of drawing lines, active lines of flight or of positive deterritorialization. The Anglo-American novel is totally different. ... From Hardy to Lawrence, from Melville to Miller, the same cry rings out: Go across, break out, break-through, make a beeline, don't get stuck on a point.[2]

This is the recurrent Deleuzian rallying cry: keep deterritorialized, plump for the potential, tilt towards becoming.

In his *Dialogues* with Claire Parnet, Deleuze makes this theme even more explicit. He states: 'Anglo-American literature constantly shows these ruptures, these characters who create their line of flight, who create through a line of flight. Thomas Hardy, Melville, Stevenson, Virginia Woolf, Thomas Wolfe, Lawrence, Fitzgerald, Miller, Kerouac. In them everything is departure, becoming, passage, leap, daemon, relationship with the outside.'[3] In counter-current to a French literary tradition which he deems wedded to epochal awareness, continuity, hierarchy, Deleuze looks to Anglo-American literature for a geographical rather than a historicist outreach: 'American literature operates according to geographical lines .... The becoming is geographical' (*D*, p. 48).

This geographical process of becoming is characterized not by operations of seismic realignment or of transubstantiation, but by waves, flows and slippages. Appropriately in this context of fluidity, Deleuze and Guattari often single out from Herman Melville's corpus of writing *Moby Dick*, the novel which D. H. Lawrence described as 'the greatest book of the sea ever written'.[4] '*Moby Dick*', they write, 'in its entirety is one of the greatest masterpieces of becoming; Captain Ahab has an irresistible becoming-whale' (*TP*, p. 243). Given the frequent inclusion of Melville among the gallery of Anglo-American writers cited by Deleuze and Guattari, and given their fascination with *Moby Dick* in particular as a paradigm of becoming, this essay will echo that focus, tracing the alleged passage of becoming, and examining the role of water as an agent in that process.

When Deleuze and Guattari speak of the becoming-whale which Melville provides in *Moby Dick*, they do not mean that Captain Ahab develops certain similarities with whales; rather, they mean that, because of his obsession with one particular whale, Moby Dick, Ahab's energies flow towards that being-state, by a process of *glissement*. Moreover, this is presented not as a

whim, a kind of 'option for whaleness', but as an irresistible impulsion, an overwhelming and even demonic manner of becoming.

When the text is examined, there are indeed many details of the narrative which insert themselves persuasively into this activity. Ahab, for instance, is already lacking part of his original corporeal identity. His leg has passed into the whale Moby Dick, who has amputated and digested it. However, at the end of his stump, Ahab has an artificial leg made from the polished jawbone of a sperm whale,[5] the same species as Moby Dick. Ironically, then, the extension of Ahab's body, its means of predatory propulsion, is supplied by that part of the whale – the jaw – which originally removed it. Thus, each party in this grisly exchange – Ahab and the whale – has donated a crucial part of its skeleton to the other. Ahab is already coterminous with the whale, even before the narrative begins.

As the narrative progresses, Ahab's becoming-whale grows in intensity. Indeed, Chapter 41 spells out how the living body of the White Whale draws towards and into itself the desiring machine, whole and entire, of Captain Ahab: 'Ahab had cherished a wild vindictiveness against the whale, all the more fell for that in his frantic morbidness he at last came to identify with him, not only all his bodily woes, but all his intellectual and spiritual exasperations' (*MD*, p. 185).

What, then, is the role of water in this process? It would be impossible to conceive of the novel *Moby Dick* without the presence of the ocean. Yet, although Melville writes in great detail about whales (varieties of, uses of, behaviour of), about harpoons, whalers and whaling, he writes comparatively little about water. The sea is, however, the fluid medium, the agency, the culture upon and within which all these interactions take place. Moreover, it enables and hastens the process of becoming-whale which Deleuze observes in Ahab.

In the first place, the narrator informs the reader early in the novel that: 'Socially, Ahab was inaccessible' (*MD*, p. 156). Already, then, he is detached from humanity. Though surrounded by people, he is always apart from them. In the Pacific Ocean, in a context where variety in human companionship is in short supply, Ahab declines to board a passing whaler and consort with its captain (*MD*, p. 235). Having emerged from the sea in which he was once dismembered, Ahab spends long hours isolated and gazing at the sea. Being inaccessible to society, he is more accessible for other being-states.

A linkage may be made here with Deleuze and Guattari's remarks on faciality: the face as a centre of codification.[6] In what they term despotic regimes, the full face radiates outwards, confident of its universal semiotic power. The example they give of this is Byzantine representations of Christ,

in which the face and eyes of Christ, intact in their own subjectivity, impose themselves on the viewer. In what they call the passional or subjective mode, on the other hand, the despotic face is averted and its power is displaced, though its signifying power remains as an abstract force. Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari associate the fixed, grounded face with the terrestrial, and the averted, more mobile face with the maritime.

At the outset of the journey, Ahab's rule imposes itself on the crew, but largely obliquely, despite his own visual cancellation: 'Their supreme lord and dictator was there, though hitherto unseen by any eyes not permitted to penetrate into the now sacred retreat of the cabin' (*MD*, p. 128). When he does appear on the quarterdeck, he assumes the demeanour of a Christ-figure, submerged and yet absorbed by his own Passion: 'Captain Ahab stood erect, looking straight out beyond the ship's ever-pitching prow. ... Moody stricken Ahab stood before them with a crucifixion in his face; in all the nameless regal overbearing dignity of some mighty woe' (*MD*, p. 130). Even towards the end of the quest for Moby Dick, when Ahab appears hardly to leave the deck, the eyes of the crew are drawn towards this figure who dominates them even while inhabiting some space beyond them: 'Like machines, they dumbly moved about the deck, ever conscious that the old man's despot eye was on them' (*MD*, p. 500). Yet, 'they could never tell unerringly whether, for all this, his eyes were really closed at times: or whether he was still intently scanning them' (*MD*, p. 501).

In gazing out to sea, Ahab resembles Captain Vere, in Melville's short story *Billy Budd*. Standing alone on the quarterdeck, Vere 'would absently gaze off at the blank sea', lost in 'the current of his thoughts'.[7] This alignment of human preoccupations with a 'current', a flow, facilitates the transmigration of identity which Melville's narrative dramatizes. It is memorably described in Chapter 35 of *Moby Dick*, where the narrator describes how a sailor of dreamy disposition may be lulled into listlessness by 'the blending cadence of waves with thoughts, [so] that at last he loses his identity' (*MD*, p. 162). In this reverie, the spirit 'becomes diffused through time and space' (*MD*, p. 163). In this connection, Deleuze and Guattari quote, in *Mille plateaux*, a comparable line from Lawrence's novel *Kangaroo* about being 'alone, mindless and memoryless, by the sea' (*TP*, p. 189). In Melville's hands, the sea may even be an imagined one. Thus, when the eponymous Bartleby, in the short story often cited by Deleuze, enters a mode of continuous, rather than intermittent, gazing outwards, the narrator describes him as 'a bit of wreck in the mid Atlantic'.[8]

Ahab sees the ocean not as an element of primeval beauty, but as both a constant reminder of the whale kingdom concealed within it, and as a means of propulsion towards a single and unforgettable member of that kingdom.

So, in Chapter 37, he declares himself immune to the tranquillity of sunset, when 'the warm waves blush like wine' (*MD*, p. 170). Instead, from his sternward cabin, he broods over the ship's wake, and dreams of racing, whale-like, 'under torrents' beds', fuelled by his drive for revenge. By contrast, Starbuck in the following chapter gazes forward on the bow side, free of Ahab's ballast and yet fearful of it: 'Foremost through the sparkling sea shoots on the gay, embattled, bantering bow, but only to drag dark Ahab after it, where he broods within his sternward cabin, builded over the dead water of the wake' (*MD*, p. 172). For Ahab, the wake is not 'water under the bridge', matters floating into oblivion. It is precisely his obsession with those past waters which constantly propels him into new waters.

In Deleuzian terms, the temporal modes of Starbuck and Ahab are radically differentiated. Starbuck, here and elsewhere, operates within *Chronos*, a measured and actualized time which has the power to determine and situate things and persons. Ahab, on the other hand, may be seen to be in the mode designated *Aeon*, the time which Deleuze and Guattari define as 'the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that knows only speeds and continually divides that which happens into an already-there that is at the same time not-yet-here, a simultaneously too late and too early, as something that is both going to happen and has just happened' (*TP*, p. 262). As Paul Brodtkorb observes: 'Ahab has made his future determine his present, even as he has made his past ... determine his future. Because it is his kind of past that always comes to meet him from his future, he has always lived ahead of himself, *having* no other present but the empty one his future gives him.'[9] At the outset of the novel, Ahab is seen to have been driven, or to have driven himself, into a *reactive* life, one that is fuelled by *ressentiment*, at least as far as his attitude to his own dismembered body is concerned. His wound is stigmatic; though part of his body, it is not a property but an attribute; it has an exterior life; it festers continuously because Ahab is caught up in a mode of anamnesis, in a cyclical recall and reprojection of his bodily trauma. All his energies are directed towards constant but useless remedial missions to unlive the past by pre-living the future. This reactive mode contrasts forcefully with the active life, cited by Deleuze in *The Logic of Sense*, of the poet Joë Bousquet. Having received a bullet in the spinal cord during World War I, Bousquet spent the remaining decades of his life bedridden and in pain. Yet, unlike Ahab, whose wound is an incubus, an oppression, Bousquet stated: 'My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it.'[10]

As the months pass and his long reveries increasingly consume him, Ahab will transcend the particularities of that *ressentiment* and cede to the process of becoming-whale which Deleuze discerns. While he travels the waters, Ahab presumes upon their continuity. He knows that, as long as the water lasts,

his quarry will be theoretically available to him. Theoretical also will be Ahab's calculation of Moby Dick's whereabouts, since, as the narrator asserts, 'Ahab . . . knew the sets of all tides and currents' (*MD*, p. 198), and therefore feels himself equipped to map out the migration of the sperm whale's feeding-grounds. Yet the water, though mapped, still evades and occludes. Ishmael says of the Pacific Ocean in Chapter 111 that its 'gently awful stirrings seem to speak of some hidden soul beneath' (*MD*, p. 456). As the *Pequod* approaches Java, the finger of morning sun across the water seems to be 'enjoining some secrecy', and 'the slippered waves whispered together as they softly ran on' (*MD*, p. 271). The suspicious Ahab, his whole being straining towards that of Moby Dick, is by now 'prepared to connect the ideas of mildness and repose with the first sight of the particular whale he pursued' (*MD*, p. 272). Yet his expectations are again overturned when the sea reveals not a white whale but a creamy giant squid, a creature of rumour and legend upon which Moby Dick may or may not feed, for 'the spermaceti whale obtains his whole food in unknown zones below the surface' (*MD*, p. 272).

As he travels on, Ahab begins to take on more and more the features of the cetaceous and the aquatic. In describing the joint preoccupation which links man and whale in the narrative, Deleuze writes in *Bartleby; or, the Formula* of 'the furrows that twist from Ahab's brow to that of the Whale'.[11] Once again, as with the whalebone pegleg, the human body and the whale body are seen as conjoining. But these twisting lines to which Deleuze refers extend not only to the whale, but to its orientation, its vicinity. They are 'lignes de fuite' in the original architectural sense; they run along parallel lines as far as the point, still invisible on the horizon, where they will converge upon Moby Dick. Their rhizomatic outreach extends from Ahab's frowning forehead as he pores over his maps, to that virtual space in which he will be proximate to Moby Dick. The link is memorably made in Chapter 44: 'It almost seemed that while he himself was marking out lines and courses on the wrinkled charts, some invisible pencil was also tracing lines and courses upon the deeply marked chart of his forehead' (*MD*, p. 198). The brow of both of these aged combatants – Ahab and Moby Dick – is stark in its lividness. When Moby Dick strikes the starboard bow of the ship, he does so not with his tail but with 'the solid white buttress of his forehead' (*MD*, p. 534). Ahab's forehead can appear equally albescent and threatening. In Chapter 29, Stubb, the second mate, ruminates after unexpectedly meeting the captain: 'I was so taken all aback with his brow, somehow. It flashed like a bleached bone' (*MD*, p. 134).

In Chapter 44, the narrator informs the reader (*MD*, p. 199) that sperm whales are commonly described as swimming in what are described as 'veins'

in the oceanic body. These are given ocean-lines between feeding-grounds, followed with uncanny exactitude by whales. But, if attributes of the human circulatory system are here assigned to the ocean, the reverse also obtains. Later, Ahab's bulging veins are likened to dangerously full tracts of water: 'The delta of his forehead's veins swelled like overladen brooks' (*MD*, p. 457). Having witnessed the death of a whale, he even voices an apostrophe to the sea, constructing himself as its offspring: 'Born of earth, yet suckled by the sea; though hill and valley mothered me, ye billows are my foster-brothers!' (*MD*, p. 468). In so doing, he also unwittingly aligns himself with the whale, which is itself, like him, a warm-blooded mammal, a borrower rather than an inhabitant of the watery element. Ahab's becoming-ocean and becoming-whale will, however, complete his extinction; not only his leg but, finally, his whole body, will be submerged. His apotheosis is foreshadowed in Chapter 132, when his attempt to plumb the depths beneath him merely imprints his own sinking form upon the water: 'Ahab leaned over the side, and watched how his shadow in the water sank and sank to his gaze, the more and the more that he strove to pierce the profundity' (MD, p. 506).

In tracking Moby Dick – a single entity among the collectivity of whales – Ahab is following not his own star, but his own demon, as described in Chapter 41: 'All the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil, to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically assailable in Moby Dick' (*MD*, pp. 185–6). Deleuze and Guattari assert: 'Captain Ahab has an irresistible becoming-whale, but one that bypasses the pack or the school, operating directly through a monstrous alliance with the Unique, the Leviathan, Moby Dick. There is always a pact with a demon' (*TP*, p. 243). Ahab opts for the anomalous, the exceptional individual. Ventriloquizing Ahab, Deleuze writes: 'Moby Dick is neither an individual nor a genus; he is the borderline, and I have to strike him to get at the pack as a whole' (*TP*, p. 245). It is in the element of water, the context of hydroculture, that such movements and transitions are facilitated. In *Mille plateaux*, Deleuze and Guattari make a similar observation with reference to Virginia Woolf's novel *The Waves*: 'Waves are vibrations, shifting borderlines inscribed on the plane of consistency as so many abstractions. The abstract machine of the waves.' (*TP*, p. 252). For Deleuze and Guattari, *The Waves* is the product of a writer 'who made all of her life and work a passage, a becoming, all kinds of becomings between ages, sexes, elements, and kingdoms' (*TP*, p. 308).

For Ahab, part of his identification with the whale results from the fact that he must join the creature in all its wanderings. In becoming whale, he replicates all the whale's watery journeyings, covering vast distances of ocean. In order to describe this affiliation, Deleuze asserts, Melville needs to invent a new language, which he calls 'the OUTLANDISH, or Deterritorialized, the

language of the Whale' (*ECC*, p. 72). In the *Dialogues*, he describes such writing in fluid terms: 'To write has no other function: to be a flux that combines with other fluxes' (*D*, p. 50).

This is a language which retains everything in suspension. In straddling multiple entities, it approximates to punning, which produces flows of double-meanings, shackling together unexpected words or concepts. As Walter Redfern writes, in an article on Melville's *Billy Budd*: 'Puns … facilitate stacked, juxtaposed meanings. … Melville relishes contradictions, complications, infinite regresses more than he does clear lines.'[12] Furthermore, he says, 'Melville succumbs to the lure of digression, yet another way of evading, or of complicating, demarcation lines' (Redfern, p. 362). Melville resists closure, completion, restriction, in harmony with the statement made by Ishmael in Chapter 32: 'God keep me from ever completing anything' (*MD*, p. 149). The formula 'I would prefer not to' in *Bartleby* has a similar role, insofar as, while apparently adopting a determinate frame of reference, it opens up zones of indeterminacy within language and social organization. Deleuze acknowledges this, in *Critique et clinique*, when describing the capacity the phrase accrues in the narrative to 'proliferate on itself, contaminate the others, sending the attorney fleeing. But it will also send language itself into flight, it will open up a zone of *indétermination* or indiscernibility in which neither words nor characters can be distinguished' (*ECC*, p. 76). As Michel Pierssens says in a memorable line which would be aptly applied to Melville: 'Le vrai sens de l'écriture, c'est le voyage qu'elle inachève.'[13]

Of Moby Dick, it can truly be said that the world is his oyster and the journey is infinite. His language and identity are unhinged from any given territory or space. As David Kirby states: 'Moby Dick is a sort of absent presence in the book … . He is always on the next page, in the next chapter.'[14] Even before the whale is first glimpsed, the novel has introduced layers of intersecting information in order to frame the whale, to present an image of him. But, as Deleuze points out: 'in each case something strange happens, something that blurs the image, marks it with an essential uncertainty, keeps the form from "taking," but also undoes the subject' (*ECC*, p. 77). In this formless universe, there are no markers of identity. Deleuze compares the narrative to a patchwork quilt: 'the American patchwork becomes the law of Melville's oeuvre, devoid of a centre, of an upside down or right side up' (*ECC*, p. 77).

Melville saw this apparent formlessness as consequent upon the nature of its cetaceous focus. Given this topic, he thought, the book would inevitably be expansive, uneven, unclassifiable. On 1 May 1850, he wrote to a friend that the effect of the Moby Dick narrative would be to pull 'poetry' out of

'blubber': 'Blubber is blubber you know; tho' you may get oil out of it, the poetry runs as hard as sap from a frozen maple tree; – & to cook the thing up, one must needs throw in a little fancy, which from the nature of the thing, must be ungainly as the gambols of the whales themselves.'[15] Over a year later, with *Moby Dick* completed, Melville writes in another letter of its 'horrible texture', using a metaphor which seems to draw the novel into affiliation with a great transversal oceanic space: 'A Polar wind blows through it, & birds of prey hover over it' (*Correspondence*, p. 206).[16]

Nevertheless, there are movements towards shapes and forms in the novel, and one pervasive image is that of the circle. Ahab pursues Moby Dick along the round surface of the globe. As Starbuck observes in Chapter 38: 'The hated whale has the round watery world to swim in, as the small gold-fish has its glassy globe' (*MD*, p. 172). This rounded image is also evoked by Melville in the Etymology which he provides as prefatory material to the novel. Here, he quotes *Webster's Dictionary* as asserting that the English word 'whale' denotes roundness or rolling (*MD*, p. 9). There is undoubtedly a visual association of whales with roundedness, with the word 'whaleback' denoting a mound which resembles the arched back of a whale.

Moby Dick does indeed lead Ahab on a very circuitous route, rounding many islands and land masses. This is despite Ahab's preference for the beeline over the arc. As John Bryant remarks: 'Ahab has no pliancy and would straighten all lines: his ambition is grooved to iron rails; he is scarred with a straight line from head to toe; he charts the globe with migration lines; he is killed by a line of rope.'[17] In any case, the circle, like Melville's narrative, is never completed. As William Spanos points out: 'The circular movement ends contradictorily in a collision that breaches the circle, discloses the absence at its centre.'[18] In the first phase of the final disaster, the whale wheels around Ahab's boat, in what the narrative describes as 'ever-contracting circles' (*MD*, p. 514), until, on the third day, the concentric circles cause the boat itself to be swallowed up into the vortex. Thus, as Spanos observes, 'at the moment when the temporal circle is expected to close on itself, it dis-integrates' (p. 144).

This is also the moment which coincides with Ahab's final stage of becoming-whale. As Deleuze remarks: 'Ce n'est plus une question de Mimésis, mais de devenir: Achab n'imite pas la baleine, il devient Moby Dick, il passe dans la zone de voisinage où il ne peut plus se distinguer de Moby Dick, et se frappe lui-même en la frappant' (*ECC*, p. 100). Ahab's death becomes him. As for what becomes of Moby Dick, Melville also, like Ishmael, and like Deleuze, refrains from closure and keeps the line moving over the horizon.

Minority, Territory, Music

Ronald Bogue

Deleuze and Guattari remark that in a rhizome as opposed to an arborescence, any point 'can be connected to anything other, and must be' (*TP*, 7; 13). In their own rhizomatic thought, the concepts of *minority* and *territory* in general are not intimately conjoined, yet the two points can be usefully related – and indeed, we are told, they must be. The concept of *minority* engages the conventional idea of a statistically small ethnic or racial group, but extends far beyond that to the broad category of what Deleuze and Guattari call the 'minor', which includes the notions of minor literature, minor culture and the minor usage of language.[1] The concept of *territory*, which Deleuze and Guattari discuss in its narrow ethological sense in *A Thousand Plateaus*, is inseparable from the general notions of territorialization, reterritorialization and deterritorialization, which play through their thought in a wide range of contexts. The path from minority to territory runs from literature to music and suggests some of the ways Deleuze and Guattari connect the two arts. Both literature and music, we shall find, prove to be arts capable of a minor usage, whereby lines of continuous variation and a general chromaticism are engaged in a process of deterritorialization.

I. MINORITY

Kafka

Deleuze and Guattari's first extended treatment of the topic of 'the minor' can be found in their *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (1975). Their discussion has its point of origin in a lengthy diary entry of Kafka's, dated 25 December 1911, in which he reflects on such minor literatures as Czech literature and Jewish literature in Warsaw, noting that the absence of

dominant great writers within these traditions has certain positive consequences. No single genius silences other writers, and as a result the literary community is especially lively, competitive and active. No towering figure serves as an easily emulated model, and hence the untalented are discouraged from writing, and those with talent are able to maintain their mutual independence. When such minor traditions come to construct their literary histories, no great writers arouse multiple and changing interpretations that vary with fluctuations in taste; thus, their histories offer 'an unchangeable, dependable whole that is hardly affected by the taste of the day' (*Diaries*, 193). The end result is that literature in such minor traditions takes on a much more collective function than in major traditions. The contentions of competing schools, journals, cabals and camps become the focus of national concern, the literary and the political become intertwined as literature assumes a central role in the formation of national identity, aesthetic polemics become 'a matter of life and death' (*Diaries*, 194), and literature becomes 'less a concern of literary history than of the people' (*Diaries*, 193). Thus Kafka concludes his 'character sketch of the literature of small peoples' with the following outline: '1. Liveliness: a. Conflict. b. Schools. c. Magazines. 2. Less constraint: a. Absence of principles. b. Minor themes. c. Easy formation of symbols. d. Throwing off of the untalented. 3. Popularity: a. Connection with politics. b. Literary history. c. Faith in literature, can make up their own laws' (*Diaries*, 195).

Deleuze and Guattari identify three basic characteristics of minor literature: 'in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization'; 'everything in [it] is political'; and 'in it everything takes on a collective value' (*K*, 16–17; 29–31). The second and third characteristics clearly echo the features delineated by Kafka in his discussion of minor literature. In a major literature, the personal, familial and conjugal can remain detached from the socio-political sphere, which tends to function as a mere background or environment. In a minor literature, by contrast, 'its cramped space forces each individual intrigue to connect immediately to politics' (*K*, 17). When Kafka identifies as one of the benefits of minor literature 'the dignification of the antithesis between fathers and sons and the possibility of discussing this' (*Diaries*, 192), he is simply stressing the inextricability of the personal and the political in such traditions. In this political treatment of the familial, relations take on a collective significance and immediately extend to other spheres – the 'commercial, economic, bureaucratic, juridical' (*K*, 17). The 'collective value' of minor literature is closely related to its immediately political nature, but what Deleuze and Guattari emphasize in this third characteristic is not simply the interpenetration of social and personal relations, but also the possibility of a collective enunciation of a group solidarity

and a 'revolutionary machine-to-come' (*K*, 18). As Kafka points out, in minor traditions literature can bring about 'the coherence of national consciousness', which otherwise is 'often unrealised in public life and always tending to disintegrate' (*Diaries*, 191). The marginal situation of minor writers allows them 'all the more the possibility to express another possible community and to forge the means for another consciousness and another sensibility' (*K*, 17). And in the absence of great stylists whose individualized, personalized voices serve as models of emulation in major literatures, minor writers tend to articulate 'collective assemblages of enunciation' (*K*, 18) that belong to no individual subject.

It might seem that Deleuze and Guattari are simply elaborating on Kafka's empirical observations of the features of literary traditions devoid of great writers, but what they argue is that minor literature is less a matter of specific cultural communities than of a general *usage* of language, a minor usage that can be found in any social group and in any language. Herein lies the importance of the first characteristic of minor literature – that 'in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization' – and it is in Kafka's minor usage of German that Deleuze and Guattari find an exemplary instance of minor literature's deterritorialization of language. At the turn of the century, many Prague Jews felt distanced from their peasant roots and uncomfortable with the Czech language (Kafka being an exception among his contemporaries in the latter respect). Yet the German they spoke was a 'paper language', artificial and formal, as well as being the language of an oppressive minority, itself removed from its native cultural milieu. The Prague dialect, influenced by Czech, was in many regards an impoverished German, characterized by 'the incorrect use of prepositions; the abuse of the pronominal; the employment of malleable verbs (such as *geben*, which is used for the series "put, sit, place, take away" and which thereby becomes intensive); the multiplication and succession of adverbs; the use of pain-filled connotations; the importance of the accent as a tension internal to the word; and the distribution of consonants and vowels as part of an internal discordance' (*K*, 23).[2] Prague German, then, displayed 'a high coefficient of deterritorialization' in that it was at once detached from its native context and rendered artificial through its heavy bureaucratic associations, and at the same time destabilized by the way it was used – through ungrammatical constructions, words with multiple and shifting non-standard meanings, accents and gestures that lend an elusive aura of affective intensity to the language, etc. Prague Jews found themselves foreigners in their own tongue, and they responded in one of two ways. Some chose 'to artificially enrich this German, to swell it up through all the resources of symbolism, of oneirism, of esoteric sense, of a hidden signifier' (*K*, 19). Kafka, by contrast, sought to

impoverish Prague German further, to destabilize it and imbue it with affective intensity through an ascetic limitation of vocabulary, an avoidance of metaphor, symbols, and esoteric allusions, and a distribution of accents and rhythms that render the language both unsettlingly irregular and fastidiously obsessive.[3] Kafka's response, in short, was to take advantage of the tendencies already present in the minor usage of German by Prague Jews, and to manipulate, develop, modify and exaggerate those tendencies in his own minor usage of the language.[4]

Language

In the fourth section of *A Thousand Plateaus*, 'November 20, 1923: Postulates of Linguistics', Deleuze and Guattari outline a general theory of language that helps clarify the notion of a minor usage of language. The primary function of language, they argue, is not to communicate information but to impose power relations. To learn a language is to learn a host of categories, classifications, binary oppositions, associations, codes, concepts, logical relations, etc. whereby the world is given a certain coherence and organization. Far from being neutral, the order imposed by a language is part of a complex network of practices, institutions, goods, tools, and materials imbued with relations of force. Following the line of analysis developed by speech-act theorists, Deleuze and Guattari insist that language is a mode of action, a way of doing things, and the condition of possibility of any language is the complex network of practices and material elements that shape a given world. This complex network is made up of what Deleuze and Guattari call 'assemblages' (*agencements*), heterogeneous collections of actions and entities that somehow function together.[5] These may be divided into two broad categories that function as a level of content and a level of expression, the first consisting of non-discursive *machinic assemblages* of bodies, 'of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another', the second of discursive *collective assemblages of enunciation*, 'of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies' (*TP*, 88). Machinic assemblages are the various patterns of practices and elements through which a world's bodies are formed, and collective assemblages of enunciation are the patterns of actions, institutions and entities that make possible linguistic statements. Collective assemblages of enunciation induce 'incorporeal transformations' of bodies in that they transform elements and configurations of the world through speech acts.[6] When the minister says, 'I thee wed', or the judge says, 'I pronounce you guilty', a transformation takes place, a body is changed from bride to wife, from defendant to felon.

Although collective assemblages of enunciation and machinic assemblages are related to one another as expression to content, they are not to be understood in terms of the Saussurean categories of signifier and signified. The two types of assemblages are independent and heterogeneous: 'One can never assign the form of expression the function of simply representing, describing, or averring a corresponding content. ... In expressing the non-corporeal attribute, and by that token attributing it to the body, one is not representing or referring but *intervening* in a way; it is a speech act' (*TP*, 86).

Collective assemblages of enunciation intervene in machinic assemblages, and that which puts the two forms of assemblages in relation to one another in any given instance Deleuze and Guattari call an 'abstract machine', which consists of unformed matter and non-formalized functions that are virtual without being actual, yet are immanent within the real. One means of approaching this difficult concept is by situating it within a linguistic context, and for our purposes a specific example may suffice – that of the phrase 'I swear!', a statement with varying significance in Kafka's work. Consider first the phonemic aspect of this statement. The word 'swear' may be pronounced with diverse accents and intonations, and its acoustic attributes will differ with the physiological characteristics of each speaker. Conventionally, the phoneme is thought of as a mental constant determined by its differential relations with other phonemes. Different pronunciations of the same phoneme are merely insignificant variations of a single constant; only differences that impose meaningful distinctions are pertinent, such as those that transform 'swear' into 'sweat' or 'sway'. Deleuze and Guattari argue, however, that the constant derives from the variations, not the reverse. The multiple, heterogeneous pronunciations of the word 'swear' are so many actualizations of an immanent 'line of continuous variation' that passes through all potential pronunciations of the word. This line of continuous variation is a continuum of sonic possibilities that is real but not actual; it is virtual, and each pronunciation of a given phoneme may be thought of as a concrete actualization of a specific point along the continuum. This virtual line of continuous variation is a component of an abstract machine.

All elements of language must likewise be regarded as determined by immanent lines of continuous variation. Thus, the grammatical and syntactical rules that are conventionally viewed as the generative causes of a well-formed statement such as 'I swear!' must instead be seen as derivative effects of grammatical/syntactical lines of continuous variation, in this instance a continuum of forms that might include 'I swear', 'I do swear', 'So do I swear', 'Swear I', 'I do so swear, do I'. But most important, the semantic dimension of language must also be understood in terms of lines of con-

tinuous variation. The statement 'I swear!' has a different meaning when pronounced by a son before his father (as in Kafka's *The Judgment*), by a reluctant fiancé before a 'family tribunal' (as in Kafka's letter describing his meeting with disappointed relatives over his indefinitely postponed marriage), or by a defendant before a judge (as in *The Trial*). Conventionally, a single denotative core of meaning is thought to inform various utilizations of a given semantic unit, its diverse contextualizations being simply contingent variations on a basic stable sense. Deleuze and Guattari counter that each enunciation of 'I swear!' is an actualization of a line of continuous variation immanent within the real, 'a continuum of "I swear!" with the corresponding transformations' (*TP*, 94). This semantic continuum is inseparable from a wide range of practices, institutions and entities that make up the contents of the diverse, contextually embedded speech acts distributed along that continuum. Not only is each performance of "I swear!" an actualization of phonemic, grammatical, syntactical and semantic lines of continuous variation, but it is also an action within a situation, a means of intervening in bodies and inducing incorporeal transformations in them. Each 'I swear!' presupposes patterns of actions and elements that comprise a collective assemblage of enunciation as well as networks of practices and entities that constitute non-discursive machinic assemblages. And the lines of continuous variation that play through these assemblages function together as an abstract machine.

One can see then that the common notions of grammatical rules, correct pronunciations, syntactical regularities, proper meanings, standard usage, etc. are not the essential constituents of language, but the secondary effects of power. The lines of continuous variation within a given social field can be used in two basic ways. They can be constricted, regulated, organized, controlled and disciplined, or they can be set in oscillation, intensified, amplified and ramified. The inculcation of a standard, correct, proper language instils a thorough coding of the world according to a dominant order. It also entails a stabilization of inherently unstable elements and a valorization of elements in terms of a hierarchy of norms and deviations – correct vs. incorrect usage; standard speech vs. dialect, patois, jargon, slang; prestigious vs. unprestigious discourse, etc. A standard language does not exist by itself as a static, self-enclosed, rule-governed system, but it issues from multiple patterns of actions and entities organized in such a way as to restrict variation and regularize relations of force. But lines of variation may be used in other ways as well. The 'impoverished' German of Prague Jews, the Creoles of Caribbean islanders, the Black English of African-Americans are diverse usages of major languages that destabilize linguistic regularities and intensify lines of continuous variation. In a similar fashion, the

experimentations of writers such as Kafka, Beckett, Céline and Gherasim Luca (to name but a few of Deleuze and Guattari's favourite authors) make 'language itself stammer' by placing 'all linguistic, and even non-linguistic, elements in variation, both variables of expression and variables of content' (*TP*, 98). Each of these writers invents a minor usage of language, a way of being 'a foreigner, but in one's own tongue', of being 'bilingual, multi-lingual, but in one and the same language, without even a dialect or patois' (*TP*, 98).

Minorities

We can now see what relation there is between a minor usage of language and the notion of a minority. The opposition of majority and minority is not strictly a matter of numbers but of 'a constant, of expression or content, serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it' (*TP*, 105). The majority is defined by a hierarchical set of values embedded in language. One might say that the dominant standard 'is the average adult-white-heterosexual-European-male-speaking a standard language (Joyce's or Ezra Pound's Ulysses)' (*TP*, 105). The linguistic oppositions of adult/child, white/coloured, heterosexual/homosexual, European/non-European, male/female encode power relations, and the dominant term of each opposition serves as a norm against which deviations are measured. Each norm is a constant, stable and unchanging, and each is reinforced by the system of linguistic constants of a standard language, be they semantic, syntactic, grammatical, lexical, or phonemic (in that 'correct speech' or 'standard usage' is always value-laden). Women may outnumber men, and blacks may outnumber whites, but the majority remains male and white. 'Majority assumes a state of power and domination, not the other way around. It assumes the standard measure, not the other way around' (*TP*, 105). Yet curiously the majority is like Odysseus, who tells the Cyclops he is 'nobody' (*Personne*), whereas the minority is 'everybody' (*tout le monde*). The analytic standard/norm against which deviation is measured is an abstract, unchanging ideal embodied in no individual. No one measures up, everyone falls short to some extent, but most importantly, everybody *changes*, and change, flux, metamorphosis, becoming are the paths of creation. 'That is why we must distinguish between: the majoritarian as a constant and homogeneous system; minorities as subsystems; and the minoritarian as a potential, creative and created, becoming' (*TP*, 105–6). This is not to deny that numerically small mino-rities are frequently oppressed by majorities, or that majorities often deem themselves worthy of the norms they represent. It means, however, that the

problem of minorities is not to restore a counter-identity, to return to a long-lost pure culture and tongue, but to enter into a process of becoming whereby the constants and norms of the dominant, majoritarian order are put into continuous variation. This process of becoming is a potential open to everyone, but no one automatically enters it by virtue of his or her social position. Minorities can easily inculcate their own constants and norms. As a result, they, too, must construct their own means of becoming-other, their own lines of continuous variation. 'All becoming is minoritarian. Women, regardless of their numbers, are a minority, definable as a state or subset; but they create only by making possible a becoming over which they do not have ownership, into which they themselves must enter; this is a becoming-woman affecting all of humankind, men and women both. The same goes for minor languages: they are not simply sublanguages, idiolects or dialects, but potential agents of the major language's entering into a becoming-minoritarian of all of its dimensions and elements' (*TP*, 106).

If we return to Deleuze and Guattari's description of minor literature in *Kafka*, we may now see more fully the logical relationship between its three basic characteristics, 'the deterritorialization of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation' (*K*, 18). Language is a mode of action informed by relations of power. The abstract machine's virtual lines of continuous variation are actualized in collective assemblages of enunciation and non-discursive machinic assemblages. A major usage of language fixes, regularizes and stabilizes forms and meanings, and thereby territorializes variations. It reinforces categories and distinctions that compartmentalize existence, thereby fostering an isolation of the personal and the political. It also encourages both the reinforcement of the dominant views of the majority and the illusion of the autonomy of the individual voice. By contrast, a minor usage deterritorializes language by disturbing dominant regularities and setting them in variation. In disrupting majoritarian categories, a minor usage connects the personal and the political in proliferating networks of becoming. And in activating real (albeit virtual) lines of continuous variation, a minor usage directly engages collective assemblages of enunciation, fashioning not an individual voice but the voice of a people-to-be, i.e. a people in the process of becoming other. It is in this sense that in minor literature 'there isn't a subject; *there are only collective assemblages [agencements] of enunciation*, and literatures expresses these acts [*agencements*] insofar as they're not imposed from without and insofar as they exist only as diabolical powers to come or revolutionary forces to be constructed' (*K*, 18; 33).

Bene

In his 1979 essay 'One Less Manifesto', Deleuze elaborates on the concept of minor literature, reiterating many of the points made in *Kafka* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, but also indicating ways in which the concept may be applied to the theatre. The essay appears in a volume entitled *Superpositions*, which also includes the text of the drama *Richard III, or the Horrible Night of a Man of War*, by the Italian playwright and filmmaker Carmelo Bene. A significant figure in the Italian theatre, Bene has written and produced a number of plays based on earlier dramas, including *Arden of Feversham*, *Othello*, *Macbeth* and *Lorenzaccio*, as well as films inspired by earlier works, such as *Don Giovanni*, *Salome* and *One Less Hamlet*.[7] Bene's *Richard III* takes Shakespeare's history play as its point of departure, incorporating selected characters, scenes and lines from the original, but deforming them through extended textual additions, incongruous gestures and actions, surreal sets and props, and various devices for manipulating and denaturalizing the spoken word. In Deleuze's analysis, Bene's *Richard III*, like many of his other plays and films, has a 'critical function' (*OLM*, 239) that is both subtractive and constitutive. What Bene subtracts from Shakespeare are 'the elements of power' (*OLM*, 241), both those represented in the drama – history, the state, royal authority – and those inherent in drama as a mode of representation – structure, standard language, lucid text, dialogue, etc. From what remains, Bene constitutes a different set of characters – a different Richard, Lady Anne, Duchess of York, Marguerite, Elizabeth and Jane Shore (Richard III is the only male Bene retains from Shakespeare) – none of which is a coherent and consistent 'subject' but instead a line of continuous variation through which the 'character' and actor pass as an unfolding field of dramatic events is constructed. Bene constitutes as well a different language, different forms of enunciation, new patterns of gesture, and new relations between speech, setting and action. In sum, from the 'subtraction of the stable elements of power' Bene releases 'a new potentiality of theatre, an always unbalanced, non-representative force' (*OLM*, 242).

Deleuze finds in Bene's Italian a minor usage of language, a means of making language itself stammer. Bene manages 'to impose on language, as it is spoken perfectly and soberly, this line of variation that will make you a foreigner in *your own* language or make a foreign language your own or make your language a bilingualism immanent to your foreignness' (*OLM*, 247). Bene also makes use of various possibilities for metamorphosing language in oral performance, inducing a general 'aphasia' through whispers, stammers, cries, groans, barely audible lines, deafeningly amplified tirades, lip-sync playback, etc. He abandons the conventions of properly constructed dialo-

gue, with its rules of opening and closure, continuity and proper sequencing of exchanges. Instead, 'there is no dialogue in this theatre; for voices, simultaneous or successive, superimposed or transposed, are caught in this spatio-temporal continuity of variation. It is a sort of *Sprechgesang*. In song, it is a matter of maintaining the pitch, but in the *Sprechgesang* one always varies the pitch with ascendings and descendings' (*OLM*, 246). Bene induces as well a transmutation of speech acts through the shifting and unstable tones and attitudes with which the actors deliver their lines. Deleuze notes that Lady Anne's statement 'You disgust me!' is a different speech act when pronounced by 'a woman at war, a child facing a toad, or a young girl feeling a pity that is already consenting and loving' (*OLM*, 246). In her extended interaction with Richard, the actress playing Lady Anne moves through all these variables at once, managing 'to stand erect like a woman warrior, regress to a childlike state, and return as a young girl – as quickly as possible on a line of continuous variation' (*OLM*, 246). The result is a 'You disgust me!' that unfixes its social co-ordinates and oscillates among its diverse virtual positions, entering into multiple combinations with the other oscillating speech acts of the scene.

Bene's minor use of language necessarily affects non-linguistic aspects of his drama, among which gesture particularly interests Deleuze. One critic notes that gestures and objects in Bene's theatre often obstruct action, the actors' bodies impinging on one another, costumes restricting their movements, objects blocking their movements. But Deleuze argues that obstruction and opposition are not central to the gestures of this theatre, for these characteristics imply relations of power, and 'the relations of force and opposition are part of what is shown only to be subtracted, deducted, neutralized' (*OLM*, 249). Instead, Bene treats gesture in a musical fashion, according to relations of speed and slowness that vary in irregular and unpredictable ways. Bene admires certain Italian saints, '"the saints sanctified by grace: Saint Joseph of Copertino, the imbeciles, the idiot saints, Saint Francis of Assisi who danced for the Pope"' (cited in *OLM*, 243), identifying 'their grace with the movement of disgrace' (*OLM*, 249–50). Bene sees these saints as sanctified by that which disgraces them in the eyes of social authority, but he also regards them as imbued with a physical grace of movement determined by their departure from conventional behaviour, with its regular, prescribed habits of comportment and interaction. Likewise, Richard's constant stumbling, falling, tottering, collapse and resuscitation (noted at several points in Bene's text) are elements of the construction of Richard's grace through movements of disgrace, means whereby he deforms the forms of proper behaviour and discovers new gestural velocities and directions. 'The result is that the same gesture or word is never repeated

without obtaining different characteristics of time. This is the musical formula of continuity, or of form as transformation' (*OLM*, 249). The abandonment of conventional gestures entails a departure from pre-established forms, but also from socially constructed roles and identities (the gestures appropriate, say, for a king, an adult, a man). In his deformation of standard gestures, Richard replaces forms with speeds and social roles with affects and intensities unassociated with any subjective identity. In this regard, his gestures fulfil what Deleuze regards as 'two essential aims of the arts', 'the subordination of form to speed, to the variation of speed, and the subordination of the subject to intensity or to affect, to the intense variation of affects' (*OLM*, 249).

Deleuze traces an illustrative sequence of gestures in the scene of Richard's courtship of Lady Anne. Shakespeare's original is not parodied by Bene, 'but multiplied according to the variable speeds or developments that will come together in a single continuity of creation (not a dramatic unity)' (*OLM*, 250). While Richard delivers his lines of love, the actor playing the character 'begins to begin to understand', according to Bene's stage directions – that is, he begins to construct the gestural trajectory of a new set of movements. He takes winding sheets from the corpse of Henry VI, whose coffin is at the back of the stage, picks up various prosthetic limbs and artificial body parts stashed in cabinet drawers and strewn across the stage, and wraps them one by one to his body with the winding sheets as he speaks with Lady Anne. The prosthetic devices, signs of deformity and corporeal subtraction, gradually become part of Richard's gestural comportment, costumes of an action that takes him beyond his historical and political role and destiny. Lady Anne reacts with disgust to Richard as the representative of state power, but as he accrues various deformities she responds with pity, sympathy and an increasing eroticism. Gradually she helps him find prosthetics and wrap them to his body, and she herself accelerates an eccentric sequence of gestures, 'continually undressing and dressing herself in a rhythm of regression-progression echoing Richard's subtractions-constructions' (*OLM*, 251). Finally, as the characters develop their separate lines of gestural variation, the two lines enter into relation with one another and form a single continuum, itself comprised of indissociably related discursive and non-discursive elements. 'And each one's vocal variations, phonemes and tonalities, form a tighter and tighter line infringing on each one's gestures, and vice versa,' at which point there are not 'two intersecting continuities but one and the same continuum in which the words and gestures play the roles of variables in transformation' (*OLM*, 251).

The theatre might seem to provide exceptional instances of minor literature, in that drama necessarily involves a wide range of non-linguistic

elements that are not a part of other literary forms. But in actuality, drama simply makes evident what is implicit in all literature. In Deleuze and Guattari's view, the discursive and the non-discursive are inseparable (though by no means identical). Language is a mode of action informed by the interplay of machinic assemblages and collective assemblages of enunciation. Words intervene in bodies, and all the elements of language – phonemic, syntactic, semantic – derive their function from patterns of practices, institutions and material objects. Kafka's minor usage of German intensifies the linguistic practices of Prague Jews, but in so doing it necessarily engages all the elements inherent in varying speech situations. The continuum of 'I swear!' passes through words, intonations, gestures, bodies, buildings and locales, and Kafka's minor usage of that continuum sends reverberations through all those elements. Bene's minor theatre likewise intensifies lines of variation inherent in the Italian language, and through the actors' delivery and diverse sonic manipulations of their speech, deformations in the performance of language are induced, while the elements of gesture, costume and setting are denaturalized, transmuted and recombined in unexpected arrangements. Yet Richard's stammerings and groans, his constant staggering and stumbling, his prosthetic modifications of his body and his interactions with props and stage furniture are not fully isolable from his words. A minor usage of language engages relations of action and power, which interconnect meanings, sounds, movements, bodies and decor. Bene's minor theatre dramatizes the pragmatic nature of language. In this sense it may be viewed as the theatre of minor literature, a staging of the full range of elements implicit in the minor usage of language engaged in by all minor writers in all forms of literary invention.

II TERRITORY

The Refrain

As we have seen, the concepts of minority and territory are interrelated, in that a minor usage of language effects a deterritorialization of linguistic regularities, but what this notion of 'deterritorialization' has to do with concrete geographical territories remains to be determined. Throughout their collaborative works, Deleuze and Guattari make frequent use of the terms deterritorialization and reterritorialization, but it is only in section eleven of *A Thousand Plateaus*, '1837: Of the Refrain', that they address the topic of territory *per se*, engaging the subject via an analysis of music's relation to animal ethology.[8] Music, they assert, 'is a creative, active

operation that consists in deterritorialising the refrain [*la ritournelle*]',
whereas the refrain 'is essentially territorial, territorializing, or reterritor-
ializing' (*TP*, 300; 369). Deleuze and Guattari identify three basic aspects of
the refrain, which we may label a point of order; a circle of control; and a line
of flight toward the outside. An instance of a point of order is that of the
tune a child sings to comfort herself when she's alone and afraid in the dark.
A circle of control is evident in the perimeter of a cat's domain marked by his
spray. And a line of flight is met with in the mass movements of lemmings,
birds, or lobsters. Although the point of order, circle of control and line of
flight are most easily understood in terms of diverse moments and scenarios,
Deleuze and Guattari insist that they are not 'successive moments in an
evolution', but 'three aspects of a single thing, the Refrain' (*TP*, 312).
Nevertheless, these three aspects of the refrain vary in their relative
importance when considered in the context of different animals and their
environments. The refrain in its broadest sense is a rhythmic regularity that
brings order out of chaos. All animals interact with the world to fashion
environments, or milieus, and each milieu is defined by the components of
which it is comprised. 'Every milieu is vibratory, in other words, a block of
space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of the component' (*TP*,
313). Milieus confront chaos, and rhythm 'is the milieus' answer to chaos'
(*TP*, 313). The amoeba's inner metabolic rhythms, its movements in its
aqueous medium, its absorptions of nutrients and reactions to external sti-
muli, the fluctuating waves of forces and particles that impinge on its surface
– all may be seen as components of an interactive system of rhythms, or
regular patterns of space-time, which together comprise the refrain that
characterizes a milieu.[9]

All animals inhabit milieus, but only some occupy territories. A territory
emerges when a milieu component ceases to be merely functional and
becomes expressive. The bright colouration of the male stickleback fish, for
example, is not simply a mating stimulus for the female, but it serves also as
a placard signalling the male's territorial rights. The colour is 'both a quality
and a property, *quale* and *proprium*' (*TP*, 315), the qualitative expression of
the territory and the signature of its possessor. What is functional in mating
behaviour gains autonomy, becomes detached from its milieu context. In a
similar fashion, the stagemaker bird marks its territory by pulling leaves
from trees and placing them in patterns on the ground. Here, leaves cease to
function as parts of a tree habitat and become signs of the bird's domain. The
territory is 'an act that affects milieus and rhythms, that "territorialises"
rhythms' (*TP*, 314). Paradoxically, the territorializing act proceeds via a
detachment, decoding or 'deterritorialization' of milieu components and a
reinscription, recoding or 'reterritorialization' of those components as

expressive qualities within a territory. Nor is the territorial act performed exclusively by the territory's possessors. Territorialization 'is an act of rhythm that has become expressive, or of milieu components that have become qualitative' (*TP*, 315). Rhythm itself territorializes, which is a somewhat enigmatic way of saying that territories are emergent features of the regular patterns of complex ecological systems. The patterns are rhythms, melodies, refrains, and though produced by animals and their environments, they are *relations* between elements, and hence features of the system as a whole rather than any of its separate components.

The 'T factor, the territorializing factor', then is found 'precisely in the becoming-expressive of rhythm or melody, in other words, in the emergence of proper qualities (colour, odour, sound, silhouette . . .)' (*TP*, 316). Rhythms that are fixed and functionally coded in milieus become detached and assume new roles as expressive, proper qualities. These qualities serve as signs of the territory and its occupant's possession of the domain, but the rhythms of a territory also tend to take on a life of their own and become more than mere signatures of ownership. Territorial motifs 'form *rhythmic faces or characters*', and territorial counterpoints 'form *melodic landscapes*', motifs and counterpoints becoming autonomous patterns that follow 'an autodevelopment, in other words, a style' (*TP*, 318–19). Further, every territory is open to an outside, and its rhythms and patterns include 'lines of flight', unstable vectors that serve both as constituents of the territory and sources of its potential dissolution. In this regard, the long-distance migrations of spiny lobsters, Alaskan salmon and Canadian geese are simply extreme instances of a general tendency of every territory to move beyond itself towards the surrounding world. One can see, then, that the three aspects of the refrain correspond to three degrees of increasing deterritorialization that are met with in the generation of a territory. The refrain as point of order is a rhythmic regularity that organizes milieus in fixed patterns. Since territories encompass milieus and possess lines of flight, the refrain appears in territories in all its guises – point of order, circle of control, line of flight, 'three aspects of a single thing' (*TP*, 312).

Music

Many birds are territorial, and birdsongs are often recognized as having a territorial function. Ornithologists distinguish between calls, or communicational signals of imminent danger, presence of food, proximity of mates or foes, etc., and songs proper, which, depending on the species, may vary in length and complexity from two- to three-second repeated motifs to

extended, multisectional, improvisatory performances. In Deleuze and Guattari's terminology, bird calls are largely milieu components, fixed to specific functions, whereas birdsongs are territorial elements, sonic components of milieus that have been unfixed and reconfigured in a more autonomous fashion. Ethologists debate whether birds are musicians, some arguing that birds sing only in response to hormonal stimuli, others insisting that birds have an aesthetic sense, take pleasure in singing for its own sake, and in a few cases, create original sonic compositions. Deleuze and Guattari concur that birds are artists, though they do not treat the issue as one of instinctual versus free activity. Art has its origin in the emergence of qualities as expressions of a territory. The stickleback's colouration and the stagemaker's leaves are artworks, whether produced primarily by instinct or volition. What counts is the object and its status within the act of territorialization. Birdsongs likewise are artworks, for they are deterritorialized milieu components that express a territory and a property, and in their extended and elaborate forms they become part of autonomous 'rhythmic characters' and 'melodic landscapes' that tend beyond the territory towards the cosmos as a whole. The bird sings its territory, or rather, the territory as relational rhythmic act sings itself through the bird, as the refrain actualizes musical points of order, circles of control and lines of flight.

What relation does birdsong have to human music? Certain compositional practices of the composer Olivier Messiaen suggest an answer.[10] In a series of works from the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, Messiaen incorporates birdsongs into his music, rendering as accurately as possible through conventional musical instruments the intervals, rhythms, articulations and timbres of the melodies of various species of bird. Yet Messiaen admits that much is changed when one transfers to human instruments the microintervals and rapid tempos of birdsongs, as well as those articulations and timbres peculiar to avian physiology.[11] Once the intervals are stretched to fit the chromatic scale, the tempos slowed to human speeds, and the attack and tone adapted to suit orchestral instruments, the melodies are virtually unrecognizable to the most discerning of ornithologists, and once the birdsong motifs are combined in polyphonic patterns and manipulated to become parts of a compositional whole, they are even further transformed. Despite Messiaen's efforts to imitate birdsong, his musical practice is that of a 'becoming-bird', a passage between bird and human that produces something new and unexpected, not an imitation but a deterritorialization of birdsong.

Music 'is a creative, active operation that consists in deterritorialising the refrain' (*TP*, 300). What might seem an idiosyncratic technique in Messiaen is actually paradigmatic of all musical composition. To the extent that they

create genuine music, all musicians – even birds – deterritorialize the refrain. And they are able to do so because the refrain deterritorializes itself. In its first guise as point of order, the refrain manifests itself in various milieu rhythms, which are fixed to specific functions (eating, mating, fighting, etc.). In its second guise as territorial motif, the refrain is itself a deterritorialization of milieu rhythms, and in its third aspect as line of flight, it is a deterritorialization of territorial rhythms. Even the most rudimentary of birdsongs is a deterritorialization of the milieu refrain, an unfixing and decoding of calls with particular functions, and the most complex birdsong further deterritorializes rhythms that have been fixed and coded within territories and open them towards an outside. The compositions of Messiaen simply extend this process of deterritorialization, taking as their material the refrains of birds and submitting them to diverse operations and procedures that produce new sonic events.

Yet we must not think that Deleuze and Guattari's point is that composers simply render human analogy of the sounds of nature. The example of Messiaen's use of birdsong is instructive, in that it suggests a direct way in which music deterritorializes the refrain, but it is potentially misleading if we do not keep in mind that the refrain is not exclusively sonic. Refrains are *rhythms*, relational patterns that shape milieus and territories.[12] The rhythms of mating, feeding, reproduction, nurture, play, struggle and exploration; the periodic fluctuations of weather, seasons, tides or currents; the recurrent flows of gestures, movements, sights, sounds, smells, tastes – all combine in refrains. The task of music is less to convert natural sounds to human sounds than to render sonorous the non-sonorous forces that play through nature, and to do so by deterritorializing the rhythmic relations of the world, transforming them, and inventing new modes for their interconnection and interaction. In his monumental orchestral work *From the Canyons to the Stars . . .* (1974), for example, Messiaen makes use of a number of birdsongs, but he also claims to render sonorous the multiple rhythms of the birds' habitats throughout the course of a day, the slow rhythms of the geological formations of the Utah canyons, and the extended rhythms of the constellations. His composition engages these various refrains not by 'imitating' birds, sagebrush, rocks and stars, but by extracting from milieu components their rhythmic relations and submitting these relations to processes of creative metamorphosis, first fashioning non-mimetic analogs of those relations in the form of melodic and harmonic motifs, then combining, transforming, dividing, inverting those motifs, and finally shaping them into a structurally coherent sequence of interconnected movements. Although Messiaen provides evocative titles for each of the twelve movements of this work – e.g. 'The Desert', 'Orioles', 'Interstellar Call', 'Zion

Park and the Celestial City' – the resulting composition is less a musical evocation of a setting than a self-organized sonic response to a set of abstract relations. And though other composers may not articulate their practice in such terms, they too manipulate and transform the rhythms that surround them and pervade them whenever they create music.[13]

Minority and Territory

What, then, is the relation between minority and territory, between literature as a minor usage of language and music as the deterritorialization of the refrain? Language is a mode of action informed by relations of power. Machinic assemblages and collective assemblages of enunciation comprise patterns of practices, institutions and material objects that organize and regulate the immanent lines of continuous variation that play through the phonemic, grammatical, syntactic and semantic elements of speech and writing. The patterns of the relations of power that infuse and shape language may also be termed refrains, periodic rhythms that compose milieus and territories (as well as other forms of social-environmental organization, which we would need to detail in a thorough analysis of this problem). A minor usage of language induces a destabilization of linguistic constants, an unfixing of semiotic regularities, and in this sense it may be seen as a deterritorialization of the refrains immanent within various speech-act events. Both literature and music are experimentations on the real, means of capturing, dissolving and transmuting existing relations of force and then reshaping and reconstructing them in new configurations. Literature works with a linguistic medium, music with a sonic medium, but both engage rhythms and forces that extend through fields that include the discursive and the non-discursive, the sonic and the non-sonic. Writers manipulate words, but words function as components of context-specific speech-acts, which are comprised of multiple linguistic and non-linguistic elements. A minor usage of language affects all the components of speech-acts, and in the theatre one sees an explicit demonstration of literature's implicit deterritorialization of diction, gesture, movement and setting through the manipulation of the word. Similarly, in Messiaen's experimentations with birdsong, he necessarily engages elements beyond those of mere sound, for each birdsong is part of a complex territorial assemblage of interrelated rhythms that constitute patterns of courtship, mating, reproduction, feeding, etc. In this sense, music's deterritorialization of the refrain, like literature's minor usage of language, entails an engagement of proliferating networks of relations that stretch across heterogeneous domains, the refrain incorporating sonic and

non-sonic components alike, just as speech acts involve variables of language, gesture, action and all the non-discursive components of the given contexts of their performance.

To a certain extent, humans are territorial animals, and works of literature and music often have specifically territorial associations. Languages arise in concrete regions; tales, myths and legends are created by peoples inhabiting their native soils. The rhythmic and melodic modes of ancient Greece belong to specific locales, as do the *talas* (basic rhythmic units) of traditional Indian music. (Indeed, the complex relations between a geographic area and its artistic creations are such that a territory and its literature and music may be said to mutually define one another.) As birds sing their territory, so do humans speak or sing theirs. But the literature and music of a given territory are transfused by relations of power, and to the extent that they are territorial arts, they reinforce the domination of the majority, i.e. those who represent the standard and norm against which all deviation is measured. No matter how oppressed a given group may be, a return to its native soil, to the tales and songs of the homeland, remains a return to a major culture and a major usage of language and sound. The minor is essentially homeless, nomadic, vagabond. A minor usage of language puts constants in variation, disengages them from their territorial roots, and sets them in perpetual movement. The aim of minor literature is to set all the constants of language in such continuous variation, just as it is the aim of music to deterritorialize all aspects of the refrain. In a brief remark about Viennese atonal music, Deleuze and Guattari observe that in the works of composers like Schoenberg, twelve-tone rows may deterritorialize tonality, but the other elements of music – rhythm, dynamics, attack, timbre – receive a relatively conventional treatment. What Deleuze and Guattari call for is an experimentation on all aspects of music, a 'generalized chromaticism' (*TP*, 97) that puts all musical constants in variation. Likewise, they support in literary creation a parallel experimentation on all aspects of language. As Deleuze remarks in 'One Less Manifesto', 'a minor language is comprised of only a minimum of structural constancy and homogeneity. It is not, however, a pulp, a mixture of dialects, since it finds its *rules* in the construction of a continuum. Indeed, the continuous variation will apply to all the sonorous and linguistic components in a sort of generalized chromaticism' (*OLM*, 245 translation modified). Deleuze observes that Bene's 'writing and gestures are musical', in that Bene treats all the components of drama as variations in speed and intensity. 'This is the musical formula of continuity, or of form as transformation' (*OLM*, 249). At a certain level of abstraction, experimentations on the lines of continuous variation immanent within language and those immanent within territorial refrains may be seen as experimentations on speeds and intensities, on

relational patterns and rhythms, on oscillations, vibrations and modulations in a spatio-temporal continuum. At that level, both literature and music have a common function as minor usages of relations of power and as deterritorializations of territorial forces.

Empiricism Unhinged: from Logic of Sense to Logic of Sensation

Claude Imbert

I

Logic of Sense was published in 1969; *Francis Bacon, Logic of Sensation* came out 12 twelve years later. Why would an empiricist philosopher such as Deleuze indubitably find himself engaged in logic? Why didn't he resolve the whole problem of sense by appealing to mere sensation, as was the custom in the eighteenth century and in particular for Condillac, and the problem of logic by common sense? Whatever may be the part of humour in the titles, during the 12-year interval the issue remained a pressing one, but then was never taken up again by Deleuze after 1981. What obstacle had he overcome, clearing up the way for a new empiricism?

Towards the end of the 1960s Deleuze left the history of philosophy in which he had to that point excelled. 'I paid my debt off, Nietzsche and Spinoza were the last instalments. Afterwards I wrote books for myself', that is to say, not constrained by 'the traditional image that philosophy projected'. *DR* (1968) turned to more urgent concerns. 'Modern life is such that, confronted with the most mechanical, the most stereotypical repetitions, within and without, we endlessly extract from them little differences, variations and modifications.'[1] This observation called for a new conception, freed from inherited categories – not simply new concepts but rather altogether a new procedure. The task of life is 'to have all these repetitions coexist in a space where difference is distributed'. But this is not about 'a reaction against concepts, nor a simple call to lived experience'.[2] In fact, in its positivity, 'empiricism is a mysticism and a mathematicism of the concept'. *Mysticism*, because it will be capable of realism through its own operation, without any need for that kind of legitimacy Kant derived from the possibility of experience. Deleuze takes over Kant's argument: it is the concept alone which gives experience its configuration, renews and varies it.

Mathematicism, because the concept will carry out the strategy of indivi-
duation and seriality which characterizes the mathematics of algebraic
manifolds (or *varieties*). This notion is borrowed from Riemann and Laut-
mann, and preferred to that of *sets*.[3] At the beginning of the twentieth
century, the paradoxes of set theory had underlined *a contrario* the incoherent
usage of a predicative logic when applied beyond its plausible circumstances.
They thus revealed the limits of a classical epistemology of the *object*.

Deleuze's metaphors invited their share of criticism. Yet they do possess
the advantage of being consciously chosen, once all naive recourse to standard
philosophical usage has been rejected. 'We write only at the frontiers of our
knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance,
and transforms the one into the other.' This risk was assumed in order to
avoid another one, graver than silence or death, the hazard of an indefinite
procrastination, waiting for a knowledge which at the end of the day would
never trace the transversal line of modern experience. This new trial of
empiricism would itself be experimental. It would associate the virtual
resources of utopia to local investigation, as in the *Erewhon* of Samuel Butler,[4]
where Deleuze detects a double anagram: *no where* and *now here*. The sort of
presence which empiricism claims for has in fact no place on the axis of time.
It superimposes its demand like a utopia, all while reinventing this topicality
of the *here* and *now*, once the shifters and deictic marks proper to the grammar
of utterance have been identified to the requirements of the message as
specific information. But Deleuze has dissimulated none of the semi-failure of
this first step out of the history of philosophy. It was neither sufficient to
object to the analytical protocols of philosophy's 'traditional image', nor even
to contrast it *ex abrupto* with a new conception for which the Riemannian
mathematics of varieties offered a striking analogy, but no syntax.

LS displaces the angle of attack. 'As soon as I start speaking, I suppose
that the sense is understood, that it is already there. ... Sense is like the
sphere in which I am already established in order to enact possible deno-
tations, and even to think their conditions. Sense is always presupposed as
soon as *I* begin to speak; I would not be able to begin without this pre-
supposition.'[5] Deleuze still had to survey this antecedence of sense which
localizes, identifies and thereby dismisses the pretensions of the Kantian *a
priori*.

It is true that sense is the characteristic discovery of transcendental phi-
losophy and that it replaces the old metaphysical Essences. (Or rather,
sense was first discovered in the form of an impassive neutrality by an
empirical logic of propositions which had broken away from Aris-
totelianism. And then for a second time, sense was discovered in the form

of genetic productivity by transcendental philosophy which had broken away from metaphysics.) (*LS*, p. 105)

The parenthesis is essential. It opens onto the archaeology of sense. Deleuze shows us, as Schliemann did when he unveiled successive urban formations in the layers beneath Troy, an empirical logic, historically situated, instead of an epiphanic *origin*. Empirical, this logic presents itself therefore as a Spinozist tool, which 'forges itself'.[6] Instead of a history unified by Criticism and an ageless logic masking real operations, in this book Deleuze puts into play, by means of a collage, when necessary and where pertinent, all the intellectual implements gathered from his own past as an historian. Here lies the whole thrust of the book: once we have restored to Stoicism that which the transcendental operation had turned to its own benefit, once we stop isolating knowledge from ethics, we will be able to understand its most recent variants. Kantian criticism finds itself enmeshed in a regime of transformations that it wanted to ignore and that it could not dogmatically bring to definite closure since in fact it ultimately pertains to it. Thus the archaeology of sense had fractured the very pavement of transcendental phenomenology.

Different linguistic notions will articulate this empirical quest for sense: *utterance* rather than *concept*, and *syntax* rather than *synthesis*. Stripped of its criticist turn, Stoicism is also liberated from the Kantian table of judgments where transcendental subjectivity had become operational and visible. It imposes itself afresh, upon this edge of emotion where each consciousness has to configure its own survival. The climax of *LS* is this twenty-second section whose theme is the *wound*, which Joë Bousquet did elaborate in a poetic interlude, or the *crack* – alluding to Scott Fitzgerald.[7] 'How to save yourself while saving the surface and all the organization of the surface, including the language of life . . . all the lessons to be received from stoicism?' *LS* is a dramatic book about the objectivization of the event from the depth of its affect.

This book renounced the arborescence of parts and chapters, weaving together 'series' as if they were incidental premises. Opening up a multiplicity of entrances, they reproduce history as event from within philosophical argumentation itself. This is where Lewis Carroll intervenes, exemplary and decisive in this machinery of sense, which, not unlike the Sun or Death, cannot be viewed directly. Sense renews itself by the overlapping of two procedures. On the one hand, it imposes its new legislation visible in the multiplication of nonsense and paradoxes in accordance with Paul's *dictum*: 'the Law makes abound the sins'. On the other hand, sense takes over the generativity of common language, which it bends along its own syntax. Chrysippus, Kant and Russell did not proceed any differently. We are familiar with Stoic paradoxes that force us to distinguish between the *signifier*

and the *signified* to avoid the shame of ludicrous consequences (*if you say chariot, a chariot comes out of your mouth*). Russell's paradoxes favoured the theory of types, with the difference that this time syntax, intended to support mathematics, had forsaken natural language to promote a formulaic and quantificational writing. The consequence of this shift came soon enough, when Quine dismissed signification as a myth.[8] Something there had nevertheless been invented or confirmed, namely the enrichment of available syntaxes at the turn of the nineteenth century. As to criticism, Kant had also multiplied the paradoxes, antinomies and paralogisms of a metaphysical cosmology and psychology riveted to the uncontrolled inferences of perceptive knowledge. His table of logical functions discarded the non-sensical by restraining acceptable syntactical functions to those supposed to be necessary and sufficient to Newtonian mathematics. Causality was then but the linguistic image of an underlying dynamic integration. Thus the boat, sailing down the stream from the upper to the lower reaches of the river, illustrated the causal order of experience, which neither a mere conjunction of propositions nor the Humean probabilities could balance out. The Kantian deduction, which concludes to the legitimacy of 12 categories, is based on such a syntactical correspondence. But its success was paid for by mapping the functions of mathematical physics within the constraints of a predicative grammar adequate for judgment

Lewis Carroll, the logician, takes his place in this high lineage where he holds a position symmetrical to that of Hume. He attacks Kantian logic at its heart at the moment when he precipitates into nonsense the mapping of mathematical operations into a predicative grammar and *vice versa*. His humour was double-sided. First, in his books of logical puzzles, Carroll played with the mistake of transferring the algebraic into the predicative, then he brought to the surface of a narrative what happens when one imports into the real the symmetries and operations of mathematics. Alice grows and diminishes at will and the bunny always arrives too early or too late. The bunny keeps on consulting his watch, but since this Wonderland no longer has anything in common with a solar and Newtonian world, he is never on time.

Dodgson, alias Lewis Carroll, was a sufficiently recognized mathematician, if not creative according to the contemporary criteria of the discipline, to have held a permanent appointment at Oxford. His scientific writings are in the direct lineage of his contemporaries.[9] During the second half of the nineteenth century, it became clear that it was neither necessary nor even useful to hold onto Euclidian geometry. As for geometry itself, whose hypothetical and experimental character Riemann had shown, it could be conveniently exposed by algebraic means. Euclidian geometry and the pro-

positional structure of the *Elements* had lost their advantage as principles with respect to experience and perception. Euclid would be better appreciated in the proximity of his 'modern rivals' than in the context of Stoic cosmos or Kantian experience.

The sagacity of the mathematician Dodgson, his practice of algebra, also had as an immediate consequence a preference of Boolean logic over the syllogistic of predicates. His logical puzzles develop by contrast the paradoxes of a syllogistics submitted to an analytics of terms. Its power of decision will fade in the infinite regression of their arborescence. For a predicative proposition A to imply a predicative proposition B, there must be a proposition C, precisely the one which declares this implication. And in its turn, this proposition C demands a proposition D which will assert the basis of this second implication, between C and the couple (A, B), etc. Lewis Carroll brings out in formal terms the danger of a regression, of which Kant had only shown the danger in material terms, those of a rational cosmology, but which he did not really escape despite the legal apparatus of his transcendental deduction. It became clear that syllogistics, where inference occurs according to an analytical link between terms (*akoluthia*), always supposes a world where the cohesion of these terms can be verified. No doubt the judgment of experience made short work of it, but all the while founding its certainty on a phenomenological coherence soon to be deprived of its scientific support.

We thus understand that Carroll had already written the first forms of modern paradoxes. His writings on logic presents, sometimes *a contrario*, algebraic operations as being worthy pretenders, not any less honourable than predication, to the definition of a logical syntax. How did they disturb the very notion of experience? We should not forget that the mathematician Dodgson preceded the logician, and the logician preceded the writer. Who is Alice? As Jean Gattegno, the most recent French translator of Lewis Carroll, underscores – Alice is not a character, she is a sum of utterances. So, the mathematician pursued in fiction his own evidence. Of these statements/ utterances, many are but a manner of assenting to the event, or rather to exclaim, however strange the 'wonder' might be. Alice is a grammatical figure burdened neither by assertion nor by modalities of experience. She embodies with much humour the *difference* and *repetition* of the modern life. She intervenes there as a *non-person*, astonished in this land which is but the sum of her astonishments. Indifferent to a dissolved *self*, she takes over from the self-absorbed London dandy who never wonders at anything. Her universe and her body are subject to topological and algebraic operations well-known to the mathematician: transformation by more or less, symmetry of the before and after, reversible transfers not submitted to the arrow of time,

ignorance of the grammar of shifters proper to assertive utterances. Alice strings together trajectories, lines and circles, without any of those *a priori* markers of a world – maps, clocks and categories. While privileging exclamations, she stands up to the constraints of dialectics, and keeps on speaking without having been invited to do so. She illustrates with full candour this loss of experience that Walter Benjamin stigmatizes in his Baudelaire essays and yet she is not at all melancholic about it. Her character corresponds to grammatical possibilities, but this cannot be wholly attributed to the idiosyncrasies of English humour. It is also of note that Dogdson/Caroll in freeing Alice's gaze from the 'natural geometry' of the world, and her words from the grammar of experience, gave a clear, if surprising, complement to his scientific writings. Following which, he overcame, we are told, a stuttering that had been tormenting him since adolescence. Dissociation of grammars, poetic opening, empiricism would be thereafter 'syntax and experimentation, syntactics and pragmatics'.[10]

As to Stoicism, if Deleuze played on the paradoxes of Chrysippus and on the tragedies of Seneca, he ignored nothing of contemporary scholarship. When Victor Goldschmidt emphasized that technique, properly Stoic, of living the present by incorporating or embodying an event, in itself incorporeal, his remarkable contribution to the history of philosophy had something of an anti-Heideggerian manifesto.[11] Goldschmidt explained how the grandiose ethics of a life in accordance with the economy of the world does not shy from, even calls for, the most modest, ordinary and practical ways of joining with it. Thus, a man who walks can embody the event of his walking, which otherwise would be but an undifferentiated state of the world, and thus, while instantiating it as an individual event, at the same time he qualifies it. Every action effectuates a physical present and times it, as it were. The present is the embodied aspect of what happens, something like its conscious dimension, but committed to the objectify of the unperturbed event. Nothing here would be philosophically pertinent if the Stoic did not double his conduct with the formulae that objectifies it. Expounding and configuring the event was a school exercise. Certainly there was a need for implicit homonymy between the present indicative which perpetually succeeds itself in the flow of perceptions and the present of the theorems of an eternal world. In that, the Stoics only fixed Platonic participation in their own linguistic rigor. But now the separation of these two instances, the recent transfer of the languages of nature onto mathematical syntaxes with no conjugation or temporality, together with the poetic or literary management of the present, had ruined Kantianism while revealing, by way of contrast, the relevance of Stoicism's singular operation.

Alice was both a scaled-down model and a humorous variant of it while

the poet Joë Bousquet, for his own part, embodied its modern specificity. His poetry, clearly Surrealist in its means, free from the ideology of the world, and nevertheless Stoic in its effects, kept nothing of the dogmatic stance of the Stoa. It did endorse and promote the insolent ethics of sense. From Carroll to Bousquet, Deleuze lines up in a series the questions behind the empiricist project: What is Stoicism? What is an existence devoted to the mere succession of events as wonders, an existence without the alibi of depth, like that of a little girl or of a playing card (which the characters of Lewis Carroll become on occasion)? What is a work of art? A manner of being capable of the event, where 'a profound link is confirmed between ethics and the logic of sense'.[12]

Deleuze perfectly understood what was at stake in the grammar of Stoicism. Thus he underlines its 'proud verb' – we would say the impersonal form – where the subject is elided, as authorized by the Latin language (*pluit, decet*), a grammatical turn which the Stoics had sumptuously appropriated into philosophical usage. Working in a direction opposite to that of Aristotelian *analysis*, which nullifies verbal syntax, divides the proposition up in its terms, submits it to the epistemology of things and predicates, and thus hopes to draw natural history from the chain of predication, the Stoics, on the contrary, focused on the singularities of verbal syntax and gave to the Hellenistic grammatical heritage more than twenty centuries of classicism. Deleuze supposes a variant which, far from deconstructing classical syntax, would be akin to a new grammar grafted on the old one, perhaps virtually associated to discursive practice, but always at the frontier of a familiar and of a 'foreign language' (Proust), so that we always perceive the operation of language through which culture is carried out. As interested as any, in those years, in the *linguistic turn*, Deleuze also stresses the event of saying in relation to the physical event, an event we shall only ever know through its affect and its effect and sees in postwar poetics an attempt at reflecting this relation. Here Bousquet was exemplary: 'My wound existed before me, I was born to incarnate it.' I am born therefore in the instant where the wound, this one or that one, is embodied, just like the Stoic sage inscribes in himself the *walking* which he effectuates, the event of which one will say *it walks* or *one walks*, as one says *it rains* or *the rainfall is heard*. Thus appears in the linguistic game of Deleuze a fourth person of the impersonal voice, distinguished from the third, because the Gods have withdrawn and that it is no longer a question of translating the meteorological event using Zeus and his thunder. The fourth person, at the limit of our regime of utterances, perhaps an infinitive formula, opens up a way-out for a post-Mallarmean poetics.

Anglo-American literature illustrates this invention of prohibited syntactical structures, this escape of English beyond the domain of enun-

ciation – maybe as a consequence of the sailors' talk, so insistent in nine-
teenth-century novels. There, words are exchanged which are neither truly
orders nor truly facts, but instantaneous conjunctions that are beyond dis-
cussion. Those technical words carry out the urgency of acting, the instru-
ment, the gesture, and the resulting manoeuvre. After the unusual lesson of
Lewis Carroll, Deleuze runs through them, from Melville to Conrad, col-
lecting artificial languages, technical or creolized, which counter-effectuate
the trial of the sea in the pragmatic terms of a manoeuvre, and probe the
capacity of the English language to disorganize its syntax. Modernity made
its way through those writers who preferred experimenting with the outer
surface of language rather than seeking confessions and little secrets, and
were certainly not converts of 'Writing' As Virginia Woolf once remarked.
Melville is straightforward: the scribe Bartleby illustrates *a contrario*, by his
profession as a copyist and his behaviour, the impossible resistance to the
event – 'I would prefer not to'. He barely survives by repetitions painfully
interrupted by unbearable differences.

   Surrealism burst at the end of the First World War. Seeing in it a counter-
effectuation of the trenches would not be the worst manner of accounting for
it. One century before, there had already been one of these archetypal battles
hovering over events: Waterloo for which the young Fabrice, in Stendhal,
had made himself the dazzled spokesman. Like Hegel at Jena ten years
before, Fabrice also thought he had seen the destiny of the world passing by
with the imperial cavalry, even if this destiny had already been discarded
into the pit of History.[13] Surrealism is the conclusion of another war. No
signification hovered over Verdun, nothing but devastation, as in the crude
figuration, in 1895, by Douanier Rousseau in *War, or The Horseman of
Discord*.[14] Amazon with a fixed gaze, riding in fiery sky, full of smoke, above
a field of cadavers that she does not look at – war is the exalted executioner of
universal consumption which no universal history will redeem. The Doua-
nier thought of himself as modern, but was then dismissed as a 'naïve'
painter. Later, Max Ernst, who fought in that war, reinvented Alice, and
other adventures of a little girl named LopLop, producing sense of the world
by means of collage. Aragon, it is said, had Ernst read Lewis Carroll.[15]
Deleuze seems to have seriously followed the thread of such incidents of
Surrealism up to the point where Bousquet inscribes in it his Stoic paradigm,
muddling up the heroic posture, erasing its grammar of the world and at
once brings Surrealism to its point of philosophical identification. Whence
this unpredictable truth conferred on the marionette Alice: a figure drawn
from Victorian England, acquiring a new relevance with each successive
translations, here treated as a pure montage of Lewis Carroll the logician.

   Deleuze thus ties up the threads of post-war philosophy by retracing the

sequence that Merleau-Ponty had followed. No surprise there – we were forewarned. Right after the Second World War, having just published the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty outdated his own just-minted phenomenological paradigm by substituting for it a new one: the sequence of five literary perceptions: 'Montaigne, Stendhal, Proust, Breton, Artaud'.[16] Deleuze recalls that at the threshold of the Renaissance Montaigne had put Stoicism into movement, and inserts Bousquet between Breton and Artaud. Nothing therefore in this Surrealist fugue which justifies the provocation often attributed to it, since, on the contrary, it is about the perpetuation of some procedure of sense. As Deleuze highlights in detail its syntactical counter-effectuations, there is nothing obscure about Surrealism. 'Each time, a brilliant and proud verb surfaced', such as the verb "to green" [*verdoyer*], distinct from the tree and its greenness'.[17] The event must dazzle qualitatively, not as mere phenomenality but as the first spices of intelligence. The verb, in the infinitive mood, leaves behind the traits of *deixis* and of aspectuality by which Stoicism syntactically reverberated the conjugation of the events, including the fact that I find myself at the point of their incidence as their witness and last mediator. The poetics of Bousquet focuses on the sharpness of the event – explosion of *qualia* freed from their phenomenal vector, multiplying the intensity of a verb. From episode to episode, the singular history of these dimensions of thought was thus traced, local innovations which harden into a style. Just like contemporary mathematics did produce a set of formulas to convert operations extrinsic to any predicative language into a more comprehensive syntax, those innovations did reduce the claims of Kantianism to the limits of its outdated logic. Then appears, more pernicious than the paralogisms of rational cosmology which summoned up Kant's philosophical genius, this logical common sense (*sensus communis logicus*), this alleged support of experience upon which criticism as well as empiricism had based their arguments. Deleuze had liberated himself from that unquestioned syntax, responsible for 'the traditional image of philosophy'.

In spite of the many steps of its argument, *LS* follows a clear ordering. The short sequence on Joë Bousquet, Malcolm Lowry and Francis Scott Fitzgerald constitute the heart of it and form a redefinition of Stoicism. Side-stepping the failures of post-Kantian dialectics, Joë Bousquet's infinitives had hit the right spot. Of course, the point is not to repudiate the usages of grammatical conjugation and linguistic utterance, but to break a grammatical monopoly that had remained uncontested for twenty centuries. It is about inventing yet one more time a way out for thought – a 'cogito for a dissolved self' – here ironically associated to the infinitive, freed for a 'becoming-other than oneself'. Deleuze said that there is a philosophical style, and he clearly practised it, but it is always a 'matter of syntax'.[18] For

time, more clocks and new ones were needed. From this point of view, in his former writings, Deleuze granted more to Heidegger than to Husserl, more to *Sein und Zeit* than to the *Lessons on the Intimate Consciousness of Time*. But since these new clocks are, in language, other syntaxes, this time Heidegger is caught being only half-clever: he deconstructs the language but keeps a nostalgia for church bells; he plays on the infinitive but keeps the markers of *deixis* (*Da*), to which he associates a verb (*Sein*), but an inert verb, carrying neither action nor quality, a mere disguise for nihilism. Nothing is left of the radiant '*to green*', neither in the motto of the *Dasein* nor in its cluster of existentials dedicated to death. The grammatical 'pride' of the verb in the infinitive mood [*verbe fier*] which Deleuze puts to the fore retains nothing of that Stoic haughtiness of which Jansenism was so suspicious, because it is devoid of the decision of an assertion. Deleuze overcomes the phenomenological rites whose descriptive and testimonial grammar had for such a long time mobilized classical philosophy and which Heidegger did ultimately focus on 'being to death'. Deleuze enhances *a contrario* the tacit power of an infinitive conjugation and a formulaic[19] writing, as that of manifestos, classifieds, telegrams or 'telephone calls', already present in Proust and in Valéry's *Log Book*. Not 'the right word', but 'just a word'.

'The only manner to defend language is to attack it ... Every writer is obliged to forge his own language.'[20] Syntactical dimensions had eliminated dimensions of things. They alone paid tribute to the generative capacity of language. Better than a utopia, the outline of their diagrams draw a virtual conceptuality, and a philosophical intelligence of something which is no longer *experience* becomes possible. Deleuze would later borrow from Bateson the anthropological description of these *plateaus* when a moment of stable intensity occurs in a community, interrupting for a while a Chaos of confrontations and rivalries – whence this *chaosmos*, one of these Deleuzian 'portmanteaux words' imitated from Carroll that have exasperated many readers. This word also denotes a program, in the crack between the chaos of resignation and the cosmos of irenical wishful thinking, a program which might inspire philosophical writing. 'A flat surface is the character of a discourse', such is the axiom of Lewis Carroll. In a late note, Deleuze showed how this conquest of the surface articulates, from Alice to Bruno, the work of the English storyteller.[21]

The itinerary of this difficult book, *The Logic of Sense*, is now clearly traced, including the detour of *Alice in Wonderland*. Lewis Carroll had distributed at the extreme limits of his talent two ways of discourse which did definitely bifurcate in the course of the nineteenth century. Here was the crucial event which annulled any hope of grafting mathematical operations on a Stoic *basso continuo*. Carroll laid bare what criticism had still enveloped in a hybridi-

zation that Kant himself knew to be the last and only guaranty of trans-cendentalism.[22] But what is hidden in the first *Critique*, in the untold col-lusion between empirical common sense and logical common sense, transpires elsewhere, Deleuze notes, in the ambiguity of the *aesthetic*. Sub-jugated in the first *Critique* to possible experience, in the third *Critique* it becomes real experience – that of art. Drawing from this dissociation, empiricism will find the means to renew itself.

II

The Logic of Sense had followed this part in the transformation of empiricism that literature took upon itself to explore. The myth of common sense was dissipated by an inventive syntax that pushed common usage to its outer limit. But what of it beyond this paradigm of literature? Deleuze did not neglect that dauntless and methodical empiricism so typical of contemporary sciences, subjecting to continuous scrutiny their own intellectual tools. There is no limit to their borrowing of models, algorithms and syntaxes without which their concepts would be nothing but lexicographic niceties. Thus Deleuze left behind his former reference to algebraic manifolds for the multiple processes, each time singular and complex, through which reality configures itself. Francis Bacon's pictorial achievement will confirm what Valéry, earlier, expected from a commerce with painting as assiduous as his daily practice of mathematics. After two versions of *La Méthode de Léonard de Vinci*, nothing had survived of the myth of the universal engineer, above all nothing of the myth of a pure mind. Degas' canvases and monotypes, unexpected in their articulation of postures and gestures, their treatment of affect and their technical virtuosity, had decisively taken up the syntactical and graphic challenge of Mallarmé.[23]

While analysing the paintings of Bacon, Deleuze follows a series of fea-tures whose order 'is only worthwhile from the point of view of a general logic of sensation'. He will track down the primary elaboration of affect, for which *LS* still borrowed from psychoanalysis, even if it were quite restricted to orality. Bacon pushes aside the tropes of psychoanalysis because the deformation of his own figures, by means of stretching, displacement and circular *à-plats*, have outdated narcissism and oedipianism as much as they dismissed the obsession of verbalization. Merleau-Ponty saw in *modern painting* a confirmation of the obsolescence of the perceptive canon, with its machinery of 'sense data' and primordial utterances, and of the phenomeno-logical apparatus of description. Deleuze notes that this obsolescence begins when 'man no longer sees himself quite like an essence, but rather as an

accident', that is to say immerged in the web of events.[24] Bacon insists, as did Cézanne, that he does not seek to render the object, but the visibility itself, in that corporeal echo which the pictorial gestures bring to completion.[25]

This specificity of painting, and perhaps its irrevocable privilege, is confirmed when Deleuze twice confronts Lewis Carroll to Francis Bacon. Both have overturned the canons of storytelling and representation, each one playing with the medium so as to disorient narration or capture on canvas something else than the splendid visibility of the *beautiful image*. But Bacon ignores those transformations by analogy and symmetry which affect the body and the tribulations of Alice. His canvas is cleansed of all the perspectives and Euclidian scenographies that haunt the gaze, memory and techniques of the academic painter. His figures are isolated, his triptychs are discontinuous, his mirrors are blackened, refusing to lend their catoptrics to whatever geometry of representation. The *à-plat*, a flattening out, admits only surface transformations, tears, stretches and spasms.

> Bacon did not see at all the mirror as Lewis Carroll did. The body goes through the mirror, it is lodged within it, itself and its shadow. Whence the fascination. There is nothing behind the mirror, but inside. The body seems to get longer, flatten down and stretch out, as if it were contracting itself to pass through a hole.

Bacon concentrates in the mouth and the smile the deformations of that which is not yet or no longer a human face. Bacon 'paints heads, not faces'.[26] He shakes them, swirls them, slaps them, rips from them fragments of a mask so that the totality of the body surfaces there in an ultimate contortion of the mouth. Bodies at the cusp of the fall, piled up as in a *Pietà*, suspended or collapsed flesh of his Calvaries, figures encircled by the halo of a projector or by the ring of a circus, all are seized upon in their specific manner of not suffering themselves, as if they were vomited from within the envelope of their skin. The figure, which is a posture, does not hide anything of the animal body in the quest of a face barely sketched by a smile. Deleuze notes all the pictorial variants of this pure affect the mathematical *storyteller* had labelled 'smile of cat with no cat'.

Working at the border of the smile and the shout, Bacon painted a dozen versions of *Portrait of Pope Urban X*. The figure of Velázquez is torn away from its pontifical apparatus, enclosed in a kind of parallelepiped where it will exercise an endless priesthood. In a first version, Urban X turned his gaze towards a quarter of meat freshly flayed. Then the face occupied the centre of the canvas, thunderstruck by the invisible evidence of an unspeakable disaster, like the hero of Burroughs in *The Mechanical Bride* or

the screaming face of the nurse in *Battleship Potemkin,* an image we know inspired Bacon. Seized in this quasi-transparent confessional, a seer prisoner of visibility, the face beneath the tiara will exhibit for eternity a paroxysm of terror and of pity which it no longer can end, through absolution or remission. The hallucinated head is the transcription of a shout. His spasmodic expression 'does not paint the horror but the shouting' – confirming thus Cézanne's dictum: 'life is scary'. Deleuze compares this shout to those of Alban Berg, that of Marie, horizontally rent, or that of Lulu which exceeds the range of a human voice. But this painting of the affect had taken its dimensions from the cubism of Cézanne. 'The conic shout, which fuses with the vertical axis, the stretched out, triangular smile that fuses with the horizontal axis, are the real *motifs* of this painting', transcribed in the contractions and relaxations of a mouth.[27] Deleuze reads Bacon's triptychs as a contemporary musical score whose writing might have been induced by a Cézannian syntax. Like Merleau-Ponty, he situates the breaking-through of modern painting at the point where Cézanne, half a century after the failure of Frenhoffer[28] and ignoring the optical naturalism of the Impressionists, brought the mastery of colours. This 'Poussin direct from nature' that he was aiming for, is obtained from a *Logic of coloured sensations,* where he thought himself to be just a primitive.[29] This would be a logic of colours finally out of the Garden of Eden, freed from their liturgical calendar and their messianism, those of an Orion un-blinded to its own myths.[30] Coloured sensation, motif, figure, such is the Cézannian sequence: 'This figurative path, Cézanne gave it a simple name: sensation. It is the sensible form brought back to sensation', a disaffected expression of the affect which confers to *Les Grandes Baigneuses* their poignant strangeness. Bacon, who seems to have painted only people close to him, eliminates from his portraits the familiarity of the friend or of the model. 'You would like,' says Sylvester, 'to be able in a portrait to create the appearance of a Sahara, to make it in such likeness, even if it seems to contain the distances of the Sahara.' At the beginning of the century, some reproached Cézanne for his woody or mineral faces.

According to Cézanne, colour is the place where the brain and the world do meet. Bacon wonders likewise about the 'very heated and difficult question as to why a painting touches directly the nervous system'. He called upon Valéry: sensation is transmitted directly, avoiding the detour of a story to be told. How is it transmitted? The painting deploys, by the very fact of its existence, by the fact that it is painted and that it is seen, an efficiency whose principles are not declared. Deleuze also wonders about this power of creative synthesis. A few reasons are easily dismissed because they always suppose what needs to be explained: the gripping nature of the scene, the continuity of a move. All these are linked to figurative painting, foreign to

what makes Bacon a Cézannian, 'much more than if he were a disciple of Cézanne'. Synaesthesia is another candidate, suggesting heaviness in the curbed figure of Millet or the horse's gallop in Picasso's corridas. But if the moment of pathos underlying that kind of correspondence shows the insufficiency of the common-sense protocol of recognition, then 'it is that the painter *makes us see* a sort of original unity of the senses and to make visually apparent a multisensible figure'. One must assume a certain vital power that traverses all the sensorial domains, as when music grips the heart or secretly calls upon the muscular sense. 'The ultimate is then the relationship of rhythm with sensation, which places in each sensation the levels and the domains by which it passes.'[31] Resonance rather than synaesthesia, articulation of intensities which colours convert into *à-plats* and ruptured tonalities: Deleuze concedes to them the articulation of a stridence rather than of an alphabet. Painting is a matter of consonance. It is verified each time the painting is seen, as in the opera by Berg which makes us hear the shout and the noise within the musical sound.

This sensation of colours, modulated as in the orchestration of a cry, joins the intensity of the verdant [*verdoyer*] – a proud verb, whose infinitive does not cancel the grammatical figure but rather reveals its empirical and vital archaeology. In both cases a regime of qualitative intensity conveys the affect, effectuates its demand and makes it explicit in the forms of the sensible. Thus the juxtaposition of brushstrokes in Cézanne's painting and the broken tonalities in that of Bacon enter into equivalence. Deleuze can take up, and this time before the verbal elaboration, the question left to the purview of psychoanalysis: how does this secondary order called sublimation come about? He knew very well that Freud had renounced this subject.[32] Painting revealed this singular capacity of acting out proper to sensation, much like a constitutive hysteria.[33] It is also a process of truth as much as of expression since it concerns the passage from the possible of the experience to the fact of the painting, producing the 'most real' image. This reality of the image, without a back side, refuses the sly game of being hidden underneath appearances: it is implied in the realism of the choices which makes it an image. If the painter brings his body (Valéry again), it is a body 'without organs', freed from the five senses, the six virtues and the seven sins. Deleuze follows its operations in a series going from Artaud to Bateson. Painting is a production of surfaces, of diagrams and of figures of affect.

Why was this detour, along the experience of modern painting, necessary? First it has eliminated the protocol of phenomenology with its elaborate weaving of evidence and narrations. Merleau-Ponty turned this denial into a philosophical testament. And on the positive side, with the elimination of a passive and representative sensation the black spot of empiricism was cleared.

The intervention of the painter who fabricates the visible with the visible, who makes us see 'the invisible of the visible' (Klee), did overcome that Aristotelian prejudice. 'Paul Valéry had a profound idea: what is most deep is the skin. This is a Stoic discovery which presupposes a great deal of wisdom and entails an entire ethic.'[34] But this surface of painting – fresco, or canvas, first integument, protector of our sensorial surfaces, tattoo, Achilles' shield[35] – had definitively liberated itself of any kind of natural history. Then came about an anthropological history of figures and apotropaic diagrams, followed by geometrical perspectives. This history became clear after Baudelaire had pointed out heroism in black redingotes and modern effects in his criticism of *Les Femmes d'Alger*. Bacon's painting exemplified once more, with even more harshness and bitterness, Baudelaire's poetic operation, which flows from his *Salons* to *Les Fleurs du Mal*. After the Second World War, there was no longer any need for a scandalous title for empiricism to explore and probe all its possibilities.

In linking to a *logic of sense* a *logic of sensation*, Deleuze had thus twice annulled a long-enduring philosophical opposition between the sensible and the intelligible. He prepared there the premises for a new kind of conceptuality, strictly attached to its medium and circumstances. Such would be his last book.[36] While bringing to the fore how the Stoics had put aside Aristotelianism through the description of some effective grammatical operations, he had already substituted a conscious balance of *syntax* and *pragmatics* to the *logical common sense* Kant had invested with the mission to defend criticism. A decade later, Bacon's painting demonstrates how sensation, once transcribed in dimensions of painting, mostly transform the implicit in the affect into figures of intelligence, which confirmed the order of Stoic introductions to logic.[37] It does not make much sense, however, to wonder about the necessity of keeping with the term *Stoicism* for something that had ceased being the name of a School, and that Deleuze applies to the surrealism of Joë Bousquet as much as to Valéry. Discontinuity is precisely what permits this insolent repetition in extreme difference.

What matters is elsewhere. It lies in having liberated empiricism from this archaeology of sense which had long implied Stoicism in the logical diagrams of transcendental philosophy. Michel Foucault reviewed *LS* under the title *Theatrum philosophicum*. He praised a decisive intervention in the field of a French philosophy that had for such a long time searched for its future of concreteness and modernity in an ultimate recourse to phenomenology. On this last act of a Stoic-Kantian phenomenology the curtain was now lowered. The logic of sensation had gained its independence, and painting no longer needed to answer to the rule of universal translation between things and words – a tacit classical assumption that prowls in the

premises of Kant and is in fact the literal meaning of *phenomenology*. Such was the postulate that the Stoics had given to Alexandrian culture and that Kantian aesthetics still enveloped in the definition of its specific pleasure as an agreement between intuition and understanding.

While identifying the singular syntactic operation which had given its classical turn to Alexandrian Athens, varying the poetics at the root of discursivity, pursuing the invention of virtual dimensions where sense is incessantly constructed, in drawing deliberately from Carroll, Lowry, Fitz-gerald, Melville or Beckett, and from the painting of Bacon and Cézanne, Deleuze had opened a way out of the sensualist stance of empiricism. That stance, and the role of antagonist that Kant conferred on it in the repertory of philosophies which articulate his *Brief History of Reason*, was thus swept away by the same high tide which also vanquished criticism.[38]

III

Life

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Absolute Immanence

Giorgio Agamben

LIFE

By virtue of a striking coincidence, the last texts published by Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze before their deaths have at their centre the concept of life. The meaning of this testamentary coincidence (for what is at issue in both cases is something like a will) goes beyond the secret solidarity between two friends. It implies the statement of a legacy that clearly concerns the coming philosophy, which, to make this inheritance its own, will have to take *its* point of departure in the concept of life towards which the last works of both philosophers gesture. (Such, at least, is the hypothesis guiding this inquiry.)

Foucault's text is entitled 'Life: Experience and Science', and was published in the January – March 1985 issue of *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (it was submitted to the journal in April 1984 and therefore constitutes the last text to which the author could have given his *imprimatur*, even if it takes up and modifies a text of 1978).[1] What characterizes these pages, which Foucault conceived as a great homage to his teacher, Georges Canguilhem, is a curious inversion of what had been Foucault's earlier understanding of the idea of life. It is as if Foucault, who, with *The Birth of the Clinic*, had begun under the inspiration of Xavier Bichat's new vitalism and definition of life as 'the set of functions that resist death', ended by considering life instead as the proper domain of error. 'At the limit,' Foucault writes, 'life . . . is what is capable of error . . . With man, life reaches a living being who is never altogether in his place, a living being who is fated "to err" and "to be mistaken." '[2] This displacement can be seen as further documentation of the crisis that Foucault, according to Deleuze, experienced after the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*. But what is at issue here is surely something more than disappointment or pessimism; it is something like a new experience that necessitates a general reformulation of the relations between truth and

the subject and that, nevertheless, concerns the specific area of Foucault's research. Tearing the subject from the terrain of the *cogito* and consciousness, this experience roots it in life. But insofar as this life is essentially errancy, it exceeds the lived experiences and intentionality of phenomenology: 'Does not the entire theory of the subject have to be reformulated once knowledge, instead of opening onto the truth of the world, is rooted in the "errors" of life?'[3]

What is the nature of a knowledge that has as its correlate no longer the opening to a world and to truth, but only life and its errancy? Alain Badiou, who is certainly one of the most interesting philosophers of the generation immediately following Foucault and Deleuze, still conceives of the subject on the basis of a contingent encounter with truth, leaving aside the living being as 'the animal of the human species', as a mere support for this encounter. It is clear that what is at issue in Foucault is not simply an epistemological adjustment but, rather, another dislocation of the theory of knowledge, one that opens onto entirely unexplored terrain. And it is precisely this terrain, which coincides with the field of biopolitics, that could have furnished Foucault with the 'third axis, distinct from both knowledge and power', which Deleuze suggests he needed, and which the essay on Canguilhem defines *in limine* as 'a different way of approaching the notion of life'.

PHILOSOPHY OF PUNCTUATION

Deleuze's text, which will be our sole subject of study for the rest of this chapter, bears the title 'Immanence: A Life . . . ' ('Immanence: Une vie . . . ') and appeared in the journal *Philosophie* two months before the philosopher's death. Unlike Foucault's essay, it is a brief piece that has the cursory *ductus* of a summary note. Even its title, despite its vague and almost suspended appearance, must have been carefully considered. The two key concepts are neither united in a syntagma nor tied by the particle 'and' (which is so characteristic of Deleuze's titles); instead, each term is followed by a punctuation mark (first a colon, then ellipsis dots). The choice of this absolutely non-syntactical articulation (which is neither hypotactic nor paratactic but, so to speak, atactic) of the two terms is surely not accidental.

Elements for a philosophy of punctuation are, with the exception of the brief indications in Adorno's essay, almost entirely lacking.[4] It has been observed that in philosophical texts, not only nouns but also adverbs can acquire the dignity of genuine terms (Puder and Löwith have noted the special function of the adverbs *gleichwohl* and *schon* in, respectively, Kant and

Heidegger). It is less well known that even punctuation marks (for example, the hyphen in expressions such as Being-in-the-world) can take on a technical function (the hyphen is, in this sense, the most dialectical of punctuation marks, since it unites only to the degree that it distinguishes and distinguishes only to the degree that it unites). Deleuze himself has suggested that punctuation has a strategic importance in his works. In *Dialogues*, after developing his theory of the special meaning of the conjunction 'and', he adds, 'It is too bad, for that matter, that many writers do away with punctuation, which in French also holds for AND.'[5] If one keeps in mind the simultaneously destructive and creative character that this theory attributes to the particle at issue ('and' [*et*] takes the place of 'is' [*est*] and disarticulates ontology, yet 'and' also 'makes language spin', introducing *agencement* and stuttering), this implies that in the title 'Immanence: A Life . . . ', the use of the colon between 'Immanence' and 'A Life' as well as of the final ellipsis dots carries out a decisive intention.

THE COLON: IMMANATION

In treatises on punctuation, the function of the colon is generally defined in terms of an intersection of two parameters: a pause value (stronger than the semicolon and less than the period) and a semantic value, which marks the indissoluble relation between two meanings, each of which is in itself partially complete. In the series that goes from the equals sign (identity of meaning) to the hyphen (the dialectic of unity and separation), the colon thus occupies an intermediary function. Deleuze could have written 'Immanence Is a Life', or 'Immanence and a Life' (in the sense in which 'and' takes the place of 'is' to create an *agencement*) and, furthermore (according to the principle underlined by J. H. Masmejan[6] that only a comma can take the place of a colon): 'Immanence, A Life'. Deleuze instead used a colon, clearly because he had in mind neither a simple identity nor a simple logical connection. (When Deleuze writes in the text, 'one can say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else', it suffices to recall the title's colon to exclude the possibility that he intends an identity between 'immanence' and 'a life'.) The colon introduces something more than an *agencement* between immanence and a life; it introduces an *agencement* of a special kind, something like an absolute *agencement* that also includes 'non-relation', or the relation derived from non-relation of which Deleuze speaks in his discussion of the relationship to the Outside in his book on Foucault. If we take up Adorno's metaphor of the colon as a green light in the traffic of language – the aptness of which is verified by punctuation treatises, which classify the

colon among 'opening' marks – we can then say that between immanence and a life there is a kind of crossing with neither distance nor identification, something like a passage without spatial movement. In this sense, the colon represents the dislocation of immanence in itself, the opening to an alterity that nevertheless remains absolutely immanent: that is, the movement that Deleuze, playing on Neoplatonic emanation, calls *immanation*.

ELLIPSIS DOTS: VIRTUALITY

Analogous remarks could be made for the ellipsis dots that close (and that at the same time leave open) the title. One could even say that the value of the ellipsis dots as a technical term is nowhere as apparent as in the very title 'Immanence: A Life ... '. Elsewhere, Deleuze observes how Céline's use of ellipsis dots deposes the power of syntactical ties: *'Guignol's Band* achieves the ultimate aim: exclamatory sentences and suspensions that do away with all syntax in favour of a pure dance of words.'[7] The fact that an asyntactical and, more generally, asemantic element is present in punctuation is implicit in the constant relation between punctuation and breathing that appears from the very first treatises on punctuation and that takes the form of a necessary interruption of meaning ('the middle dot', one reads in Dionysius Thrax's *Grammar*, 'indicates where one is to breathe'). But here the ellipsis dots function not so much to suspend meaning and make words dance outside all syntactic hierarchy as to transform the very status of the word 'life', from which the ellipsis dots become inseparable. If terminology, as Deleuze once said, is the poetry of philosophy, here the rank of *terminus technicus* falls neither to the concept *life* nor to the syntagma *a life*, but solely to the nonsyntagma *a life*. ... Here the incompleteness that is traditionally thought to characterize ellipsis dots does not refer to a final, yet lacking, meaning (Claudel: 'a period is everything; an ellipsis is not everything'); rather, it indicates an indefinition of a specific kind, which brings the indefinite meaning of the particle 'a' to its limit. 'The indefinite as such,' Deleuze writes, 'does not mark an empirical indetermination, but a determination of immanence or a transcendental determinability. The indefinite article cannot be the indetermination of the person without being the determination of the singular.'[8]

The technical term *a life* ... expresses this transcendental determinability of immanence as singular life, its absolutely virtual nature and its definition through this virtuality alone. 'A life', Deleuze writes, 'contains only virtual entities. It is composed of virtualities, events, singularities. What one calls virtual is not something lacking in reality.'[9] Suspending all syntactic ties, the

ellipsis dots nevertheless maintain the term 'life' in relation to its pure determinability and, while carrying it into this virtual field, exclude the possibility that the indefinite article 'a' might (as in Neoplatonism) transcend the Being that follows it.

BEYOND THE COGITO

Considered as a simultaneously asyntagmatic and indivisible block, the title 'Immanence: A Life ... ' is therefore something like a diagram condensing the thought of the late Deleuze. At first glance, it already articulates the fundamental character of Deleuzian immanence, that is, its 'not referring to an object' and its 'not belonging to a subject' – in other words, its being immanent only to itself and, nevertheless, in movement. It is in this sense that Deleuze evokes immanence at the beginning of the text, under the name of 'transcendental field'. Here 'transcendental' is opposed to 'transcendent', since it does not imply a consciousness but is solely defined as what 'escapes all transcendence, both of the subject and of the object'.[10] The genesis of the notion of transcendental field can be found in Deleuze's *Logic of Sense*, with reference to Sartre's 1937 essay *La Transcendence de l'ego*. In this text (which Deleuze judges to be 'decisive'), Sartre posits, according to Deleuze, 'an impersonal transcendental field, not having the form of a synthetic personal consciousness of a subjective identity'.[11] Here Deleuze makes use of this concept – which Sartre does not succeed in fully liberating from the plane of consciousness – to reach a pre-individual and absolutely impersonal zone beyond (or before) every idea of consciousness. It is impossible to understand Deleuze's concept of transcendental field or its strict correlate, the concept of singularity, if one does not register the irrevocable step they take beyond the tradition of consciousness in modern philosophy. Not only is it impossible, according to Deleuze, to understand the transcendental, as Kant does, 'in the personal form of an I'; it is also impossible (here Deleuze's polemical target is Husserlian phenomenology) 'to preserve for it the form of consciousness, even if we define this impersonal consciousness by means of pure intentionalities and retentions, which still presuppose centres of individuation. The error of all efforts to determine the transcendental as consciousness is that they think of the transcendental in the image of, and in resemblance to, that which it is supposed to ground.'[12] From Descartes to Husserl, the *cogito* made the transcendental possible as a field of consciousness. But if it thus appears in Kant as a pure consciousness without any experience, in Deleuze, by contrast, the transcendental is resolutely separated from every idea of

consciousness, appearing as an experience without either consciousness or subject: a transcendental empiricism, in Deleuze's truly paradoxical formula.

Thus liquidating the values of consciousness, Deleuze carries out the gesture of a philosopher who, despite Deleuze's lack of fondness for him, is certainly closer to Deleuze than is any other representative of phenomenology in the twentieth century: Heidegger, the *'pataphysical'* Heidegger of the wonderful article on Alfred Jarry, the Heidegger with whom Deleuze, through this incomparable Ubuesque caricature, can finally reconcile himself.[13] For *Dasein*, with its Being-in-the-world, is certainly not to be understood as an indissoluble relation between a subject – a consciousness – and its world; and *alētheia*, whose centre is ruled by darkness and *lēthē*, is the opposite of an intentional object or a world of pure ideas. An abyss separates Heidegger's concepts from the Husserlian intentionality from which they derive, and it is this abyss that, in displacing these concepts along the line that goes from Nietzsche to Deleuze, makes them into the first figures of the new postconscious and postsubjective, impersonal and non-individual transcendental field that Deleuze's thought leaves as a legacy to 'his' century.

THE PRINCIPLE OF IMMANENCE

A genealogy of the idea of immanence in Deleuze must begin with the third and eleventh chapters of Deleuze's great monograph on Spinoza. Here the idea of immanence has its origin in Spinoza's affirmation of the univocity of Being in contrast to the Scholastic thesis of *analogia entis*, according to which Being is not said of God and finite creatures in the same way. 'For Spinoza, on the other hand,' Deleuze writes,

> the concept of univocal Being is perfectly determinate, as what is pre-dicated in one and the same sense of substance in itself, and of modes that are in something else. . . . Thus it is the idea of immanent cause that takes over, in Spinoza, from univocity, freeing it from the indifference and neutrality to which it had been confined by the theory of a divine creation. And it is in immanence that univocity finds its distinctly Spinozist for-mulation: God is said to be the cause of all things *in the very sense (eo sensu)* that he is said to be cause of himself.[14]

The principle of immanence, therefore, is nothing other than a generalization of the ontology of univocity, which excludes any transcendence of Being. Yet through Spinoza's idea of an immanent cause in which agent and patient coincide, Being is freed from the risk of inertia and immobility with which

the absolutization of univocity threatened it by making Being equal to itself in its every point. Spinoza's immanent cause produces by remaining in itself, just like the emanational cause of the Neoplatonists. But the effects of Spinoza's immanent cause do not leave it, unlike those of the emanational cause. With a striking etymological figure that displaces the origin of the term "immanence" from *manere* ('to remain') to *manare* ('to flow out'), Deleuze returns mobility and life to immanence: 'A cause is immanent ... when its effect is 'immanate' in the cause, rather than emanating from it.'[15]

Immanence flows forth; it always, so to speak, carries a colon with it. Yet this springing forth, far from leaving itself, remains incessantly and vertiginously within itself. This is why Deleuze can state – with an expression that shows his full awareness of the decisive position that immanence would later assume in his thought – that 'immanence is the very vertigo of philosophy'.[16]

What is Philosophy? gives what one could call the theory of this vertigo. The extreme consequences of the concept of 'immanation' are drawn out in the idea that the plane of immanence, like the transcendental field of which it is the final figure, has no subject. It is immanent not to something, but only to itself: 'Immanence is immanent only to itself and consequently captures everything, absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing remaining to which it could be immanent. In any case, whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent *to* Something, we can be sure that this Something reintroduces the transcendent.'[17] The risk here is that the plane of immanence, which in itself exhausts Being and thought, will instead be referred 'to something that would be like a dative'. The third 'example' of Chapter 2 presents the entire history of philosophy, from Plato to Husserl, as the history of this risk. Deleuze thus strategically makes use of the absolutization of the principle of immanence ('immanence is immanent only to itself') to trace a line of immanence within the history of philosophy (one that culminates in Spinoza, who is therefore defined as the 'prince of philosophers') and, in particular, to specify his own position with respect to the tradition of twentieth-century phenomenology. Starting with Husserl, immanence becomes immanent to a transcendental subjectivity, and the cipher of transcendence thus reappears at its centre:

This is what happens in Husserl and many of his successors who discover in the Other or in the Flesh, the mole of the transcendent within immanence itself ... In this modern moment we are no longer satisfied with thinking immanence as immanent to a transcendent; *we want to think transcendence within the immanent, and it is from immanence that a breach is expected* ... The Judeo-Christian word replaces the Greek logos: no longer

satisfied with ascribing immanence to something, immanence itself is made to disgorge the transcendent everywhere.[18]

(The allusion to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas – two philosophers whom Deleuze, in fact, considers with great interest – is clear.)

But immanence is not merely threatened by this illusion of transcendence, in which it is made to leave itself and to give birth to the transcendent. This illusion is, rather, something like a necessary illusion in Kant's sense, which immanence itself produces on its own and to which every philosopher falls prey even as he tries to adhere as closely as possible to the plane of immanence. The task that thought cannot renounce is also the most difficult one, the task in which the philosopher constantly risks going astray. Insofar as immanence is the 'movement of the infinite'[19] beyond which there is nothing, immanence has neither a fixed point nor a horizon that can orient thought; the 'movement has engulfed everything', and the only possible point of orientation is the vertigo in which outside and inside, immanence and transcendence, are absolutely indistinguishable. That Deleuze encounters something like a limit point here is shown by the passage in which the plane of immanence appears as both what must be thought and as what cannot be thought: 'Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every plane, and to think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought, as the not-external outside and the not-internal inside.'[20]

A LIFE

In this light, the indication contained in Deleuze's 'testament' acquires particular urgency. The philosopher's supreme gesture is to consign immanence to the title 'Immanence: A Life ... ', that is, to consider immanence as 'a life ... '. But what does it mean for absolute immanence to appear as life? And in what sense does Deleuze's title express his most extreme thought?

Deleuze begins by specifying what we could have imagined, namely, that to say that immanence is 'a life ... ' is in no way to attribute immanence to life as to a subject. On the contrary, 'a life ... ' designates precisely the being immanent to itself of immanence, the philosophical vertigo that is by now familiar to us: 'one can say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life; rather, immanence that is in nothing is in itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence ... '.[21] At this point, Deleuze gives a succinct genealogical sketch by means of references to passages in Fichte and Maine de Biran.

Immediately afterwards, as if realizing the insufficiency of his references and fearing that his final thought might remain obscure, he has recourse to a literary example:

> No one has related what a life is better than Dickens, by taking account of the indefinite article understood as the index of the transcendental. A good-for-nothing, universally scorned rogue is brought in dying, only for those caring for him to show a sort of ardent devotion and respect, an affection for the slightest sign of life in the dying man. Everyone is so anxious to save him that in the depths of his coma even the wretch himself feels something benign passing into him. But as he comes back to life his carers grow cold and all his coarseness and malevolence return. Between his life and death there is a moment which is now only that of a life playing with death. The life of the individual has given way to a life that is impersonal but singular nevertheless, and which releases a pure event freed from the accidents of inner and outer life; freed, in other words, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: *Homo tantum* with which everyone sympathizes and which attains a soil of beatitude. [22]

Deleuze's reference is to the episode in *Our Mutual Friend* in which Riderhood nearly drowns. It suffices to skim these pages to realize what could have so forcefully attracted Deleuze's attention. First of all, Dickens clearly distinguishes Riderhood the individual and the 'spark of life within him' from the scoundrel in which he lives: 'No one has the least regard for the man: with them all, he has been an object of avoidance, suspicion and aversion; but the spark of life within him is curiously separable from himself now, and they have a deep interest in it, probably because it is life, and they are living and must die.'[23] The place of this separable life is neither in this world nor in the next, but between the two, in a kind of happy netherworld that it seems to leave only reluctantly:

> See! A token of life! An indubitable token of life! The spark may smoulder and go out, or it may glow and expand, but see! The four rough fellows seeing, shed tears. Neither Riderhood in this world, nor Riderhood in the other, could draw tears from them; but a striking human soul between the two can do it easily. He is struggling to come back. Now he is almost here, now he is far away again. Now he is struggling harder to get back. And yet – like us all, when we swoon – like us all, every day of our life, when we wake – he is instinctively unwilling to be restored to the consciousness of this existence, and would be left dormant, if he could.[24]

What makes Riderhood's 'spark of life' interesting is precisely this state of suspension, which cannot be attributed to any subject. It is significant that Dickens refers to this state as 'abeyance', using a word that originates in legal parlance and that indicates the suspension of rules or rights between validity and abrogation ('the spark of life was deeply interesting while it was in abeyance, but now that it got established in Mr Riderhood, there appears to be a general desire that circumstances had admitted of its being developed in anybody else, rather than in the gentleman').[25] This is why Deleuze can speak of an 'impersonal life' situated on a threshold beyond good and evil, 'since only the subject who incarnated it in the middle of things made it good or bad'.[26] And it is in relation to this impersonal life that Deleuze's brief reference to Maine de Biran becomes fully comprehensible. Starting with *Mémoire sur la décomposition de la pensée*, Maine de Biran's entire work is motivated by the indefatigable attempt to grasp, prior to the I and the will and in close dialogue with the physiology of his time, a 'mode of existence that is so to speak impersonal'.[27] Maine de Biran calls this mode of existence 'affectibility' [*affectibilité*] and defines it as a simple organic capacity of affection without personality that, like Condillac's statue, becomes all its modifications and yet, at the same time, constitutes 'a manner of existing that is positive and complete in its kind'.[28]

Not even Dickens's text, however, seems to satisfy Deleuze. The fact is that the bare life that it presents seems to come to light only in the moment of its struggle with death ('a life should not be contained in the simple moment in which individual life confronts universal death').[29] But even the next example, which is meant to show impersonal life insofar as it coexists with the life of the individual without becoming identical to it, bears on a special case, one that lies in the vicinity not of death but of birth. 'The smallest infants,' Deleuze writes, 'all resemble each other and have no individuality; but they have singularities, a smile, a gesture, a grimace, events that are not subjective characters. The smallest infants are traversed by an immanent life that is pure potentiality [*pure puissance*], even beatitude through suffering and weaknesses.'[30]

One could say that the difficult attempt to clarify the vertigo of imma- nence by means of 'a life' leads us instead into an area that is even more uncertain, in which the child and the dying man present us with the enigmatic cipher of bare biological life as such.

THE ANIMAL ON THE INSIDE

In the history of Western philosophy, bare life as such is identified at a decisive moment. It is the moment in which Aristotle, in *De anima*, isolates

the most general and separable meaning of 'living being' [*zōon*] among the many ways in which the term is said. 'It is by living,' Aristotle observes,

> that the animal is distinguished from the inanimate. But life is said in many ways, and we say that a thing lives if any one of the following is present in it – thought, sensation, movement or rest in a place, besides the movement implied in nutrition and decay or growth. This is why all plants seem to us to live. It is clear that they have in themselves a principle and a capacity by means of which they grow and decay in opposite directions. ... This principle may be separated from others, but the others cannot exist apart from it in mortal beings. This is evident in the case of plants; for they have no other capacity of the soul. This, then, is the principle through which all living things have life. ... By 'nutritive faculty' [*threptikon*] I mean that part of the soul that even the plants share.[31]

It is important to observe that Aristotle does not at all define what life is. He merely divides it up in isolating the nutritive function and then orders it into a series of distinct and correlated faculties (nutrition, sensation, thought). What is clearly at work here is the exemplary principle of Aristotle's thought, the principle of the ground. This principle consists in reformulating all questions that have the form of 'what is it?' as questions that have the form of 'through what thing (*dia ti*) does something belong to something else?'. 'The *dia ti*', the 'through-what', or 'why', we read in *Metaphysics*, 1041 a II, 'is always to be sought in the following fashion: through what thing does something belong to something else?'. To ask why (*dia ti*) a thing is said to be a living being is to seek the ground through which life belongs to this thing. The undifferentiated ground on whose presupposition individual living beings are said to be alive is nutritive life (or vegetative life, as it was called by ancient commentators, referring to the particular status of plants in Aristotle as obscurely and absolutely separated from *logos*).

In the history of Western science, the isolation of this bare life constitutes an event that is in every sense fundamental. When Bichat, in his *Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort*, distinguishes 'animal life', which is defined by its relation to an external world, from 'organic life', which is nothing other than a 'habitual succession of assimilation and excretion', it is still Aristotle's nutritive life that constitutes the background against which the life of superior animals is separated and on which the 'animal living on the outside' is opposed to the 'animal on the inside'. And when, at the end of the eighteenth century, as Foucault has shown, the State started to assume the

care of life and the population as one of its essential tasks and politics became biopolitics, it carried out its new vocation above all through a progressive generalization and redefinition of the concept of vegetative or organic life (which coincides with the biological heritage of the nation). And today, in discussions of *ex lege* definitions of new criteria for death, it is a further identification of this bare life – which is now severed from all cerebral activity and subjects – that still decides if a particular body will be considered alive or, instead, abandoned to the extreme vicissitudes of transplantation.

But what, then, separates this pure vegetative life from the 'spark of life' in Riderhood and the 'impersonal life' of which Deleuze speaks?

UNATTRIBUTABLE LIFE

Deleuze is aware that he enters a dangerous territory in displacing immanence into the domain of life. Riderhood's dying life and the infant's nascent life seem to border on the dark area once inhabited by Aristotle's nutritive life and Bichat's 'animal on the inside'. Like Foucault, Deleuze is perfectly conscious of the fact that any thought that considers life shares its object with power and must incessantly confront power's strategies. Foucault's diagnosis of the transformation of power into biopower leaves no doubts on the matter: 'Against this power that was still new in the nineteenth century,' Foucault writes, 'the forces that resisted relied for support on the very thing it invested, that is, on life and man as a living being. ... Life as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it.'[32] And Deleuze remarks: 'Life becomes resistance to power when power takes life as its object. Here again, the two operations belong to the same horizon.'[33] The concept of resistance here must be understood not merely as a political metaphor but as an echo of Bichat's definition of life as 'the set of functions that resist death'. Yet one may legitimately ask if this concept truly suffices to master the ambivalence of today's biopolitical conflict, in which the freedom and happiness of human beings is played out on the very terrain – bare life – that marks their subjection to power.

If a clear definition of 'life' seems to be lacking in both Foucault and Deleuze, the task of grasping the sense of 'life' in Deleuze's last work is all the more urgent. What is decisive here is that its role seems exactly opposed to the one played by nutritive life in Aristotle. While nutritive life functions as the principle allowing for the attribution of life to a subject ('This, then, is the principle through which all living things have life'), *a life* ... , as the

figure of absolute immanence, is precisely what can never be attributed to a subject, being instead the matrix of infinite desubjectification. *In Deleuze, the principle of immanence thus functions antithetically to Aristotle's principle of the ground.* But there is more. While the specific aim of the isolation of bare life is to mark a division in the living being, such that a plurality of functions and a series of oppositions can be articulated (vegetative life/relational life; animal on the inside/animal on the outside; plant/man; and at the limit, *zoē/bios*, bare life and politically qualified life), *a life* ... marks the radical impossibility of establishing hierarchies and separations. The plane of immanence thus functions as a principle of virtual indetermination, in which the vegetative and the animal, the inside and the outside and even the organic and the inorganic, in passing through one another, cannot be told apart:

> A life is everywhere, in all the moments a certain living subject passes through and that certain lived objects regulate: immanent life carrying along the events or singularities which do nothing more than actualise themselves in subjects and objects. This indefinite life does not itself have moments, however close together they might be, but only meantimes [*des entre-temps*], between-moments. It neither takes place nor follows, but presents the immensity of the empty time where the event can be seen that is still to come and yet has already passed, in the absolute of an immediate consciousness.[34]

At the end of *WP*, in one of the most important passages of Deleuze's late philosophy, life as absolute immediacy is defined as 'pure contemplation without knowledge'. Here Deleuze distinguishes two possible modes of understanding vitalism, the first as act without essence, the second as potentiality without action:

> Vitalism has always had two possible interpretations: that of an idea that acts but is not – that acts therefore only from the point of view of an external cerebral knowledge (from Kant to Claude Bernard); or that of a force that is but does not act – that is therefore a pure intentional Awareness (from Leibniz to Ruyer). If the second interpretation seems to us to be imperative, it is because the contraction that preserves is always in a state of detachment in relation to action or even to movement and appears as a pure contemplation without knowledge.[35]

Deleuze's two examples of this 'contemplation without knowledge', this force that preserves without acting, are sensation ('sensation is pure

contemplation') and habit ('even when one is a rat, it is through contemplation that one "contracts" a habit').[36] What is important is that this contemplation without knowledge, which at times recalls the Greek conception of theory as not knowledge but touching [*thigein*], here functions to define life. As absolute immanence, *a life* . . . is pure contemplation beyond every subject and object of knowledge; it is pure potentiality that preserves without acting. Brought to the limit of this new concept of contemplative life – or, rather, living contemplation – we cannot then fail to examine the other characteristic that, in Deleuze's last text, defines life. In what sense can Deleuze state that *a life* . . . is 'potentiality, complete beatitude'?[37] To answer this question we will, however, first have to further deepen the meaning of the 'vertigo' of immanence.

PASEARSE

Among the works of Spinoza that have been preserved, there is only one passage in which he makes use of the mother tongue of Sephardi Jews, Ladino. It is a passage in the *Compendium grammatices linguae hebraeae*[38] in which the philosopher explains the meaning of the reflexive active verb as an expression of an immanent cause, that is, of an action in which agent and patient are one and the same person. *Se visitare*, 'to visit oneself', the first Latin equivalent that Spinoza gives to clarify the meaning of this verbal form (which in Hebrew is formed by adding a prefix not to the normal form but to the intensive form, which in itself already has a transitive meaning), is clearly insufficient; yet Spinoza immediately qualifies it by means of the singular expression *se visitantem constituere*, 'to constitute oneself visiting'. Two more examples follow, whose Latin equivalents (*se sistere, se ambulation dare*) strike Spinoza as so insufficient that he must resort to the mother tongue of his people. In Ladino (that is, in the archaic Spanish spoken by Sephardim at the time of their expulsion from Spain), 'to stroll' or 'to take a walk' is expressed by the verb *pasearse* ('to walk-oneself', which in modern Spanish is instead expressed as *pasear* or *dar un paseo*). As an equivalent for an immanent cause, which is to say, an action that is referred to the agent himself, the Ladino term is particularly felicitous. It presents an action in which agent and patient enter a threshold of absolute indistinction: a walk as walking-oneself.

In Chapter 12, Spinoza poses the same problem with reference to the corresponding form of the infinitive noun (in Hebrew, the infinitive is declined as a noun):

Since it often happens that the agent and the patient are one and the same person, the Jews found it necessary to form a new and seventh kind of infinitive with which to express an action referred to both the agent and the patient, an action that thus has the form of both an activity and a passivity. ... It was therefore necessary to invent another kind of infinitive, which expressed an action referred to the agent as immanent cause ... , which, as we have seen, means 'to visit oneself', or 'to constitute oneself as visiting' or, finally, 'to show oneself as visiting' [*constituere se visitantem, vel denique praebere se visitantem*].[39]

The immanent cause thus involves a semantic constellation that the philosopher-grammarian grasps, not without difficulty, by means of a number of examples ('to constitute oneself as visiting', 'to show oneself as visiting', *pasearse*) and whose importance for the understanding of the problem of immanence cannot be underestimated. *Pasearse* is an action in which it is impossible to distinguish the agent from the patient (who walks what?) and in which the grammatical categories of active and passive, subject and object, transitive and intransitive therefore lose their meaning. *Pasearse* is, furthermore, an action in which means and end, potentiality and actuality, faculty and use enter a zone of absolute indistinction. This is why Spinoza employs expressions such as 'to constitute oneself as visiting', 'to show oneself as visiting', in which potentiality coincides with actuality and inoperativeness with work. The vertigo of immanence is that it describes the infinite movement of the self-constitution and self-manifestation of Being: Being as *pasearse*.

It is not an accident that the Stoics used precisely the image of the walk to show that modes and events are immanent to substance (Cleanthus and Chrysippus, indeed, ask themselves: who walks, the body moved by the hegemonic part of the soul or the hegemonic part itself?). As Epictetus says, with an extraordinary invention, the modes of Being 'do Being's gymnastics' (*gymnasai*, in which one should also etymologically hear the adjective *gymnos*, 'bare').[40]

BEATITUDE

In this light, Deleuze's notes on Foucault, published by François Ewald under the title 'Desire and Pleasure', contain an important definition. Life, Deleuze, says, is not at all nature; it is, rather, 'desire's variable field of immanence'. Given what we know of Deleuzian immanence, this means that the term 'life' designates nothing more and nothing less than *the immanence of*

desire to itself. It is clear that for Deleuze, desire implies neither alterity nor a lack. But how is it possible to conceive of a desire that as such remains immanent to itself? Or in other words, how is it possible to conceive of absolute immanence in the form of desire? To phrase the question in the terms of Spinoza's *Compendium*: how is it possible to conceive of a movement of desire that does not leave itself, that is, simply as immanent cause, as *pasearse*, as desire's self-constitution as desiring?

Spinoza's theory of 'striving' (*conatus*) as the desire to persevere in one's own Being, whose importance Deleuze often underlines, contains a possible answer to these questions. Whatever the ancient and medieval sources of Spinoza's idea (Harry A. Wolfson lists a number of them, from the Stoics to Dante), it is certain that in each case, its paradoxical formulation perfectly expresses the idea of an immanent movement, a striving that obstinately remains in itself. All beings not only persevere in their own Being (*vis inertiae*) but *desire* to do so (*vis immanentiae*). The movement of *conatus* thus coincides with that of Spinoza's immanent cause, in which agent and patient cannot be told apart. And since *conatus* is identical to the Being of the thing, to desire to persevere in one's own Being is to desire one's own desire, to constitute oneself as desiring. *In* conatus, *desire and Being thus coincide without residue.*

In his *Cogitata Metaphysica*, Spinoza defines life as *conatus* ('life is the force by which a thing perseveres in its own Being'). When Deleuze writes that life is desire's variable field of immanence, he therefore offers a rigorously Spinozan definition of life. But to what degree can life, thus defined in terms of *conatus* and desire, be distinguished from the nutritive potentiality of which Aristotle speaks and, in general, from the vegetative life of the medical tradition? It is worth noting that when Aristotle defines the characteristic functions of the nutritive soul (*threptikē psychē*) in *De anima*, he makes use of an expression that closely recalls Spinoza's determination of *conatus sese conservandi*. Aristotle writes: 'It [*trophē*, nutritivity] preserves its substance. ... This principle of the soul is a potentiality capable of preserving whoever possesses it as such [*dynamis estin hoia sōzein to echon autēn hēi toiouton*].[41] The most essential character of nutritive life, therefore, is not simply growth but above all self-preservation. This means that whereas the medico-philosophical tradition seeks carefully to distinguish the various faculties of the soul and to regulate human life according to the high canon of the life of the mind, Deleuze (like Spinoza) brings the paradigm of the soul back to the lower scheme of nutritive life. While decisively rejecting the function of nutritive life in Aristotle as the ground of the attribution of a subjectivity, Deleuze nevertheless does not want to abandon the terrain of life, which he identifies with the plane of immanence.[42]

But what does it then mean to 'nourish'? In an important essay, Émile Benveniste seeks to determine a unity for the many, often discordant meanings of the Greek word *trephein* (to nourish, to grow and to coagulate). 'In reality', he writes,

> the translation of *trephō* by 'nourish' in the use that is actually the most common does not suit all the examples and is itself only an acceptation of both a broader and a more precise sense. In order to account for the ensemble of semantic connections of *trephō*, we have to define it as: 'to encourage (by appropriate measures) the development of that which is subject to growth'. ... It is here that a peculiar and 'technical' development is inserted, and it is precisely the sense of 'curdle'. The Greek expression is *trephein gala* (*Od.* 9. 246), which must now be literally interpreted as 'to encourage the natural growth of milk, to let it attain the state toward which it is tending'.[43]

If the original meaning of *trephō* is 'to let a being reach the state toward which it strives', 'to let be', then the potentiality that constitutes life in the original sense (self-nourishment) coincides with the very desire to preserve one's own Being that, in Spinoza and Deleuze, defines the potentiality of life as absolute immanence.

It is, then, possible to comprehend why Deleuze writes that a life is potentiality, complete beatitude. Life is 'composed of virtuality';[44] it is pure potentiality that coincides with Being, as in Spinoza, and potentiality, insofar as it 'lacks nothing' and insofar as it is desire's self-constitution as desiring, is immediately blessed. All nourishment, all letting be is blessed and rejoices in itself.

In Spinoza, the idea of beatitude coincides with the experience of the self as an immanent cause, which he calls *acquiescentia in se ipso*, 'being at rest in oneself', and defines precisely as *laetitia, concomitante idea sui tamquam causa*, 'rejoicing accompanied by the idea of the self as cause'. Wolfson has observed that in Spinoza, the reference of the term *acquiescentia* to *mens* or *anima* may reflect Uriel Acosta's use of *alma* and *espirito* with *descansada*.[45] But it is far more important that the expression *acquiescentia in se ipso* is an invention of Spinoza's, which is not registered in any Latin lexicon. Spinoza must have had in mind a concept that, as an expression of an immanent cause, corresponded to the Hebrew reflexive verb; but he was forced to confront the fact that in Latin, both the verb *quiesco*, 'to rest', and its compound *acquiesco*, 'to be at rest', are intransitive and therefore do not allow a form such as *quiescere* (or *acquiescere*) *se*, 'resting oneself' (whereas Ladino, by contrast, furnished him with the form *pasearse*, in which agent and patient are identical, and could in

this case perhaps have offered the reflexive *descansarse*). This is why he forms the expression *acquiescentia*, constructing it with the preposition *in* followed by the reflexive pronoun *se*. The syntagma *acquiescentia in se ipso*, which names the highest beatitude attainable by human beings, is a Hebrewism (or a Ladinoism) formed to express the apex of the movement of an immanent cause.[46]

It is precisely in this sense that Deleuze uses the term 'beatitude' as the essential character of 'a life ... '. *Beatitudo* is the movement of absolute immanence.

PERSPECTIVES

It is now possible to clarify the sense in which we were able to state at the beginning of this chapter that the concept of 'life', as the legacy of the thought of both Foucault and Deleuze, must constitute the subject of the coming philosophy. First of all, it will be necessary to read Foucault's last thoughts on biopower, which seem so obscure, together with Deleuze's final reflections, which seem so serene, on 'a life ... ' as absolute immanence and beatitude. To read together, in this sense, is not to flatten out and to simplify; on the contrary, such a conjunction shows that each text constitutes a corrective and a stumbling block for the other. Only through this final complication is it possible for the texts of the two philosophers to reach what they seek: for Foucault, the 'different way of approaching the notion of life', and for Deleuze, a life that does not consist only in its confrontation with death and an immanence that does not once again produce transcendence. We will thus have to discern the matrix of desubjectification itself in every principle that allows for the attribution of a subjectivity; we will have to see the element that marks subjection to biopower in the very paradigm of possible beatitude.

This is the wealth and, at the same time, the ambiguity contained in the title 'Immanence: A Life ... '. To assume this legacy as a philosophical task, it will be necessary to reconstruct a genealogy that will clearly distinguish in modern philosophy – which is, in a new sense, a philosophy of life – between a line of immanence and a line of transcendence, approximately according to the following diagram.

It will be necessary, moreover, to embark on a genealogical inquiry into the term 'life'. This inquiry, we may already state, will demonstrate that 'life' is not a medical and scientific notion but a philosophical, political and theological concept, and that many of the categories of our philosophical tradition must therefore be rethought accordingly. In this dimension, there

will be little sense in distinguishing between organic life and animal life or even between biological life and contemplative life and between bare life and the life of the mind. Life as contemplation without knowledge will have a precise correlate in thought that has freed itself of all cognition and intentionality. *Theoria* and the contemplative life, which the philosophical tradition has identified as its highest goal for centuries, will have to be dislocated onto a new plane of immanence. It is not certain that, in the process, political philosophy and epistemology will be able to maintain their present physiognomy and difference with respect to ontology. Today, blessed life lies on the same terrain as the biological body of the West.

Immanence: a Life . . .

Gilles Deleuze

What is a transcendental field? It is distinct from experience in that it neither refers to an object nor belongs to a subject (empirical representation). It therefore appears as a pure a-subjective current of consciousness, an impersonal pre-reflexive consciousness, a qualitative duration of consciousness without self. It would seem strange for the transcendental to be defined by such immediate data were it not a question of transcendental empiricism in opposition to everything that constitutes the world of the subject and object. There is something wild and powerful in such a transcendental empiricism. This is clearly not the element of sensation (simple empiricism) since sensation is only a break in the current of absolute consciousness; it is rather, however close together two sensations might be, the passage from one to the other as becoming, as increase or reduction of power [*puissance*] (virtual quantity). That being the case, should the transcendental field be defined by this pure immediate consciousness with neither object nor self, as movement which neither begins nor ends? (Even the Spinozist conception of the passage or quantity of power invokes consciousness.)

However, the relation of the transcendental field to consciousness is only *de jure*. Consciousness becomes a fact only if a subject is produced at the same time as its object, all three of them being outside the field [*hors Champ*] and appearing as 'transcendents'. On the other hand, as long as consciousness crosses the transcendental field at an infinite speed which is everywhere diffuse, there is nothing that can reveal it.[1] It expresses itself as fact only by reflecting itself onto a subject which refers it to objects. This is why the transcendental field cannot be defined by its consciousness which is nonetheless co-extensive with it, but withdraws from all revelation.

The transcendent is not the transcendental. Without consciousness the transcendental field would be defined as a pure plane of immanence since it escapes every transcendence of the subject as well as of the object.[2] Absolute immanence is in itself: it is not in something, not *to* something; it does not

depend on an object and does not belong to a subject. In Spinoza immanence is not immanence *to* substance, but substance and modes are in immanence. When the subject and the object, being outside the plane of immanence, are taken as universal subject or object in general *to* which immanence is itself attributed, then the transcendental is completely denatured and merely reduplicates the empirical (as in Kant) while immanence is deformed and ends up being contained in the transcendent. Immanence does not relate to a Something that is a unity superior to everything, nor to a Subject that is an act operating the synthesis of things: it is when immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that we can talk of a plane of immanence. The plane of immanence is no more defined by a Subject or an Object capable of containing it than the transcendental field is defined by consciousness.

Pure immanence is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanence which is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is sheer power, utter beatitude. Insofar as he overcomes the aporias of the subject and the object Fichte, in his later philosophy, presents the transcendental field as a *life* which does not depend on a Being and is not subjected to an Act: an absolute immediate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers back to a being but ceaselessly posits itself in a life.[3] The transcendental field thus becomes a genuine plane of immanence that reintroduces Spinozism into the heart of the philosophical operation. Was not Maine de Biran taken on a similar adventure in his 'later philosophy' (the one he was too tired to see through to the end) when he discovered an absolute and immanent life beneath the transcendence of effort? The transcendental field is defined by a plane of immanence, and the plane of immanence by a life.

What is immanence? A life ... No one has related what *a* life is better than Dickens, by taking account of the indefinite article understood as the index of the transcendental. A good-for-nothing, universally scorned rogue is brought in dying, only for those caring for him to show a sort of ardent devotion and respect, an affection for the slightest sign of life in the dying man. Everyone is so anxious to save him that in the depths of his coma even the wretch himself feels something benign passing into him. But as he comes back to life his carers grow cold and all his coarseness and malevolence return. Between his life and death there is a moment which is now only that of *a* life playing with death (Charles Dickens, *Our Mutual Friend* (1865), 1997: Penguin Books, p.439). The life of the individual has given way to a life that is impersonal but singular nevertheless, and which releases a pure event freed from the accidents of inner and outer life; freed, in other words, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: *Homo tantum* with which everyone sympathizes and which attains a soil of beatitude. This is a

haecceity, which now singularizes rather than individuating: life of pure immanence, neutral and beyond good and evil since only the subject which incarnated it in the midst of things rendered it good or bad. The life of such an individuality effaces itself to the benefit of the singular life that is immanent to a man who no longer has a name and yet cannot be confused with anyone else. Singular essence, a life ...

A life should not be contained in the simple moment when individual life confronts universal death. A life is everywhere, in all the moments a certain living subject passes through and that certain lived objects regulate: immanent life carrying along the events or singularities which do nothing more than actualize themselves in subjects and objects. This indefinite life does not itself have moments, however close together they might be, but only meantimes [*des entre-temps*], between-moments. It neither takes place nor follows, but presents the immensity of the empty time where the event can be seen that is still to come and yet has already passed, in the absolute of an immediate consciousness. The novels of Lernet Holenia put the event in a meantime [*un entre-temps*] that is capable of swallowing up whole regiments. The singularities or events constitutive of *a* life co-exist with the accidents of the corresponding life, but neither come together nor divide in the same way. They do not communicate with each other in the same way as do individuals. It even seems that a singular life can do without any individuality whatsoever, or without any other concomitant that individualizes it. Very young children, for example, all resemble each other and have barely any individuality; but they have singularities, a smile, a gesture, a grimace – events which are not subjective characteristics. They are traversed by an immanent life that is pure power and even beatitude through the sufferings and weaknesses. The indefinites of a life lose all indetermination insofar as they fill a plane of immanence or, which strictly speaking comes to the same thing, constitute the elements of a transcendental field (individual life on the other hand remains inseparable from empirical determinations). The indefinite as such does not mark an empirical indetermination, but a determination of immanence or a transcendental determinability. The indefinite article cannot be the indetermination of the person without at the same time being the determination of the singular. The One [*L'Un*] is not the transcendent which can contain everything, even immanence, but is the immanent contained in a transcendental field. 'A' [*Un*] is always the index of a multiplicity: art event, a singularity, a life. ... Although a transcendent which falls outside the plane of immanence can always be invoked or even attributed to it, it remains the case that all transcendence is constituted uniquely in the immanent current of consciousness particular to this plane.[4] Transcendence is always a product of immanence.

A life contains only virtuals. It is made of virtualities, events, singularities. What we call virtual is not something that lacks reality, but something that enters into a process of actualization by following the plane that gives it its own reality. The immanent event actualizes itself in a state of things and in a lived state which bring the event about. The plane of immanence itself is actualized in an Object and Subject to which it attributes itself. But, however hard it might be to separate them from their actualization, the plane of immanence is itself virtual, just as the events which people it are virtualities. The events or singularities give all their virtuality to the plane, just as the plane of immanence gives a full reality to the virtual events. The event, considered as non-actualized (indefinite), lacks nothing; all it requires is for it to be put in relation with its concomitants: a transcendental field, a plane of immanence, a life, some singularities. A wound incarnates or actualizes itself in a state of things and in a lived state; but it is itself a pure virtual on the plane of immanence which draws us into a life. My wound existed before me ...[5] Not a transcendence of the wound as a superior actuality, but its immanence as a virtuality always at the heart of a milieu (field or plane). There is a great difference between the virtuals which define the immanence of the transcendental field and the possible forms which actualize them and which transform them into something transcendent.

Translated by Nick Millett[6]

Notes

Introduction

1. *D*, p. 15. Or, again: 'Many commentators have loved Spinoza sufficiently to evoke a Wind when speaking of him. And in fact no other comparison is adequate' (*SPP*, p. 130).
2. On Foucault: 'A thought's logic is like a wind blowing on us, a series of gusts and jolts' (*N*, p. 94).
3. 'Following Sartre's refusal to accept the Nobel Prize, the review *Arts* published, under the title 'He Was My Master', a tribute from Deleuze (*Arts*, 28 Oct–30 Nov 1964). It contains an interesting comparison between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, in which one can see the beginnings of the theme of an a-personal individuation: 'Sartre was inclined to identify man's existence with non-being, a 'hole' in the world: little lakes of nothingness, he would say. But Merleau-Ponty preferred the idea of folds, simple folds and enfoldings.' Later on, in his book on Leibniz, Deleuze reversed this evaluation (*LB*, p. 146, n. 28). See also below, p. 76, n.22.
4. Not only the Sartre of *The Transcendence of the Ego* and *Being and Nothingness*, works which defined consciousness as distance and negativity, and adherence to the given as bad faith, but also the founder of *Les Temps Modernes* (with Simone de Beauvoir and Maurice Merleau-Ponty) a journal and an intellectual movement which radically opposed the establishment, in particular Colonialism.
5. 'I have never been worried about going beyond metaphysics or any death of philosophy. The function of philosophy, still thoroughly relevant, is to create concepts' (*N*, p. 136).
6. On the brain, see *TP*, pp. 15–16; *N*, p. 149; *WP*, p. 208.
7. *LS*, p. 6. The main references here are Emile Bréhier, *La Théorie des Incorporels dans l'Ancien Stoïcisme* (Paris, 1928), and Victor Goldschmidt, *Le Système Stoïcien et l'Idée de Temps* (Paris, 1953). In his study of the concept of an event, Deleuze presents an important analysis of the paradoxes Lewis Carroll based *Alice* on.
8. *ES*, p. 133. Within a philosophical context dominated by Hegelian or Heideggerian approaches, Deleuze's interest for an empiricist philosopher was an act of resistance.
9. '. . . the English are precisely those nomads who treat the plane of immanence as a movable and moving ground, a radical field of experience, an archipelagian world where they are happy to pitch their tents from island to island and over the sea. . . . They develop an extraordinary conception of habit: habits are taken

on by contemplating and by contracting that which is contemplated. Habit is creative. . . . We are all contemplations, and therefore habits. I is a habit' (*WP*, p. 105).

10. Institut de Recherche et Coordination Acoustique Musique. Available on website: http://www.imaginet.fr/deleuze/TXT/IRCAM78.html.

11. In this respect he is very close to the Foucault of *The Archeology of Knowledge* and *The Order of Discourse* whom he described as 'a new archivist'. The archivist, like the archeologist, above all works on the materiality of the trace, its insertion in a system of traces, before endeavouring to find a meaning or an origin.

12. One could say of Deleuze what Proust says of Wagner, namely that his work is made of 'aggregations' and 'additions'. Boulez says that 'Proust completely understood how Wagner worked, never going back on himself but always using the same motifs, the same basic resources, in order to achieve a continuous development that is both extremely concise and extremely free' (quoted by Jean-Jacques Nattiez, *Proust as Musician*, translated by Derrick Puffett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 111, n. 2). Deleuze shares this method, and Proust's 'additions' have their equivalent in his 'arrangements'.

13. See also, in *The Logic of Sense*, the important series 'Of Singularities', especially pp. 104ff.

14. See 'Spinoza et la méthode générale de M. Guéroult', in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 74: 4, Oct–Dec 1969, pp. 426–37.

15. In an important letter to Arnaud Villani of 29 December 1986, quoted in Arnaud Villani: 'Méthode et théorie dans l'oeuvre de Gilles Deleuze', *Les Temps Modernes*, Jan–Feb 1996, 51–586, p. 151.

Chapter One: The Plane of Immanence and Life

1. In this essay I investigate further the idea of the plane of immanence in relation to the idea of *life* as reworked by Deleuze, taking as my point of departure an earlier essay of mine, published in Brazil as 'A idéia de "Plano de Imanência"' (in F. Evora and O. Giacoia (eds), *Figuras de Subjetividade* (São Paulo, ed. ANPOF, 1997), pp. 79–106, and in France as 'Le Plan d'Immanence' in Éric Alliez (ed.), *Deleuze: Une Vie Philosophique* (Paris, ed. Synthélabo, 1998), pp. 305–23. I owe to Jean Khalfa innumerable suggestions which enabled me to make this text clearer.

2. The idea of an infinite movement, which defines the plane of immanence, has an undeniable cosmological and 'vitalist' dimension. It refers to Nature as becoming, in the footsteps of Bergson and Whitehead. But two other authors also had a marked influence on Deleuze with their incursions into the field of philosophy of biology (individuation, ontogenesis, the relation organism/medium, the *folds* of the brain): Raymond Ruyer (*La Genèse de la Forme Vivante*, Paris, Flammarion, 1958) and Gilbert Simondon (*L'Individu et sa Genèse Physico-Biologique*, Paris, Aubier, 1964). Embryogenesis, which Deleuze considers, is an example of an 'infinite movement', *the ontogenesis or genesis of Being*. The '*trans-cendental*' nature of Deleuze's philosophy does not prevent it from being impregnated by an atmosphere which is, so to speak, *Pre-Socratic*.

3. When he defines the relation between concept and plane Deleuze is referring to
    Étienne Souriau, *L'Instauration Philosophique* (Paris, ed. Alcan, 1939).
4. Henri Poincaré is not, strictly speaking, an intuitionist, as this term is
    understood in contemporary mathematics and logic. Nevertheless, he was
    opposed to Russel's logicism and Hilbert's formalism. A similar opposition can
    be found in the works of Brunschvicg and Cavaillès, although in different
    degrees and in a different style. They all place more emphasis on the creation of
    a theory, than on its logical or axiomatic exposition, and they insist on an
    'internal history' of concepts. Cf. Henri Poincaré, *Science et Méthode* (Paris,
    Flammarion, 1908), Léon Brunschvicg, *Les Étapes de la Philosophie Mathématique*
    (Paris, Alcan, 1912) and Jean Cavaillès, *Sur la Logique et la Théorie de la Science*
    (Paris, PUF, 1947).
5. A 'matter of being', as Deleuze puts it designating the other pole of the
    'doublet' formed with 'image of thought'. And this doublet *is the movement*
    which criss-crosses the plane of immanence.
6. *DR*, p. 154, my emphasis.
7. *WP*, pp. 39–43.
8. *WP*, pp. 48–9. The notion of the 'encompassing' (*Umgreifende*) interests Deleuze
    to the extent that it points to the impossibility of thinking a 'horizon of all
    horizons', which would reduce the plane to the *'omnitudo realitatis'* or to a
    noumenal One-All. But, if it prohibits access to the transcendent, except
    indirectly by means of 'ciphers', it is for this very reason that the encompassing
    ends up transforming itself into a 'bassin pour les éruptions de transcendence'.
9. The relation virtual/actual should be thought in opposition to the relation
    possible/real, where the first term is conceived of as logically and ontologically
    prior to the second. It is Bergson's idea of a creative and essentially unpre-
    dictable becoming which is at the root of Deleuze's concept of the virtual. As in
    the verses of Eliot's *Four Quartets*: '*What could have been is an abstraction /
    Remaining a perpetual possibility / Only in a world of speculation*'.
10. Cf. Chapter 1 ('The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding') in
    the second book of the Transcendental Theory of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The
    best analysis of the relation between Kant and Deleuze which I know is Gérard
    Lebrun's 'Le Transcendental et son image', in E. Alliez (ed.), *Gilles Deleuze, Une
    Vie Philosophique*, Synthélabo, 1998, pp. 207–32.
11. Though born out of combat with *doxa*, the original sin of philosophy, according
    to Deleuze, is to preserve its 'orientation', or common sense as *'concordia facul-
    tatum'*. It is not the 'philosophy of common sense' which he has in mind here,
    but rationalism in its more radical form: Plato, Descartes and Kant with the
    common assumption that the identification of the object by a *recta mens*,
    orthodox or 'straight' thought, is founded on the identity of the I and directed
    by the model of recognition. Husserl, with the inversion of the Galilean per-
    spective, arrives at the *Urdoxa*, at the idea that 'the earth as Ur-arché does not
    move', sublimating the commitment of philosophy to common sense, even
    though he intends to break radically with the 'natural attitude' (cf. *Umsturz der
    kopernikanischer Lehre die Erde als Ur-Arché bewegt sich nicht'*, French translation by
    D. Frank, *Philosophie, no 1*, Ed. De Minuit, 1984).
12. To anticipate our comparison between Deleuze and Wittgenstein, recall
    Wittgenstein's remarks in his lectures in the 1930s reported by G. E. Moore:

'[Wittgenstein] quoted, with apparent approval, Lichtenberg's saying 'Instead of saying 'I think' we ought to say 'It thinks'' ("it" being used, as he said, as "Es" is used in "Es blitztet")'. G. E. Moore, 'Wittgenstein's Lectures, 1930–33', in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions*, ed. by James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Hackett, Indianapolis, 1993), pp. 100–1. As we shall see later, perhaps both Wittgenstein and Deleuze would also have recommended that we say '*Es lebt*' instead of '*Ich lebe*'.

13. Universals, whether they be noetic, eidetic (Plato's ideas), reflexive (the Kantian *Ich denke*), or communicative (the inter-subjectivity of Husserlian phenomenology), which completely reabsorb and domesticate the currents and differences which criss-cross the plane of immanence, turn it into a transcendent entity – respectively the object of contemplation, the subject of reflection, and the other subject of communication. Cf. *WP*, p. 52. In a way, Husserlian intersubjectivity is a sublimated form of the universalistic illusion by promoting the identification of concept and communication. Jules Vuillemin pointed out the roots of this illusion in a *circularity* in the determination of concept and communication. Cf. J. Vuillemin *L'Héritage Kantien et la Révolution Copernicienne* (Paris, PUF, p. 253). This critique is developed in Deleuze's philosophy into a critique of the practice of philosophy as communication (we could speak of a 'civilization of papers') in the contemporary society of control.

14. We can locate precisely the reasons which both separate and bring together Deleuze and Husserl in their conceptualization of the 'transcendental'. Husserl writes: 'In truth, this psychology of Hume *is the first systematic attempt at a science of the pure data of consciousness*: I would say that we are dealing with a pure egology if Hume had not also described the self as a pure fiction', *Erste Philosophy I* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), pp. 156–7. Deleuze is closer to Sartre's version which returns to ego its *non-originary character*, and understands it as both psychological and transcendent. Cf. J.-P. Sartre, *La Transcendence de l'Ego* (Paris, Vrin, 1936). Deleuze finds other models for a field of consciousness which is pre-subjective and impersonal in the first chapter of Bergson's *Matière et Mémoire*, in the 'stream of thought' or of consciousness of William James (who also said that it would be better to say 'It thinks' rather than 'I think'), and in Nietzsche who saw in the *cogito* nothing more than a grammatical illusion.

15. The facticity of the *episteme* is directly considered by Foucault in *L'Archéologie du Savoir*. See, for example, his definition of 'archive'. 'Instead of seeing, on the great mythical book of history, lines of words that translate in visible characters thoughts that were formed in some other time and place, we have, in the density of discursive practices, systems that establish statements as *events* (with their own conditions and domain of appearance) and *things* (with their own possibility and field of use) et des *choses*'. (p. 128; my emphasis). Deleuze, in *Le Nouvel Archiviste*, insists on the facticity of Foucault's concept of statement. Statements are not propositions, and archaeology aims neither to formalize nor to interpret them (neither logical analysis nor hermeneutics), but rather to describe them as forms of *practice*. However, the difficulty for Deleuze remains that of the articulation between *practice* and *truth*. Thus, in 'Désir et Plaisir' (in 'Foucault aujourd'hui', *Magazine Littéraire*, n. 325, pp. 59–65, note F, paragraph 3, Deleuze goes as far as saying: 'From where, in Michel, the problem of the role of the intellectual; from where his manner of reintroducing the category of truth,

which leads me to ask the following: renewing completely this category, by making it depend on power, will he meet in the renewal a matter which can be turned against power? But here I can't see how.'

16. For Heidegger the idea of *ontological difference*, that is the difference between the sense of Being and the sense of existent, is also an operator in the deconstruction (*Abbau*) of metaphysics. The history of metaphysics is the history of the forgetting of Being. If Being is defined as the 'horizon' of the appearance of existents, it is precisely a 'transcendental field', like the plane of immanence in Deleuze. For Heidegger one loses one's way in philosophy when Being is thought as a privileged existent (*Ens realissimum*), and for Deleuze, when the plane of immanence is objectified, or made transcendent, for the construction of a sovereign and universal concept.

17. *WP*, p. 39.

18. Cf. Hegel, *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1952, preface, p. 39: 'Das Wahre ist so der bacchantische Taumel, na dem kein Glied nicht trunken ist...'. For a detailed examination of the relationship between Deleuze and Hegel, see Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1993). In *DR* (p. 70) Deleuze admits the merit of his 'adversary' Hegel, even though immediately afterwards he emphasizes the superiority of his 'ally' Leibniz.

19. *WP*, p. 59.

20. *WP*, p. 42.

21. For Bergson, the illusion of the priority of the possible over the real is allied to another illusion, that of the priority of nothingness over being, of emptiness over the plenum. The metaphor in question is to be found in *L'Évolution Créatrice*: 'Enfin je ne puis me défaire de l'idée que le plein est une broderie sur le canevas du vide, que l'être est superposé au néant, et que dans la représentation de "rien" il y a "moins" que dans celle de "quelque chose"' (Centenary edition, PUF, p. 729).

22. *WP*, p. 60.

23. *WP*, p. 42 (their italics).

24. *WP*, p. 42.

25. In the *Tractatus* the idea of an event (*Tatsache, Sachveralt*) is defined as articulation between things (*Ding, Sache*) or objects (*Gegenstände*), whose properties are internal, fixed like Platonic ideas, and which determine the substance of the world. Here the emergence of events does not deform the smooth surface of the immutable essence of things.

26. *DR* opens with a reference to Péguy's book *Clio* and its conception of repetition (page 8, note 1). Deleuze's conception is constructed with the help of Péguy, Kierkegaard and Nietszche: '... *Kierkegaard contre Hegel, Nietzsche contre Kant et Hegel, et de ce point de vue Péguy contre la Sorbonne.*' (p.14).

27. Cf. J. C. Pariente, 'Bergson et Wittgenstein', in G. G. Granger (ed.), *Wittgenstein et le Problème d'une Philosophie de la Science* (Paris: ed. CNRS, 1971).

28. *'Beim Philosophieren muss man in's alte Chaos hinabsteigen, und sich dort wohlfühlen'*, *Culture and Value*, translated Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 65.

29. *WP*, p. 41.

30. *Culture and Value*, p. 44.

31. Cf. Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York, Vintage/Random House, 1973), p. 319.

32. J. Bouveresse, *Le Mythe de l'Intériorité* (Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1987), p. 593.

33. For the concept of *Weltbild*, cf. e. g. *On Certainty* § 94: 'But I did not get my picture of the world [*Weltbild*] by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.' For *Weltanschauung* see § 422: 'So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism. Here I am being thwarted by a kind of *Weltanschauung*.' Note that both the English and French translations retain the word '*Weltanschauung*' in § 422, whereas they translate '*Weltbild*' as, respectively, 'picture of the world' and '*image du monde*'. I can avoid a *Weltanschauung* which seems to hinder my reflection and infiltrates itself into my thought, but I cannot rid myself of a picture of the world unless I change it for another, through conversion or cultural change.

34. Concepts can only co-exist – be co-possible, combine or oppose in contradiction – given the background of the plane. Thus, on the plane of immanence instituted by the Kantian critique there is a 'collision' between intuition and intellectual knowledge; the very concept of *intellectual intuition*, which circulates freely on the plane of classical metaphysics, is excluded from the new plane.

35. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, Blackwell, 1969), § 97.

36. Cf. J. A. Giannotti *A Apresentação do Mundo* (S. Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 1996).

37. Cf. Bento Prado Jr, 'Erro, ilusão, loucura' in A. Novaes (ed.), *A Crise da Razão* (S. Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1996), pp. 111–133.

38. *Philosophie*, 47 (1995).

39. In the *Tractatus* there is no room for the 'principle of sufficient reason'. Facts do not lose their contingency when they arise in the prior framework of logical space. In the later Wittgenstein this prior framework itself becomes contingent. Here we have something like an *ultimate* level which does not for that reason lose its contingency, which could be different.

40. Deleuze's metaphor of the 'fold' (*le pli*), used in his book on Leibniz, is implicit in Foucault's 'empirico-transcendental doublets' and is also illuminating for understanding the articulation between *praxis* and symbolization in the thought of the later Wittgenstein. A form of life folds upon itself in the rules of a language-game. To use another metaphor: life and language are the two sides of a Möbius strip.

41. Cf. J. A. Giannotti, *op.cit.*

42. Let us remember, among others, the example of the pragmatist and historicist reading proposed by Rorty in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, UP, 1979) which more than once identifies the styles of Wittgenstein, Dewey and Heidegger (of course, the Heidegger of the 'History of Truth').

43. On Kierkegaard and Deleuze, cf. Note 27. On Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, see Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, pp. 36, 37, 43 and 61. Kierkegaard is also mentioned together with Heidegger in *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann*, ed. B. F. McGuinness (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979), cf. the notes for 30 December 1929.

44. *WP*, p. 36

45. '... grässlichen Übels, der ekelhaften, seifenwässrigen Wissenschaft', *CV*, p. 49.
    [The word 'grässlichen' seems to have been missed out of Winch's translation,
    which runs: 'of an evil – our disgusting soapy water science' (translator's note)].
46. *Culture and Value*, p. 35 (cf. Wittgenstein's remarks on Heidegger in *Ludwig
    Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, ed. B. F. McGuinness, translated by B. F.
    McGuinness and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979) pp. 68–9).
47. *Culture and Value*, translated by Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 65.
48. A notoriously difficult term of Wittgenstein's to translate – cf. G. P. Baker and
    P. M. S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning* (Oxford: Blackwell,
    1980), pp. 531–2 for a discussion of the problems involved, and an explanation
    of this key Wittgensteinian concept. The best solution, which I have adopted
    here, is to leave this term in German. (translator's note).
49. The profound influence of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Idea* on
    Wittgenstein reveals itself in the propositions on solipsism and ethics in the
    Tractatus. Even Schopenhauer's language is to be found there, in the opposition
    between the World and the Will (cf. proposition 6.372).
50. Michel Foucault, Preface to the English translation (by Robert Hurley, Mark
    Seem and Helen R. Lane) of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus:
    Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (The Athione Press, 1983), p. xiii.
51. Deleuze *'Immanence: A Life ... '*, p. 5.
52. In order to define the plane of immanence, Deleuze uses this scholastic termi-
    nology. It means a being which possesses in itself the reason for its being.
    Abalietas is its opposite: a being whose existence depends on that of another.
53. In German idealism (Fichte, Hegel...) the Absolute 'become subject', knows (as
    did Christ on the cross) the *Unrühigkeit* of the human subject, the uneasiness
    (Locke) or fear of death (Hobbes) of the psychological subject of British
    empiricism.
54. Deleuze once again assumes the task of reworking the idea of the transcendental
    from the starting point of Bergson's critique of the Kantian aesthetic, or of the
    'spacial' conception of time presented there. In *Les Données Immédiates de la
    Conscience* Bergson opposed to Kant the idea of the essential difference between
    quantitative and qualitative multiplicities. It is in this idea, although re-
    worked, that Deleuze finds one of the supports for his theory of the 'asymmetric
    synthesis of the sensible' in *DR*.
55. Deleuze, *ibid.*
56. Here I have in mind the structure of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: the Aesthetic,
    Analytic and Dialectic. But also of the architectonic trinity of the three *Cri-
    tiques*, which express different games or combinations between these three
    faculties, sensibility, understanding and reason. This threefold game of faculties
    is the central idea of Deleuze's book on Kant.
57. On the one hand, grammatical propositions are *zeitlos*, whereas propositions
    strictly speaking are *zeitlich*. And this may perhaps imply a change in Witt-
    genstein's conception of death. In the *Tractatus* we find the Epicurean thesis that
    'Death is not an event in life ... Our life has no end just in the way in which our
    visual field has no limits' (6.4311). In 1944 Wittgenstein added, 'If in life we
    are surrounded by death ... ' (*Culture and Value*, p. 50e). Has anything really
    changed?

58. Wittgenstein, *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), Vol. I, §913) 'Nur im Fluss des Lebens haben die Wörte ihre Bedeutung'.
59. G. H. von Wright, 'Wittgenstein in Relation to his Times', in G. H. von Wright, *Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), p. 216.
60. Wittgenstein writes: 'What a narrow life on Frazer's part! As a result: how impossible it was for him to conceive of a life different from that of the England of his time. Frazer cannot imagine a priest who is not basically a present-day English parson with all the same stupidity and dullness', 'Remark's on Frazer's *Golden Bough*', translated by John Beversius, in Klagge and Nordmann (eds), *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions*, p. 125.
61. Cf. Wittgenstein on Ramsay, *Culture and Value*, p. 17; and Ramsay on Brouwer's 'bolshevism', *The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays*, ed. R. Braithwaite (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931).
62. In the chapter 'Geophilosophy' (*WP*, p. 105), Deleuze says, thinking principally of Hume, 'The English nomadize over the old Greek earth, broken up, fractalized, and extended to the entire universe'. The enemy of all eternally fixed foundations, of all *Ur-Arche*, the nomad is, by definition, 'anarchontic'.
63. David Hume, *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, ed. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1947), Part VIII, p. 187.

Chapter Two: Intensity, or: the 'Encounter'

1. In *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, Deleuze gives a synthetic presentation of the main concepts in Spinoza's system and explains their meaning for his thought. See also *TP*, 253–60.
2. Cf. Martial Guéroult, *La Philosophie Transcendantale de Salomon Maïmon*, p.160ff.
3. Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783), §16. The *Critique of Pure Reason* also relates time and intensity, but in a more allusive manner: '[Sensation in itself] has, to be sure, no extensive magnitude, but yet it still has a magnitude (and indeed through its apprehension, in which the empirical consciousness can grow *in a certain time* from nothing = 0 to its given measure), thus it has an *intensive magnitude* ... ' (*CPR*, A165/B208). On these proofs, see J. Rivelaygue, pp. 162–6.
4. Leibniz, *New Essays Upon Human Understanding*, IV, XVI, 12.
5. Here Deleuze refers to Simondon's *L'Individu et sa Genèse Psycho-biologique* (Paris: Aubier, 1964), pp. 41–2.
6. Cf. A. Philonenko, 'Etude leibnizienne. La loi de continuité et le principe des indiscernables'.
7. This is probably the reason for Deleuze's less than enthusiastic response to phenomenology: it has deprived the subject and the object of the stability of self-identity, but only to transfer it to their relation.
8. Of perspectivism, Deleuze writes: 'it does not mean a dependence in respect to a pre-given or defined subject; on the contrary, a subject will be what comes to the point of view' (*F*, p. 19). One might wonder what 'brings' the subject to the point of view when God's metaphysical choice of the best possible world no longer organizes the totality of monads. It cannot be the subject itself, since it

does not pre-exist it. Deleuze might answer that it is the 'I' inasmuch as it rises from a long contraction of habit, from persevering, from the will for 'it' to continue, from the inclination proper to the habit which leads to the capacity to occupy a certain point of view, to shed a light on a certain sequence within the world. But this is a way of delaying the problem: why such inclination of habit? In other words it is difficult to attach, or append, the subject to the world without dissolving it.

9. Extensive magnitude consists in the adding up of identical units: one hundred centimetres equal one metre. By contrast, intensive magnitude grows along critical points which are supposed to account for the qualitative specificity of what they measure; thus, for temperature, $0°$ and $100°$ centigrade are critical points (freezing and boiling), which define water in itself. But this classical distinction cannot be held from the point of view of the Hegelian dialectic.

10. Here Deleuze refers to *The Republic* and credits Plato for coming close to the discordant usage of faculties, for grasping what thought only truly thinks when it is forced to think. But he immediately criticizes Plato's conception of the limit proper to each faculty. For Plato, sensibility does not face the insensible as the being of the sensible, but rather as another sensible being; memory (in reminiscence) does not encounter pure past as the being of the past, but, again, a past being, etc. In other words, Plato would fail in his attempt to break up the framework of the empirical. In the end, the Good would warrant the harmony of the system. If a faculty were truly to reach the transcendent point where its limit is both what undoes it and what gives it its own being (minute sensations for sensibility, pure past for memory, the differential for thought), it is clear that the succession of discordances does not unfold along Plato's ascending hierarchy (sensation, memory, thought). Rather it forms a zigzag line, without upper limit 'for faculties yet to be discovered, whose existence is not yet suspected' (*DR*, p. 143).

11. See François Zourabichvili, *Deleuze. Une Philosophie de l'Événement*, p. 119ff.

12. Here Deleuze refers to Joë Bousquet, *Les Capitales* (Paris, 1955: Le Cercle du Livre), p. 103.

13. On this question of linear time or *'Aeon'*, see *LS*, p. 58ff; p. 162ff.

14. Deleuze analyses the relationship Hölderlin/Kant in: 'On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy', *ECC*, p. 27ff.

15. Cf. F. Zourabichvili, *op.cit.*, p. 77 ff.

Chapter Three: Nietzsche and Spinoza: New Personae in a New Plane of Thought

1. Here we consider Nietzsche and Spinoza, but equally important studies in the history of philosophy are his works on Hume, Bergson, Leibniz, Kafka and even Kant, whose presence is often felt in many of Deleuze's writings, despite many disagreements between them. References to Nietzsche's posthumous writings are given as follows: *VP*, II, 51 refers to the French edition of the *Will to Power* which Deleuze refers to (Paris: Gallimard, 1947). *WP*, 1067 refers to the English translation published by W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967). Whenever possible additional references are given

to the Colli and Montinari's edition of Nietzsche's posthumous fragments as *CM*, 1885 38 [12]. *Beyond Good and Evil* is abbreviated as *BGE*, *The Gay Science* as *GS*, *The Twilight of Idols* as *TI*, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as *TSZ*.

2. Pierre Zaoui, in his article *La 'grande identité' Nietzsche-Spinoza, quelle identité?* (*Philosophie n°47: Gilles Deleuze*, Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1995) studies the relationship between these two philosophers through the work of Deleuze. His departure point is the amazement of finding this striking declaration in an interview given by Deleuze: 'Everything tended towards the great identity between Nietzsche and Spinoza.' A whole section of his article focuses on these 'objective convergences' between the thoughts of Nietzsche and Spinoza in order to make them clear the *properly Deleuzian* aspect of this 'identity', not only in Deleuze's own conception of identity (see, among other texts, *DR*, p. 40), but also, in a more secret philosophical movement. Zaoui thus notes that the idea of identity as a secondary principle, as a *resulting* principle, is constructed in a movement going from Spinoza to Nietzsche.

3. *N*, p. 6.

4. Zaoui, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

5. On the plane of immanence, see, in the present work, the chapter by Bento Prado Jr. In *WP*, Chap. 3, Deleuze and Guattari describe the crucial role of *conceptual personae* in the movement of philosophy. 'Conceptual personae carry out the movements that describe the author's plane of immanence, and they play a part in the very creation of the author's concepts. ... The conceptual persona has nothing to do with abstract personification, symbol or allegory, since it lives and insists. The philosopher is the idiosyncrasy of his conceptual personae. ... In philosophical enunciation we do not do something by saying it but produce movement by thinking it, through the intermediary of a conceptual persona. Thus conceptual personae are the true agents of enunciation' (pp. 64–5). The authors note the diversity of types of conceptual personae: they can be historical (Plato's Socrates, or, as in this case, Deleuze's Nietzsche) or more or less invented (Nietzsche's Zarathustra).

6. This absorption of Nietzsche's thought within Deleuze's own plane, and its prolongation *without deformation*, truly produces effects *upon Nietzsche's thought*, driving it to positions it cannot avoid and forcing it into new necessities. It becomes more and more difficult, as one advances into Deleuze, to speak of and understand Nietzsche without using Deleuzian terminology. We are thus exploring here a Nietzschean problem which *would not exist as such if it were not for Deleuze*.

   On the double influence of Deleuze the historian upon the historical Nietzsche and the reverse, see Scarlett Marton, 'Deleuze et Son Ombre', in *Gilles Deleuze – une Vie philosophique*, Eric Alliez, ed., (Paris, ed. Synthélabo, 1998), pp. 233–4.

7. *VP*, II 51/ *WP*, 1067/*CM*, 1885 38 [12].

8. *NP*, p. 50.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 52–3.

10. *VP*, II 309/*WP*, 619/*CM*, 885 36[31]; cited by Deleuze, *ibid*, p. 49. On this question, see pp. 6–8 and 49–55, where Deleuze presents the radically affirmative character of the difference in Nietzsche, as well as his anti-Hegelianism. Hegel construes difference as negation and then negates this negation to advance a monist metaphysics: on this point see also Scarlett Marton, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

11. 'The Will to Power *interprets* (– it is a question of interpretation when an organ is constructed): it defines, delimits, determines degrees, variations of power. Mere variations of power could not feel themselves to be such: there must be present something that wants to grow and interprets the value of whatever else wants to grow. Equal *in that*– In fact, interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something. (The organic process constantly presupposes interpretations.) (*VP*, II, 130/*WP* 643).

12. The idea of a differentiating principle not conceived as a unity external to what it determines is given thorough consideration in *DR*, pp. 119–21.

13. Nietzsche criticizes Schopenhauer for it (*VP*, II, 23/*WP*, 692): 'My proposition is: that the *will* of psychology hitherto is an unjustified generalization, that this will *does not exist at all*, that instead of grasping the idea of the development of one definite will into many forms, one has eliminated the character of the will by subtracting from it its content, its "whither?" – this is in the highest degree the case with Schopenhauer – what he calls "will" is a mere empty word.'

14. On struggle and combat seen as means of enrolling forces in the construction of new assemblages, and not as a struggle to eradicate difference, see, among other texts, Deleuze, *ECC*, pp. 132–5.

15. Nietzsche, *WP*, 552/*CM*, 1887, 9 [91].

16. In so far as it is chaos and cosmos – according to the different perspectives of the heterogeneous and blind forces in opposition, on the one hand, and of the evaluative wills on the other – the Nietzschean universe can be seen as a *chaosmos*. Provided, that is, one understands that the concepts of *force* and *will* cannot be thought of in isolation from each other without absurdity (cf. note 13).

Besides, this understanding of chaosmos as neither system nor affirmation of pure diversity, is rooted in a movement – the movement of forces exerted and of the evaluation of these forces understood as wills. In Nietzsche there is neither atomism nor monadism, even of forces, so that if, as Leibniz writes (*Monadology*, §67), all new forms constituted by forces can be decomposed into forces, each of these forces may itself be subjected to this genealogy. All assemblage can be considered as a fishpond – but however close you come, you can only find assemblages: in each fish in the pond there are ponds filled with fish. In Nietzsche, from the outset, reality is constituted by a movement of inter-relation, by captures and compositions.

17. F. Zourabichvili, 'Deleuze et le possible (l'Involontarisme en Politique)', in *Gilles Deleuze – une Vie philosophique, op. cit.*, p. 340.

18. *NP*, p. 185. This presence at the heart of assemblages of an evaluative will, a will able precisely to give to agency its own integrity (its idiosyncrasy) – is what motivates Deleuze to claim that the essence of an individual object is only apprehensible via the question 'who' and not the traditional 'what' or 'what is it'? In fact, the essence of a thing is determined by forces in affinity with it and the will inhabiting them. 'The essence of a thing is discovered in the force which possesses it and which is expressed in it, it is developed in the forces with an affinity for this first one, endangered or destroyed by the forces which are opposed to it and which can take hold of it: essence is always sense and value.' Essence is thus an essentially perspectival form of reality, dependant on a will which appropriates in the course of its evaluation (*ibid.*, p. 77).

19. *Ibid.*, p. 86. On the will to power and domination as the lowest degree of the will to power, see *ECC*, p. 133; on the question of the connection between ability and power see also, among other texts by Deleuze and Guattari, 'How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs' (*TP*, pp. 149ff).

20. *AO*, p. 21.

21. See *D*, p. 65; and *WP*, p. 159.

22. In *The ABC of Gilles Deleuze*, interviews with Claire Parnet published on video in 1994. The contents of these interviews are available in English on the Internet site http://www.langlab.wayne.edu/Romance/FreD_G/ABC1.html.

23. This example, also relevant to anthropology, has a strong resonance with Spinoza's conception of the individual as a mode of existence, as a singular distribution of affects. Spinoza's individual is a composition of powers: each individual or *finite mode*, as singular power-to-be-affected, is characterized by a relationship of movement and rest between the myriad extensive parts which make it up. Here too we see a complexity in the many stages of individuation. Spinoza takes the example of chyle and lymph which, in composing themselves as well as their respective parts, form blood, a higher level individual, and a new ratio of movement and rest (letter XXXII to Oldenburg, commented in *SP*, Ch. III). The composition of several bodies in a new and more extensive ratio of movement and rest is the formation of a new mode of being – a new power of being affected and thus a new distribution of affects towards a new individual perception. A new finite mode comes into existence and is immediately determined as the effort of persevering in this existence (*conatus*), in order to preserve this singular ratio. To do so, just as in the case of the tick, there is a selection and organization of affects: evaluation of good and bad, and of whatever augments or diminishes the power to act (see *D*, p. 60–61).

24. *VP*, II, 230/*WP*, 492/*CM*,1885 40 [21]. Nietzsche writes in *Truth and Lie in an Extra Moral Sense*, in *Posthumous Writings 1870–1873*: 'Does not nature keep much the most from him, even about his body, to spellbind and confine him in a proud, deceptive consciousness, far from the coils of the intestines, the quick current of the blood stream, and the involved tremors of the fibres? She threw away the key; and woe to the calamitous curiosity which might peer just once through a crack in the chamber of consciousness and look down, and sense that man rests upon the merciless, the greedy, the insatiable, the murderous, in the indifference of his ignorance — hanging in dreams, as it were, upon the back of a tiger.'

25. *TI*, 'The problem of Socrates', §4.

26. Deleuze pays particular attention to the ideas of *action* and *reaction* in his presentation of the thought of Nietzsche. See *NP*, Ch. II.

27. Descartes, *Metaphysical Meditations*, 2nd and 6th meditations.

28. 'The *subject*: this is the term for our belief in a unity underlying all the different impulses of the highest feeling of reality: we construe this belief as the *effect* of one cause – we believe so firmly in our belief, that for its sake we imagine "truth", "reality", "*substantiality*" in general' (*VP*, I, 150/*WP*, 485/*CI*, 10 [19]).

29. On the movement of the will to power within the Self, understood as superior corporeal reason, see in *TSZ*, 'The despisers of the body'. And in *VP*, II, 261/ *WP*, 676: '. . . we perceive that a purposiveness rules over the smallest events that is beyond our higher understanding: planning, selectivity, co-ordination, repara-

tion, etc. In short, we discover an activity that would have to be ascribed to *a far higher and more predictive intellect* than we know of. We learn to *devalue* all that is conscious; we unlearn feeling responsible for ourselves, since our conscious and purposive dimension is only the smallest part of us. Of the numerous influences operating at every moment, e.g., air, electricity, we sense almost nothing: there could well be forces that, although we never sense them, continually influence us. Pleasure and pain are very rare and scarce appearances compared with the countless stimuli that a cell or organ exercises upon another cell or organ.'

    In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze argues in many places for an idea of individuation as passing through different stages of 'partial, larval *selves*', notably pp. 96–7.

30. *SP*, Ch. II.
31. On the parallelisms of body and mind in Spinoza, *ibid.*, pp. 86-91.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 20–2. See Spinoza, *Ethics*, III, definition of desire.
33. *Ethics*, III, 9, scholium.
34. Deleuze analyses Spinoza's exposition of God's ordinance to Adam against the eating of the fruit of knowledge in paradise, and Adam's moralizing mis-understanding of this injunction. Adam sees this indication relative to effects (the fruit will have ill effects of decomposition) as a Law claiming the status of a cause determining the action ('You must!'). (*SP*, pp. 22–5). Always it is a matter of power, of the ability to seize the event and rise to it. X. Papaïs wrote (in 'Puissances de l'artifice', *Philosophie, op. cit.*, pp. 86–7): 'The enemy is always intimate, interior. It lies within thought itself, its possible weakness and its ineffective forms, its degraded or sterile products, stupidity and baseness. In these, thought backs down, which always indicates a loss of power. In baseness and stupidity, it misses the event, it ends up unable to connect with anything. All these forms of sadness exhibit the same character: retreat, involution of meaning, power reduced to reaction. In them, experience is not pursued further, nor constructed; it is only felt. ... Such are bad or weak powers: the world is no longer constructed, its connexions implode, and what is left behind are isolated, insignificant elements.' See also *NP*, pp. 111–19.
35. Which would amount to turning Nietzsche's thought into a simplistic 'Platonism in reverse'.
36. In *ECC* (p. 105), Deleuze presents this new power of the false as heralded by the figure of Dionysus.
37. *GS*, §351.
38. *TSZ*, *The Three Metamorphoses*.
39. *TSZ*, *The Spirit of Gravity*. On the different degrees of affirmation and on the mule's assent, as well as on the superior man who perpetuates nihilism once divine ideals have collapsed, see *NP*, pp. 39–42 and *ECC*, pp. 100–101.
40. *VP*, II, 170/*WP*, 617/ *CM*, 1886–7, 7 [51].
41. *TSZ*, *Vision and the Enigma*. Nietzsche stages here the leap of a life overcoming its own nihilistic agony: a serpent (nihilism) slides into the mouth of a young shepherd while asleep. 'A young shepherd did I see, writhing, choking, quivering, with distorted countenance, and with a heavy black serpent hanging out of his mouth. Had I ever seen so much loathing and pale horror on one countenance?

    'Bite! Bite its head off! Bite!', cries Zarathustra – 'The shepherd however bit as my cry had admonished him; he bit with a strong bite! Far away did he spit the

head of the serpent – and sprang up. No longer shepherd, no longer man – a transfigured being, a light-surrounded being that *laughed*!'

For a discussion of the eternal return and the relations it inaugurates between the one and the many, see *NP*, pp. 23–9, 186–9, as well as *DR*, pp. 115, 125–6.

42. See Deleuze, 'Conclusions sur la Volonté de Puissance et l'Éternel Retour', in *Nietzsche, Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie n°VI* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967), p. 283.

'To affirm is not to take responsibility for, or assume the burden of what is, but to release, to set free what lives' (*NP*, p. 185). On *amor fati* as a *redoubled* form of affirmation see, *ibid.*, pp. 180–86.

43. Klossowski P., *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, (London: The Athlone Press), p. 73.

44. *VP* IV, 637.

45. *GS*, §276 and *TSZ*, prologue, §4. On the eternal return as destroying its own agent, see *DR*, pp. 91–3.

46. This is what makes us contend that the Overman is not an example which Nietzsche invites us to live up to, but rather a philosophical concept. 'Absolute deterritorialization does not take place without reterritorialization. Philosophy is reterritorialized on the concept. The concept is not object but territory.' *WP*, p. 101.

47. *TP*, pp. 250–51. It is true that Nietzsche develops the idea of the *movement outwards*, of the *liberation* from debilitating structures, in particular in *TI*, §38. Deleuze's appropriation of Nietzsche bears the mark of his Spinozism: the body only makes sense when conceived as limited (when the mode is *finite*), and knowledge of the third type is conquered through a long process, a process of liberation.

48. *WP*, pp.160–61.

49. 'It would be necessary for the individual to grasp herself as event; ... In this case, she would not understand, want, or represent this event without also understanding and wanting all other events as individuals and without representing all other individuals as events. ... This is the ultimate sense of counteractualisation. This, moreover, is the Nietzschean discovery of the individual as the *fortuitous case*, as Klossowski takes it up and restores it, in an essential relation to the eternal return.' (*LS*, p. 178)

50. Maintaining an individual unity, even by contrast with the tendency to shatter the individual (*Ego fatum!*), this is also a dimension of Nietzsche's thought: 'A philosopher: that is a man ... who is struck by his own thoughts as if they came from the outside, from above and below, as a species of events and lightning-flashes peculiar to him; who is perhaps himself a storm pregnant with new lightnings; ... a being who often runs away from himself, is often afraid of himself – but whose curiosity always makes him 'come to himself' again.' *BGE*, §292. Or, §287, '*The noble soul has reverence for itself*'.

51. *GS*, §349.

52. The finite mode is defined essentially as a degree of power, an intensive part of divine (or *natural*) power. This essence has, for its corollary in existence, a specific ratio of movement and rest among its extensive parts. When the essence of a modality comes into existence, it means that an infinity of extensive parts is determined by external causes to enter into its own characteristic ratio. Then

power can be determined as *conatus*, which is to say, as effort to persevere in existence. For a theoretical synthesis of finite modes, see *EP*, Ch. XII–XIV.

53. See in *Ethics*, III, the definition of desire: *'Desire* is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular activity by some given affection. . . . by an affection of man's essence, we understand every constitution of the said essence, whether such constitution be innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.' The essence is affected by transitions towards more or less joy or sadness. On the power to be affected, see in particular *Ethics*, IV, 38–9.

54. The essences of modes do not *last*; their eternity is said to have no connection with time. *Ethics*, V, 23, demonstration and scholium. This conception of eternity is developed in *DR*, pp. 2–3. See also *SP*, Ch. IV, 'Eternity'.

55. Cf. *Ethics*, IV, 4, and more generally *SP* pp. 97–104. Spinoza notes the finitude of a mode only existent within extreme limits. It will always retain a minimal amount of passive affects. Here too one can see in Spinoza's thoughts on liberation the origin of Deleuze's inflexion of Nietzsche (cf. note 47).

56. *Ethics*, IV, 4.

57. Klossowski reminds us that if individuals 'have *become powerful* it is precisely because they have conceived of a *meaning* – for if a meaning corresponds to a state of power, conversely, this state must claim this meaning as its own in order to maintain itself' (*op. cit.*, p. 119). On this point, Deleuze presents Nietzsche as the accomplishment of the movement Spinoza had initiated: 'Nevertheless, there still remains a difference between substance and modes: Spinoza's substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance, but as though on something other than themselves. Substance should itself be said *of* the modes and *only of the modes*. Such a condition can be satisfied only at the price of a more general categorical reversal according to which being is said of becoming, identity of that which is different, the one of the multiple, etc. . . . Nietzsche meant nothing else by eternal return' (*DR*, pp. 40–41).

58. 'The world is neither true nor real but living. And the living world is will to power, *will to falsehood, which is actualised in many different powers*. To actualise the will to falsehood under any power whatever, to actualise the will to power under any quality whatever, is always to evaluate. To live is to evaluate' (*NP*, p. 184, my emphasis).

59. *PV*, p. 20.

Chapter Four: An Impersonal Consciousness

1. Which is very different from 'having a culture'. See *article 'culture' in The ABC of Gilles Deleuze.*

2. This is brought out by their successive titles: *Meditationes de prima philosophia in qua Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demonstratur* (1641, Paris); *Meditationes de prima philosophia in quibus Dei existentia et animae humanae a corpore distinctio, demonstrantur* (1642, Amsterdam).

3. *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* and *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy.*

4. *PV*, pp. 9–10.
5. It is well known that this move goes beyond the traditional sceptical preamble in its radicalism. It conditions Descartes' entire ontology and from it he draws the negation of the impossible demand of scepticism – the demand that one should compare knowledge with its objects – by positing that there is no object except for (mathematical) thought and that the demand rests on the most naïve of distinctions.
6. On this point, see the articles in which Jaakko Hintikka analyses the Cogito not as an inference but as a sort of private performative, expressing the existence of the subject in the process of thought: '*Cogito, ergo sum*: Inference or Performance?', *The Philosophical Review*, LXXI (1962), pp. 3–21, and 'Cogito, ergo quis est?', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, (1996), pp. 50–195.
7. Deleuze often analysed Kant's critique of Descartes. See especially *KCP*, pp. 15–16, and *DR*, pp. 85–7.
8. *Pensées*, tr. and with an intro. by A. J. Krailsheimer (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), p. 218, §542. *ES* contains a series of reflections on this subject, in connection with associationism. In an earlier text on Hume, *David Hume, sa Vie, son Oeuvre avec un Exposé de sa Philosophie* (Paris, 1952), André Cresson and Gilles Deleuze suggest a link between Hume, Pascal and Montaigne (pp. 38–9).
9. He also says, in the third 'Lecture on Kant': 'It is the pure and empty line of time which cuts across, which causes this kind of fracture in the I, between an "I think" as determination and an "I am" as determinable in time. Time has become the limit of thought and thought never ceases having to engage with its own limit.' This brings out particularly clearly Deleuze's method in the history of philosophy, a method which always immediately organizes his commentary in the vicinity of the limit-points of the ideas he is studying. On the theme of the 'fracture', that archetype of the incorporeal, see his excellent readings of Fitzgerald, Lowry and Zola, in *LS* (22nd series, 'Porcelain and Volcano', and Appendix V).
10. This is well known as far as causality is concerned, since causality presupposes temporal determinations. Hume had shown that what the verb 'to cause' means is not the concept of a particular property of a body, which would explain why and how this body can have an effect on another body, but a regular succession in time.
11. Not even extension, unless one presupposes that thought can be extended or that it never constitutes an object properly speaking. Mathematical, aesthetic and theological objects would also have to be accounted for.
12. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Transcendental Analytic, Ch. 1: 'The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding' (A66/B91).
13. One could say that *Difference and Repetition* is an attempt to return to Kant's original inspiration, before he characterized the plane of immanence as a passivity conceived of as non-synthetic, or as a receptivity that was then contrasted with a spontaneity that itself was conceived as synthetic (see the excellent analyses of the relations between time and thought on pp. 85–96).
14. In fact, Deleuze could have gone right back to Descartes, who infers the intervention of a rational judgment in the constitution of the objecthood (but not yet the reality) of the wax, beginning from the way this constitution implies a potential infinity of aspects ('I can grasp that the wax is capable of countless

changes of this kind') (*Meditations on First Philosophy*, Second Meditation, in *Descartes, Selected Philosophical Writings*, tr. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, with an intro. by John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 83). In the plane of immanence constituted by radical doubt, these changes can only be changes of aspect. See Appendix VIII to paragraph 18 of Husserl's *Crisis*. And also Deleuze's entertaining Chapter XI of *ECC*, 'An Unrecognised Precursor to Heidegger: Alfred Jarry' (p. 92, on the 'epiphenomenon').

15. These excerpts can be compared with the words of a poet who shared Deleuze's passion for the painting of Francis Bacon, Jacques Dupin, who wrote in *L'Ephémère*, no. 6 (1968):

> What holds our attention, beyond the analysis of the causes, circumstances and effects of a social phenomenon, is the non-meaning of the event. Its obscurity which binds us. Its becoming and its influence which question us .... .
>
> What has just been born and assumed bodily shape, and refuses to cast a shadow, to clothe itself, to lean against the wall. What has just been born from a shudder and is indiscernible from it.

16. J. P. Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego* (New York: Noonday Press, 1957) (Sartre refers to Spinoza, p. 39) [Note by Deleuze].

17. It would be tedious to compile a list of all these references as they occur throughout Deleuze's oeuvre. It is worth noting that one of the first published texts, 'Du Christ à la bourgeoisie' (*Espace*, 1, new series, 1946) includes a long, unattributed quotation of Sartre's famous article on intentionality in Husserl (1939, reprinted in *Situations*, I) and that several of Deleuze's works mention *The Transcendence of the Ego*: *LS, DR, WP*, 'Immanence: A Life ... '.

18. 'Immanence: A life ... ', see below pp. 170; 202.

19. This later work has often been perceived as a repudiation. Thus Alquié wrote in these terms about *The Transcendence of the Ego*: 'If the subjectivity which it [existentialism] describes were impersonal, or transcendental, things would indeed be able to shine in it, with an obvious brilliance and all their colours intact. As is well known, Sartre was at first tempted by this interpretation, and even criticised Husserl on its basis' ('Surrealism and Existentialism', 1948, in *Solitude de la Raison*, Paris: 1966, p. 80). On the history of the Sartre-Husserl connection on this subject, see Rudolf Bernet, *La Vie du Sujet* (Paris: PUF, 1994), pp. 300ff.

20. These notions of singularity and vicinity are crucial. Deleuze takes them from topology and phonology. 'To the determinations of differential relations there correspond singularities, distributions of singular points which characterize curves or figures (a triangle for example has three singular points). Thus the determination of the phonematic relations proper to a given language assigns singularities in whose vicinity the sonorities and meanings of the language are constituted. The reciprocal determination of the symbolic elements [in this case the phonemes] extends thereafter to the complete determination of the singular points which constitute a space corresponding to these elements' ('What are the defining marks of structuralism?', in *Histoire de la Philosophie*, general editor François Châtelet, vol. 8, Paris, 1973, p. 309).

21. I am walking along the sea and I can hear its roar. What I hear, in fact, is an infinite number of noises made by the small waves, by micro-waves. See too Leibniz's theory of music: 'Music is an occult arithmetical exercise of the soul which is unaware that it is counting, as it does many things in confused or insensible perceptions which it cannot notice through distinct apperception. For those who believe that there cannot be anything in the soul of which it is unaware are mistaken' (G. W. Leibniz, letter to Goldbach, 24 June 1712: see French translation and introduction by Frédéric de Buzon in *Philosophie*, 59, September 1998). See also *Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason*, §17.

22. On this point, see Chapter 2 of *The Fold*, especially p. 146 n. 28, where Deleuze contrasts the readings of Leibniz by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, notably on the question of being present to, in, or for the world.

23. This text is quoted, without reference to Sartre, in 'Du Christ à la Bourgeoisie'.

24. See in particular P.I, ch. IV and P.II, ch IV.

25. Pierre Clarac, in his preface to the essay 'Contre Sainte-Beuve' in the volume of the same title in the Pléiade edition (1971, pp. 819ff) maintains that although for Proust the theoretical essay was for a long time linked to the novel, the two plans finally diverged. The texts he himself quotes clearly seem to me to indicate the opposite, since, for Proust, the novel finally replaces the essay ('my novel fills every gap'). In any case, it is clear that in a deep sense the essay against the biographical method contains the genesis of the *Search*, especially its darker parts.

26. *Foucault* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1986). *Negotiations*-contains a conversation devoted to this book under the title 'Life as a Work of Art' (pp. 94–101). See also pp. 111–12.

27. In his 'Postscript on Control Societies', Deleuze draws a picture of a widespread crisis in all systems of discipline (prison, hospital, factory, school, family) and sketches out the description of a society of continuous control, where the password has replaced the old official number, and continuous education has replaced the straitjacket of discipline.(*N*, pp. 177–82).

28. *L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*, video recording, 1996, 'D for desire'. This theory of desire is compatible with what Deleuze says about montage in his books on cinema. It is also at the heart of the book on Proust.

29. On the topic of the 'social' sector, see Deleuze's foreword to the book by Jacques Donzelot, *The Policing of Families*, tr. by Robert Hurley (Baltimore, MD; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

30. See also Chapter III of *Dialogues*.

31. Deleuze says clearly that in accounting for the genesis of the ego, 'we must always return to the [baroque] theatre of Leibniz – and not to the cumbersome machinery of Husserl' (*LS*, p. 113). On theatre as presentation, and not representation, see also his texts on Artaud and Beckett.

32. Deleuze often refers to Artaud's article on the body without organs published in *84*, nos 5–6 (1948). See also the texts in *Suppôts et Suppliciations* (vol. XIV of Artaud's *Oeuvres complètes*, Paris, 1978). René Girard astutely noted the link with Surrealism, in a review – deeply critical, in fact – of Anti-Oedipus (*Critique*, 306, November 1972, p. 990).

33. See in particular in *SP*, the article 'Affections, Affects', and Ch. VI: 'Spinoza and Us'.

34. Levinas speaks of the 'extreme uprightness in the face of my fellow man, rending

the plasticity of the phenomenon'. He continues: 'Uprightness of an exposure to death, defenceless; and, before all language, and before all mimicry, a demand made of me from the depths of an absolute solitude; a demand addressed to me as an order issued, a putting in question of my presence and my responsibility' (*Entre Nous. On Thinking-of-the-other*, tr. by Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (London: Athlone Press, 1998), p. 130). These texts could be compared with Proust's descriptions of faces as traps organized around points of fascination. A good example is the celebrated passage describing monocles at the beginning of the Sainte-Euverte soirée, in Swann's Way, tr. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin, revised by D. J. Enright (London: Chatto and Windus), pp. 394–5.

35. 'Hysteria', in *FB*, is taken in the sense of the psychiatric picture of it which emerges in the nineteenth century – a catalogue of spasms and trances.

Chapter Five: The Time(s) of the Cinema

1. *L'Épuisé*, a postface to *Quad* by Samuel Beckett, Paris: Minuit, 1992, p. 72. Reprinted in *ECC*, p. 159ff.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 93 and 96, *ECC*, pp. 168–9.
3. Published respectively in 1983 and 1985, the two volumes were conceived as a whole, but significant differences in their own developments drew the attention of many commentators. The first volume follows an analytical and genetic plan: the photogram is presented as the ultimate component of the film, and through it are explained framing, decoupage, the various types of montage and the different forms of image-movements (which can all be inferred from a primary form, the perception-image). Thus the second commentary on Bergson presents a genesis of varieties of image-movements from a first or primary determination, given by the perception-image (Ch. IV). The second volume is concerned with a very different type of image, the time-image, and does not follow this genetic principle. In it, Deleuze's description sometimes seems attracted by the proliferating power of more contemporary narrations and focuses on a less classical type of cinema, even an experimental one.
4. See C. Metz, 'Pour une phénomenologie du Narratif' and 'Langue ou Langage' in *Essais sur la Signification au Cinéma*, T.1, Klincksieck, Paris, 1968, pp. 25–9 and 46–56.
5. Deleuze's opposition to Metz's equation of film and language (which entails that of shot and statement) is summarized in D. N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997, p. 38–43. There is also a thorough discussion of the relevance of Metzian categories when applied to the experience of film temporality in Alain Ménil, *L'Ecran du Temps*, Lille: PUL, 1992, Chapters 2 and 3.
6. See Bergson, *L'Évolution Créatrice*, in *Oeuvres*, Paris: PUF, 1959, p. 753. One must refer to the whole of Chapter IV, a retrospective glance at the history of Western thought entitled: 'Thought's Cinematographic Mechanism and the Mechanistic Illusion. Overview on the History of Systems. True Becoming and False Evolutionism'. The second commentary on Bergson in Chapter IV of *MI*

shows clearly that what is at stake in Bergsonism can be understood by reading *L'Évolution Créatrice* together with *Matière et Mémoire*.

7. See *MI*, all of Chapter 1 and pp. 2–3 and 8–10.

8. *Ibid.*, Ch. 1 (§§2 and 3, *passim*).

9. This term appears regularly in Deleuze's work, even though he rarely uses '-ism' categories. What is at stake here is to trace the thread the cinema followed, consciously or not, from its origin. Among several texts, see *MI*, pp. 55, 57–8, 206. On these questions see my essay 'Deleuze et le Bergsonisme du Cinéma', in *Philosophie*, Paris: Minuit, n°47, 1995.

10. For Deleuze, 'modern cinema' comes after neo-realism and is anchored in the generalized crisis of the action-image which made it possible; thus the time-image will require a type of narration exploring precise dissociations of audio and visual images. This is why in the first chapter of *TI* Rosselini and de Sica, taken as models of a disjunction of the audio-optical situation from the sensori-motor one, co-exist with directors as diverse as Godard, Rivette, Bresson or Antonioni.

11. *MI*, pp. 2–3.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

13. Cf. O. Fahle, 'Deleuze et l'Histoire du Cinéma' in O. Fahle and L. Engell, *Le Cinéma selon Deleuze*, Weimar: Verlag der Bauhaus-Universität/Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1997. In the same volume, R. Bellour defends a different point of view, arguing for the conformity of Deleuze's periodization to chron-ologies accepted by most historians of the cinema, while refusing all reduction to a historicist point of view ('Penser, raconter, le cinéma de G. Deleuze'). On the difficulties arising from the internal complexity of the concept of time-image, see M. Grande, 'Le Temps au Miroir' and A. Scala, 'Signes de Temps' in *Pensare il Cinema*, R. de Gaetano, ed:, Rome: Bulzoni. In *Le Cinéma selon Deleuze*, see the articles by G. Fihman and M. Grande.

14. Commentaries abound on this difficulty. Most notable are the articles by J.-L. Leutrat, 'Deux Temps, Trois Mouvements', in *Kaléidoscope*, Lille: PUL, 1991, and by Reda Bensmaïa, 'Un Philosophe au Cinéma', *Magazine Littéraire*, n°257, September 1988. These questions are the object of more thorough analysis in conferences on the works by Deleuze on the cinema. Cf. in *Deleuze, Pensare il Cinema*, R. de Gaetano, ed. Bulzoni, the contributions by J.-L. Leutrat, 'Deleuze, le Cinéma et l'Histoire' and 'Une Géographie du Cinéma' (R. de Gaetano), as well as the collection *Le Cinéma selon Deleuze*, O. Fahle and L. Engell, eds.

15. See *The Time Image*, pp. 40–41, or p. 271. The joining of Bergson and Kant is done twice, pp. 39–41, 81–3, in connection with the crystal-image. But the formula 'le temps est hors de ses gonds', transposition by Deleuze of Hamlet's 'Time is out of joint' runs through the whole work. It is explicitly commented on in the article 'Sur Quatre Formules Poétiques Qui Pourraient Résumer la Philosophie Kantienne' (in *ECC*).

16. See *TI*, Ch. IV and V, in particular 'What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time: since the past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, time has to split itself in two at each moment as present and past, which differ from each other in nature, or, what amounts to the same thing, it has to split the present in two heterogeneous directions . . . Bergsonism has often been reduced to the following idea: duration

is subjective, and constitutes our internal life. ... But, increasingly, [Bergson] came to say something quite different: the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, and it is we who are internal to time, not the other way round' (pp. 81–2).

17. *TI*, p. 41.

18. *TI*, p. 271. For the opposition of *Aeon* and *Chronos*, see *TI*, p. 81 and *LS*, Twenty-third Series.

19. *DR*, p. 211.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

22. *WP*, p. 58.

23. *DR*, pp. xxi–xxii.

24. *L'Épuisé*, p. 94.

25. *WP*, p. 110.

26. 'These two themes, the open totality and the event in the course of happening, are part of the profound Bergsonism of the cinema in general' (*MI*, p. 206).

27. *MI*, p. 55.

28. 'The great cinema authors are like the great painters or the great musicians: it is they who talk best about what they do. But, in talking, they become something else, they become philosophers or theoreticians ... ' (*TI*, p. 280).

29. Cf. R. de Gaetano, 'Mondes Cinématographiques', in *Le Cinéma selon Deleuze*.

30. For other aspects of the connection of 'cinema's Bergsonism' according to Deleuze with Bergson's philosophy, see G. Fihman, 'Deleuze, Bergson, Zénon d'Élée et le Cinéma', A. François and Y. Thomas, 'La Dimension Critique de Gilles Deleuze', and M. Grande, 'Les Images non Derivées', in *Le Cinéma selon Deleuze*.

31. For more details on the historical and conceptual background, see my article 'Deleuze et le Bergsonisme du Cinéma' in *Philosophie*, 47, Paris: Minuit, 1995. Historically, the first significant polemic is that which split French cinema in the 1920s. It led to considering the cinema in its relationship to thought. Marcel L'Herbier summarizes it in *La Tête qui Tourne*, Paris: Belfond, 1979. See also *Intelligence du Cinématographe*, Paris: Corréa, 1946 (republished by Buchet-Chastel, ed. D'Aujourd'hui, coll. 'Les Introuvables'). For a more thorough analysis of the historical and intellectual context, see Richard Abel, *French Cinema: the First Wave, 1915–1929*. Princeton University Press, 1983, and David Borwell, *French Impressionist Cinema: Film Culture, Film Theory, and Film Style*, Iowa University Press, 1973.

32. The purpose of the first chapter of *MI* is to find, within Bergson's analysis, the moment when it literally misses the cinema, even though it had concepts that were adequate to its nature (the movement-image) and the appropriate theoretical framework.

33. There are numerous meeting points between Bergson's thought and the reflections of Epstein, Balázs or even Yuri Lotman and Rudolf Arnheim. Not only do they borrow some of his schemes of thought (for instance, that of the melody, or of the lesson), but they mainly aim at defining the modalities of a direct presentation of time, most notably Epstein. And to reach this aim, they have to oppose the movement-image to photography, understood as immobile section, snapshot, superficial view upon things, etc. In the same way, they have

to contrast the non-reproductive dimension of the film image with the repro-
ductive framework of the photographic image. Cf. Béla Balázs, *The Spirit of
Film*, 1930; *Theory of the Film: Character and Growth of a New Art* (1945 and
1952); Rudolf Arnheim, *Film as Art* (1932). Arnheim's thought has gone far
beyond the cinema. But his book *Visual Thinking* (1969) demonstrates his
constant interest for this orientation of thought. In particular, his understanding
of the percept and of the relationship percept/concept coincide with Bergson's
considerations (cf. *Visual Thinking*, Ch. II and III).

34. Jean Epstein, *Esprit de Cinéma*, in *Ecrits sur le Cinéma* 2, Paris: Seghers, 1974,
p. 93.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 89–90, my italics. This is strangely consonant with the vocabularies of
Bergson and Deleuze. Deleuze sees in the cinema an art wholly devoted to the
production of open totalities, in which the process represented constantly
changes nature while dividing.
37. Jean Epstein, *Intelligence d'une Machine*, in *Ecrits sur le Cinéma 1*, Paris: Seghers,
1974, pp. 333–4.
38. *Esprit de Cinéma*, pp. 90–91.
39. Jean Epstein, *Le Cinéma du Diable*, in *Ecrits 1*, p. 370. My italics.
40. The expression appears for the first time in Spinoza's treatise *On the Improvement
of the Understanding*. It is clear that this question derives from Deleuze's Spi-
nozism. See in particular *EP*, Ch. 8. The question is dealt with in relationship to
the cinema in *TI*, Ch. VII.
41. *B*, p. 28.
42. Jean Epstein, *Le Cinéma du Diable*, in *Ecrits 1*, p. 371.
43. Bergson, 'La perception du changement', in *Mélanges*, Paris: PUF, 1972, p. 913.
44. 'If pure perception is defined in principle as that which coincides with the
present, and thus can be identified with an instantaneous vision, it is a narrow
and pared down vision of things, which is restricted to an ideal point, the
instant, and determined according to the necessities of action. By contrast,
contemplation can be compared to this view of the present which reaches its
depth thanks to the width of the angle of shot; in that, it brings the present
back within the perspective of the depth of time.' *Matière et Mémoire*, p. 31. See
also the conclusion of the book.
45. Bergson, 'La perception du changement', in *Mélanges*, Paris: PUF, 1972, p. 913.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 897.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 911.
48. Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Psychology of Imagination*, London: Methuen, 1978.
49. See *Negotiations*, Ch. II.5 'On *the Movement-Image*'.
50. See *MI*, all of Chapter IV and in particular pp. 61–3. See also the third com-
mentary on Bergson, in *TI*, Ch. 3, p. 56 ff, where the qualitative approach to the
image is considered from the point of view of the interrelations of the virtual
and the actual.
51. *MM*, p.161; all the consequences of this hypothesis are drawn in Ch. 1, pp.
171–6.
52. *MI*, p. 58.

53. Deleuze praises Merleau-Ponty for retaining Bergson's understanding of depth and applying it in his analysis of Cézanne (see *I-T*, p. 142, note 13). In the same perspective, see *DR*, pp. 50–52 and 228–31, and *WP*, pp. 195–7.
54. *TI*, p. 22.
55. *TI*, p. 108. But the idea of a non-chronological time will come later (pp. 123–4), when pure memory frees itself from the memory-image, announcing the crystal-image.
56. *DR*, p. 229; on the reversal of depth, see pp. 228–31 and 50–51.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
58. See all of the beginning of *Matière et Mémoire*, in particular: 'All seems to take place as if, in this aggregate of images which I call the universe, nothing really new could happen except through the medium of certain particular images, the type of which is furnished to me by my body ... The objects which surround my body reflect its possible action upon them.' *Matter and Memory*, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer. New York: Zone Books, 1988, pp. 18–21. The idea of a privileged image is complex: a first approach to it can be found p. 176; its possibility depends on the relationship of reaction and reflection between my body and other objects.
59. Cf. *TI*, p. 179ff. Here too one must have abandoned C. Metz's semiological analysis and the equation shot-statement.
60. Cf. *MI*, pp. 58–9: 'This infinite set of all images constitutes a kind of plane [*plan*] of immanence. The image exists in itself, *on this plane*. This in-itself of the image is matter: not something hidden behind the image, but on the contrary the absolute identity of the image and movement. ... Now, of course, closed systems, finite sets, are cut from this universe or *on this plane*; it makes them possible by the exteriority of its parts. But it is not one itself. It is a set, but an infinite set. ... It is therefore a section ... ' (my emphasis).
61. TI, p. 22.
62. But time also pertains to intensity, a point directly derived from the *Données immédiates de la conscience*.
63. *DR*, p. 230. I develop these points in 'L'Image-temps: une Figure de l'Immanence?' in *Iris*, 'Gilles Deleuze, Philosopher of the Cinema', no. 23, 1997, D. N. Rodowick (ed.).

Chapter Six: Deleuze and Anglo-American Literature: Water, Whales and Melville

1. Seminar of 22 October 1985, quoted in André Pierre Colombat, 'Deleuze and Signs', in Ian Buchanan and John Marks (eds), *Deleuze and Literature* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), pp. 14–33 [p. 20].
2. *TP*, p. 186.
3. *D*, pp. 36–7.
4. D. H. Lawrence, *Studies in Classic American Literature* (London: Heinemann, 1964), p. 151.
5. See Herman Melville, *Moby Dick* (London: Penguin, 1994), p. 130. Hereafter referred to as *MD*.
6. See, for example, 'Year Zero – Faciality', Chapter 7 of *MP*, pp. 167–91.

7. Herman Melville, 'Billy Budd', in *Billy Budd, Sailor, and Other Stories* (London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 321–409 [p. 339].

8. Herman Melville, 'Bartleby', in *Billy Budd, Sailor, and Other Stories* (London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 59–99 [p. 83].

9. Paul Brodtkorb Jr, *Ishmael's White World: A Phenomenological Reading of Moby Dick* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 80–81.

10. See *LS*, p. 148.

11. *ECC*, p. 77.

12. Walter Redfern, 'Between the Lines of "Billy Budd"', *Journal of American Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1983), pp. 357–65 [p. 364].

13. Michel Pierssens, 'Gilles Deleuze: Diabolus in Semiotica', *MLN*, Vol. 90, No. 4 (May 1975), pp. 497–503 [p. 500].

14. David Kirby, *Herman Melville* (New York: Continuum, 1993), p. 84.

15. Letter to R. H. Dana Jr, 1 May 1850, in *The Writings of Herman Melville: Vol. 14, Correspondence*, ed. Lynn Horth (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press and the Newberry Library, 1993), pp. 160–62 [p. 162].

16. Letter to Sarah Huyler Morewood, September 1851, pp. 205–6.

17. John Bryan, *Melville and Repose: The Rhetoric of Humor in the American Renaissance* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 200.

18. William V. Spanos, *The Errant Art of Moby-Dick: The Canon, the Cold War, and the Struggle for American Studies* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 142.

Chapter Seven: Minority, Territory, Music

1. We might note as well that the French word *mineur(e)* bears the connotation of immaturity, as in the case of an individual who has not attained his or her majority, and hence of a lack of seriousness, whereas the substantive *minorité* has an immediately demographic connotation.

2. Deleuze and Guattari base their remarks on Prague German on Klaus Wagenbach's extended discussion of the subject in *Franz Kafka: Eine Biographie Seiner Jugend 1883–1912*, pp. 83–95. I have amended the citation to remove the typographical error of *Giben* for *Geben* in Deleuze and Guattari's text.

3. Deleuze and Guattari argue that Joyce and Beckett, as Irishmen writing in English, faced a dilemma similar to that of Prague Jews at the turn of the century, and that their differing strategies for deterritorializing English resemble those adopted by Kafka and his contemporaries, Joyce artificially enriching the language, Beckett by contrast proceeding 'by dryness and sobriety, a willed poverty, pushing deterritorialization to such an extreme that nothing remains but intensities' (*K*, 19; 35).

4. For commentaries on Kafka as a minor writer, see Bensmaïa's foreword to the English translation of *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, 'The Kafka Effect', Colombat (pp. 230–41), and Chapter 5 of my *Deleuze and Guattari* (pp. 107–23). For discussions of minor literature, see Bensmaïa's essays 'Traduire ou "Blanchir" la Langue: *Amour Bilingue* d'Abdelkebir Khatibi', and 'On the Concept of Minor Literature. From Kafka to Kateb Yacine', the special

issues of *Cultural Critique*, numbers 6 and 7, devoted to minor literature, as well as Hicks, Lloyd, Reizbaum, Renza and my 'Minor Writing and Minor Literature'.

5. The term *agencement*, translated variously as 'assemblage', 'arrangement' or 'organization', can denote both a particular arrangement of entities and the act of assembling or combining elements in a given configuration. Particularly useful are Deleuze's remarks about language and assemblages in *Dialogues*: 'The minimum real unit is not the word, the idea, the concept or the signifier, but the *assemblage*. It is always an assemblage which produces utterances. Utterances do not have as their cause a subject which would act as a subject of enunciation, any more than they are related to subjects as subjects of utterance. The utterance is the product of an assemblage – which is always collective, which brings into play within us and outside us populations, multiplicities, territories, becomings, affects, events' (*D*, 51).

6. The term 'incorporeal transformations' Deleuze and Guattari take from the Stoic theory of incorporeals, which Deleuze discusses at several points of *The Logic of Sense*, especially Series two, twenty and twenty-three. Deleuze's primary sources for his understanding of the Stoics are Emile Bréhier's *La Théorie des Incorporels dans l'Ancien Stoïcisme* and Victor Goldschmidt's *Le Système Stoïcien et l'Idée de Temps*.

7. Useful studies of Bene in English include Kowsar and Fortier. A collection of major studies of Bene in Italian is available in his *Opere*.

8. For a more extended discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's approach to music and territoriality, see my 'Rhizomusicosmology' and 'Art and Territory'.

9. Deleuze's first published book, *Instincts et Institutions*, assembles a number of brief texts on this topic, by authors as diverse as Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Darwin, Cuvier, Bergson, Malinowski, Freud, Lévi-Strauss and Eliade. Deleuze's short introduction on the relationship between animal instincts and social institutions inaugurates a line of speculation that reappears with some frequency throughout his thought.

10. In *TP*, Deleuze and Guattari make reference to Messiaen's music, his use of birdsong, and his concept of 'rhythmic characters' [*personnages rythmiques*]. See especially *TP*, 299–309 and 316–20. See also *FB*, v. 1, p. 48.

11. Messiaen says of his citations of birdsongs in his music: 'Personally, I'm very proud of the exactitude of my work; perhaps I'm wrong, because even people who really know the birds might not recognize them in my music, yet I assure you that everything is real' (Messiaen, 94).

12. Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of territorialization as an 'act of rhythm' suggests that they take 'rhythm' in its broadest sense, to include both temporal and spatial patterns (as one speaks of the rhythm of the elements of a painting, sculpture or building, for example). Hence, all the relational patterns of music may be subsumed within the general category of rhythm.

13. A thorough treatment of Deleuze and Guattari's approach to music would include a review of their differentiation of Classical, Romantic and Modern compositional practices in *A Thousand Plateaus* (337–50). Deleuze discusses music as well in the final chapter of *The Fold*, concentrating primarily on music's relation to the other arts in the Baroque, and in *Périclès et Verdi*. Also of interest is Deleuze's brief article 'Boulez, Proust et le Temps: "occuper sans

compter"', as well as a lecture on Boulez that Deleuze delivered at IRCAM [Institut de Recherche et Coordination Acoustique/Musique] in 1978, titled 'Conférence sur le Temps Musical' (available through the internet site Web Deleuze, at http://www.imaginet.fr).

Chapter Eight: Empiricism Unhinged: from Logic of Sense to Logic of Sensation

1. *DR*, p. XIX.
2. *DR*, p. XX.
3. Bernhard Riemann, *On the Hypotheses that Lie at the Foundations of Geometry* (1854, later published by Dedekind), and Albert Lautmann, *Essai sur l'Unité des Mathématiques et Divers Écrits* (Paris: UGE, 1978).
4. *DR*, p. XXI.
5. *LS*, p. 28.
6. Spinoza, *Tractatus de Emendatione Intellectus*.
7. *The Crack Up*, 1936.
8. Cf. W.V. O. Quine's Word and object, on the myth of meaning as a specific mental entity.
9. *A Syllabus of Plane Algebraical Geometry, Systematically Arranged, with Formal Definitions, Postulates, and Axioms* (1860), *Euclid and his Modern Rivals* (1879), *Curiosa Mathematica* (1888–95), *A Fascinating Mental Recreation for the Young: Symbolic Logic* (1896).
10. *D*, p. 59; *N*, p. 165.
11. Cf. Victor Goldschmidt, *Le Système Stoïcien et l'Idée de Temps* (Paris: Vrin, 1953); Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (1928).
12. *LS*, p. 31.
13. Cf. the first chapter of *La Chartreuse de Parme* and the *Preface* to *Phenomenology of the Mind*.
14. Henri Rousseau ('le Douanier'), *La Guerre ou la Chevauchée de la Discorde*, 1895. Rousseau added to its title: 'She passes, frightening, leaving despair everywhere, tears and ruins.'
15. See the catalogue of the Max Ernst retrospective exhibition, Werner Spies (ed.), Centre G. Pompidou, 1991, in particular the contribution of Sarah Wilson, '*Max Ernst au Pays des Merveilles*'.
16. Cited by Claude Lefort, in the introduction to *La Prose du Monde*.
17. *LS*, p. 221.
18. *N*, p. 164
19. See 'Bartleby or the Formula', in *ECC*.
20. Proust, *Correspondance avec Madame Strauss*, letter 47.
21. *ECC*, Ch. III, and LS p. 11.
22. Cf. C. Imbert, *Phénoménologies et Langues Formulaires* (Paris: PUF, 1992), ch. IV, p. 137.
23. *Introduction à la Méthode de Léonard de Vinci* (1895), later revised and *Degas: Danse et Dessin* (1938).
24. On all of this, see M. Merleau-Ponty, *L'Oeil et l'Esprit* and *FB*, ch. XIV, p. 80.
25. The brutality of fact, interviews with Francis Bacon.

26. *FB*, pp. 17 and 23.
27. *FB*, XIII, p. 78.
28. Balzac, *Le Chef d'Oeuvre Inconnu*.
29. Laurence Gowing, 'Cézanne, the Logic of Organized Sensations', in *Cézanne, the Late Work*, New York, 1977.
30. Cf. Poussin, *Orion Aveugle*, which is also the title of a book by Claude Simon on Poussin's masterpiece.
31. *FB*, p. 31.
32. As Merleau-Ponty reminded us with respect to Freud's essay *Leonard da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood*, in 'Le Doute de Cézanne' (1945), in *Sens et Non Sens* (Paris: Nagel, 1948).
33. We know that Deleuze preferred to borrow the language of psychiatry to that of psychoanalysis. For two reasons: to avoid the dialectical structures still present in psychoanalysis, and out of a preference for the description of symptoms and postures, rather than the assignation of aetiologies.
34. *LS*, p. 10.
35. Collector of solar energy, and first depository of propitiatory emblems in Homer.
36. *WP*, 1989.
37. Cf. Laertius, VII, 74, 'Phantasia comes first, then ... '
38. This *brief History of Reason* comes at the end of *The Critique of Pure Reason*.

Chapter Nine: Absolute Immanence

1. This text has been reprinted in Michel Foucault, *Dits et Écrits* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), IV, p. 763.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 774.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 776.
4. Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, 'Satzzeichen', *Akzente*, 6 (1956).
5. *D*, p. 73.
6. J. H. Masmejan, *Traité de la Ponctuation* (Paris, 1781).
7. Gilles Deleuze, *ECC*, p. 112.
8. Gilles Deleuze, 'Immanence: Une Vie ... ', *Philosophie*, 47 (1995): 6.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
11. *LS*, p. 98.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
13. The history of the relations between Heidegger and Deleuze – through Blanchot, for example, and the often unacknowledged Heideggerian dimension of contemporary French philosophy – remains to be written. In any case, however, it is certain that the Heidegger of Deleuze is altogether different from the Heidegger of Lévinas and Derrida.
14. *EP*, p. 67.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
17. *WP*, p. 45.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–7.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 59–60.
21. Deleuze, 'Immanence: Une Vie . . . '. See below.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Charles Dickens, *Our Mutual Friend* (London: Penguin Books, 1997), p. 439.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 440.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 442.
26. Deleuze, 'Immanence: Une Vie . . . '.
27. Pierre Maine de Biran, 'Mémoire sur la Décomposition de la Pensée', in *Oeuvres*, Vol. 3 (Paris: Vrin, 1988), p. 388.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 370.
29. Deleuze, 'Immanence: Une Vie . . . '.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Aristotle, *De Anima*, 413 a 20–b 10.
32. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 144–5; the original is in *La Volonté de Savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), pp. 190–91.
33. p. 92.
34. Deleuze, 'Immanence: Une Vie . . . ' p. 5.
35. *WP*, p. 213.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 342.
37. 'Immanence: Une Vie . . . '.
38. Spinoza, *Opera*, ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1925), 3: 361.
39. *Ibid.*
40. See Victor Goldschmidt, *Le Système Stoïcien et l'Idée de Temps* (Paris: Vrin, 1969), pp. 22–3. Deleuze cites this passage in *LS*, p. 147.
41. Aristotle, *De anima*, 416 b 12–20.
42. When Aristotle defines the intellect (*nous*) by its capacity to think itself, it is important to remember that he has already considered a self-referential paradigm, as we have seen, in his discussion of nutritive life and its power of self-preservation. In a certain sense, thought's thinking itself has its archetype in nutritive life's self-preservation.
43. Émile Benveniste, *Problems in General Linguistics*, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971), p. 252.
44. 'Immanence: Une Vie . . . ', p. 6.
45. Harry A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 325.
46. The term *acquiescentia* is registered in the *Thesaurus* of neither Estienne nor Teubner. As to the ablative construction of *acquiescere* with *in* (in the sense, Estienne specifies, of *acquiescere in re aliqua, aut in aliquo homine, cum quadam animi voluptate, quieteque consistere et oblectari in re aliqua, in qua prius in dubio aut solicitudine anima fuisset*), it is never used with the reflexive pronoun.

Chapter Ten: Immanence: a Life . . .

1. Cf. Bergson: 'as though we reflected back to surfaces the light which emanates from them, the light which, had it passed on unopposed, would never have been revealed' (Bergson, 1911: 29).
2. Cf. Sartre (1957). Sartre establishes a transcendental field without subject which refers to an impersonal, absolute, immanent consciousness in relation to which the subject and object are 'transcendents'. On James, cf. David Lapoujade's analysis (Lapoujade, 1995).
3. Already in the second introduction to the *Science of Knowledge*: 'an intuition of sheer activity, not static, but dynamic; not a matter of existence, but of life' (Fichte, 1970: 40). On life according to Fichte, cf. his *Way Towards the Blessed Life* (1806) and Guéroult's commentary (Guéroult, 1974: 9).
4. Even Husserl recognizes this: 'That the being of the world "transcends" consciousness in this fashion (even with respect to the evidence in which the world presents itself), and that it necessarily remains transcendent, in no wise alters the fact that it is conscious life alone, wherein everything transcendent becomes constituted, as something inseparable from consciousness . . . ' (Husserl, 1960: 62). This will be the point of departure of Sartre's text.
5. Cf. Joë Bousquet, *Les Capitales* (1955).
6. Thanks to Ariel Greco for his comments on this translation.

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An extensive bibliography of Deleuze's texts and translations, compiled by
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http://www.webdeleuze.com/TXT/ENG/GDBIB2.htm

A series of links to Deleuzian bibliographies is available at
http://www.langlab.wayne.edu/Romance/FRED_G/FRED&GLinks.html

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