# LEADING CHANGE IN POLICE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

By

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LEADING CHANGE IN POLICE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

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This research project examines the issues associated with leading change in police performance measurement. The research question posed by this thesis is "How does the researched model of police performance measurement compare to current methods in terms of acceptance or resistance to change?" The study examines contemporary research on creating public value, developing effective outcome measurements, and examines the various processes that affect change. This research includes two surveys regarding competency at, and perception of, current performance measurement that assist in developing the project's recommendations. Those recommendations include developing better internal and external environmental assessment competencies, the adoption of effective strategic planning processes, devising outcome-oriented performance measures, a plan for leading transformational change, and effective training in the above processes.

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#### CHAPTER 1

#### INTRODUCTION

## Context of the Problem

Police leaders participate in strategic planning but often fail to adequately measure the success of strategic plan implementation. Most often, plan managers tend to use output measurements, such as how many times some task was done, instead of outcome measurements, such as what quality was - or was not - created by implementing the plan. In fact, police leadership in America has institutionalized output measurements since early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The development of the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system created an enduring standard measurement for police effectiveness based upon reported crime (Maguire, 2003). Such a singular approach to performance measurement belies the issues associated with crime causation and citizen fear of crime (Moore, Thatcher, Dodge, & Moore, 2002). Without effective measurement, there is little connection between planning objectives and organizational achievement.

Changing the current performance measurement paradigm has assumed increased significance because of citizen concern over police effectiveness and rising police budgets. Police leaders are increasingly responsible to the public for the rising bottom line associated with fighting crime and maintaining order, yet their standard measurement system fails to capture significant data on the outcomes of those taxpayer expenses. Significant changes in police crime-fighting tactics, such as the New York Police Department's computer statistics driven Compstat model (Bratton & Knobler, 1998), are the result of this increased pressure to reconcile costs. Yet, these new proactive tactics only represent the ratio of police resources to the increase or decrease of the crime rate.

A lower crime rate becomes the outcome without full consideration as to whether or not the cost was worth the expense. This means-to-an-end only considers the application of operational resources to accomplish police goals, but fails to consider the impact of that process of the agency's clients, customers, constituents, co-producers, and its own members (Moore, 2003).

Leading change in police performance measurement considers more than the development of new processes for creating value. It requires a local definition of value as part of the strategic planning process. All stakeholders must embrace the resulting vision for change, especially those within the agency (Charrier, 2004).

## Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study is to identify effective processes for leading a change in the way police executives measure performance. The study will examine contemporary research regarding the development of effective outcome measurements and recognize current methods for creating valuable outcomes. The object of the study is to identify the leadership challenges to implementing these new and more effective performance measurements and design a leadership process to implement suggested changes in a manner that will overcome systemic impediments to the change process. For example, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department embarked on a strategic planning exercise in 2000. The major work entailed the development of the vision, values, mission, goals, and strategies. Once developed, the plan failed to institutionalize in terms of measured outcomes and did not succeed at becoming part of the agency's daily focus or routine.

### Background of the Study

The strategic management of police agencies generally consists of the application of resources in certain areas to reduce the effects of crime and disorder. Current research on changing police performance measures indicates that police departments generally determine their effectiveness by measuring changes in the rate of certain categories of crime (Moore, 2003; Maguire, 2003, 2004; Sparrow 2000). That research suggests that police departments must use a more inclusive approach to problem analysis by collecting a wider range of data similar to the SWOT – Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats – analysis popularized by business in the private sector (Hill & Jones, 2004). These data are more useful than reliance on crime trend information to gauge effectiveness, yet police leaders have an institutionalized reliance on trends that have been popular for most of the last century. Police leadership as an institution has long recognized the need to be proactive instead of reactive (Thibault, Lynch, & McBride, 2004), but contemporary leaders generally design a proactive form that suits the agency in terms of its culture, structure, and values. Such tactics are comfortable to the agency as they represent a reliable mental model of the traditional business of policing. With the emergence of new researched standards for measuring police performance, agency leaders must concern themselves with the process of change. Charrier (2004) observes that defining a vision is only part of driving change:

Police chiefs are expected to implement theoretical frameworks that support contemporary leadership models such as learning organizations, enlightened leadership, or the consensus model. Although most police executives would agree with the argument for developing more adaptive organizations, they realize

that the difficulty lies in implementation and the ability to affect the behavior and attitudes of managers to facilitate change. (p. 60)

Thus, the bigger issue is designing an organizational model that is receptive to a more public view of policing that meets the needs of both internal and external stakeholders.

## Research Question

The research question posed by this thesis is "How does the researched model of police performance measurement compare to current methods in terms of acceptance or resistance to change?"

#### **Definition of Terms**

The following terms are the planning lexicon of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (2000):

Vision: Vision refers to the ultimate picture of what the organization is striving to achieve. A vision is timeless.

Values: The values are the standards that the members of the organization exhibit in behavior. Values are timeless.

Mission: The mission is a broad statement of purpose for the organization.

Missions usually are for three to five years.

Goals: The goals are explicit statements that support the mission. Goals generally are for one to three years.

Strategies: The strategies are specific, measurable actions that support the goals. Strategies are for one year or less.

Tactics: The tactics are detailed steps to support the strategies. Tactics change weekly and monthly as strategies progress.

The following are definitions of descriptive terms of governance concepts used in this paper (Dechman, 2004):

System (in the larger sense): The assemblage of people, procedures, and machines that are combined and that work together to perform Processes that produce tangible Products on a recurring basis.

Process: A sequence of actions that must be performed by the System to produce a specific result. Generally, a number of Processes must be combined to produce a Product

Products: The specific, tangible results produced by a System. The reason that a System exists is to produce a specific set of Products.

Governance: The executive-level management of a System of people, procedures and machines, with the following key management responsibilities: (a) Establishing and administering standards and policies that define system performance expectations, process guidelines and constraints, and Product requirements; (b) monitoring and assessing system performance, and identifying actions required to maintain or improve system efficiency or effectiveness; and (c) identifying changes in system performance or products that are required to satisfy new or modified goals and objectives of the organization.

Process Analysis: The characterization of specific action sequences that must be accomplished by the people, procedures, and machines of a system to produce results.

Metrics: Specific characteristics of a process or product that can be quantitatively measured on a recurring basis and subsequently compared to assess efficiency and

effectiveness. Performance and quality metrics are often quantified in terms of effort, time, and cost.

Process Re-engineering: The analysis and design of modifications to system components – the skills, roles and responsibilities of people; the procedural actions comprising the processes; and the functionality and performance of the machines – to achieve improvements in efficiency or effectiveness of the system, or to modify the system to produce new products or satisfy new goals and objectives.

#### Procedures

A comprehensive literature review will determine contemporary issues in police performance measurement with an emphasis on recommendations regarding the challenges of leading change. A survey of eight police agencies will determine contemporary performance measurement protocols as identified in the literature review. The administration of a stratified survey instrument on a single agency will determine performance measurement perceptions by position within the organization, test the worth of measurement changes recommended in the literature review, and establish the degree of resistance or acceptance to change. Analysis of the assembled data will establish the thesis recommendations for leading change in police performance measurement.

#### Assumptions

The first assumption is that current police performance measurements fail to take full consideration of the entire range of data required for police strategic planning and problem solving. The second assumption is that contemporary police leaders initiate proactive measures for crime fighting and order maintenance without developing effective measures of performance. The last assumption is that policing as a profession is

comfortable with trend measurements and police personnel at all levels are resistant to any change in established practices.

#### Limitations

Research for this project will be limited in scope to assessing the issues associated with leading change in performance measurement. While the project's survey research is limited to police agencies, the comprehensive literature review will include both police and private sector perspectives.

## Significance of the Study

The results of this project have bona fide implications for strategic planning performance measurement for police and public service agencies. The significance of the study is that leading a strategic management effort requires the clear communication of the agency's vision to all stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 2004; Kotter, 1996; Marquardt, 1999; Senge, 1994; Yukl, 2002). As a first step, the police must effectively understand the wants, needs, and perceptions of their constituents. Second, agencies must develop proactive plans that result in outcomes that create value for the public (Moore, 2003; Sparrow, 2000). Third, agencies must develop a performance measurement metric (Maguire, 2003). Last, police department leaders must understand impediments to leading a change effort. This understanding should commit top executives to exciting middle managers about the urgency and need for change, cause middle managers to commit to that change, and change the culture and climate of the agency (Charrier, 2004; Kotter).

#### **CHAPTER 2**

#### LITERATURE REVIEW

### Introduction

Performance measurement has been an issue of police management from the inception of consent policing in 1829. Social and economic events of the last half-century have caused police managers to validate mounting public scrutiny and increasing public safety budgets through established output-oriented measurements. Such measurements are rarely instructive in terms of intended outcomes. Research argues that many contemporary police managers have yet to attain a level of performance accountability that is common in the business world. Many have embraced the process of strategic management, yet most planning efforts fail at creating a shared organizational vision of problem solving in the police-client context. Recent academic research suggests that police managers must redefine organizational direction in terms of institutionalizing the creation of value consistent with public policy (Moore, et al., 2002).

The literature reviewed for this project consists of strategic management concepts widely used in business, contemporary examples of outcome based policing, and academic research on problem solving and performance measurement. Finally, this chapter examines literature concerning the leadership issues and challenges associated with the measurement of strategic performance in the police-client context.

#### Historical Perspective

Policing by consent of the public began in London, England as established by the Metropolitan Police Act in June of 1929 (Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990). Principle nine from the original duty manual states that, "The test of police efficiency is the

absence of crime and disorder and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them" (New Westminster Police, 2004,  $\P$  9). It reveals an early benchmark in performance measurement: The result of policing would be the absence of crime through an orderly process (Thibault et al., 2004).

Comparative police performance measurement began in the United States with the creation of Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) in 1930 in which police departments reported crime data to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. UCR data has continued to be collected and "has become the primary foundation for comparative performance measurement of police agencies in the United States" (Maguire, 2003, ¶ 6). The UCR Part 1 crimes of murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, arson, and auto theft are critical measures, but are not the only critical measures of crime in terms of victim importance (Sparrow et al., 1990). The comparative value is that this index presents individual and cumulative temporal benchmarks for an agency. Comparisons across jurisdictions are problematic due to disparate populations, geography, and demographics (Maguire).

The reform of policing that took place in America in the first two-thirds of the 20<sup>th</sup> century produced an environment in which law enforcement agencies were resentful of political interference, and rooted police "legitimacy, methods, and aspirations in the ideas of law enforcement and crime control" (Sparrow et al., 1990, p. 40). Largely still in place, it produced a police style centered around crime control with the enforcement of laws through the weapon of arrest as its primary method (Sparrow et al.). Resulting performance measurements were likewise reactive in orientation and concerned the number of arrests, cleared cases, recovered property, and response times using the tactical

tools of arrests, reactive investigations, and police omnipresence (Maguire, 2003, 2004; Sparrow et al.; Thibault et al., 2004).

Social, political, and economic events in the last half-century have caused a greater emphasis on the efficiency and effectiveness of the police. Civil unrest, landmark decisions constraining police discretion, and public investigations of police misconduct have "combined to produce an epidemic crisis of legitimacy for the American police...

[and] pointed rather forcefully to the need for alternative measures of police performance" (Maguire, 2003, ¶ 9-10). George Mason University's Professor Edward Maguire's research illustrates that an agency could perform well in terms of crime reduction while still performing poorly by other measures such as brutality, corruption, and public support. Further, the crime control tactics of arrest and investigation do not represent the largest portion of police activity.

Therefore, a comprehensive suite of performance measures needs to account for a broader spectrum of the work that police do, not just that part of their work related to issuing citations and arresting offenders. If police are supposed to prevent crime and motor vehicle accidents, solve community problems, reduce disorder, and build lasting community relationships, then performance measures should reflect their success in producing these and other valuable outcomes. (Maguire, 2003, ¶ 12)

#### Strategic Management

"A biologist once noted that every living organism survives because it has a competitive advantage in its environment. Businesses are no different" (Kaydos, 1993, p. 41). Hill and Jones (2004) identify strategic planning as a process designed to increase

the organization's effectiveness, sustain competitive advantage, and ensure profitability. Important features to that planning process include articulation of the organization's vision, core values, mission statement, and goals and objectives. Each of those elements should be the result of internal and external analysis in order to provide unique value to the organization. A strategic planning process guides resources, decisions, and behaviors that support the organization's competitive strategy.

Hill and Jones (2004) describe a mission statement as "a formal declaration of what the [organization] is trying to achieve over the medium to long term" (p. 10) to focus the organization toward value creation in terms of the end user. Value statements are important descriptions of the behaviors that management expects in all aspects of the organization's activities. "Values are commonly seen as the bedrock of a company's organizational culture" (p. 13). Activity directed by management is the process for animating the organization's statements of vision, mission, and values.

Management must affirmatively direct the activity of the organization. Mission and vision describe what an organization should achieve and why. Goals, objectives, strategies, and tactics are explicit statements that variously describe the creation of value. They must be congruent with the organization's vision and mission, measurable to benchmark performance, focus the organization on critical issues, must realistically challenge the agency to attain them, and must be time and outcome specific (Hill & Jones, 2004).

Markides (2000) recommends the development of innovative strategies that are the sum of three questions: Who should we target? What services should we offer? How should this be done? "A new strategic position is simply a new viable

who/what/how combination" (p. 8). The procedure does not find better ways and processes, but allows for the innovation of different ways and processes.

#### Table 1

How to create a unique strategic position (Markides, 2000, p. 23)

- 1. Define what business it believes it is in.
- Decide who will be its targeted customers, what products or services it will offer them, and how it will achieve all this in an efficient way.
- Construct the appropriate organizational environment that will support the choices made.

As such, strategy development "is all about combining these activities into a system that creates the requisite fit between what the environment needs and what the company does... in a way as to create a strong and reinforcing system" (pp. 24-5).

Creating value and sustaining competitive advantage requires a careful analysis of both internal and external forces that affect the organization. The analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) assists managers in achieving competitive advantage (Perreault, Jr. & McCarthy, 1996). Hill and Jones (2004) describe strengths and weaknesses in terms of distinctive competencies, or firm-specific strengths. Distinctive competencies are a combination of resources and capabilities used to shape the organization's strategies in order to achieve competitive advantage and profitability. "At best, strategy involves conscious decision reflecting the company's chosen customers and how it will compete for them in the marketplace. At worst, the strategy requires

doing whatever seems best at the time" (Kaydos, 1993, p. 40). Performance measures translate strategy into readily understood terms and "improve the effectiveness of everyone's decisions – from the executive suite to the front line" (p. 41). The object of a SWOT analysis is to develop operational strategies that fully capitalize on strengths and market opportunities while mitigating weakness and market threats (Hill & Jones).

Michael E. Porter's (1980) five forces model is another analytical tool to determine market opportunities – weak competitive forces, and threats – strong competitive forces, within an industry. Porter's model (a) analyzes the risk of potential competitors; (b) examines the intensity of rivalry among competitors; (c) assesses the bargaining power of buyers; (d) evaluates the bargaining power of suppliers; and (e) considers the availability of substitutes. Such examination in the business world is commonplace in successful organizations. While leading General Electric, Jack Welch designed a series of questions similar to Porter's model. These questions examined GE's position in the market, competitor moves in the market, as well as what the market may do based upon competitive forces. The answers to those questions would determine GE's need to change (Welch & Byrne, 2003). "Strategy is all about combining these activities into a system that creates the requisite fit between what the environment needs and what the company does" (Markides, 2000, p. 24). In policing, the task is to use functional parts in a manner that creates a strong reinforcing system.

#### NYPD: A Progressive Example

William Bratton served as police commissioner for the City of New York from 1994 to 1996 and brought with him a reputation as a tough chief that could turn around underperforming agencies by emphasizing the crime-fighting role. With New York, he

inherited a city and a police force in despair. UCR Part 1 crime rates had increased steadily for three decades causing some to refer to the city as the Rotten Apple instead of the Big Apple (Kim & Mauborgne, 2003). Bratton found that the New York Police Department (NYPD) more often measured police activity without measuring results. The NYPD kept statistics more to keep score than to assist in the crime fighting effort. His belief is that a reduction in crime was analogous to the bottom-line profit measurement used in business (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). His crime fighting strategies stayed consistent with his turnaround reputation. "Felony crime fell 39%; murders, 50%; and theft, 35%. Gallup polls reported that public confidence in the NYPD jumped from 37% to 73%, even as internal surveys showed job satisfaction in the police department reaching an all-time high" (Kim & Mauborgne, p. 61).

Bratton's team created the turnaround by promising a reduction in crime, then holding the entire agency to that promise. His crime fighting strategy was based on the of the Broken Window theory of policing: (a) Neighborhood disorder creates citizen fear; (b) broken windows are a signal that nobody cares; and, (c) police can only reduce fear and crime through the legitimacy and assistance of citizens (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Under Bratton, the NYPD became accountable for crime and fear by establishing a four-pronged framework for all crime fighting strategies: (a) Accurate and timely intelligence; (b) rapid deployment; (c) effective tactics; and (d) relentless follow-up and assessment (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).

The NYPD achieved accurate and timely intelligence by mapping the location of crime and criminals. Instead of mapping UCR Part 1 crimes, they disaggregated the categories into component parts. For example, they affected a reduction in the homicide

rate through extensive data analysis of shooters and shootings. Rapid deployment occurred through a process of decentralization of department resources to provide a comprehensive response capacity for identified crime patterns. Effective tactics consisted of comprehensive and flexible police actions that could adapt to shifting crime trends. Relentless follow-up and assessment of former tactics brought an awareness of tactic effectiveness for future reference (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).

The NYPD achieved accountability through the biweekly crime meetings known as Compstat, a hybrid word for computer comparison statistics (Sparrow, 2000), in which select precinct commanders would brief the NYPD command staff on crime fighting strategies (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). The NYPD leadership institutionalized Compstat meetings as the primary performance measurement tool for achieving broadly constructed outcomes based upon precinct response to the department's crime fighting strategies. This "sophisticated data-driven data management accountability system" (Fagan & Davies, 2000, p. 472) was often mean-spirited if the commander was less than engaged in the identification and suppression of emerging problems in their precincts (Bratton & Knobler). The power of Compstat was the potential of sanctions for failure to perform in a very public forum. The mandate was to reduce crime or have a plan to get there (M. H. Moore, personal communication, July 16, 2003).

The Compstat process is still in use and provides visual snapshots of preliminary crime statistics for tactical planning and deployment of resources. Analyzed crime data generate electronic pin maps of major crime locations, patterns, and trends. Compstat gauges crime-fighting effectiveness by monitoring arrest activity, responses to pattern crimes, and the implementation of crime strategies (NYPD, 2004a). Compstat

accountability occurs at all levels with the empowerment and interrogation process at the command level replicated at the street level.

Two of the ten NYPD crime strategies addressed integrity, corruption, and professionalism (NYPD, 2004b). NYPD included accountability for officer conduct by decentralizing most internal investigations to the precinct level. Commanders therefore had direct responsibility for investigating, and dealing with, officer misconduct. With investigations as the stick, the carrot was training in professionalism.

Two words every cop should learn are "explanation" and "apology." If an officer is not in an emergency situation, he or she should always explain an action before taking it. The public is infinitely more likely to go along with an officer if they understand what he or she is doing and why. And if he or she has done something wrong, an officer should apologize. (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 248)

Bratton understood that the police needed to be assertive to take back the streets, but heavy-handedness would not achieve community legitimacy and support. The police increase their legitimacy by seeking the public's consent regarding police operations (Moore et al., 2002). That support was an essential element of Bratton's leadership strategy, referred to as "the three Ps: partnership, problem solving, and prevention" (p. 255). The NYPD leadership intended to create a "crisis of confidence" (p. 259) within the department and the community.

Bratton believes that the reduction of crime is the police equivalent to the bottom line profit of the business world (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). Moore et al. (2002) note, "both citizens and managers want some measure of performance that is as simple, powerful, and objective as the private sector's famed 'bottom line'" (p. 11). They

disagree with Bratton's bottom line assessment inasmuch as business net profit is the remainder established by profit minus expenses. Moore et al. believe Bratton failed to account for the cost of fighting crime in terms of hard expenses, the capital required, and soft expenses, the erosion of citizen trust or intrusion upon personal rights. These tangible and intangible costs determine the degree of the police agency's legitimacy and support. Other academics believe that those costs were high, claiming the NYPD broken windows enforcement was tantamount to biased-based policing. "There is now strong empirical evidence that individuals of color are more likely than white Americans to be stopped, questioned, searched, and arrested by police" (Fagan & Davies, 2000, p. 458). "[T]he implementation of Broken Windows policies was disproportionately concentrated in minority neighborhoods" (p. 461).

Bratton's leadership in New York City was a turnaround for which he credits a revitalized police philosophy fueled by the above stated crisis of confidence. Academics have differing opinions on how to credit New York's dramatic reduction in crime.

"There's a miracle happening before our eyes," said Jeffrey Fagan, director of the Center for Violence Research and Prevention at Columbia University. "Cops deserve credit, but it would be a first in the history of social science for there to be a single reason for such a dramatic change in social behavior." (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, pp. 289-90).

Alternatively, "Harvard's Mark Moore told The New York Times, 'New York has enjoyed a significant drop in crime that can't be easily explained by sociological factors. Therefore, the claim this might be the result of police activity looks pretty good'" (p. 295). Academic consensus is firm that crime rates and enforcement statistics are

valuable, but fail to measure effectively all the dimensions of police performance (Maguire, 2003; Moore et al., 2002; Sherman, 1998; Sparrow, 2000).

Regardless of the academic position, Bratton's leadership in crime fighting deserves inquiry due to his demonstrated result of lowering crime in New York City. The bold approach to achieving dramatic outcomes won the 1996 Ford Foundation annual Innovations in American Government competition (Sparrow, 2000).

# Contemporary Research on Performance Measurement

"Performance measures which reflect [strategy] can be specified for every function within the business... When managers clearly understand what is best for the company, the thousands of decisions that must be made every day will be better decisions" (Kaydos, 1993, p. 40). "If you want to improve performance, you must first measure performance" (p. 44). Establishing the metrics for that performance measurement is the subject of much debate and contemporary discussion.

Traditional thinking of what is important to measure in policing is changing.

Maguire (2003) cites a plethora of research that discredits the reactive outputs of crime rates, arrests and citations, case clearance data, and response times as being effective performance measurements. He suggests that police performance is multidimensional and "police agencies need to adopt outside-the-box thinking when generating performance measures" (¶ 28). Police often define themselves by their outputs. In doing so, agencies risk defining themselves too narrowly. Instead of defining in terms of outputs, it is more realistic to define in terms of core competencies (Markides, 2000); police do not just make arrests, they prevent crime and disorder. Departments must engage the community in the philosophy and concepts of police goals and expectations.

"Implicit in any goal is a series of more specific outcomes that reflect the general goal, and which can be translated into specific performance measurements" (Maguire, ¶ 28). Any measurement of performance needs to reflect the work the police actually do. If enforcing the law through arrest and citation consumes 30% of the department's effort, then it is unrealistic to take a full measure of a department by its enforcement data. "Those agencies that concentrate only on one or a handful of performance dimensions to the exclusion of others, do so at their peril" (¶ 29). Business routinely measures performance on many dimensions. "Companies make the list [of the 100 Best Corporate Citizens] for serving seven stakeholder groups well, and stockholders are just one. The other six are employees, the community, the environment, overseas stakeholders, minorities and women, and customers" (Miller, 2002, ¶ 2).

Maguire (2003) suggests considering the multidimensionality of performance by taking into account equity, effectiveness, and efficiency. Equity is the organization's ethical fairness, effectiveness is a qualitative measure of success at goal attainment, and efficiency is the ratio of outputs or outcomes to inputs. "These three generic dimensions are helpful for beginning to think about some of the ways that organizations might vary in terms of their performance" (¶ 33). "Treating performance as a unidimensional phenomenon means that 'good' departments are good at all aspects of policing, while poor departments are poor in all aspects" (¶ 38).

Maguire (2003) identifies four researched performance measurement systems that identify five to seven dimensions of police performance. Common among them are the dimensions of crime prevention, fear reduction, enforcement, mission accountability, and professional responsiveness. Of the four systems, the research by Moore et al. (2002)

represents the most recent and comprehensive offering. They assert that net value occurs by measuring the movements of the following dimensions expressed as goals.

#### Reduce Criminal Victimization

"Without doubt, reducing crime and criminal victimization is the single most important contribution that police are expected to make to society's well-being. In business parlance, reducing crime is 'job #1'" (Moore et al., 2002, p. 41). The authors are skeptical to attribute crime reduction solely to police efforts citing social and economic variables as causal factors, yet they acknowledge that local or geographic crime reduction can be an important result of police activity. Crime reduction is a difficult dimension to measure since many serious crimes "go unreported but still take their toll on society's welfare... A police department to which crimes are not reported is one that has become irrelevant to citizens rather than one that has succeeded in reducing crime" (p. 42). General public surveys can measure the rate of underlying victimization and unreported crime. Aside from the predictable enforcement methods of investigation, arrest, and citation, the authors suggest reducing crime rates through the many processes of prevention. The police "can reduce crime through interventions that do not depend on threatened or actual arrests...[Important] preventive activities fit directly into the core mission of reducing crime" (p.44).

#### Call Offenders to Account

"In this view, identifying and making cases against criminal offenders is consistent with achieving the principled goal of doing justice. Achieving that goal, in turn, is valuable in itself even if it produces no or little impact on crime" (Moore et al., 2002, p. 45). Holding offenders to account focuses "attention on something that the

police can control. [The police] may not be able to influence overall levels of crime, but they ought to be able to identify and apprehend those who offend" (p. 45). Regardless of the effect on crime, Moore et al. believe there is a social expectation of punishment for criminal activity.

Reduce Fear and Enhance Personal Security

Reducing citizens' fear of crime and enhancing their sense of security relates to police effort in the first two dimensions. Economic losses are only "a small part of the overall social costs of crime. The other costs are linked to the fear that victimization induces" (Moore et al., 2002, p. 46). The authors include that "fear is triggered by relatively minor instances of disorder, and responds more to changes in disorderly conditions than to underlying risks of criminal victimization" (p. 47). The authors create a strong link between reducing fear and the first two dimensions.

When fear is reduced, informal social control is enabled. When informal social control is enabled and combined with police action, serious crime goes down. Similarly, when the police focus on minor criminal offenses to reduce fear, it seems that they have a direct effect on serious criminal victimization as well. (p. 48)

Moore et al. (2002) discuss the importance or remembering that citizens remain the "first line of defense against crime" (p. 49) even though that responsibility is more often attributed to the police. This principle is as old as modern consent policing, first surfacing in the London Metropolitan Police duty manual of 1829:

Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the

police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence. (New Westminster Police, 2004, ¶ 7)

For measurement purposes, "one might be interested in knowing how much of the burden of crime control [the police] had left in the hands of citizens, and how the citizens were responding to that burden" (Moore et al., p. 50).

Guarantee Safety in Public Spaces

Goldstein (1990) remarked that a major police responsibility was the management of vehicles and people in public locations. Moore et al. (2002) comment that traffic presents a larger threat to citizens than crime, and traffic enforcement causes the greatest interaction between the public and the police. "What is true for public streets is also true for other common spaces such as public parks and schoolyards... [and] commercial activities that can affect the population's health and safety" (p. 52). Measurements of these activities "remind citizens and the police that they exist to promote fairness and liberty, not simply to ensure security" (p.52).

*Use Financial Resources Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively* 

In keeping with their discussion of gross vs. net value, Moore et al. (2002) "recognize that the value of the police depends not only on how much they produce, but also on how much it *costs* to produce those things" (p.78). Policing needs to occur at the lowest financial cost. In business, "good budgeting and financial planning require an understanding of how a [process] works and the forces that drive costs. Budgets should not be simply an extrapolation of what happened last year" (Kaydos, 1993, p. 42).

*Use Force and Authority Fairly, Efficiently, and Effectively* 

An important cost of policing is the interpersonal capital gained or lost in the way the police exercise their authority. Effective performance measures help clarify and communicate the meaning of good performance to improve skills and change errant behavior. Feedback is the only way to make training stick (Kaydos, 1993).

Moore et al. (2002) comment that money and authority are assets the police use to achieve some public result prioritized by value. Efficiency focuses on the cost.

Effectiveness focuses on the result. To embrace accountability is to be responsive to those that provide legitimacy and support (M. H. Moore, personal communication, July 16, 2003).

Satisfy Customer Demands/Achieve Legitimacy with Those Policed

Moore et al., (2002) stress the importance of satisfaction with the police in the quest to excel in all the other dimensions. "Measures of customer or client satisfaction are best obtained through surveys that ask either the general population, those who have called the police, or those who have been cited or arrested by the police about their experiences" (p.79).

With the goals and performance dimensions established, Maguire (2004) recommends the identification of "theories and concepts and then collect data on specific measures that reflect those broader theories and concepts... [It] should be a liberating, unconstrained process in which participants are encouraged to think well outside of the traditional boundaries" (p.1). "Objective performance measures help keep everyone honest by preventing problems from being swept under the rug" (Kaydos, 1993, p. 41)

and keep problems in the proper perspective. "You are what you measure" (M. K. Sparrow, personal communication, July 17, 2003).

Maguire (2004) suggests supplementing established traditional output and outcome measures by the following data collection methods:

#### General Community Surveys

"These kinds of surveys are useful for several purposes: learning about crime, fear of crime, victimization experiences, and overall impressions about the police" (Maguire, 2004, p. 8). Maguire cautions that an agency can get out of a survey what they put into it. The police must construct an instrument that determines service quality, frequency of contact, and the source of public impressions of the agency. Moore et al. (2002) suggest that client surveys are general measurements of satisfaction. Surveys are an outsider's opinion, which "can act as a catalyst in prompting an organization to rethink the way it does business" (Markides, 2000). Oftentimes policing is the result of what has been successful in the past without giving much consideration to the perceptions of the community.

# Contact Surveys

Surveys of victims, witnesses, and suspects provide the police with valuable perceptual data. Victim and witness data gauge appropriateness of response and suspect data can be equally useful. While surveys from enforcement targets are commonly perceived as biased, "research has shown that citizens are willing to accept negative outcomes if they view the process that led to the outcome as fair" (Maguire, 2004, p. 8).

# Employee Surveys

Employee surveys gauge perceptions about administrative initiatives, assess morale, and benchmark the work environment "to form composite measures of the organizational social climate" (Maguire, 2004, p. 8). Moore et al. (2002) suggest the development of an internal support survey to measure the agency's capacity to achieve goals in terms of resources and ability. Properly constructed, employee surveys can measure the relationship between social climate and achievement in an organization. For example, the leadership climate is a direct reflection of "the expectations followers have for the leader and the expectations the leader has for the followers" (Taylor & Rosenbach, 2000, p. 73).

#### Direct Observation

Trained raters or coders using systematic social observation techniques can assess the "physical and social disorder in neighborhoods... generating data, independent of the police, on quality of life issues in the community" (Maguire, 2004, p. 8). While expensive and personnel intensive, trained raters can gather valuable observational data on citizen encounters.

## Independent Testing or Simulation Studies

Tests to create artificial opportunities to measure performance provide data on response capability, quality of service, and outcome effectiveness. "While certainly controversial, testing and simulation offer some interesting promise for collecting performance data that are truly independent of the police" (Maguire, 2004, p. 9).

"Once the performance measures have been selected, and the data have been collected, the next question is what kind of analysis to perform" (Maguire, 2004, p. 9).

Maguire suggests aggregating the data for each performance measure, then aggregating all scores to represent an organization-wide score. Maguire makes such scoring analogous to standardized test scores such as the SAT. Scores within dimensions are an aggregate of that dimensional measurement and those aggregated composites compute to a standard range. These composite scores can provide a comparative measurement but require statistical expertise.

Maguire (2004) suggests that the performance domains require analysis to determine their comparative weights. This is an introspective process to determine which goals and dimensions are the most important. He recommends experts, focus groups, and citizen surveys as means to assessing weights.

The object of Maguire's (2003, 2004) research is to establish a performance rating system to allow police administrators to make fair comparisons. He is currently part of an initiative with the Commission for Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) that, along with validating goals and performance domains nationwide, will establish a useful protocol for comparing agencies across the differences of size, geography, socioeconomics, and demographics. CALEA hopes this research will culminate in a nationwide implementation of a comparative performance measurement tool. Maguire currently believes that implementation should include (a) a commitment to comparative measures; (b) selection of units to compare; (c) establishing valuable performance dimensions; (d) determining measurements; and (e) using the measurements to improve the organization. "Performance measurement is essential for communicating strategy, recognizing problems and opportunities, allocating resources efficiently, good

control and planning, and for developing and motivating an organization" (Kaydos, 1993, p. 44).

## **Problem Identification and Analysis**

Key to developing a performance measurement system is the need to gain an understanding of the nature and complexity of police problems. Goldstein (1990) developed a scientific process, termed problem-oriented policing, that is the base theory for most academic thought regarding police problem solving (Maguire, 2003; Moore, 2003; Moore et al., 2002; Sparrow, 2000; Sparrow et al., 1990). Goldstein recognized that police are generally reactive and respond to problem symptoms without fully addressing the extent of the underlying problems. Managers often rely on subjective judgment without recognizing problems, which if ignored, never go away by themselves (Kaydos, 1993).

Goldstein's (1990) process is an effectiveness model that advocates a change from "the continuing preoccupation with means over ends; with operating methods, process, and efficiency over effectiveness in dealing with substantive problems" (p. 15). It stresses engaging the community and making fuller use of the "skills, brains, and time of rank-and-file police officers" (p. 27). The management and leadership responsibility is to overcome resistance and institutionalize a coherent process.

#### Grouping Incidents as Problems

The incident is the primary work unit of the general patrol officer and is a traditional police process designed "to increase the efficiency with which incidents are handled" (Goldstein, 1990, p. 33). Managers measure this efficiency by response times and clearance rates. Officers "may investigate a crime but stop short of exploring the

factors that may have contributed to its commission" (p. 33). Effectiveness calls for recognizing that incidents are often merely overt symptoms of problems requiring the recognition of relationships, causal conditions, and factors.

Focusing on Substantive Problems as the Heart of Policing

Professor Malcolm Sparrow (2000) challenges the police to "pick important problems and fix them" (p. 132) as a useful phrase to communicate the essence of problem solving. Substantive police problems are substantive community problems. The police must turn to the community "to define the problems that should be of concern to the police... and [gain] an understanding of all of the dimensions of a problem in the total community" (Goldstein, 1990, p. 34).

Focusing on the substantive, community problems that the police must handle is a much more radical step than it initially appears to be, for it requires the police to go beyond taking satisfaction in the smooth operation of their organization; it requires that they extend their concern to dealing effectively with the problems that justify creating a police agency in the first instance. (p. 35)

Effectiveness as the Ultimate Goal

Most changes in police process relate to operational effectiveness. "Too often, after an enormous investment in a major change, we have been left wondering what value the change had for the quality of police service" (Goldstein, 1990, p. 36). Effectiveness in police problem solving can be a matter of (a) problem elimination; (b) reduction of related incidents; (c) reduction of harm per incident; (d) a better processing of incidents; or (e) removing the problem from police consideration. The latter is an effective response when something – or someone – else provides a more effective solution

(Goldstein, 1990). Effectiveness is a story that describes an outcome, not a statistical table (M. K. Sparrow, personal communication, July 16, 2003).

Clearly identified problems require the systematic collection and analysis of problem data. "This means an in-depth probe of all of the characteristics of a problem and the factors that contribute to it" (Goldstein, 1990, p. 36). Goldstein's systematic inquiry includes understanding the problem's nature, collecting data from more than police sources, ensuring for accuracy of the data and conclusions, and complete objectivity. "Trying to fix something you don't understand may result in disaster" (Kaydos, 1993, p. 41).

Disaggregating and Accurately Labeling Problems

Systematic Inquiry

The development of more effective police responses requires disaggregating problems into their components and establishing interrelatedness. Problems are the result of a system of related incidents and conditions requiring identification and understanding (Marquardt, 1999; Senge, 1994). Disaggregating the problem and determining the interdependency and interconnectedness of the problem's issues, factors, and symptoms is a strategic process and function of systems thinking. Organizations gain leverage by "strengthening the fundamental response and weakening the symptomatic responses" (Senge, p. 110). There is a delay associated with disaggregating the problem and determining the interdependency and interconnectedness of the problem's issues, factors, and symptoms. Some solutions take time in the development of agency competencies to solve a particular problem. Interim or short-term solutions are acceptable as long as the management hierarchy understands that the problem-solving goal is that of achieving a

fundamental solution. Senge suggests the management principle of keeping the focus on that fundamental solution. Labeling a problem as a crime problem indicates that the police only have an enforcement interest and belies the depth of the issue (Goldstein, 1990).

Analysis of the Multiple Interests in Problems

"The nature of the community's concern and interest in a problem is of critical importance in deciding how best to respond to it" (Goldstein, 1990, p. 40). Police must assess community concern, and locus of concern, to determine the legitimacy of the problem and therefore their interest in fashioning a response. Some issues become police problems simply because the police treat them as such, squandering resources best reserved for issues of community concern (Goldstein). Malcolm Sparrow suggests the determination of whether or not there is a relationship between the proposed outputs – processes, and outcomes – value (personal communication, July16, 2003).

Capturing and Critiquing the Current Response

"In handling complicated matters, the need to improvise has prompted some officers to develop unusually effective ways to deal with specific problems" (Goldstein, 1990, p. 43). Responses to the same problem may vary from individual to individual or change depending upon the practice of different organizational components. "After careful evaluation, these types of responses might profitably be adopted as standard for an entire police agency" (p. 43).

An Uninhibited Search for a Tailor-Made Response

The criminal justice system is not always the best solution to a police problem.

"An intensified concern with substantive problems builds on recent efforts to develop

authority and responses that are more suitable than the criminal law for dealing with some police business" (Goldstein, 1990, p. 45). The best solution is the response that holds the greatest potential for solving a substantive problem.

Adopting a Proactive Stance

The police must display initiative to identify and respond to substantive problems at an earlier stage. Further, they should be more outspoken in advocating community concerns. "In the range of postures that the police can assume, there is ample room for them to take greater initiative in dealing with community problems" (Goldstein, 1990, p 47). The goal is to develop strategies to intervene in problems sooner by addressing early precursors to problematic events (Sparrow, 2000).

Strengthening the Decision-Making Processes and Increasing Accountability

There is a great emphasis on "structuring and controlling [police] discretion" (Goldstein, 1990, p. 47) through policy, regulations, and civilian oversight. "If the procedures for addressing community problems are widened and given greater visibility, policy decisions will be aired, resulting in greater involvement of the community in these decisions and the articulation of more precise guidance to operating police officers" (p. 48). Whatever direction results, management's responsibility is to direct employee efforts to those ends by the setting of specific employee performance goals (Dessler, 2004).

Evaluating Results of Newly Implemented Responses

Effectiveness includes a commitment to evaluation. Evaluation validates effort and guards against false claims of success. It also institutionalizes effective solutions while determining the solution's continued viability (Goldstein, 1990).

Given the wide range in the type, level, and size of problems, there will be equal variety in the type of evaluation that is required. It will be relatively easy to measure the effectiveness of new responses to some problems. Others will require more complex procedures. (p. 49)

Malcolm Sparrow lectures that there is no well-used machinery for problem solving. There is not a tradition of analytical and scientific thought. All over law enforcement, there are a number of insights that have no home. For example, there was no home for the insight on middle easterners taking flying lessons. He believes that problem-oriented policing instruction is now a question of individual style rather than as an effective means of creating value. It must not be a style, but rather an official agency method for solving important problems. The police must integrate function, process, and problem-oriented policing into workable mechanics (personal communication, July 15, 2003).

In relating problem solving to the performance measurement of the NYPD, Sparrow (2000) does not believe that Bratton's Compstat model equaled problem solving in the larger sense as prescribed by Goldstein (1990).

It focuses only on reported crime, not on other types of problems; the analysis slices the reported crime data geographically, specifically, by precinct; it uses the existing precinct structure (notably, precinct commanders) as the system for allocating responsibility; and it focuses heavily on the tactics of aggressive order maintenance as a method for establishing police control over streets and public places. (Sparrow, p. 217)

Fagan and Davies (2000) concur, believing that NYPD reinvented community policing in New York. "Community standards were no longer identified through structured and systematic interactions between police and community leaders" (p.472). Problem solving and outcome-based performance measurement was the domain of the precinct commanders, not the community. Moore et al. (2002) clarify that Compstat (a) only measured the value of reducing crime without measuring other value dimensions; (b) focused on results without considering the cost in expended resources or intensive use of authority; and (c) only reviewed the concerns of top management. Moore et al. assert that there is an expectation that the police should spot value at every opportunity, not just in measured dimensions. Moore emphatically believes that Bratton created value among those he led and it benefited the organization. He believes organizations do not change unless challenged (personal communication, July 16, 2003).


# The Strategic Triangle

"Public managers create public value... [and they] need an account of the value their organizations produce" (Moore, 2003, p. 57). Moore and the faculty of the Kennedy School of Government developed a strategic model for the public sector. The model considers three separate but interconnected domains to consider the value of a strategy. The operational capacity domain is the agency's inventory of resources for the creation of value. Co-producers can enhance that capacity if there is a shared interest in creating a certain value. These partnerships materially reduce the cost of creating that value. Operational capacity can both empower and limit depending upon the wealth or dearth of resources. The value domain is that which establishes the agency's mission and goal orientation. It constitutes the value for which the agency will strive to achieve. The

connection between operational capacity and value represents the agency process for achieving value. Value is client satisfaction or desired social outcome. The organization's collective outputs establish the process for creating value in order to attain the value goal. The last corner of the triangle is the source of the agency's legitimacy and support, populated by the people who provide resources to the agency. For the police, those inputs generally involve authority and money. The connection between operational capacity and legitimacy and support represents the relationships between the resource providers and the agency. The connection between legitimacy and support and the value dimension represents the valued sought by the resource providers.

All three dimensions together represent the value chain. The organization processes the inputs of money and authority through procedures, programs, policies, and technology to create value for the agency's source of legitimacy and support.

Figure 1. The Strategic Triangle



Moore's (2003) strategic triangle is a dynamic set of interrelationships and forces that change over time. The agency can lose legitimacy and support if its value and resource providers misalign. It may further lose support if its process is ineffective at achieving value, or the value expected by the resource provider. It is the responsibility of the agency manager to discover unrecognized linkages in the dimensions and develop latent support. The police manager only has control over the range between inputs and outputs. The world's forces control the determination of client satisfaction and social outcomes. Moore notes that crime is a social outcome.

Since process problems are the largest limiting factor, Moore (2003) suggests starting with the agency's operational capacity to determine the potential for creating value. Performance measurement measures the organization's capacity to achieve.

Operational capacity measurement can motivate if the goal is achievable or challenging. Sparrow (2000) adds that policies are entrenched in the present; technology rarely supports the future.

#### Leadership Challenges

Forsyth (1999) conceptually defines leadership as a "specialized form of social interaction: a reciprocal, transactional, and sometimes transformational process in which cooperating individuals are permitted to influence and motivate others to promote the attainment of group and individual goals" (p. 343). Forsyth's behavioral definition divides leadership into relationship and task behaviors. Relationship concerns interpersonal satisfactions, and task behaviors pertain to solving a problem. The leader's efficiency with the balance of these behaviors ultimately determines effectiveness.

Kim and Mauborgne (2003) assess William Bratton's turnaround of the NYPD as a demonstration of what they describe as tipping point leadership. "The theory of tipping points hinges on the insight that in any organization, fundamental changes can occur quickly when the beliefs and energies of a critical mass of people create an epidemic movement toward an idea" (p. 60). They indicate that the NYPD experience was not an anomaly in that Bratton previously turned around three other agencies using similar leadership. They demonstrate how he overcame cognitive, resource, motivational, and political hurdles.

Bratton begins by overcoming the cognitive hurdles that block organizations from recognizing the need for change. He does this by putting managers face-to-face with operational problems. Next, he manages around limitations on funds, staff, or equipment by concentrating resources on the areas that are most in need of change and that have the biggest payoffs. He meanwhile solves the motivational problem by singling out key influencers – people with disproportionate power due to their connections or persuasive abilities. Finally, he closes off resistance from powerful opponents. (p. 60)

Kim and Mauborgne (2003) explain that success is a collective effort, but a tipping point leader is essential to create a turnaround such as experienced by an organization "as large and as wedded to the status quo as the NYPD" (p. 69). "The lesson here is that what gets measured becomes important – that's why it gets done" (Kaydos, 1993, p. 44).

#### Culture

"Organizational culture is the characteristic values, traditions, and behaviors a company's employees share" (Dessler, 2004, p. 302). The organizational culture directly affects leader effectiveness. Goldstein (1990) acknowledged as an impediment to problem solving that, "the police field is preoccupied with management, internal procedure, and efficiency to the exclusion of appropriate concern for effectiveness in dealing with substantive problems" (p. 14). Means – the way of doing things, become more important than the ends – the outcome of the means.

Hill and Jones (2004) define organizational culture as one of the three essential elements of strategy implementation and describe culture as "the specific collection of values and norms shared by people and groups in an organization" (p. 417). Schein (1992) clarifies the concept of organizational culture as shared assumptions and underlying beliefs, the latter being learned survival responses. Taylor and Rosenbach (2000) provide the means for that survival learning process by stating that "culture is communicated through stories, rituals, and symbols, and it is one that is implicit as well as explicit" (p. 74). In essence, belief shapes value; what is valued equals the organization's culture.

Yukl (2002) writes that there are two ways a leader influences an organization's culture. Primary cultural influences are those made important through leader behavior, and secondary factors provide influence through the environment created by the leader. The former is an amalgam of explicit leader behavior that projects certain beliefs and desired traits and values. The latter represents the conditions created by the leader that

are congruent with leader behavior and the desired culture. What is important to management must be important to the organization.

### Cohesion

Related to culture, group cohesion is a combination of the group's strength of linking bonds, their unity, the feelings of attraction to each other, and the degree to which they coordinate efforts to achieve goals (Forsyth, 1999). Forsyth synthesized the research on group cohesiveness into a multidimensional construct.

Table 2

Cohesion: A Multidimensional Construct (Forsyth, 1999, p. 151)

Dimension	Definition
Social force	The total field of forces that act on members to remain in the group
Group unity	A synthesis of individuals' sense of belonging to a group and their
	sense of morale associated with membership in the group
Attraction	That group property that is inferred from the number and strength
	of mutual positive attitudes among the members of a group
Teamwork	A dynamic process that is reflected in the tendency for a group to
	stick together and remain united in pursuit of its goals and
	objectives

## Conflict

"Change invariably creates conflict. It spawns a hotly contested tug-of-war to determine winners and losers" (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Conflict resolution occurs negatively through passive avoidance or active fighting, and positively through passively yielding or active cooperating (Forsyth, 1999). Probably the most damaging resolution is that of a fighting response. Leadership style contributes to the level of conflict within a group and individual personality differences can explain behavior and determine vulnerability to conflict. Sarcasm has become a socially condoned way to express hostility, represented as a fighting style of conflict resolution. Low workplace tolerances to sarcasm lead to anger and conflict and high tolerance inures to organizational stability (Calabrese, 2000).

Cooperating occurs when the topic of conflict is less than critical in terms of outcome or when a truly rational argument achieves consensus (Forsyth, 1999).

Groupthink is a cooperating style when a group comes together around an individual or idea without objectively questioning the information source. It creates a strong force for uniformity and can be emotional rather than objective (Hill & Jones, 2004).

Change

Yukl (2002) writes, "Before people will support radical change, they need to have a vision of a better future that is attractive enough to justify the sacrifices and hardships the change will require" (p. 283). Leaders closed to change and self-examination will have a most difficult time creating change in an organization. According to Marquardt (1999), the leader "cannot change the problem without changing [the leader]... If an organization sacrifices individual learning, it risks the organizational capacity to change"

(p. 131). From an awareness of a problem all the way through discovery to action, the individual has learned.

Another impediment to change is "the disease of gamesplaying that [dominates] people's behavior in face-to-face meetings... where the name of the game is getting ahead by making an impression, or, if you are already at the top, staying there" (Senge, 1994, p.182). He cautions that research has shown that we trap ourselves in defensive routines.

#### Mental Models

Senge (1994) describes mental models as those "deeply held internal images of how the world works, images that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting" (p.174). Breyfogle, Enck, Flories, and Pearson (2001) describe this phenomenon as organizational wisdom, that intuitive knowledge process due to experiences of the past. Those familiar ways can inhibit the leadership environment. Senge clarifies those mental models as "images, assumptions, and stories" (p. 175) that shape our behavior as they represent our perceptions of order, the way things ought to be, and the way we expect things to be. Mental models are complex cognitive biases that influence how people process information and make decisions (Hill & Jones, 2004). They are representative of a person's experiences, which result in personal commitments to beliefs that shape performance in certain situations. They not only affect what we do, but those biases can influence what we believe we see (Senge, 1994). Interestingly, they most often represent a person's deeds, not their words.

Chris Argyris (1982) comments that espoused theories are not always the same as theories-in-use. A person's public statement of personal belief, or organizational policy,

may differ from that person's actual beliefs as demonstrated by performance. Not knowing that a mental model actually exists will generally stall the learning and understanding process. Regardless of the method used, these processes allow the individual to step back from the situation and observe the system of decision-making (Senge, 1994). These methods require a reflective process of factual examination and introspection designed to peel away layers of bias and perception that have formed mental models that can adversely affect the quality of a decision. It is a process of "learning new skills and implementing institutional innovations that help bring these skills into regular practice" (Senge, p. 186). Yet, mental models tend to screen new information that does not support our beliefs, discarding it as wrong or irrelevant and killing innovation (Markides, 2000). Exposing generalizations, recognizing those thoughts that belie words, balancing advocacy with inquiry, and admitting those newly discovered realities are essential for facilitating the change process (Marquardt, 1999). Markides identifies various tactics for escaping mental models.

Table 3

Some Tactics for Overcoming Mental Models (Markides, 2000, p. 34)

Identify them and question them.

Facilitate this questioning by developing a positive crisis in the organization.

Utilize outsiders as catalysts for discussion.

Replace the top management.

Benchmark outside the industry.

Institutionalize a questioning attitude throughout the organization.

Experiment with new ideas.

Provide facts or examples that go against conventional wisdom.

Monitor leading indicators of the company's performance.

Seek feedback from outsiders – customers, distributors, and so on.

#### Decision-Making

James Stokesbury (1981) remarks that leadership, and the resulting decision-making, defy the development of an effectiveness metric. The short-term solutions are easy to measure, manage, and supervise while fundamental solutions may require reallocation of resources already encumbered for the short term. Unchecked, the side effect is that the fundamental solution is bypassed "leading to even greater reliance on the symptomatic solution" (Senge, 1994, p. 381). Stokesbury's study of four great military leaders revealed separate strengths and weaknesses that may have categorized their individual competencies. Interpersonal outcomes, not military achievement, became the test of their effectiveness. Stokesbury writes, "The more difficult such leadership becomes, the more it requires skill approaching art." Walter Ulmer, Jr. (1988) reinforces Stokesbury's point: "There are tenuous links here between cause and effect; results – even when discernible – are difficult to quantify. Often there are incomplete or conflicting data from multiple sources" (p. 249).

# Framing Change

Bolman and Deal (2003) discuss organizations in the frames of structure, people, company politics, and the organization's symbols. In terms of structure, police agencies generally represent the Bolman and Deal concept of a divisionalised form that consists of

quasi-autonomous units grouped by like functions. These tall structures separated by function are effective when little cross-functional coordination and communication is required. Unfortunate for this traditional structure, emerging crime fighting and order maintenance strategies require the close coordination of different functional units to comprise a holistic response to a problem (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). Bolman and Deal identify that, "Finding a satisfactory system of roles and relationships is an ongoing, universal struggle" (p. 69) for leaders. Restructuring may become necessary when form no longer is consistent with function. They state that, "restructuring is a powerful but high-risk tool for organizational change" (p. 92). The risks include short term "confusion, resistance, and even a decline in effectiveness. Success or failure in the long run depends on how well the new model aligns the organization with its environment, task, and technology" (p. 92).

Bolman and Deal (2003) identify an organization's leadership culture as instrumental in accomplishing stated goals. The assumptions that leaders make about followers, their theories-in-use, become their demonstrated style of leadership. Police human resource management compares to traditional military chain-of-command leadership, with sanctions imposed for failure to follow orders. Such culture is effective during the execution of critical tasks, but the majority of police-related human interactions are much more relationship-oriented. Bolman and Deal suggest improving human resource management through better employee selection, retention, investment, and empowerment. Collins (2001) believes that the key to achieving such improvements is the result of getting the right people the first time. He qualifies the right people as those that converge their passion with what they can do the best. Such people will

embrace change since it aligns with who they are and what they consider important. "The right people will do the right things and deliver the best results they're capable of, regardless of the incentive system (p. 50). He comments that getting the right people, and removing the wrong ones, is difficult in public agencies such as police departments. However, he adds, "You might still have to carry the wrong people along, but you can essentially restrict them to backseats on the bus by not including them" (p. 217).

O'Toole (1995) comments at length about organizations leading change through moral, values-based, human resource management. "Moral and effective leaders listen to their followers because they respect them and because they honestly believe that the welfare of the followers is the end of leadership" (p. 9). O'Toole's value-based leadership model is averse to the situational leadership style. That style represents the typical field management of police resources, balancing the concerns of the task with concerns for the people accomplishing the task (Blake & Mouton, 1975).

Bolman and Deal's (2003) political frame represents the power, conflict, and coalition processes in an organization. Their political assumptions are that (a) organizations are coalitions of diverse individuals and interests; (b) there are enduring differences between coalition members; (c) the important decisions are about allocating scarce resources; (d) all the above creates conflict with power as the most important asset; and (e) decisions are the result of negotiation and position. While police management relies upon legitimate authority and position power (French & Raven, 1959; Yukl, 2002), effectiveness is most often the result from the power, conflict, and coalition of the political frame (Bolman & Deal).

Few civilian vocations exemplify the power of Bolman and Deal's (2003) symbolic frame more than that of the police. Uniform appearance, authority, and group identification form a powerful culture of well-recognized symbols. While helpful from a control perspective, these symbols can undermine value creation if the public views the police as only representing power and authority (Fagan & Davies, 2000). Intrusive abuse of police authority reduces the worth of the value being created through citizen dissatisfaction regarding police tactics (Moore et al., 2002).

### Learning to Change

Bringing change to an entire organization requires planning and coordination.

Marquardt (1999) identifies a number of factors in creating a learning organization. He describes a learning organization as being composed of people, the organization, and knowledge. The first step is to create a culture in which the organization is committed to solving important problems. Marquardt recommends that gaining top management's support is crucial. The organization's people have institutional knowledge of systemic problems and are in the best position to devise solutions. The creation of action learning groups is a step that requires time and training in systems thinking. Systems thinking is a non-linear process of examining the interrelationships and interconnectedness of processes that come together to form a system (Senge, 1994).

Marquardt (1999) recommends ample training for these action learning groups through workshops designed to give added perspective to the problem solvers.

Marquardt believes the use of a facilitator is essential for groups attempting to solve important organizational problems. Management must commit to institutionalizing these teams and not see them as ad hoc groups assembled for just one particular problem.

The expansion of action learning throughout the organization may not be expeditious if the initial learning teams have not been successful, or if their results are viewed by the organization as less than successful. This might present a substantial impediment to institutionalization. Repeating the above-described learning process for each new learning group creates a situation in which action learning is as familiar as is the organization's name and mission (Marquardt, 1999).

Senge (1994) and Marquardt (1999) have identified that problems are generally the result of complex interrelated issues, factors, and situations in which managers attempt to solve using problem solving formats based on linear thinking. These short-term solutions only shift the burden of the solution to symptomatic, rather than fundamental, solutions (Senge). Marquardt's action learning uses an integrated approach to problem solving that is results-oriented and creates a learning organization when institutionalized over time. Implementation of an action learning program is not a random process. As stated by Marquardt,

To be successful, action learning needs to follow a number of clearly defined steps and procedures. Action learning can be adapted to take on a variety of forms and formats in order to provide optimum benefit for its users. Getting an action learning program started is a challenge, but the payoff is well worth the effort. (Pp.169-70)

Advocacy of a certain management position becomes reinforcing and "advocacy without inquiry begets more advocacy" (Senge, 1994, p. 198). Senge suggests "simple questions such as, 'What is it that leads you to that position?' and 'Can you illustrate your point for me?' ... can interject an element of inquiry into a discussion" (p. 198).

Dialogue – going beyond any one individual's understanding – is the beginning of team learning discipline (Senge). The team owns the process of thinking together and forming common goals and vision as one. When teams are learning they are able to accomplish tasks with marvelous results and members learn more than they could have by themselves. Senge explains, "The discipline of dialogue also involves learning how to recognize the patterns of interaction in teams that undermine learning. The patterns of defensiveness are often deeply engrained in how a team operates [and can] undermine learning" (p. 10). Helplessness undermines the incentive to learn. "Conversely, if we know our fate is in our own hands, our learning matters" (p.10). He continues that the localness of authority for problem solving requires a distancing from the top of the organization.

## Resisting Change

The hardest part of leading change is in overcoming the resistance to it (Dessler, 2004). Destructive patterns of leader behavior often precede business failure and often go unnoticed. These patterns are flawed executive mind-sets that distort a company's perception of reality, delusional attitudes that keep this inaccurate reality in place, breakdowns in communications systems developed to handle potentially urgent information, and leadership qualities that keep a company's executives from correcting their course – a reluctance to change (H. W. Door, personal communication, October 26, 2004). Kotter (1996) agrees, citing eight reasons why firms fail. Chief among those reasons are the institutional complacency borne of "too much past success, a lack of visible crises, low performance standards, [and] insufficient feedback from external constituencies" (p. 5). Tichy (2002) believes that good leadership is the antithesis of

complacency. "Leaders see everything in life as an opportunity to change and grow. As a result, they work longer and harder than most people can even imagine" (p. 164).

O'Toole (1995) notes that leaders can sometimes inadvertently foster resistance to change when presented with challenges to their worldviews.

#### Leading Change

In his research on leading change, Kotter (1996) discovered that useful change is a process "that creates power and motivation sufficient to overwhelm all the sources of inertia" (p. 20). That process is the result of leadership more than management. Kotter (1995) developed this process into an eight-step course of action that represents the experiences of successful organizations.

Step one: Establishing a sense of urgency.

Kotter (1996) is emphatic that "without a sense of urgency, people won't give that extra effort that is often essential. They won't make needed sacrifices" (p. 5). "A positive crisis can be achieved by developing a new and ambitious objective... It is not enough to convince people that questioning the status quo is merely important. They must be convinced that it is absolutely urgent" (Markides, 2000, pp. 32-3). Kotter describes this step as the process of examining competitive realities and discussing crises and opportunities. Tichy (2002) researched the success of General Electric in detail and found that GE executives found it helpful to create the crisis regarding what trouble the future may hold in order to break from employee complacency.

Step two: Forming a powerful guiding coalition.

Kotter (1996) explains that the top executive often initiates major change and the effort makes progress for a while. Mid-level managers that are not part of the change

process resist the change passively. "Individuals alone, no matter how competent or charismatic, never have all the assets needed to overcome tradition and inertia" (p. 6). Kotter recommends that the guiding coalition must have enough power to lead the change effort. That group must include all executives and managers. He concedes that such cohesion is more difficult in large companies. The focus of the guiding coalition is to influence all levels of the organization, and to do so visibly. The coalition's message is one of encouraging teamwork and mission focus.

Step three: Creating a vision.

Kotter (1996) explains, "Urgency and a strong guiding team are necessary but insufficient conditions for major change... The creation of a powerful vision will direct, align, and inspire actions on the part of large numbers of people" (p. 7). Vision guides employee decision-making with compelling statements about the future. Those decisions are important for the development of strategies for achieving that vision. Organizations often use consultants to facilitate visioning workshops that facilitate the creation and understanding of the process (Tichy, 2002). Gardner (1990) comments on outside viewpoints that "only from outside can one expect judgments untainted by the loyalty and camaraderie of insiders, undistorted by the comfortable assumptions held within the walls" (p. 130).

Step four: Communicating the vision.

Kotter (1995, 1996) explains that most change efforts fail due to an incredibly narrow and limited communication system. The vision of the guiding coalition requires constant communication at all levels at all times.

Transformation is impossible unless hundreds or thousands of people are willing to help, often to the point of making short-term sacrifices. Employees will not make sacrifices, even if they are unhappy with the status quo, unless they believe that useful change is possible. Without credible communication, and a lot of it, the hearts and minds of the troops are never captured. (1995, p. 63)

Using every communication vehicle possible ensures not only a wide distribution of the message, but reinforcement of the new vision and strategies. The guiding coalition has the responsibility of teaching new behaviors by the example. As CEO of General Electric, Jack Welch dedicated half of his working time to teaching, talking, and training in his vision and teachable points of view (Tichy, 2002; Welch & Byrne, 2003).

Step five: Empowering others to act on the vision.

Successful transformations require the combined activities of large numbers of people participating in new and innovative processes in furtherance of the vision. To ensure success, the organization must ensure that there are no obstacles to these new processes. Kotter (1995, 1996) includes examples of obstacles as reliance on past practices, dated organizational structures and job descriptions, and the self-interests of the employees that feel threatened by change. The guiding coalition, and by extension the entire organization, must be vigilant in identifying persons, systems, and structures that will block the new vision.

Transformational change requires the encouragement of managed risk taking and new activities and actions. Empowering employees to develop new methods and processes is often too risky for some managers who may choose to pocket veto an idea. The guiding coalition must ensure for the clear communication of innovative ideas to

eliminate any single point of failure. New ideas are often shunned in the police culture rife with ritual, norms, and custom (Thibault et al., 2004).

Step six: Planning for and creating short-term wins.

A transformational change takes time. Employees want to understand that their efforts will produce expected results. Failure to see a few wins along the way will dishearten those employees, causing them to give up and revert to the old process and ways of doing things (Kotter, 1995, 1996). The coalition must plan for milestone achievements that indicate progress to the new vision and offset impatience. In policing, these milestone achievements may include a leveling of crime, disorder, or complaints (Maguire, 2003, 2004). Kotter makes the distinction between planning for visible performance improvements and creating those improvements. Mangers should be vigilant for opportunities to improve. This is similar to the 6 Sigma concept of low-hanging fruit: Opportunities for improvement that can excite and motivate employees to further success (Breyfogle et al., 2001).

Managers cannot neglect the importance, and motivating effect, of recognizing and rewarding employees involved in the improvements. Again, clear organizational communication of planning goals, improvements, and achievements is important in maintaining the sense of urgency (Kotter, 1995, 1996)

Step seven: Consolidating improvements and producing still more change.

Managers must understand that a collection of short-term wins does not equal transformation; they are milestone benchmarks along the journey of the vision. "Leaders of successful efforts use the credibility afforded by short-term wins to tackle even bigger problems" (Kotter, 1995, p. 66). Believing that success breeds success, Breyfogle et al.

(2001) comment, "Learning organizations become curious about [6 Sigma] processes, embrace change, and gain confidence with each successful improvement" (p. 93). Progress creates credibility with the transformation effort. That increased credibility reinforces a resolve to change systems, structures, and policies that do not fit the vision. Creating a new culture includes "hiring, promoting, and developing employees who can implement the vision" (Kotter, p. 61).

Step eight: Institutionalizing new approaches.

Institutionalization of the new processes, procedures, and methods throughout the organization is essential. They must become part of the organizational culture.

Two factors are particularly important in institutionalizing change in corporate culture. The first is a conscious attempt to show people how the new approaches, behaviors, and attitudes have helped improve performance... The second factor is taking sufficient time to make sure that the next generation of top management really does personify the new approach. (Kotter, 1995, p. 67)

Collins (2001) explains that great leaders began transformations by getting the right people on the bus, and the wrong people off. In his study of over 2,100 organizations, he found that the companies that transitioned from good to great were those with the right people. "The right people will do the right things and deliver the best results they're capable of, regardless of the incentive system" (p. 50). Collins agrees that leadership succession planning is a crucial function. Leaders should set-up their successors for even greater success in the next generation.

#### CHAPTER 3

#### **METHODOLOGY**

#### Introduction


The literature review has framed the issues regarding the need for a change in how the police measure performance, and the leadership challenges associated with driving that change. Research of available survey instruments revealed two researched survey specimens pertinent to the development of survey instruments for this study.

The Police Executive Research Forum's (PERF) Measuring What Matters project resulted in the development of citizen and business survey guides and accompanying objective measures for comparison. The PERF surveys and objective measures, attached as Appendix A, provide the basis for validating community concerns. The PERF survey dimensions of (a) community health; (b) community security and safety; (c) perceptions of safety and security; (d) confidence, trust, and satisfaction; and (e) traffic safety represent the chief areas of external constituent concern regarding perceptions of crime and disorder.

The aim of the PERF project is to develop a wide variety of agency-level performance measures to help law enforcement better measure how they are meeting their overall objectives. PERF developed a broad enough range of measures so that any law enforcement agency could choose which measures best suit their needs and their available resources. Thus, the PERF measures are quite extensive. The object is not for an agency to implement all the measures. Rather, an agency can choose from the measures and implement those that are most appropriate.

According to PERF researcher Stacy Osnick Milligan, PERF began this project by first developing an overall outcomes model as illustrated in Figure 2. The outcomes model has three major law enforcement outcomes – safety and security, perceptions of safety and security, and confidence and trust in the police. The model intends to document major law enforcement outcomes that would appeal to the vast majority of police agencies (personal communication, July 12, 2004).

Figure 2. PERF Outcomes Model



The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA) has proposed a survey, attached as Appendix B, for developing performance measures for law enforcement agencies. The CALEA police agency survey consists of pertinent questions that measure the agency's current capability of obtaining measurement data in terms of data availability. The CALEA questions use a gradient difficulty scale of (a) Not Difficult – already collecting data; (b) Some Difficulty – current data collection

procedures can be modified to provide new data; (c) More Difficult – new procedures would have to be instituted to collect data; and (d) Great Difficulty – collection is next to impossible. The survey questions test data availability in nine performance measurement dimensions. The CALEA survey takes its essence from the research of George Mason University's Dr. Edward Maguire (2003, 2004), as referenced in this study's literature review. Dr. Maguire collaborated with CALEA in pursuit of U.S. Department of Justice funding for a pilot project regarding police performance measurement. The pilot test for the performance measurement project commenced in January 2004 and samples 16 police and sheriff's departments of varying size, jurisdictional responsibility, and geographic location. As of this study, CALEA and Dr. Maguire are collecting data but have not yet achieved the funding necessary to analyze the data or formulate study recommendations.

Both the PERF external survey of community concerns and the CALEA internal survey of competency in performance measurement are consistent with the contemporary research identified in the review of literature for this thesis project, and provide a rich basis for the development of the survey instruments for this study. Specifically, the referenced research projects frame the issues of measuring police performance in the context of this thesis. Both projects frame pertinent measurement issues to derive (a) a peer agency survey of current performance measures and subjective assessment items to measure those agencies tolerance of, or resistance to, organizational change; and (b) a stratified survey of a single agency's tolerance of, or resistance to, organizational change in terms of agency culture and climate. The importance of these thesis surveys is to provide data for the analysis of resistance to change in order to shape recommendations for agency leaders that need to drive that change effectively.

## <u>Samples</u>

Two samples were solicited for testing of the research question. The goals of the surveys were to establish qualitative and quantitative data for measurement by seeking specific information that is familiar to the respondents by asking them to volunteer information about their organizations, opinions, and beliefs. These surveys were single cross sections designed to collect information at a single point in time from samples selected to represent the total populations (Polland, 1998).

Competency at Performance Measurement Survey

A quantitative convenience sample of eight police executives that volunteered data tested their respective range of performance measurement in terms of the PERF and CALEA suggested measurement protocols. Sampling of current competency at, or resistance to, measuring performance was limited to surveying the police departments of Phoenix Arizona, Charlotte-Mecklenburg North Carolina, Arvada Colorado, Redondo Beach California, Irvine California, Greenwood Village Colorado, Garland Texas, and the San Diego California Sheriff's Department. The selection of these agencies was a convenience sample based upon their willingness to participate in the survey (Polland, 1998).

Perception of Performance Measurement Survey

A stratified survey of commissioned members of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department was used to determine the cultural perceptions of current performance measurement effectiveness. Selection occurred by selecting every fifth name from a seniority list of 2,632 commissioned employees. Such selection ensured a random selection of assignment, rank, tenure, and gender.

## Design Method

Competency at Performance Measurement Survey

The design method was to administer quantitative surveys that measure (a) current competence at performance measurement; and (b) the issues associated with the impediments to leading change in performance measurement. The purpose of this study was to compare actual performance measurement with researched models brought forth in the literature review. The instrument contains a combination of open and closed response questions regarding comparative agency demographic information. It then asks for performance measurement data in nine dimensions of performance measurement. Each dimension uses a three-point ordered-answer agreement scale of: (a) We collect this data; (b) We would collect this data if we could; and (c) We have no interest in collecting this data. Each dimension ends with an open response area for optional comments.

Perception of Performance Measurement Survey

The design method was to administer qualitative surveys in order to make judgments about the respondents' perceptions of performance measurement. The purpose of this study was to collect perceptual data that could benchmark the agency's belief system. That qualitative data would affect research recommendations designed to improve individual and agency performance through improved performance measurements. The survey uses closed response questions to collect demographic data on division of assignment, classification, tenure, and gender. Ten perceptual closed response questions test perceptions to performance measurement and utilize a five-point ordered-answer agreement scale of (a) I strongly agree; (b) I somewhat agree; (c) I have

no opinion; (d) I somewhat disagree; and (e) I strongly disagree. The survey contains a finishing open response question for optional comments.

### Research Question

The research question posed in Chapter 1, "How does the researched model of police performance measurement compare to current methods in terms of acceptance or resistance to change?" remains valid for the sampling methodology.

# Survey Instruments

Competency at Performance Measurement Survey

The eight survey participants represent a diverse mix in terms of geography, jurisdiction, population, and organizational culture. The intention is not to provide an accurate statistical mean in terms of the survey's objectives, but to sample the current competency at performance measurement while determining impediments to leading change in performance measurement. These data intend to represent organizational philosophy in terms of current measurement practice and tolerance to change in contrast with the PERF and CALEA suggested measurement protocols.

To determine competency at performance measurement, a survey derived from the CALEA survey and PERF study was administered to the Phoenix Police Department, San Diego Sheriff's Department, Irvine Police Department, Redondo Beach Police Department, Garland Police Department, Greenwood Village Police Department, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, and the Arvada Police Department. This survey instrument, attached as Appendix C, tested the pertinent performance measurement domains and included subjective questions to test resistance. This survey was administered via e-mail using the Zoomerang ® survey software.

Perception of Performance Measurement Survey

Members representing different functional responsibilities and authority positions within the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department were surveyed to identify organizational impediments to driving change in performance measurement. This survey, attached as Appendix D, measures agency perception of performance measurement effectiveness.

Stratification occurred through selection of every fifth personnel number from the active personnel list of 2,692 sworn – commissioned – police officers. Personnel numbers are unique individual identifiers assigned in ascending numerical order at the time of the employee's hiring. That selection protocol resulted in a random selection of 533 potential respondents of diverse rank, classification, tenure, gender, and division of assignment. Administration of this survey occurred through a combination of 220 paper surveys, and 313 Zoomerang ® e-mail survey invitations. The latter were administered to those that possessed a department e-mail account.

The intent of that selection protocol was to achieve a responding sample size of approximately 300 participants representing a cross section of the organization. That number of respondents would achieve a 95% confidence level with a  $\pm$  5% sampling error (Salant & Dillman, 1994). The method ensured that the sample contained various functional and supervisory assignments. The sample size represents 20% of the agency's leadership, middle management, and line officers. Survey responses should reveal perceptions of performance measure effectiveness useful in developing the recommendations of this study.

#### Pilot Testing

Both survey instruments were pilot tested by informal advisors in order to reveal flaws in the research design or methodology before launching the actual surveys (Polland, 1998).

Competency at Performance Measurement Survey

Pilot testing of this survey discovered and removed two duplicate question sets. Pilot testing also caused a restructuring of some answer selections. The initial survey contained the following answer range: (a) We collect this data; (b) We do not collect this data; (c) We would collect this data if we could; and (d) We have no interest in collecting this data. Pilot testing revealed that selection of (b) We do not collect this data, would mask the reason the data were not collected. Since one of the survey objectives was to test resistance, it was more important to force a selection between (c), We would collect this data if we could, and (d) We have no interest in collecting this data. By removing (b), We do not collect this data, the respondent would be compelled to make a judgment as to why the data were not collected. Thus, the answer selection changed to (a) We collect this data, (b) We would collect this data if we could, and (c) We have no interest in collecting this data. In that manner, analysis of the responses could focus on why the data were not collected with (b) indicating desire and (c) indicating a resistance.

Perception of Performance Measurement Survey

Pilot testing determined that some survey items were wordy, complex, and phrased in a negative manner. Restructuring created additional validity, applicability to all respondents, and ease of understanding. Pilot testing caused restructuring of survey

items into ten simple statements about performance measurement. The five-point agreement scale was anchored at Strongly agree, and Strongly disagree.

#### Data Analysis

Competency at Performance Measurement Survey

The theoretical model tested is that traditional police operations provide service designed to produce value for the agency with little regard for creating a more holistic value for the public. The independent variables in the survey are the researched performance measurement methodologies articulated in the survey questions. The dependent variables are the survey outcomes measured against the predictor variables (Cresswell, 2003). The relationship between the two variable sets establishes the breadth of the divide between researched theory and actual practice in the agency competency survey.

Perception of Performance Measurement Survey

The theoretical model tested is that a cross-section of agency employees are aware of current measurements which relate to strategic planning and have an enduring belief in the effectiveness of those measurements. The comparison of different cross-sectional groups identifies cultural norms of resistance that will challenge leadership efforts to drive change.

# Reporting Results

Competency at Performance Measurement

Self-selection by respondents resulted in a 100% return rate. Respondents consisted of upper mid-level managers through agency executives and there is high confidence that the responses reflect actual agency practice on data collection. As

reported in Table 4, gross tabulation of responses by survey domain reveals there is an approximate 81% collection of data as suggested by the PERF and CALEA best practices research; a 9% incompetence at collecting the suggested data; and 10% response rate indicating organizational resistance to collecting data. The implication from the survey is that agencies are very competent at collecting traditional data that directly correlates to police operations, yet 20% of the responses indicate that they have not developed a competency to collect certain data or resist collecting the data. This represents a large block to driving lasting change in agency performance measurement.

Table 4

Competency at Performance Measurement Survey cumulative responses within each survey domain sorted by competency

Dimension (items within dimension)	We collect data	Would but cannot	No interest
Quality service Delivery (4 items)	31 (96.8%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (3.2%)
Reduce victimization (6 items)	43 (89.6%)	3 (6.2%)	2 (4.2%)
Organizational climate (10 items)	68 (85.0%)	5 (6.2%)	7 (8.8%)
Responding to offenders (8 items)	53 (82.8%)	4 (6.3%)	7 (10.9%)
Resource use (7 items)	46 (82.1%)	8 (14.3%)	2 (3.6%)
Fear, safety, and order (10 items)	62 (77.5%)	6 (7.5%)	12 (15.0%)
Use of authority (6 items)	37 (77.1%)	5 (10.4%)	6 (12.5%)

Ethics and values (7 items)	43 (76.8%)	5 (8.9%)	8 (14.3%)
Customer satisfaction (5 items)	24 (60.0%)	10 (25.0%)	6 (15.0%)
Total responses (63 total items)	407 (80.8%)	46 (9.1%)	51 (10.1%)

The collective 19% dissonance between the surveyed agencies and the best practices model indicate limitations at important measurement criteria. For example, as indicated in Table 5, agencies show the greatest incompetence or resistance to the questions regarding the administration of various surveys, a practice noted in the literature review as being essential for effective crime prevention and order maintenance competency.

Table 5

Agency responses to eleven questions measuring current survey competency

Surveys (total survey-related items)	We collect data	Would but cannot	No interest
Agency response (11 items)	57 (64.8%)	17 (19.3%)	14 (15.9%)

## Demographics.

All eight agency executives returned surveys regarding their respective agency's competency at performance measurement for a 100% response rate. Complete survey response summaries are included in Appendix C. Demographic information revealed the following ranges (a) commissioned officer population from 2,901 to 65; (b) 1,082 to 53 non-commissioned employees; (c) 520 to 23 square miles of jurisdiction; (d) 1,500,000 to

13,000 resident population; (e) 12 million to several thousand annual visitors; (f) and department budgets from \$7,100,000 to \$442,900,000.

Jurisdiction.

All respondents reported full or shared police agency jurisdiction within their area of control. Such a response identifies respondents as prototypical police agencies.

*Issues of delivering quality services.* 

All respondents reported collecting this data except for one response that there was no interest in collecting community/citizen surveys.

Issues of fear, safety, and order.

The ten items in this dimension concerned agency competency in measuring stakeholder perceptions, enforcement and prevention data, and statistics on coordination of effort with external constituents. The insight to this dimension is that the agencies were more apt to collect and analyze traditional data from internal sources such as accidents, reported crimes and disturbances, and Computer Assisted Dispatch (CAD) reports. The agencies were less apt to collect community, client, or constituent data on fear and safety. For example, when polled on business surveys and data on targeted victim groups, only four collected data. The remaining four were split as to whether they would if they could or had no interest.

Issues of ethics and values.

This dimension concerned agency competency in measuring citizen complaints, internal discipline, and the openness of that process. It was revealing that about 15% of responses to the seven survey items reported that they had no interest in the data. The

highest level of resistance -50% of respondents - was in the openness of the internal discipline process.

*Issues of legitimacy/customer satisfaction.* 

This dimension concerned agency competency in measuring the satisfaction with police outcomes among various external constituencies. This dimension also contained the highest rate of resistance and lack of competency at 35% of all responses. Four of the six items tested agency competency at surveys. Twenty responses indicated survey use, while 12 responses indicated a lack of competency or a resistance to surveying, a key element of performance measurement discovered in the literature review.

*Issues of organizational climate/competence.* 

The ten items within this dimension concerned agency competency in measuring employee issues such as performance, education, turnover, attendance, and satisfaction. Respondents returned with a 68% level of competency. Eight of the ten items contained responses indicating high competency. That rate skewed lower by an inordinately low competency at collecting data on officer discretion and job satisfaction surveys.

*Issues of reducing crime and victimization.* 

The six items in this dimension measured the competency of collecting information on victimization and reported crimes. It was also the highest rated dimension in terms of competency at 89.6%. That response is somewhat predictable as this dimension is consistent with standard police output measures. Again, the total competency skewed lower due to a soft response to the single survey competency question. A single optional comment indicated that the agency had not purposely excluded victimization surveys, but had just never considered the value of such activity.

*Issues of resource use.* 

The seven items within this dimension measured cost, effectiveness, and productivity issues. Five of the seven items revealed high competency. Data on cost effectiveness and differential response to calls revealed a lack of competency at collecting such data. These are predictable results in that few agencies develop metrics for effectiveness in terms of value creation.

*Issues of responding to offenders.* 

These eight items measured competency at collecting data on offenders. A relatively high resistance and lack of competency at collecting data on alternatives to incarceration – 63% of the responses – skewed what would have been a dimension of high competence.

*Issues of use of authority.* 

The six items of this dimension measured competence at collecting data on complaints, lawsuits, uses of force, officer injuries, and citizen acceptance with an aggregate competency of 80.8%. Again, the lowest rating was in citizen surveys in which only half of the respondents answered that they did collect survey data.

Perception of Performance Measurement Survey

Ratio of responses to surveys distributed.

Stratified selection of 533 survey recipients resulted in 300 respondents that achieved a 56.3% aggregate response rate. Eighty-seven of 220 selectees returned completed paper surveys for a 39.5% response rate, and 213 of 313 selectees fully participated in the Zoomerang ® e-mail survey invitation for a 68.1% response rate. The disparity between paper and e-mail responses is attributed to two factors. First, the e-

mail invitation to the Zoomerang  $\mathbb{R}$  survey site required very little effort on the part of the respondent. Further, a second invitation was sent via e-mail to visit the Zoomerang  $\mathbb{R}$  survey site. During the administration of the e-mail survey, it was discovered that some respondents could not complete the survey since they had department e-mail access, but did not have Internet access. The aggregate response sufficiently achieved the targeted 95% confidence level with a  $\pm$  5% sampling error (Salant & Dillman, 1994).

Perception of performance measurements.

Responses of Strongly Agree and Somewhat Agree were considered positive. No opinion and disagreement responses were considered negative. The highest aggregate scores involved dimensions of operational measurements. The lowest scores involved elements of communication. Table 6 lists those perceptual responses in which the positive score exceeded 70%. The type of questions asked in this grouping are those in which the employee would expect to have the most personal knowledge.

Table 6

Positive responses – Above 70%

Survey question in order of positive response		Positive Response	Negative Response
1.	The members of the department that I	79.7%	20.3%
	know are familiar with the ICARE values		
	and practice them during everyday work.		
2.	Metro effectively measures community	79%	21%
	safety, fear of crime, and social order		
	concerns.		

3.	My supervisors effectively measure	76.3%	23.7%
	individual effectiveness and competence		
	using feedback and performance appraisal.		
4.	My unit adequately measures its	76.3%	23.7%
	effectiveness.		
5.	We use analysis of crime and disorder to	72.3%	27.7%
	develop effective strategies for reducing		
	crime and victimization		
6.	I understand the department's strategic	71.7%	28.3%
	plan.		

Table 7 lists those perceptual responses in which the positive score was less than 70%. It is worth noting that these negatively skewed responses generate from survey items characterized as having to do with organizational communication. The most negative of these relate to communication from the organization's top leadership.

Table 7

Negative responses – Below 70%

Survey question in order of negative response	Positive Response	Negative Response
Our top leaders are constantly reviewing	35.3%	64.7%
how we as a department are doing by		
getting information from within our own		
ranks.		

2.	Our top leaders are constantly reviewing	57.3%	42.7%
	how we as a department are doing by		
	getting information from the community.		
3.	My unit uses its resources in a cost	67.0%	33.0%
	effective manner achieving the best "bang		
	for the buck"		
4.	We gather and use information (such as	68.0%	32.0%
	citizen complaints & commendations, uses		
	of force, and lawsuits) to ensure we use		
	our authority wisely.		

Ratio of responses by stratification.

This survey revealed that supervisors were more apt to respond positively to the survey items by 9:1. The single exception involved the item on effectiveness at measuring community safety, fear of crime, and social order concerns. In terms of tenure, those with less than three years were apt to be most positive in their answers by 6:4. The next most positive group was the polar opposite of the youthful group – those with more than 21 years – by 4:6. The group that responded most negatively was the respondents with six to ten years of tenure by 5:5. In terms of gender, the 263 responding males answered positively by 6:4. The 32 responding females answered positively by 4:6.

#### CHAPTER 4

#### PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

#### Introduction

Results of the research indicate a number of important observations in terms of competency, resistance to change, and perception of current performance measurement. There are distinct gaps identified between the researched model of performance measurement and the survey sample that indicate difficulty in driving change to better effectiveness measures. Further, the perceptual survey responses reveal a lack of universal understanding about current competencies, as well as deeply rooted issues regarding organizational communication. This chapter will measure the associations between perceptions and reality to provide a causal explanation (Polland, 1998).

# **Subject Information**

Competency at Performance Measurement

The results of the agency survey reveal that those agencies are competent in terms of police efficiency – output – measures. CAD data, arrest numbers, citations, accidents, and crime reports establish the basis for ICR reporting which dates to 1930 in the United States. A general observation is that all eight agencies rely on internally generated hard data for analysis and planning. As noted in the literature review, measuring effectiveness requires capturing outcomes other than simple changes in rates or patterns (Maguire, 2002, 2003; Moore et al., 2002; Moore, 2003). To be effective, the value creation process must consider the cost of policing in terms of customer, client, and constituent perceptions of police activities. As noted in Chapter 3, the sampled agencies

demonstrated the least competency at measuring perceptual data. This is especially true regarding an aggregate 64.8% competency with perception surveys.

Traditional police value-chain thinking only considers the outcomes derived from the application of police capacity to create value for the police. Moore's (2003) Strategic Triangle considers the agency's base of legitimacy and support as a necessary coproducer and client in value creation. That base includes the stakeholders identified in Maguire's (2003, 2004) research. Those stakeholders include customers such as businesses and citizens, clients such as criminals or nuisances, and co-producers such as other public agencies and interagency factions. Those are the same groups addressed by Maguire's research, and the PERF Outcomes Model, as survey targets. More than 35% of the agency responses revealed no capacity, or a reluctance, to survey the above groups. The generalization here is that failure to take into account the concerns of the policing environment disallows police administrators from thoroughly understanding the nature and complexity of strategic responses. Measuring policing only in terms of trends and police perceptions misses the opportunity to determine if lowered rates equal community value.

The causal explanation for this lack of competency is likely that policing is bound to traditional practices and measures. As described by Thibault et al. (2004), policing is in most respects a closed culture that resists outside influences. Kotter (1995, 1996) noted that the institutionalization of transformational change requires new permanent behaviors and processes. At NYPD, then Police Commissioner William Bratton institutionalized the Compstat model for the entire country. As chief of the Los Angeles Police Department a decade later, Bratton understands that there is more to dealing with

crime and disorder than crime statistics. He believes the key to effective policing is investing in community partnerships and building valuable relationships (personal communication, December 9, 2004).

#### Resistance to Change

The agency survey reported an overall 10.1% resistance to changes in performance measurement. That resistance ranged from a low of 3.2% in the resource use domain to a high of 15% on issues of fear, safety, order, and customer satisfaction. It is worth noting that the former dimension consisted mostly of traditional effectiveness and output measures, in which data are captured as a routine course of business. The latter dimension polled poorly in six areas in which the data were nontraditional such as surveys or input from clients and co-producers. While not an empirical indication of resistance, it is noteworthy that the customer satisfaction domain had an aggregate lack of competency of 40%. That percentage includes answers of, We would collect the data if we could at 25.0%, and We have no interest in collecting this data at 15%. It is a reasonable assumption that changing the process to enable such data collection is judged as not worth the effort, especially since those areas involved surveys.

The causal explanation for agency resistance is as Kotter (1996) noted.

Resistance to change is normal and believed inevitable. With about one-fifth of the responses indicating a lack of competency or desire, it can be postulated that little effort has been expended in those measurement areas. This seems verifiable regarding the lack of competency at surveys – a process that is not incredibly complex.

Kotter (1996) also believes that the waste and anguish associated with change is avoidable by pursuing his eight-step strategy to transform organizations. To him, the best

way to avoid – or limit – resistance, is by changing the culture of resistance with a culture of innovation, challenge, and accomplishment.

#### Perception

The perception of performance measurement administered to the commissioned members of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department was revealing. The greatest negative perception involved organizational communication, especially as it applies to information gathering by the agency's top leadership. Perceptions do not have to be accurate to be real. Commonly shared perceptions about an agency's leaders provide a huge resistance to overcome. In this instance, the agency's top leaders need to overcome a 65% perception that they are not sensitive to employee feedback, and a 42% negative perception regarding citizen feedback.

It is interesting to note that the strongest areas of positive responses were in those areas of personal interest to the respondent. Questions regarding their own performance and the performance of their units, their effectiveness, and demonstration of values had the highest ratio of positives to negatives. The causal explanation for these perceptual findings is most likely due to the respondents' proximity to the issue. Members tend to have a greater knowledge, and a more positive perception, about those issues with which they are most familiar.

#### **Information Sources**

Researched Performance Measurement Models

The CALEA Performance Measurement Dimension and Measures project and the PERF Measuring What Matters project both exemplify a need to shift from output measures of efficiency to outcome measures of effectiveness. Both projects require a

greater organizational sensitivity to community perceptions of safety, security, and trust in the police. The overarching PERF goal is an outcomes model to create community health. Similarly, the CALEA project advances enhanced performance measurements as a guide to police resource allocation.

#### **SWOT Analysis**

The findings of the two surveys provide an opportunity to match these data along with the two researched performance measurement models in terms of regarding internal analysis of strengths and weaknesses, and external analysis of opportunities and threats.

Internal strengths are those existing distinctive, firm specific, competencies of the organization (Hill & Jones, 2004). As noted earlier, current policing measurement competently measures outputs. Response times, clearance rates, individual and unit performance, resource allocation, costs, and measures of internal discipline provide police managers with enough data to determine trends.

Internal measurement weaknesses are those areas in which little or no measurement capacity exists. As discovered in the agency survey, and reinforced by the perceptual survey, police managers have either elected not to build this measurement capacity or have resisted collecting those data. Formal feedback collection from employees, customers, constituents, co-producers, and clients forms the basis of establishing better police strategies. This lack of measurement capacity deprives police managers of determining if the value created for the agency is also considered value in the total policing environment. It neglects considering the multidimensionality of an agency's performance in terms of equity – ethical fairness, effectiveness – success at goal attainment, and efficiency – the ratio of outputs to inputs (Maguire, 2003).

Table 8

Performance Measurement SWOT Analysis

Measurement Strengths	Measurement Weaknesses
Response to crime and disorder	Feedback from employees
Individual and unit effectiveness	Feedback from customers
Analysis of crime and disorder	Feedback from constituents
Resource usage	Feedback from co-producers
Use of authority	Feedback from clients
	Resistance to change
	Traditionalist culture
	Poor organizational communication
	Weak guiding coalition
Measurement Opportunities	Measurement Threats
Engaged communities	Budget and economy concerns
Academic partnerships	Citizen fear or apathy
Technological advancements	Increased crime and victimization
Information availability	Eroded source of legitimacy and support

SWOT Matrix source: www.marketingteacher.com

Measurement weaknesses also include internal blocks to an agency's ability to measure key performance indicators. As indicated in Table 8, these include the causal explanation

hypotheses mentioned earlier in this analysis. Resistance to change, a traditionalist culture, communication issues, and a weak guiding coalition represent a culture that will impede transformation.

Measurement opportunities are those occasions in which an agency can take advantage of conditions. Measurement opportunities abound in the new millennium. Communities respond well to partnerships with the police in such activities as Neighborhood Watch, D.A.R.E., and volunteer groups. They are a source of information as well as a source of labor for data collection. Many agencies have formed symbiotic partnerships with academia to enhance the quality of their services. Academics can add structure and value to the survey development, distribution, collation, and analysis processes. Technology, such as the Zoomerang ® Web-based survey service is a low-cost option for wide distribution of surveys via e-mail and the Internet. With the Internet, information is closer at hand than ever before. The issue is to develop internal capacity, or leverage the capacity of others, to mine for that information.

Measurement threats occur when external conditions endanger the agency's ability to measure the policing environment. Economy concerns regularly drive police activities as administrators are asked to do more with less. This often curtails activities considered peripheral to the core police functions of responding to crime and disorder. Citizen fear or apathy is a threat to performance measurement if those citizens opt out of the process. Increases in crime and victimization can cause agencies to revert to reactive strategies that are oriented to short-term accomplishments. Additionally, the nature of police work risks the one big incident that can severely erode an agency's source of legitimacy and support. Incidents of police brutality such as the Abner Louima sodomy

case in New York, the Rampart Division scandal in Los Angeles, or continuing widespread community concerns about ethical issues such as racial profiling have a deleterious effect on an agency's base of legitimacy and support. It is essential that agencies have a pre-existing productive relationship with their communities.

Relationships are built during the good times (W. Bratton, personal communication, December 9, 2004).

#### CHAPTER 5

# SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## **Summary**

Purpose and Significance of the Study

The purpose of the study was to identify effective processes for leading a change in the way police executives measure performance. The significance of the study involves the identification of measurement processes, and the organizational and environmental impediments to process implementation.

Review of the Literature

Current measurement of police performance is largely a collection of outputs with a history dating to early in the twentieth century. New police performance management concepts spawned by aggressive actions to reduce crime in New York City concentrate on maximizing existing resources using new strategies. The risk associated with this effort is the potential for alienating the public from the police with the perception that those new strategies are achieved without public equity. Current research in performance measurement recommends the creation of a reinforcing loop established by the interaction of effective measurement of creative outcome-oriented strategies based on holistic environmental assessments.

#### Methodology

The literature review framed the issues regarding the need for a change in how the police measure performance. Research of available survey instruments revealed two researched survey specimens pertinent to the development of the two survey instruments

used for this study. Those surveys illustrated the leadership challenges associated with driving that change.

Data Analysis

Data analysis led to a number of causal explanations regarding why agencies do not measure a wider range of performance attributes. A traditionally closed culture in policing, reliance on traditional practices and measures, police culture, lack of measurement capacity, resistance to change, and perceptions borne of mental models all create formidable blocks to developing, implementing, and measuring innovative new strategies.

#### Conclusions

Based upon the data gathered and analyzed, this author concludes that sufficient empirical research exists to guide agencies in the development of viable outcome-oriented measures of performance. Yet value creation is not the function of measurement. The development of new analytical processes and agency competencies at assessing need, developing strategies, and leading transformational change is the process for creating value. Measurement simply determines whether the strategic goals are being achieved.

An overarching conclusion to this research is that traditional policy, procedure, and practice for short-term management of reactive policing create an impressive impediment to viable strategic planning and plan implementation. Police agencies must build resources and capabilities in order to keep focused on fundamental solutions.

Bringing change to an entire organization requires planning, coordination, and the

creation of a culture in which the organization is committed to solving important problems. The goal is to institutionalize the process.

Many issues can impede organizational change. Management resistance is a critical issue in police administration. Employee resistance is another impediment in a highly structured environment. Traditional rules, regulations, and procedures reinforce that resistance, and they are most often only changed by a benchmark incident. Taken in total, these factors represent friction to the change process.

#### Recommendations

Leading change in police performance measurement requires much more than establishing a metric to assess accomplishment. It requires the construction of a reinforcing governance system of new, and often innovative, processes designed to facilitate the creation of public value. The following five recommendations are the summation of this research project:

1. Police agencies must build a competency for the effective assessment of the internal and external environments. A thorough examination of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats establishes the current operational environment. This examination requires a shift towards considering the multidimensionality of policing by taking into account equity, effectiveness, and efficiency of policing (Maguire, 2003). While an environmental assessment will reveal hard data such as population, reported crime, and agency capabilities, police leaders should seek perceptual feedback on a range of issues from a variety of sources on a regular basis (Maguire, 2004; Moore et al., 2002). Analysis of this data will reveal issues of concern regarding the efficacy of police operations,

- expectations of the police, and a determination of what is considered as valuable.

  Data should be collected from surveys of the community, businesses, recipients of police contact, and from employees.
- 2. Police agencies must develop a process for effective strategic planning based upon the foregoing assessments. Strategy development requires innovative thinking and a willingness to risk changing traditional police activities. Finding important problems to fix is the work of the entire agency based upon a wide variety of input. Important problems worked on by a committed and diverse group should search for new and innovative solution sets (Senge, 1994). Disaggregating the problem and determining the interdependency and interconnectedness of the problem's issues, factors, and symptoms is a strategic process and function of systems thinking (Goldstein, 1990; Marquardt, 1999; Senge). The result should be proactive strategies that are outcome-oriented.
- 3. Police agencies must adopt a new scheme of performance measures that abandon reliance on assessing only rates, trends, and police outputs. Current researched methods, such as the CALEA and PERF projects, establish measures that are outcome-oriented and multidimensional. Moore et al., (2002) recommend measuring the movements of the following dimensions expressed as strategic goals:
  - a. Reduce criminal victimization.
  - b. Call offenders to account.
  - c. Reduce fear and enhance personal security.
  - d. Guarantee safety in public spaces.

- e. Use financial resources fairly, efficiently and effectively.
- f. Use force and authority fairly, efficiently, and effectively.
- g. Satisfy customer demands/achieve legitimacy with those policed.
- 4. Police agencies must commit to leading transformational change as a new management process. While various problem-solving processes have been revealed in this research, Kotter's (1995) eight-step process for leading transformational change surfaces as the most comprehensive:
  - a. Establishing a sense of urgency.
  - b. Forming a powerful guiding coalition.
  - c. Creating a vision.
  - d. Communicating the vision.
  - e. Empowering others to act on the vision.
  - f. Planning for and creating short-term wins.
  - g. Consolidating improvements and producing still more change.
  - h. Institutionalizing new approaches.

The most important intended consequence of this approach to leading change is to create a new culture of innovation and empowerment. The powerful guiding coalition diminishes resistance by visibly marketing of the plan and earnestly embracing the organization's vision. The culture becomes institutionalized by aligning all processes with the vision, strategies, and goals of the organization.

5. Police agencies must commit to effective training processes. The best plan for facilitating change in police management is to train problem-solving groups as part of the police strategic planning process. The organization's people have

institutional knowledge of systemic problems and are in the best position to devise solutions (Dessler, 2004; Marquardt, 1999; Senge, 1994). In policing, cross-functional teams are a realistic situation since many problems span many work functions.

Training therefore plays an increasingly vital role in implementing the employer's strategic plans [and] in the employer's performance management process. This is the process employers use to make sure employees are working toward organizational goals... Taking a performance management approach to training assumes that the training effort explicitly makes sense in terms of what the company wants each employee to contribute to achieving the company's goals. (Dessler, p. 159)

New skills transfer to the implementation of the organization's strategies. Worker involvement programs and performance improvement programs "aim to boost organizational effectiveness by getting employees to participate in the planning, organizing, and general managing of their jobs" (p. 169).

#### Researcher Observations

The research question, "How does the researched model of police performance measurement compare to current methods in terms of acceptance or resistance to change?" compelled the creation of two survey instruments which provided enough data to validate concerns about perception and resistance. The research cited in this study provides practical direction to police leaders to assist them in environmental analysis, strategic planning, and managing that plan through effective performance measurement.

The initial expectations of this project were validated when one-fifth of the survey responses indicated a lack of capacity or a resistance to developing that capacity. The perceptual survey validated concerns regarding organizational communication as a major block to leading change. Respondents had less perceptual problems with issues that were close to their operational proximity, or personal in nature. The literature reviewed on change suggests that resistance problems are not insurmountable, but they require a commitment that must span the breadth of the agency's management structure.

#### Recommendations for Further Research

Research continues with both the PERF and CALEA projects. The thrust of continued research should concentrate on several issues. First, the subsequent research – as is being done by the CALEA project – needs to establish a process for building capacity at performance measurement easily replicated by police agencies. While there may be no one best way, there can at least be a blueprint for others to follow or adapt. Since, performance measurement is only a way to determine if the agency's strategy is viable and effective, research is suggested in the development of a process for the creation of those viable strategies based upon internal and external analysis.

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# APPENDIX A: Police Executive Research Forum Measuring What Matters

# **Project Survey Guides**

# Survey Measures of Community Health

# I. Community Survey

Please describe how satisfied you are with the following.

Response Set: Six point scale from very dissatisfied to very satisfied

- 1. How satisfied are you with the quality of life in your neighborhood?
- 2. How satisfied are you with the quality of life in the city?
- 3. How satisfied are you with your neighborhood as a place to live?

# II. Victim Survey

May choose to repeat questions from above.

## III. Business Survey

How satisfied are you with the quality of life in the neighborhood where your business is located?

Response Set: Six point scale from very dissatisfied to very satisfied

# Objective Measures of Community Health

Measure	Source	
Population (density and	U.S. Census	
race/ethnic composition)	http://www.census.gov/	
<del>-</del> ,	•	
Median family income	U.S. Census	
	http://www.census.gov/	

Unemployment rate	Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/	
Gain/loss of public revenue	City or county Budget	
Accidents and crimes related to substance abuse	Police Department	
Business Growth (sq. feet of new construction or renovation)	Local planning board	
Neighborhood Revitalization I # new buildings, houses, renovations	Local planning board or permits	
Average or median price of a home	Multiple Listing Service and U.S. Census http://www.census.gov/	
Boarded and vacant properties (number and location)	Local or State Department of Health	
Abused/neglected children per 1,000 children	Local or State Child and Family Services	
Domestic violence shelters	Federal listings http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/help.htm or State listings (like MD) http://temp.peoples- law.org/finding/commres/commres.html	
Use of public transportation (ridership)	Local Transportation Agencies or http://www.apta.com/research/stats/ridershp/index.cfm	
Use of parks and other public spaces	Local parks and recreation agency	
Traffic Congestion	Department of Transportation	
Vital statistics (e.g., leading causes of death, birth-related problems/diseases, life expectancy, etc.)	National Center for Health Statistics http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ or State/Local Health Departments	

## Survey Measures of Community Security and Safety

# I. Resident Self Report Survey

Have any of the following happened in the last year? Did you report the incident(s) to the police?

Response Set: The respondent will be asked to mark all that apply. The response set will also include a yes/no response for whether they reported the crime to the police.

- 1. Someone broke into your house
- 2. Property was stolen from your house/yard
- 3. Someone stole, broke into, or vandalized your car
- 4. Someone held you up on the street and robbed (or tried to rob) you
- 5. Someone threatened to beat you up or otherwise threatened to harm you physically
- 6. Someone actually beat you up or otherwise harmed you physically
- 7. You were involved in a traffic accident (that was not your fault) and you sustained serious injuries, that is, you needed medical attention

# II. Juvenile Self Report Survey

During the last 12 months, how often have you done the following?

Response set: 1) not at all, 2) once, 3) twice, 4) 3 or 4 times, and 5) 5 or more times.

- 1. Run away from home (for more than 24 hours)
- 2. Gotten into a serious fight in school or at work

- 3. Taken part in a fight where a group of your friends were against another group
- 4. Hurt someone badly enough to need bandages or a doctor
- 5. Taken something not belonging to you worth under \$50
- 6. Taken something not belonging to you worth over \$50
- 7. Gone into some house or building when you weren't supposed to be there
- 8. Damaged school property on purpose
- 9. Sold an illegal drug
- 10. Bullied or intimidated someone
- 11. Participated in a gang or gang-related activities
- 12. Used a drug that wasn't prescribed to you, or were involved with drugs in some other capacity

Survey Measures of Community Security and Safety

## III. Business Self Report Survey

1. Estimate how many times the following has happened in or around your establishment during the last 12 months? Did you report these incidents to the police?

Response Sets: One answer will be the number of times the following has occurred to a business. The response set will also include a yes/no response for whether they reported the crime to the police.

# Shoplifting

Loitering

Computer crimes

Commercial Break-ins

Commercial Vandalism

Commercial Auto thefts

Robbery, including armed robbery

2. In the last 12 months, what actual financial loss did your business suffer due to crime?

What was your annual gross income from your business during the last 12 months?

3. During the last 12 months, which crimes were of most concern to your business?

# Objective Measures of Community Security and Safety

	Measure	Source
>	Incident based, reported crime by crime type	Police Department, UCR/NIBRS
>	Victimization Survey (local self-report – see attached questions)	Community Survey
	Clearance rate	Police Department
	Ratio of recorded crimes to arrests	Police Department
>	Percent of cases dropped by prosecutor due to problem with the police investigation	District Attorney's Office
>	Number and type of calls for service (where type is defined as the final disposition of the call rather than initial coding of the call)	Police Department

>	# parolees, probationers in neighborhood	Board of Probation/Parole or Police Department
>	Insurance Claims (loss of property due to crime)	Insurance Companies
	Business Crime 1. Commercial Break-ins 2. Commercial Vandalism 3. Shoplifting 4. Commercial Auto thefts 5. Self-reported crimes, see attached questions	Police Department and Business Community Survey
>	Juvenile Crime  1. Reported crimes on school grounds 2. Police reports of incidents where suspect is under the age of 18 3. Self-reported crimes, see attached questions	Police Department and Juvenile Self Report Survey

# Survey Measures of Perceptions of Safety and Security

# I. Community Survey

## Fear of Crime

Regarding the following items, how fearful are you of....

Response set: Six point scale ranging from very afraid to not afraid at all

- 1. Crime in your neighborhood generally?
- 2. Being home alone during the day?
- 3. Being home alone after dark?
- 4. Walking/jogging locally during the day?
- 5. Walking/jogging locally after dark?
- 6. Traveling on public transportation during the day?
- 7. Traveling on public transportation after dark?

# Disorder

Please describe how much of a problem the following activities are in your neighborhood.

Response set: Six point scale from big problem to no problem at all

#### Social Disorder:

- 1. Drinking in public
- 2. Youth gangs
- 3. Illegal drug use in public
- 4. Drunk driving
- 5. Public drug sales
- 6. Vandalism
- 7. Public prostitution
- 8. Panhandling
- 9. Loitering
- 10. Truancy
- 11. Speeding vehicles
- 12. Domestic violence
- 13. Car theft
- 14. Homelessness
- 15. Groups of teens hanging out on corners or streets
- 16. Loud music/parties
- 17. Neighborhood fights
- 18. Racial prejudice/hate crimes

## Physical Disorder:

- 1. Garbage/litter
- 2. Abandoned cars
- 3. Rundown buildings
- 4. Poor lighting
- 5. Overgrown shrubs
- 6. Empty lots
- 7. Graffiti
- 8. People not keeping up houses or apartments

# II. Victim Survey

#### Fear of Crime

How fearful are you that you will be a victim of this same crime in the future?

Response set: Six point scale ranging from very afraid to not afraid at all

## Disorder

No disorder measures for a victim survey.

## III. Business Survey

## Fear of Crime

A. In the past 12 months, which of the following have you engaged in to help increase security at your business because you are fearful of crime?

Response set: Mark all that apply

- 1. Installed window bars, dead bolt locks, or gates
- 2. Employed or contracted with private security

- 3. Contracted with an off-duty police officer
- 4. Used an alarm system
- 5. Requested an increase in police visibility around your business
- Attended a seminar or requested a meeting with police to discuss how to better protect your business
- 7. Ask the police to do crime survey of your business
- 8. Other
- B. Regarding the following items, how fearful are you of....

Response set: Six point scale ranging from very afraid to not afraid at all

- 1. Crime in the neighborhood where your business is located?
- 2. Being at your business alone during the day?
- 3. Being at your business alone after dark?
- 4. Walking near your business during the day?
- 5. Walking near your business after dark?
- 6. Traveling to your business on public transportation during the day?
- 7. Traveling to your business on public transportation after dark?

#### Disorder

Please describe the extent to which the following activities negatively impact your business.

Response set: Six-point scale from no negative impact to big negative impact

#### A. Social Disorder:

- 1. Drinking in or around your establishment
- 2. Youth gangs

- 3. Illegal drug use in or around your establishment
- 4. Public drug sales in or around your establishment
- 5. Vandalism
- 6. Public prostitution around your establishment
- 7. Panhandling in or around your establishment
- 8. Loitering in or around your establishment
- 9. Speeding vehicles around your establishment
- 10. Car theft around your establishment
- 11. Homelessness around your establishment
- 12. Groups of teens hanging out on corners/streets around your establishment
- 13. Loud music/parties around your establishment
- 14. Neighborhood fights in or around your establishment
- 15. Racial prejudice/hate crimes in or around your establishment

#### B. Physical Disorder:

- 1. Garbage/litter around your establishment
- 2. Abandoned cars around your establishment
- 3. Rundown buildings around your establishment
- 4. Poor lighting in or around your establishment
- 5. Overgrown shrubs around your establishment
- 6. Empty lots around your establishment
- 7. Graffiti in or around your establishment
- 8. People not keeping up houses or apartments around your establishment

#### IV. Juvenile Survey

# Fear of Crime

A. Regarding the following items, how fearful are you of....

Response set: Six point scale ranging from very afraid to not afraid at all

- 1. Crime in your school generally?
- 2. Walking to/from school during the day?
- 3. Walking to/from school after dark?
- 4. Traveling to school on public transportation during the day?
- 5. Traveling to school on public transportation after dark?
  Objective Measures of Perceptions of Safety and Security

Fear of Crime Disorder

	Measure	Source	Measure Source
>	Police call data related to suspicious persons/vehicle	PD	Police call records, arrests, and reports for social and physical disorder (see list below)
>	Crime prevention seminars requested	PD	Direct observations of social and observations physical disorder (see list below)
>	Security premises surveys requested	PD	
>	# deaths, injuries resulting from crime	PD *note that some of this information would be collected on the "traffic measures"	Social Disorder:  Drinking in public  youth gangs  illegal drug use in public  drunk driving  public drug sales  vandalism  public prostitution  panhandling  loitering  truancy  speeding vehicles

			<ul> <li>domestic violence</li> <li>car theft</li> <li>homelessness</li> <li>groups of teens hanging out on corners or streets</li> <li>loud music/parties</li> <li>neighborhood fights</li> <li>racial prejudice/hate crimes</li> <li>Disturbance in public place</li> <li>Disturbance in licensed premises</li> <li>Disturbance in private property</li> <li>Civil dispute</li> <li>Other unlisted disorder/nuisance</li> </ul>
<b>&gt;</b>	Gun permits issued	Sheriff's Office or other agency responsible for Brady checks	Physical Disorder:      garbage/litter     abandoned cars     rundown buildings     poor lighting     overgrown shrubs     empty lots     graffiti     people not keeping up houses or apartments
>	Use of parks and other public spaces	Local parks/ recreation agency or Observations	

Survey Measures of Confidence, Trust, and Satisfaction

# I. Community Survey

# Confidence

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Response set: Six-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree

#### A. Confidence index

- 1. The police respond quickly if I call them for an emergency.
- 2. The police solve cases in an expedient manner.
- 3. The police respond to community concerns.
- 4. The police provide quality service to the residents of this community.
- 5. The police are properly managed.
- 6. The police use resources efficiently.
- 7. The police know how to perform their roles properly.
- B. Questions relating to the outcome measures
  - 1. The police reduce residents' fear of crime.
  - 2. The police have increased residents' confidence in the police department.
  - 3. The police effectively control crime in my neighborhood.

#### C. Additional suggestions

- 1. If I were robbed, I believe the police would try hard to find the robber.
- 2. If I knew about potential crime problems I would report them because I have confidence in the police to address the issue.

#### Trust

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Response set: Six point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree

- 1. The police are honest.
- 2. The police treat people fairly.
- 3. The police do not use excessive force.
- 4. The police enforce the law equally.

- 5. The police treat people with respect.
- 6. The police behave professionally.

#### **Satisfaction**

Please describe how satisfied you are with the police department in the following areas.

Response set: Six point scale from very dissatisfied to very satisfied

- 1. Controlling crime in your neighborhood.
- 2. Managing traffic in your neighborhood.
- 3. Increasing residents' confidence and trust in the department.
- 4. Reducing residents' fear of crime.
- 5. In general, how satisfied are you with the police department?

# II. Victim Survey

#### Confidence

If you were a victim of a crime in the future, how confident would you be that the police will:

Response set: Six-point scale from not confident at all to very confident

Arrive in a reasonable amount of time.

- 1. Attempt to locate witnesses.
- 2. Search for and collect evidence.
- 3. Give advice on preventing future incidents.
- 4. Contact you to inform you of the status of the case.

#### Trust

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

Response set: Six-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree

1. I believe that police will respond appropriately to other crime victims regardless of race, sex, age, or other characteristic.

#### **Satisfaction**

Please describe how satisfied you were with the police department in the following areas.

Response set: Six point scale from very dissatisfied to very satisfied

A. General satisfaction questions

In general, how satisfied were you with the police's response to your case?

- B. Patrol satisfaction questions
  - 1. The time it took the officer to respond to my call.
  - 2. The officer's courteousness and concern about my situation.
  - 3. The officer's ability to provide helpful information in the event I needed some follow-up at a later date.
- C. Investigative satisfaction questions
  - 1. The time it took the detective to contact me.
  - 2. The detective's courteousness and concern about my case.
  - 3. The detective's efforts to keep me informed on the status of my case.

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

Response set: Six-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree

1. If a similar situation should develop in the future, I would feel comfortable if the same patrol officer handled it.

2. If a similar situation should arise in the future, I would be satisfied if the same detective handled it.

### III. Business Survey

#### Confidence

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Response set: Six-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree

- 1. The police help local businesses prevent crime.
- 2. The police help address local business concerns about crime.
- 3. If my business were robbed, I believe the police would try hard to find the robber.

#### Trust

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

Response set: Six-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree

I believe the police respond fairly and equally to businesses in my community

#### **Satisfaction**

Please describe how satisfied you are with the police department in the following areas.

Response set: Six point scale from very dissatisfied to very satisfied

- 1. How satisfied are you with the police department's service to the business community generally?
- 2. How satisfied are you with the police department's responsiveness to the business community's concerns?

# Objective Measures of Confidence, Trust, and Satisfaction

	Measure	Source
>	Level of witness cooperation	Prosecutor's Office or Police Department or Victim Services Agency
	Level of involvement of the community in police- sponsored events (e.g., National Night Out)	Police Department
	Number of volunteers in the PD	Police Department
>	Number of citizen compliments and citizen complaints (by type of compliment and complaint)	Police Department or External Citizen Review Board responsible for complaints
	Number of internal compliments and complaints	Police Department
>	Number and/or outcome of lawsuits or settlements involving the department or specific officers	Police Department or Prosecutor's Office
>	Media coverage of police (including editorials, letters to the editor) complimenting or complaining about the police	Media Sources
	Number of collaborative partnership projects	Police Department
1	Number of requests for presentations	Dalias Danastmant
	Number of requests for presentations	Police Department
>	Number of calls to elected leaders (both complaints and compliments)	Elected Leaders

# Survey Measures of Traffic Safety

# I. Community Survey

# Self Report Driving Behavior

Please describe whether you do the following things often, occasionally, or rarely.

Response Set: Often, Occasionally, or Rarely

#### A. Use of seat belts

- 1. When you are driving, how often do you wear your seatbelt?
- B. Speeding behavior (defined as more than 15 miles over speed limit.)
  - 1. How often do you exceed posted speed limits?

### C. Reckless Driving

- 1. How often do you use your turn signal when you are changing lanes or turning?
- 2. When you are driving, how often do you pick a lane and stick with it, rather than change lanes in order to get somewhere more quickly?
- 3. When you are on a two lane divided highway and you get behind a car going under the speed limit how often do you stay behind the slower driver rather than look for a chance to pass?
- 4. How often do you roll through a stop sign; that is, not come to a complete stop before you proceed?
- 5. How often do you speed up to get through a yellow light before it turns red?

#### Police Monitoring of Traffic

How well do the police monitor traffic in your neighborhood?

Response Set: Six-point scale from police monitor very well to police do not monitor at all

#### II. Victim Survey

See questions listed on the confidence, trust, and satisfaction measure.

See victim self report on the security and safety measure.

# III. Business Survey


No measures for traffic on a business survey.

# Objective Measures of Traffic Safety

Measure	Source
Number of vehicle crashes	Police Department
Number of vehicle crashes with serious personal injuries*	Police Department
Number of vehicle crashes with fatalities	Police Department
Number of DUI-related crashes	Police Department
Number of drug-related crashes (not alcohol)	Police Department
Number of traffic complaints over time	Police Departments or State Department of Transportation
Number of pedestrian injuries/deaths	Police Departments or State Department of Transportation
Observations of blocked intersections	Observations
Observations of traffic violations/infractions	Observations
Observations of seat belt usage	Observations by Police Department or Local Transportation Office

<sup>\*</sup>Serious injury includes fractures, internal injury, severe cuts, crushing, burns (excluding friction burns), concussion, severe general shock requiring hospital treatment, detention in hospital as an in-patient, either immediately or later, injuries to casualties who die 30 or more days after the accident from injuries sustained in that accident.

# LAW ENFORCEMENT OUTCOMES CONTRIBUTING TO OVERALL COMMUNITY HEALTH



**INTERMEDIATE S&S** 

MAJOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OUTCOMES

**ULTIMATE GOAL** 

# APPENDIX B: CALEA Performance Measurement Dimensions and

# Measures

# Background Questions

1.	How many sworn (commissioned) employees does your agency have?
	•
2.	How many non-sworn (civilian) employees does your agency have?
	•
3.	What is your physical jurisdiction in square miles?
	•
4.	What is your service area population?
	•
5.	Does this include a substantial amount of non-residents?
	• Yes
	• No
	Annual non-resident visitors
6.	What is your current policing budget?
	•
7.	Are you responsible for general law enforcement?
	Solely responsible
	<ul> <li>Jointly responsible with other agencies</li> </ul>
	Occasionally responsible
	<ul> <li>Not responsible</li> </ul>

8. Are you responsible for criminal investigations?

- Solely responsible
- Jointly responsible with other agencies
- Occasionally responsible
- Not responsible
- 9. Are you responsible for traffic accident investigation?
  - Solely responsible
  - Jointly responsible with other agencies
  - Occasionally responsible
  - Not responsible
- 10. Do you enforce state law?
  - Solely responsible
  - Jointly responsible with other agencies
  - Occasionally responsible
  - Not responsible
- 11. Do you enforce local law?
  - Solely responsible
  - Jointly responsible with other agencies
  - Occasionally responsible
  - Not responsible

Dimensions and Measures for Agency Performance Measurement

Below are nine Performance Measurement Dimensions and their related measures. Please indicate the degree of difficulty you foresee in reporting by selecting one answer in accordance with the following scale:

1 – Not Diffic	1 – Not Difficult – already collecting data								
2 – Some Diff	2 - Some Difficulty -procedures can be modified to provide new data								
3 – More Diffi	3 – More Difficult – new procedures would have to be instituted to collect data								
4 – Great Diff	iculty –	collect	ion is n	ext to impossible.					
Issues of Delivering (	Issues of Delivering Quality Services (Existing or Possible Measures)								
12. Data a	12. Data available from official measures (calls for service, CAD records,								
compla	complaints, other existing analytical surveys.								
•	1	2	3	4					
13. Data a	vailable	e from p	erception	on measures community/citizen surveys					
•	1	2	3	4					
14. Data a	vailable	e from n	ion-law	enforcement activities – citizen academies,					
recove	ring los	st prope	rty, etc.						
•	1	2	3	4					
15. Data a	vailable	e from o	outcome	based programs such as Neighborhood					
Watch	, DARE	E, etc.							
•	1	2	3	4					
16. Comm	ents on	this dir	nension	:					
Issues of Fear, Safety,	, and O	rder (Ex	kisting o	or Possible Measures)					
17. Data a	vailable	e from s	urveys	of local businesses					
•	1	2	3	4					
18. Data a	vailable	e from c	ommun	ity surveys					
•	1	2	3	4					
19. Data a	vailable	e from e	mergen	cy management drills, exercises					

		•	1	2	3	4		
	20.	Data a	vailable	e from h	azard re	eporting (e.g., pot holes, street lights out, etc.)		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	21.	Data a	vailable	e from n	notor ve	ehicle collisions		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	22.	Data a	vailable	from n	uisance	crimes/quality of life issues		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	23.	Data a	vailable	e from t	raffic er	nforcement (citations/violation location, etc.)		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	24.	Data a	vailable	e from F	Hot Spo	t crime analysis		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	25.	Data a	vailable	on self	f-protec	tion measures (e.g., programs for targeted		
		groups, women, elderly, etc.)						
		•	1	2	3	4		
	26.	Data a	vailable	e on use	of publ	lic space (e.g., parks, urban areas, etc.)		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	27.	Comm	nents on	Issues	of Fear,	Safety, and Order:		
Issues of Ethics/Values:								
	28. Data available on citizen complaints							
		•	1	2	3	4		
	29.	Data a	vailable	on per	ceptions	s of police ethics		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	30.	Data a	vailable	on offi	icer/emp	oloyee commendations		

	•	1	2	3	4					
	31. Data	availabl	e on dis	cipline	patterns					
	•	1	2	3	4					
	32. Data	2. Data available on employee surveys								
	•	1	2	3	4					
	33. Data	availabl	e on out	tcomes	of the complaint process					
	•	1	2	3	4					
	34. Data	availabl	e on pul	olication	n of internal investigative information					
	•	1	2	3	4					
	35. Comi	ments or	issues	of ethic	s/values:					
Issues of I	egitimacy	//Custon	ner Satis	sfaction						
	36. Data	available	e on bus	siness si	urveys					
	•	1	2	3	4					
	37. Data	availabl	e on tar	geted ar	nd/or general community surveys					
	•	1	2	3	4					
	38. Data	availabl	e from o	custome	er satisfaction surveys					
	•	1	2	3	4					
	39. Data available from special population surveys (elderly, minorities, etc.)									
	•	1	2	3	4					
	40. Data	available	e on clie	ent/cons	stituent surveys (offenders, victims,					
	gover	rnment a	gencies	)						
	•	1	2	3	4					
	41. Com	ments or	1 Issues	of Legi	timacy/Customer Satisfaction:					

# Issues of Organizational Climate/Competence

42. Data available on compensation and benefit surveys							
•	1	2	3	4			
43. Data a	vailable	e on em	ployee	competence/performance measures			
•	1	2	3	4			
44. Data a	ıvailable	e on em	ployee	education			
•	1	2	3	4			
45. Data a	ıvailable	e on em	ployee	retention/turnover			
•	1	2	3	4			
46. Data a	ıvailable	e on grie	evances	/discipline rates			
•	1	2	3	4			
47. Data a	ıvailable	e on job	satisfac	ction surveys			
•	1	2	3	4			
48. Data a	vailable	e on off	icer disc	cretion/empowerment			
•	1	2	3	4			
49. Data a	ıvailable	e on abs	enteeis	m			
•	1	2	3	4			
50. Data a	ıvailable	e on em	ployee	training (in-service, advanced, specialized)			
•	1	2	3	4			
51. Data a	ıvailable	e on cor	rective/	remedial training			
•	1	2	3	4			
52. Comn	nents on	Issues	of Orga	inizational Climate/Competence:			

# Issues of Reducing Crime and Victimization

	53. Data available on calls for service data collection and analysis							
		•	1	2	3	4		
	54. D	ata a	vailable	on DU	Ι			
		•	1	2	3	4		
	55. D	ata a	vailable	on gun	incide	nts		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	56. D	ata a	vailable	on pro	tective (	orders		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	57. D	ata a	vailable	on vict	timizati	on surveys		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	58. D	ata a	vailable	on fire	arms vi	olations		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	59. D	ata a	vailable	on vict	timizati	on surveys		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	60. C	omm	ents on	issues (	of Redu	cing Crime and Victimization:		
Issues of R	Resour	ce U	se					
	61. D	ata a	vailable	on cos	t effecti	veness (bang for the buck)		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	62. D	ata a	vailable	on the	cost of	service delivery		
		•	1	2	3	4		
	63. D	ata a	vailable	on diff	erential	response to incidents based on		
	ci	rcum	stances					

		•	1	2	3	4
(	64. l	Data av	vailable	on proc	ductivit	y
		•	1	2	3	4
	65. l	Data av	vailable	on resp	onse tii	me
		•	1	2	3	4
	66. l	Data av	vailable	on satu	ration i	n demand/deployment at peak times
		•	1	2	3	4
(	67. l	Data av	vailable	on volu	ınteeris	m
		•	1	2	3	4
(	68. <b>(</b>	Comm	ents on	Issues o	of Reso	urce Use:
Issues of Re	espo	nding	to Offe	nders		
(	69. l	Data av	vailable	on alter	rnatives	s to arrest
		•	1	2	3	4
,	70. l	Data av	vailable	on arre	sts/citat	tions/referrals
		•	1	2	3	4
,	71. l	Data av	vailable	on pros	secution	ns
		•	1	2	3	4
,	72. l	Data av	vailable	on case	es cleare	ed by arrest
		•	1	2	3	4
,	73. 1	Data av	vailable	on alter	rnatives	s to incarceration (house
	ä	arrest/p	orobatio	n/parol	e)	
		•	1	2	3	4
,	74. l	Data av	vailable	on regi	stered o	offender tracking

		•	1	2	3	4				
	75. Data available on repeat offenders									
		•	1	2	3	4				
	76. Data available on warrant service									
		•	1	2	3	4				
	77. C	omm	ents on	Issues	of Resp	onding to Offenders:				
Issues of Use of Authority										
	78. Data available on analysis of citizen complaints									
		•	1	2	3	4				
	79. D	ata a	vailable	on bias	sed base	ed policing surveys				
		•	1	2	3	4				
	80. D	ata a	vailable	on use	of force	e incidents				
		•	1	2	3	4				
	81. D	ata a	vailable	on inju	ries to/	from officers				
		•	1	2	3	4				
	82. D	ata a	vailable	on law	suits/se	ttlements				
		•	1	2	3	4				
	83. D	ata a	vailable	on pub	lic acce	eptance of police authority surveys				
		•	1	2	3	4				
	84. C	omm	ents on	Issues	of Use o	of Authority:				

# APPENDIX C: Competency at Performance Measurement

The following survey represents the questions asked and the responses received during the survey period from October 6, 2004 through October 28, 2004. The total number of responses to an answer, as well as the percentage of those responding to that answer, is noted to the right of each answer choice. Survey respondent comments are inserted as they appear in the survey.

# SURVEY OF AGENCY PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND ATTRIBUTION

The following survey questions were adapted from research on performance measurement completed under the direction of Jack Greene, Dean, College of Criminal Justice at Northeastern University, and Edward Maguire, Associate Professor, Administration of Justice Program, George Mason University. That research is part of a Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA) proposal for the development of performance measures for law enforcement agencies. Dr. Greene and Dr. Maguire have granted permission for a derivation of their proposed survey to be used in this study. Confirmation of their permission is available upon request.

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#### SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS

Thank you for agreeing to participate. The first section of this survey simply gathers agency information. Subsequent sections are asking various questions about performance measurements. Please attempt to answer these questions in terms of your agency's philosophy rather than reliance upon personal beliefs. Please feel free to add personal comments at the end of each session if you have more information that you might wish to contribute. The survey should not take more than about 30 minutes if you have an adequate knowledge base on your agency's performance measurement philosophy. Again, thank you for your time in this project.

#### **BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

### 1. Agency Name

- 1 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department
- 2 Arvada Colorado Police Department
- 3 Redondo Beach Police Department
- 4 Greenwood Village Police Department
- 5 Phoenix Police Department
- 6 Garland Texas Police Department
- 7 San Diego County Sheriff
- 8 Irvine Police Department Irvine, CA
  - 2. How many sworn (commissioned) employees does your agency have?
- 1 1524
- 2 139
- 3 105
- 4 65

5	2,901
6	295
7	2245
8	165
	3. How many non-sworn (civilian) employees does your agency have?
1	470
2	75
3	58 Full Time; 15 Part Time
4	23
5	1,082
6	128
7	733
8	71 Full Time; 98 Part Time
	4. What is your physical jurisdiction in square miles?
1	381.3
2	32
3	6.3
4	8.21
5	520
6	57
7	4,200
8	55.2
	5. What is your service area population?
1	675,000
2	105,000
3	67,000
4	13,000
5	1,500,000

- 6 215,000+ 7 812,558 8 171,800 6. D
  - 6. Does your agency police a substantial amount of non-residents such as tourists and visitors?

•	Yes	6	75%
•	No	2	25%

- 7. How many of these non-residents visit your jurisdiction annually?
- 1 Tens of thousands for conventions and visitors.
- 2 Minor tourism specifically in Arvada; however, the metro area has a great deal of tourism. As a result, we do get visitors staying in Arvada with friends and family, but it is not a police issue for us.
- 3 Various websites estimate 1.5 million plus to the beaches and various attractions
- 4 55,000
- 5 12 million visitors plus several thousands of new arrivals from Mexico
- 6 Not Applicable
- 7 Contact visitors bureau
- 8 City population reaches 350,000 during the work day week, the Spectrum Entertainment Center has an additional 40-50,000 visitors on a weekend night
  - 8. What is your current policing budget?
- 1 ∼155 million
- 2 19 million
- 3 22.7 million dollars
- 4 7.1 million
- 5 367 million
- 6 33.7 million
- 7 \$442,930.198
- 8 36,022,548

9. Are you responsible for general law enforcement?			
<ul> <li>Solely responsible</li> </ul>	6	75%	
• Jointly responsible with other agencies	2	25%	
<ul> <li>Occasionally responsible</li> </ul>	0	0%	
<ul> <li>Not responsible</li> </ul>	0	0%	
10. Are you responsible for criminal investigations?			
<ul> <li>Solely responsible</li> </ul>	6	75%	
• Jointly responsible with other agencies	2	25%	
<ul> <li>Occasionally responsible</li> </ul>	0	0%	
<ul> <li>Not responsible</li> </ul>	0	0%	
11. Are you responsible for traffic accident investiga	ition?		
<ul> <li>Solely responsible</li> </ul>	5	63%	
• Jointly responsible with other agencies	3	38%	
<ul> <li>Occasionally responsible</li> </ul>	0	0%	
<ul> <li>Not responsible</li> </ul>	0	0%	
12. Do you enforce state law?			
<ul> <li>Solely responsible</li> </ul>	3	38%	
• Jointly responsible with other agencies	5	63%	
<ul> <li>Occasionally responsible</li> </ul>	0	0%	
<ul> <li>Not responsible</li> </ul>	0	0%	
13. Do you enforce local law?			
<ul> <li>Solely responsible</li> </ul>	5	63%	
• Jointly responsible with other agencies	3	38%	

•	Occasionally responsible	0	0%
•	Not responsible	0	0%

#### DIMENSIONS AND MEASURES FOR AGENCY PERFORMANCE

#### **MEASUREMENT**

Below are nine Performance Measurement Dimensions and their related measures. Please indicate your agency's current practice by selecting the response that most closely represents your agency's philosophy or practice.

NOTE: Answer that you "collect the data" if you routinely access data collected by another source.

# EXISTING OR POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR ISSUES OF DELIVERING QUALITY SERVICES

Below are nine Performance Measurement Dimensions and their related measures.

Please indicate your agency's current practice by selecting the response that most closely

represents your agency's philosophy or practice.

14. Data from official measures such as calls for service, CAD records, complaints, or other existing analytical surveys.

•	We collect this data	8	100%	
•	We would collect this data if we could	0	0%	
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%	
15. Data from perception measures such as community/citizen surveys				
•	We collect this data	7	88%	
•	We would collect this data if we could	0	0%	
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%	

Data available from non-law enforcement activities – citizen academies,
 recovering lost property, etc.

•	We collect this data	8	100%
•	We would collect this data if we could	0	0%
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%

17. Data available from outcome based programs such as Neighborhood

Watch, DARE, etc.

•	We collect this data	8	100%
•	We would collect this data if we could	0	0%
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%

18. OPTIONAL COMMENTS Please provide any comments you would like to share regarding this dimension:

Law enforcement duties are shared with various agencies in mutual aid situations. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and California Highway Patrol will provide mutual aid in forensics and various types of investigations if requested. This is the exception rather than the norm. It is usually only requested to avoid claims of conflict of interest in specific cases.

EXISTING OR POSSIBLE MEASURES REGARDING ISSUES OF FEAR, SAFETY, AND ORDER

19. Data available from surveys of local businesses

•	We collect this data	4	50%
•	We would collect this data if we could	3	38%
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%

20. Data available from community surveys				
• We collect this data	6	75%		
• We would collect this data if we could	1	13%		
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%		
21. Data available from emergency management drills	, exerci	ses		
• We collect this data	7	88%		
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%		
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%		
22. Data available from hazard reporting such as potho	oles, stre	eet lights out,		
etc.				
• We collect this data	5	63%		
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%		
• We have no interest in collecting this data	3	38%		
23. Data available from motor vehicle collisions				
• We collect this data	8	100%		
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%		
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%		
24. Data available from nuisance crimes/quality of life	issues			
• We collect this data	8	100%		
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%		
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%		
25. Data available from traffic enforcement (citations/	violatio	n location, etc.)		
• We collect this data	8	100%		

• We would collect this data if	we could 0	0%	
• We have no interest in collect	ting this data 0	0%	
26. Data available from Hot Spot crime	analysis		
• We collect this data	8	100%	
• We would collect this data if	we could 0	0%	
• We have no interest in collect	ting this data 0	0%	
27. Data available on self-protection pro	grams for targeted gro	oups such as	
women, elderly, etc.			
• We collect this data	4	50%	
• We would collect this data if	we could 2	25%	
• We have no interest in collect	ting this data 2	25%	
28. Data available on use of public space such as parks, urban areas, etc.			
• We collect this data	4	50%	
• We would collect this data if	we could 0	0%	
• We have no interest in collect	ting this data 4	50%	
29. OPTIONAL COMMENTS Please pr	covide any comments	you would like	
to share regarding this dimension:			
We have not done an extensive citizen survey within the past two to four years, but have had surveys of this type in the past. We are currently averaging about two emergency management drills involving public safety, Citizen Core Council Volunteers, and City Staff each year (both tabletop and field exercises). Potholes, lights out, and other infrastructure maintenance are reported to Public Works by police and citizens. We are instituting automated Hot Spot analysis with crime analysis using ESRI GIS software currently. Previous analysis has been accumulated from Computer Aided Dispatch and Records Management ad hoc query tools and "manual" collating and analysis. Data on the elderly and other special interest groups would be captured			

from crime data through data mining of CAD and RMS data.

Question 22- we do not collect that data but the city streets department makes that

1

2

available to us. Question 28 again the police department does not collect that data but we can get it from city parks and rec. department

# EXISTING OR POSSIBLE MEASURES REGARDING ISSUES OF ETHICS AND VALUES:

# 30. Data available on citizen complaints

• We collect this data	8	100%
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%
31. Data available on citizen perceptions of police ethi	cs	
• We collect this data	4	50%
• We would collect this data if we could	3	38%
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%
32. Data available on employee commendations		
• We collect this data	7	88%
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%
33. Data available on discipline patterns		
• We collect this data	7	88%
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%
34. Data available on employee surveys		
• We collect this data	6	75%
• We would collect this data if we could	1	13%

• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%	
35. Data available on outcomes of the complaint proces	SS		
• We collect this data	8	100%	
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%	
36. We openly publish internal affairs data such as com-	nplaint l	nistory,	case
dispositions, etc.			
• We openly publish this data		3	38%
• We would openly publish this data if we had	d it	1	13%
• We have no interest in openly publishing th	is data	4	50%
37. OPTIONAL COMMENTS Please provide any com	ments :	you wou	ıld like
to share regarding this dimension:			
ISSUES OF LEGITIMACY/CUSTOMER SATISFACTION			
38. Data available on business surveys			
• We collect this data	5	63%	
• We would collect this data if we could	2	25%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%	
39. Data available on targeted and/or general communi	ty surve	eys	
• We collect this data	4	50%	
• We would collect this data if we could	3	38%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%	
40. Data available from customer satisfaction surveys			
• We collect this data	7	88%	

• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%	
41. Data available from special population surveys suc	h as the	elderly,	
minorities, etc.			
• We collect this data	4	50%	
• We would collect this data if we could	3	38%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%	
42. Data available on client/constituent surveys from groups such as			
offenders, victims, other government agencies			
• We collect this data	4	50%	
• We would collect this data if we could	2	25%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	2	25%	
43. OPTIONAL COMMENTS Please provide any comments you would like			
to share regarding this dimension:			
We have an interest in collecting client and constituent data but the method of distribution and collection of the data has been problematic. Our last surveys several years ago had to be manually tabulated and reproduced. This resulted in significant person hours that we do not currently have due to staffing shortages and budget reductions. We are not adverse to surveys; we don't have the time or resources. We have citizen satisfaction surveys that are distributed and/or taken by sergeants fulfilling work objectives given to them in evaluations.			
ISSUES OF ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE/COMPETENCE			
44. Data available on compensation and benefit surveys			
• We collect this data	7	88%	
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%	

• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%	
45. Data available on employee competence/performance measures			
• We collect this data	7	88%	
• We would collect this data if we could	1	13%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%	
46. Data available on employee education			
• We collect this data	7	88%	
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%	
47. Data available on employee retention/turnover			
• We collect this data	8	100%	
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%	
48. Data available on grievances and discipline rates			
• We collect this data	8	100%	
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%	
49. Data available on job satisfaction surveys			
• We collect this data	5	63%	
• We would collect this data if we could	1	13%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	2	25%	
50. Data available on officer discretion/empowerment			
• We collect this data	2	25%	

•	We would collect this data if we could	3	38%
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	3	38%
51. Data a	available on absenteeism		
•	We collect this data	8	100%
•	We would collect this data if we could	0	0%
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%
52. Data available on employee training such as in-service, advanced, and			
specia	alized		
•	We collect this data	8	100%
•	We would collect this data if we could	0	0%
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%
53. Data available on corrective/remedial training			
•	We collect this data	8	100%
•	We would collect this data if we could	0	0%
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%

54. OPTIONAL COMMENTS Please provide any comments you would like to share regarding this dimension:

Training documentation for each employee is collected in a computer application TMIS. Training hours needed by employees are published and distributed to supervisors starting at 13 months prior to the tardy date. We have not collected data on employee job satisfaction or empowerment in a formal survey. However, officers are invited to comment on these subjects in a pre-evaluation form that must be completed prior to their supervisor completing the evaluation.

## ISSUES OF REDUCING CRIME AND VICTIMIZATION

55. Data available on calls for service data collection and analysis

• We collect this data	7	88%
• We would collect this data if we could	1	13%
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%
56. Data available on drunken or impaired driving incid	dents	
• We collect this data	8	100%
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%
57. Data available on gun incidents		
• We collect this data	8	100%
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%
58. Data available on protective orders		
• We collect this data	7	88%
• We would collect this data if we could	1	13%
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%
59. Data available on firearms violations		
• We collect this data	8	100%
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%
60. Data available on victimization surveys		
• We collect this data	5	63%
• We would collect this data if we could	1	13%
• We have no interest in collecting this data	2	25%

61. OPTIONAL COMMENTS Please provide any comments you would like to share regarding this dimension:

We have never collected data on victimization surveys. There is not an affirmative decision not to collect them; their value has not been considered.

# ISSUES O

OF RESOURCE USE			
62. Data available on cost effectiveness to ensure that	the best	value is	
obtained in terms of cost			
• We collect this data	5	63%	
• We would collect this data if we could	2	25%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%	
63. Data available on the cost of service delivery			
• We collect this data	7	88%	
• We would collect this data if we could	1	13%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%	
64. Data available on differential response to incidents based on			
circumstances			
• We collect this data	4	50%	
• We would collect this data if we could	3	38%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%	
65. Data available on productivity measures such as the number arrests, calls			
for service, citations, etc.			
• We collect this data	8	100%	
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%	

• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%	
66. Data available on response time			
• We collect this data	7	88%	
• We would collect this data if we could	1	13%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%	
67. Data available on saturation in demand/deploymen	t at peal	k times	
• We collect this data	8	100%	
• We would collect this data if we could	0	0%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%	
68. Data available on volunteerism			
• We collect this data	7	88%	
• We would collect this data if we could	1	13%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%	
69. OPTIONAL COMMENTS Please provide any comments you would like			
to share regarding this dimension:			
Question 63 we do collect data on some programs but not all			
ISSUES OF RESPONDING TO OFFENDERS			
70. Data available on alternatives to arrest			
• We collect this data	6	75%	
• We would collect this data if we could	1	13%	
• We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%	

71. Data available on arrests/citations/referrals

•	We collect this data	8	100%		
•	We would collect this data if we could	0	0%		
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%		
72. Data a	vailable on prosecutions				
•	We collect this data	6	75%		
•	We would collect this data if we could	1	13%		
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%		
73. Data a	vailable on cases cleared by arrest				
•	We collect this data	8	100%		
•	We would collect this data if we could	0	0%		
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	0	0%		
74. Data available on alternatives to incarceration such as house					
arrest/probation/parole					
•	We collect this data	3	38%		
•	We would collect this data if we could	2	25%		
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	3	38%		
75. Data available on registered offender tracking					
•	We collect this data	7	88%		
•	We would collect this data if we could	0	0%		
•	We have no interest in collecting this data	1	13%		
76. Data available on repeat offenders					
•	We collect this data	7	88%		
•	We would collect this data if we could	0	0%		

<ul> <li>77. Data available on warrant service</li> <li>• We collect this data</li> <li>• We would collect this data if we could</li> <li>0</li> <li>0%</li> </ul>
• We would collect this data if we could 0 0%
• We have no interest in collecting this data 0 0%
78. OPTIONAL COMMENTS Please provide any comments you would like
to share regarding this dimension: Zero (0) responses
ISSUES OF USE OF AUTHORITY
79. Data available on analysis of citizen complaints
• We collect this data 6 75%
• We would collect this data if we could 1 13%
• We have no interest in collecting this data 1 13%
80. Data available on biased based policing surveys
• We collect this data 6 75%
• We would collect this data if we could 1 13%
• We have no interest in collecting this data 1 13%
81. Data available on use of force incidents
• We collect this data 7 88%
• We would collect this data if we could 1 13%
• We have no interest in collecting this data 0 0%
82. Data available on injuries to/from officers
• We collect this data 7 88%
• We would collect this data if we could 0 0%

- We have no interest in collecting this data 13% 83. Data available on lawsuits/settlements We collect this data 7 88% We would collect this data if we could 0 0% • We have no interest in collecting this data 13% 84. Data available on public acceptance of police authority surveys We collect this data 50% 25% We would collect this data if we could 2 • We have no interest in collecting this data 25%
- 85. OPTIONAL COMMENTS Please provide any comments you would like to share regarding this dimension:

  Zero (0) responses
- 86. GENERAL COMMENTS Please provide any additional comments you would like to share regarding your agency's efforts at performance measurement, including perceptions of your agency's acceptance or resistance to capturing and using such data:

The city of Arvada as a whole is interested in performance measurement. We rely a great deal on data analysis to understand our actions and efforts. We also use data analysis to help us make decisions. Generally, Arvada P.D. does a good job of collecting data. We need to continually improve our efforts and understanding of what the data tells us and how to use that information.

This concludes the survey. Thank you for your participation.

#### APPENDIX D: Perception of Performance Measurement Survey

The following survey represents the questions asked and the responses received during the survey period from October 3, 2004 through October 22, 2004. The total number of responses to an answer, as well as the percentage of those responding to that answer, is noted to the right of each answer choice. Survey respondent comments are inserted as they appear in the survey.

#### PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT EFFECTIVENESS SURVEY

This survey is designed to gauge the degree of employee understanding regarding performance measures used by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. By receiving this, you have been randomly chosen from the Personnel Number list of active commissioned police or corrections officers and supervisors. This survey represents 20% of those active members. The purpose of this survey is to collate responses and then analyze the information as it pertains to this study. The information offered in individual responses is confidential and will be discarded after posting to the survey database. Your input is important to designing effective measures and the courtesy of your reply is sincerely appreciated.

When you have completed the survey, please seal it in the envelope provided and return it through interdepartmental mail to:

## PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS DIVISION OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF

SURVEY DISTRIBUTION INFORMATION – Please select only one response

1	Division	of Aggi	anna ant
Ι.	Division	OI ASSI	giiiiieiii

	TD 1 1 1 1	·	^	A A /
1 1	Loohniool	Services Division	(1)	0%
1 1	тесинисат.	Services i hivisioni	()	1 7/0

		Human Resources Division	11	4%
		Professional Standards Division	8	3%
		Detention Services Division	48	16%
		Central Patrol Division	51	17%
		Valley Patrol Division	71	24%
		Investigative Services Division	43	14%
		Special Operations Division	53	18%
		I would rather not answer	15	5%
2.	Classif	fication		
		Officer/Detective	222	74%
		Sergeant	52	17%
		Lieutenant	15	5%
		Captain	6	2%
		Appointed Staff	2	1%
		I would rather not answer	3	1%
3.	Tenure	2		
		0-2 years	23	8%
		3-5 years	58	19%
		6-10 years	77	26%
		11-20 years	106	35%
		21+ years	32	11%
		I would rather not answer	4	1%

### 4. Gender

			Male	263	88%
			Female	32	11%
			I would rather not answer	5	2%
SURVEY	QU	ESTIO	NS – Please answer the following ten	questic	ons by selecting only
one of the	avai	ilable r	esponses. Your response should repre	esent ho	w you feel about the
question.					
	5.	My un	it adequately measures its effectivene	ess.	
			I strongly agree	91	30%
			I somewhat agree	138	46%
			I have no opinion	21	7%
			I somewhat disagree	31	10%
			I do not agree	19	6%
	6.	Metro	effectively measures community safe	ety, fear	of crime, and social
		order o	concerns.		
			I strongly agree	65	22%
			I somewhat agree	172	57%
			I have no opinion	18	6%
			I somewhat disagree	34	11%
			I do not agree	11	4%
	7.	The m	embers of the department that I know	are fan	niliar with the ICARE
		values	and practice them during everyday w	ork	
			I strongly agree	97	32%
			I somewhat agree	142	47%

		I have no opinion	22	7%		
		I somewhat disagree	29	10%		
		I do not agree	10	3%		
8.	My su	pervisors effectively measure individu	ual effec	ctiveness and		
	compe	etence using feedback and performance	e apprai	isal.		
		I strongly agree	109	36%		
		I somewhat agree	120	40%		
		I have no opinion	10	3%		
		I somewhat disagree	40	13%		
		I do not agree	21	7%		
9.	We us	e analysis of crime and disorder to de	velop ef	fective strategies for		
	reducing crime and victimization.					
		I strongly agree	87	29%		
		I somewhat agree	130	43%		
		I have no opinion	37	12%		
		I somewhat disagree	34	11%		
		I do not agree	12	4%		
10.	. My un	it uses its resources in a cost effective	manne	r achieving the best		
	"bang	for the buck"				
		I strongly agree	98	33%		
		I somewhat agree	103	34%		
		I have no opinion	31	10%		
		I somewhat disagree	41	14%		

	I do not agree	27	9%			
11. Our top leaders are constantly reviewing how we as a department are						
doing	doing by getting information from the community.					
	☐ I strongly agree 42 14%					
	I somewhat agree	130	43%			
	I have no opinion	91	30%			
	I somewhat disagree	24	8%			
	I do not agree	13	4%			
12. Our to	p leaders are constantly reviewing ho	w we as	a department are			
doing	by getting information from within ou	ır own r	anks.			
	I strongly agree	22	7%			
	I somewhat agree	84	28%			
	I have no opinion	35	12%			
	I somewhat disagree	100	33%			
	I do not agree	59	20%			
13. We ga	ther and use information (such as citiz	zen com	plaints &			
comm	endations, uses of force, and lawsuits)	) to ensu	are we use our			
authority wisely.						
	I strongly agree	76	25%			
	I somewhat agree	128	43%			
	I have no opinion	49	16%			
	I somewhat disagree	28	9%			
	I do not agree	19	6%			

14. I understand the department's strategic plan.

☐ I strongly agree	76	25%
☐ I somewhat agree	139	46%
☐ I have no opinion	51	17%
☐ I somewhat disagree	24	8%
☐ I do not agree	10	3%

# 15. OPTIONAL COMMENTS – Please feel free to add any comments that you would care to make about performance measurement:

- I think we do a good job on this Department, but we still have a long way to go.

  Personnel shortages, morale and training issues need to be dealt with.
- I believe that the way we measure performance, and deploy manpower is antiquated. The matrix audit recommended deploying manpower based on how the officers work, how busy they are, and how long they are assigned calls. But we still do the old way of number of calls for service.
- The general public does not have an accurate assessment of this department's performance. A rise in crime has been attributed to a low ratio of officers. To citizens. This is not entirely accurate. The crime reduction potential of this agency is affected by recent managerial decisions that have fostered an air of hesitancy and apprehension among officers who have to deal with the actual front line task of law enforcement every day.
- 4 This is the greatest police department in the world.
- From the position I'm in, it seems that our department does not always improve in areas that can be improved and often, studies, analysis is done but not acted upon. The units that can effect change need the power to do it and there needs to be accountability among all aspects of the department when called upon to make changes. Overall, I feel our department is working hard to continually improve itself and its service to the public.

- One detective sees himself as always being on time, if not early, and works hard all day. He has extraordinary demands placed on him as the Spanish speaker for the whole building and acting sergeant much of the time. Another detective in the same detail gets her hair and nails done on duty, leaves work early, and complains when a callout conflicts with the hair appointments she schedules for on-duty time. The working detective is tasked with training her. She comes to the detail not knowing how to turn on her computer. She constantly kicks the cord loose as she spins in her chair and kicks her feet throwing child-like tantrums. She whines to the "working" detective to crawl under her desk to plug it in. The working detective types her search warrants for her because she doesn't know how to type, or what goes into a search warrant. After a year and no improvement in her performance, the working detective complains to the supervisor that she is not competent to do the job and that it would be best to have her go elsewhere to gain some experience and then return to the detail. The supervisor says, "The best detectives use others, she USES everybody, she's the best detective in the unit!" She frequently stops for drinks in her take-home vehicle with that same sergeant. She can't get a case approved by the D/A so she says she's going to go home and put on a dress that reveals her breasts and go to that D/A's office and lean over the desk to influence him to approve the case. The day comes when she develops a hatred for the "working" detective because, as she says, he reminds her of her father; i.e., disciplined and religious. Her hatred turns into rage one day and she blocks the working detective into an office and screams obscenities at him while pointing her finger in his face. The working detective steps to go around her to leave the office and she steps in front of him blocking his egress. He physically moves her by grasping her shoulders to get around her. The working detective after 17 years of exemplary police service is force transferred from the unit for touching her. Nearby employees vouch for the working detective saying that they never even heard him raise his voice, only her "her" screaming. The sergeant says, "sorry, it's out of my hands "they're" going to make an example out of you. No, I do NOT feel like performance is accurately assessed.
- 7 I strongly feel that we are one of the best police agencies in the country. While we

- may not be perfect, we always are striving to improve.
- I recommend that our staffing within Detention Services be reviewed. We have plans to increase our patrol staffing increasing the number of arrests within the community. This is a direct impact on the Detention Center. Our staffing will need to increase to ensure a safe and orderly operation.
- As a Sergeant in ISD, my opinion is that there is a lack of financial resources particularly in the FPCB. Property Crimes East and West continue to be a revolving door to others details in the other bureaus. I feel it is time to address why personnel have the need to leave those details and other units in FPCB. There needs to be a way of being creative to keep the people we train from leaving.
- 10 Metro has in the past and continues to operate with a "Knee-jerk" reaction to complaints from the community as well as some department members. We create way too many policies every time someone thinks they are hearing or seeing too much "good old fashion" police work. Some units operate understaffed because some bosses don't think that they need any help even though the workload is over whelming. We are in the dark-ages compared to some smaller departments in the Southwest. When it finally breaks is when the administration will realize there was a problem, even though they had been told about the potential disaster early on.
- This survey seems to focus on Department measurement as a "whole." If this is the intent, than as a Whole, I feel we do a really good job. Individual employee performance measurement continues to be of interest. I am not sure that we have created an effective means by which to measure employee performance. Offering the 360 training to Sergeants is a very good idea as well.
- 12 Personally, I feel the Department could better allocate its resources.... I think its time to look at the units that are more public relationship oriented to determine if those officers are really as effective as they would be working in a patrol division. I think its time to decentralize some of the Det. Bureau assignments and give station captains more resources at the area commands to address their crimes.
- 13 As a commissioned officer for nine years, the leadership (Sheriff's) for LVMPD has

been great. However, I do feel as though management has their own agenda and often overlook ideas presented by non-management personnel. For example, my unit utilizing video equipment daily to identify suspects for prosecution. Due to budget restraints, were told equipment is not available. An addition, LVMPD, like all other City and County facilities are stretched thin for money and additional personnel; yet the phrase "Do more with less" is causing employee stress, lack of resources and tension in the work place among co-workers, thus affecting employee performance. I am privileged and proud to be member of the Department and enjoy my profession and know that change is constant. I would hope that management realizes that at least 90% of their employees are committed to doing an excellent job; however, we are limited by valley growth, less personnel and most of all, budget restraints.

- The view from the top of the heap is clouded. Administration has lost touch with the assets and conduct needed to perform the job. Polls are nice but they do not show the real problem. Numbers and polls tend to have negative impacts on the performance of the job. We have begun evaluation job performance based on citizen perception, while good rapport and reputation with the public is needed, it should not control our performance. The public would have us guarding their personal door and turning a blind eye to their discretions. Some times performance needs to be measured by results and reality. We cannot continue to please all of the people all of the time.
- I think that the concept of CMS has some validity but what it has become is a bean counting session. Supervisors are now becoming more and more worried about how many beans they have to present at CMS which standing alone really is a very poor method of determining how well we are doing as a police department. In the last decade, this police department has gotten very good at arresting people but has incrementally gotten worse and worse at the quality of work we do. There are of course systemic problems that impact the zealousness of prosecutions but when a criminal case cannot be put before a jury because of the sloppiness of the work, we cannot point fingers at anyone else. Street Officers and Detectives have to worry about pleasing their supervisors who want more and more beans regardless if the beans are spoiled.

- I understand the department's strategic plan. However, I wonder if other supervisors understand it. Often I find other supervisors operating in a manner that is inconsistent with our agencies vision. In fact there are supervisors with there own vision that is not the agencies, however, I am told it is "TIED" to the departments vision. So, I believe many of our rank are not focused on the department vision. In turn, I don't think they understand the department strategic plan. If they did Metro's vision would be their vision. This is not a matter of semantics. Otherwise, the process of developing a strategic plan would have been pointless.
- I believe we have come a long way in communicating the top priorities of the Department to the line level, but there is always room for improvement.
- I think that the administration has a better understanding of the communities needs and thoughts then they do of the members of the department. This administration has NOT mentioned the ICARE values one time since it took command, it is no longer of importance to the head of agency and that is a HUGE loss we were just beginning to reap the benefits of a concerted "cultural" change in this agency. Recent officer actions are proof that we have lost ground again
- When need to screen and not accept every citizen complaint that comes our way.

  There are to may complaints that should never go to a SOC.
- There is need for more officers in higher crime area and too many officers in lower crime areas especially on day shift. Some day shift units seems to be doing something but are utilizing officer initiated codes in order not to be clear..
- We need more officers. The public is not safe and we have no more time for proactivity. We are surviving from our good reputation earned years ago, but we are chipping away at it. Fix this problem before the damage is irreversible. I do not want to be another LAPD. I love this department.
- It seems that it's not so much performance measurement as how much is it going to cost. When it comes to using overtime, they are more willing to let things be unsafe and not use the overtime because of the cost, performance suffers, but it doesn't matter because of the cost of overtime. We need more staff, but that too is a cost issue. I

- think it's more measured by cost than achievement and performance.
- I feel the Use of Force policy has to wide of a net. It takes good hard workers and has them questioning how they work to keep from getting a letter from IAB.
- 24 Management must be wary of evaluating performance by reviewing CAD Stats. Let me put it simply, "You wouldn't go to play a round of golf with just one club...."
- The department administration does not seek feedback or opinions from line officers.

  The administration seems to depend on feedback from other administrators or feedback that has been received from line officers but relayed through layers of supervisors that water down or distort the opinions to make them sound positive by the time they reach the top.
- Having been in my assignment for only 4 weeks I see several areas we need to improve in. In some cases when asked why are we doing what we are doing the answer is "because we that is the way we have always done it" or "that is the way Doug Spring wanted us to do it." There has also not been a great amount of analysis on how well we are doing our jobs or thought on how we can do them better. That is changing but the road is an interesting one!
- I think overall the department and our command staff do an excellent job. However, the Gang Unit is not bang run as effectively as it could be.
- The performance appraisals as they are being use now are useless. It is not a fair reflection on weather or not an employee is performing well or not. For the most part the department does not use the performance appraisal for anything except for merit increases. If they had sum substance to them and the department would use them when it came to promotions, I believe they would be worth completing.
- 29 It's a great idea but it's kind of sad that the only time we get these surveys or videos is around accreditation time.
- 30 I believe that our department does an outstanding job in dealing with a population as unique as the citizens that make up Las Vegas.
- 31 The Department has a history of "punishing" everyone for the mistakes of a few.

When one officer makes a mistake, everyone "pays" with never ending "mandatory" training, etc. Also, less and less authority is given to lieutenants and captains. We seem to be caught up in an age of indecisiveness because lieutenants and captains have to wait for approval from "above." Often times it appears as though decisions from above are inconsistent in that one chief may make a decision only to have another chief change the decision or have a different set of rules and standards for their side of the house. It seems to me that if the captains and lieutenants are going to be somewhat restrained in their ability to make decisions than at least the chiefs and assistant sheriffs should be uniform in their decisions. I don't mean to sound overly negative because most times we are on the right course; however, it is those other times where it appears as though communication is not what it should be side to side at executive level. We should not also be so quick to develop more mandatory training when a select few consistently make the same mistakes. Those persons should be dealt with on a one on one basis. If their supervisors are not getting the job done than we should hold them accountable as well. It seems as though sometimes decisions like mandatory training deal more with perception than reality.

- 32 The flow of information from the analysts or supervisors to the troops is sometimes delayed. Supervisors are now beginning to hold the troops accountable once this information is received.
- Early warning system is flawed. Officers receive triggers just for being on a call with another officer who might have a trigger. Example: I was sent to a call then Dispatch cancelled me. A citizen's complaint was filed on the officer that arrived on the call, I got the trigger, a memo in my file, and I didn't arrive.
- There is too much of an emphasis on "bean counting" arrests, and using this data to attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of our unit. Many times individual detectives or squads are turned away from long-term large investigations because no "numbers" are coming in, when in fact a successful investigation many times is more effective in fighting crime in the long-term by shutting down entire operations as opposed to individual suspects. I understand the dept needs to somehow gauge a unit's effectiveness, and also individual officers/detectives, however effective leadership

- should recognize that "bean counting" should only be part of the overall evaluation of a performance measurement.
- I think this dept is suffering form an all time low in moral. I'm watching places like Metrocomm and other employees leave at an all time rate. I think high-ranking personnel should look at that...
- I think that individual squads should have the ability to do more self-initiated activity, such as search warrants, drug buys, submit warrants, and DPAs so officers can further their career for future promotions or details. I also think that officer safety needs to be #1 on the list and not worry about looking to intimidating.
- I do not feel that most supervisors here (inside DSD) are supporting their officers. Everyone is running in fear of being fired, suspended, or sued. We do not receive much thanks from anyone, but it would be nice to be recognized for the job we do. I want to see more support from within and doing what is right as opposed to constantly playing politics.
- Repair vehicles so they are safe, listen tot he operator of the vehicle, not the "key room guy." Vehicles how about some modern equipment (i.e. LED light bars, less amp draw more warning power). Next time policy is changed for "our benefit" how about asking us (survey, etc.)
- As a whole, the Department is great; however, I've been in the military and this Department has nowhere near the camaraderie and friendships that should be happening. It seems that at this Department it's every man or woman for his or herself. I think more understanding and compassion should come with mistakes made because that's just what they are "mistakes." Too many good officers are losing there jobs. We need to work together and only then will we be able to say that measuring ones true performance shows his or her abilities as a police officer and a member of the community.
- 40 I have no opinion on several questions due to not knowing what is going on with upper level staff or supervisors.
- 41 Ref #12, I think the leaders get info from the ranks, but I have not seen them do

- anything with the info given them. It seems they do what their going to do no matter what the people who it effects say.
- 42 Reference ICARE that is set aside for the sake of arrests, citations, and stats.

  Officers are not given any recognition if they follow ICARE. Keeping your nose clean, doing your job and coming to work every day and doing it properly doesn't matter. It's all about stats!! If the Dept. is going to implement ICARE, hold people to it and discipline those who do not follow it. We have people on this Dept. who have committed crimes, violated Dept. rules, regulations and values and are in supervisory positions. I have been an employee of LVMPD for 17 yrs. and I have very little respect for some of our so-called employees, supervisors and leaders. Good luck!
- 43 No use to waste comments because it really makes no difference. We are a good Dept. in spite of ourselves.
- I feel we are doing too much with too little. When we measure our performance at what cost are we going to go before we have a breakdown in the ranks. We need to cut services and increase main power before things get out of control.
- Most of the staff and supervisors are out of touch with common police work. They keep trying to re-invent the wheel and justify their existence. The morale among the working police officer is very low but this administration does not want to hear the truth. Even we officers with just a few years on can see that you treat officers differently. Why don't you use the words integrity, care and others in your motto "I CARE"? There are some good supervisors on this Department but not many who care about people instead of the task. Bring fairness and caring for the employees back to this department and you just may see the morale and respect come back to the LVMPD.
- 46 I work in CCDC so some of the questions do not pertain to me.
- #5: my unit's only effect on the community is to get people in and out of the facility as efficiently as possible, and their care while in the facility. #7: While most people I know couldn't tell you what ICARE, stands for, they are professional people and treat others as such. #8: my supervisor has not visited me on post in over 3 months. #9:

this may be done with the community by Patrol, but in corrections, we are trying to put 10 lbs. of stuff in a 5 lb. bag. The strategies are very limited. #10: our division is in a constant struggle to maintain staff. Admin. Should look within to build job satisfaction so people don't go to Patrol for greener pastures. The last section I was in was a nightmare. A supervisor with no business sense trying to cut costs; he just cut morale. #11: I have had no exposure to how or if this has been done. #12: not as much as possible, but I did get this survey, right. #13: sometimes uniformed public's opinion is weighted too heavily when developing strategies and policies.

- Patrol-based suggestions: (1) strategic plan needs to be technology based; (2) in reference to "bang for the buck"... Dept. should have Patrol take home vehicles; (3) less restrictions on Patrol for creating/executing warrants; (4) miscellaneous/random classes that are mandatory, to include required certifications, should be set for once a year on a specific date/time, not like current grab-bag scheduling.
- 49 The department has a strong breakdown with leadership. The department promotes an individual but then provides no long-term training or mentoring. What training is provided is on management skills versus leadership skills. The department should look at how the military develops leaders as well as initiate a leadership mentoring program.
- Our opinions are sent up, through the chain of command, but are filtered too much. Very rarely does anyone higher than Lieutenant speak with graveyard officers.
- 51 nope
- In general, we are doing well as a department and morale is decent. We obviously need more officers and to centralize investigative bodies with patrol. All too often, information is not communicated and patrol is not informed. This hampers us and leaves us out of the loop. we are becoming too large a department not to recognize this weakness and need to address it ASAP>
- Acting on #12 would certainly help. Timely feedback would be welcome.
- When you ask what the top leaders are doing, I have no idea. I find out what they are doing by watching the news.

- Regarding the Department and their solicitation and acceptance of input from department personnel, this does not truly occur. While staff may solicit input, they disregard on the input without fail. My impression is that the Department and its top leaders are mostly interested in pandering to the public to ensure a future re-election for the Sheriff, and in so doing, ensure a future position of the upper staff. Safety and the effective use of personnel is a concern, but not the top concern of staff. The truth of the aforementioned can best be shown in the excessively restrictive policies and procedures that are changed to be more even more restrictive on a weekly basis. There is very little trust that exists between staff and the people who get the job done.
- I feel at times the department somewhat is too eager to believe suspects or the accused over that of the involved officers, which makes it easier for them to hold officers and department liable for their involvement in crimes and drugs.
- Manpower should be used to target your specified unit of assignment main function and not as a primary resource for other special details. Once manpower is allocated properly, we as a department will be able to overall accomplish our main goal, which is, protect and serve the Las Vegas/Clark County community.
- 58 Some personnel are given more latitude, others get punished, while people doing same thing wrong, get warning.
- I feel that LVMPD is one of the best police departments in the U.S. We have an excellent, large, and caring police department. Over the 8 years of my career, I have spoken with officers from various departments across the country. They are always impressed with the amount of excellent training and professionalism we show. I am very happy with Metro (LVMPD) and enjoy working with this department. The employees at Metro are among the most caring people I have ever met in my life.
- One of the largest problems I see is CMS driven police work. We are consistently given tasks based on our "shift's" CMS responsibility regardless of if we have an effective plan implemented. Additionally, on several occasions we have had solid information or plans to tackle problems which do not match our CMS responsibility for our shift so we have been denied the chance to pursue those tactics.

- I believe that the executive chain of command have a serious lack of communication with its front line officers. Officers do not wish to speak freely due to fear of unjust consequences. Perhaps anonymous feedback boxes or anonymous e-mails can solve this problem.
- 62 CMS needs to focus on crime. We seem to be chasing dots on a map and not effectively utilizing the data collected. Crime series, i.e. robberies, commercial burglaries, are easier and based on correct data. Residential burglaries/auto theft info is not accurate due to victims not knowing the actual times of theft.
- 63 Performance measurement data is worthless without accountability. My belief is accountability is lacking in CCDC. How can my performance be effectively measured if the supervision of my duties consists of a once a week, 2 minute walk through, by the floor sergeant? And why measure performance if we will not be held accountable for substandard performance? I do not mean to insult the supervisory staff, though a minority deserve it. The current environment is a product short staffing and task saturation.
- Very happy with the department; however, CMS and stats are driving us in wrong direction. Supervisors want Action Plans and stats while proactive police work gets brushed aside. I have been driven to make meaningless arrests just to boost stats. One quality arrest will get more prison time then 10 B.S. arrests. But the brass can't sell that. They want numbers!!! It takes numbers to get the new bond. It takes numbers to make my captain look better than your captain, etc.
- It appears that at times the department allows the citizens, use of force and lawsuit concerns to overrule its own officer's concerns and opinion. It also, at times, appears to lay blame on the area command rather than the area when the strategies developed don't work or the crime rate just rises. Manpower is always an issue especially in a growing population such as Las Vegas. Everyone is trying to work smarter and harder to keep up. I do believe that the department as a whole is moving in the right direction and I appreciate the opportunity to express my opinion. Thank you.
- 1) I feel we get the most "bang for the buck" (question 10 above) however; sometimes

there are not enough bucks. 2) In order to effectively gather information from the ranks (#12) the ranks must feel it is safe to speak without reprisal. This format would be better.