

Public Safety in the City of Baltimore

A Strategic Plan for Improvement



Anthony Batts
Police Commissioner

Baltimore Police Department

To the Baltimore Community:

Today, the Baltimore Police Department issues its “Public Safety in the City of Baltimore: A Strategic Plan for Improvement,” which will become the cornerstone of Baltimore policing for the next five years. The preparation for the document, based on a review by the Strategic Policy Partnership, LLC in conjunction with the Bratton Group, LLC compared the department to national best practices, received important input from Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, City Hall officials, the Baltimore Fraternal Order of Police (Lodge 3), Vanguard Justice Society, community members and organizations, members of other city and state agencies, and personnel throughout the Baltimore Police Department. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Governor Martin O’Malley for his financial support of the project.

The Strategic Plan addresses the significant challenges that the department faces in its efforts to reduce crime, particularly violent crime and the conditions that create fear and concern over quality of life issues in our neighborhoods. It is built on a wide-ranging examination of all aspects of the department and its approaches to fighting crime in Baltimore, and it includes specific strategies to lower violent crime, address quality of life concerns, engage communities, enhance personnel policies, improve training, increase efficiency, and uphold the highest ethical and professional standards.

The Strategic Plan reviews areas where the department has made substantial gains during the past year as it worked to repair the policing infrastructure; yet, it also identifies serious challenges and deficiencies that must be addressed. The department and all of its personnel remain steadfastly committed to improving policing services throughout the city and addressing the fear of violence that grips many of our neighborhoods.

We commit ourselves to work with the community to accomplish the goals set forth in this Strategic Plan. We believe that the future of this city and its Police Department is bright, and that we now have a clear path forward. I look forward to working with all of our Baltimore Police Department personnel and the citizens of Baltimore to make a safe and secure Baltimore a reality.

**Anthony W. Batts,
Police Commissioner**

November 21, 2013

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Executive Summary

The City of Baltimore has struggled for decades with violent crime and other social disorder that creates an atmosphere of fear in many of its historic neighborhoods. The Baltimore Police Department today faces numerous challenges, including an unacceptably high level of violent crime and a need to improve policing services during a time of fiscal restraint. This Strategic Plan details the steps that the department will undertake over the next five years to reduce crime, improve service, increase efficiency, redouble community engagement, and provide for the highest standards of accountability and ethical integrity.

Commissioner Anthony W. Batts, the other members of the Baltimore Police Department, Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake and the City's leadership, and the citizens of Baltimore have recognized the need to build on recent achievements and create new strategies to address the many challenges that remain. In forming this Strategic Plan, the department collaborated with Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, members of the City Council, personnel of all ranks and functions in the department, other City agencies, and national law enforcement experts. It contains an in-depth description of the policing environment, community and personnel perceptions of the department, recent strategic improvements, challenges facing the department, an outline of the values and responsibilities of all personnel, and a set of fundamental goals for the department accompanied by specific objectives and strategies that will help the department to achieve them.

The fundamental pillars for the department outlined in this Strategic Plan are:

- The Baltimore Police Department will reduce crime throughout the City by targeting gangs, guns, violent repeat offenders, and the conditions that allow crime to flourish.
- The Baltimore Police Department will develop and maintain relationships of trust with all members of the Baltimore community and work collaboratively with other organizations to solve community problems.
- The Baltimore Police Department will bolster support systems to strengthen data quality and improve information sharing to provide actionable and timely intelligence and support field operations.

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- The Baltimore Police Department will be an organization that maintains the highest standards of ethics, integrity, and accountability.
 - The Baltimore Police Department will be a learning organization that is capable of acting with expertise in all areas of law enforcement.

During the next five years, the department will transform itself to meet the vision set forth by these pillars. Many urgent reforms will occur within a few months; some long-term goals will require considerably more time to achieve. Following the reform process, the Baltimore Police Department will reflect the following characteristics:

- Strong community collaboration in areas of policy development, strategic and tactical development, transparency, and the sharing of responsibility between police and community for effective crime reduction and safety throughout the city.
- A commitment to constitutional, transparent, and effective strategies that focus on arresting the most violent individuals that commit the majority of violent crime in Baltimore.
- A focus on outcomes rather than simply activities as the metric for measuring police performance.
- A strengthened commitment to problem-solving as a key means for reducing repeat situations of concern for the community and situations requiring police attention.
- Internal police management practices that show respect for employees and value the work they do, pushing down authority within the organization to be creative problem-solvers within policy guidelines.
- A more efficient police organization that will provide greater value for the resources allocated by the citizens of Baltimore.
- Improving performance management initiatives, including Comstat, to ensure all employees are accountable for outcomes resulting from their activities.

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- A community that truly shares responsibility for setting the standard for safety and security in every neighborhood; where community members are vocal that they will not tolerate aberrant criminal and deviant behavior that damages their neighborhoods' quality of life.
 - High levels of satisfaction with police performance in meeting community needs, resulting in higher levels of police legitimacy in the community and increased confidence that the police are treating everyone with respect, regardless of their circumstances.
 - Maximizing police officers assigned to neighborhood policing.
 - Widespread acknowledgement in the community that "cops count" in maintaining Baltimore as a great place to live and work.
 - Powerful ethics within the police organization focused on truthfulness at all times and a commitment to excellence in community service through the organization's activities.

This document also includes specific steps for transforming the department. The department will take concerted steps toward reducing violent crime in Baltimore as well as quality of life problems that give rise to environments where crime can flourish. Towards this end, the department will:

- Challenge district commanders to implement real-time creative strategies to reduce crime in their own districts.
- Bolster the impact of patrol officers by initiating new problem-solving strategies and reallocating patrol resources.
- Better emphasize and retrain officers to understand the necessity of legitimacy, respect, and fairness as core principles of effective citizen interactions.
- Increase robust and energetic foot patrols and other tactics to ensure that officers are engaging citizens and have a "felt presence" in Baltimore neighborhoods.

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- Increase capacity to collaborate with citizens, community organizations, other City agencies, and other entities to address quality of life concerns.
 - Initiate a robust “take back public spaces” campaign.
 - Strengthen the investigative and intelligence focus on violent repeat offenders.
 - Upgrade information infrastructure and capabilities to allow for more widely-integrated, accessible, and higher quality data to enable better intelligence-led policing.
 - Increase capacity to conduct data-driven crime reduction plans.
 - Restructure departmental communications practices to create greater efficiencies and collaboration throughout the department and better response to calls for service.
 - Create departmental policy and internal affairs structures that will ensure fair discipline, increased transparency, and the highest level of integrity for all personnel.
 - Revamp training programs to enhance safety, increase efficacy in numerous areas, and align with national best practices.
 - Ensure that departmental personnel understand what they are accountable for and that they can communicate whether they understand their responsibilities and have the resources to carry them out.
 - Implement personnel, equipment, and other cost-saving efficiencies throughout the department.

The implementation of this plan will transform the Baltimore Police Department and provide an unprecedented level of service to the citizens of Baltimore. The department and its personnel look forward to the opportunity to collaborate with the community we serve to create a safer City for all residents and visitors.

Public Safety in Baltimore A Strategic Plan for Improvement

Introduction

This plan provides a strategy for the Baltimore Police Department to achieve a level of excellence that meets the expectations and needs of the city's residents, businesses and visitors. It is based on a four-month review of the Police Department undertaken by Strategic Policy Partnership, LLC in conjunction with the Bratton Group, LLC.

Since arriving in Baltimore last year, Police Commissioner Anthony Batts has been reviewing all aspects of how the Police Department addresses crime, interfaces with the Baltimore community, and deals with important quality of life issues throughout the city. When he arrived, Commissioner Batts found many systems in the department were in need of reform, infrastructure required dramatic improvement, performance management systems required overhaul, and resources had to be allocated more scientifically in response to crime trends and calls for service.

During the last year, the department has laid the foundation for many of the improvements needed to achieve public safety excellence in Baltimore. These improvements will take some time to put in place. This plan lays out the remaining work to be accomplished over the next five years, building upon the infrastructure that is now in place.

Many members of the department, the Baltimore community and its leadership have participated in the development of this plan. The Baltimore Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) has provided valued input through its "Blueprint for Improved Policing," released in July 2012¹. Many of the findings and suggestions detailed in that document have been incorporated into this plan. Community groups and organizations responded to surveys, participated in focus groups and made numerous suggestions about improvements, many of which have also been incorporated into the plan. The command staff of the department has fully participated in the review of their areas of responsibility, with their recommendations for the way forward found throughout the pages that follow. Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake and city leadership have also offered important guidance as this plan evolved.

¹ <http://www.fop3.org/images/documents/policing.pdf>

The report is divided into a number of sections. First, this report reviews the state of the department and the policing environment. Second, it details recent strategic improvements. Third, department values and accountabilities are outlined, and finally, this document outlines several pillars to move the department forward, each accompanied by strategic objectives and strategies.

Overview of Baltimore City

The Baltimore Police Department's primary function is to serve those who have made Baltimore their home, place of business, or entertainment destination. The Baltimore Police Department's strategic plan must be built on a strong foundation of understanding the City of Baltimore, its strengths, challenges, and opportunities.

Baltimore, affectionately nicknamed "Charm City," is a city of strong neighborhoods, including 72 designated historic districts. Baltimore spans more than 92 square miles, and has a resident population of about 621,000. The city has a rich history dating back to colonial times. Key American historical events during the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 took place in Baltimore, including Francis Scott Key's composition of our national anthem, The Star Spangled Banner.

Baltimore is home to the second largest seaport on the East Coast. It is also home to both Johns Hopkins University and Johns Hopkins Hospital, the city's two largest employers and eight colleges and universities. These institutions along with a substantial federal workforce and many private employers provide a large number of high-skilled jobs to the city alongside the city's many service-oriented jobs.

The city also has a strong arts community, with numerous performing arts venues, companies and festivals, including Artscape, America's largest free outdoor arts festival, and Latino and African-American heritage and cultural festivals. It strongly supports the Ravens and the Orioles, its National Football League and Major League Baseball teams, the Baltimore Grand Prix and is home of the Preakness, the second leg of the Triple Crown.

Population Challenges

The population of Baltimore in 2012 was 621,342, a slight increase from the previous year. Prior to 2012, the city's population had been steadily declining since 1950, when the population peaked at about 950,000. Many other large, industrial cities in the United States have experienced similar population declines. Like Baltimore, these cities have faced disinvestment in neighborhoods, declining property values, and an eroding tax base. The remaining population tends to be more economically

challenged, and often has a higher need for city services, including those from the police. City government, caught in the squeeze of declining tax revenues and increasing demand for services, must be creative and strategically focused.

The most recent census numbers show the trend of population decline may be reversing, with a slight increase in population. Much of this trend reversal is attributable to a resurgence of downtown Baltimore and the surrounding neighborhoods. Ensuring these areas are both safe and perceived as safe are essential to continuing this positive trend.

In the city's 2012 citizen survey,² more than one-third said they are either very likely (20%) or likely (17%) to move out of Baltimore in the next one to three years. Respondents cited "crime rate is too high" as the second most-popular reason for moving out of the city (14%), one point lower than the most popular reason, pursuing another job. Additionally, the number one response to "the most important thing to improve life in Baltimore City" was "reduce crime." Thus, controlling and reducing crime are clearly key to addressing the city's population challenges.

Economic Challenges

Today, many of the city's jobs are in the low-wage service economy. The city's unemployment rate hovers around 11%, and about one-quarter of Baltimore residents live in poverty. In the city's 2012 citizen survey, Baltimore residents did not rate highly the availability of jobs in the city. About 66% of residents rate the availability of jobs as either fair or poor, while only 18% rate job availability as either excellent or good. The remaining 16% responded that they did not know.

A major contributor to the city's job base is the city's tourism industry, which contributes over \$4 billion annually to the city's economy from more than 21 million visitors annually. Ensuring that the city is safe for those visitors as well as maintaining the city's reputation as a safe place to visit are essential to protecting and expanding the city's important tourism industry.

The city has put much effort into expanding the job base, building on the relatively high percentage of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) jobs linked to the Johns Hopkins Hospital and Health System, University of Maryland Medical System and similar institutions. Ensuring the city is safe is also essential to support these efforts so both new businesses and their employees feel safe making Baltimore their home.

² http://bbmr.baltimorecity.gov/portals/bbmr/documents/Baltimore%20Citizen%20Survey%20Report%202012_rev2.pdf

Perceptions of Safety

A key goal of any police department is ensuring that the residents, business people, and visitors feel safe in their neighborhoods, downtown, and public spaces. Two recent surveys illuminate community perceptions of safety in the city and provide important feedback for the department. The Schaefer Center for Public Policy at the University of Baltimore conducted a citizen survey in 2012³ and the Baltimore Police Department conducted a survey among community leaders in October 2013.⁴ Data from both surveys are recounted here.

The services provided by the Baltimore Police Department are considered very important to the residents of the city. In the city's 2012 survey, residents were asked to rate the importance of city services on a scale of 1 to 10. Respondents rated police services as a 9.25, with only fire protection receiving a slightly higher importance rating. Less than half, however, rated police services provided as either excellent (14%) or good (32%), with 29% rating them as fair and 19% as poor. The remaining 6% did not provide a rating.

A majority of residents had a favorable perception of the Baltimore Police Department, saying their overall impression of the department was either very favorable (16%) or somewhat favorable (37%). Nonetheless, a significant number said their overall impression of the department was either somewhat unfavorable (20%) or very unfavorable (11%). The remainder (16%) did not provide a response. Ratings for police interactions were much better for those who had actual experience with either the Baltimore Police Department or a Baltimore police officer. A majority (68%) rated their interaction as positive, with only about one-quarter (26%) rating it negative. The remainder (6%) did not provide a response.

As the following exhibit shows, many residents surveyed were either very satisfied or satisfied with police presence, responsiveness, approachability, professionalism, and ability to prevent crime. However, a substantial percent were either unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the Baltimore police in each of these characteristics.

³ http://bbmr.baltimorecity.gov/portals/bbmr/documents/Baltimore%20Citizen%20Survey%20Report%202012_rev2.pdf

⁴ Contact the Baltimore Police Department for survey results

Thinking about the police in your neighborhood, how satisfied are you with the following:						
	Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Neither Satisfied nor Unsatisfied	Unsatisfied	Very Unsatisfied	No Opinion
Police Presence	10%	41%	10%	27%	7%	3%
Responsiveness	11%	36%	8%	26%	8%	7%
Approachability	11%	39%	9%	23%	9%	6%
Professionalism	12%	35%	11%	23%	11%	5%
Preventing Crime	8%	34%	17%	25%	7%	6%

Source: Baltimore City Citizen Survey 2012 Report, Schaefer Center for Public Policy, University of Baltimore

The Citizen Survey also shows that most people say they feel safe in their neighborhoods during the day and at night, as well as in city parks during the day (71%). Residents reported feeling very safe or safe downtown (73%) during the day but unsafe or very unsafe (50%) at night.


How safe or unsafe do you feel in the following locations?					
	Very Safe	Safe	Unsafe	Very Unsafe	No Opinion
In neighborhood during the day	37%	53%	7%	2%	1%
In neighborhood at night	16%	50%	25%	7%	2%
Downtown during the day	19%	54%	13%	3%	10%
Downtown at night	3%	31%	36%	14%	15%
In City parks during the day	11%	60%	10%	2%	16%

Source: Baltimore City Citizen Survey 2012 Report, Schaefer Center for Public Policy, University of Baltimore

Most city residents surveyed rated both violent crime and property crime as serious problems. Over eighty percent rated violent crime as either a very serious problem (53%) or a serious problem (30%). Many also felt that violent crime was getting either much worse (14%) or worse (37%). About fifty-six percent rated property crime as either a very serious problem (24%) or a serious problem (32%). Some also felt that property crime was getting much worse (6%), and a sizeable percentage thought that it is becoming worse (28%).

Results of the Community Leader Survey were similar, revealing the majority rate most of the services provided by the BPD as either extremely or very important. The most important services were addressing violent crime and responding to emergency 9-1-1 calls for service. For each of these services, 98% rated them as either extremely or very important. Addressing illegal gang and drug activity was also rated as extremely or very important.

For all the services provided, less than half of community leaders surveyed were satisfied with the current service being provided by the Baltimore Police Department. For violent crime, the service rated as most important, only 31% were either satisfied or very satisfied. Response to emergency 9-1-1 calls, the second highest rated service in terms of priority, was rated somewhat higher, with 47% either satisfied or very satisfied. Addressing illegal gang activity, property crime, providing neighborhood patrol, and addressing illegal drug activity were all rated as very important, with fairly low percentages satisfied with those services.



Favorably, community leaders reported strongly agreeing or agreeing (68%) that officers are "polite to people" and are trustworthy (61%). Also, 38% of respondents felt concerned that officers didn't understand or identify with the community or understand their particular needs (37%).


Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about Baltimore Police:					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
Polite to People	12%	56%	17%	6%	8%
Trust Officers	11%	50%	22%	9%	8%
Treat with Dignity / Respect	8%	46%	23%	8%	15%
Apply Law Regardless of Gender	8%	33%	18%	7%	34%
Consistent with my Views of Right and Wrong	7%	41%	23%	8%	21%
Understand and Apply Law Fairly	6%	37%	22%	8%	26%
Make Fair / Impartial Decisions	5%	32%	23%	7%	33%
Understand my Needs	4%	35%	27%	10%	24%
Understand / Identify with Community	6%	34%	27%	11%	21%
Consider Views of Those Involved	4%	29%	23%	8%	37%
Apply Law Regardless of Race	8%	28%	22%	13%	30%
<i>Source: BPD Community Leader Survey, an email and web based survey completed in October 2013.</i>					

Overview of the Baltimore Police Department

The Baltimore Police Department, the largest law enforcement agency in the State of Maryland and one of the larger major city departments in the United States, is a historic and proud organization. Baltimore first formed a police force in 1784, when constables were appointed and given legal authority to keep the peace. The department has undergone many evolutions in its long history. It first introduced badges and guns in 1853, became controlled by the military during the Civil War and the State thereafter, introduced call boxes and patrol wagons during the late 19th century, established its Police Academy in 1913, saw its first Police Commissioner in 1920, and began a rapid modernization campaign during the mid-20th century. The department has also overcome a number of significant challenges, including a police officers' strike in 1974 and rising crime rates throughout much of the 20th century. The department today is a complex police agency whose varied units and structures reflect the challenges of modern urban policing. The department's jurisdiction encompasses an area of 86.0 square miles – 78.3 sq. miles of land and 7.7 sq. miles on waterways – and serves over 620,000 residents plus thousands more commuters, tourists, and others who travel to the city.

The department presently budgets for 3,444 employed personnel – 3,080 sworn officers and 364 civilians. These personnel work in the department's nine districts and at headquarters, which is located downtown. The department's three bureaus – Neighborhood Patrol, Investigations and Intelligence, and Professional Standards and Accountability – contain most of the department's sworn positions, while many civilians work in the Management Services Division, which is headed by the department's civilian Chief Financial Officer.

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



Revised: October 30, 2013 8:58:15 AM
Prepared By: Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau

Values and Accountability

Values set the core commitments of the department, forming the basis of how members of the department address the policing challenges they face. These values are never to be ignored or violated. They form the basis of policing policy, providing guidance in defining acceptable choices when addressing problems and exercising discretionary authority. In applying these values, it is important to note that process always trumps outcomes. For example, it is never acceptable to violate the law when seeking to achieve a police objective.

The core set of values that will drive performance of all members of the Baltimore Police Department are:

1. **Teamwork** – We work together as one organization in carrying out the mission of the department; our respective units do not act as distinct “silos” from one another. As individual members of the department, we are respectful of each other and work collectively to solve problems and serve the community.
2. **Integrity/High Ethical Standards** – We are committed to the enforcement of laws and the preservation of order and property. We personify high ethical standards, honesty, truthfulness, and consistency in our words and actions. This is how we prove ourselves to be worthy of the public’s trust. We exercise discretion in a manner that is beyond reproach. We do not accept gifts or special considerations as a consequence of our office.
3. **Professionalism** – We treat the public and our colleagues with courtesy and respect. We understand that our appearance, words, and demeanor contribute to the public’s confidence in us. We are responsive to the community, and deliver services promptly and efficiently.
4. **Fairness and Impartiality** – We act with fairness, restraint, and impartiality in carrying out our duties. We work with the community to continually understand and overcome cultural influences and unconscious biases. We understand that our actions, combined with the way we treat members of the community, contributes to our “legitimacy” in the eyes of the public.

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5. **Efficiency** – We keep abreast of standard procedures, legal issues, and innovative topics in modern policing through regular training. We exercise rigor in thinking strategically about identifying trends, exploring alternative solutions, and solving problems.
 6. **Advocacy and Empathy** – We have compassion for victims of crime. As members of the community, we have respect for and promote the diversity of the community. We advocate for social and other supportive services for victims, youth, and others involved in the criminal justice system.

Accountabilities by Rank

All police officers are responsible for addressing a wide range of public safety situations affecting the quality of life within the community. In performing their duties, they are accountable for:

- The quality of their problem-solving, decision-making, and judicial use of discretionary authority.
- The quality and professionalism of their communication and interactions with the community, treating everyone with whom they have contact with respect and dignity, regardless of their position in life.
- Exercising judgment in a manner that is reassuring and responsive to the community.
- The treatment of victims and those in need of assistance in a manner that reflects the department's values.
- The type of relationship the department has with the community.
- The level of communication, cooperation, and coordination with their fellow officers.
- Conducting themselves in a way that leads citizens to perceive their actions as legitimate and procedurally fair.

Sergeants are responsible for the consistency in officers' delivery of services. They are also accountable for:

- The quality of work of their subordinates, and communicating their strengths and weaknesses to them.
- The level of communication between officers and their colleagues, clients, and the community.
- Officers' understanding of and adherence to the department's mission and values.
- Ensuring their subordinates are informed about situations or circumstances that may impact their assignments.

Lieutenants are responsible for the general oversight and management of the units for which they have operational control, and are also accountable for:

- The effective coordination among the various operational components of the department.
- Ensuring clear and open lines of communication between the units that report to them.
- The accuracy and timeliness of information provided to others in the department.
- The identification of crime patterns and trends, and the development of intervention strategies to be carried out by their subordinates.
- Thinking strategically in the development of problem solving strategies that meet certain criteria.
- The management of accurate, timely, and important information that is brought to the attention of their Captain, Major or other direct supervisor.

Majors and Captains assigned to districts are responsible for managing the delivery of police services in a geographic area of the city. The Major is the commanding officer of the district, and the captains are their seconds-in-command. They are accountable for the delivery of police services in their assigned district. They are also accountable for:

- The maintenance of staffing levels (ensuring proper staffing levels in order to maintain a safe and adequate delivery of police services).
- The perception among the community in their area of assignment regarding the quality of police service delivery and police legitimacy in the eyes of the community.
- Knowing the state of crime and quality of life issues in their area and having strategies to address those problems.
- The adherence of all subordinates in following constitutional policing practices and ensuring procedural fairness in actions in the field.
- Defining and distributing informative and actionable intelligence and analysis.
- Balancing expenditures associated with their areas of responsibilities so that they are consistent with the overall mission and needs of the department.
- Ensuring victims and persons in need of assistance are treated in accordance with the values of the department.
- The management of accurate, timely, and important information that is brought to the attention of their manager.

Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, Chiefs, and Majors and Captains in non-district assignments are responsible for management of major divisions, sections, and functions in the department. They have the following accountabilities:

- The productivity of personnel under their command including energy of employees, commitment to departmental values, and understanding of subordinates regarding department goals and objectives.
- Actions taken to implement elements of the department improvement process that falls under their command.
- Administration of discipline in a fair and equitable manner aimed at improving employee performance.
- Sharing information and working collaboratively with their peers to enhance department performance and outcomes.

Deputy Commissioners are responsible for establishing and maintaining a desired level of professional services, maintaining a high level of coordination of services with other agencies, and addressing perceptions of fear and other concerns in the community. They have the following accountabilities:

- The overall level of public trust and the professional reputation of the department.
- The level of professionalism among all members of the department.
- Transparency of operations and decisions in the eyes of the public.
- The level of collaboration and the quality of the partnerships that exist among city departments, service providers, other external agencies, as well as the various boards and commissions.
- The allocation of resources in order to maintain an adequate level of police services.
- The provision of officers' needs for guidance, training, professional development, and resources.
- The management of accurate, timely, and important information that is brought to the attention of the Commissioner.


The Commissioner is also accountable for:

- Outlining the vision for the department.
- Ensuring all members of the department are carrying out their duties in a manner that is consistent with the department's mission.
- Instilling the core values by which the department holds itself.

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- Accepting the responsibility for the conduct of the members of the department, and taking decisive action that corrects any matters that impinge upon the reputation and effectiveness of the department.
 - Creating a working environment that is designed to carry out the department's overall mission.
 - The quality and effectiveness of the overall external and internal communication networks required to provide for the overall effectiveness of the police department's operations.
 - Providing for the proper and legitimate exercise of the department's official authorities.
 - Identifying metrics that will be used to assess police performance and reflect expectations of the Baltimore community.

Internal Strengths - Employee Perceptions of Baltimore Police Department – To be successful, BPD must rely on the men and women that wear the badge. The department must provide a positive work environment where these employees can successfully perform their functions, develop and expand their skills and capabilities, and feel positive about their work and contribution. A successful organization provides a clear sense of mission and purpose to its employees, provides clear and consistent communication, has a positive organizational culture that values and facilitates teamwork, focuses on providing quality service based on the needs of its community, provides a positive work environment with the needed space and tools, focuses on training and developing its personnel, and has strong employee morale with a positive outlook for the future of the organization.

As the following exhibit shows, the Baltimore Police Department currently has many of the characteristics of a strong and successful organization. This includes a strong sense of teamwork with almost all employees seeing themselves as a team player. The vast majority of BPD employees also feel responsible for helping the BPD succeed, and give their all each day.




Communication of job responsibilities in the department is also positive, with the vast majority (90%) of employees agreeing they know what is expected of them. Most (83%) also know how their job contributes to the department's success. The lines of communication are positive, with most employees agreeing they can communicate with their division or unit management if needed. About two-thirds of employees feel that their supervisors are knowledgeable and trustworthy. Nearly as many feel that the department is committed to providing quality service, and feel their suggestions and opinions for improving the BPD and its services are valued.

The FOP’s own focus groups also reveal internal strengths. As per the FOP’s “Blueprint for Improved Policing:⁵” “The general consensus among participants is that members of the BPD are willing to work diligently, are proud of what they do, and want to make a difference to improve Baltimore. The overarching sentiment repeatedly stated in the focus groups is that this is the reason officers joined the BPD and it is the reason they have remained.” This motivation is a major cornerstone for the improvements in the department called for by the FOP’s blueprint as well as this Plan.

Internal Challenges - Employee Perceptions of the Baltimore Police Department

While employees identified many internal strengths of the department, they also identified a number of shortcomings or challenges. Many of these challenges, identified by the FOP in its Blueprint and by many other sources, have developed over years or decades, and have left employees frustrated, anxious, and, in many instances, with low morale. The following graph portrays the department’s internal challenges:



⁵ <http://www.fop3.org/images/documents/policing.pdf>

Less than one-third of BPD employees agree that they have the equipment they need to do their jobs. For example, numerous complaints were made over the quality, age, and condition of police vehicles. This included having too few vehicles to field patrol officers, resulting in as many as four patrol officers in one vehicle at times.

Only 27% of BPD employees felt employees were adequately held accountable for poor performance. Similarly, only 14% of employees agreed that employee discipline was fair, consistent, or adequate. Many employees felt that accountability and discipline were too dependent on relationships and friendships within the department, and that “who you were friends with” influenced the discipline process too much, leading to inconsistencies. Others felt that the process was cumbersome and took too long. The survey revealed examples of employees suspended for five years or more as they waited for disciplinary verdicts, and it also revealed examples of personnel that could not testify due to personal integrity issues. Respondents also cited a lack of supervisor training and capabilities in how to hold employees accountable for misconduct.

Less than one-quarter of employees felt that there was adequate recognition for exemplary efforts or performance by employees, or that promotions were fair. Even fewer believed that communication within the department was clear, consistent, or adequate, or agreed that their suggestions and ideas for improving the department or its services were valued. Many employees stated that there was no mechanism to provide positive reinforcement when good things are accomplished. Some commented that it takes over a year to get a positive write-up through the process, and they are often declined and exemplary actions will instead be described as routine police work.

Few employees (14%) believed that the police department is supported by the Baltimore community. The recent change in police pensions and health care benefits appears to have contributed to this perception. Many department employees feel no one in the city cares about them. Recent cuts in the budget for training and staff development, and for tuition reimbursement appears to have contributed to this perception.

The lowest level of agreement by BPD employees was with the statement, “Employee morale is good.” Only nine percent believed that the overall morale of BPD employees is good. Pension changes, manpower shortages in patrol, confusion over the organization of the department and responsibilities, and a lack of consistency were identified as factors contributing to low morale. Substantial anxiety over not knowing which work shifts officers will be assigned to, and the potential to be detailed to work at the last minute creates substantial personal and family strain. Poor working conditions at many of the BPD facilities were also cited as contributing to low morale, with dilapidated, unclean, and poorly supplied facilities.

The FOP's focus groups reported very similar findings. Personnel complained of "low pay, high stress, low morale, poor working conditions, diminished benefits, and [poor] public perception" that hampers the department's mission and its ability to retain good officers. The blueprint also identified perceived problems in each of the areas identified in the employee survey.

Strategic Pillars for a Safer Baltimore

Year One Accomplishments and Initiatives

Early in his tenure, Commissioner Batts identified five strategic pillars toward creating a safer Baltimore: concentration on violent offenders, gang members and guns; community engagement; actionable and timely intelligence; data sharing; and ethics, integrity, and accountability. Recently, the department has made considerable progress toward implementation of many key initiatives that support these pillars. Over the years, many basic departmental systems were allowed to deteriorate, relationships with the community and other agencies were broken, technical capacities were eroded, and other fundamental areas were otherwise deficient, undermining effective service and law enforcement capacities. Such deficiencies have limited the department's ability to sustain reductions in certain types of crime. The following items detail key actions that the department has undertaken under Commissioner Batts:

I. Concentration on Violent Offenders, Gang Members and Guns:

The department has worked to increase its focus on violent offenders, the people who commit a majority of the violent crime in the city. This is a fairly small group of people who can be identified through good intelligence and partnerships with the community.

Officers working patrol throughout the city have laid the foundation for meaningful action against these individuals and increased impact on crime and disorder. According to the five-year trend, violent crime has decreased⁶, and this Plan intends to help achieve further decreases. As of October 5, 2013 violent crime in the city is down 6% from last year⁷. Homicides and non-fatal shootings are down 0.7% below the five-year average. There has also been a substantial change in the environment within which homicides occur, as homicides in private spaces (as opposed to the street) are 26% above the five-year average while shootings in public spaces are 21% below the five-year mean. BPD's crime reduction strategy is being altered to address

⁶ Contact the Baltimore Police Department for 5 year crime statistics

⁷ Contact the Baltimore Police Department for 2012 crime statistics

this changing environment. Recognizing that arrests alone are not the ultimate solution to Baltimore's crime problem, important improvements have been made to the investigative process. During the last year, Part I violent crime⁸ arrests increased and will continue to do so under the strategies being put into place under this Plan. For 2012:

- Homicide arrests are up 69% (81 versus 48 last year)
- Robbery arrests are up 13% (576 versus 512 last year)
- Aggravated Assault arrests are up 14% (942 versus 823 last year)

Focus on Targeted Enforcement – Commissioner Batts has prioritized making quality, constitutional arrests in the highest crime areas to drive reductions in violent crimes. As a result, since May of 2012, when this new focus was introduced, the department has seen a 66% reduction in violent crime in the Monument Street corridor from 2012, 21% below the five-year mean, and a 33% reduction at the “Tri-District” Western, Southern, and Southwestern Districts intersection, 50% below the five-year mean. This strategy will be expanded in this Strategic Plan. The department has also targeted gangs and individuals that are known to contribute to violent crime, a campaign that has included several important indictments of Black Guerilla Family members and other gangs.

Emergency Action Teams – At the direction of Commissioner Batts, the department formed specialized tactical “Emergency Action Teams” (EAT) teams, which are rapidly deployable, specially trained small unit teams that can perform high-risk extractions and other operations. BPD realized the need for such units after a May 2013 incident where an ex-Army Ranger and then-BPD officer barricaded himself in his home during a domestic disturbance call and shot his girlfriend from a second-story window. By the time SWAT was able to extract her, she had succumbed to her injuries. Team members will already be on patrol with gear across the city, with a quorum of officers always on patrol. The EAT officers on patrol who receive specialized training will have access to long rifles for “cover,” as well as “ballistic blankets” to protect officers as they retrieve downed officers or civilians. The training for the teams has been completed, and the EATs will be fully operational in the near future when they receive all necessary equipment.

⁸ http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/about/offense_definitions.html

Realigned the department – The Commissioner has introduced changes to the organizational structure of the department that has resulted in the ability to conduct more focused command oversight of the entire organization. Prior to the current configuration, the department had only two Deputy Commissioner positions (one for operations and for administration) and, for a time, one Deputy Commissioner, which limited command oversight and created inefficiencies. Commissioner Batts has added a third Deputy Commissioner, and realigned the organizational structure of the department to create a dedicated Deputy Commissioner for Neighborhood Patrol, for Investigations and Intelligence, and Professional Standards and Accountability. The department has also added a civilian Chief Financial Officer, who oversees the Management Services Division.

II. Community Engagement:

Fostering trust with communities is paramount toward creating sustained crime reductions. Building relationships of trust requires that the department demonstrate that its purpose is to serve the community and not just make arrests; that it acts in consultation with residents to generate strategies that are right for individual communities; that it is sensitive to the needs of diverse groups of people; and that it will hold its members accountable when they take action that can endanger community trust. The department has recognized the importance of building relationships based on these tenets, and has already taken several actions to help do so. Furthermore, the Commissioner has emphasized the importance of ensuring that field activities such as stop and questioning meet constitutional standards. From January 1 through November 2013, citizen complaints against BPD police officers fell by 34% (or 204 complaints).⁹

Community Partnerships Division – The department created a Community Partnerships Division, which oversees participation in the city’s multi-agency re-entry programs and conducts faith-based initiatives, community policing pilot programs, youth relations initiatives and more. The division is headed by a Lieutenant Colonel who oversees a staff that works with officers to improve their capacities as problem-solvers in community cooperation and collaboration.

⁹ Contact the Baltimore Police Department for statistics about citizen complaints

Faith-based outreach – The Community Partnerships Division has spearheaded a campaign to involve the faith-based community in its community policing efforts. This has included forums, the creation of a dedicated sergeant for faith-based initiatives, and the creation of Neighborhood Service Unit officers that will be assigned to faith-based functions in every district. The department continues to work with faith-based institutions to involve them in solving community problems.

Formation of Citizen Advisory Groups – The department has formed advisory groups to address critical community-police issues. These groups – which include, for example, an African-American group, a business group, and an LGBT group – serve as a sounding board for the department as it forms new policies and addresses current policies and practices on a bi-monthly basis. The groups act both as advisors and critics of departmental policies and practices, as well as ambassadors for the police to the community. When applicable, the advisory group meetings are held in the communities that the groups serve.

Comstat in the Community – The department is holding its weekly Comstat meetings in the community every three months. It allows the public to see first-hand how the Comstat process works and to help further inform and engage communities in making their community safer. The department plans to continue Comstat in the community throughout the year.

“Public Enemy #1”– The department has worked with the media to raise public awareness of persons sought as “public enemy #1’s” as designated by the department. The program was created to further engage the community and help apprehend highly dangerous criminals that jeopardize the safety of the community. Partnering with community collaborators, the department captured four dangerous suspects accused of murder or attempted murder.

III. Actionable and Timely Intelligence and IV. Data Sharing:

Collaboration with State and Federal Agencies – To strengthen relationships with federal law enforcement officials, the department has held monthly coordination meetings with the FBI, DEA, ATF, US Attorney’s Office, US Marshal Service, and the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HITDA) Task Force, and the State’s Attorney’s Office to increase collaboration between these agencies and the department in targeted enforcement efforts aimed at high crime locations and repeat offenders. These agencies all meet once per month to coordinate a strategic response to address crime.

Recalibrated Relationship with other Baltimore Law Enforcement Agencies –The department has also improved its relationship and line of communications with the School Police and Sherriff’s Office. The department advocated for changes to laws that prohibited the Sherriff’s Office from serving protective orders, which the Sherriff’s Office will begin serving in the near future. This will eliminate one more burdensome task for patrol officers, who need to be able to spend more time in their assigned neighborhoods to achieve the strategies put forth in this plan. The department and the School Police have also increased their cooperation to enhance public safety in Baltimore. In addition to previous cooperation with the department that includes School Police representation in Comstat and substantial information sharing with the department, School Police are now deployed on weekends to reinforce the department in areas in high need of police services.

EcoATM – EcoATMs are kiosks designed to allow individuals to quickly dispose of cell phones, MP3 players, and other electronic devices for cash in an environmentally safe manner. Though EcoATM kiosks are monitored during each transaction remotely and require sellers to present government-issued identification before making a sale, the Baltimore City Council passed legislation which banned EcoATMs for fear that they might cause spikes in cell phone and other electronics robberies and thefts. The kiosks are still legal in Baltimore County and other Maryland jurisdictions surrounding Baltimore, and, according to the department, many cell phones and other electronics that are stolen in Baltimore are sold in nearby jurisdictions.

At the request of the Commissioner, the BPD convened a statewide law enforcement working group (which has included representatives from the company) to discuss standardizing reporting and other law enforcement concerns pertaining to EcoATM. Some jurisdictions have suggested banning the EcoATMs, while others propose statewide regulations that would be similar to those placed on pawnshops, secondhand dealers, and scrap metals dealers wherein sellers are required to provide government-issued identification and electronically report daily transactions which are entered into a statewide law enforcement database. The department has committed itself to working with statewide law enforcement and our elected officials who plan to address the matter in the 2014 legislative session.

V. Ethics, Integrity and Accountability:

Internal affairs procedures have significant ramifications in virtually all aspects of police departments. They help maintain the public trust in the agency, ensure adherence to legal guidelines and effective practices, assist departments in exercising

command oversight, reinforce training, protect the integrity of the department, and more. Agencies with inadequate internal affairs systems often struggle to maintain effective standards, morale, and discipline.

Creation of Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau – The department’s organizational chart previously contained only two bureaus – operations and administration – with all internal affairs functions listed as part of administration along with human resources, communications, fiscal, etc. Under Commissioner Batts, and along with other organizational chart rearrangements, the department created a Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau that contains all internal affairs and training functions and is headed by a Deputy Commissioner.

Reducing Disciplinary Case Backlog – Discipline has not always been a priority for the Baltimore Police Department. For many years, the internal affairs system was amalgamated with other administrative functions in the Administration Bureau. The internal affairs system accrued numerous deficiencies during this time, including a backlog of disciplinary verdicts that were never carried out and a substantial case backlog. It has not been uncommon for cases in this department to take as many as three years to resolve. The Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau (PSAB), under the direction of a new Deputy Commissioner hired this year from another law enforcement agency, has been working through the backlog and making structural improvements to prevent future backlogs. The department has presently narrowed its backlog from 130 outstanding internal affairs cases to about 90.

Trial Board Reforms – Part of the disciplinary case backlog arose from an incentive for officers to seek a hearing in front of a Trial Board. As part of the department’s administrative hearing system, sworn personnel accused of misconduct are entitled to be tried before a Trial Board instead of accepting the discipline handed down through Internal Affairs Division (IAD) channels. The PSAB recently reformed the Trial Board for two principle reasons. First, to help stem a bias toward inappropriately lenient verdicts and inappropriate “not guilty” rulings. These biases occurred largely because officers of similar rank to the accused worried that they would endanger themselves if they were to render a strong verdict should they themselves be accused of similar offenses. Second, the Command Staff felt that the Trial Board did not exercise “appropriate command oversight” as trial board members were often insufficiently experienced with the policies.

PSAB reformed the trial boards with higher-ranking personnel to address these issues. Formerly, a command staff member, lieutenant, and person of same rank as the accused would sit on the trial board. Now, two command staff members and one of equal rank as the accused sit on the board. Recently, new personnel were trained for the Board to increase the pool of

potential trial board members. The last training session finished in August of this year, and all eligible Trial Board members are trained.

Police-Officer Involved Shootings Reforms – Commissioner Batts has directed the department to institute changes concerning police officer involved shootings (POIS). As per Maryland state law and BPD’s General Orders on the use of force, the IAD responds to POIS shootings and requests but does not require information from the officer who fired. Policies pertaining to the shooting officer are legally constrained by 1) the Maryland Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights (LEOBR) and 2) the FOP contract. Present BPD practice, informed by the FOP contract, is to wait until criminal proceedings against the officer are complete before beginning administrative ones. The department is now creating a strategic plan for reforming use of force, including the application of force, tracking of force, and training on force, and tactics for de-escalation.

While changes to policies involving the shooting officers might require legislative changes to the Maryland LEOBR, PSAB has taken steps to change policies regarding witnessing officers. Under previous Commissioners, IAD would only respond to shootings “to be present.” Under the policies at the time, IAD had no powers or mandate concerning witnessing officers in POIS’s; they would simply receive the results of the Homicide Section’s investigations. Homicide meanwhile would gather the witnessing officers off-scene in voluntary interviews. Homicide would then compile after-action reports that were passed along to IAD, but because they were gathered from voluntary statements, they often did not contain sufficient evidence to clearly demonstrate whether the POIS was within department guidelines and policies.

More recently, PSAB implemented a policy where IAD reconstructs the scene of the shooting. This allows IAD to determine whether the shooting officer was in compliance with orders and training, which are more demanding than legal parameters. On September 30, 2013 PSAB completed a draft General Order that would mandate that all POIS’s be investigated by new Use of Force Review Teams.

Creation of Use of Force Review Board and Teams – The Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau (PSAB) has drafted two new General Orders, one for a new Use of Force Review Board and one for Police-Involved Major Use of Force Response Teams. They contain guidelines on when the Use of Force Teams will investigate, instructions for supervisors and others, and how the Use of Force Board will adjudicate cases. The Board will rule whether major uses of force were “in policy” or “out of policy.” Upon finding that actions were “out of policy,” the board will forward the findings to the Commissioner and to the Education and Training section to rectify any training deficiencies. Under the current draft proposal, the Board consists

of all three Deputy Commissioners, the Chief of the Office of Internal Oversight, the Chief of Patrol, and the Director for Education and Training.

Public Transparency Policy for the Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau – The Commissioner and the PSAB have committed to being as transparent as possible concerning internal affairs and the PSAB. While the department does not and cannot divulge information about pending cases to the public, the department has made an increased effort to be forthright about PSAB policies and procedures, informing the public about time frames, policies, the role of various agencies and actors, when cases close, etc. The PSAB has also increased its cooperation with the State’s Attorney’s Office, prioritizing passing along information as it becomes available about pending cases and investigations.

Ability to Intercede in Command Investigations – According to a General Order, Command Investigation Units (CIUs) should only investigate cases wherein the “BlueTeam” entry does not contain any evidence of “allegations of an integrity violation” or “any matter of particular sensitivity.” (Such allegations are defined more specifically elsewhere in the GO). This does not always occur in practice, possibly because supervisors have favorable biases toward officers under their command, do not want to lose manpower to IA cases, or some other reason. Regardless of the reason, many cases that should be reviewed by IAD never left the commander who originally reviewed the case. To end this practice, the PSAB ended Command Incident Reports in favor of the digitized “BlueTeam” system. Now, IAD accesses the BlueTeam system and triages all cases to determine whether incidents can be adjudicated at the command level or whether they need to be processed through the internal affairs system.

Examination of National Best Practices and Training of Internal Affairs Personnel – The department has contracted with a subject matter expert to develop training for internal affairs personnel and examine other US and Maryland localities internal affairs structures.

Creation of Office of Internal Oversight – The department created an Office of Internal Oversight in PSAB that is headed by a Colonel and centralizes the internal review and audit processes of the department. This allows for greater pooled expertise and command oversight of internal reviews, written directives, and inspections.

Additional Year One Initiatives:

I. Quality of Life Issues

The department has recognized the importance of targeting quality of life concerns that create conditions that allow more serious crime to flourish. The department also recognizes the imperative of responding to ordinary citizens' concerns as part of its core mission as a public service agency. Many of these concerns – including but not limited to those posed by residents of high Part I crime neighborhoods – pertain to quality of life issues.

Taking Back Public Spaces – Thus far, the department has commenced meaningful quality of life campaigns pertaining to public spaces. The Commissioner started a “take back our public spaces” campaign that started with Lexington Market, where the city is making substantial investments to turn the historic space into a renowned destination. The market has been beset by loitering and drug activity, some of which is related to clients of several drug rehabilitation clinics that are in close proximity of the market. The department is seeking to implement a strategy in the area and similar areas that addresses the challenges posed by four distinct groups: the homeless, substance abusers, individuals who suffer from mental health ailments, and the true predators. Police will take the lead on the last category, and are collaborating with other agencies and organizations to address the former three categories in a model of shared cooperation. Other agencies and organizations included in the department's efforts are area drug rehabilitation clinics, charities, the academic sector, liquor store and bar personnel, private security guards, and other city agencies. The department also has increased uniformed presence and posted codes of conduct to better address disorder and fear-inducing behavior. The department also plans to begin “take back” efforts in other public spaces, including Federal Hill and areas adjacent to the Pimlico Race Track.

Keeping officers on patrol – The department has taken some key steps toward keeping officers on patrol in Baltimore's neighborhoods, where they can build relationships with the community, address quality of life concerns, and conduct crime reduction activities. First, the department re-established a Telephone Reporting Unit (TRU) through which people can report crime occurrences without a police officer having to be dispatched to take the report in person. Incidents which occurred some time ago, or for which a report is required for insurance purposes can now be reported by telephone and a report created. This avoids the necessity of an officer being dispatched, thus freeing officers up for strategic neighborhood crime reduction activities.

Many people who call the police simply desire to have a report made about their concern, whether it be a stolen vehicle, lost property, or minor thefts. While these reports provide the documentation often needed for insurance companies, they also provide important information to crime analysis which then tracks occurrences for use in officer assignments to hotspot areas, as well as investigators who use the information to link past occurrences when arrests are made, thus clearing cases committed by the arrested person.

Second, the department initiated multi-agency meetings to address intoxicated individuals rejected from the Central Booking Intake Facility (CBIF) on medical grounds, which ultimately drains patrol resources during busy, nighttime hours. Residents and the department have realized a need to address some problems pertaining to intoxicated individuals, who can endanger themselves and those around them and cause a nuisance to residents in some neighborhoods. Many jurisdictions have dedicated facilities that temporarily hold intoxicated individuals as they sober up, but Baltimore lacks such facilities. Instead, when individuals are detained for public intoxication or they are arrested and rejected by the CBIF (which cannot supervise them due to medical liability), the department's only legal option is to assign an officer to supervise the intoxicated individual at a hospital Emergency Room. The Commissioner has convened meetings with academic experts and other city agencies and has made some progress toward finding a long-term solution.

Finally, the department is developing a plan to civilianize parts of the agency to put more officers in the field. Presently, the department's ratio of civilian to sworn personnel is slightly less than 10 to 1, substantially higher than other major city departments in the region. The Human Resources section is in the process of developing a list of positions that can be civilianized. It has identified 45 positions that are possible candidates for civilianization and is initiating discussions with the heads of units and sections that contain those positions. Plans have already been developed to civilianize the Quartermaster Unit (with two supervisors and six shopkeepers), though the process of doing so has been delayed because the Section has been unable to fill the positions due to the department's strict hiring guidelines. Civilianization will also provide other significant benefits for the department and civilian personnel by allowing for greater career advancement.

Line-ups in consultation with the Innocence Project – Commissioner Batts, Maddie DeLong of the Innocence Project New York, and Darrel Stephens, executive Director of Major Cities Chiefs Association, authored a paper on reframing suspect identification as part of a Harvard University collaboration. As a result, the department has been in consultation with the Innocence Project on improving line-up procedures. The department launched double-blind, sequential line-ups in October, putting the department on the leading edge of best investigatory practices.

II. Improve Departmental Morale, Training and Opportunities for Advancement

Departmental infrastructure, planning, equipment, communications practices, training, and other items are crucial in maintaining a successful patrol function and other crime-fighting operations. The department has made some improvements to the department's structure, which will increase administrative efficiency and provide personnel resources to critical functions. The department's investment (particularly financially) in infrastructure, equipment, and operational support services has lagged for years, but the department has recently made key investments that will improve morale, safety, and efficiency. The department has also neglected to update or upgrade practices or procedures, affecting multiple critical operations.

It has been widely acknowledged – by personnel, the Commissioner, the FOP, the Command Staff, and even by the media – that low employee morale has hampered the Baltimore Police Department for many years. While much of the problem stems from the problem of finite resources, the Commissioner has been insistent on improving conditions for employees, especially in ways that do not require additional funding.

More Input from Employees of all Ranks and Types – The Commissioner has been holding “Town Hall” meetings with sergeants, lieutenants, and civilian staff. These quarterly meetings address various issues and enable “two-way” communication. The department has also created an internal “suggestion box” e-mail, and conducted a broad employee survey.

New Sergeants and Lieutenants School – The Education and Training Section is in the process of reformulating the curriculum for sergeants and lieutenants training. The new curricula – whose topics were identified by the command staff in meetings earlier this year – will be more focused on inculcating leadership and command abilities as opposed to just tactical knowledge. The new, two-week curricula will be submitted to the Maryland Police Training Commission (MPTC) for approval before implementation. The new curricula will be completed and ready for implementation following certification by the Commission.

Assessing the promotional process and putting new processes in place for all ranks – The Commissioner has sought to create a continuous learning organization by assessing candidates’ “promotability,” a concept that is tied to specific training and capacities for each rank and job classification. This transformation commenced in the recent lieutenants’ exam, which

placed less emphasis on rote memorization and more on critical thinking and problem-solving skills. The Commissioner seeks to ensure all personnel are continuously learning and improving – no matter their rank or responsibility.

Improvement of the Field Training Program – At present, the Field Training Program deviates from national best practices in many areas; however, the department has rectified many problems in this program this year and laid much of the groundwork for broad improvements in the future. Under Commissioner Batts, the department ended the practice of detailing academy recruits to the field before they were fully trained (these recruits were used to add police presence to public events such as the Preakness, Fourth of July, etc.); is reviewing options for increasing incentives for Field Training Officers (FTOs); has improved the physical security of field training records; reemphasized FTO training; improved FTO communication with the rest of the Education and Training (E&T) section; improved the scale, criteria, and forms by which academy recruits are assessed; and has seen renewed focus on the program by the executive command staff.

Command staff and professional staff management training days – The Commissioner has created professional development training days for command staff that take place every six weeks. These off-site sessions are designed to improve the command staff's ability to carry out their responsibilities to the department and the public, and include command incident training, equal employment opportunity issues, internal discipline, new operational tactics best practices, media training and broad, strategic overviews of the issues facing Baltimore. These training days have been underway since the Commissioner arrived, and have thus far covered Baltimore's racial history, overviews of basic training, media training, overviews of legal issues, how BPD can work with housing laws to improve public safety, human trafficking, an overview of the department's helicopter capabilities, the new Emergency Action Teams and more. Civilian staff training sessions are also underway to reinforce initial training and make all personnel in all sections current on technological and policy changes.

Creation of Committee to Examine Counseling Services – The department has convened an internal committee, chaired by the Chief of Staff, that includes the House of Ruth, FOP, the Vanguard Justice Society, and representatives from medical and city services to establish best practices for providing treatment of and counseling related to family violence, alcohol abuse, and returning military veterans to municipal policing. The meetings have included representatives for Psychological Consulting Associates (PCA), with which the department has contracted to provide anonymous counseling as well as the city's Department of Human Resources, which oversees the City's Employee Assistance Plan (EAP) for all city civilian employees.

Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA) Certification – LEOSA is a 2004 federal law that permits all types of former law enforcement officers to carry concealed weapons regardless of conflicting local or state laws. The department has undergone the certification process so that it can now qualify former officers under LEOSA.

Key Hires and Promotions – The Department has recently hired or promoted key personnel that have helped it move forward in the above areas and the vision laid out by this strategic plan. These include but are not limited to a new commander of the Community Partnerships Division, Director of Analytical Intelligence, Director of Information Technology, and three new Deputy Commissioners of the Professional Standards and Accountability, Investigations and Intelligence, Neighborhood Patrol Bureaus, a new Chief of Staff, Equal Employment and Opportunity Director, and a Chief Financial Officer.

Reassignment of Animal Cruelty investigations to the K-9 Unit – Responsibility for investigating allegations of animal cruelty used to fall under one sergeant under Operations who could not adequately perform this task due to numerous other responsibilities. This task was assigned to the K-9 Unit in Summer 2013. The innovative concept appears to be working well, resulting in several proactive investigations addressing animal cruelty.

III. Facilities and Equipment

Facilities Improvements – The department is in critical need of basic improvements to many of its facilities and it has made some progress in some of its facilities. In particular, the Facilities Unit made substantial improvements to the Southeastern District headquarters by soliciting donations as well as utilizing departmental and city resources.

Equipment Purchases – The department has begun a number of important acquisitions processes, including electronic control devices (ECDs), patrol rifles, and new SWAT equipment and vans.

The department currently has 421 ECDs manufactured by Taser. The department has requested that the city acquire ECDs for all officers. ECDs sometimes provide the safest (for both the officer and suspect) or the only less-lethal alternative to firearms to incapacitate individuals who are actively resisting, are aggressive and non-compliant, are potentially violent, in possession of a weapon, and/or otherwise unable to be safely subdued. All the current Tasers lack a 5-second cycle safety feature, and all are being replaced.

The patrol rifles are for use by Emergency Action Teams (EAT), which consist of specially trained officers who are always in the field and can mobilize rapidly when an immediate tactical response is required. These rifles, which are similar in make to the new SWAT rifles, will be delivered before the end of the year.

Finally, the department has ordered new SWAT rifles, which will also be delivered by the end of the year. According to departmental personnel, the old rifles along with much of the SWAT equipment is very outdated and puts officer safety at risk. Other new SWAT gear – including tactical vests – was delivered at the end of July. Much of this gear was outdated, expired and/or broken. Finally, the department has requested the purchase of two new SWAT vans. The old SWAT vans, purchased in 2002, pose multiple safety concerns. They have no seat belts; “benches” in the vans are actually makeshift wooden structures built by the SWAT officers themselves; and they have no holders for gear, which would pose a serious safety risk to officers in accidents or sudden braking as they could be maimed by the falling gear which also must be kept in the back of their SWAT vans.

Review of vehicle and maintenance policies – The department is conducting a review of take-home, leased, rental, and pooled vehicles to determine if vehicles are being used appropriately and whether associated costs can be reduced. The department currently leases or rents about 250 vehicles, and possesses about 650 others. The FOP and the department have also recognized that the department possesses a large number of improperly maintained vehicles, and the review will also identify the type and scope of maintenance problems.

IV. Overtime Management and Other Cost-Saving Measures

The department has put into place several new cost-savings measures in the areas of overtime and personnel management. The department is committed to matching workload to demands to create efficiencies and reduce costs. While standard overtime is by far the largest contributor to the department’s overall overtime costs, the department and city have conducted audits of two other overtime expenditures – special event overtime and overtime paid to other police agencies – and determined that it should be able to make substantive cost reductions in these areas. The department is also putting into place a new court overtime management system that is already resulting in major savings for both the city and the department.

Improvements in Special Event Overtime – Special event overtime falls under departmental “secondary employment” guidelines. Currently, there are no standardized policies pertaining to designated types of secondary employment. Presently,

according to a city audit, the “current fees charged for policing special events do not capture the actual cost of service” because vendors are typically charged a \$1 per hour fee plus the cost of overtime,” which excludes the cost of full administrative overhead, traffic control outside the venue, and other “indirect costs.” As such, only about half of special event costs between 2010-2012 were reimbursed. The 2012 net special events cost was \$4.5 million.

Of particular concern are the overtime policies regarding large events at stadium facilities. In addition to the above, the teams do not reimburse BPD for the full cost of overtime due to a contract with the Maryland Stadium Authority.

In addition to charging the full-cost rate for stadium events, the Baltimore Bureau of the Budget and Management Research (BBMR) and Baltimore CitiStat have proposed charging the full rate for traffic control for all stadium special events, increasing the police services fee for all special events and creating a discounted rate for non-profit and charitable special events. This is projected to increase reimbursement by \$2 million per annum. This will help reduce the department’s yearly special event overtime overage of approximately \$3 million.

Court Overtime Management – The department put into place a Court Overtime Management system that it anticipates will save the City \$550,000 this fiscal year, bringing this expenditure \$250,000 under budget. The new system is designed to eliminate unnecessary overtime expenses by ensuring that only officers who have pertinence to a case are summoned to court. Formerly, officers would go to court only to find they were not needed; however, due to contractual obligations, they were paid overtime for going to court anyway. To rectify this, the Court Liaison Unit (CLU) wrote new SOPs published October 1, 2013 that included several new initiatives. First, the CLU is ensuring that the court matrix, which tells the State’s Attorney’s when officers are available to testify in court, is current. The CLU has worked to update the matrix, and next year, the department and State’s Attorney’s office will be moving to a digital court scheduling system that will automate the court matrix. The department aims to cooperate with the State’s Attorney’s office to have heavy operations units scheduled for only two court days per week. Presently, members of such units often must go to court every day from Mondays through Fridays. Second, the unit is cooperating with the State’s Attorney’s office to provide notification to personnel who must go to court two days in advance. Officers are often notified presently at the end of their shifts that they must go to court the next morning, and sometimes they do not appear. Third, the unit is now receiving notification when an officer is no longer required to be present on a particular court case and calling the officers accordingly. Finally, the Central Booking Intake Facility is now converting 200-300 additional cases per month into citations, which then require no court appearances by officers.

V. Preparing for Emergencies

In the last year, the department has worked to improve its capacity to respond to emergencies such as active shooters, natural disasters, terrorist events, and more. The public expects and deserves excellence from its first responders in times of the most serious need, and the public should have the utmost confidence that its police department can maintain order during major incidents. Not only can major emergencies, if handled improperly, cause widespread loss of life, but they can damage the public's trust and confidence in its police department. As such, the department's steps this year toward swift and comprehensive emergency management and tactical response are crucial to its overall efforts to improve policing in Baltimore.

Citywide emergency planning – The department is creating a new major incident plan that will complement the city's multi-agency disaster plan, which already has a corresponding Police Commissioner's Memorandum (PCM) in the department. However, the department has recognized the need for a more comprehensive and detailed plan than the current one, which orders all available personnel to travel to central, "stay" locations in their districts unless they are called out. The department is presently drafting a new plan that will be up-to-date on evolving departmental capacities in emergency management, establish chains of command, set guidelines for incident management and communication with other city agencies, plan for particular types of operations, and more.

VI. Administrative Improvements

Improving legislation on curfews and padlock laws – The department has been working with City Council members regarding laws that can aide efforts to bolster public safety. The department cooperated with the City Council to introduce new curfew legislation. The curfew legislation will allow identification of children on school nights and families that may need assistance with wrap-around services to help children.

The department is also recommending strengthening public nuisance ("padlock") laws. It has been discussing with City Council members to assess avenues to improve the public nuisance law which currently allows the Police Commissioner to order the discontinuance of the nuisance to include the temporarily closure of establishments that are harming public safety. Washington DC and Prince George's County utilized padlock reform to dramatically reduce violent crime resulting from

negligent club management. The leverage encouraged cooperation with club owners to ensure self-enforcement and removal of community nuisance.

Rewriting General Orders and Police Commissioner's Memorandums – The department has contracted with a specialist company and is rewriting training guidelines and standard operating procedures and consolidating the multiple types of policy documents (such as General Orders (GOs)) and Police Commissioner's Memorandums (PCMs)). The process will see a digitized and more user-friendly interface for reviewing policies, periodic checks to ensure that the policies stay current on all federal and state laws and other legal changes, and more. The 18-month project, which started summer 2013, will also include a training element that will provide users with quizzes that can be performed on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis. As of the issuance of this plan, 46 new GOs, 12 PCMs, one Training Guideline, 21 other forms, and three standard operating procedures (SOPs) are under revision. The 18-month project will see all types departmental policy formats will be merged into a single document.

The Strategic Challenges

Meeting the objectives set by the Commissioner will require addressing a wide number of diverse strategic challenges. The pillars will require a broad array in shifts in tactics, strategies, technological capabilities, organization, training, and other steps. There are many challenges that can be addressed in relatively short order, while other areas will require a number of years of investment to fix systems that have atrophied or to introduce new capabilities.

Energizing the workforce – While the FOP leadership has been strongly supportive of reforms in the department and have offered important suggestions of how the department can reach new levels of excellence, some police officers are not energized to a level that fully assists the department in meeting current challenges of crime and disorder in the community. These officers come to work and see the job as little more than responding to calls for service with the time not spent responding to these calls being the officer’s own time, not time to work on community problem-solving. A challenge for the department is to motivate every officer to match the high performing, engaged officers who have a strong commitment to make a difference in crime levels, community service, and addressing quality of life issues that plague a number of neighborhoods. Given the challenges of policing Baltimore, every employee must ensure that they put full energy and effort into their work, matching the many employees of the department who currently pursue excellence in their work. The Commissioner is committed to making the Neighborhood Patrol Bureau – which contains most of the department’s sworn personnel – the backbone of the department. The department is committed to using patrol officers to their full potential as generalists who solve a wide-array of problems for the community using creativity and problem solving.

Engaging the community – There has been widespread concern among some parts of the Baltimore community about the lack of police engagement with the community, particularly at the patrol officer level. While there are numerous officers who have very positive relationships with the residents and business people in the areas in which they work, there are many residents who feel that their officers are not engaged, that officers simply drive through the neighborhood without any real contact with residents except when responding to a call for service, officers in field assignments must work hard to have a “felt presence” throughout the neighborhoods to which they are assigned.

Addressing simplistic and singular crime solutions – There is no single, simple solution to addressing crime in the city. Arrests alone will not solve the problem of crime in Baltimore. Massive campaigns to stop and question citizens will not have a dramatic impact on crime because such practices – when applied without concern for constitutional protections of citizens and

how those are stopped are treated – create tensions in the community that detract from meaningful approaches to crime reduction. Experience across the country shows that the most effective crime control strategies encompass a combination of initiatives, involving police, other government agencies, and the community, and are supported by state and federal agencies. The metrics of success combine strong trusting relationships of police with the community, energetic police action, targeting repeat offenders who commit a majority of crime, and strong community activism and moral voices that press for a crime free community. When those elements are in place, the community can reach a tipping point where crime and disorder are no longer tolerated in neighborhoods, crime cannot flourish, and the norm is a general absence of crime. The experiences in Los Angeles, Cincinnati, New York in the mid-1990s have demonstrated the importance of reaching that tipping point, with police and community collaboration being key to success.

Strengthening the infrastructure – The policing infrastructure has been allowed to deteriorate to a deplorable level over time where today information technology, buildings, vehicles, and related assets no longer support the type of policing required to address Baltimore’s problems. Police officers need to be able to work in a reasonable environment, with good equipment, clean and modern facilities, and modern communications. Regular improvements to the infrastructure are critical if the community is to expect police offices to work to the level that is required in Baltimore. The department should also consider private/public partnerships or state level assistance to rehabilitate structures.

Ensuring a fair but effective disciplinary process – The manner that discipline is administered is critical to employee job satisfaction. Over the years, there has been substantial concern among employees that discipline has not been equitable or fairly applied, with some employees receiving greater disciplinary sanctions than others, perceived to be based upon race or internal department relationships of those who are treated less severely for equal offenses. Likewise, the legal and contractual requirements for discipline can make it very difficult for the department to effectively administer discipline. Some members, when charged with violations of ethics, policy, or procedure often take advantage of the ability to drag out the disciplinary process to their own benefit. Changing this system will be a challenge but a requirement if employee morale is to be improved. Clear standards for discipline must be established and the department must have the ability to administer discipline fairly and equitably must be established. The FOP leadership will be critical to turning around an inefficient and antiquated system. The department has made substantial strides in recent months in addressing some of these issues but faces substantial challenges in adopting a system that is truly equitable and fair, focused on preventing future violations, ensuring that progressive discipline is in place, and the ensuring that the process is timely so that employees are not long-delayed in receiving resolutions to their cases.

Strengthening the Training Function – One of the most important goals for the department will be improving training to ensure that all officers perform to the highest professional standards. This will require strong leadership at the Education and Training Section as well as strong support from management at all levels. Under Commissioner Batts, training has taken on a higher profile and greater priority but the challenge for the department will be to expand that commitment and sustain it with state of the art training programs for personnel at all levels of the organization.

Providing quality crime data and rigorous analysis of that data – For some time, the department has not been able to collect real-time crime data that would permit rapid deployment of personnel to hotspots or to respond to evolving crime patterns. The state of the department’s data systems has made the collection and dissemination of crime data difficult. The department still lacks a crime analysis capability of sufficient size and competence to rigorously analyze data to provide guidance to field personnel and investigators regarding how to prevent future occurrences once a crime pattern has been identified. The needed components are a complex web of now independent activities which are beginning to come under centralized control but other parts of the process must be processed, such as ensuring that district personnel file crime reports before the end of their shifts and providing the capacity to enter that report data into the department’s records management system quickly so it is available for analysis.

Improving cooperation with other agencies and organizations – The department has a history of seeing itself as independent of other law enforcement agencies and community agencies as well; thus, the level of collaboration with these agencies has been weak in many areas. A wide variety of agencies can make important contributions to the department’s crime reduction and prevention goals but it will require that department personnel understand the importance of such collaboration and break down the silo walls that have often prevented it.

Preparing for robust emergency management – As is true for every community, the city has to be well prepared for effective emergency management when crises occur, such as severe storms, natural disasters, major fires, and related crises. Effective emergency management requires coordinated action – well planned in advance and practiced regularly – among a wide range of agencies. Police must play a major role in such situations. There have been improvements in these capabilities over the last few years but full engagement of the wide range of agencies whose participation is critical has yet to be fully achieved. It is a major near-term priority for all the agencies, particularly the police.

Ensuring financial, personnel, and other resource efficiencies – The department – which has been largely operating in “crisis mode” for many years – has not adequately focused on ensuring that there is sound financial management standards in place. Overtime often runs over the budget, even while analysis indicates that overtime is not always used in a prudent and effective manner. Staffing allocation is often out of sync with demand for service. There are a number of areas where there is duplication of effort. Given the financial pressure the City faces, sound fiscal management is critical for effective performance in the future. Managers must be held accountable for the manner in which they manage finances and use resources in the future.

The Strategic Initiatives

Fulfilling the five pillars set forth by Commissioner Batts will require a broad commitment to transforming the department in several key areas. This Strategic Plan expands the original five pillars, building upon progress that has been made and recognizing challenges that remain. Specifically, the plan will focus the department on the following five pillars:

- 1. The Baltimore Police Department will reduce crime throughout the City by targeting gangs, guns, violent repeat offenders, and the conditions that allow crime to flourish.*
- 2. The Baltimore Police Department will develop and maintain relationships of trust with all members of the Baltimore community and work collaboratively with other organizations to solve community problems.*
- 3. The Baltimore Police Department will bolster support systems to strengthen data quality and improve information sharing to provide actionable and timely intelligence and support field operations.*
- 4. The Baltimore Police Department will be an organization that maintains the highest standards of ethics, integrity, and accountability.*
- 5. The Baltimore Police Department will be a learning organization that is capable of acting with expertise in all areas of law enforcement.*

Pillar 1: The Baltimore Police Department will reduce crime throughout the City by targeting gangs, guns, violent repeat offenders, and the conditions that allow crime to flourish.

Strategic Objective 1.1: Challenge District Commanders to improve crime reduction in their districts and bolster patrol officers reduction impact

Background: The BPD has divided the city into nine patrol districts, each commanded by a major who is assisted by a captain serving as second in command. The districts report up through three areas, each commanded by the lieutenant colonel, to the Chief of Patrol who holds the rank of colonel. Within the districts, three eight-hour shifts are each

commanded by a lieutenant. Most districts are divided into three sectors, except for two districts that have four sectors, with each sector supervised, on each shift, by a sergeant, and each sector subdivided into posts. The advantage of this system is that the sergeant and the team of officers he supervises generally work the same hours, which should provide for a higher quality of supervision than is possible when sergeants and their officers are on different schedules. Under current short staffing conditions, however, as much as forty percent of posts on each shift are being staffed on overtime, so that sergeants are often supervising personnel from other shifts or even other districts. Mandatory overtime, sometimes imposed with short notice, is hurting morale among the young patrol force and contributing to steady attrition in the ranks, as officers with as little as two to three years on the job leave the BPD for other, better-paying departments in the surrounding suburbs.

Most districts maintain a so-called “flex squad”, a flexible unit that is not assigned to posts or to answer calls for service. This flex team, which may include a lieutenant, three to four sergeants, and as many as 16 officers, is available for assignment to specific crime patterns, disorder problems, or other conditions in the district. In the districts where the Special Enforcement Section (SES) maintains a significant presence focused on defined zones within the districts flex squads and other non-calls- for-service resources are far more limited. SES officers are assigned to high violent crime zones in multiple districts not directly under the command of the district major.

There is a clear need for the adjustment of posts and for a reassessment of staffing practices. The posts have not been adjusted since the 1980s. Staffing all posts at all times, regardless of the call-for-service load and crime conditions, is costing large amounts in overtime, undermining morale, and helping to drive attrition. In addition, there is a sense in the department that the patrol force has become disengaged from the problems on the street, and particularly from crime, and that the districts are largely functioning in a reactive mode, responding to calls, but doing little else to assert police control in the neighborhoods. There is a widespread desire among employees to have a work schedule alternative to standard 8-hour shifts. There is a broad range of options available that have been implemented by other agencies, and good track histories of the impact of those schedules. It is important that a work schedule that is adopted ensure that it maximizes the matching of personnel availability to service demand requirements and the need for proactive crime and problem-solving activities. Likewise, if possible, it is important that employees are provided equal access to leave days on weekends. Finally, the work schedule must reduce overtime expenditures rather than expand them.

The districts each staff a Neighborhood Services Unit of a sergeant and several officers. These units too, in addition to addressing quality-of-life conditions, should be playing a role in the anti-crime strategy, gathering intelligence about criminal activity from community members and assisting with community security initiatives. An enhanced Comstat process, as recommended later in Pillar 3, will work to guide and drive district anti-crime efforts forward. Just as each district commanding officer should function as the chief of police for their one-ninth of the city and should be challenged to deliver effective police service to the community, addressing all areas of community concern including quality-of-life issues and serious property and violent crimes, the sector sergeants should be challenged to function in the same capacity in their assigned sectors. The keys to achieving these goals are communication, management, coordination, and accountability managed in district-based Comstat process, which mirrors the citywide Comstat process described below.

Strategy: The district commanders will function as the primary managers and analysts of day-to-day crime problems and patterns in their respective districts, including reading all Part I crime reports in the district each day. They should have resources at their disposal, including flex units that equip them to respond swiftly to emerging problems and crime patterns. These flex units also serve a secondary purpose, presenting the opportunity to reward high-performing patrol officers with training in tactical police work, which can be useful in their patrol work or if they show investigative competencies, future assignment with the District Detective Units, the Special Enforcement Section, or the centralized investigative units. Shift lieutenants and sector sergeants should be leading patrol officers to engage with crime conditions on streets and with regular actors who are known to perpetrate criminal acts. The department will also establish a Patrol Staffing Assessment Working Group that will examine how to improve patrol allocations and management of calls for service. The department will undertake a near-term analysis of the potential alternative work schedules, the impact, and matching with criteria previously described. The preferred schedule will be tested in one district for several months and then employees surveyed, and overtime and operational data collected and reviewed to determine impact. That work schedule, if still the most appropriate, will then be adjusted for expansion to the other districts. The Patrol Staffing Assessment Working Group will also implement new boundaries to reduce the post concept in lieu of a sector team model, which will allow greater discretion and flexibility to the sector sergeant. The group will also consider whether to divide the Northeastern District in the near-term. The department will also create an Operations Analysis Unit that will collect and analyze information on workload and organizational performance.

Strategic Objective 1.2: Strengthen the investigative process to increase closure rates and bolster criminal cases against violent offenders

Background: The department's investigative components should be central to ensuring that the violent repeat offenders (VROs) targeted by intelligence, patrol, and enforcement components including non-departmental partners (such as the State's Attorney and federal partners) will be prosecuted and incarcerated. These components include the VRO Program and the investigatory components under the Investigations and Intelligence Bureau, most notably the Homicide Section and the District Detective Units (DDUs). The department's other units, including intelligence units and those in the Neighborhood Patrol Bureau, also play a key role in gathering evidence, appearing at trial to testify to suspects' actions, and otherwise sustaining criminal charges.

A workable and effective violent repeat offender (VRO) program can be an essential part of BPD's attack on violent crime. It is generally agreed that the actual killers in an urban area – as distinct from less violent criminals – are a small minority not only among a city's population, but among the criminal population itself. If they can be identified and extracted from the communities in which they prey, sharp declines in violent crime can be achieved. This is surely the intent of the current VRO program in the BPD, but observers from the BPD and the State's Attorney's Office generally agree that program has lost its impetus and its focus in recent years. The process of establishing VRO lists has not been disciplined or well regulated, and lists have become too long and insufficiently selective. District commanders have been charged with identifying VROs in their respective districts, and the results have been uneven. Some in the department believe that the State's Attorney's office controls the VRO list, but the State's Attorney's Office representatives maintain that they are reliant on the Department for most of the identifications. There have also been some differences about when a VRO can be removed from the list, with the State's Attorney's Office favoring retaining VRO names until subjects have been successfully prosecuted and sentenced to at least two years in prison, and some BPD officers urging a quicker turnover.

The department maintains DDUs in all nine districts, each commanded by an investigative lieutenant and usually divided into three squads supervised by sergeants, with squads assigned to robbery, burglary, and aggravated assault, including non-fatal shootings. Structurally, this kind of decentralized detective capability is essential in a large city where centralized detective units tend to lose contact with field officers, with local citizens, with useful informants, and with essential knowledge about the worst actors in the local criminal population. While the structural configuration is optimal, in practice, the DDUs have been understaffed and subject to a wide range in the quality of their management. DDU staffing has

fallen from a typical unit of 14 detectives to units of ten or even seven. Understaffing has had a particular impact on burglary investigations, where there is often a lone burglary detective in a given district contending with hundreds of burglaries per year and basically performing what some managers call a “data-entry function” rather than a true investigative role. DDUs lack uniform case assignment, case management, and case closing practices and may not be prioritizing cases to ensure the most efficient use of the local detective resource. Some DDUs work closely with district commanders and others are less cooperative.

DDUs are the primary investigators of local crimes, including local robberies and burglaries, serious assaults and non-fatal shootings. This is a critical role with respect to both the reality and the perception of crime in neighborhoods. Although citizens are alarmed by homicides and shootings, they are far more likely to be victimized in robberies and burglaries, and a police department that fails to make a credible effort in these areas loses public confidence. It is essential, therefore, while attacking violent crime with the VRO program, that BPD also sustains the DDUs in their important work.

The Homicide Section must be a critical part of the Department’s strategy to reduce violence in Baltimore. At present, the Section does not function as a key player in developing a master VRO list alongside the Operational Intelligence Section and the various district resources. More important, there is not a continuous flow of information between the Homicide Section and other components of the anti-violence plan. At present, Homicide Section detectives maintain that they receive only the most perfunctory information about shootings being investigated by the DDUs.

As of July 2013, the Homicide Section had 66 investigative personnel, including two lieutenants, eight sergeants, and 41 detectives working in eight squads (with one sergeant and five investigators in each squad) that investigate current homicides. The eight squads operate in two shifts and follow a rotation model that provides coverage to respond to new homicides, investigate cases, meet with witnesses, and provide court testimony. Importantly, these units do not operate on a geographic basis at present. Other Homicide Section personnel include a cold case squad (one lieutenant and five investigators), an administrative staff (one sergeant and three detectives), and an operations unit (one sergeant and five detectives) that is largely devoted to locating witnesses for court when cases are coming up for adjudication. The unit is commanded by a captain who reports to the lieutenant colonel in charge of Criminal Investigations. By mid-September, there had been 167 homicides in Baltimore in 2013 compared with 151 in prior year, for increase of 11 percent. There had been 70 homicide arrests.

In addition to homicides, the Homicide Section investigates unattended and suspicious deaths (including overdoses), officer-involved shootings, and serious assaults on city workers. Three years ago, following an incident in which police officer was killed by friendly fire, the Homicide Section was assigned responsibility to investigate all intentional discharges of police firearms, which Homicide personnel maintain should be the responsibility of Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau (there are two draft General Orders that have been completed that would make this the case). The section presently lacks a number of vehicles, especially vehicles equipped with lights and sirens that would allow them to reach crime scenes more quickly. The Homicide Section also lacks a technical unit assigned strictly to Homicide Section to work with phones and other technical evidence in a timely fashion to support homicide investigations. In an effort to share intelligence and to gather information about current homicides, the Homicide Section also holds a weekly Homicide Intelligence Meeting and invites District Detective Unit personnel, SES personnel, and other relevant managers to attend, but the meeting is largely unstructured and can be improved. At present, the Homicide Section has no geographic structure for cases that occur in particular areas of the city. While many Section members argue that such a structure is unwarranted in a small city such as Baltimore, most agree that there are distinct areas of the city and that many criminals regard moving from one area to another in Baltimore as the equivalent of moving out of town, meaning that a geographically structured unit could present distinct advantages.

The State's Attorney's Office is a crucial partner in any plan to address and reduce violent crime and other crimes in Baltimore. The VRO program and any other targeted efforts require full cooperation between investigators and the prosecutors who bring cases to trial and who persuade juries to render guilty verdicts. Police investigations and arrests that do not lead to successful prosecutions and sentencing are incomplete and ineffectual processes. Yet, there have been many cases where officers and investigators are unavailable to assist in the prosecution after an arrest is made, and the States Attorney's Office reports that up to 25 percent of cases dismissed in court are dismissed because of officers' failure to appear at scheduled court proceedings. They also express concern that detectives are not always available to complete follow-up or further necessary investigation in cases that have already been charged. In addition, State's Attorney's Office representatives say that the quality of report writing by officers is often poor and that the quality of their courtroom testimony can be weak as well. The State's Attorney's Office has also raised the issue of officers not calling into the prosecutors at central booking after they make an arrest, as they are required to do because arrest wagons rather the arresting officers bring the arrestees to central booking.

Strategy: The department will utilize the State's Attorney's Office-endorsed VRO plan wherein identified VROs will be singled out for heavier prosecution for *all* crimes (not just those explicitly related to Part 1 crimes). The department will use this model to form investigations around targeted VROs themselves instead of only targeting homicides and other Part 1 crimes. (The Operational Intelligence Section will lead the actual compiling of the VRO list, but the investigatory units and many others will need to be in consultation with that Section). The department will increase cooperation with the State's Attorney's Office as well as the U.S. Attorney's Office in cases that are taken federal. The DDUs will standardize management practices, including structured case assignment protocols and a case management system that requires supervisory review of regularly scheduled progress reports from assigned detectives about the cases they are working. The Homicide Section will conduct a pilot of geographically based homicide investigations with several detectives and a supervisor familiar with an area from previous assignments to investigate homicides and possibly non-fatal shootings occurring in that district. The flow of information from the DDUs to the Homicide Section will be increased significantly, as will the two-way flow of information between field intelligence officers and the DDUs, including formalizing the weekly homicide intelligence meeting. The department will address personnel failure to appear at court and other court-related issues through cooperation with the State's Attorney's Office and monitor the roll out of the new court management systems (see above).

Strategic Objective 1.3: Develop a robust Baltimore "Ceasefire" program to target violent, gang-related crime

Background: Ceasefire, a violence reduction strategy created by David Kennedy based on his work with the highly successful Boston Police Department youth violence reduction/intervention initiative in 1996, is a problem-oriented policing and violence intervention strategy. The strategy has three essential components. First, Ceasefire programs focus on gaining community cooperation in addressing violent, gang-related crime. Legitimacy is paramount for Ceasefire programs, as most gang members believe that the community tacitly supports them instead of the police. The programs also build legitimacy by showing the community that police want to serve them instead of simply putting communities' wayward sons and daughters in jail. Second, Ceasefire programs use gang intelligence to isolate and capture the most violent offenders. In most cities, a small percentage of gang members are usually responsible for a large percentage of homicides and shootings, particularly in crime-prone neighborhoods. After these individuals are targeted and arrested, the US Attorney's offices prosecute them as per agreements with the Ceasefire partnership. This is because federal crimes typically carry longer sentences than state ones and require that those convicted serve a higher percentage of that time. (For this and other reasons, Ceasefire programs also require extensive cooperation from federal authorities). Third,

Ceasefire programs rely on “call-ins” to persuade most members of violent gangs to give up violence. Before the “call-ins,” gang intelligence units identify all the members of the most violent gangs, and these members are served with letters that tell them to come to the “call-ins” or face arrest or escalated enforcement. These “call-ins” warn the less violent members of the most violent gangs that they are being watched by the police and will be severely punished for any further violence. At the “call-ins,” they are also addressed by family and community members, who show that the community does not support their actions, and by social services, which offer assistance in providing jobs, housing, etc. Ceasefire programs have been markedly successful in reducing targeted crimes in cities across the United States.

Strategy: The department will develop a robust Ceasefire initiative, working with the Center for Crime Prevention and Control at John Jay College in New York City. The department will appoint a Ceasefire coordinator who will lead a citywide, multi-agency Ceasefire project team. The project team will bring in federal, state, and community partners, to implement a Ceasefire strategy based on those that have been resoundingly successful in other jurisdictions.

Strategic Objective 1.4: Strengthen the link between the Special Enforcement Section, the Intelligence and Investigations Bureau, and the districts.

Background: The Special Enforcement Section (SES) is the latest incarnation of an enforcement team that has operated under other names in the past 12 years, including the Organized Crime Division and the Violent Crime Impact Division (VCID). It has also worked under a variety of operating philosophies, targeting narcotics at one point and assigned to identified violent zones currently. SES is a melding of two police roles, functioning as both a crime suppression unit that is sent into violent areas to control crime and also as what is often referred to as a proactive investigations unit, not investigating specific past crimes like the DDUs, but working to build cases against the gang leaders and local drug organization bosses who contribute to much of the violent crime in neighborhoods. As such, it can be a centrally important contributor to the BPD’s anti-crime strategy and especially its effort to arrest and convict violent repeat offenders (VROs). As already noted, VROs may be committing murders for which they cannot be readily convicted, but evidence might be assembled to convict them of other serious crimes, including robberies, burglaries weapon possessions, and felony narcotics crimes, all carrying potentially heavy sentences.

SES currently has 140 officers operating in 21 enforcement teams (each consisting of a sergeant and five officers), an undercover squad, two vice units (concentrating on prostitutes and clubs), and a covert surveillance team. It has identified

48 criminal “sets” in the city and has done close analysis on some of them to identify main players and shooters associated with these sets. There is a core of more experienced SES officers, who are capable of conducting sophisticated investigations, which can successfully target VROs and other violent actors across the city. SES is also the central repository of confidential informants. Ten of the 21 SES enforcement teams are currently assigned to zones within the Eastern and Western districts, which limits the SES’s ability to target violent actors citywide. This is a critical deficiency as similar, proactive investigative units in other major cities have enjoyed the most success when they are geographically based and held accountable for progress in specific areas. Coordination within the SES as well as with outside units is also not optimal at present time. This coordination is essential to ensure that SES’ expansive capabilities are able to see Department- and city-wide benefits.

Strategy: The department will expand the Special Enforcement Section, its capacities across the department and all districts, and its cooperation with units under the Investigations and Intelligence Bureau and the State’s Attorney’s Office. To work with optimum effectiveness, SES will coordinate on a continuous basis among its own units, with the district commanders and the district intelligence officers (DGIOs), with the DDUs in the districts, and with the Centralized Homicide section and Operational Intelligence Division. The SES major case teams will be conversant with the cases that the SES teams assigned to specific districts are working. The SES sergeant supervising district SES teams will be keeping the district commander and the district intelligence officer apprised of investigations under way and will him- or herself be familiar with the DDU cases, especially shooting cases, which may overlap with any SES investigations. All but the most sensitive active SES investigations will be shared at the district level. At the citywide level, close coordination with the Homicide Unit and the Operational Intelligence Section is essential. District commanding officers will participate in the selection process of officers who will be assigned to SES teams in their respective districts.

In concert with the effort to strengthen district-based law enforcement in Baltimore with a more active response to crime from patrol and with improved District Detective Units (DDUs), at least one SES team will be assigned to each district, with additional teams assigned in the more crime-prone districts like the Western and the Eastern. Each team will be supervised by a sergeant reporting to a lieutenant, who will be responsible for three SES teams assigned to contiguous districts or areas. In addition, the six to eight SES major case teams could be sent into districts experiencing spikes in violence or where intelligence indicates the presence of more sophisticated entrenched gangs or cliques, who are often responsible for the worst violence and who are certainly the most difficult to build cases against. Each of these major case teams will be

assigned a prosecutor from the State's Attorney's Office to assist investigations, especially in securing search warrants and eavesdropping orders, and to vigorously prosecute successful cases.

Strategic Objective 1.5: Increase the Operational Intelligence Section's reach across the districts and the department and create a centralized Violent Repeat Offenders (VRO) Program

Background: The Operational Intelligence Section (OIS) will play a pivotal role in implementing the department's anti-crime strategy because so much of the strategy is driven by improved intelligence, focus, and targeting of violent repeat offenders (VROs). The Operational Intelligence Section encompasses a variety of units, including the task forces and HIDTA groups that work with federal agencies. It also manages the department's participation in the Regional Auto Theft Team (RATT), two units focused on tracking guns, a Cyber and Electronic Crimes Unit, and the Warrant Apprehension Task Force (WATF). The newly appointed commander of the Operational Intelligence Section is undertaking a review of the wide variety of units under his command, including 27 different units and task forces apart from the Warrant Apprehension Task Force (WATF), which, staffed with 95 personnel, is the largest unit in the Operational Intelligence Section.

Questions remain as to the productivity of these units and whether they are staffed properly. The Gang Unit, for instance, has one sergeant and four detectives, while the Cyber Crimes Unit has one sergeant and eight detectives. Presently, there are as many detectives in Asset Forfeiture as there are in Gangs. Between the six detectives in the Gun Trace Task Force and four in the Gun Registry Unit, there are 10 investigators doing largely administrative work on guns. While tracing and registering guns are important, is the priority of these units targeting and arresting those individuals selling and buying guns illegally.

The Warrant Apprehension Task Force (WATF) appears to have a very successful track record in locating and arresting people wanted on warrants. In general, detectives do not execute their own arrest warrants but refer them to the WATF. The WATF does not limit its activity to knocking on the door of the last known address of the wanted person; rather, it undertakes investigations of its own to locate subjects, including interviewing acquaintances of the subject and extending to sophisticated techniques like wire taps. Unlike the situation in many other cities that have no equivalent of the WATF, there are very few wanted felons at large in Baltimore. WATF can serve as an extremely useful component in BPD's anti-violence effort, bringing felons swiftly into custody once cases have been built against them.

The OIS will oversee a revived District Gang Intelligence Officer (DGIOs) program. DGIO's will be on the staff of the Operational Intelligence Section, but detailed to a district. In this role, the DGIO will report daily to the District Commander, but the work produced will be reviewed by the OIS Commander to ensure quality control of process and output. The DGIOs will be pivotal players in the overall effort to gather critical intelligence, tracking gang members and addressing their critical activities, expedite information flow, and improve coordination among all the various enforcement efforts under way at any given time. Policy will be established to prevent the DGIO function from becoming an administrative catchall in the district, and a specific job description will be established for the function.

As detailed above, targeting VROs is paramount to reducing violent crime in Baltimore as the vast majority is committed by a small group of gang-affiliated individuals; yet, at present, the VRO program lacks a *de facto* leading unit or section and suffers from a lack of central direction. Instead, there are multiple priority “repeat offender” lists maintained by several different entities. Without a centralized, master VRO list that utilizes all of the department’s pertinent intelligence resources, the department will be unable carry out the targeted effort called for in this plan. This includes human intelligence resources that point to the factors behind violent crime events and actors, which would be provided by OIS, but also quantitative violent crime data provided by the Analytical Intelligence Section, district-specific information provided by the DDUs, homicide information provided by the Homicide Section, and priorities set by the State’s Attorney’s Office. The previous rule of thumb that each district should provide ten individuals for the department’s central VRO list is arbitrary. Districts with more serious and widespread violence problems may submit as many as 15 names. More peaceful districts may submit as few as five. The view of the State’s Attorney’s Office is that VROs should not be removed from the list until conviction has merit because it will ensure a continuing BPD focus on the case after arrest and through to sentencing, but the VRO list should be regularly revisited by the Operational Intelligence Section to ensure that it remains current. In addition, BPD can maintain and “VRO-in-Waiting” lists of other violent actors who should be targeted when resources become available.

Strategy: The department will evaluate all OIS units and task forces using productivity measures (arrests, successful investigations, etc.). The OIS will develop profile sheets for each unit commander displaying specific measures of productivity or success. The OIS will ensure that all of its units collaborate and are not in conflict with SES operations. Additionally, DGIOs will be established in every district under the supervision of the OIS. The DGIOs will also serve as important contributors in the VRO process, providing a conduit for district intelligence about VROs to the Operational Intelligence Section.

The department will generate a single, master VRO list that will consider a broad spectrum of input. First, the commander of OIS will convene a VRO committee with representatives from the Analytical Intelligence Section (AIS), Homicide Section, Special Enforcement Section, the commander of the District Detective Units, and the State's Attorney's Office. The newly created District Intelligence Officers should also be able to provide input once those positions are filled. The meetings will provide input to the OIS and AIS in formulating a process by which to rank VROs. This process should start with the AIS, which will generate an initial ranking of offenders based on quantitative crime data. This initial ranking will then be passed along to the OIS, which will consider input from the above entities and human intelligence. The State's Attorney's Office's input will be especially crucial, as once VROs are identified, the office will develop investigative strategies in coordination with various investigative units. Standard criteria should also be applied, including the general criminal records of subjects, subjects who have been acquitted in homicide cases whom the State's Attorney's Office and the BPD believe to have been guilty, suspects in homicide cases who were never charged, shooting victims who appear to be participants in blood feud and vendetta cases, and various intangible factors identified by district commanders, investigators, and prosecutors. All participants in this process should be seeking to select and target the real drivers of violence in Baltimore and not just the local predicate felons. Following initial classification by the AIS and input from the above entities, the OIS will then generate a finalized VRO list on a regular basis.

Strategic Objective 1.6: Maximize assignment of police officers to the districts so that they can undertake crime control and problem-solving activities of concern to the neighborhood.

Background: The department must focus its resources on patrol and the investigatory and intelligence processes that guide patrol if it is to improve crime control and problem-solving activities. Many resources have been diverted from these functions and assigned to joint task forces with other agencies or administrative positions. It appears that some of the personnel assigned to external task forces provide less of a return than the number of officers so assigned might indicate. In many of these cases it appears that these groups are focusing a majority of their efforts on activities that do not impact core crime-fighting strategies.

The Human Resources section recently completed a staffing audit that flagged 45 positions – the majority in the Records Management Unit – to be examined to determine whether they can be civilianized. The Human Resources intends to initiate discussions with the commanders of units and sections that contain flagged positions to see whether in fact these positions should be civilianized. These units and sections include, as aforementioned, the Records Management System,

Staff Review, Information Technology, Facilities Management, and Quartermasters. The Quartermaster Unit had been identified as a target for civilianization even before the audit and is presently underway, though it remains delayed due to candidates failing the department's strict background examinations. The department will also explore whether the Quartermasters can be wholly privatized. This will put valuable resources back into neighborhood patrol and generate expertise in administrative functions throughout the department as civilian specialists take over the roles formerly performed by sworn officers, improving both police services and departmental efficiency.

The department also has a number of sworn officers assigned to task forces and other groups that detract from district staffing. No broad, strategic overview has been conducted to determine whether the staffing levels of these units actually contribute as much to crime control as would be if these officers were instead assigned to the districts.

Strategy: The department will civilianize as many administrative and other applicable positions as possible. Human Resources will complete the civilianization of the Quartermaster Unit, including two quartermasters supervisors and four storekeepers; civilianize fiscal section positions that do not require sworn personnel; conduct a cost-benefit study to determine whether the department will save funds by privatizing the quartermasters function and receive the same level of services. Human Resources will meet with the commanders of the aforementioned units and sections to determine whether the positions flagged for possible civilianization should be civilianized. Human Resources will also examine positions in the districts for potential civilianization for tasks such as property management and clerical support. The department will also evaluate staffing and productivity of officers assigned to external groups and task forces.

Strategic Objective 1.7: Strengthen the department's response to evolving crime patterns through real time reporting of crime data, strengthened crime analysis, and proactive assignment of personnel to hotspots

Background: Timely crime data and robust analysis are critical in ensuring that patrol and investigatory units are able to target the perpetrators, conditions, locations, and other facets of violent crime. At present, the data and analytical capacities at the department are likely incapable of providing the criminal intelligence necessary to carry out the targeted strategies put forth in this plan. It is critically important that the department redouble its focus on producing quality data with which the Analytical Intelligence Section can produce actionable intelligence as well as bolstering the Section's resources. A newly hired civilian director heads the Analytical Intelligence Section, which includes the Crime Analysis Unit, the Watch Center, the CitiWatch Unit, and the Comstat Unit. The Crime Analysis Unit includes all of the department's six

civilian crime analysts, whose employment are all funded by external grants. Much of the Unit's present inefficiencies and incapacities owe to two problems: understaffing and inadequate data from other units. The department is seeking to hire an additional nine civilian crime analysts, but in the meantime, the Crime Analysis Unit remains understaffed by about 40 employees according to many States' standards. This deficiency includes analysts dedicated to strategic and tactical analysis as well as any that would complement any other units or sections. Under present staffing practices, however, increasing staffing levels will prove challenging because of the practice of only hiring analysts who are grant-funded – meaning that the analysts typically start searching for new employment once the two-year grant periods are half over and do not receive typical employee benefits such as overtime – and low salary levels compared to surrounding jurisdictions. There is also no budget to ensure that analysts assigned to the unit receive sufficient training in statistical analysis, intelligence analysis, spatial analysis, and advanced crime analysis capability. Eliminating off-peak scheduling can alleviate some of the present work shortages, but this would still not leave nearly enough staff present during operating hours to accomplish the goals set forth in this plan. There is also a need for an increase of staffing in the Watch Center to ensure that intelligence intake remains accurate and up-to-speed and allow analysts to stay focused on analytical tasks.

Another recurring problem for the Crime Analysis Unit as well as the Comstat Unit is the lack of timely and accurate data that can be used to generate analysis that will help the department achieve its core mission. Much of this stems from the present lack of ability for field officers to conduct remote data entry, but also from poor data practices – namely a proliferation of databases outside of RMS, a massive data entry backlog, poor prioritization of data entry in the Records Unit, missing or incomplete data in existing databases including RMS, widespread use of unofficial data, and errant CAD reports that are never corrected by officers on scene. The Crime Analysis Unit also suffers from a number of other deficiencies, including some technological and other logistical shortcomings.

The CitiWatch Unit – which conducts remote monitoring of CCTV cameras, GPS surveillance devices, license plate readers, and more – and the Watch Center also both contain severe deficiencies, including understaffing. The Watch Center, which is equipped with a large array of television monitors and other technology, has become a hodgepodge of basic query services and secretarial work for the Chief of Patrol. Neither the Watch Center nor the CitiWatch Units are reaching their potential as valuable intelligence resources. The Watch Center should function as a real-time, intelligence fusion center, while the CitiWatch should function as the Department's lead on citywide CCTV and other electronic intelligence resources. However, the Watch Center is saddled with numerous tasks that could be performed equally well by police cadets or clerical staff.

Strategy: The department will increase staffing in all Analytical Intelligence Section units. AIS, IT, and the Records Unit will cooperate to centralize all crime and intelligence databases, and AIS will centralize all pertinent intelligence intake functions in the CitiWatch Unit and Watch Center. The department will contract with an external party to conduct a data quality and timeliness study that will determine how to decrease the amount of time between incidents and entrance of finalized data – particularly pertaining to homicides and Part 1 crimes – into the Records Management System. AIS units will be restructured to fit specialized roles, including the assignment of tactical crime analysts to each district (though they will be physically located in the Watch Center), the addition of crime/intelligence analysts who can be assigned to the Watch Center in case of emergencies, and the inclusion of clerical workers and/or police cadets who can take over some functions currently (and inappropriately) conducted by crime analysts in the Watch Center. The AIS will advise other sections of the Department on improving data quality with the aim of providing more complete and timely data to the AIS that can be used to generate useful intelligence reporting. The Watch Center will be transformed into a “Strategic Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (SITAC)” and augmented with new technology and resources. The AIS will delineate CitiWatch Unit functions from those of the Watch Center, including transferring the Camera Technology Unit and renaming the CitiWatch Unit.

Strategic Objective 1.8: Improve the field evidence collection process and the laboratory analysis of the evidence collected

Background: The department’s Crime Laboratory Section and its Mobile Crime Scene Unit handle thousands of calls per year. Both the laboratory and the Mobile Unit are understaffed, and the lab is running significant multi-month backlogs in a number of critical areas, including fingerprints and shell casing analysis. Cases can be expedited when they have priority status, which is supposed to be vetted by the command staff, but we have not formulated any systematic way of prioritizing ordinary cases in the queue.

The backlog problem is compounded by lab practice, some of it required under interpretations of accreditation standards, including the requirements for the full completion of all lab work, all second examiner work, and all reports and report reviews before investigators can be told if they have an immediate fingerprint hit or a shell casing match. In addition, too much analysis is being done on most cases, with every shell casing examined and every fingerprint evaluated when all that may be needed in many burglaries and shootings are a few tests in each case to provide the leads to possible perpetrators, with further tests completed later if necessary. In the case of the firearms examiners, they have tested BB guns and air soft

guns, boxes of live ammunition that has never been fired, shell casings and guns from cases that have already been adjudicated – all while current cases wait in the queue. They have also repeatedly missed the deadlines in handgun violation cases, which must go to court within 18 days of arrest, even though all that is required in these cases is for a police officer – not necessarily a firearms examiner – to fire the gun and to testify to its operability, a job that could be done by light-duty officers so long as they have no misconduct issues in their files.

Strategy: The department will convene a working group on evidence processing backlogs consisting of departmental investigative managers and Crime Lab managers. The group will reassess how priorities are established and whether some of the more exacting procedures at the Crime Laboratory are really necessary to ensure accurate identifications and useable evidence. The working group will also address the sequence of non-priority cases. The department, following the working group’s recommendations, will enact changes that will increase the timeliness of evidence processing, especially for preliminary evidence that can provide leads to investigators. The department will also increase Crime Laboratory Section Staffing.

Pillar 2: The Baltimore Police Department will develop and maintain relationships of trust with all members of the Baltimore community and work collaboratively with other organizations to solve community problems.

Strategic Objective 2.1: Make impartiality, legitimacy, and procedural justice core principles of police-civilian interaction

Background: Fairness and impartiality are necessary qualities of “procedural justice,” which builds a sense of legitimacy in communities for the actions that police take to benefit residents. Fair and impartial policing involves treating everyone with respect, even criminals even as they are being arrested. It also involves educating police officers on the communities that they serve so that they are sensitive to the communities’ needs and do not see young members of certain communities as inherently suspicious. Without procedural justice, police cannot make sustainable and meaningful progress against violent crime or provide a sense of safety in all neighborhoods. The department has been meeting with Fair and Impartial Policing, LLC, and considering implementing its science-based approach, which teaches trainees how to overcome biases.

Strategy: The Education and Training Section will introduce “fair and impartial” police training to in-service and academy training. Departmental training on fairness and impartiality should include instruction on community institutions, cultural

diversity, patrol tactics, how to build trust in field contacts, and the benefits of trusting relations with community members. The training should also include outside speakers on the importance of legitimacy and community members to talk about their neighborhoods' relationships with the department, presently and formerly. The department will ensure that all officers understand that the aforementioned concepts are paramount to the department's goal to become a service-oriented and problem-solving law enforcement agency and thus essential to the department's objectives, and that they will be assessed accordingly.

Strategic Objective 2.2: Increase patrol field contacts by increasing foot patrols and ensuring that officers have a “felt presence,” interacting with citizens and addressing quality of life concerns in the neighborhoods to which they are assigned.

Background: Creating a “felt presence” is not only contingent on the number of officers in a given area, but on how the officers interact in that area with citizens. In communities with a felt presence, residents are aware that the officers who patrol the neighborhood care about the people they pass on their posts and the life of the community. Presently, neighborhood residents and leaders complain that post officers do not speak to residents to learn their concerns, gain their knowledge about ongoing events in the neighborhood, or their vision for public safety in their community. This owes to a lack of foot patrols, but also to lacking a culture wherein all police officers are expected to be “problem-solvers.” Officers should be learning about the residents they serve, gaining information that can be translated into better neighborhood strategies, and building trust.

Strategy: Increase foot patrols and ensure that officers are trained in community interaction. This training should include holding academy training events in communities wherein trainees can meet community leaders, integrating training content from national models offered by federal agencies such as the Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing, training officers to feel comfortable interacting with individuals from a wide array of backgrounds, and other aspects of building trusting relationships with communities. The department will submit all new training to the MPCTC.

Strategic Objective 2.3: Fully implement the new Community Partnership Divisions strategies and Standard Operating Procedures, including staffing the Neighborhood Services Units and the rest of the division

Background: The Community Partnership Division (CPD), headed by a lieutenant colonel, was created this year to assist the department in establishing community partnerships, which are vital toward its overall crime and violence reduction efforts. The CPD focuses on strengthening partnerships with the community, both for the Police Commissioner as a liaison to various groups and for the districts, laying the foundation for strong partnerships with local neighborhood groups toward crime reduction and neighborhood problem solving. The CPD aims to assist the districts in establishing relationships with key, local actors, to directly address quality of life concerns, raise awareness about the department's efforts to combat crime, engage concerned citizens in identifying conditions that create an atmosphere where crime can flourish as well as problematic groups and individuals, build trust with young community members, and reduce recidivism among parolees and probationers through community involvement.

The CPD is comprised of four units: Community Policing, Faith-Based, Explorers and Youth Matters, and Re-Entry. Ideally, a Sergeant would head each unit in the CPD; at present, sergeants command only two units (one captain, two sergeants, and four officers, and an administrative secretary staff the entire division at present). The CPD will exercise joint command over the Neighborhood Services Units (NSUs), each of which will consist of one sergeant and four officers. A pilot program is underway in the Eastern District and will soon be so in the Western District. The units will report to the CPD as well as their respective district commanders.

The CPD's Neighborhood Services Units is focused on galvanizing all district community shareholders to come together, pool resources toward anti-crime efforts, and work in partnership with the district. This allows the CPD to map available community assets within each district (and, eventually, across the city), information that is then communicated to community members and the department. The NSUs also aims to establish a positive perception of the department among all Baltimore stakeholders, which is vital toward gaining their cooperation. Thus far, this NSUs has engaged at least 5,500 stakeholders in various meetings and forums, which have included "senior summits," ServFest (wherein 175 people participated alongside department personnel in cleaning up many Eastern District communities collecting tons of trash), For the Good of the City Summit (wherein community leaders from across the City gathered in structured groups to discuss violence reductions strategies), a "Guns for Laptops" event (which netted 70 guns), a "300-Man March" against violence (which turned into an 800-man march), a motorcycle "Peace Ride" (200 participants), partnership with "A Mother's Cry," a

community walk of Mothers that lost their sons to violence in the City (75 participants), “Coffee with a Cop,” which allows community members to meet with post officers to exchange information, and numerous other community meetings, walks, and forums. The Unit will also oversee the NSUs when they come online in each district.

The Faith-Based Unit develops working partnerships with a variety of faith-based entities to address brokenness, anger, neighborhood conflicts, poverty and crime within the City and encourages faith-based partners to sustain their efforts. CPD’s faith-based component has hosted and/or participated in over 30 events in the community that have directly included at least 15,000 participants and have connected tens of thousands more. These events have made a direct impact on the quality of life and reduction of crime for Baltimore residents. Notable events have included “Clarion Call,” an introductory event intended to build solid partnerships with faith-based organizations that included over 300 clergy; “Days of Hope,” which partnered with 15 faith-based institution to address poverty-related issues (handing out free meals and groceries etc.); “Cycle of Hope,” an event which included 4,000 bicyclists from across the US; “Blessed Baltimore Motorcades,” which included over 2,000 people in all Districts; “Sidewalk Sunday School,” which included over 500 youth and other participants and included safety tips and other activities; and other walks and meetings.

The Explorers and Youth Unit assists the youth of Baltimore City to lead quality lives fueled by positive decisions and positive engagement – socially, physically and educationally. To do this, CPD partners with youth organizations, the school system, community shareholders and faith-based organizations to build youth programs. The Unit has hosted and/or participated in seven events in the community and have directly engaged over 1,000 youth. These events have made a direct impact on the quality of life for the youth. Notable events have included Youth Summits, the first of which consisted of 150 diverse and influential youth leaders from across the City, to help bridge the gap between youth and the police; meetings with the Baltimore City Youth Commission; the “Youth Unlocked” launching rally, which included fun activities, interactive civic engagement (including a “Speak Out Booth” and documentary filmmaking and spoken word instruction), and more; four “Youth Block Parties,” which included fun activities as well as awareness-raising campaigns about risky behavior; a partnership with “Xpressive4ever,” a dance and arts organization that caters to underserved youth; and various other meetings with youths as well as organizations that serve youths. The unit will also coordinate departmental initiatives with the Explorers program via the NSUs, and will liaise with the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice as it develops its new curfew center.

Finally, the Re-Entry Unit aims to reduce recidivism by working with organizations relating to parolees and probationers and the released prisoners themselves. The Unit is focused on creating a Citywide Re-Entry Collaborating Team that will work in conjunction with the City's multi-agency re-entry program. The team will meet weekly to identify and update high-risk offenders (VROs, gun offenders, career criminals, etc.) scheduled to be released from incarceration within the following four to six months. These same high-risk offenders will be targeted for evaluation, engagement, services, tracking, and mentoring after their release for up to one year. Additionally, high-risk offenders already in the general population meeting certain criteria will also be a focus the same agenda. Information gathered from the program will be passed to District Commanders and other pertinent personnel in the department.

In addition to establishing the NSUs under the command of the CPD, writing all necessary SOPs pursuant to the four CPD pillars, and establishing the rest of the division's staffing and chain of command, the CPD needs to fully engage the Community Relations Councils (CRCs) and create smaller, tailored neighborhood subcommittees to collaborate with the department to address neighborhood crime problems. Community-oriented policing approaches require frequent broad consultation with community forums in "town hall" type settings to gain legitimacy as well as smaller meetings with neighborhood leaders to actually formulate agendas based on the broader public input. At present, the CRCs provide an effective basis for "town hall"-style input, but there exists no central plan as to how the Councils fit into broader crime control strategies and no smaller forums to help formulate concerted agendas.

Strategy: The department will establish all necessary documentation and SOPs concerning the Neighborhood Services Units and other CPD units. The SOPs will detail the responsibility of officers supporting all four CPD pillars. These officers, which will report to the CPD commander but liaise with district commanders, will work with neighborhood groups to identify problems that require police and community to join together in developing effective responses. These officers will adopt the problem-solving protocols (SARA – Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment) articulated by the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing in developing strategies with the community. The Re-Entry Officer's responsibilities will include attending monthly Citywide Re-Entry Collaborating Team, attending community intelligence and quarterly Homicide meetings, updating supervisors in bi-weekly reports; monitoring high-risk offenders that cycle through the re-entry program; monitoring and tracking crime trends within the district and identifying "Hot Spots;" collaborating with Parole and Probation case managers to conduct home visits and follow-ups on re-entry offenders on a weekly but randomized basis; ensuring that timely intelligence and community status changes are communicated with district commanders and the CPD administration. The Neighborhood Services Units will be fully staffed in each district (beginning with the Eastern

and Western), consisting of officers already posted in patrol units within the division. The five remaining positions under the CPD Division will be fully staffed.

The department will also create CRC objectives that detail how CRCs fit into the department's overall mission. The department will create complementary subcommittees, comprised of neighborhood leaders, who can work with district commanders, the CPD division, and the rest of the department to formulate plans to address community concerns.

Strategic Objective 2.4: Establish a long-term communications plan to highlight positive change to showcase to Baltimore residents, thereby regaining trust and cooperation toward improving public safety

Background: Presently, the department has public communications personnel in its Media Relations Section (MRS), but no long-term, central communications plan. The department has been developing a plan that, once implemented, will help complement changes to community engagement practices, provide more detail to the public about the police department and its operations, and increase day-to-day transparency of police actions.

Strategy: The department will draft a Communications Plan and fully staff the Media Relations Section. This will require hiring an MRS director, a civilian administrative assistant, and rightsizing the unit to handle media demands for the 24-hour per day news cycle.

Strategic Objective 2.5: Assign responsibility for ensuring departmental compliance with the Maryland Public Information Act (MPIA)

Background: There is no set standard operating procedure system to vet the requests to ensure that releases do not disclose confidential or sensitive information.

Strategy: The department will create an MPIA Unit that will operate under the Legal Section.

Strategic Objective 2.6: Improve department liaison with other city agencies that have a stake and role in solving community problems that impact crime

Background: Police agencies have a tendency to consider themselves as operating in a silo, apart from other agencies of the government. Yet, the success of policing in addressing crime and other neighborhood problems such as disorder and quality of life issues requires substantial coordination between police managers and managers of other city departments. This collaboration requires that members of the command staff have specific assignments to serve as liaison with several city departments and other agencies that are beneficial in addressing these neighborhood issues.

Strategy: Every member of the command staff, as a collateral duty, will be assigned liaison responsibility with one or more city agencies and community agencies who can contribute to the effectiveness of addressing crime and neighborhood quality of life issues. The agencies selected will be those who have impact on these problems, who need police collaboration to be effective and who can be leveraged to greater impact when coordinated with the department. The Chief of Staff will identify the departments and agencies to which liaison assignments will be made, and assignments then made in a meeting with the Command Staff. A policy will be developed setting forth liaison responsibilities. Prior to determining these assignments, discussions will occur with the involved departments and agencies to identify those managers who will serve as the contact point for the BPD managers.

Strategic Objective 2.7: Implement new “take back public spaces” efforts and capacities to address quality of life concerns.

Background: The department is seeking to implement new “take back public spaces” campaigns in several areas, including Lexington Market – a historical space with the potential to become a major citywide and tourist destination; Federal Hill, a nightlife hotspot located near the Ravens and Orioles stadiums; and 5100 Park Heights, a commercial face block adjacent to Pimlico Race Track.

Lexington Market is in the middle of a dynamic and changing area. At the outer circle are educational and medical institutions, and the middle circle is comprised of some residences and small businesses, including several methadone maintenance clinics. The market itself is the hub of these two circles. Extensive remodeling of the market is in the planning stage. The market, while active and busy, shows its age and now attracts loiterers. The problems include drug use and

dealing (especially prescription drugs), abuse of methadone, jaywalking, auto and parking violations, aggressive panhandling, and other forms of disorderly behavior.

Federal Hill is an economically stable, middle class area that surrounds one of Baltimore's well known markets: Cross Street Market. Immediately surrounding Cross Street Market is a thriving commercial area with many bars that attract outsiders to the neighborhood, especially over weekends. While crime is not a major problem, disorderly behavior over the weekends is. The disorderly behavior includes drunken misconduct, public urination in the surrounding residential areas, and noisiness, especially after early morning bar time.

5100 Park Heights is a commercial face block adjacent to the Pimlico Race Track. Many businesses in the area are struggling to survive. Police who formerly lived nearby indicate that it has been this way for at least 30 years, indicating that the neighborhood has some regenerative power (i.e.,it avoids a "tipping point" after which the entire area is destroyed.) The main problem in this area is that there are at least five liquor stores in this one face block. In addition to attracting drug dealers, some of the stores themselves violate ordinances (e.g., selling individual cigarettes). This environment has encouraged serious drug dealing and offenses that are consistent with such an area.

One common challenge to all of these areas is Baltimore's lack of a holding facility for intoxicated individuals. Without such a facility, officers must escort detained intoxicated persons or prisoners rejected by the Central Booking Intake Facility (CBIF) due to intoxication to a hospital Emergency Room. The City has been holding meetings to try to find a long-term solution to the problem of what to do medical rejections at CBIF (which is a State facility) generally, which have also included discussions have talks on intoxicated individuals. One Johns Hopkins expert has suggested that she could apply for funding in cooperation with the city to build a "sobering center" modeled after such centers that have been successful on the West Coast.

Strategy: Adopting the highly successful Broken Windows approach developed by George Kelling and James Q. Wilson, the department will draw upon the advice and counsel of Dr. Kelling in developing actions plans for each area identified as having public space issues. The work must consider and bring together actors who can address the challenges presented by four distinct groups: the truly homeless, substance abusers, individuals who suffer from mental health issues, and true predators. It will also address the issue of intoxicated person's behavior and impact on community feelings of safety and security. This will include formalizing the periodic "take back our public spaces" meetings in a "public spaces committee;" investigating whether some bus stops that attract frequent loitering can be moved; initiating dialogue with drug

rehabilitation clinics that are in close proximity to public spaces as well as liquor stores, bartenders, private security personnel, and others; posting community rules; and investigating whether building a “sobering center” or some other arrangement with area hospitals can help alleviate some of the present difficulties associated with medical rejections from the Central Booking Intake Facility.

Strategic Objective 2.8: Formulate a patrol plan to accommodate the Baltimore casino expected in 2015

Background: It is expected that a Casino will open in downtown Baltimore in 2015. The experience in other cities where such casinos have been opened indicates that the local police agencies must carefully liaison with casino security and managerial staff and provide special policing attention to the area around the casino, where there will be substantial crowds and potential for street disorder. Cities such as Detroit and Cincinnati have established special policing districts for these sub-areas, having responsibility for liaison, enforcement, crowd control, event management and related matters, having good success in meeting the challenges of these areas.

Strategy: The department will develop plans for the creation of a special policing district to manage the events associated with the Casino. The district will handle liaison with the Casino, special events in the area of the Casino, and all matters relating to the environment the Casino.

Strategic Objective 2.9: Enhance coordination with the Baltimore City Public Schools and other City agencies to formulate a holistic approach to juvenile crime prevention and policing

Background: Youth disorder, youth crime, youth interaction with police, the police role in schools and the impact of neighborhood violent crime on youth development is a significant problem in many sections of the city. In high crime areas, young people are psychologically impacted by seeing violence or hearing about violent crime in the area in which they live. Many youth come from homes that are troubled, where little supervision is placed on youth activities outside the home. Youth relationships with police can often be problematic, both because of youth behaviors and the lack of skill among police officers in dealing with youth.

The department has also been a partner in the creative StopWatch initiative adopted by the Transit Police in Boston for reducing youth disorder youth school travel hours to school. The StopWatch initiative organized neighborhood volunteers, including school teachers, neighborhood residents, youth workers and others to patrol key problem areas after school, resulting in a dramatic reduction in youth disorder. The neighborhoods of Boston that had substantial after school youth disorder now find the problem has been resolved.

Strategy: The department will create a joint committee of police and school personnel to consider approaches to addressing the problems of youth disorder and crime, in addition to the impact crime events have on youth development. A Coordinator of these efforts will be identified and will work toward implementing the best practices to address these issues. This officer will staff the joint committee, and will develop strategies leading toward implementation of best practice approaches. The Education and Training Section will have staff trained in teaching de-escalation techniques for teenagers, collaborating with a local psychologist who can bring professional insight to the training.

Pillar 3: The Baltimore Police Department will bolster support systems to strengthen data quality and improve information sharing to provide actionable and timely intelligence and support field operations.

Strategic Objective 3.1: Strengthen the Comstat process for managing performance, initially in responding to crime and later the operation of each unit in the department

Background: CompStat is a proven command accountability system that was developed by the New York City Police Department in the mid-1990s and has been adopted by many of the larger urban police agencies in United States. It is credited with being a major factor in driving down American crime, including New York City's lasting crime declines of more than 80 percent. CompStat convenes district commanders, investigative supervisors, and the supervisors of special units for intensive, probing crime strategy sessions that sharpen the focus on current crimes and emerging crime patterns, that enforce communication and coordination among separate units and enforcement functions, and that help to shape and direct enforcement efforts. CompStat should not be just a general review of crime trends but a detail-driven dialogue about individual crimes and crime patterns and the steps being taken to counter them. BPD's "Comstat" could be used to oversee and monitor every component of the anti-crime strategy described above, from the VRO program, to the district commands, to the DDU local investigations, to the SES targeting of gangs, to Homicide Section cases, to district intelligence officers, to evidence collection and processing, to better cooperation with the State's Attorney's Office.

Currently, Comstat is not what should and can be. The session is not run as a probing inquiry of all Part I crime and enforcement, and it is almost totally focused on homicides and shootings to the exclusion of robberies, burglaries, and flex unit and SES arrest activity for these and other crimes. The agenda for the meeting is usually controlled by the field managers called to the podium rather than by the top BPD managers. As a result, the meetings have more the character of presentations than of real questioning sessions designed to share successful strategies or to correct an insufficient focus on crimes, failures of follow-through with respect to specific cases, and departures from the requirements outlined in the plan above. It has been stated here that BPD has most of the components in place to mount successful anti-crime strategies but that some of these components need redirection or refocus. The FOP's "Blueprint" also contends that Comstat became a "whipping post," designed to criticize commanders rather than a problem-solving forum. A primary purpose of the BPD Comstat process should be to ensure that all of these components are working as envisioned, that each is doing its job, and that the work all of all components is continuously coordinated for the most effective use of both intelligence and resources.

Comstat, until late this year, was scheduled in the afternoons, preventing commanders from returning to work after the meetings, and the commanders presented at Comstat in a regular order, which did not ensure the highest level of accountability, as commanders knew that they would not be called on. At present, Comstat questioning is conducted by the three lieutenant colonels who each oversee areas encompassing the nine patrol districts, instead of providing for quality control oversight in each of the districts, which might include helping district commanders to understand the expectations of Comstat and helping them prepare for the meeting by holding area-level or district-level Comstats. Comstat also lack a focus on the actual breakdown of the actual breakdown of crime ("tell me what happened") and the plans to address crime increases ("tell me what you're doing about it"). Comstat, at present, does not include sufficient information on SES operations, such as recaps of SES activities in the districts, or other specialized units. One of Comstat's most important functions is to develop true working relationships among all personnel operating at the district level, including the district commanders, the DDU supervisors, the SES squad leaders, and detectives from centralized units conducting investigations into district crime.

The Comstat report should be revised to provide more with less, so that it provides a quick focus on violent crime and Part I property crime and the enforcement activity against these major crimes. The present report is far too lengthy and unfocused. It includes too many subcategories of the seven major felonies in each district. This information is certainly useful for district commanders, but its inclusion of the report detracts from the broad overview of crime which Comstat is

supposed to provide. The weekly report also does not include crime and enforcement data that occurs after midnight on Saturday, and thus the weekly Comstat data excludes what is generally found to be the high crime hours between midnight and 4 AM on Sunday morning. In all other jurisdictions, the Comstat week is defined as starting on Monday at 12:01 AM and ending Sunday at midnight.

Strategy: The department will change Comstat to include a strong narrative and focus on Part 1 crimes and restructure the Comstat meeting with a set agenda, moderator, and greater focus on citywide crime issues (as opposed to questions which only pertain to one district and should be discussed outside of Comstat). Every district will be ordered to prepare to present at every Comstat meeting, and the “batting order” will be eliminated with districts instead presenting in a randomized order. The department will ensure that the Comstat process is robust enough to oversee and monitor every component of the anti-crime strategy, and will eventually broaden Comstat to include Ceasefire and VRO program components after adoption and problem-solving initiatives aimed at neighborhood disorder and quality of life issues. The department will also amend the Comstat report to help carry out these objectives. This will include limiting the report to ten pages, a citywide page and nine district pages, and also changing the Comstat week to Monday at 12:01 AM to Sunday at midnight. The Comstat process will also be amended to take into account budget, internal affairs complaints (use of force and type), and non-compliant professional appearance standards and equipment maintenance (especially out of compliance vehicles and personnel).

Strategic Objective 3.2: Provide for a daily crime meeting early each day to review crime data from the previous day and determine immediate steps to take to address evolving patterns

Background: It is critically important that the department focus every day on evolving patterns and steps to be taken to address these patterns and solve major crime problems. In its simplest form, this kind of orientation reflects the highly successful “cops on the dots” strategy used by Commissioner Bratton in New York City, which saw a dramatic reduction in crime levels. Successful daily crime efforts need to contain and be focused on the same core components as Comstat, which are 1) timely and accurate information or intelligence, 2) rapid deployment of resources, 3) effective tactics, and 4) relentless follow-up. District commanders and the command staff need to be aware on a daily basis of current and 24-hour crime trends, the location of patterns, and the success or failure of tactics being used to address them. To do this, the department will need to adopt a daily crime report that guides the daily crime call and the command staff to shape a daily strategy.

Strategy: The department will formulate a daily crime report to inform where and how to allocate resources to address crime trends. It will change the bi-hourly Chief of Patrol report to include only violent crime and Part 1 property crime, and require night commanders to compile the daily crime data included in the Chief of Patrol report and call the data into the Watch Center until automatic field-based reporting capabilities are introduced. When these capacities are introduced, it will ensure that they meet the needs of the daily crime call.

Strategic Objective 3.3: Ensure that the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system upgrade will meet departmental needs and specifications

Background: The department is replacing its legacy CAD system because, among other things, the current vendor will no longer support the system. The Mayor's Office of Information Technology's (MOIT) CAD Administrator heads the CAD replacement process and heads a CAD Committee that includes the Communications Unit commander and representatives from other communications and public safety agencies. Among other advantages, the new CAD system will support additional call classifications, easier "polygon" input, advanced mapping features, and better reliability.

Strategy: The department will coordinate the patrol allocation process with the Mayor's Office of Information Technology to ensure consistency with new patrol areas and call classifications.

Strategic Objective 3.4: Enhance field interoperability with departmental information systems to provide better field reporting and information access to all patrol officers and investigators

Background: At present, personnel in the field have little way of accessing or uploading crucial information to or from the estimated 130 departmental databases. The department lacks both the devices and the enterprise infrastructure that would enable this kind of interoperability in a cost-effective manner. The lack of digital field reporting ability has also contributed to deficient informational databases, as information written down on paper fails to be uploaded to the Records Management System (RMS). A contemporary field-based reporting system with CAD computers is critical to efficiency.

Strategy: The department will provide a tablet device for every field officer. It will also replace all mobile devices that use outdated operating systems. All devices, enterprise, database platforms will be interoperable with non-Windows systems. The enterprise platform will be upgraded to ensure secure actions on mobile devices.

Strategic Objective 3.5: Upgrade the Records Management System (RMS) to enable easy and centralized data entry and retrieval. Require all personnel to use the databases according to documented standard operating procedures

Background: The current RMS must be upgraded regardless of other RMS-related objectives to be compatible at least up to Windows 7 (also, as mentioned above, the system is not presently mobile-capable). However, a more common complaint about the system than its technological limitations is that it “does not contain any useful information.” Because the department lacks digital field reporting capabilities and because its present number of databases is so large, the Records Management Unit is not capable of providing basic informational services such as a single master names index, etc. Presently, much information is broadcasted department-wide only through indiscriminate “e-mail blasts.” While the department is presently planning to initiate automatic field-based reporting, it is important to note that even when it is initiated, the Records Management Unit will still have a substantial backlog of information written on paper that needs to be manually entered into the system.

Strategy: The department will integrate all databases into the RMS system as possible (those unable to be integrated into RMS will be integrated into Sharepoint), and will implement strict policies preventing the creation of databases not connected to RMS or Sharepoint unless otherwise authorized by the IT Director. Information Technology will conduct all necessary software, hardware, and off-site recovery upgrades and staff retraining and restructuring to support the RMS upgrade. The Records Management Unit and Management Services Division will assess whether any further steps beyond implementing automatic field-based reporting are necessary to expedite reducing the paper records backlog, including hiring temporary contractors.

Strategic Objective 3.6: Increase departmental capacity to perform long-term technology objectives and system upgrades by adding and re-assigning IT personnel to these functions

Background: Presently, the Information Technology staff runs and provides support services for the department's website and e-mail system. This year, the City plans to centralize all website and e-mail functions to a single citywide system for all city agencies. Technology support calls will be fielded by the MOIT, and the department will only need to update the content of its website.

Strategy: Information Technology will complete the transfer of contracting and help desk staff to MOIT. It will hire and reorient its staff toward long-term departmental technology goals, including data management and mobile architecture.

Strategic Objective 3.7: Ensure completion of all IT enterprise upgrades to ensure that the department stays current on all warranty, supportability, bandwidth, and other technology operating requirements

Background: Server and network infrastructure and other IT components need to be continually upgraded and maintained to keep their speed, reliability, cost-effectiveness, and usefulness for Department operations.

Strategy: Information Technology will conduct an annual review of all software licenses and network infrastructure. It will merge software licenses with MOIT when possible, and will conduct an audit of physical server and network infrastructure.

Strategic Objective 3.8: Establish a joint communications center for Police, Fire, EMS, 9-1-1 and 3-1-1 and ensure robust coordination between the department and these other agencies

Background: At present, 3-1-1 and 9-1-1 call takers as well as the police dispatchers operate under the auspices of the Mayor's Office of Information Technology (MOIT) in the Communications Center in Police Headquarters, while the Fire/EMS dispatchers report to the Fire Department and are located off-premises. The quality of emergency communications practices is integral to the BPD's ability to respond to emergencies and other calls for service; however, since the divergence of the 3-1-1/9-1-1 function from the department, the department has struggled to accomplish some important objectives in the Communications Center. The separate leaders of 9-1-1/3-1-1, MOIT Communications leadership, and departmental communications leadership sometimes "all think that they are in charge." MOIT personnel contend that the department does not adequately communicate its policies or objectives.

Strategy: The department will collaborate with the City to establish the citywide, joint communications center that will synthesize all emergency call-receiving and dispatch services. It will provide input to MOIT throughout the search process to ensure that the City is aware of the department's needs (especially in relation to call/dispatch coding, alternative response, telephone reporting, and the new CAD system and boundaries).

Strategic Objective 3.9: Initiate an alternative response initiative that will reduce the number of calls to which field officers must respond, so they can remain in the neighborhoods to which they are assigned engaged in proactive policing activities

Background: Reducing the number of low-priority calls that receive an officer on scene, keeping officers in the neighborhoods that they are assigned to serve, and providing rapid responses to those reporting routine police matters are critical toward achieving substantial and sustainable progress against violent crime. Dispatching officers to all calls for service – regardless of whether their presence can make a tangible impact in a case outcome – takes officers out of assigned posts and neighborhoods, detracting from the department's core problem-solving strategies, and it delays the resolution of routine police matters which citizens would prefer to be solved as soon as possible, which contradicts the department's service-orientation. Towards ending the practice of dispatching officers to all low priority calls, the department has created a Telephone Reporting Unit (TRU), presently staffed with five to six light-duty officers (depending on the shift), which can take police reports pertaining to 1) identity theft, 2) lost property, 3) stolen cars, 4) thefts from vehicles, 5) destruction of property, and 6) illegal dumping over the phone where there are no traces at the scene that would help officers locate a suspect. 3-1-1, which, like 9-1-1, operates under the auspices of City Communications, can take almost the same police reports; however, 3-1-1 and 9-1-1 calls, Initial Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) Reports, and interviews with various Communications personnel reveal that 3-1-1 operators do not often inform callers that they can take police reports, do not ask the right questions that would lead them to offer to take police reports, and sometimes flatly ask whether the caller would like to see a police officer in person outright. (Indeed, at last count, the TRU had written more reports in one month than 3-1-1 had written all year).

At present, there are two ways that 3-1-1/9-1-1 calls for police service can be written without an officer dispatched to the scene. First, 3-1-1 operators can take police reports for the same 6 types of calls that TRU will take mentioned above except that 3-1-1 maintains a rule formerly upheld by the TRU as well that its operators will not write reports if the amount damaged, stolen, or lost amounts to more than \$1,000. Second, callers who report these types of incidents to 3-1-1 may be told that an officer will be dispatched anyway (see below), and 9-1-1 does not take police reports; thus, callers are told that

an officer (or usually just “someone”) will be dispatched, and the calls are added to the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. At this point, the TRU will intercede in the dispatch process. They observe the CAD display and look for these types of calls, pulling them from the dispatch queue and calling the callers back.

TRU has been operational since July 1, but was beset by problems at its inception, though many have now been rectified. Remaining problems include inconsistent and insufficient staffing. When TRU was first created, many staff assigned to the unit simply never reported for duty there. There is also much turnover in the unit, as its officers are only assigned there while they are on light-duty, which can sometimes be only one week. This creates significant turnover in the unit, forcing the commanding officer to continually train new members. Additionally, the light-duty officers’ frequent medical appointments often keep them from work, affecting staffing levels.

Perhaps the most serious lingering problem both for the TRU as well as other areas of the department is call miscoding. The TRU’s commanding officer contends and evidence from CAD appears to suggest that 3-1-1 and 9-1-1 operators often miscode calls for service. If low-priority calls are miscoded as higher priority, the TRU will not intercede in the dispatch and thus officers will be sent to the scene.

Finally, Baltimore, unlike other jurisdictions, lacks a telephonic alternative response unit. In other jurisdictions, police officers or specially designated civilian agents can respond to certain low priority calls for service such as noise complaints, issues with youths including after-school disturbances, landlord-tenant disputes, family arguments, concerns about neighbors, property disputes, and traffic speed complaints. This provides more immediate service to callers and keeps officers on their patrol assignments. Such a program is especially crucial in Baltimore where patrol resources are already scarce and demand for police services is very high, and the Commissioner has indicated that the TRU should ultimately be transformed into a full-fledged telephonic alternative response unit.

Strategy: Effective immediately, the department will make every effort to only send officers to those situations in which having an officer on scene will be beneficial and necessary. Over the long-term, the TRU will also expand its purview into phone intervention by light-duty officers as it gains more resources. It will continue to develop its alternative response strategies, which will include a greater use of online reporting (there is a website at present, but it is not well-advertised and no surveys have been conducted which gauge satisfaction with the website), phone intervention by light-duty officers, referral to other agencies, and making appointments for individuals to see officers at a later time. The department will

cooperate with MOIT to retrain 3-1-1 operators to inform callers that they can take police reports and to better distinguish between calls for which reports can and cannot be taken. This process will include a quality control component for 3-1-1 and 9-1-1 operators to ensure that they code calls properly. The Communications Unit, together with Human Resources, will assign all TRU operators for six-month minimum tours of duty and only assign officers who are expected to be on light duty for more than 30 days, and will explore assigning final-year cadets to the TRU. The final-year cadets would likely be enthusiastic about the assignment, and would learn valuable report-taking skills. The department should also consider adding civilian specialists with customer service backgrounds to bolster the TRU in case additional personnel are needed beyond sworn personnel staffing. These specialists could be called “telephone reporting officers” or something similar, and they would be trained to write police reports like the 3-1-1 operators. The department’s Government Relations personnel will also examine the City’s false alarm reduction ordinance to determine if changes in the ordinance or enforcement practices. All of these areas will require the development of new policies and operational procedures for departmental as well as MOIT Communications staff.

Pillar 4: The Baltimore Police Department will be an organization that maintains the highest standards of ethics, integrity, and accountability.

Strategic Objective 4.1: Create a Use of Force Review Board and Force Investigation Teams

Background: Major uses of force always demand investigation in order to determine whether the use of force was within the boundaries of ethical guidelines, orders, and training. The department is initiating a Use of Force Review Board concept modeled after the Las Vegas model, which was planned and implemented by the US Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. The Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau has authored two draft General Orders for new Use of Force Review Board and Force Investigation Teams (FITs). When the Office of Internal Oversight has sufficient personnel, its FITs will include investigators for the criminal investigation as well as the administrative investigation. Criminal major use of force investigations are currently conducted by the Homicide Section, while the Internal Affairs Division (IAD) conducts the administrative investigations. Transferring these functions to FITs will ensure that officers who are trained to conduct investigations of incidents such as police officer-involved shootings (POISs) and other interactions that result in death in fact conduct all such investigations, and the transfer will place all internal affairs capacities under the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO).

The Use of Force Review Board will be specialized in adjudicating use of force cases. Force Investigation Teams (FITs) will submit a report and prepare a presentation for the Use of Force Review Board, which will render a finding. The finding and facts of the case will then be forwarded to the Commissioner by the OIO. After the Commissioner reaches a decision, a version for public release will be made available on the department's website and will be presented to the civilian review board.

The Use of Force entities will also have responsibility for investigating and adjudicating police officer-involved shootings. Presently, as per Maryland state law and FOP agreements, departmental investigators – currently multi-unit POIS teams that will be replaced by FITs once they are operational – respond to POIS shootings and request but do not require information from the officer who fired shots. Due to legal and contractual constraints, the department waits until criminal proceedings against the officer are completed before beginning administrative ones (administrative proceedings begin once the department receives a “declination letter” from prosecutors except in the rare circumstance when an officer is actually prosecuted). The recent departmental changes in POIS policies concern investigatory changes to witnessing officers. Now, IAD conducts “walk-throughs” with witnessing officers – which, at present, are only intended to record officers’ positions (including the shooters’) – to reconstruct POIS scenes with witnessing officers to gain a more complete picture of what occurred; however, compared to national best practices, there is still some room for improvement. Under the new draft GOs on the Use of Force Board and Teams, the POIS investigating function will be transferred to the FITs and be adjudicated by the Use of Force Review Board.

Strategy: The department will finalize and implement the General Orders on the Use of Force Review Board and FITs. The General Orders will include rules that require the FITs to collect the information provided to the first responding supervisor by the involved officer under the “public safety statement “rule. The FITs will also respond to scenes to interview witnessing officers. The FITs will immediately add one sergeant and four detectives, who conduct the administrative investigations. When the pool of FIT officers is expanded, the teams will also take over the criminal investigations from the Homicide Section. The PSAB will also collect data on all police officer-involved shootings so that the data can be used to inform officer training to meet real-life circumstances.

Strategic Objective 4.2: Adjust the Charging Committee to enhance fairness and command oversight

Background: The Charging Committee is a required entity established by the *Hopson* case settlement. All internal affairs charges that are sustained by the IAD will go through the Charging Committee. At present, internal affairs investigations can be conducted by Command Investigation Units (CIUs) in cases of minor violations and more serious charges are investigated by the IAD. The IAD decides if an officer is in violation of an infraction. The IAD finding is then forwarded to the Trial Board Office, which adds the charges to the finding. Once the charges are added, the Charging Committee assesses a proposed penalty. The Trial Board Office then ensures that the officers are served with the proposed penalty. At this point, the officer charges can opt for a hearing in front of the Trial Board or accept the Charging Committee's disciplinary actions.

There is a belief that the Charging Committee has been handing down, and perhaps continues to hand down, unfair verdicts that do not consider the accused officer's disciplinary and work history with the department. A thematic goal across the department's internal affairs and promotions policies are to consider a holistic view of officers. In the case of the internal affairs system, the department is seeking to ensure that disciplinary bodies do not only consider the infractions that have brought officers before them, but also the officers' history with the department and the internal affairs system. The Commissioner and the command staff contends that an officer with a lengthy disciplinary history should not incur the same punishment as an officer with little or no disciplinary history even for the same infraction. Recently, departmental leadership emphasized this to the Charging Committee, but some Committee members undermined the message. The Charging Committee's reputation for not considering work or disciplinary history have given it a reputation for handing down unfair verdicts, and this has also compounded problems with other internal affairs entities, notably contributing to a two to three year bottleneck at the Trial Board where accused officers typically seek more lenient rulings.

Strategy: The Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau will reform the Charging Committee and composition to ensure that its hearings provide a holistic view of defendants, including their work and disciplinary histories. It will remove any Committee members who refuse to follow guidance to consider accused officers' work and disciplinary history. Furthermore, the department will explore alternative Committee structures with police labor relations subject matter experts, and it will communicate any changes to the Committee to all sworn personnel to ensure that they know that they can receive a fair trial in front of the Committee.

Strategic Objective 4.3: Restructure the Internal Affairs Division investigators to enhance command oversight, provide a more complete view of cases and accused officers, and reduce the risk of favoritism

Background: In order to ensure that rank and file officers have confidence in the IA system and the command staff, they must trust in the impartiality and quality of the investigations which lead to the IA processes' outcomes. Currently, IAD sergeants review all investigations, which are then reviewed by lieutenants, and then the Chief Internal Affairs. This recent reform has increased command oversight, the ability for the investigatory process to capture a "complete picture" of the officer in question, and reduced the risk of favoritism. However, the investigations are still conducted by detectives, whose findings do not carry the gravitas, knowledge of departmental culture, rules, and regulations as would investigations conducted by personnel of higher rank. Also, because officers are typically the subject of investigations, it is possible that the investigations reflect a favorable bias toward the accused.

Strategy: IAD should be restructured so that sergeants will conduct all investigations.

Strategic Objective 4.4: Reform General Orders on personnel conduct to improve and better broadcast the department's integrity and dedication to the community

Background: The department is undertaking an initiative with a third-party specialist to review all departmental policy and governing procedures, standardize their formats, and provide a digital interface for easy reference. The contractor, Lexipol, is a national specialist in building law enforcement policy databases and reviews. The 18-month process to implement the new policies and procedures includes a review of all current policies to ensure that they are current on Maryland and federal law, best practices, and coherence with other departmental regulations, and will result in a merging of all present documentation formats such as Police Commissioner's Memorandums, General Orders, Standard Operating Procedures, etc. This will result in a single document format and database, which will be easily accessible to all officers – including in the field when officers are issued tablets as called for earlier in this document. Lexipol will also provide continuing service to the department, including ensuring that the policies stay current on legal precedents and new laws and a training mechanism for presentations during officer roll calls. The Lexipol project is expected to be completed by 2015.

The Commissioner has also identified a number of new disciplinary policies written that will assist the department in improving its public image. The department is concerned both with avoiding the appearance of impropriety and inactiveness in the eyes of the community as well as preventing such behaviors outright. The department, for instance, has never had a policy on fraternization. This year, the department enacted the first of the new General Orders on such issues identified by the Commissioner, which prohibits more than two on-duty officers from eating in the same dining establishment under normal circumstances.

Strategy: The Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau (PSAB) will continue to work with Lexipol to construct the new policy and procedures database. It will liaise with Information Technology will ensure Lexipol product meets BPD requirements. The PSAB will coordinate with the Lexipol team to check the legal status of the existing GOs and PCMs and write new ones as need be. Information Technology will coordinate with Lexipol to ensure that changes can be made to the new policy database to ensure that it is always current with the structure of departmental policy documents. The department will also enact new policies on fraternization and assess other areas for improvement in this area.

Strategic Objective 4.5: Initiate a body-worn cameras trial

Background: The Commissioner and members of the Command Staff have expressed an interest in conducting a body-worn cameras trial. Recently, a body-worn cameras trial by the Rialto, California Police Department found that they drastically reduced officers' use of force and complaints against officers. However, the cameras have also incurred complaints from citizens and police officers alike in some jurisdictions. Thus, it is crucial that any plan to introduce cameras moves slowly and gains "buy-in" from officers and the community. Commissioner Batts implemented a body-worn cameras policy for all officers in Oakland, California as Chief of Police. That pilot program clearly identified the need for a well-thought out policy that protects officers' and citizens' constitutional rights and privacy. In California, for instance, it was found that all footage reported by the camera was able to be released under California's equivalent to the MPIA; thus, the media and the general public had the right to review all departmental footage captured via body-worn cameras. Such a policy could generate privacy concerns for officers and citizens alike.

Strategy: Initiate a body-worn cameras trial and study group to evaluate whether body-worn cameras fit the needs of the department. The study group will examine expected cost to procure the cameras (both for the trial and department-wide),

operating costs, expected savings (from expected declines in litigation costs), operational benefits and detriments, and recommended initial operating policies. The study group will also reach out to other Maryland law enforcement agencies that presently use body-worn cameras or are conducting body-worn camera trials to learn about their programs' protocols and capacities.

Strategic Objective 4.6: Initiate a police officer vehicle accident prevention campaign to dissuade dangerous driving on- and off-duty

Background: The Commissioner has expressed a desire to start a police officer vehicle accident prevention campaign. Over the last five years, sworn personnel with less than five years of experience have been involved in 1,295 accidents. There is a concern among some in the department that young personnel may be driving overly aggressively because they do not consider the risks of their actions, and the Commissioner has expressed an interest in a documentary-style PSA featuring family members and spouses of officers killed in the line of duty in auto accidents. The department's Accident Investigations Unit (AIU) investigates all line-of-duty accidents and accidents involving departmental vehicles, based on AIU's investigation, Fleet Safety determines whether the accident was preventable or non-preventable. While there is nothing that indicates that those investigations are systematically deficient, the compilation of data cannot reveal key factors about personnel driving habits that could be useful in an accident aversion campaign. These include whether the officer was responding to a call for service, whether the officer had activated her/his emergency lights and sirens, and what time in the officer's shift the accident occurred (for example, one can reasonably hypothesize that many accidents might occur near the end of shifts when officers are fatigued). The department has begun to film a video Public Safety Announcement that will dissuade dangerous driving behavior.

Strategy: The Accident Investigations Unit will determine what additional data is needed to allow the discovery of the statistical trends behind auto accidents and compile them. The department will circulate its video PSA to all current officers as well as cadets and academy recruits.

Strategic Objective 4.7: Ensure that all employees have access to counseling services for non-work related issues such as domestic violence and alcohol abuse

Background: The department has convened a committee to examine present wellness strategies and determine whether employees are receiving proper counseling for issues such as domestic violence. The committee has included representatives from the FOP, House of Ruth, the Vanguard Justice Society, social services, representatives from departmental contractors, other medical professionals, non-governmental health organizations, other departmental stakeholders, and others. Currently, counseling is provided to civilian personnel through the City's multi-agency Employee Assistance Plan (EAP) and to sworn personnel through Psychology Consulting Associates (PCA), which also performs the psychology component of the department's background investigations. The commander in charge of the Human Resources section has raised concerns that PCA's counseling services are underutilized because officers fear that supervisors might have access to the information provided during counseling visits (which is not the case).

Strategy: The department will ensure that all personnel feel comfortable utilizing counseling services and know that they can do so in confidence. To ensure that personnel feel comfortable using these services, it will initiate an intra-department advertising campaign for anonymous counseling services. The campaign will emphasize that the department will not be informed of any personnel's use of the services (unless the individual poses a threat to safety).

Strategic Objective 4.8: Assess recruiting policies, outreach efforts, and retention strategies to stabilize the department's sworn workforce

Background: In 2012, the department tested 3,150 applicants who wished to become sworn officers. Of this 3,150, 213 applicants (6.7%) passed all of the requirements to become Baltimore Police Officers. Considering this year's attrition thus far (247 officers who left) and last year's ratio of applicants-to-hired officers, the department would need 3,653 applicants to replace the departing officers, a percentage increase of 16%. However, this plan of action seeks to expand patrol and other sworn functions, and, in fact, the hiring rate this year has declined dramatically thus far, with only 130 hired and with four academy classes already filled. Some of the expansions in this plan can be accomplished through civilianization of positions that are currently performed by sworn officers, by eliminating redundant police activities, and – most crucially – by strategies to increase retention, but the department needs also to find more applicants, and especially better-qualified applicants.

The 2013 net attrition of 117 officers every year is clearly not sustainable for an agency with about 2,900 sworn officers. One possible culprit is a pay differential between the BPD and other area law enforcement agencies. The FOP's "Blueprint" has identified officer retention as a key priority toward improving policing in Baltimore, and the department is committed to taking action to preserve its sworn workforce.

Strategy: The department will collaborate with a law enforcement recruitment specialist to examine outreach efforts and recruitment processes. The department will consult surveys and focus groups already conducted on employee morale to structure its retention strategies. The department will also conduct exit surveys for all officers leaving the department to determine their reasons for doing so.

Strategic Objective 4.9: Establish accountabilities for every rank and assignment in the department, with particular emphasis on how managers will be assessed and the authorities those managers must have to be successful

Background: The members of the department should have a clearly defined set of "accountabilities." Accountabilities list all the qualities of performance by which sworn personnel at particular ranks (from police officer to Commissioner) are judged. There is one list for police officers, and every rank above adds additional responsibilities. This highly successful model was first put into service by the Cambridge (Massachusetts) Police Department. It clearly defines expectations for every sworn member of the police department.

Strategy: The department will adopt the rank accountabilities set listed in a previous section of this plan. It will link those accountabilities into the performance evaluation process, and will provide guidance and training to all members of the department on those accountabilities and how they link to individual performance.

Strategic Objective 4.10: Conduct periodic surveys of personnel to ensure that they are hearing and understanding departmental priorities and that the department is gauging employee morale and satisfaction with specific areas of the department

Background: The department has tended to collect officer feedback on a sporadic basis, and a far more formal process is required. As a part of the development of this Strategic Plan, a survey of department personnel was conducted, with a substantial number of responses. The department needs to conduct regular surveys of personnel to determine employee perceptions, knowledge of current policies and procedures, perspectives on department priorities, review of job satisfaction and related matters. This will provide a regular picture of changes in morale, job satisfaction, and issues that need to be addressed from the employee perspective.

Strategy: The department will develop a survey instrument and determine a timeframe for conducting the survey of employees using an online, automatic survey service. The department will decide who should be assigned to perform the planning, research, and management of the survey process and providing regular reports on survey results. Members of the department will be provided with a summary of survey results.

Strategic Objective 4.11: Improve and standardize performance evaluation procedures

Background: As police departments move from a traditional model of policing towards a community and problem-solving model, new standards must be developed and implemented for performance evaluation to provide employees with guidance on their strengths and areas in which they can improve performance. The current performance evaluation system relies on standardized criteria that no longer reflect the expected standards for good performance in a community-oriented police agency focused on addressing crime reduction and quality of life issues in the neighborhoods. New performance evaluation criteria must be developed, and implemented in a manner that is positive for employees but also provides guidance on how they can improve their performance in the new critical areas.

Strategy: The department will form a working group to develop a new performance evaluation instrument reflecting the accountabilities for each rank described in a previous part of this Plan. It will ensure that Human Resources personnel from the City are involved in the design process. The draft evaluation instrument will be shared with employees to gain feedback prior to finalizing the form, and guidance will be provided to employees in the use of the form.

Strategic Objective 4.12: Implement a centralized overtime management and control system to reduce overtime hours and costs

Background: Overtime in the department, while generally allocated to the various commands, is not carefully monitored and is sometimes spent on activities where there is little need for overtime assignment. Use of overtime in the districts does not directly relate to crime patterns or peak hours of policing need. Thus, the cost of overtime in the department is far higher than many other similar-sized police agencies.

Strategy: An overtime control protocol will be developed and implemented. Overtime amounts will be carefully allocated to the various districts and units of the department, and the district or unit commander will be expected to ensure that overtime expenditure does not go over the allocated amount. The Commander will be held accountable for management of that overtime. A portion of the department's total overtime will go into an emergency fund controlled by the Office of the Police Commissioner, to be used only in emergencies. Commanders who do not manage their overtime effectively will face sanctions.

Strategic Objective 4.13: Ensure the fitness and availability of sworn personnel by incentivizing wellness and better managing officers on light duty or medical leave

Background: At present, all injured officers go to a single doctor at Mercy Medical to evaluate whether they should be placed on "408" or other light duty. The department is concerned that officers should return to their full-time duties as soon as they are well enough to perform their regular duties. The Human Resources section has been examining some possibilities, including hiring a third-party contractor or using the Department's Workers Compensation company's case managers to provide medical expertise to the Department in evaluating non-line of duty injuries.

Additionally, the department is seeking to implement and the FOP has long-requested the creation of a fitness incentive program. As presently conceived, personnel would take an initial test, then classes, and then pass levels, becoming eligible for bonuses just before Christmas. These will incentivize general health and fitness and will use cardio-endurance and weight loss as their metrics (as opposed to strength gains, etc.).

Strategy: The department will contract with a third-party to provide medical expertise to the department in evaluating non-line of duty injuries (in determining whether to assign non-line of duty injured officers to long- or short-term light duty, medical leave, or full duty). The department will collaborate with Risk Management to offer a fitness bonus program.

Strategic Objective 4.14: Designate standards for “secondary employment” to ensure that the terms for police presence at all special events are fair, clear, legal, and not burdensome for the department

Background: Secondary employment” refers to a number off “special event overtime”-type details that officers accept outside of their regular duties. Currently, there are no standardized policies pertaining to or designated types of secondary employment. Fees charged for policing special events do not capture the actual cost of service because vendors are usually charged a \$1 per hour fee plus the cost of overtime, which excludes the cost of full administrative overhead, traffic control outside the venue, and other “indirect costs.” As such, only about half of special event costs between 2010-2012 were reimbursed (the 2012 net special events cost was \$4.5 million). Of particular concern are the overtime policies toward large stadium events. In addition to the above, BPD is not reimbursed for the full cost of overtime.

Strategy: The department will standardize secondary employment and special event overtime practices. This will include charging the full rate for cost of services for stadium events, including traffic control, and increasing the police services fee for all special events (with discounts and some exemptions for charitable events).

Strategic Objective 4.15: Create a facilities improvement and maintenance plan that will address building cleanliness, security, safety, and other facility-related matters

Background: In recent years and like municipal agencies across the country, the department has cut back on facilities management-related expenses to divert funding to more essential, operational expenses. However, the current state of departmental facilities likely does hamper morale, security, and safety. The outdoor range is also hampering training, as its main staff training building and vehicles are in poor condition and the combat range – which is being updated – is not currently functional. It also appears that the department may not have taken full advantage of potential funding sources, particularly the City’s Capital Improvement Fund, managed by the Department of City Planning.

Strategy: The Facilities Unit will create a facilities improvement and maintenance plan that includes all departmental facilities that states standards for upkeep, condition, and any required upgrades. Submit the facilities improvement plan for third-party bidding. The facilities improvement and maintenance plan should include the removal of old cell blocks, adding training and recreation facilities, adding a roll call room, boiler room upkeep (leaking pipes, etc.), HVAC, and more. The department will also create a campaign to enlist employees in improving facilities conditions, including scheduling “clean up days” with personnel and local volunteers. The Facilities Unit will conduct facilities security assessments to ensure proper placement and presence of security cameras and locks. The department will also add a decontamination shower to the first floor of the “new” Headquarters building for use by Crime Lab personnel in case of accidents involving hazardous materials, and the Gunpowder Range facilities upgrades should be expedited or the facilities supplemented with temporary alternatives to ensure that marksmanship does not deteriorate. Finally, the department will submit improvements for facilities renovations through the City’s Capital Improvement fund.

Pillar 5: The Baltimore Police Department will be a learning organization that is capable of acting with expertise in all areas of law enforcement.

Strategic Objective 5.1: Reform the Field Training Program to more closely align with the “San Jose model” and other national best practices

Background: As a key priority, the Commissioner seeks to change departmental philosophy towards education and training such that the department becomes a “learning organization.” Among other things, this evolution will require major reforms in the field-training program – many of which are currently under way. Previous reviews of field training have found a number of deviations in the Baltimore Police Academy from national best practices. One of the most serious deficiencies in the program was its length, which the Education and Training Section is already planning to lengthen. The department also does not have sufficient numbers of certified trainers, often utilizes officers on training probation for tasks that they are not yet prepared for, minimal adherence to performance standards, and little supervision by patrol staff. Additionally, there are currently many field-training officers (FTOs) who currently do not perform field-training functions, and those in the program have too little incentive to perform duties relating to it. (The present additional compensation for FTOs is \$14 per day). Additionally, the Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commission (MPCTC) adopted new guidelines that must be met by July 1, 2014 for FTOs. These will require that the department to train and re-certify FTOs by that date according to statewide mandates.

Strategy: The department will amend in-service training rules to provide training that is consistent with national best practices and Maryland state law. It will retrain and increase incentives for FTOs and eliminate any who do not have a genuine interest in training recruits. This will be done by surveying current FTOs to determine which wish to and should remain in the program, and sending all FTOs through required recertification training. To ensure that the FTOs are able to meet the guidelines, the department will amend in-service training rules to make the recertification training count as in-service training credit. The department will also explore avenues to increase FTO incentive. Toward ensuring the best standards, the department will increase the field-training period to ten weeks, including at least four with the same FTO and mandate that field trainees will always be placed with a certified FTO if possible. If not possible, the trainee will be placed with a sergeant, and, if that is not possible, then with a non-certified officer. The department will also expediently fill the vacant Education and Training Section Director vacancy.

Strategic Objective 5.2: Increase reality-based scenario training at the Police Academy and through in-service training

Background: While the department's training protocols and results are improving under present leadership and the Education and Training Section's transfer to the PSAB, the department is in need of further improvement in its reality-based scenario training. On January 9, 2011 a "friendly fire" incident outside of the Select Lounge in downtown Baltimore claimed the lives of an officer and a civilian. An investigation by an independent commission later determined that poor crowd control and incident command training played a role in the incident. In another incident on February 12, 2013, a BPD instructor shot a Police Academy recruit in the head during a training exercise at the Rosewood Center in Owings Mills, Maryland. The instructor was found guilty in a court of law of reckless endangerment. Following this incident, the Commissioner temporarily suspended training exercises while a review was conducted. This review found numerous deficiencies in use of force training, mobile field force training, FTO training, felony car stop training, barricaded suspect training, vehicle pursuits, and police-involved shootings. Improving training and officer safety is a paramount objective of the Baltimore Police Department, one that is crucial for carrying out the visions set forth in this Plan. The department is nearing completion of one important objective in this area: training, equipping, and mobilizing the Emergency Action Teams (EATs). The EATs have been trained and will be ready for deployment when they are fully equipped.

Strategy: The Education and Training Section will implement new reality-based scenario training at the Police Academy and through in-service training, including curriculum changes that will be certified by the MPCTC. The department will

enact critical reforms to the following training areas: use of force, mobile field force, felony car stop, vehicle pursuit policies, barricaded suspects, and small unit tactics. Specifically, use of force training will be amended to certify all FTOs as use of force instructors. The department will ensure that all officers are fully trained and certified in the safe use of less-lethal weapons, e.g. Tasers and less-lethal shotguns. Mobile field force (MFF) training (e.g. crowd control) will be amended so that training will include all ranks that may be called for MFF deployment. MFF will be synced with the new emergency operations procedures, and training for both the procedures and MFF will incorporate mounted unit deployment, appropriate training, and equipment. Supervisors will also receive training on an annual basis. The PSAB will ensure a regular review of vehicle pursuit policies. Finally, the department will ensure deployment of the EATs, and a regular review of their tactics.

The Education and Section will also assemble a training review team will be consisting of advanced trainers that will help the rest of the Education and Training Section develop training philosophy and ensure consistency across different types of training. Additionally, it will develop a new training schedule that permits training to take place on a more continuous basis instead of all-at-once. This will allow personnel to better internalize new information, ensure that perishable skills are not lost, and maintain consistent district patrol workload, as current practices take officers out of the field for a full week at one time.

Strategic Objective 5.3: Form a committee to re-examine the curriculum in the sergeants and lieutenants' school

Background: Department sergeants and lieutenants require enhanced supervisory skills so they can ensure that police officers receive the guidance and support they need for maximum effectiveness. There has been a tendency for mid-level supervisors to push decision-making up the chain of command when decisions ought to be made at their own level. In past years, the department has not supported such decision-making, which is required if officers are to achieve the results sought in this Plan. The list of accountabilities described in a previous section of this plan lays out the expectations for each level, but sergeants and lieutenants require additional training to fully understand and have the skills needed for effective supervision.

Strategy: The Education and Training Section will form a committee to develop an in-service training program for sergeants and lieutenants focusing on their accountabilities, supervisory responsibilities, and management practices that

are most effective. The training program will encompass case studies where effective supervision and management practices have improved field performance, particularly in regard to crime reduction, neighborhood problem solving, and building relationships of trust with neighborhood residents and leaders. The section will submit the training program to the MPCTC by mid-2014.

Strategic Objective 5.4: Improve adherence to General Orders, Police Commissioner’s Memorandums, and legal guidelines throughout all ranks of the department

Background: Unlike many other states, Maryland does not require that sworn personnel holding a rank higher than sergeant complete annual in-service training. The department presently maintains only the minimal in-service training standards, including the lack of any such standards for lieutenants, captains, and majors. To insure consistency with the adherence to departmental policy across all ranks, the department requires a continuing education mechanism.

Strategy: The department will initiate a continuing education requirement for lieutenants, captains, and majors to ensure current knowledge of all GOs, PCMs, and legal guidelines. A digital training bulletin will be issued whenever practices are discovered that contravene departmental policy. The in-service requirements will be checked periodically to ensure that they stay current on all departmental policy, including the new policy formats created by the Lexipol project.

Strategic Objective 5.5: Develop community policing lesson plans for in-service and academy training

Background: The Police Academy and in-service training curriculum (which must be approved by the MPCTC before put into use) needs to be updated to include BPD’s Community Policing SOPs. Perhaps most critically, this training needs to inform all trainees and officers on how to interact with community members and gather community feedback. Not all officers feel comfortable interacting with community members, and this training needs to facilitate that comfort. It also needs to reinforce that community members must always be treated with respect, how to report community feedback to supervisors, and how to approach cultural differences so that individuals of unfamiliar backgrounds to officers are not treated with suspicion.

Strategy: The Education and Training Section will develop community policing training based on the Community Policing Division Standard Operating Procedures. It will amend academy and in-service training curriculum to reflect the community policing SOPs and other community policing best practices and submit all curricula changes to the MPCTC. The department will engage community members and outside experts on community relations and policing practices. The department will assess whether it is feasible to send recruits to community organizations as a curriculum requirement to learn about issues of concern to the diverse communities of Baltimore.

Strategic Objective 5.6: Develop youth interaction training that will inform trainees and current personnel about best practices in interacting with youths

Background: Juvenile crime prevention requires special training due to differences between child and adult thinking processes and capabilities. Children respond to authority differently than adults. They are often not yet capable of making mature judgments, and they are neurologically prone to higher risk behavior versus adults. Arresting youths for misdemeanor crimes is often highly counterproductive, as it can foment a lifelong anger toward law enforcement, send misbehaving youths to juvenile detention facilities where they may be recruited by gangs or become criminally violent, and ruin educational and career opportunities, possibly leading them to more serious crimes in the future. The department, in consultation with Johns Hopkins University, presently conducts training days with city youths in an Outward Bound program, which demonstrate to officers how the youths solve problems.

Strategy: The Education and Training Section will integrate youth engagement training in academy and in-service training. The department will coordinate with subject matter experts to build a training and awareness program in align with national best practices.

Strategic Objective 5.7: Implement detailed emergency response procedures that include contingency planning for specific types of emergencies, major incident chains of command, and emergency liaising procedures with other city agencies

Background: As mentioned above, the department is replacing its current disaster and emergency plan with one that is more detailed and complements the City's multi-agency plan. The draft plan contains detailed instructions for establishing perimeters around incidents, establishing incident command structures, evacuation procedures, intra- and inter-agency

communication, and more. The department is also creating first drafts of emergency checklists for particular types of incidents. The department has already conducted some training initiatives – for instance, on active shooters – with multiple partners, but the complete introduction of the new plans will require further training and discussion as they represent large changes in emergency procedures for the department. The plans will need to be periodically checked to ensure that they are current on departmental structure and capabilities. For example, the emergency operations plans will need to be amended to include the Emergency Action Teams (EATs) once they are operational.

Strategy: The department will complete drafting and implementing new disaster and emergency management plans and checklists. The Education and Training Section will develop in-service and academy training for the new emergency operations procedures. The department will also adopt a regular review process to ensure that the plan stays current on departmental and City structure, capabilities, and organization. The department will integrate its emergency procedures into City multi-agency emergency response procedures, including liaising with other City entities such as other public safety agencies, the Mayor’s Office of Information Technology, the Public Safety Emergency Communications Committee, and other City agencies.

Strategic Objective 5.8: Initiate a holistic “promotability”-based promotions process to create a continuous learning organization

Background: The Commissioner has been a vocal advocate of using the promotions process to support problem solving and create a culture of learning in the department. His concept of “promotability” is intended to create a promotions process that takes a holistic view of candidates, examining their work performance, education, critical thinking skills, and more. This concept should be applied in all departmental promotions to see that the most excellent candidates are promoted.

The City currently has a contract with a company that writes the tests for sergeants and lieutenants examinations. A recent round of lieutenants exams took place, and the Human Resources Section is planning to solicit feedback from test-takers.

The Commissioner also wishes to introduce a more rigorous application process for all at-will ranks (captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, and deputy commissioner). To do this, the Legal Section needs to assist Human Resources to

construct an application that cannot be legally construed as a test with set scoring guidelines or other elements that could be considered to be similar to a civil service exam (such as those for lower ranks).

Strategy: The department will ensure that all promotions processes assess candidates' critical thinking and problem-solving skills. These processes will reflect candidates' 1) experience, 2) education, 3) work-assignment performance, and 4) testing that reflects problem-solving skills (as described above). The department will explore additional reforms with the City Department of Human Resources to the sergeants and lieutenants exams to encourage critical thinking and problem-solving skills (as opposed to rote memorization of GOs and PCMs), and it will survey all takers of the current sergeants and lieutenants exams to gauge whether the exams are appropriate. The department will construct an essay-based application for all at-will positions in line with the "promotability" and continuous learning concepts. All at-will applications will be vetted by the Legal Section to ensure that it cannot be construed as a civil service-type exam.

Summary – There are many important actions that must be taken to bring the Baltimore Police Department to the level desired by the Baltimore community. These actions will be prioritized and sequenced so they can occur in a logical manner. It will take some time for some of them to be accomplished, and some require budgetary allocations beyond currently available resources.

The department will assign a coordinator to monitor progress of the implementation and report monthly on progress. The priority implementation steps will focus on strengthening the department's effectiveness in addressing crime, building trusting relationships with the community, improving the information systems in support of field and investigative personnel, and improving the management of the disciplinary process towards fair and equitable treatment of all members of the department.

The sheets that follow provide a detailed listing of the implementation steps for each strategic objective. These sheets list the steps to be taken and the manager accountable for the action listed.

Pillar 1: The Baltimore Police Department will reduce crime throughout the City by targeting gangs, guns, violent repeat offenders, and the conditions that allow crime to flourish.

Strategic Objective 1.1: Challenge District Commanders to improve crime reduction in their districts and bolster patrol officers reduction impact to give them the ability to do so				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
1.1.1	Implement accountabilities, the daily crime report, and resource allocation changes to enable district commanders to be the primary drivers of strategy in their districts.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
1.1.2	Evaluate district resources and personnel assignments on a regular basis.	Continuous	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
1.1.3	Ensure that shift lieutenants and sector sergeants have the resources to impact and are held accountable for reducing regular crime trends and conditions in their areas.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
1.1.4	Create a Patrol Staffing Assessment Working Group to manage the patrol allocation process. Form an Operations Analysis Unit to provide staff assistance to the Staffing Assessment Working Group. The group will consider whether to implement a sector deployment model as well as whether to split the Northeastern district in the near-term.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
1.1.5	Create an Operations Analysis Unit to collect and analyze information on workload and organizational performance	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
1.1.6	Contract for technical assistance in the review of district and post boundaries and required staffing levels based on crime and workload.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 1.2: Strengthen the investigative process to increase closure rates and bolster criminal cases against violent offenders				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
1.2.1	Target investigatory efforts based on the Violent Repeat Offender list and	Medium-term	Budget-	IIB Deputy Commissioner

	provide the Operational Intelligence Section the necessary input to compile that list.		neutral	
1.2.2	Standardize the District Detective Units, including management practices, case assignment protocols, and case management systems. This will also include the Major overseeing the DDUs to conduct regular visits to observe these practices at work.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.2.3	Conduct a pilot of geographically based homicide investigations.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.2.4	Work with the State’s Attorney’s Office to address court writing ability concerns and monitor the new court management systems to ensure that it results in a higher percentage of officers making scheduled court appearances.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 1.3: Develop a robust Baltimore “Ceasefire” program to target violent, gang-related crime				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
1.3.1	Arrange for consultation with the National Network for Safe Communities in New York City.	Short-term	TBD	Chief of Staff
1.3.2	Select a City coordinator for the Ceasefire initiative and a police commander to oversee enforcement actions.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief of Staff
1.3.3	Brief all federal and state partners regarding the initiative and create a federal/state partners working group on enforcement actions.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief of Staff
1.3.4	Create a citywide Ceasefire steering group.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief of Staff
1.3.5	Conduct outreach to the faith community and other community organizations for participation.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
1.3.6	Brief the department on the initiative and develop a “game plan” for implementation	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Commissioner

1.3.7	Collect intelligence information on groups related to violent acts. This will include a “map” of the interrelationships between these groups and their members.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.3.8	Instruct department and community members and relevant representatives of other agencies on the Ceasefire process	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	Chief of Staff
1.3.9	Develop scripts for and schedule the first call-in of violent/potentially violent actors. Hold the call-in in collaboration with clergy, community members, social agencies, and federal and state partners.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	Chief of Staff

Strategic Objective 1.4: Strengthen the link between the Special Enforcement Section, the Intelligence and Investigations Bureau, and the districts				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
1.4.1	Assign at least one SES team to each district (with more assigned to Districts in higher need of special enforcement)	Medium-term	Budget neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.4.2	Establish six to eight SES Major Case Teams that can be sent to districts in case of violent crime spikes or where intelligence indicates the presence of more sophisticated, entrenched gangs or cliques. Each team should be assigned a prosecutor from the State’s Attorney’s Office to assist the investigation.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.4.3	Increase coordination and information sharing between the SES, the districts, and other investigatory and intelligence units.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 1.5: Increase the Operational Intelligence Section’s reach across the districts and the department and create a centralized Violent Repeat Offenders (VRO) Program				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
1.5.1	Develop metrics for evaluating all OIS units and complete assessments of all units based on these metrics.	Short-term	Budget neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner

1.5.2	Establish District Gang Intelligence Officers in each district under the supervision of the OIS	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.5.3	Initiate meetings to create initial VRO scoring criteria lead by OIS and including AIS, Homicide Unit, the District Detective Units commander, and the State's Attorneys Office. AIS will use the criteria to compile an initial list. The meetings will also determine how often the VRO committee will meet to review the list.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.5.4	OIS will amend the AIS initial VRO list based on human intelligence and investigatory and other priorities of the department and State's Attorney's Office. Assign responsibility for investigating VROs to appropriate units.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.5.5	Conduct regular reviews of the VRO list as per the recommendations from the VRO committee.	Continuous	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 1.6: Maximize assignment of police officers to the districts so that they can undertake crime control and problem-solving activities of concern to the neighborhood.				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
1.6.1	Complete the civilianization of the quartermasters, including two quartermasters supervisors and four storekeepers.	Medium-term	Cost Savings	Chief Financial Officer
1.6.2	Civilianize fiscal section positions that do not require sworn personnel.	Short-term	Cost Savings	Chief Financial Officer
1.6.3	Conduct a cost-benefit study to determine whether the department will save funds by privatizing the quartermasters function and receive the same level of service.	Long-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer
1.6.4	Determine whether any other administrative, sworn positions can be civilianized.	Short-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer
1.6.5	Evaluate staffing and productivity of officers assigned to external groups and task forces.	Medium-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer

Strategic Objective 1.7: Strengthen the department’s response to evolving crime patterns through real time reporting of crime data, strengthened crime analysis, and proactive assignment of personnel to hotspots

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
1.7.1	Increase staffing in all Analytical Intelligence Section units.	Medium-term	TBD	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.7.2	Coordinate with Information Technology and the Records Unit to centralize all intelligence databases and all pertinent intelligence intake functions in the CitiWatch Unit and the Watch Center.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.7.3	Restructure AIS Units to include specialized roles that are reflected in position titles. This includes the addition of tactical crime analysts for each district and the addition of crime/intelligence analysts who can be assigned to the Watch Center in case of emergencies.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.7.4	Transform the Watch Center into a <i>bona fide</i> , departmental intelligence fusion center, augmenting capabilities with new technology and personnel resources.	Long-term	TBD	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.7.5	Delineate the CitiWatch Unit functions from those of the Watch Center and re-name both units.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 1.8: Improve the field evidence collection process and the laboratory analysis of the evidence collected

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
1.8.1	Convene a working group to address evidence-processing backlogs, including but not limited to prioritization, the appropriate level of analysis that should be done on each case, and when preliminary reports can be forwarded to investigators.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
1.8.2	Fully staff the Crime Laboratory Section	Long-term	TBD	IIB Deputy Commissioner

Pillar 2: The Baltimore Police Department will develop and maintain relationships of trust with all members of the Baltimore community and work collaboratively with other organizations to solve community problems.

Strategic Objective 2.1: Make impartiality, legitimacy, and procedural justice core principles of police-civilian interaction				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
2.1.1	Consult with external subject matter experts to introduce in-service and academy training on fairness, impartiality, legitimacy, and procedural justice.	Short-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
2.1.2	Invite community members to address in-service and academy classes.	Short-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
2.1.3	Ensure that all officers understand the importance of the aforementioned concepts and that they will be assessed accordingly.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 2.2: Increase patrol field contacts by increasing foot patrols and ensuring that officers have a “felt presence,” interacting with citizens and addressing quality of life concerns in the neighborhoods to which they are assigned				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
2.2.1	Increase foot patrols.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
2.2.2	Integrate training from the Department of Justice COPS Office.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
2.2.3	Invite community leaders to address academy classes.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
2.2.4	Submit all new training to the MPCTC, if applicable	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 2.3: Fully implement the new Community Partnership Divisions strategies and Standard Operating Procedures, including staffing the Neighborhood Services Units and the rest of the division				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
2.3.1	Fully implement the liaising function between CPD, the Neighborhood Services Units, and the districts.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
2.3.2	Finalize and fully staff the CPD organizational structure.	Medium-term	TBD	NPB Deputy Commissioner
2.3.3	Amend the CPD SOPs to support the CPD pillars (re-entry, explorers and youth, faith-based, and community policing), including SARA problem-solving protocols.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
2.3.4	Create Community Relations Councils objectives and complementary subcommittees.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 2.4: Establish a long-term communications plan to highlight positive change to showcase to Baltimore residents, thereby regaining trust and cooperation toward improving public safety				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
2.4.1	Finalize the departmental communications plan.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief of Staff
2.4.2	Fully staff the Media Relations Section.	Short-term	TBD	Chief of Staff

Strategic Objective 2.5: Assign responsibility for ensuring departmental compliance with the Maryland Public Information Act (MPIA)				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
2.5.1	Create, fully staff, and develop the SOPs for the MPIA Unit.	Short-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 2.6: Improve department liaison with other city agencies that have a stake and role in solving community problems that impact crime				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
2.6.1	Assign every member of the command staff, as a collateral duty, to liaise with one or more city and/or community agencies that can contribute to addressing neighborhood crime and quality of life concerns.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief of Staff
2.6.2	Identify which agencies can help the department achieve the above goals.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief of Staff
2.6.3	Develop policies setting forth liaison responsibilities.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief of Staff

Strategic Objective 2.7: Implement new “take back public spaces” efforts and capacities to address quality of life concerns				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
2.7.1	Develop a comprehensive “take back public spaces” plan based on “broken windows” theory and the needs of identified public spaces.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
2.7.2	Formalize the public spaces working group and add any new members who would be necessary for addressing new spaces added to the campaign or to address the following groups of individuals: homeless individuals, chronic substance abusers, mentally disturbed individuals, and predators.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
2.7.3	Form a separate committee in collaboration with other city agencies and academic institutions to examine the possibility of forming “sobering centers” or otherwise finding a long-term solution to the problem of medical rejects from the CBIF.	Long-term	TBD	NPB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 2.8: Formulate a patrol plan to accommodate the Baltimore casino expected in 2015				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
2.8.1	Create a special police district to manage the events associated with the Casino.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
2.8.2	Establish a Casino liaison commander.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 2.9: Enhance coordination with the Baltimore City Public Schools and other City agencies to formulate a holistic approach to juvenile crime prevention and policing				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
2.9.1	Assign a coordinator from CPD to collaborate with third-party experts, Baltimore Public Schools, and the Baltimore Public School Police to develop a program to develop best practices in departmental protocols towards youths.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
2.9.2	Collaborate with psychological experts to advise officers on youth interactions.	Short-term	TBD	NPB Deputy Commissioner

Pillar 3: The Baltimore Police Department will bolster support systems to strengthen data quality and improve information sharing to provide actionable and timely intelligence and support field operations.

Strategic Objective 3.1: Strengthen the Comstat process for managing performance, initially in responding to crime and later the operation of each unit in the department

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
3.1.1	Amend the Comstat packet by limiting it to ten pages, one for citywide and one for each nine districts. Each page will assess only the seven major felonies. The Comstat week will be amended so that it runs from 12:01 AM on Monday until midnight on Sunday.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
3.1.2	Restructure Comstat with a set agenda, moderator, and strong focus on citywide crime issues. Select districts to present in a randomized order so that each district commander is prepared at every meeting.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
3.1.3	Amend the Comstat process to include information on specialized units and related operations, activities within the districts, account budget, internal affairs complaints, non-compliant professional appearance standards and equipment maintenance, and eventually VRO and Ceasefire program components.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 3.2: Provide for a daily crime meeting early each day to review crime data from the previous day and determine immediate steps to take to address evolving patterns

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
3.2.1	Create a system for the collection of Part 1 crime data from 1200 AM to 11:59 PM for the previous day, every morning. This will include every district and a count of all Part 1 crimes. Information on shots fired reports should be included as a separate category as well as robberies involving a firearm.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner

3.2.2	The department will require all officers to submit a crime report for those incidents to which they respond by the end of their shift. Investigators should provide a written update for their activities for each crime to which they respond as well.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
3.2.3	Arrange that every district submit Part 1 crime data to the Watch Center by 6 AM every morning. The Watch Center staff will create a report showing the data from each district on a single report. This report will include crime mapping.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
3.2.4	Distribute the Crime Report to all members of the Command Staff Monday through Friday by 6AM for the previous day period from 12:01 AM to 11:50 PM.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
3.2.5	Hold a morning crime meeting Monday through Friday at 10:00 AM to review the previous day's crime events in each district and develop real-time strategies to address evolving patterns. On Mondays, the meeting will review the weekend events.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
3.2.6	Link District Commanders into the call by video, with the link permitting the Commanders to see the Headquarters staff in the meeting.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
3.2.7	Provide the District Commanders with visual crime maps of the previous day's major crime events.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner
3.2.8	Following the daily crime meetings, each District Commander will brief district supervisors of the day's strategy and objectives.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 3.3: Ensure that the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system upgrade will meet departmental needs and specifications				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
3.3.1	Coordinate patrol allocation process with the Mayor's Office of Information Technology, especially regarding new patrol areas and call classifications.	Continuous	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 3.4: Enhance field interoperability with departmental information systems to provide better field reporting and information access to all patrol officers and investigators.

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
3.4.1	Upgrade enterprise platform to ensure secure actions on mobile devices and ensure interoperability with non-Windows systems	Medium-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer
3.4.2	Replace all legacy mobile devices that use outdated operating systems	Medium-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer
3.4.3	Provide a tablet for every field officer. The tablets will meet minimum standards set by the department, and will be compatible with key departmental databases, including RMS and Lexipol. The tablets will also be equipped with automatic field-based reporting capability.	Medium-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer

Strategic Objective 3.5: Upgrade the Records Management System (RMS) to enable easy and centralized data entry and retrieval. Require all personnel to use the databases according to documented standard operating procedures

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
3.5.1	Integrate all departmental databases into RMS. Those that cannot be integrated into RMS will be integrated into Sharepoint. The department will maintain a strict database policy that prohibits the creation of databases outside of RMS except with the explicit permission of the IT Director.	Medium-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer
3.5.2	Information Technology will conduct all necessary software, hardware, and off-site recovery upgrades and staff retraining and restructuring to support the RMS upgrade	Medium-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer
3.5.3	The Records Management Unit and Management Services Division will assess whether any further steps beyond implementing automatic field-based reporting are necessary to expedite reducing the paper records backlog, including hiring temporary contractors.	Long-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer

Strategic Objective 3.6: Increase departmental capacity to perform long-term technology objectives and system upgrades by adding and re-assigning IT personnel to these functions

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
3.6.1	Complete transfer of contracting and help desk staff to MOIT	Short-term	Cost-savings	Chief Financial Officer
3.6.2	Reorient staff toward long-term departmental technology goals, including data management and mobile architecture	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief Financial Officer

Strategic Objective 3.7: Ensure completion of all IT enterprise upgrades to ensure that the department stays current on all warranty, supportability, bandwidth, and other technology operating requirements

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
3.7.1	Conduct an annual review of all software licenses and network infrastructure. Merge licenses with MOIT when possible.	Continuous	TBD	Chief Financial Officer
3.7.2	Conduct an audit of physical and network infrastructure.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief Financial Officer

Strategic Objective 3.8: Establish a joint communications center for Police, Fire, EMS, 911 and 311 and ensure robust coordination between the department and these other agencies

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
3.8.1	Establish a citywide, joint communications center that will synthesize all emergency call-receiving and dispatch services	Long-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer
3.8.2	Collaborate with the City in hiring a joint communications center director who is familiar with law enforcement practices and procedures.	Long-term	Budget-neutral	Chief Financial Officer

Strategic Objective 3.9: Initiate a call reduction response initiative that will reduce the number of calls to which field officers must respond, so they can remain in the neighborhoods to which they are assigned engaged in proactive policing activities

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
3.9.1	Retrain 311 operators to inform callers that they can take police reports and to better distinguish between calls for which reports can and cannot be taken.	Short-term	Budget neutral	Chief Financial Officer
3.9.2	Initiate a 311 and 911 quality control process to ensure that calls are being properly coded into the Computer-Aided Dispatch system.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief Financial Officer
3.9.3	Assign all TRU operators to 6-month minimum tours of duty. Explore whether final-year cadets might be suitable candidates to increase TRU staffing.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief Financial Officer
3.9.4	Create a departmental process to examine in what areas the TRU can take on alternative response roles, when it has appropriate staffing to do so, while ensuring that caller service will be enhanced, and following all applicable laws. When the unit takes on such roles, rename the unit "Alternative Response Unit."	Long-term	Budget-neutral	Chief Financial Officer

Pillar 4: The Baltimore Police Department will be an organization that maintains the highest standards of ethics, integrity, and accountability

Strategic Objective 4.1: Create a Use of Force Review Board and Force Investigation Teams				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.1.1	Finalize and implement General Orders on the Use of Force Review Board and FITs.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
4.1.2	Establish administrative investigative capabilities for the FITs.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
4.1.3	Establish criminal investigative capabilities for the FITs.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
4.1.4	Appoint members to the Use of Force Review Board	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
4.1.5	Initiate POIS data collection and reporting so that the data may be used to inform training. Data should include rounds fired, rounds hit, circumstances on the interaction (response to the call, foot or vehicle pursuit, etc.).	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 4.2: Adjust the Charging Committee to enhance fairness and command oversight				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.2.1	Adjust Charging Committee composition to ensure holistic views of defendants.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
4.2.2	Explore alternative Charging Committee structures with a qualified subject matter expert.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
4.2.3	Communicate any changes to the Charging Committee to all sworn personnel	Continuous	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 4.3: Restructure the Internal Affairs Division investigators to enhance command oversight, provide a more complete view of cases and accused officers, and reduce the risk of favoritism

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.3.1	IAD will be restructured so that sergeants will conduct all investigations.	Medium-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 4.4: Reform General Orders on personnel conduct to improve and better broadcast the department's integrity and dedication to the community

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.4.1	Continue to identify policy and procedures that need to be reformed in consultation with Lexipol.	Continuous	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
4.4.2	Collapse all policy into a single documentation format.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
4.4.3	Ensure legal standing and internal coherence between all documented policies.	Continuous	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
4.4.4	Construct and maintain a digital database of all policies in coordination with Lexipol.	Long-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
4.4.5	Issue new General Orders on fraternization and drug testing.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 4.5: Initiate a body-worn cameras trial

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.5.1	Initiate a body-worn cameras trial and study group.	Medium-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
4.5.2	Examine expected costs of trial and initial operational policies.	Medium-term	Budget-	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

			neutral	
4.5.3	Procure body-worn cameras for trial phase.	Long-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
4.5.4	Evaluate body-worn camera trial, including officer feedback, citizen complaints, evidentiary impact, impact on use of force, and impact on officer misconduct. The study group will also examine other Maryland jurisdictions and areas where body-worn cameras are not being used.	Long-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 4.6: Initiate a police officer vehicle accident prevention campaign to dissuade dangerous driving on- and off-duty				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.6.1	The AIU will assess the categories in its compiled reports to determine what additional categories are needed to pinpoint what common elements precipitate on- and off-duty accidents.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
4.6.2	Complete and circulate video PSA to all current officers, cadets, and academy trainees.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	Chief of Staff

Strategic Objective 4.7: Ensure that all employees have access to counseling services for non-work related issues such as domestic violence and alcohol abuse				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.7.1	Initiate an intra-departmental advertising campaign that communicates that sworn personnel can be assured that they can utilize PCA's counseling services in confidence. The campaign will emphasize that departmental personnel will not be notified about the visits or the content of those visits except in the very rare circumstance where individuals pose a threat to public safety.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief Financial Officer

Strategic Objective 4.8: Assess recruiting policies, outreach efforts, and retention strategies to stabilize the department's sworn workforce				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.8.1	Consult with law enforcement recruiting expert to examine outreach efforts and recruitment processes.	Short-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer
4.8.2	Examine existing surveys and focus groups on employee morale to assess retention strategies.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief Financial Officer
4.8.3	Issue exit surveys for all officers leaving the department.	Continuous	Budget-neutral	Chief Financial Officer

Strategic Objective 4.9: Establish accountabilities for every rank and assignment in the department, with particular emphasis on how managers will be assessed and the authorities those managers must have to be successful				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.9.1	Adopt the Accountabilities as listed in the Strategic Plan.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief of Staff
4.9.2	Amend performance evaluation procedures and metrics to reflect the accountabilities.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief Financial Officer

Strategic Objective 4.10: Conduct periodic surveys of personnel to ensure that they are hearing and understanding departmental priorities and the department is gauging employee morale and satisfaction with specific areas of the department				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.10.1	Assign an individual to construct departmental surveys via an online survey instrument to be circulated to all departmental employees. The Commissioner will decide which issues will be surveyed.	Short-term	TBD	Chief of Staff
4.10.2	The same individual will report on survey results regularly to both the Commissioner as well as the department.	Continuous	Budget-neutral	Chief of Staff

Strategic Objective 4.11: Improve and standardize performance evaluation procedures				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.11.1	Form a performance evaluation working group to develop a new performance evaluation instrument reflecting accountabilities for each rank. This group will include representatives from the Department of Human Resources.	Short-term	Budget neutral	Chief Financial Officer
4.11.2	Draft and circulate new performance evaluation criteria that reflect service- and problem-oriented policing goals and the new accountabilities. Solicit feedback on the new criteria.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	IIB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 4.12: Implement a centralized management and control system to reduce overtime hours and costs				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.12.1	Implement centralized overtime budget protocol. Link all overtime hours with a digital system and weekly reports that detail how many hours supervisors have used in the last week, how many during the current month, and projected use for 30-days.	Short-term	Cost savings	Chief Financial Officer
4.12.2	Reallocate a portion of overtime budget to the Commissioner's Office to be used at the Commissioner's discretion.	Short-term	Cost savings	Chief Financial Officer
4.12.3	Develop sanctions for supervisors who mismanage their overtime allocation.	Short-term	Cost savings	Chief Financial Officer

Strategic Objective 4.13: Ensure the fitness and availability of sworn personnel by incentivizing wellness and better managing officers on light duty or medical leave

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.13.1	The department will contract with a third-party to provide medical expertise in overseeing medical evaluations of officers who are being evaluated for light duty or medical leave.	Medium-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer
4.13.2	Establish a fitness incentive.	Medium-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer

Strategic Objective 4.14: Designate standards for “secondary employment” to ensure that the terms for police presence at all special events are fair, clear, legal, and not burdensome for the department

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.14.1	Charge for full rate for police services at stadium events, including for traffic control and any other police-related services.	Short-term	Cost savings	Chief Financial Officer
4.14.2	Restructure police services fees for all special events	Short-term	Cost savings	Chief Financial Officer

Strategic Objective 4.15: Create a facilities improvement and maintenance plan that will address building cleanliness, security, safety, and other facility-related matters

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
4.15.1	Draft a facilities improvement and maintenance plan that states standards for upkeep, condition, and any required upgrades.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	Chief Financial Officer
4.15.2	Submit improvement plan maintenance section for third-party bidding	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	Chief Financial Officer
4.15.3	Conduct security assessments of all departmental buildings, focusing on	Short-term	Budget-	Chief Financial Officer

	cameras and locks.		neutral	
4.15.4	Add a decontamination shower to the first floor of the “new” Headquarters.	Short-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer
4.15.5	Upgrade or temporarily replace Gunpowder Range facilities that are currently nonfunctional.	Short-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer
4.15.6	Submit renovation proposals to the City’s Capital Improvement Fund	Medium-term	TBD	Chief Financial Officer

Pillar 5: The Baltimore Police Department will be a learning organization that is capable of acting with expertise in all areas of law enforcement.

Strategic Objective 5.1: Reform the Field Training Program to more closely align with the “San Jose model” and other national best practices				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
5.1.1	Reassess the FTO pool through surveys that will gauge genuine interest in training recruits.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.1.2	Increase the FTO incentive and retrain all FTOs to current departmental and certification standards. The training will count as FTOs’ annual in-service.	Medium-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.1.3	Increase the field training program to ten weeks, including at least four with the same FTO.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.1.4	Fill the E&T Director vacancy.	Medium-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 5.2: Increase reality-based scenario training at the Police Academy and through in-service training				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
5.2.1	Implement reality-based scenario training, including in use of force, mobile field force, barricaded suspects, and felony car stops.	Medium-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.2.2	Train personnel in use of less-lethal force weapons.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.2.3	Sync mobile field force training with new emergency operations procedures.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.2.4	Procure and distribute remaining EAT gear and patrol rifles. Develop deployment protocols for EATs	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.2.5	Establish a regular review policy for vehicle pursuits	Continuous	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

5.2.6	Assemble a training review team comprised of advanced trainers that will assist the E&T Section in developing a training philosophy and a consistency among departmental training.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.2.7	Develop a new training schedule that will enable more frequent training for fewer hours at a time.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.2.8	Certify all FTOs as use of force instructors	Long-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 5.3: Form a committee to re-examine the curriculum in the sergeants and lieutenants' school				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
5.3.1	E&T will form a committee to develop the new in-service training school. The committee should include current sergeants and lieutenants as well as members of the command staff and external experts or members of other law enforcement agencies if warranted.	Short-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.3.2	Direct the committee to include case studies where effective supervision and management have improved field performance, especially in regard to crime reduction, neighborhood problem solving, and building relationships of trust.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.3.3	Submit the new training curricula to the MPCTC	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 5.4: Improve adherence to General Orders, Police Commissioner's Memorandums, and legal guidelines throughout all ranks of the department				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
5.4.1	Initiate an in-service training requirement for lieutenants, captains, and	Continuous	Budget-	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

	majors that covers all GOs, PCMs, SOPs, legal guidelines, and related documents.		neutral	
5.4.2	Issue digital training bulletins whenever practices are discovered that contravene departmental policy or laws.	Continuous	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.4.3	Ensure that the in-service guidelines cohere to departmental policy and policy formats.	Continuous	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 5.5: Develop community policing lesson plans for in-service and academy training				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
5.5.1	Develop community policing lesson plans for in-service and academy training based on Community Partnership Division SOPs.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.5.2	Examine current training curricula to determine whether existing training is in concert with the new lesson plans.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.5.3	Arrange for academy community policing lessons to feature community members and/or external community relations or community policing experts.	Medium-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.5.4	Study the feasibility of sending recruits to community organizations as a curriculum requirement.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.5.5	Submit all curriculum changes to the MPCTC.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 5.6: Develop youth interaction training that will inform trainees and current personnel about best practices in interacting with youths				
	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
5.6.1	Integrate youth engagement training into academy and in-service	Short-term	Budget-	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

	training.		neutral	
5.6.2	Coordinate with subject matter experts to build a training and awareness program in align with national best practices.	Short-term	TBD	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.6.3	Submit all curriculum changes to the MPCTC.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner

Strategic Objective 5.7: Implement detailed emergency response procedures that include contingency planning for specific types of emergencies, major incident chains of command, and emergency liaising procedures with other city agencies

	PRIORITY ACTIONS	Implementation Time Frame	Fiscal Impact	Assignment of Responsibility
5.7.1	Complete drafting and implementing the new disaster and emergency management plan and checklists. This will include checklists for specific types of incidents, such as active shooter and terrorism incidents, mass civil disorder, structural collapses, and natural disasters.	Short-term	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
5.7.2	Develop new in-service and academy training for the new emergency operations procedures.	Medium-term	Budget-neutral	PSAB Deputy Commissioner
5.7.3	Conduct quarterly reviews to ensure that the plan and checklists are current on departmental and City capabilities, equipment, and organization.	Continuous	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner
5.7.4	Liaise with other City agencies to integrate the plan into the City’s multi-agency emergency response procedures.	Continuous	Budget-neutral	NPB Deputy Commissioner

APPENDICES

A. Patrol Staffing and Deployment

B. Baltimore Police Department Strategic Anti-Crime Plan

C. Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau Reform and Recommendation Matrix

Appendix A

Patrol Staffing and Deployment

September 19, 2013

This chapter will evaluate the degree to which the Baltimore Police Department has the capability to collect workload information, analyze staffing needs and use that information to deploy patrol personnel. This work is generally referred to as patrol operations analysis which provides information on how time is spent on work that can be used for patrol managers and supervisors.

Operations analysis capability is important because the foundation of an effective urban police agency is its patrol force. Patrol officers have the most face to face contact with the community and can have a significant impact on police community partnerships. Generalist patrol officers should be capable of dealing with most of the problems that are confined to the patrol areas to which they are assigned.

Some agencies create special units to deal with neighborhood based crime problems and in the end those approaches do not have long term impact in neighborhoods. Special units move from hot spot to hot spot and unless patrol officers consistently spend time to deal with the conditions that generated those hot spots, they usually flare up again. Specialization should only take place based on a division of labor between patrol officers and special units assigned to work that patrol officers are not in a position to complete.'

Just putting more officers into patrol staffing is not enough to make an urban police agency effective. The patrol work schedule and geographic assignment system should assigns officers to duty in a way that fits staffing to workload levels and builds ownership of territory. Patrol officers need enough uncommitted time throughout the day to work on crime and order maintenance problems in neighborhoods and not just when call rates are lower. Attempting to implement crime reduction strategies using an inefficient deployment system will only frustrate patrol officers and damage the credibility of a police department in the community. Enough proactive patrol time must be consistently available at times when the community needs it most.

In evaluating the patrol operations analysis process in Baltimore, the role of emergency communications and support from information technology staff will be addressed. Call takers set expectations for police service based on what they tell callers about when the police will arrive.

Patrol Work Schedules

Patrol personnel should be scheduled for duty in a manner that fits the number of patrol officers to workload levels by hour of the day and day of the week. Deployment plans may need to be changed seasonally and adjusted to provide officers with more

uncommitted time at prime times for problem solving activities. At the same time, patrol deployment plans should assure that enough officers are on duty to respond to calls for police service in a reasonable period of time based upon accurate call prioritization. Accurate patrol workload data is needed to adjust a work schedule to fit demands for service from the public by hour of day and day of week.

Schedules should also be designed to minimize fatigue and provide officers some choice in their work hours. Research findings point to the impact of shift rotation, sleep patterns, and the impact of overtime on officer wellness. These well documented factors must be taken into account in designing work schedules.

Geographic Deployment

Along with staffing to workload, patrol officers should be assigned to neighborhoods based on a geographic deployment system that creates ownership of territory. Too many times ownership of work is tied to a time period that makes up a shift when officers are on duty. Without ownership of territory, problems are just passed from shift to shift. Instead, patrol officers need to be consistently assigned to a geographic area for which they are responsible for the crime problems and community satisfaction levels. Teams of officers assigned to each geographic area within a district should develop formal plans to use proactive patrol time address problems within their area.

Patrol areas should be designed to have equitable levels of workload and call prioritizations should help officers answer most of the calls that are generated from their assigned area. Boundaries for beats should account for communities recognized by residents as well as for the territory encompassed by neighborhood organizations. For residential areas with little identity or few neighborhood organizations, demographic data like age and family size may be useful in defining beats. In non-residential areas, land use information should be used in an attempt to create relatively homogeneous beats. To promote good response to true emergencies, beat boundaries should recognize boundaries like railroad tracks, bodies of water, or interstate highways. Patrol officers should play an active role in the beat design process by contributing their knowledge of problems in the city that are not captured through information on calls for service.

Measuring Patrol Staffing Needs

Officers per thousand population is sometimes used as a basis for comparing police staffing among communities. As a measure, officers per thousand population does not accurately define workload or service needs. Different communities have different rates of calls for service and crime problems even if they have the same population. Population characteristics and economic conditions have more impact on police service needs than just total population. In the end, officers per thousand

population is an approximate measure of what a community is spending on law enforcement not what it needs.

Changes in levels of reported crime have been used as a basis for setting police staffing levels. Yet a great deal of patrol workload is not crime related. Some neighborhoods can have few crimes reported but need traffic enforcement and order maintenance related to juvenile problems.

Just counting numbers of calls for service is not an adequate measure either. Some types of calls require more units and take more time than others. The seriousness of calls also varies by hour of day and day of week. Some shifts might have the same or even fewer calls but more units may be needed to answer them.

In the end, the number of police personnel needed must be based on the number of patrol officers needed on duty to provide an adequate level of service to the community. Once the number of patrol officers to be fielded has been determined, the number of supervisors and command personnel needed (based on a reasonable span of control) can be decided. Detectives, support staff, and all other positions in the police service are tied to the footprint for the organization that is established by staffing the patrol function.

Because policing is a labor-intensive service, staffing needs should be judged in terms of how time is spent on tasks. Time is indeed money in law enforcement. Policy decisions both inside and outside a police department about how patrol time is spent can have a significant impact on patrol staffing levels. The remainder of this chapter will evaluate the current patrol deployment process and recommend changes that should be included in the BPD Strategic Plan.

Calls for Service in Baltimore

The first step of the assessment was to obtain data on calls for service captured in the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system managed by the Mayor's Office of Information Technology (MOIT). Interviews were conducted with the Director of Unified Call Center Services, BPD Research and Planning staff, BPD Information Technology staff, and the City's CAD Administrator to find out where call for service records in the CAD system were stored so they could be used for this study. Here are the results of those interviews.

- Only live data used day to day in the CAD system was stored for 12 months. No staff at the BPD or MOIT knew how to download that data from the CAD system so it could be analyzed.
- Records of calls for service created by call takers are downloaded to the Police Records Management System (RMS) but that does not include

work patrol officers complete as a unit status change which are tasks that are not calls for service. Unit history data is erased when call records are downloaded to the RMS system.

- MOIT and the CAD Administrator were aware of the problem plans are in place to establish a comprehensive data warehouse when the current CAD system is upgraded so that all data collected on patrol workload will be available for analysis.
- No one unit within the BPD is responsible for operations analysis. As a result, no call for service based management reports are generated on a regular basis that describe time spent on calls, officer initiated activity, administrative tasks and proactive work.

With assistance from a Senior Programmer in the BPD Information Technology Section, raw call for service records were found in the RMS system. Five years of data is now available to the BPD to analyze call for service workload using some of the tools described in this chapter. This report will make use of the most recent calendar year, 2012.

Defining Calls for Service

Calls for service entered into the CAD system in Baltimore by 911 call takers can be for a wide variety of tasks. Dispatchers use these CAD records to document the caller's name, address and type of service provided. Some of those calls were generated by the public and others by officers as a result of routine patrol duty. Officer initiated calls can be influenced by supervision, officer initiative and the number of officers available for duty.

CAD records for 2012 were analyzed to develop some basic business rules for classifying call for service records. Police agencies that do patrol operations analysis work establish these kinds of business rules with input from patrol personnel and 911 staff so that there is agreement on how CAD records are counted.

- **Calls for service from the public** – Calls for service from the public to which units were dispatched.
- **On View Calls** – A wide range of proactive work was coded in this category to include car stops as well as administrative tasks like personal breaks.
- **Diverted** – Priority 5 calls with no units, zero travel time and at scene time.

- **No Voice 911 Calls** – Canceled by officers and dispatchers based on information or past history regarding calls.
- **Request assistance** – This is the “Situation Found” used in the CAD system and are officer generated calls.
- **Supervisor calls** – Someone from the general public requests to see a patrol supervisor regarding a previous call or report

Table 1 contains the data for each of these categories. The number of calls for service from the public can not be easily compared with other communities. Business rules for counting calls can differ from agency to agency. Income, employment and commuting patterns can all impact call rates. Conclusions that can be drawn are:


- ✓ There are half as many on view calls created as calls from the public which means that there is an effort on the part of patrol officers and dispatchers to document how time is used. District 2 had the lowest number (26,413) and District 3 had the highest (64,261) which was more than 50% higher. There may be supervisory and management practices in some districts that impact these results.
- ✓ Silent 911 calls that are canceled by officers are not dispatched calls but are a significant source of work for patrol personnel. These calls are assigned to a unit and then canceled based officer knowledge of the address or telephone number. While these calls have no recorded service time they would be handled more efficiently in the 911 center based on call history and screening policies.
- ✓ A very small percentage of the over 1.2 million call records are resolved (diverted) by call takers. This may reflect a philosophy in the 911 center of pushing calls out to patrol officers and supervisors for them to decide on how to handle them.

Table 1: Call Records Created – 2102

Type of Call	District 1	District 2	District 3	District 4	District 5	District 6	District 7	District 8	District 9	Total
Public Generated Calls	71,187	72,787	57,474	95,597	73,254	72,161	59,493	66,909	75,169	644,031
On View Calls	48,357	26,413	64,261	39,025	39,070	28,005	40,491	39,516	41,221	366,359
911 Calls No Voice Canceled	27,032	15,606	25,909	32,759	17,370	19,545	19,200	24,497	16,739	198,657
Diverted By Call Takers	2,517	1,357	1,419	2,242	1,850	1,736	1,278	1,432	1,522	15,353
Request Assistance	820	981	726	1149	973	1044	727	836	1007	8,263
Supervisor Calls	576	379	438	783	437	488	456	435	518	4,510
Total	150,489	117,523	150,227	171,555	132,954	122,979	121,645	133,625	136,176	1,237,173

Call Rates

Figure 1 shows the variation in the number of calls dispatched per district. Most of the districts (5 of 9) were around 73,000 calls per year with Northeast having substantially more calls than any other district. East and West were below 60,000 calls.



Just counting calls is not enough to make decisions on the allocation of personnel to a district. The number of units and time needed to handle those calls is important. Districts can have similar call totals but not the same levels of serious crime which requires more staff time to handle. As of December 2012, each district was staffed with the following numbers of actual (not authorized) patrol officers primarily responsible for answering calls for service in neighborhoods.

[REDACTED]

Without a data driven approach to staffing analysis, patrol managers have to distribute patrol officers to districts based on their best judgment and call counts. During interviews with patrol managers and top level command they expressed interest in a developing a bottom up approach in which patrol staffing needs are identified first so that a consistent level of service can be provided in the community


Within Districts there are smaller patrol areas called posts. The purpose of these kinds of geographic beats within a district is to keep officers within those geographic areas to improve emergency response times and promote familiarity with those parts of the city.

Table 2 contains information for each district on calls for service dispatched by post. There is a wide variation in the number of calls generated in each post. Ideally, workload among posts should be reasonably balanced so that officers assigned to them can handle a significant proportion of the calls that post generates.

Another critical analysis for deployment of personnel is the pattern of calls for service dispatched by hour of day and day of week. Conclusions that can be drawn from that graph are:

- ☒ On a citywide basis, the peak workload period is from 3 pm to 7 pm Monday through Friday.
- ☒ Sunday from 6 am to 12 midnight has the lowest rate of calls.
- ☒ Calls for service are substantially higher during the predawn morning on Saturday and Sunday compared with the rest of the week.

Call rate graphs for each of the 9 districts were also created and provided to patrol managers separately from this report. They show some variation from the citywide information because of conditions in individual districts.



Managing Calls for Service

While emergency communications is not part of the BPD, policies and practices for managing calls for service can have a significant impact on public satisfaction, efficient use of patrol officer time, diversion of patrol workload, and geographic integrity of patrol posts.

Calls should be accurately prioritized so that true emergencies can be identified. At the same time, calls should be diverted to effective alternatives to dispatching that provide good service to the public. Effective prioritization makes the best use of patrol staff time and can help keep patrol units in their assigned geographic areas. There are no standard criteria for priority categories in law enforcement. Most agencies use four basic priority categories.

- **Emergency** – These are calls in which offenders and victims are in the same place under circumstances that represent a threat to the well being of people. These are usually crimes against persons in progress. Typically, response time goals for emergency calls hover around 7 minutes,
- **Urgent** – These tend to be property crimes in progress during which there is no contact between offenders and people. There is a chance to arrest an offender but the risk to officers responding to these calls with the speed needed for emergencies is not justified to protect property and not people. Response time goals for urgent calls are in the 12 to 15 minute range so that, if possible, an arrest can be made or fresh evidence can be collected.
- **Routine** – These are calls reported well after they occurred so patrol response has very little impact on making an arrest or protecting the public. Response time goals for these calls can range from an hour to the end of the shift based on public expectations and the degree to which some of these calls can be diverted to alternatives like telephone reporting or filing online.
- **Diverted** – These are calls that are handled by means other than dispatching a patrol unit.

Table 3 ranks types of call from the most frequent to least frequent and shows the priority codes used in Baltimore. These six priorities have no formal definitions documented in policy that are taught to call takers and dispatchers. It is a system that relies entirely on the relative priority given to calls by individual staff.

It is not clear which calls are true life threatening emergencies. For example, silent alarms are coded at the highest priority level when most police agencies rank them as urgent because the vast majority are false alarms. As a result, current prioritization practices make it difficult to accurately analyze emergency response times in Baltimore.

Table 3: Calls for Service Dispatched By Priority For 2012

Call Type	1-HIGHEST PRIORITY	2-HIGH PRIORITY	3-MEDIUM PRIORITY	4-LOW PRIORITY	5-LOWEST PRIORITY	E-EMERGENCY	Total
55-DISORDERLY PERSON	30	97629	122	63	106		97950
79-OTHER	221	8422	78294	20	435	12	87404
4E-COMMON ASSAULT	78	55014	13	4	212	1	55322
65-SILENT ALARM	35458	4		2	1		35465
870-NARCOTICS - OUTSIDE	1	35118	9	5	52		35185
30-ACCIDENT-AUTO	27	569	31814	4	102		32516
49-FAMILY DISTURBANCE	13	28797	30		1	1	28842
6J-LARCENY- OTHER	10	972	19265	4	274		20525
5G-BURGLARY	24	20004	21		50		20099
75-DESTRUCT. OF PROPERT	1	696	16663	3	224		17587
99-ACCIDENT-HIT & RUN	3	590	14414		125		15132
57-SUSPICIOUS PERSON	27	12996	11	7	3		13044
6D-LARCENY- FROM AUTO		216	11408	3	212		11839
68-LOUD NOISE	1	24	110	10215			10350
31-ACCIDENT-PERSON INJ.	9607	4	68		205		9884
7C-STOLEN VEH./OTHER	9	8280	13	3	8		8313
56-MISSING PERSON	17	275	7665	2	4		7963
4D-AGG ASSAULT - HANDS	7123	44	2		35		7204
88-UNFOUNDED CALL	7118				1		7119
33-PARKING COMPLAINT		67	304	6674			7045
54-ARMED PERSON	7013	18	2	1	7		7041
20A-FOLLOWUP	13	230	305	5904			6452
60-SICK PERSON	83	5353	9		101	1	5547
50-JUVENILE DISTURBANCE		31	59	4972			5062
95-EXPARTE		142	4850		5		4997
69-INVESTIGATE AUTO	4	130	323	4510	2		4969
61-PERSON WANTED ON WAR	4	219	4178	1	275		4677
85-MENTAL CASE	33	4349	3		4	62	4451
52-ANIMAL DISTURBANCE	8	953	489	2764			4214
62-PERSON LYING ON ST.	4	4010	4		1		4019
73-FALSE PRETENSE	1	75	3577	2	37		3692
53-VEHICLE DISTURBANCE	2	182	326	3105			3615
87-NARCOTICS		3270	1		19		3290
89-911/NO VOICE CALL		3138	2				3140
28-SUICIDE - ATTEMPT	3069	12	2				3083
83-DISCHARGING FIREARM	2889	3					2892
59-INTOXICATED PERSON		316	2488				2804
3N-ROBB MISC (A)	2410	3			18		2431
66-AUDIBLE ALARM	2263	3		4			2270
29-DRIVING WHILE INTOX.	8	2064			2		2074
81-RECOVERED PROPERTY	7	180	136	1698	42		2063
74-STREET OBSTRUCTION	4	190	158	1678			2030
3P-ROBB MISC (UA)	1928	7	1		39		1975
39-FIRE	1943	2	1		6		1952
55A-PROSTITUTION COMPLAINT	1	1910					1911
80-LOST PROPERTY	1	8	35	1662	201		1907
58-INJURED PERSON	6	1748			105		1859
60A-AED NONBREATHING	1772	8					1780
26-RECOVERED VEHICLE	1	34	1643		2		1680
63-HOLDUP ALARM	1464	1		1			1466
67-CHILD ABUSE-PHYSICAL	1457	1			5		1463
4A-AGG ASSAULT - GUN	1429						1429
98-CHILD NEGLECT	1380	2	5		1		1388
79T-SIGNAL OUT		11	1248				1259
4B-AGG ASSAULT - CUT	1230	1			1		1232
6F-LARCENY- BICYCLE		45	942		7		994
2J-OTHER SEX OFFN.	891	5	1		10		907
78-GAMBLING		9	687	1			697
70P-ILLEGAL DUMPING(IN PROG)	2	96	44	520			662

Table 3: Calls for Service Dispatched by Priority For 2012 (continued)

Call Type	1-HIGHEST PRIORITY	2-HIGH PRIORITY	3-MEDIUM PRIORITY	4-LOW PRIORITY	5-LOWEST PRIORITY	E-EMERGENCY	Total
52A-ANIMAL CRUELTY		104	551	1			656
82-PROWLER	634	1					635
77-DOG BITE	1	62	505				568
23-UNAUTHORIZED USE		2	7	519			528
76-CHILD ABUSE-SEXUAL	485		1				486
2A-RAPE (FORCE)	405		2			1	408
6B-LARCENY- PURSE SNATC	249	1	1			1	252
20H-TRAFFIC CONTROL		5	14	215			234
51-STREET DISTURBANCE		2	2	210			214
70A-ILLEGAL DUMPING		9	17	185			211
27-CARJACKING	191						191
87V-NARCOTICS-ONVIEW		165				4	169
93-ABDUCTION - OTHER	165					1	166
38-ASSIST MTA	150						150
70-SANITATION COMPLAINT		11	13	122		1	147
79B-BLDG COLLAPSE	130						130
84-BOMB SCARE	118	1				6	125
48-INVOLUNTARY DETENTION			71			12	83
96-STOP & FRISK				61		1	62
40-ASSIST THE FIRE DEPT						49	49
20F-WARRANT			6	38			44
34-ACC-DEPT		4	37			2	43
31P-ACCIDENT - INJURY - PED	41						41
20D-DETAIL				36			36
79H-HARBOR RESCUE	33						33
94-ABDUCTION BY PARENT	28						28
79R-LIGHTRAIL			21				21
97-SEARCH & SEIZURE				17		2	19
32-ACCIDENT-AUTO DEATH	18						18
72-EXPLOSION	1	17					18
35-ACC-DEPT-PERS INJ	16						16
79W-WATER RESCUE	14		1				15
64-DRUG FREE ZONE		13					13
3Q-ROBBERY - CAB	12						12
79S-SHIP FIRE			12				12
3L-ROBB BANK (A)	9						9
84B-BIOHAZARD	9						9
99P-ACCIDENT - HIT & RUN - PED		1	4				5
37-PROTECT WITNESS	4						4
30P-ACCIDENT - AUTO - PED			3				3
20B-FOOT PATROL				2			2
24-TOWED VEHICLE				2			2
86-SPECIAL CURFEW			1				1
90-BARRICADE	1						1
Grand Total	93802	298878	203014	45240	2971	126	644031

Another problem with the call priority and coding system is that the second highest category of call is “Other” which alone accounts for 14% of all calls dispatched. When a call category is that large and that vague, it is usually a sign that changes need to be made in call codes and staff training.

Data on calls dispatched can be useful in finding opportunities to use alternative call handling methods to reduce the number of units dispatched to non-emergency calls to create more time for proactive work in neighborhoods. During 2012, patrol officers were dispatched to almost 100, 00 calls for which alternatives to dispatch actually provide better service to the public.

- Larcenies and larcenies from autos – These calls totaled 41,491 which is the fourth highest total of call calls. These are not calls regarding crimes in progress and in few of these cases are there witnesses or useful evidence to collect.
- Alarms- Silent and audible alarms account for 37,735 which is the fourth highest number to which units were dispatched. In most cases these were false alarms. An alarm ordinance needs to be in place that will make the best use of alarms by reducing false alarms.
- Destruction of property- A total of 16,890 calls were not in progress and could have been taken by phone rather than through a delayed response by patrol officers.

There may be even more categories of calls in which patrol response is not the best way to provide service and use public funds. Sick person calls should be handled by EMS personnel unless they need police presence for security. It would make sense not to dispatch officers to calls for situations in which the same advice can be provided immediately over the telephone.

The City 311 center does very little to divert police workload. Less than 500 reports were taken by 311 staff each year during 2011 and 2012. Table 4 shows that those reports were for loss of parking tags, license plates, wallets and purses, and driver’s licenses.

Table 4: Reports Taken By 311 – 2011 and 2012


Offense Type	2011	2012
Larceny from Auto		
Tags/Stickers	193	112
Cell Phones	2	3
Wallets/Purses	2	12
Driver's License/ID	0	0
Misc.	29	56
Larceny		
Tags/Stickers	2	1
Cell Phones	13	27
Wallets/Purses	26	16
Driver's License/ID	0	2
Misc.	15	33
Lost Property		
Tags/Stickers	30	28
Cell Phones	37	29
Wallets/Purses	51	59
Driver's License/ID	3	12
Misc.	8	9
Destruction of Property		
Tags/Stickers	0	0
Cell Phones	39	68
Wallets/Purses	0	0
Driver's License/ID	0	0
Misc.	4	3
Total	454	470

Time Spent on Tasks

Counting calls is just a basic measure of patrol workload. Once calls can be counted, the number of units dispatched to calls and the time it takes to handle those calls more accurately captures workload.

There is also work aside from calls for service that make up an officer's day. Much of that is usually captured in unit history records rather than calls. Units log in and out of service using codes that identify the tasks they are performing. Unfortunately, those unit history records are not available for 2012. If they were, time spent on tasks could be

broken down in to four main categories. This information can be analyzed in a pie chart like example below which is from another urban police agency that shows the proportion of time spent on these tasks.



- Calls for service – Calls for service from the public received by telephone to which patrol units were dispatched.
- On-View Activity – These are incidents that include crimes that officers either discover themselves or are brought to their attention by the public.
- Administrative Tasks – This work includes court time, meal breaks and other tasks that are a natural extension of patrol duty.
- Officer-Initiated Activity - This category includes work performed based on the discretion of patrol officers and supervisors. It includes routine traffic stops, traffic enforcement or control duty, follow-up investigations, and community policing related work.
- Proactive Time – This is time used for activity associated crime control goals or delivering service to the community

There are no national standards for the proportion of time that should be included in each of these categories of work. Administrative time is managed so that it is no higher

than 25%. The percentage of spent on calls for service and time available for proactive work depend on how efficiently agencies manage patrol time, patrol staffing levels and the role of patrol. Like any other city service, the level of police service is a public policy decision in which staffing is tied to measurable levels of service to the community. To increase police community partnerships at the neighborhood level, enough proactive time must be available for officers to do that work.

For agencies that field generalist officers assigned to neighborhoods in a geographic policing model, they need proactive time to address problems in those areas. Many agencies (Los Angeles, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and Seattle) set a goal of 40% proactive time which is 24 minutes per unit per hour. In agencies that use a split force in which special units do proactive work and patrol officers just respond calls, proactive time for patrol is generally at about 20%. That is just enough time, 12 minutes per unit per hour, for a routine traffic stop.

The only source of data on non-call related work is 366,359 on view events entered as call records. That total means the BPD averaged about 1,000 on view events per day compared with 1,600 calls for service from the public that were dispatched. It is hard to know how complete these records are until a full staffing analysis study is completed that is based on time spent on calls and these tasks.

Table 5 shows the diverse types of administrative and proactive patrol activities coded as on view during 2012. Business rules need to be developed by the BPD to analyze this information and errors in call coding need to be corrected. Despite those limitations, several conclusions can be drawn from these on view call records.

- Detail is a general category which suggests it might be useful to define the nature of these details to determine if they are administrative work or proactive patrol duty.
- The top three categories of details, car stops and field interviews account for 60% of the total of on view activity.
- Equipment repair which includes vehicle service is the fourth highest category.

The average number of on view events per day is not proportional to actual patrol officers assigned to each district which is shown in Figure 4. These differences could be the result of decisions made to assign patrol officers to districts or supervision within districts. More work needs to be done to use CAD data to measure and evaluate time officers spend on work other than calls for service.




Table 5: On View CAD Records -2012

Situation Found	Disrict									
	01-CD	02-SED	03-ED	04-NED	05-ND	06-NWD	07-WD	08-SWD	09-SD	Total
20D-DETAIL	18519	7985	11073	9620	15942	6626	12806	9219	15420	107210
25-CAR STOP	9598	4546	7349	10690	8538	6729	8737	11003	7667	74857
FI-FIELD INTERVIEW	4841	4258	5813	3260	2715	2293	5567	4040	4297	37084
20G-REPAIRS/SERVICE	957	362	20968	1430	2413	1074	706	1977	1874	31761
20J-TRANSPORT	2362	974	6551	1104	811	1091	1559	1286	1451	17189
87V-NARCOTICS-ONVIEW	791	952	1891	1557	487	1664	1529	1112	788	10771
20F-WARRANT	680	1069	1068	1291	521	1256	464	1477	1131	8957
20Z-OTHER	592	392	653	3053	1233	334	236	980	324	7797
20B-FOOT PATROL	901	514	1177	266	525	465	1657	1463	761	7729
79-OTHER	1048	607	960	878	688	686	801	802	878	7348
61-PERSON WANTED ON WAR	498	362	936	737	434	681	821	783	703	5955
24-TOWED VEHICLE	876	285	570	480	515	649	787	600	636	5398
87-NARCOTICS	965	119	306	256	130	672	848	235	415	3946
20A-FOLLOWUP	244	621	359	346	455	207	240	289	242	3003
87O-NARCOTICS - OUTSIDE	488	136	292	199	68	223	578	383	581	2948
4E-COMMON ASSAULT	360	258	207	380	276	260	271	259	319	2590
97-SEARCH & SEIZURE	122	270	348	345	118	240	316	308	367	2434
20M-PERSONAL RELIEF	225	52	359	102	353	61	448	501	134	2235
55-DISORDERLY PERSON	399	152	151	262	211	157	241	261	360	2194
20E-COURT	398	7	517	29	41	341	16	93	436	1878
30-ACCIDENT-AUTO	293	235	156	233	307	193	118	158	181	1874
6J-LARCENY- OTHER	435	173	121	193	195	183	143	140	214	1797
81-RECOVERED PROPERTY	325	196	182	164	135	160	147	174	196	1679
60-SICK PERSON	295	103	105	105	192	143	86	78	69	1176
26-RECOVERED VEHICLE	68	91	136	190	71	138	148	162	85	1089
75-DESTRUCT. OF PROPERT	176	173	89	143	89	74	96	87	112	1039
65-SILENT ALARM	20	56	47	136	148	83	117	129	121	857
55A-PROSTITUTION COMPLAINT	36	159	59	46	95	157	5	50	219	826
6D-LARCENY- FROM AUTO	161	137	54	111	68	65	42	54	62	754
99-ACCIDENT-HIT & RUN	108	106	70	85	100	76	59	74	68	746
49-FAMILY DISTURBANCE	85	61	88	67	79	72	69	90	52	663
20C-BANK CHECK	160	13	72	198	54	91	45	15	13	661
80-LOST PROPERTY	169	70	56	55	54	77	45	48	76	650
34-ACC-DEPT	94	71	78	76	55	58	43	54	63	592
58-INJURED PERSON	112	72	48	49	62	57	60	51	72	583
5G-BURGLARY	32	55	64	70	63	60	54	69	88	555
31-ACCIDENT-PERSON INJ.	86	47	64	72	66	56	49	37	58	535
20L-LUNCH	3	1	495		8				6	513
95-EXPARTE	27	24	86	64	68	28	17	114	32	460
73-FALSE PRETENSE	83	47	24	94	57	58	18	29	45	455
54-ARMED PERSON	62	46	49	63	35	33	38	45	50	421
96-STOP & FRISK	14	5	38	9	2	4	33	246	20	371
4D-AGG ASSAULT - HANDS	87	41	33	25	29	38	39	29	42	363
88-UNFOUNDED CALL	27	49	52	53	21	19	50	45	29	345
48-INVOLUNTARY DETENTION	51	30	56	40	16	22	37	62	31	345
56-MISSING PERSON	23	16	30	46	52	40	25	36	39	307
39-FIRE	33	28	35	40	23	27	33	42	44	305
3N-ROBB MISC (A)	35	35	35	27	40	43	24	24	35	298
7C-STOLEN VEH./OTHER	30	43	31	42	26	26	15	22	32	267
2J-OTHER SEX OFFN.	67	25	16	28	27	23	23	32	25	266
20H-TRAFFIC CONTROL	40	31	37	5	34	17	11	34	30	239
85-MENTAL CASE	47	16	8	28	31	11	20	21	18	200
20N-SCHOOL/CHURCH	3	1	32	1	25	4	21	51	51	189
67-CHILD ABUSE-PHYSICAL	8	16	15	21	18	30	19	28	17	172
3P-ROBB MISC (UA)	31	31	15	21	16	19	10	10	11	164

Table 5: On View CAD Records -2012 (continued)

Situation Found	District									
	01-CD	02-SED	03-ED	04-NED	05-ND	06-NWD	07-WD	08-SWD	09-SD	Total
2A-RAPE (FORCE)	25	14	6	13	23	12	8	10	13	124
4A-AGG ASSAULT - GUN	14	10	23	7	14	9	9	15	13	114
29-DRIVING WHILE INTOX.	13	39	7	10	10	4	5	4	12	104
4B-AGG ASSAULT - CUT	18	16	20	6	7	4	6	4	9	90
76-CHILD ABUSE-SEXUAL	4	5	13	15	14	11	7	10	10	89
59-INTOXICATED PERSON	12	16	5	2	26	1	2	2	7	73
83-DISCHARGING FIREARM	8	7	5	6	20	5	6	7	7	71
57-SUSPICIOUS PERSON	9	6	2	8	11	3	7	8	5	59
33-PARKING COMPLAINT	5	21	3	3	5	3		1	6	47
20S-SUPERVISOR COMP	13	6	8	1	4	1	2	8	4	47
35-ACC-DEPT-PERS INJ	11	7	7	2	4	3	7	1	1	43
78-GAMBLING	6	1	5	1	5	4	13	2	5	42
23-UNAUTHORIZED USE	1	4	4	11	2	5	4	3	2	36
6F-LARCENY- BICYCLE	11	7	2	1	4	1			5	31
27-CARJACKING	1	1	2	4	7	7	5	3	1	31
77-DOG BITE		6	3	2	5	3	1	1	5	26
50-JUVENILE DISTURBANCE	1	2	2	2	10	3	3	1	1	25
98-CHILD NEGLECT		2	4	7	2			4	4	23
69-INVESTIGATE AUTO	1	2	2	3	10			2	2	22
52-ANIMAL DISTURBANCE				4	11	3	2	1	1	22
66-AUDIBLE ALARM		3	1	3	7	3		2		19
60A-AED NONBREATHING	1	1	3	3	3		4	1	2	18
13-ASSIST OFFICER	4		1	2	2	5		3	1	18
62-PERSON LYING ON ST.		2	1	2	10		1			16
28-SUICIDE - ATTEMPT			2	4	1	4		1		12
84-BOMB SCARE				1	1		3		4	9
31P-ACCIDENT - INJURY - PED	1	2	1		1	3	1			9
93-ABDUCTION - OTHER	1		1	2	1			2	1	8
74-STREET OBSTRUCTION				1	4	3				8
68-LOUD NOISE		1			2	4			1	8
6B-LARCENY- PURSE SNATC		3		2		1	1			7
53-VEHICLE DISTURBANCE				2		1	1		3	7
32-ACCIDENT-AUTO DEATH					2	2		1	1	6
52A-ANIMAL CRUELTY				1				4		5
20K-ESCORT			1	2	1				1	5
70-SANITATION COMPLAINT	1					1	1	1		4
70P-ILLEGAL DUMPING(IN PROG)		1		1	1		1			4
35P-ACC - DEPT - PERS INJ - PED				2	1		1			4
34P-ACC - DEPT - AUTO - PED		1		1	1			1		4
30P-ACCIDENT - AUTO - PED	2			1			1			4
89-911/NO VOICE CALL			1		1		1			3
79T-SIGNAL OUT		1	1					1		3
79H-HARBOR RESCUE	1								2	3
70A-ILLEGAL DUMPING		1					1			2
40-ASSIST THE FIRE DEPT					1			1		2
3L-ROBB BANK (A)						2				2
38-ASSIST MTA		1		1						2
94-ABDUCTION BY PARENT									1	1
82-PROWLER				1						1
79W-WATER RESCUE	1									1
79B-BLDG COLLAPSE	1									1
64-DRUG FREE ZONE	1									1
63-HOLDUP ALARM					1					1
3Q-ROBBERY - CAB									1	1
32P-ACCIDENT - FATAL - PED			1							1
Total	48357	26413	64261	39025	39070	28005	40491	39516	41221	366359
Rate per day	132.123	72.16667	175.5765	106.6257	106.7486	76.51639	110.6311	107.9672	112.6257	1000.981

Current Patrol Deployment Practices

Decisions regarding the deployment of personnel assigned to work within districts involve work scheduling, minimum staffing levels, and assignment of personnel to geographic areas. These decisions should be based on accurate workload data which is not available to BPD managers.

Without useful information on workload, the BPD seems to have assigned work to investigators and special to address problems as they arise. The number of personnel allocated to these non-patrol units was most likely based on educated guesses on the number of staff need to handle a given problem. To place this issue in an organizational perspective, Table 6 contains data on police officer assignments within the BPOD based information obtained for this study. [REDACTED]

Table 6: Allocation of Police Officers [REDACTED]

This allocation pattern reflects a special unit approach to community policing. The role of patrol officers has become that of just 911 responders. Calls are handled to resolve problems on a short term basis and not enough patrol time is spent on prevention and intervention that help make neighborhoods safer.

Patrol officers have the most face to face contact with the public on a daily basis. Those contacts are critical to building community partnerships in neighborhoods. Unfortunately, specialization of policing tends to reduce the skills and job satisfaction of patrol officers because they view their role as to just handle calls from one to the next. Patrol is the largest part of the personnel cost funded by the City for policing and could be the largest prevention field force in Baltimore. The current approach to allocation and management of patrol officers does not make the best use of that investment.

Patrol Work Scheduling

Personnel are the largest cost item for police services and patrol accounts for the largest number of staff in most police services. Work scheduling is the primary tool used to focus patrol staff time on service demands and problem solving work in neighborhoods.

A wide range of factors in a community can impact whether a patrol work schedule meets the needs of a particular police agency. There are three primary groups of people whose needs must be met if a schedule is to be judged as successful.

1. **General public.** The schedule must assign patrol personnel for duty to provide the public within geographic patrol areas with the level of protection and service by hour of day, day of week and season that can be reasonably expected, or promised, given the level of resources budgeted for police service in Baltimore.
2. **Patrol personnel.** It must allocate workload evenly so that officers are not overworked at peak periods, take into account research findings on the effect of schedules on officer fatigue, and fairly assign days off which impact family life. These factors can make scheduling an emotional issue that causes conflict within police agencies.
3. **Police managers.** It must make good business sense to both the police service and regional government. Costs of new schedules need to be carefully along with the measurable benefits of that schedule. Managerial issues that arise can relate to officer availability for duty, supervision, court attendance, fleet management, and budget must be satisfactorily addressed.

Matching staffing levels to workload as closely as possible is in the interest of all three stakeholders. Efficient scheduling of personnel reduces officer stress by helping them work at a steady pace and not have extremes in workload. Matching staffing to workload provides the public with consistent service and meets the needs of managers by assuring elected officials that funds for patrol personnel are being used as efficiently as possible.

Scheduling practices can also promote fatigue that can risk officer safety and performance. Dr. Bryan Vila wrote what has become a landmark book entitled *Tired Cops* published by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). In that book and his subsequent research, Dr. Vila explains research findings that identified factors that

should be taken into account in designing work schedules for people like patrol officers who must be on duty 24 hours a day 7 days a week¹.

- Longer shift hours can lead to fatigue because sleep deficits can be caused when sleep time is lost to commuting time and overtime.
- Shift rotation causes changes in sleep patterns that reduce sleep time and lead to fatigue so the longer the time between shift rotations the less negative impact on sleep patterns so fewer rotations produce less negative effects
- Rotating against the clock rather than forward in time causes even more disruption of sleep patterns because it takes up to 12 days to adjust to a backward rotation and 8 days to a forward rotation in shift hours.
- Choice is important to reducing employee stress associated with scheduling and shift assignment.
- Officers and managers need to be educated about sources of fatigue and hazards associated with fatigue so they can minimize its impact.

Characteristics of the BPD Work Schedule

Baltimore patrol officers work a schedule that calls for a repeating cycle of 5 day on, 2 days off, 4 days on and 2 days off depicted in the chart below. This even numbered on off pattern rotates weekdays off so that weekend days are equitably distributed. The weakness of this type of schedule is that it is not possible to consistently schedule more personnel on busier days of the week and less personnel when workload is lower.

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
On	On	On	On	On	Off	Off	On	On	On	On	Off	Off	On

This problem is compounded because the same number of personnel is assigned to each of three shifts which are most often 7 am to 3 pm, 3pm to 11 pm, and 11 pm to 7 am. The only variations are based on reductions due to long terms sick leave or light duty for individual officers.

Another influence that promotes equal staffing levels is that minimum staffing is considered one car assigned to every post on all shifts. There is no data to support this

¹ Vila, Bryan; Morrison, Gregory; Kenney, Dennis; "Improving Schedule and Work Hour Policies and Practices to Increase Police Officer Performance, Health and Safety", Police Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2002, pages 19-21.

as a staffing level that provides a good level of service. Data presented earlier in this chapter shows wide variation in calls generated by posts so assigning one car to each post on every shift does not match different levels of workload posts generate.

Geographic Deployment

The basic method used in all nine districts for assigning personnel is described in Table 7. Patrol lieutenants are responsible for shifts in the day and not geographic areas within districts. Shifts rotate to every 28 days which provides enough time for officers to adjust their sleep patterns.

Table 7: Patrol Staff Assignment Structure

7 am to 3pm	3 pm to 11 pm	11 pm to 7 am
Shift Lieutenant	Shift Lieutenant	Shift Lieutenant
Sector 1 Sergeant 8 officers	Sector 1 Sergeant 9 Officers	Sector 1 Sergeant 9 Officers
Sector 2 Sergeant 9 Officers	Sector 2 Sergeant 9 Officers	Sector 2 Sergeant 9 Officers
Sector 3 Sergeant 10 Officers	Sector 3 Sergeant 10 Officers	Sector 3 Sergeant 10 Officers
Sector 4 Sergeant 9 Officers	Sector 4 Sergeant 10 Officers	Sector 4 Sergeant 9 Officers

The only patrol manager responsible for territory under this system is the major responsible for the district. There is no relief factor built into this system for vacation, sick leave or training for sector sergeants. As a result, there are not enough of sergeants to assure that a group of sergeants consistently work in one sector. This type of assignment system promotes teamwork at the shift level and not the sector level among shifts. Accountability for problems is shared by three shifts rather than a team assigned to a geographic area.

Officer Availability for Duty

Personnel policies, labor agreements, management practices and state labor law can all impact the number of days per year patrol officers are available for duty. To account for the impact of lost time, a Shift Relief Factor (SRF) is used to calculate the impact of leave, scheduled days off, training and other assignments on the availability of officers for front line duty. The SRF requires information on training, leave or other duties that take officers away from being assigned to front line duty responding to calls for service.

Leave information was obtained from payroll records for 1,150 patrol officers assigned to districts who worked for a full 12 months in patrol. This sample reflects typical officers and not new recruits, personnel transferred out or into patrol during the year, or those that retire. Those records provided data on:


- Vacation taken.
- Sick leave taken.
- Compensatory time used.
- Leave without pay.
- Personal leave.

Additional information is collected by the BPD on a monthly basis on lost time that is not reflected in payroll records. Reports submitted by Districts are collated at headquarters by Neighborhood Policing Division staff. In June, the study team was provided with a report on the status of patrol personnel not available for duty. Those reports provided information on:

- Detailed out.
- Suspended.
- Military leave
- Limited duty.
- Extended medical.
- Long term medical

Finally, data was not available for on duty training hours and time spent by police officers serving as acting sergeants. Estimates were used for these two categories based on information obtained during interviews.

Figure 5 shows the relative contribution each leave category made on the availability of patrol officers for duty. Detailing officers out of patrol duty and medical leave contribute significantly to reducing officer availability. Days worked represents less than half (44.8%) of the total time officers are available for duty.



Lost officer availability is reflected in Table 7 which contains leave data and calculations used to estimate the SRF for 2012. The resulting SRF of means that if the BPD needs to field 10 officers on a given shift, a total of 23 officers need to be assigned to that shift to account for time officers are not available for field duty. This level of lost time significantly increases the cost of policing in Baltimore.

Table 8: Estimated Shift Availability Factor (SRF)

1. Potential Staff Days Available					
	1,150	personnel multiplied by	366	days	420,900
2. Days Officers Unavailable					
	Scheduled Days Off				129,490
	Vacation				20,328
	Sick time				3,367
	Personal leave				1,584
	On duty training*				5,349
	Acting sergeant*				3,450
	Detailed out				21,571
	Suspended				15,151
	Limited duty				14,638
	Extended medical				8,731
	Long term medical (408)				4,622
	Military leave				3,595
	Compensatory time used				273
			Total Leave Days		232,150
3. Actual Staff Days Available					
	Potential Days	-	Leave Days Taken	=	Actual Days Available
	420,900	Minus	232,150	=	188,750
4. Shift Relief Factor					
	Potential Staff Days Available				
		Divided By	Divided By	=	SRF
	Actual Staff Days Available				
		420,900			
		Divided By		=	2.23
		188,750			
*estimate					

Recommendations

The BPD needs to make major changes in its approach to patrol deployment that will be critical to building better working relationships with neighborhood residents and businesses. The Strategic Plan should include short term changes upon which future improvements can be built.

More substantial changes will take longer but they must be implemented through a transparent process for implementing neighborhood based policing. Police personnel and the community need to work together to build a new geographic deployment system in patrol that establishes ownership of neighborhoods and makes the best use of patrol staff time.

Immediate Needs

These changes can provide some immediate improvement in making better use of patrol time and provide better service to the community. These changes should be made by the spring of this year to prepare for increases in calls for service during the upcoming summer in 2014. These changes should not require significant financial resources but generate successes that could establish credibility for the strategic plan.

1. Establish and train a Patrol Staffing Assessment Work Group
 - a. This work group will serve as the primary mechanism for involving staff in the work to be done to develop a new data driven staffing model. The work group should be responsible for ongoing evaluation of patrol deployment practices and continuous improvement in the delivery of services.
 - b. The work group should be made up of no more than 18 people representing a cross section of ranks and districts. Staff from communications, planning and information technology would also be part of the committee because they have a major role in collecting data about patrol workload.
 - c. A set of operating policies will be developed for the work group for review and approval by the Chief of Police. The work group should have a chair and co-chair. It will meet about every two weeks to review progress on projects being completed as part of the assessment. Subcommittees should be formed to deal with specific issues as needed.
2. Improve management of calls for service.

- a. Redefine call priority categories to more effectively identify emergency, urgent and routine calls. Identifying true emergencies will help the BPD to accurately measure response time to those calls.
 - b. Create an alternative call handling unit for making referrals, giving advice as well as taking reports. A great deal of service requested by the public is for non-emergency services that, in many cases, can be provided by means other than dispatching patrol units. Call for service data should be evaluated to identify goals for diverting calls from dispatching and actually improve citizen satisfaction by providing the right information and services faster.
 - c. The City false alarm reduction ordinance should be re-evaluated to determine if changes in the ordinance or enforcement of it can reduce dispatching of patrol units to false alarms.
3. Make interim changes to make better use of patrol time. These steps will begin the process of analyzing information that can be used to more efficiently deploy patrol personnel.
- a. Develop new minimums by Sector not post to reduce overtime based on service time on calls for service. The BPD has analyzed data on travel and at scene time for calls for service. That information should be used to set goals for the percentage of time units should spend on calls for service by hour of day and day of week in each sector in each district. This basic method can be improved in the future but will provide a first step in reducing unnecessary overtime and better fitting staffing to workload levels.
 - b. Use service time hours to reallocate personnel among Districts. Balancing hours spent handling calls among the districts will help to make service more consistent from district to district.
 - c. Evaluate all patrol officer positions outside first line district assignments and put as many back as possible into patrol duty.
 - d. Modify the current patrol work schedule using service time hours to better fit staffing to workload. Modifications could include implementing shift bids rather than rotation so that staffing can be varied on shifts. A fourth shift could be created to help match staffing to peak and slow activity periods.

- e. Reduce the number of personnel on long time medical leave and those detailed out of patrol duty so more patrol officers are available for front line duty in Districts.

Long Term Goals

These changes will help the BPD to implement a geographic based policing model that will strengthen the delivery of services at the neighborhood level. That work will depend upon the development of an operations analysis capability within the BPD that will provide managers with information about how staff time is being used to answer calls for service and investigate crimes.

1. Establish an operations analysis capability.
 - a. Create an Operations Analysis unit responsible for collecting and analyzing information on workload and organizational performance in handling it. The unit should be staffed with three to four personnel representing a blend of civilian analysts and sworn personnel who have degrees in business or public administration. Current BPD Information Technology staff could be assigned to the unit along with qualified sworn personnel already employed.
 - b. A CAD data warehouse should be developed that can be used within the BPD for analyzing calls for service and officer initiated activity. The unit should be responsible for establishing business rules for identifying errors and exceptions and monitoring CAD data quality.
 - c. Training should be provided to patrol supervisors and managers on how to use patrol workload data to manage staff time.
 - d. Eventually address all aspects of operations to include criminal investigations and support services.
2. Redeploy Patrol to Implement Neighborhood Policing
 - a. Complete a detailed workload and staffing study to determine patrol staffing needs by hour of day and day of week. A queuing model should be used to determine staffing needed by hour of day and day of week to provide acceptable emergency response time, proactive time and free units to promote officer safety.

- b. Adopt a sector policing structure that eliminates posts and assigns teams of officers to sectors so that staffing can be varied in each sector by hour of day and day of week.
- c. Develop boundaries for Districts and sectors based on workload, natural and manmade boundaries, and community characteristics
- d. Implementing Neighborhood Policing will also require redefining the role of patrol officers so that they become generalists who can deal with a wide range of problems in sectors. Special units may still be needed to deal with problems that sector teams are not able to address. The role of sector commanders, first line supervisors, investigators, crime analysts and dispatchers will also need to be clarified.

Appendix B

Baltimore Police Department Strategic Anti-Crime Plan

I. Introduction: The Challenge of Crime

The Baltimore Police Department (BPD) faces the challenge of escalating violence as well as increases in other forms of crime within the City of Baltimore. Under the leadership of Commissioner Anthony Batts, the BPD has been reviewing its crime-fighting operations and strategies to determine the best course for redirecting its efforts to better control both the violent crime and the property crime that are contributing to a growing sense of insecurity in the city. The BPD has many of the components of an effective crime-fighting strategy already in place, and Commissioner Batts and his advisers believe that what is needed is not a wholesale reorganization of the department, but instead an overarching plan and set of operating protocols that will better organize BPD's crime-fighting assets, improve coordination among the various operational components, and bring both a sharper focus and a greater sense of urgency to all of the department's operations.

The next section of this chapter contains a review of the BPD's current structure and strategies with an assessment of the strengths and weakness in each of the areas discussed. This discussion takes place in the context of a number of key issues:

- The need to identify the truly violent actors on the Baltimore scene – i.e., the shooters who are responsible for most of the murders and gun assaults – and to use every means at the BPD's disposal to build the cases that will remove these violent repeat offenders (VROs) from the Baltimore community to penal institutions where they will be incarcerated for significant amounts of time. The BPD already has a VRO program, but it must be reanimated and refocused for maximum effect.
- The need for a district-based, locally-driven community-connected anti-crime effort, with district majors and district captains empowered and resourced to act against crime in each district and who are held accountable for achieving measurable results. Much of the infrastructure for such an effort is already in place, including a well-structured patrol system, flexible or "flex" units in most districts to respond to specific conditions of community concern and emerging crime patterns, and Neighborhood Service Units (NSUs) to work with community members, but adjustments in resources and management are necessary to achieve optimum results.
- The need for consistent investigative response to local crimes in each district, including robberies, burglaries, and assaults. BPD already maintains District Detective Units (DDUs) in each of the nine BPD districts, but the quality of case management and investigative follow through varies sharply from district to district and the response to burglaries has been particularly weak.
- The need to focus key enforcement units on the details of active homicide investigations so that connections between homicides and shootings can be

established and various units can be enlisted in the effort to bring murderers to justice. The BPD already holds weekly homicide intelligence meetings, but these meetings should be formalized for greater focus and productivity.

- The need to establish a more fluid and comprehensive intelligence system throughout the BPD so that critical information flows more swiftly and more completely among the nine districts, the nine DDUs, the centralized investigative units, the citywide Special Enforcement Section (SES) and the Operational Intelligence and Analytic Intelligence Sections. The BPD already assigns intelligence officers to each district, but this function has atrophied and should be completely revamped, including clear job descriptions for intelligence officers and dual reporting by these officers to the district command and to the centralized Operational Intelligence Section.
- The need for focused and thorough investigations into organized gangs, as well as the loosely knit turf-based drug gangs who control drug operations in specific areas, and into other criminal affiliations that are the cause of much of violence in Baltimore so that the gangs can be dismantled and cases can be built against the main players in these criminal organizations that will keep them in jail for extended sentences. The BPD already maintains a Strategic Enforcement Section (SES), which has much of the investigative capacity required, but this unit is currently tied to small zones within districts, which diminishes its overall impact.
- The need to prioritize important ballistic, fingerprint, and biological evidence so that it is processed in a timely manner to support current investigations of shootings, burglaries, robberies, and other crimes. The BPD crime lab is constrained by accreditation-related rules that are interfering with its primary mission of providing both leads and inculpatory evidence to detectives working current cases.
- The need for better police report writing, better investigative follow up on charged cases, and higher quality police testimony in court to help ensure that charged cases proceed successfully to conviction and sentencing. Cases are being dismissed, and cases that could be won are being lost, because of the failure of police officers to appear in court, to adequately document and investigate cases, and to be credible and convincing witnesses on the stand, all of which should be remediable problems.
- The need for a vigorous Compstat process to oversee all BPD operations and to drive forward the crime-fighting agenda with a sense of urgency. The BPD already has Compstat process in place, but it lacks the kind of focus on specific crimes occurring in specific districts, including those that may transcend district boundaries, and on specific tactics and solutions that makes Compstat effective.

Any police department effort against crime is a melding of various components, including uniformed patrol, investigation of past crimes, proactive investigations of violent criminal groups and gangs, the management and analysis of intelligence and data about where, when, and how crime is occurring, the management and analysis of physical evidence to support investigative cases, and overall strategic oversight of all these components to ensure efficient and successful operations in every district and every section and unit. As noted above, the components are largely in place in BPD. Some need to be reinvigorated

and some need to be refocused, and that is the purpose of this plan. A review of the primary components of the plan follows in the next section.

II. The Components: The Pieces of the Plan

1) The Violent Repeat Offender (VRO) Program

A workable and effective violent repeat offender (VRO) program will be an essentially important part of BPD's attack on violent crime. It is generally agreed that the actual killers in an urban area – as distinct from less violent criminals – are a small minority not only among a city's population, but among the criminal population itself. If they can be identified and extracted from the communities that they prey on, sharp declines in violent crime can be achieved. This is surely the intent of the current VRO program in the BPD, but observers from the BPD and the State's Attorney's office generally agree that program has lost its impetus and its focus in recent years. The process of establishing VRO lists has not been disciplined or well regulated, and lists have become too long and insufficiently selective. District commanders have been charged with identifying VROs in their respective districts, and the results have been uneven. Many in the BPD believe that the State's Attorney's office controls the VRO list, but the State's Attorney's Office representatives maintain that they are reliant on the BPD for most of the identifications. There have also been some differences about when a VRO can be removed from the list, with the State's Attorney's Office favoring retaining VRO names until subjects have been successfully prosecuted and sentenced to at least two years in prison, and some BPD officers urging a quicker turnover.

The advantages of VRO program endorsed by the State's Attorney's Office should be evident. When identified VROs are brought forward for prosecution, prosecuting attorneys will recognize that these individuals represent a menace to society which may be far greater than the crime for which they are accused and will be alerted to press forward with the prosecution instead of seeking negotiated settlements and plea bargains. Likewise, investigators in the BPD can target these individuals for arrest on lesser charges when they cannot establish sufficient evidence to charge them with murders and shootings. Instead of an anonymous VRO falling through the cracks in a crowded and impersonal criminal justice system, he will be clearly identified for the special attention he deserves by both police and the prosecutors.

Reanimating the BPD's VRO program will require active cooperation between the BPD, with the State's Attorney's Office, and with the U.S. Attorney's Office in cases that are taken federal. District commanders should have a say in who is chosen, but the selection process should include input from the District Detective Unit commanders, Homicide Section detectives active in each district, the Special Enforcement Section, the Operational Intelligence Section, and, of course, the State's Attorney's Office. Standard criteria should also be applied, including the general criminal records of subjects, subjects who have been acquitted in homicide cases whom the State's Attorney's Office and the BPD believe to have been guilty, suspects in homicide cases who were never charged, shooting victims who appear to be participants in blood feud and vendetta cases, and various intangible factors

identified by district commanders, investigators, and prosecutors. All participants in this process should be seeking to select and target the real drivers of violence in Baltimore and not just the local predicate felons. The Operational Intelligence Section would manage the VRO selection process and serve as the repository of the current list. In a recommendation below, this chapter calls for the appointment of district intelligence officers (DIOs) in each BPD district, and it is envisaged that these DIOs will serve as important contributors in the VRO process, providing a conduit for district intelligence about VROs to the Operational Intelligence Section. The list should probably not exceed 100 individuals citywide. The previous rule of thumb that each district should provide 10 individuals for the VRO list is arbitrary. Districts with more serious and widespread violence problems may submit as many as 15 names. More peaceful districts may submit as few as five. The view of the State's Attorney's Office that VROs should not be removed from the list until conviction has merit because it will ensure a continuing BPD focus on the case after arrest and through to sentencing, but the VRO list should be regularly revisited by the Operational Intelligence Section to ensure that it remains current. In addition, BPD can maintain and "VRO-in-Waiting" lists of other violent actors who should be targeted when resources become available.

2) The Nine Patrol Districts

The BPD has divided the city into nine patrol districts, each commanded by a major who is assisted by a captain serving as second in command. The districts report up through three areas, each commanded by the lieutenant colonel, to the Chief of Patrol who holds the rank of colonel. Within the districts, three eight-hour shifts are each commanded by a lieutenant. Each district is divided into three sectors, with each sector supervised, on each shift, by a sergeant, and each sector subdivided into five or six posts. The advantage of this system is that the sergeant and the team of officers he supervises generally work the same hours, which should provide for a higher quality of supervision than is possible when sergeants and their officers are on different schedules. Under current short staffing conditions, however, as much as forty percent of posts on each shift is being staffed on overtime, so that sergeants are often supervising personnel from other shifts or even other districts. Mandatory overtime, sometime imposed with short notice, is hurting morale among the young patrol force and contributing to steady attrition in the ranks, as officers with as little as two to three years on the job leave the BPD for other, better-paying departments in the surrounding suburbs.

Most districts maintain a so-called "flex squad", a flexible unit that is not assigned to posts or to answer calls for service. This flex team, which may include a lieutenant, three to four sergeants, and as many as 16 officers, is available for assignment to specific crime patterns, disorder problems, or other conditions in the district. In the the districts where the Special Enforcement Section (SES) maintains a significant presence focused on defined zones within the districts flex squads and other non-calls- for-service resources are far more limited.

There is a clear need for the adjustment of posts and for a reassessment of staffing practices. The posts have not been adjusted since the 1980s. Staffing all posts at all times, regardless of the call-for-service load and crime conditions, is costing large amounts in

overtime, undermining morale, and helping to drive attrition. In addition, there is a sense in the department that the patrol force has become disengaged from the problems on the street, and particularly from crime, and that the districts are largely functioning in a reactive mode, responding to calls, but doing little else to assert police control in the neighborhoods.

The districts should be full participants in any strategic anti-crime plan. The district commanders should be functioning as the primary managers and analysts of day-to-day crime problems and patterns in their respective districts, including reading all Part I crime reports in the district each day. They should have resources at their disposal, including flex units that equip them to respond swiftly to emerging problems and crime patterns. These flex units also serve a secondary purpose, presenting the opportunity to reward high-performing patrol officers with more interesting assignments and to train officers in tactical police work, setting them on a career path that can later lead to assignment with the District Detective Units, the Special Enforcement Section, or the centralized investigative units. Shift lieutenants and sector sergeants should be leading patrol officers to engage with crime conditions on streets and with regular actors who are known to perpetrate criminal acts. The BPD should consider reducing the post concept significantly in favor of a team concept operating at the sector level, empowering the sector sergeant to allocate patrol resources within the sector as conditions require. This would give sergeant more genuine geographic responsibility and should relieve some the staffing pressures, because the shift lieutenant and the sector sergeant could make judgments about the staffing required on a given shift rather than automatically filling all posts.

The districts each staff a Neighborhood Service Unit (NSU) of a sergeant and several officers. These units too, in addition to addressing quality-of-life conditions, should be playing a role in the anti-crime strategy, gathering intelligence about criminal activity from community members and assisting with community security initiatives. An enhanced Compstat process, as recommended later in this chapter, will work to guide and drive district anti-crime efforts forward. Just as each district commanding officer should function as the chief of police for their one-ninth of the city and should be challenged to deliver effective police service to the community, addressing all areas of community concern including quality-of-life issues and serious property and violent crimes, the sector sergeants should be challenged to function in the same capacity in their assigned sectors. The keys to achieving these goals are communication, management, coordination, and accountability managed in district-based Compstat process, which mirrors the citywide Compstat process described below.

3) The District Detective Units

The BPD maintains District Detective Units (DDUs) in all nine districts, each commanded by an investigative lieutenant and usually divided into three squads supervised by sergeants, with squads assigned to robbery, burglary, and aggravated assault, including non-fatal shootings. Structurally, this kind of decentralized detective capability is essential in a large city where centralized detective units tend to lose contact with field officers, with local citizens, with useful informants, and with essential knowledge about the worst actors in the local criminal population. But while the BPD structural configuration is optimum, in

practice the DDUs have been understaffed and subject to a wide range in the quality of their management. DDU staffing has fallen from a typical unit of 14 detectives to units of ten or even seven. Understaffing has had a particular impact on burglary investigations, where there is often a lone burglary detective in a given district contending with hundreds of burglaries per year and basically performing what some BPD managers call a “data-entry function” rather than a true investigative role. DDUs lack uniform case assignment, case management, and case closing practices and may not be prioritizing cases to ensure the most efficient use of the local detective resource. Some DDUs work closely with district commanders and others are less cooperative.

DDUs are the primary investigators of local crimes, including local robberies and burglaries, serious assaults and non-fatal shootings. This is really a critical role with respect to both the reality and the perception of crime in neighborhoods. Although citizens are alarmed by homicides and shootings, they are far more likely to be victimized in robberies and burglaries, and a police department that fails to make a credible effort in these areas loses public confidence. It is essential, therefore, while attacking violent crime with the VRO program, that the BPD also sustain the DDUs in their important work.

DDU management practices should be standardized across the entire BPD and should include structured case assignment protocols and a case management system that requires supervisory review of regularly scheduled progress reports from assigned detectives about the cases they are working. The major overseeing the DDUs for the Investigations and Intelligence Bureau should function as the enforcer of quality control in all nine DDUs, making regular visits to each DDU and observing investigation and case management practices in each DDU. As discussed below in the section on the Crime Laboratory, the management and prompt processing of evidence, such as firearms evidence in shooting cases and fingerprints in burglary cases are vitally important to the success and productivity of the DDUs. In addition, the capacity to sort and display clear digital, sequential photos of local criminals who fit descriptive characteristics, to victims and witnesses can be a key factor in identifying and apprehending robbery and serious assault suspects. Detectives with this photo identification capability should be available to respond to almost all robberies, serious assaults and non-fatal shootings. Experienced detectives know that in many of these cases, victims and witnesses will be fully cooperative with investigators initially, but as time goes by and in the matter of a few short days, their cooperation can rapidly diminish. The capacity to show photos should be available in each DDU, and it should be standard practice for DDU detectives to have victims view photos as soon after a robbery or assault as possible.

4) The Special Enforcement Section (SES)

The Special Enforcement Section (SES) is the latest incarnation of an enforcement team that has operated under other names in the past 12 years, including the Organized Crime Division and the Violent Crime Impact Division (VCID). It is also worked under a variety of operating philosophies, targeting narcotics at one point and assigned to identified violent zones currently. SES is a melding of two police roles, functioning as both a crime suppression unit that is sent into violent areas to control crime and also as what is often referred to as a proactive investigations unit, not investigating specific past crimes like the

DDUs, but working to build cases against the gang leaders and local drug organization bosses who contribute to much of the violent crime in neighborhoods. As such, it can be a centrally important contributor to the BPD's anti-crime strategy and especially its effort to arrest and convict violent repeat offenders (VROs). As already noted, VROs may be committing murders for which they cannot be readily convicted, but evidence might be assembled to convict them of other serious crimes, including robberies, burglaries weapon possessions, and felony narcotics crimes, all carrying potentially heavy sentences.

SES currently has 140 officers operating in 21 enforcement teams (each consisting of a sergeant and 5 officers), an undercover squad, two vice units (concentrating on prostitutes and clubs), and a covert surveillance team. There is a core of more experienced SES officers, who are capable of conducting sophisticated investigations, that can successfully target VROs and other violent actors across the city. SES is also the central repository of confidential informants in the BPD. Ten of the 21 SES enforcement teams are currently assigned to zones within the Eastern and Western districts, which limits the SES's ability to target violent actors citywide. The SES's current commander wants to restructure the SES to create six to eight major case squads, staffed and directed to make targeted cases against gangs and drug organizations while simultaneously shrinking SES and returning about half of the SES officers to patrol assignments. He has identified 48 criminal "sets" in the city and has done close analysis on some of them to identify main players and shooters associated with these sets.

Experience in other cities, and especially in New York City, has shown that proactive investigative units like the SES are most productive, in terms of their impact on violent crime and crime generally, when they are geographically based and held accountable for progress in specific areas. In concert with the effort to strengthen district-based law enforcement in Baltimore with a more active response to crime from patrol and with improved District Detective Units (DDUs), at least one SES team should be assigned to each district, with additional teams assigned in the more crime-prone districts like the Western and the Eastern. Each team would be supervised by a sergeant reporting to a lieutenant, who would be responsible for three SES teams assigned to contiguous districts or areas. In addition, the six to eight SES major case teams could be sent into districts experiencing spikes in violence or where intelligence indicates the presence of more sophisticated entrenched gangs or cliques, who are often responsible for the worst violence and who are certainly the most difficult to build cases against. Each of these major case teams should be assigned a prosecutor from the State's Attorney's Office to assist investigations, especially in securing search warrants and eavesdropping orders, and to vigorously prosecute successful cases.

To work with optimum effectiveness, SES should be coordinating on a continuous basis among its own units, with the district commanders and the district intelligence officers (DIOs), with the DDUs in the districts, and with the Centralized Homicide section and Operational Intelligence Division. The SES major case teams should be conversant with the cases that the SES teams assigned to specific districts are working. The SES sergeant supervising district SES teams should be keeping the district commander and the district intelligence officer apprised of investigations under way and should himself be familiar

with the DDU cases, especially shooting cases, which may overlap with any SES investigations. All but the most sensitive active SES investigations should be shared at the district level. At the citywide level, close coordination with the Homicide Section and the Operational Intelligence Section is essential. To enhance this coordination, it is recommended that the SES be transferred from the Neighborhood Patrol Bureau, where it is currently assigned, to the Investigations and Intelligence Bureau and that responsibility for the training, developing, and supporting the investigative capabilities should remain with the SES commander. District commanding officers should participate in the selection process of officers who will be assigned to SES teams in their respective districts.

5) The Homicide Section

As of July 2013, the BPD Homicide Section had 66 investigative personnel, including two lieutenants, eight sergeants, and 41 detectives working in eight squads (one sergeant and five investigators in each squad) that investigate current homicides. The eight squads operate in two shifts and follow a rotation model that provides coverage to respond to new homicides, investigate cases, meet with witnesses and provide court testimony. Other Homicide Section personnel include a cold case squad (one lieutenant and five investigators), an administrative staff (one sergeant and 3 detectives), and an operations unit (one sergeant and five detectives) that is largely devoted to locating witness for court when cases are coming up for adjudication. The unit is commanded by a captain who reports to the lieutenant colonel in charge of Criminal Investigations. By mid-September, there had been 167 homicides in Baltimore in 2013 compared with 151 in prior year, for increase of 11 percent. There had been 70 homicide arrests.

Homicide Section personnel are generally not in favor of assigning homicide investigators to work cases in a specific district or area of occurrence. They describe Baltimore as a small city, where this kind geographic specialization is unnecessary. Yet, most agree that there are distinct areas of the city and that many criminals regard moving from one area to another in Baltimore as the equivalent of moving out of town. Therefore, there may significant benefits to assigning homicide there may significant benefits to assigning homicide detectives on a geographic basis. A pilot project should be implemented assigning several detectives and a supervisor – who may have worked for many years in patrol, in flex units, in a SES team, or in a DDU in a given district and who have extensive knowledge of the area and its residents – to investigate homicides and possibly non-fatal shootings occurring in that district.

In addition to homicides, the Homicide Section investigates unattended and suspicious deaths (including overdoses), officer-involved shootings, and serious assaults on city workers. Three years ago, following an incident in which police officer was killed by friendly fire, the Homicide Section was assigned responsibility to investigate all intentional discharges of police firearms, which Homicide personnel maintain should be the responsibility of Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau. The section complains of a lack of vehicles, especially vehicles equipped with lights and siren that would allow them to reach crime scenes more quickly. The Homicide Section managers see the need for a technical unit assigned strictly to Homicide Section to work with phones and other technical evidence in a timely fashion to support homicide investigations.

The Homicide Section is obviously a critical part of the BPD strategy to reduce violence in Baltimore. As observed above, they should be key players in developing the violent repeat offender (VRO) list, working with the Operational Intelligence Section and the various district resources. More important still, there should be a continuous flow of information between the Homicide Section and the other components of the anti-violence plan. At present, Homicide Section detectives maintain that they receive only the most perfunctory information about shootings being investigated by the DDUs, and the flow of information from the DDUs to the Homicide Section should be increased significantly. The field intelligence officers, recommended below, should be able to facilitate a more complete information flow in both directions.

In an effort to share intelligence and to gather information about current homicides, the Homicide Section holds a weekly Homicide Intelligence Meeting and invites District Detective Unit personnel, SES personnel, and other relevant managers to attend. This meeting is an excellent idea but could be far more effective than it is currently. The meeting should be given a more formal structure and run by a panel of the lieutenant colonel in charge of Criminal Investigations, the DDU major, the Homicide Section captain, and the commander of the Operational Intelligence Section. Attendance should be mandatory, and recorded, for district intelligence officers, District Detective Unit commanders, and the SES commanding officer and lieutenants. Current cases and suspected perpetrators should be discussed in the context of the VRO list and of the various longer term investigations the SES, the task forces, and the HIDTA groups may have under way. DDU information about current shooting incidents and patterns in the district of occurrence should be actively solicited. Neither attendance nor participation at this event should be voluntary. The panel should run the meeting, call on participants, solicit information as necessary, and request specific enforcement, investigation, or other actions be taken. These should be recorded as action items, and follow-up should be managed by the lieutenant colonel of Criminal Investigations. All but the most sensitive active investigations should be fully shared at the Homicide Intelligence Meeting. Sensitive cases should only be restricted with the approval of the lieutenant colonel of Criminal Investigations and the patrol and investigative Deputy Commissioners, who may make other arrangements to share information in a less public forum. The Homicide Intelligence Meeting should function as the central clearinghouse for intelligence about all violent crime and as an important means to target investigative resources on the most violent actors on the Baltimore scene.

6) The Operational Intelligence Section

The Operational Intelligence Section will play a pivotal role in implementing the BPD anti-crime strategy because so much of the strategy is driven by improved intelligence, focus, and targeting of violent repeat offenders (VROs). The Operational Intelligence Section encompasses a variety of units, including the task forces and HIDTA groups that work with federal agencies. It also manages BPD's participation in the Regional Auto Theft Team (RATT), two units focused on tracking guns, a Cyber and Electronic Crimes Unit, and the Warrant Apprehension Task Force (WATF). The newly appointed commander of the Operational Intelligence Section is undertaking a review of the wide variety of units under his command, including 27 different units and task forces apart from the Warrant

Apprehension Task Force (WATF), which, staffed with 95 personnel, is the largest unit in the Operational Intelligence Section. Whether all these units perform productive work and whether they are staffed properly remain open questions. Why, for instance, is the Gang Unit staffed with only one sergeant and four detectives while the Cyber Crimes Unit has one sergeant and eight detectives? Why are there as many detectives working in Asset Forfeiture as there are in gangs? Between the six detectives in the Gun Trace Task Force and the four in the Gun Registry Unit, there are 10 investigators doing largely administrative work on guns. While tracing and registering guns are important, is the priority of these units targeting and arresting those individuals selling and buying guns illegally? The entire array of units and task forces should be evaluated using productivity measures, including arrests and successful investigations, and profile sheets should be developed for each unit commander displaying specific measures of productivity or success. To the extent possible under agreements with federal and other partners, these units should be redirected and possibly resized to better support the BPD effort against violent crime. Coordination and de-confliction among all these units and coordination with SES operations should also be high priorities.

Warrant Apprehension Task Force (WATF) appears to have a very successful track record in locating and arresting people wanted on warrants. In general in Baltimore, detectives do not execute their own arrest warrants but refer them to the WATF. The WATF does not limit its activity to knocking on the door of the last known address of the wanted person. It undertakes investigations of its own to locate subjects, including interviewing acquaintances of the subject and extending to sophisticated techniques like wire taps. Unlike the situation in many other cities that have no equivalent of the WATF, there are very few wanted felons at large in Baltimore. WATF can serve as an extremely useful component in the BFD anti-violence effort, bringing felons swiftly into custody once cases have been built against them.

The Operational Intelligence Section will oversee a revived District Intelligence Officer (DIOs) program in the BPD. A DIO will be assigned to each district, but would also be a direct report to the commander of the Operational Intelligence Section. The DIOs would be pivotal players in the overall effort to gather critical intelligence, expedite information flow, and improve coordination among all the various enforcement efforts under way at any given time in the BPD. Policy should be established to prevent the DIO function from becoming an administrative catchall in the district, and a specific job description should be established for the function.

- While the District CO should have influence in choosing his or her DIO, the position should be part of the Operational Intelligence Section, reporting to the commanding officer in charge of the section. The Operational Intelligence Section commanding officer should play a role in the selection process, and possibly a DIO selection panel should be formed.
- The DIO ideally should have worked or spent time in the district to which the DIO is appointed. He or she should have a record of productivity and a good employment history.
- If possible, the DIO's should have the rank of sergeant.

- As part of the Operations Intelligence Section, the DIO should be equipped with iPhone, tablet, auto, etc. and receive specialized training. The DIO tours and regular days off should be flexible and designed to maximize effectiveness. A modest amount of overtime will likely be a part of the DIO equation.
- The BPD should implement a general order announcing the establishment of the position and containing a specific job description.
- Each DIO should function as the corporate memory about crime and violence in his or her district. Each DIO should work from the district, with a desk, a locker, office space, file cabinets, etc., in the district.
- Violent repeat offenders (VRO's) should be an important part of the DIO's duties. The DIO should know which VROs are in and out of prison at all times. The DIO should be involved in the strategy to take down each VRO.
- The DIO should sign up confidential informants, obtain search warrants, and debrief prisoners. The DIO should track community complaints about crime and especially about narcotics for referral to districts units and to SES.
- The DIO should assist the district commanding officers in formulating plans to reduce problem crimes.
- The DIO should connect the dots, identify problem crimes and problem areas, and coordinate with the DDU, SES, and the Homicide Section.
- The DIO should have rapport with Parole and Probation. He or she should be cognizant of prisoners soon to be released back to the district. The DIO should assist in formulating plans to address these individuals.
- The DIO should address patrol roll calls on crime and violence.
- Each DIO should attend the weekly homicide intelligence meeting, even if there have been no homicides in his or her district for the period under review.
- The commanding officer of the Operational Intelligence Section should maintain regular contact with each DIO and conduct biweekly DIO meetings that all DIOs must attend. The primary purpose of these meetings will be to discuss crime patterns and trends in each district, as well as patterns that are affecting several districts. The director of the Analytical Intelligence Section and members of her staff should also attend.
- The DIO is not an administrative position. The DIO should not be assigned to clerical duties. The DIO should not be tasked in preparing the district commanding officer for Compstat meetings. Nor should the DIO be tasked with reading the commanding officer's emails or attending routine meetings in the commanding officer's absence. While each DIO should attend Compstat, the voice of crime reduction and strategic planning in each district should always be the district commanding officer.

Consideration should be given to making the commanding officer of the Operational Intelligence Section a major's position to give the post the authority to effectively conduct enhanced intelligence gathering and intelligence management functions across the BPD, including the management of the DIOs. Consideration should be given to making commanding officer of the WATF a captain's position to recognize this post's

responsibilities in the management of 95 personnel in critically important enforcement function.

7) The Crime Laboratory and Mobile Crime Unit

The Crime Laboratory Section of BPD and its Mobile Crime Scene Unit handle thousands of calls per year. Both the laboratory and the Mobile Unit are understaffed, and the lab is running significant multi-month backlogs in a number of critical areas, including fingerprints and shell casing analysis. Cases can be expedited when they have priority status, which is said to be vetted by the BPD command staff, but there does not appear to be any systematic way of otherwise prioritizing cases in the queue. It is certainly appropriate to prioritize the processing of evidence in a murder case, but is it also necessary to choose among other cases, whether shootings, burglaries, or robberies in order to select the ones that have the best chance of proceeding to successful prosecutions, the ones that seem to be linked to patterns of crime, and any case that may help to make headway in incriminating a violent repeat offender (VRO).

The backlog problem is compounded by lab practice, some of it required under interpretations of accreditation standards, including the requirements for the full completion of all lab work, all second examiner work, and all reports and report reviews before investigators can be told if they have an immediate fingerprint hit or a shell casing match. In addition, too much in the way of analysis is probably being done on most cases, with every shell casing examined and every fingerprint evaluated when all that may be needed in many burglaries and shootings are a few tests in each case to provide the leads to possible perpetrators, with further tests completed later if necessary. In the case of the firearms examiners, they have tested BB guns and air soft guns, boxes of live ammunition that has never been fired, shell casings and guns from cases that have already been adjudicated, all while current cases wait in the queue. They have also repeatedly missed the deadlines in handgun violation cases, which go to court within 18 days of arrest, even though all that is required in these cases is for a police officer, not necessarily a firearms examiner, to fire the gun and to testify to its operability, a job that could be done by light-duty officers so long as they have no misconduct issues in their files.

The backlogs and prioritization issues at the Crime Laboratory Section are not going to be resolved under current operating procedures. What is necessary is to convene a working group of BPD investigative managers and Crime Laboratory managers to reassess how priorities should be established and whether some of the more exacting procedures at the Crime Laboratory are really necessary to ensure accurate identifications and useable evidence. Physical evidence is an extremely important part of the police investigation process, and if the analysis of evidence lags events by six months or more its usefulness is greatly diminished no matter how accurate or thorough the eventual analysis may be. Ultimately, prioritization of cases should follow established procedures, not just a call from the bosses to speed a particular case along, so that a much larger number of cases with real leads and real impact can be supported by the timely processing of evidence. This prioritization program should be managed by the lieutenant colonel in charge of Criminal Investigations so that a reasonable accommodation can be reached between the needs of field

investigators for timely evidence analysis and the standards necessary to maintain the integrity and accuracy of the evidence analysis process.

Although, there should be additional personnel hired in the longer term to support the important functions of the Crime Laboratory Section, there are efficiencies that can be achieved by reengineering the current practices in latent print and shell casing identifications. More timely analysis of latent prints can lead to substantial improvement of pattern burglary investigations. More timely shell casing analysis can enable the linking and mapping of related shooting incidents, where the same firearm has been used in multiple shootings, often strengthening cases against the violent felons. There are other police departments with accredited crime labs that do not operate under the stringent guidelines used in BPD. In the reengineering process, consideration should also be given to sending some evidence to the Maryland State Police Lab.

8) The State's Attorney's Office

The State's Attorney's Office is crucial partner in any BPD plan to address and reduce violent crime and other crimes in Baltimore. The violent repeat offender (VRO) program and any other targeted efforts require full cooperation between investigators and the prosecutors who bring BPD cases to trial and who persuade juries to render guilty verdicts. Police investigations and arrests that do not lead to successful prosecutions and sentencing are incomplete and ineffectual processes. Yet, there have been many cases where BPD officers and investigators are unavailable to assist in the prosecution after an arrest is made, and the States Attorney's Office reports that up to 25 percent of cases dismissed in court are dismissed because of BPD officers' failure to appear at scheduled court proceedings. They also express concern that BPD detectives are not always available to complete follow-up or further necessary investigation in cases that have already been charged. In addition, State's Attorney's Office representatives say that the quality of report writing by BPD officers is often poor and that the quality of their courtroom testimony can be weak as well. The State's Attorney's Office has also raised the issue of BPD officers not calling into the prosecutors at central booking after they make an arrest, as they are required to do because arrest wagons rather the arresting officers bring the arrestees to central booking.

A ranking supervisor in the BPD and a supervising State's Attorney should be designated as the points of contact to resolve the issues of court appearance control. Issues of post-arrest or post-charging investigative support for prosecutors should be resolved by the same designated supervising State's Attorney dealing directly with the lieutenant colonel in charge of criminal investigations. Consideration should be given to assigning a small team of investigators to provide full-time investigative support to the State's Attorney. In many jurisdictions this support is provided by a team made up of retired investigators/supervisors hired to provide the State's Attorneys/prosecutors with an investigative staff under their direct control.

Better field supervision can remedy the failure of BPD officers to call into the prosecutors at central booking after they make arrests. Patrol sergeants are fully aware when any of their officers makes an arrest, and these sergeants should be required to ensure that

arresting officers have called in to the prosecutors before completing the tour. Training will be needed to improve officers' report writing and testifying skills. The State's Attorney has offered the services of his staff in providing some of this training as part of the recruit training process and as part of the continuing in-service training of police officers and detectives.

9) The Compstat Process

Compstat is a proven command accountability system that was developed by the New York City Police Department in the mid-1990s and has been adopted by many of the larger urban police agencies in United States. It is credited with being a major factor in driving down American crime, including New York City's lasting crime declines of more than 80 percent. Compstat convenes district commanders, investigative supervisors, and the supervisors of special units for intensive, probing crime strategy sessions that sharpen the focus on current crimes and emerging crime patterns, that enforce communication and coordination among separate units and enforcement functions, and that help to shape and direct enforcement efforts. Compstat should not be just a general review of crime trends but a detail-driven dialogue about individual crimes and crime patterns and the steps being taken to counter them. In the BPD, Compstat could be used to oversee and monitor every component of the anti-crime strategy described above, from the VRO program, to the district commands, to the DDU local investigations, to the SES targeting of gangs, to Homicide Section cases, to district intelligence officers, to evidence collection and processing, to better cooperation with the State's Attorney's Office.

Currently, the BPD Compstat is not what should and can be. The session is not run as a probing inquiry of all Part I crime and enforcement, and it is almost totally focused on homicides and shootings to the exclusion of robberies, burglaries, and flex unit and SES arrest activity for these and other crimes. The agenda for the meeting is usually controlled by the field managers called to the podium rather than by the top BPD managers. As a result, the meetings have more the character of presentations than of real questioning sessions designed to share successful strategies or to correct an insufficient focus on crimes, failures of follow through with respect to specific cases, and departures from the requirements outlined in the plan above. It has been stated here that BPD has most of the components in place to mount successful anti-crime strategies but that some of these components need redirection or refocus. A primary purpose of the BPD Compstat process is to ensure that all of these components are working as envisioned, that each is doing its job, and that the work all the components is continuously coordinated for the most effective use of both intelligence and resources.

Compstat should be scheduled for the early morning rather than the afternoon so that managers can return to work after each session. The district commanders should not know in advance which districts will be called up for review at each Compstat. Every district commander should be ready to present at every Compstat. The Compstat questioning should not be conducted by the three lieutenant colonels who each oversee areas encompassing three patrol districts. Their role in Compstat, and in operations generally, should be quality control oversight in each of the districts, which might include helping

district commanders to understand the expectations of Compstat and helping them prepare for the meeting by holding area-level or district-level Compstats. The prime questioners at the citywide Compstat session should be the Deputy Commissioners of Neighborhood Patrol Bureau and the Investigations and Intelligence Bureau. Questions should be more focused on the actual breakdown of crime ("tell me what happened") and the plans to address crime increases ("tell me what you're doing about it"). There should be more discussion about current crime increases and decreases. What is causing a steep increase in auto theft in three contiguous districts and what initiatives have been undertaken to check the problem? Why have robberies exploded along a certain corridor and what can patrol, the local DDU, and the local flex unit do to respond? Why has there been a spate of shootings in one neighborhood and are they all related attacks and retaliations? There should be some focus at Compstat on SES operations, including a recap of SES activities in the districts. Two separate podiums, each equipped with a microphone could be used to bring up the district commander at one podium and the relevant investigative commanders at the other, which might include the DDU supervisor for the district, the relevant homicide supervisor, or the relevant SES or task force supervisor. One of Compstat's most important functions is to develop true working relationships among all personnel operating at the district level, including the district commanders, the DDU supervisors, the SES squad leaders, and detectives from centralized units conducting investigations into district crime.

The Compstat report should be revised to provide more with less. The summary sheets for each district should be designed to provide a quick focus on violent crime and Part I property crime and the enforcement activity against these major crimes. The primary report should be only ten pages, a citywide page and a single page each for the crime and enforcement activity taking place in each of the nine districts. The report does not need to include subcategories of the seven major felonies. Rather, district commanders reading their Part I crimes every day and strategizing about how to address these crimes should be able to articulate the details of how these crimes are occurring and what their strategies are to address them. The existing weekly report does not include crime and enforcement data that occurs after 2400 hours on Saturday, and thus the weekly Compstat data excludes what is generally found to be the high crime hours between 2400 hours and 0400 hours on Sunday morning. In all other jurisdictions the Compstat week is defined as starting Monday at 0001 hours and ending Sunday at 2400 hours.

III. Summary of Recommendations

- 1) Establish a Current Violent Repeat Offender (VRO) List – The Operational Intelligence Section should establish a current violent repeat offender list in cooperation with the State's Attorney's Office and in consultation with the BPD district commanders and district intelligence officers, the DDU investigative lieutenants, the Homicide Section, and the Special Enforcement Section (SES). The list should include, as appropriate, suspects in homicides who were acquitted or never charged, shooting victims who are tied to gang or criminal activity, and others who are identified as drivers of violence in Baltimore. Function as the primary

liaison to the State's Attorney's Office, the Operational Intelligence Section should reach consensus with the prosecutors on who should be targeted intensive investigation and enhanced prosecution. The Operational Intelligence Section should periodically revisit and refresh the VRO list.

- 2) Empower and Challenge District Commanders – The commanders of the nine patrol districts should function as the primary managers and analysts of day-to-day crime problems and patterns in their respective districts, including reading all significant crime reports in the district each day. They should have resources at their disposal, including flex units, which equip them to respond swiftly to emerging problems and crime patterns. They will be the primary representative of the district at Compstat.
- 3) Increase Crime-Focused Supervision – Direct shift lieutenants and sector sergeants to lead patrol officers to engage with criminogenic conditions on streets and with regular actors who are known to perpetrate criminal acts.
- 4) Consider Reducing Patrol Posts in Favor a System Based on Larger Sectors – The BPD should consider reducing the post concept significantly in favor of a team concept operating at the sector level, empowering the sector sergeant to allocate patrol resources within the sector as conditions require. This would give sergeant more genuine geographic responsibility and should relieve some the staffing pressures, because the shift lieutenant and the sector sergeant could make judgments about the staffing required on a given shift rather than automatically filling all posts.
- 5) Enlist Neighborhood Units in the Effort to Identify Crime Problems – The districts each staff a Neighborhood Service Unit (NSU) of a sergeant and several officers. These units too, in addition to addressing quality-of-life conditions, should be playing a role in the anti-crime strategy, gathering intelligence about criminal activity from community members and assisting with community security initiatives.
- 6) Standardize District Detective Units (DDUs) – DDU management practices should be standardized across the entire BPD and should include structured case assignment protocols and a case management system that requires supervisory review of regularly scheduled progress reports from assigned detectives about the cases they are working.
- 7) Provide for DDU Quality Control – The major overseeing the DDUs for the Investigations and Intelligence Bureau should function as the enforcer of quality control in all nine DDUs, making regular visits to each DDU and observing investigation and case management practices in each DDU.
- 8) Establish Digital Photo Display Capabilities to Assist Robbery and Assault Investigations – Each DDU should maintain the capacity to sort and display clear digital, sequential photos of local criminals who fit descriptive characteristics, to

victims and witnesses providing key evidence in identifying and apprehending robbery and serious assault suspects.

- 9) Increase DDU Staffing – As staffing resources allow, increase staffing in District Detective Units based on the caseload in each district.
- 10) Assign Special Enforcement Section (SES) squads to Each District – In concert with the effort to strengthen district-based law enforcement in Baltimore with a more active response to crime from patrol and with improved District Detective Units (DDUs), at least one SES team should be assigned to each district, with additional teams assigned in the more crime-prone districts like the Western and the Eastern. Each team would be supervised by a sergeant reporting to a lieutenant, who would be responsible for three SES teams assigned to contiguous districts or areas.
- 11) Establish SES Major Case Teams – Establish six to eight SES major case teams that can be sent into districts experiencing spikes in violence or where intelligence indicates the presence of more sophisticated entrenched gangs or cliques, who are often in back of the worst violence and who are certainly the most difficult to build cases against. Each of these major case teams should be assigned a prosecutor from the State’s Attorney’s Office to assist investigations, especially in securing search warrants and eavesdropping orders, and to vigorously prosecute successful cases.
- 12) Mandate Coordination Between SES, the Districts, and other Investigative Units – SES should be coordinating on a continuous basis among its own units, with the district commanders and the district intelligence officers (DIOs), with the DDUs in the districts, and with the Centralized Homicide section and Operational Intelligence Division. The SES major case teams should be conversant with the cases that the SES teams assigned to specific districts are working. The SES sergeant supervising district SES teams should be keeping the district commander and the district intelligence officer apprised of investigations under way and should himself be familiar with the DDU cases, especially shooting cases, which may overlap with any SES investigations.
- 13) Transfer the Special Enforcement Section – To enhance coordination among investigative units, SES should be transferred from the Neighborhood Patrol Bureau, where it is currently assigned, to the Investigations and Intelligence Bureau and responsibility for the training, developing, and supporting the investigative capabilities within SES should remain with the SES commander.
- 14) Conduct a Pilot of Geographically Based Homicide Investigations – There may significant benefits to assigning homicide detectives on a geographic basis. A pilot project should be implemented assigning several detectives and a supervisor – who may have worked in patrol, in flex units, in a SES team, or in a DDU in a given district and who have extensive knowledge of the area and its residents – to investigate homicides and possibly non-fatal shootings occurring in that district.

- 15) Evaluate the Assignment of Intentional Police Discharges Investigations – Evaluate whether intentional police discharges should be investigated by the Homicide Section, as they are now or by the Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau.
- 16) Formalize the Weekly Homicide Intelligence Meeting – The weekly homicide meeting should be given a more formal structure and run by a panel of the lieutenant colonel in charge of Criminal Investigations, the DDU major, the Homicide Section captain, and the commander of the Operational Intelligence Section. Attendance should be mandatory, and recorded, for district intelligence officers, District Detective Unit commanders, and the SES commanding officer and lieutenants. Current cases and suspected perpetrators should be discussed in the context of the VRO list and of the various longer-term investigations the SES, the task forces, and the HIDTA groups may have under way. DDU information about current shooting incidents and patterns in the district of occurrence should be actively solicited. Neither attendance nor participation at this event should be voluntary. The panel should run the meeting, call on participants, solicit information as necessary, and request specific enforcement, investigation, or other actions be taken. These should be recorded as action items, and follow-up should be reported to the lieutenant colonel of Criminal Investigations.
- 17) Evaluate Productivity and Staffing of the HIDTA Groups and Task Forces – The entire array of units and task forces assigned to the Operational Intelligence Section should be evaluated using productivity measures, including arrests and successful investigations, and profile sheets should be developed for each unit commander displaying specific measures of productivity or success. To the extent possible under agreements with federal and other partners, these units should be redirected and possibly resized to better support the BPD effort against violent crime. Coordination and de-confliction among all these units and coordination with SES operations should also be high priorities.
- 18) Establish District Intelligence Officers (DIOs) – Assign a district intelligence officer DIO to each district, who is also a direct report to the commander of the Operational Intelligence Section. The DIOs would be pivotal players in the overall effort to gather critical intelligence, expedite information flow, and improve coordination among all the various enforcement efforts under way at any given time in the BPD. Policy should be established to prevent the DIO function from becoming an administrative catchall in the district, and a specific job description should be established for the function.
- 19) Consider Upgrades for Managerial Positions in the Operational Intelligence Section – Consideration should be given to making the commanding officer of the Operational Intelligence Section a major's position to give the post the authority to effectively conduct enhanced intelligence gathering and intelligence management functions across the BPD, including the management of the DIOs. Consideration should be given to making commanding officer of the WATF a captain's position to

recognize this post's responsibilities in the management of 95 personnel in critically important enforcement function.

- 20) Convene a Working Group on Evidence Processing Backlogs – Convene a working group of BPD investigative managers and Crime Laboratory managers to reassess how priorities should be established and whether some of the more exacting procedures at the Crime Laboratory are really necessary to ensure accurate identifications and useable evidence. There are efficiencies that can be achieved by reengineering the current practices in latent print and shell casing identifications.
- 21) Address Failure to Appear and Other Court-Related Issues – A ranking supervisor in the BPD and a supervising State's Attorney should be designated as the points of contact to resolve the issues of court appearance control. Issues of post-arrest or post-charging investigative support for prosecutors should be resolved by the same designated supervising State's Attorney dealing directly with the lieutenant colonel in charge of criminal investigations. Consideration should be given to assigning a small team of investigators to provide full-time investigative support to the State's Attorney. In many jurisdictions this support is provided by a team made up of retired investigators hired to provide the prosecutors with an investigative staff under their direct control.
- 22) Supervise Arrest Processing Requirements – Better field supervision can remedy the failure of BPD officers to call into the prosecutors at central booking after they make arrests. Patrol sergeants are fully aware when any of their officers makes an arrest, and these sergeants should be required to ensure that arresting officers have called in to the prosecutors before completing the tour.
- 23) Train for Better Report Writing and Court Testimony – Training will be needed to improve officers' report writing and testifying skills. The State's Attorney has offered the services of his staff in providing some of this training as part of the recruit training process and as part of the continuing in-service training of police officers and detectives.
- 24) Establish a Robust Compstat Process – Establish a Compstat process that can be used to oversee and monitor every component of the anti-crime strategy, from the VRO program, to the district commands, to the DDU local investigations, to the SES targeting of gangs, to Homicide Section cases, to district intelligence officers, to evidence collection and processing, to better cooperation with the State's Attorney's Office.
- 25) Simplify the Compstat Report – The Compstat report should be revised to provide more with less. The summary sheets for each district should be designed to provide a quick focus on violent crime and Part I property crime and the enforcement activity against these major crimes. The primary report should be only ten pages, a citywide page and a single page each for the crime and enforcement activity taking place in each of the nine districts

Appendix C

Police Department

Baltimore, Maryland

Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau Reform and Recommendation Matrix

September 24, 2013

Number	Recommendations and Implementation Steps Professional Standards & Accountability Bureau	Status
1	The BPD shall report on the findings of all audits on a quarterly basis to the Mayor's Office (during Police Stat).	To be implemented by October 2013.
2	The BPD shall develop and implement a plan that ensures annual personnel performance evaluations for all sworn employees that address officers' civil rights integrity and community interaction, supervisors' performance in addressing at-risk behavior, and their reviewing and handling of use of force incidents.	To be implemented by February 2014.
3	Administrative detectives from the Professional Standards & Accountability Bureau shall conduct all administrative investigations of major Uses of Force, while detectives from the Investigations and Intelligence Bureau shall conduct separate criminal investigations of such uses of force when appropriate.	Office of Internal Oversight will be taking admin responsibility. General Order in Draft Phase. 9/18/2013
4	A Use of Force Review Board shall review all major uses of force and in-custody deaths. Upon its review, the Use of Force Review Board will provide the Police Commissioner with its recommended findings.	In Progress. Improvements within next 30 days. General Order is Draft phase 9/18/2013

5	The BPD will clarify/develop its Constitutional Policing policies.	In Progress. Lexipol to update every 30 days
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS AND TRIAL BOARDS		
6	<p>Upon completion of the administrative investigation of any complaint lodged against a member of the BPD:</p> <p>a. The case (if sustained) will be forwarded to PSAB.</p> <p>b. Charging Committee will determine the recommended adjudication and penalty (if any) in accordance with both the BPD’s disciplinary matrix and the merits of the case.</p> <p>c. PSAB will provide the accused employee with documentation advising him/her of the charges, the respective findings and the penalty, if any.</p> <p>d. The accused employee will have an opportunity to review the case and its findings. He/She may either accept the findings and possible penalty, or he/she may elect to take the matter before a Trial Board (hearing will be according to FOP agreement and LEOBR rules).</p>	<p>Completed 2013. Audit to be conducted within 60 days.</p> <p>General Order to be updated 9/18/2013</p>
7	Trial Boards will be staffed with members of this organization of the rank of Captain or above. The exception will be the “peer member” who, according to the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights (LEOBR), will continue to be of the same rank as the accused employee.	<p>Completed 2013.</p> <p>General Order / SOP to be updated 9/18/2013</p>
8	The Trial Board’s decision will be forwarded to the Police Commissioner (or his/her designee) who has final decision-making authority on member discipline.	<p>Completed</p> <p>General Order to be updated 9/18/2013</p>
9	<p>Trial Boards will fall under the auspices of PSAB. Members involved in the trial board process (Command Staff and rank-equivalent peer members) will receive additional training to ensure the process operates efficiently and effectively. a. Minimum standards for adjudication of disciplinary cases include the following:</p> <p>i. The burden of proof is on the agency.</p> <p>ii. The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.</p> <p>iii. The standards of evidence are those of administrative law,</p>	<p>Completed 2013</p> <p>General Order to be updated 9/18/2013</p>

	<p>not criminal law.</p> <p>iv. No presumptions of truth are made regarding facts in dispute.</p> <p>v. No presumptions are made regarding witness credibility: all persons are equally credible unless an objective, fact-based evaluation of the witness’s capacities, testimonial coherence, and other relevant and demonstrable factors justify otherwise.</p> <p>vi. Conclusions are logically deduced from the evidence.</p> <p>It should be noted that a thorough review of adjudicative standards would exceed the scope of this report and would more easily be found in legal reference works or state jury instructions on assessing evidence and testimony. Nevertheless, an adjudication lacking in any of the six standards above should not be considered properly justified.</p>	
POLICE-INVOLVED MAJOR USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS AND THE “PIMI TEAM”		
10	<p>It is the policy of the Baltimore Police Department to thoroughly investigate and accurately document all of the facts surrounding incidents when an officer discharges a weapon, or is the victim of an assault that involves: the discharge of a firearm; serious injuries to officers and citizens; and in-custody deaths.</p>	<p>Current policy. General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>
11	<p>It is the policy of the Baltimore Police Department that activation of the Police-Involved Major Use of Force Incident (PIMI) Team shall be <u>MANDATORY</u> whenever:</p> <p>a. A sworn member of any rank discharges his/her weapon, regardless of the circumstances and whether or not anyone was injured.</p> <p>b. A civilian is <u>shot at</u> by police gunfire, regardless of circumstances.</p> <p>c. A civilian is <u>struck by</u> police gunfire, regardless of the injury severity or circumstances.</p>	<p>In Progress. Currently PIMI is named POIS. Renaming to be completed within 30 days.</p> <p>General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>
12	<p>The PIMI Team policy applies to the following types of incidents: a. Death or injury of an officer by gunfire.</p> <p>b. Death or injury of a citizen by police gunfire.</p> <p>c. Intentional discharging of a firearm by an officer.</p> <p>d. In-custody deaths.</p> <p><u>EXCEPTIONS</u></p>	<p>In Progress. The implementation of In-custody deaths are to be implemented immediately (next In-Custody death</p>

	<p>If no person is struck by police gunfire, activation of the PIMI Team is NOT required in the following police-involved shooting incidents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The police-involved shooting of a vicious or dangerous animal. ii. The negligent handling of a firearm by a sworn member which results in an unintentional discharge without injury. 	<p>incident) General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>
13	<p>The PIMI Team shall consist of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Supervisor, Homicide Section, who is the lead investigator and is tasked with conducting the Criminal Investigation. b. Supervisor, PSAB, to conduct the Administrative Investigation to ensure compliance with departmental rules and regulations. c. Supervisors from the Firearms Training Unit and the Physical Skills Unit, to examine any and all training issues surrounding the incident and, when appropriate, provide training for the involved officer. d. Technician, Mobile Crime Laboratory Unit, to process the incident scene in accordance with procedures contained in the Crime Laboratory Section's technical manual and in coordination with Homicide Investigators. e. Spokesperson, Public Affairs Office, to ensure an accurate and timely flow of information to the public. 	<p>Already implemented 2012 General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>
14	<p>The PIMI Teams shall conduct criminal and administrative investigations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The Supervisor, Homicide Section, will solicit a voluntary statement from the involved officers as soon as practical. b. All statements, whether voluntary or compelled, shall be tape recorded and/or videotaped. c. For the purposes of identifying positions on the day/night of the incident, investigators from the Homicide Section will conduct a walk-through with any/all witnessing officers who did not fire their weapons. d. PSAB detectives may observe and have access to the voluntary statement given to the Homicide Section. 	<p>Already implemented 2012. General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>
15	<p>PSAB detectives shall conduct compelled interviews with the involved officers and ensure the compelled interview is thorough and addresses all of the relevant administrative</p>	<p>Implemented March 2013.</p>

	<p>concerns. This will be done at the direction of the PSAB and when no conflict with a criminal case exists.</p> <p>a. The compelled statement from any involved member(s) will not be shared with the criminal investigators.</p> <p>b. Detectives from the Homicide Section may not observe or have access to any compelled statements, information, or evidence obtained from an involved employee who has been compelled to give a statement.</p>	<p>General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>
16	<p>The PSAB will ensure the Police Commissioner is provided with a 24 hour synopsis of the known facts following the incident.</p>	<p>Completed General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>
USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD		
17	<p>A Use of Force Review Board (the Board), convened by the Deputy Police Commissioner, PSAB, will examine all incidents in which:</p> <p>a. A police officer intentionally discharges his/her weapon (other than during authorized firearms training);</p> <p>b. There is injury to or the death of an officer due to gunfire;</p> <p>c. There is significant injury (requiring hospital admission) to or the death of a civilian due to police-related actions (including in-custody deaths); or</p> <p>d. Any incident at the direction of the Police Commissioner.</p>	<p>To be Implemented within 30 days.</p> <p>General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>
18	<p>The Board will, as appropriate for the particular circumstances, review a police-involved major use of force incident:</p> <p>a. No later than three months from the date that a decision letter is received from the State's Attorney's Office; or</p> <p>b. Within ninety days of the completion of the administrative investigation of a Major Use of Force Incident; or</p> <p>c. At the Deputy Police Commissioner's request to review a particular incident.</p>	<p>To be implemented within 30 days.</p> <p>General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>
19	<p>The Board will examine/review:</p> <p>a. All incidents as they pertain to equipment, training and policy matters.</p>	<p>To be implemented within 30 days.</p>

	<p>b. All incidents as they pertain to an officer’s police tactics, the precipitating events that led to the use of force, and an evaluation of or revision to training and/or practices.</p> <p>The enhanced administrative review under this new policy will consider the strategic, tactical, policy, training, and risk management implications of any such incident, including whether changes to policy, procedures, equipment, or training might mitigate the effects or reduce the number of similar incidents in the future. The administrative detectives’ investigative scope will be the actions leading up to, during, and immediately after the incident.</p>	<p>General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>
<p>20</p>	<p>Every review conducted by the Board will:</p> <p>a. Be conducted in a manner reflective of the perspective of the involved employee(s). Personal, subjective opinions do not factor into the review;</p> <p>b. Focus on the Tactics used by the involved employee(s), leading up to, during, and immediately after the incident; and</p> <p>c. Focus on the Force Used during the incident, to include a determination as to whether or not the Force was Within Department Policy and Procedures.</p>	<p>To be implemented within 30 days.</p> <p>General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>
<p>21</p>	<p>The recommended findings for the Board are as follows:</p> <p>a. <u>TACTICS</u>:(Recommended Findings)</p> <p>i. The Police Commissioner has the final determination on findings.</p> <p>b. <u>Tactical Debrief</u>: The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance. The Tactical Debrief will be conducted by personnel from the Education & Training Section. All major uses of force will be subject to a Tactical Debrief. The tactical debrief is non-punitive.</p> <p>i. This debrief shall be conducted within 30 days of the conclusion of the Board’s review.</p> <p>c. Administrative Disapproval – Out of Policy:</p> <p>i. Tactics employed during a PIMI incident were not objectively reasonable under the circumstances specific to the incident, and significantly deviated from approved departmental training or</p>	<p>To be implemented within 30 days.</p> <p>General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>

	<p>practices.</p> <p>ii. A deficiency has been identified that requires “Retraining.”</p> <p>iii. There is a historical basis that warrants the finding (employee has received previous training for similar concerns).</p>	
22	<p>When a finding of Administrative Disapproval – Out of Policy is rendered the Board shall recommend any of the following, but must provide some rationale for the recommendation:</p> <p>a. Retraining: This is appropriate where there was no malice on the part of the involved member, and it is clear that he/she was not following proper training guidelines. In this case, the involved member may have developed a pattern or practice that is counter to effective tactics and best practices and may not realize it. This retraining will be facilitated by the Education & Training Section.</p> <p>b. Notice to Correct Deficiencies (NTC): A NTC is appropriate where the employees’ actions manifest disregard for departmental training <i>not</i> amounting to misconduct. In this case the involved member may have had prior training or counseling on the same or similar concerns. A NTC is just that, placing the employee on notice that his/her actions were deficient and need to be corrected.</p> <p>c. Disciplinary Recommendation: Disciplinary recommendations are appropriate when the involved member’s conduct or actions manifests misconduct. <i>*General Order C-10, “Disciplinary Matrix,” shall be used as a guide.</i></p>	<p>To be implemented within 30 days.</p> <p>General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>
23	<p>The USE OF FORCE will have the following recommended findings:</p> <p>a. <u>In Policy – No Further Action:</u> The force used was objectively reasonable under the facts and circumstances and therefore within departmental policy.</p> <p>i. The question is – would a similarly situated department member (member with similar background, training and experience), when faced with the same facts and circumstances, have perceived the same threat and would he/she have reacted in a similar manner?</p> <p>ii. For example – Officer Jones reacted as any reasonable officer would have under the circumstances. He observed</p>	<p>To be implemented within 30 days.</p> <p>General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>

Walker, a known gang member, turn and run away after being ordered to stop. This reasonably increased Officer Jones' sense of an impending threat from an uncooperative (known) gang member. When the suspect, who demonstrated his intent on escaping, reached into his pocket and removed a dark object, Officer Jones reasonably perceived that object to be a firearm. When Walker intentionally pointed the perceived firearm at Officer Jones, Jones reacted to the deadly threat as any officer would under those facts and circumstances. He reasonably perceived that his life was in danger and reacted based on his training and experience. In response to Walker's actions and in defense of his own life, Officer Jones fired at Walker to end that threat. His actions and the use of force were objectively reasonable and within policy.

b. Administrative Disapproval – Out of Policy: The Use of Force was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

i. This will require an in-depth discussion on why, including a discussion of policy and training issues. Incidents such as shooting at moving vehicle cases are far more unambiguous when specific or general prohibitions are in place. However, remember that the objective reasonableness of the force is the key. The objective in cases which are not as clear is to explain why the actions for the employee were not reasonable under the circumstances, and why a similarly situated member (member with similar background, training and experience) would not have had the same perceptions or reacted in the same manner.

ii. For example, Officer Johnson's perception that the domestic violence suspect was armed with a deadly weapon and posed the threat of death or serious injury was not reasonable. This incident occurred during daylight hours on the porch of the residence, and Officer Johnson's view was unobstructed within 15 feet of the suspect. The suspect in this case was an elderly person (83 years old) who was armed with a 23-inch-long wooden stick. The stick was $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch in diameter. The suspect was on the porch of his home and was clearly irate over the preceding domestic incident. While the stick, under certain circumstances, may reasonably be considered a deadly weapon, those facts were not present to support such a perception in this situation. Accordingly, Officer Johnson's reaction and his decision to use deadly force in defense of his own life in this case were not

Also, Officer Johnson stated that he felt "threatened," but could not articulate specific reasons why during his statement. In fact, Officer Johnson was aware that the suspect was standing near a

	<p>walker and likely lacked mobility. Though the suspect threatened to “kill” Officer Johnson, Johnson, with his 12 years of experience and his background and training, had a duty to assess all tactical and force options available to him to resolve the confrontation.</p> <p>*As a general rule, policy should be cited when providing rationale for findings.</p>	
24	<p>Commanding Officer’s participation during the Board:</p> <p>a. Two weeks prior to the Board’s review, the Commanding Officer/Captain of the involved member will receive a complete copy of the administrative investigation with all interview transcripts. Each respective Commanding Officer/Captain is required to attend any Board involving his/her personnel, and must be prepared to present his/her recommended findings and supporting rationale for the Tactics and Force used during the incident. Commanding Officers/Captains must also be prepared to present the involved member’s work history. (Use of Force History & Complaint History to be obtained from IAD.)</p> <p>b. Upon being notified that he/she will be appearing before the Board, the Commanding Officer/Captain should do the following to prepare:</p> <p>i. Ensure he/she receives a complete copy of the administrative investigation.</p> <p>ii. Schedule a “walk-through” with the involved member.</p> <p>1. Don’t forget to include the supervisors involved in the incident.</p> <p>2. The walk-through should be at the actual scene of the incident.</p> <p>3. Considerations should be given to conducting the walk-through at the same time frame & conditions as the day of the incident.</p> <p>4. During the walk-through, the involved member may recall something differently or have insight that might clarify an issue or add perspective. In these instances, the Commanding Officer/Captain should contact PSAB to discuss these clarifications with investigators. Substantially different recollections should also be reported to PSAB.</p> <p>5. The walk-through will aid the Commanding Officer/Captain</p>	<p>To be implemented within 30 days.</p> <p>General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013</p>

	in his/her decision-making process relative to his/her findings and recommendations.	
25	Investigators will present their investigation to the Board in PowerPoint format. They will answer any factual questions the Board may have and address any investigative issues or concerns.	Already Implemented 2012. General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013
26	The Commanding Officer/Captain will then orally present his/her recommendation for findings in Tactics and Use of Force and supporting rationale. The Commanding Officer/Captain will also present the involved member's work history and answer any questions from the Board.	To be implemented within 30 days. General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013
27	The Board will then clear the room for deliberations (the members will be discussing private personnel information). This process takes place in a closed session among Board members. The Board may call on experts or others to clarify issues and provide feedback as needed. There are no time restrictions placed upon deliberations.	To be implemented within 30 days. General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013
28	The Board then has everyone re-enter the room. The Board announces its findings and discusses its rationale for Tactics and Use of Force. The Board will also highlight any topics and issues to be discussed during the mandatory Tactical Debrief.	To be implemented within 30 days. General Order /SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013
29	The Board prepares correspondence for the Police Commissioner reflective of its findings and recommendations. While the UOFRB seeks a majority, any member can have a minority opinion and, if so, shall write his/her rationale and forward same along with the majority's report to the Police Commissioner.	To be implemented within 30 days. General Order / SOP in Draft Phase

		9/18/2013
30	At the conclusion of the Board's hearing, the Police Commissioner will be presented with its recommended findings.	To be implemented within 30 days. General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013
31	The Police Commissioner makes the final decision on whether or not to accept the Board's recommendations (minority or majority) or a different finding based on LEOBR mandates.	To be implemented within 30 days. General Order / SOP in Draft Phase 9/18/2013
INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION (IAD)-A SUBCOMPONENT OF PSAB TO BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED WITHIN 18 MONTHS		
32	The BPD shall provide quarterly reports to the Mayor's Office (during Police Stat) on all disciplinary action, providing overviews of the circumstances and the disciplinary action, and explanations for the chosen action.	To be implemented within 30 days. Memo sent to IAD to start September 2013 IAD is working on presentation 9/18/2013
33	The BPD shall develop a written plan for organizing and executing regular, targeted and random integrity audit checks to identify and investigate officers engaging in at-risk behavior, as well as random audits of warrant applications, arrest and booking reports, and use of confidential informants.	To be implemented within 60 days.
34	Continue 24-hr toll-free complaint hotline and distribute materials to the community advising of how to make a personnel complaint.	To be implemented within 60 days.
35	The BPD shall upgrade their database containing relevant information about its officers and their practices to serve as an Early Warning System to identify at-risk behavior and promote best practices. The system should have the capability to search	To be implemented within 6 months.

	and retrieve information and statistics on the department's personnel complaints.	General Order in Draft Phase 9/18/2013
36	Supervisors and managers shall monitor officers for risk behavior. The department will implement Comment Cards entries and Notices to Correct of Deficiencies forms to document employee behavior. The forms will be presented to the officers for their review and if they elect, they can provide a rebuttal which will also be entered into their personnel file.	To be implemented by January 2014.
37	Train managers and supervisors on the department's Early Warning System designed to identify and address employees with at-risk behavior and implement corrective measures.	To be fully implemented within 12 months
38	The BPD shall collect for its Early Warning System database information relating to officers' use of force, firearm discharges, injuries to officers, the results of all investigations into disciplinary matters, awards or commendations earned by officers, criminal charges brought against an officer, lawsuits or claims brought against officers, arrest reports, and training history.	To be implemented by January 2014. General Order in Draft Phase 9/18/2013
39	In conducting an investigation, the BPD shall keep records of all interviews, collect and preserve all evidence, and identify and report in writing all inconsistencies in statements.	Already BPD Policy. Audit to be conducted by January 2014.
40	The BPD shall provide a report to the Civilian Review Board on the discipline imposed each quarter.	To be implemented within 30 days. OIO meets with board on 9/19/2013
41	The BPD shall ensure that complaints are stored and are retrievable for future audits.	Already policy. Audit within 6 months
42	The BPD shall ensure that materials are distributed to preselected locations throughout the community with information about individual rights and the process for filing a personnel complaint against a BPD employee.	To be implemented in 60 days.
43	The BPD shall keep complainants informed of the progress and ultimate resolution of their complaints in a manner consistent	To be implemented

	with the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR).	within 30 days. SOP due from IAD October 1, 2013
44	The BPD shall continue to notify the Baltimore City States Attorney's office whenever an officer shoots and/or injures a person, or is alleged to have committed criminal misconduct.	Already Implemented 2012. General Order in Draft Phase 9/18/2013
45	The BPD, with input from the Civilian Review Board and the community, will clarify supervisors' responsibilities when responding to allegations of discriminatory or unconstitutional policing.	To be implemented with 12 months.
46	To ensure that allegations are being investigated at the appropriate level, IAD will review <i>all</i> complaints lodged against members of the department and determine which cases are suitable for investigation at the command level and which cases will be investigated at IAD.	Already policy. Audit to be conducted with 6 months.

ETHICS ENFORCEMENT SECTION (EES)-A SUBCOMPONENT OF PSAB

47	<p>Revisions will also be made to the Ethics Enforcement Section.</p> <p>a. Currently, EES is housed in the same physical location as IAD. This unnecessarily causes EES undercover officers to be exposed to members of the department and the public. The potential for EES staff being recognized limits their ability to conduct proactive undercover investigations.</p> <p>b. As a result, EES will be moving to an off-site, undisclosed, nondescript location.</p> <p>c. The EES membership will be increased, and the section will be separated from IAD and report to the Commanding Officer of the General Accountability Office.</p> <p>d. Their renewed focus and dedication will ensure that EES is investigating only the most serious allegations, and will afford them the opportunity to cultivate more proactive investigations and audits of both targeted and randomly selected department personnel.</p>	<p>Completed 2013. EES has been relocated.</p> <p>Still need to increase personnel</p>
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EDUCATION AND TRAINING SECTION-A SUBCOMPONENT TO BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED WITHIN 12 MONTHS

48	Conduct periodic audits of officer and supervisory training in order to improve current training curricula to reduce incidents	To start immediately
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	of excessive force, false arrests, illegal searches, and make greater use of community-oriented-policing training models.	and completed by January 2014
49	BPD shall conduct an evaluation of successful programs across the U.S. addressing police interactions with persons who may be mentally ill, and conduct an evaluation of BPD training, policies, and procedures for such interactions.	To start immediately and completed by January 2014
50	Audit and update all current use of force-related policies and training materials to reflect the new major use of force investigation and review procedures.	To start immediately and completed by January 2014
51	Review the current reporting of less-than-lethal force and the Use of Force Report by which the less-than-lethal force is reported and reviewed by supervisors.	To start immediately and completed by January 2014
52	BPD will train its officers in the use of verbal de-escalation techniques to be used during interactions with citizens during traffic stops.	To start January 2014
53	All officers, recruits and supervisors currently on patrol, will be trained in areas of cultural diversity, sensitivity, verbal de-escalation, and supervisor skills. This training will be reinforced throughout the entire academy process. Current officers will be instructed in these skills once a year as part of their in-service training.	To start January 2014
54	All supervisors will receive yearly training in supervisory and leadership skills, accountability, integrity, and cultural diversity.	To start January 2014
55	BPD will evaluate its current curricula and evaluate the current crisis intervention program and employee training.	To begin within 30 days
NEIGHBORHOOD PATROL BUREAU		
TO BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED WITHIN 18 MONTHS		
56	Supervisors and managers shall monitor officers for risk behavior. The department will implement Comment Cards entries and Notices of Deficiencies forms to document employee behavior. The forms will be presented to the officers for their review and if they elect, they can provide a rebuttal which will also be entered into their personnel file.	To start January 2014 General Order in Draft Phase 9/18/2013
57	Supervisors and managers shall review complaint and work history information pertaining to employees under their purview.	To start within 30 days Memo sent to

		Command Due October 1, 2013
58	Senior Managers shall review the actions of subordinate managers and supervisors regarding adherence to the policy of identifying and addressing at-risk behavior by employees.	To start within 30 days Memo sent to Command Due October 1, 2013
59	Develop and implement a protocol that sets requirements for training and managing units that monitor gangs and violent activity to ensure proper experience with the practices of the units and ensure training in interpersonal and administrative skills, cultural and community sensitivity, and police integrity.	To begin planning within 30 days. Fully implemented by January 2014
60	The BPD shall strive to implement a supervisor to officer ratio of 1 to 7 for greater oversight and management efficiency.	18 months 8/26/13, PC assigned to fiscal, DC Palmer, DC Rodriguez
61	The BPD shall have all booking recommendations reviewed by a permanent rank supervisor prior to booking.	Already Policy; However, G.O. may need to be updated and an audit conducted within 3 months.
62	All requests for warrants and affidavits shall be reviewed and approved by the shift commander who will determine appropriateness, legality, and conformance with policies and procedures.	To be implemented within 30 days. G.O. being amended
63	All search warrants enforcement shall have a detailed tactical plan that is to be reviewed and approved by the unit supervisor and the shift commander.	Threat assessment already in place. Audit to be conducted with 30 days for compliance.
64	In conducting an investigation, the BPD shall keep records of all interviews, collect and preserve all evidence, and identify	Already policy.

	and report in writing all inconsistencies in statements.	Audit to be conducted within 90 days.
65	BPD officers shall continue to complete a report each time an officer conducts a motor vehicle stop or pedestrian stop.	Stop receipts need to be entered in database. Audit to be conducted within 6 months. (Item same as # 69) Citizen contact reports and all departmental documents need to be changed from Stop & Frisk to Investigative Stops. PCM sent to PC for signature
66	The BPD shall continue to conduct Community Outreach efforts and Public Information programs for each BPD District Command, to include open meetings with public attendance.	Already implemented. Audit to be conducted within 6 months.
67	The BPD shall prepare and publish on its website semiannual public reports including statistics on geographic and racial information of arrests, summary of discipline imposed upon claims of misconduct, and any new policies.	Some items already completed. To be fully implemented within 90 days.
68	BPD will continue to use and update the Traffic Stop Report.	Audit within 6 months.

69	Citizen Contact sheets shall continue to be issued when no custodial arrest is made but a citizen is stopped and detained by police.	Stop receipts need to be entered in database. Audit conducted within 6 months (Item same as # 65)
71	BPD will also develop an inter-agency Crisis Intervention Committee that will develop resources available to refer individuals in crisis.	Crisis Intervention Team already exists.
72	All commanding officers and above will be attending refresher and basic ICS courses.	Implemented 2013
73	All events (preplanned) and incident (spontaneous) action plans will be written and implemented using the ICS system.	Implemented 2013
74	ICS systems and terminology will be incorporated into future departmental promotional testing.	Implement during next Sergeant's test in 2014
75	Commanding Officers throughout the organization will be trained on Crowd Management and Crowd Control Techniques.	To be Implemented in 2014
76	Front line supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants) will be trained along with their subordinates on Crowd Management and Crowd Control Techniques.	To be Implemented in 2014
77	Periodic training will be conducted by each district, by shift, to ensure that proficiency in these perishable skills is maintained.	To be Implemented in 2014
78	Each district will conduct periodic audits to ensure its employees' emergency equipment is in proper working order. a. If equipment is found to be unserviceable, steps shall be taken to replace or correct the equipment for its deployment when necessary. b. The Office of General Accountability will be responsible for conducting annual audits to ensure compliance.	Already Policy. Audit to be conducted within 30 days.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS SECTION		
TO BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED WITHIN 6 MONTHS		
79	BPD shall establish a media advisory working group to facilitate information dissemination to various communities	To be implemented

	within Baltimore City.	within 60 days.
INFORMATION SERVICES SECTION		
TO BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED WITHIN 12 MONTHS		
80	The department shall collect for its Early Warning System database information relating to officers' use of force, firearm discharges, injuries to officers, the results of all investigations into disciplinary matters, awards or commendations earned by officers, criminal charges brought against an officer, lawsuits or claims brought against officers, arrest reports, and training history.	To be implemented within 12 months. General Order in Draft Phase 9/18/2013