15 November 2002
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US Department of State
International Information Programs
Washington File
_________________________________
14 November 2002
(Energy Secretary says 2003 conference will address "dirty bomb" issue) (3410) Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham says it would not take "exorbitant quantities of nuclear or radiological materials" for terrorists or rogue states to produce a "dirty bomb" or radiological dispersal device. In a November 14 keynote address to the 2002 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference in Washington, Abraham said "there is no margin for error" since there are both states and sub-state actors seeking nuclear or radiological materials. Too much uranium and plutonium "remains under-secured," he said. "We all need to apply the best technologies, the best know-how, experience, and expertise that we can to this problem," he said. Countries need to think about what steps they need to take to address the threat. "The United States is employing a multi-pronged strategy, expanding materials protection programs, accelerating its assistance to other countries under the Second Line of Defense program, working with our own customs organization, and expanding research and development to detect nuclear materials," he said. "We are all vulnerable, so we all have to work together," Abraham added. The secretary also said there are plans to hold an international conference in Vienna in March 2003 to address the threats posed by radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) and unsecured civil nuclear materials. "The relative simplicity of constructing a dirty bomb, coupled with the widespread availability of suitable radioactive material," he said, makes it clear "that the civilized nations of the world must come together to address these threats." His remarks also touched on recent efforts to address vulnerabilities taken by Russia, Ukraine, the Republic of Georgia, Yugoslavia and China. Following is the text of Abraham's remarks, as prepared for delivery: (begin text) "Ten Principles for Nuclear and Radiological Materials Security" Remarks of Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace International Non-Proliferation Conference November 14, 2002 Good morning. It's an honor to be here. I'd like to extend my thanks to Jessica Mathews and Joseph Cirincionne of the Carnegie Endowment for sponsoring this conference. I'd also like to thank Rose Gottemoeller for that kind introduction. And let me say how pleased I am to discuss a matter on which I place the highest priority -- the ongoing efforts of the United States to secure and reduce nuclear and radiological materials. The Bush administration is fully committed to this agenda, and I think what we have accomplished by establishing the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction indicates the seriousness of purpose we bring to it. Indeed, this is a challenge shared by all the civilized nations of the world, and certainly President Bush's leadership has been crucial to bringing the international community together to find the common ground necessary to counter a threat common to each of us. The president made this clear last May, when he and President Putin jointly committed to "work closely together, including through cooperative programs, to ensure the security of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, information, expertise, and material." It was a commitment taken very seriously throughout our administration and is reflected prominently in our recently published national security strategy. That document asserts that "strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technology, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction" are a very high priority for this administration. The materials necessary to build nuclear weapons -- highly enriched uranium and plutonium -- may not be widely available, but they can be extraordinarily dangerous. We know that too much uranium and plutonium remains under-secured. The materials that could be used in radiological dispersal devices, or RDDs, while perhaps not as dangerous, are available in virtually every country in the world. Addressing the non-proliferation question is among the most serious responsibilities I have as Energy Secretary, and one on which I have spent a lot of time working. In nearly two years in office, I've organized my thoughts into 10 principles for nuclear and radiological security. Today I want to discuss these 10 principles, how the United States is implementing them, and I want to highlight the challenges the world faces. I hope you find this approach useful. Principle One: The threat continues to evolve. Over the past decade or so, thinking about the proliferation threat has focused mostly on rogue states seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction, or the materials needed to acquire them -- and on the problems caused by under-secured nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. Now, the international community is additionally focusing on threats posed by terrorist networks that seek such weapons and materials. Such threats have long been a concern, of course, but now they are a far greater focus of attention. And much more attention is being paid to the risks associated with the misuse of radiological materials -- a concern hardly thought about until the past year. September 11, 2001, made these concerns more immediate. That day demonstrated the unblinking commitment that terrorists have to mass destruction -- including their blithe indifference toward killing thousands of innocents. If these purveyors of hate managed to acquire the deadly materials necessary for nuclear or radiological weapons, they would surely find ways to use them. The United States is meeting this challenge by accelerating programs, increasing their funding, and looking for new approaches. To that end we have forged a strong relationship with my counterpart from Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, who has played a key role in the progress we are making. Moreover, in three speeches to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna since 9/11, I have emphasized a simple but irrefutable message: We are all vulnerable, so we all have to work together. Principle Two: The margin of error is small. In the past decade alone, the IAEA has reported about 200 attempts at the illicit smuggling of nuclear materials. Some reports are more credible than others, and most involve materials not always considered a threat. But this phenomenon nonetheless tells us a number of things. -- First, there are any number of states and sub-state actors interested in acquiring nuclear or radiological materials. -- Second, we do not know what we do not know. In February 2002, the CIA's National Intelligence Council concluded, "We assess that undetected smuggling has occurred, although we do not know the extent or magnitude of such threats." -- And third, even a little success in smuggling or theft can have a great impact. Terrorists or rogue states do not need exorbitant quantities of nuclear or radiological materials to achieve their ends. Based on IAEA calculations, only a relatively small amount of highly enriched uranium could be enough for a nuclear explosive device. And if the goal is to build a radiological dispersal device, or "dirty bomb," the amount can be even less, depending on the material used. So there is no margin for error. We all need to apply the best technologies, the best know-how, experience, and expertise that we can to this problem. The United States is employing a multi-pronged strategy, expanding materials protection programs, accelerating its assistance to other countries under the Second Line of Defense program, working with our own customs organization, and expanding research and development to detect nuclear materials. Others need to think about similar steps. Principle Three: The problem demands a broad array of responses. Nuclear and radiological materials security is a multifaceted problem. Physically securing nuclear materials is critical, but it is only part of the solution. I find useful the following framework for thinking about how to address nuclear material security: -- First, nuclear material can be made more physically secure. Border monitoring, export controls, and other measures, including the application of safeguards by the IAEA, also help to ensure that nuclear materials stay where they are supposed to be. -- Second, nuclear material can be consolidated. By reducing the number of sites storing this material, we can reduce vulnerability to threat or sabotage. -- Third, nuclear material can be reduced. The total amount of this material needs to be brought down -- for example, through down blending HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium), or burning plutonium as MOX (Mixed Oxide -- plutonium/uranium nuclear fuels) fuel in nuclear power plants so that it can no longer be used for nuclear weapons. -- Finally, the production of excess nuclear material can be ended. The value of reducing nuclear materials increases greatly, if at the same time no more such material is being produced. What all this tells us is that we need to address the nuclear materials security problem comprehensively -- in all its dimensions. Principle Four: There are good reasons to focus on Russia. A January 2001 report noted that the fall of the Soviet Union led to "the dissolution of an empire having over 40,000 nuclear weapons, (and) over a thousand metric tons of nuclear materials," and that Russia lacked the infrastructure "to assure that chains of command remain intact and nuclear weapons and materials remain securely beyond the reach of terrorists and weapons-proliferating states." We've paid so much attention to Russia because that is where the material is. And we have had much success. In part, that is due to Russia's own strong commitment to reducing nuclear materials threats -- as I have seen firsthand on numerous occasions. As a result, Russia and the United States have enjoyed unprecedented cooperation over the past few years. This has led to a number of agreements and accomplishments: -- Security upgrades to MinAtom's (Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy) nuclear weapons complex should be completed in 2008. Security upgrades to the Russian Navy's entire nuclear weapons arsenal, about 4,000 total weapons, should be completed by 2005. We are ahead of previous estimates for completing this work. -- The United States and Russia will dispose of additional nuclear material, beyond that stipulated in existing agreements. We have agreed, for example, that the United States will purchase additional HEU from Russia. We're going to do more. -- We're going to shut down the three reactors in Russia that are still producing about 1.5 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium every year. -- And, over the next year, border security upgrades will increase from four to 21 sites in Russia and the Ukraine -- an important contribution to international efforts to curtail nuclear smuggling. The United States and Russia have taken major steps to secure Russian materials, but there is much more to be done. Which brings me to my fifth principle: Principle Five: This is a worldwide problem demanding international solutions. I'm gratified to see steps being taken by many countries. Working with the United States, for example, the Ukrainian government has made significant progress in protecting materials at nuclear facilities. The United States recently completed critical physical protection improvements at the Nuclear Research Institute in Rez, in the Czech Republic. And the United States assisted Uzbekistan in completing security upgrades that reduce the vulnerability of sensitive facilities in that country. The international cooperation that was demonstrated in the recent effort at the Vinca research reactor in Yugoslavia, where enough nuclear material for more than two nuclear weapons was removed, was exemplary. Russia, Yugoslavia, the IAEA, and an American non-governmental organization, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, all made critical contributions to this operation. Vinca laid bare the potential security risks posed by HEU fuel at former Soviet-supplied research reactors in approximately 17 countries. This fuel needs to be repatriated to Russia, where it will be safer from the risk of theft or diversion. We -- and the Russians -- are committed to accelerating the conversion of these reactors, and removing the fuel posing proliferation risks. I'd be remiss if I didn't mention a recent effort in the Republic of Georgia that demonstrated international cooperation at its finest. With the help of the IAEA, Georgia recently recovered six radioactive thermal generators, or RTGs, that had been in that country since the days of the Soviet Union. These Soviet-era portable heat sources were radioactive and considered highly vulnerable. I'm proud that DOE is now assisting the Georgians in improving the security of these generators. The G-8 Global Partnership well demonstrates how nations can cooperatively address nuclear and radiological material security challenges. The G-8 has committed $20 billion [$20,000 million] over the next 10 years to pursue critical non-proliferation projects. I believe that the Global Partnership has the potential to establish a coordinated non-proliferation effort with a global reach -- as reflected in the substantial resource commitments that the G-8 allies are making to address proliferation threats. The Global Partnership will affect United States nuclear non-proliferation programs in many ways. Allied contributions could help us move forward on plutonium disposition, for example, or permit us to accelerate the closure of Russia's remaining plutonium production reactors. The visible involvement of the world's leading economies in cooperative non-proliferation efforts demonstrates that eliminating such threats is a global responsibility. The challenges we face are global; the solutions must be global as well. The United States is already working closely with our G-8 partners to identify ways to carry out the ambitious goals the Global Partnership has established. I personally believe that the Global Partnership will make a major contribution to reducing nuclear and radiological materials threats, and it will be exciting to see its potential unleashed over the next few years Principle Six: The potential misuse of radiological sources needs to be addressed. I've focused my comments on nuclear materials security. But September l1 has also led many of us to think more about the potential misuse of radiological sources that are both much more abundant and much less secure. These materials could be used to make radiological dispersal devices, so-called "dirty bombs." This is an urgent problem and we need to treat it as such. As I said in Vienna at the IAEA General Conference two months ago, "Addressing the threats posed by radiological dispersal devices cannot be put off to be handled later.… (We need) to reduce the vulnerability of the most dangerous of these materials to acquisition by those seeking to use them as weapons of terror." Since September 11, the United States has begun working bilaterally with Former Soviet Union [FSU] states, including Russia, to enhance the security of radiological sources. We are also working with Russia and the IAEA as part of a "Trilateral Initiative" to locate Russian-origin sources in the FSU and return them to Russia for final disposition. Other nations must be involved to address this threat. At the recent meeting of the IAEA, I proposed an international conference to promote greater international appreciation of this potential danger, and to begin mapping out steps to address this problem. The relative simplicity of constructing a dirty bomb, coupled with the widespread availability of suitable radioactive material, made it clear to me that the civilized nations of the world must come together to address these threats. In fact, this is an area where virtually all the international community should play a role. Yesterday IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei and I formally announced that such a conference will take place next March in Vienna. I look forward to working with him and with all of you to identify meaningful steps we can take to reduce the threat posed by RDDs. Principle Seven: The IAEA's contribution is invaluable. I am gratified that soon after I speak, Director General ElBaradei will share his views with you. Over the past two years I have had the opportunity to work very closely with the Director General. He is a serious and deeply committed man. In working with him, I have come to appreciate just how important the IAEA is to helping nations grasp nuclear material security problems. The United States has worked with the IAEA to help conduct 30 training courses on physical protection, including one just a few weeks from now in Shanghai. Over 800 students from more than 60 countries have attended these courses. The IAEA is also leading the international effort to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material -- a critical instrument in our efforts to better secure fissile materials -- and we look forward to concluding that effort. Once agreed, the strengthened Convention will establish a new foundation to help all states adopt a set of shared standards, with respect to how we handle and transport nuclear material. Particularly in light of heightened concerns over terrorism, I encourage the international community to consider steps to help establish "best practices and procedures," thereby ensuring nuclear materials are as safe and secure as they can possibly be. The IAEA is also instrumental to our efforts to address radiological security issues. The IAEA can help its members identify resources to safely dispose of unneeded radiological materials and make available its invaluable experience, as those member states address radiological source concerns. But the IAEA needs resources to do its job. At the recent General Conference, I urged an increase in the IAEA safeguards budget. Under my direction, the Department of Energy has made significant voluntary contributions -- totaling millions of dollars -- to the IAEA to help it fulfill its mission. The United States will continue to support the IAEA strongly, because it is foolhardy to do otherwise. I urge all others to do the same. Principle Eight: Materials security is ultimately a national responsibility. One point that I cannot stress too much is that the responsibility for progress falls on each individual member of the international community. Those of us that actually have plutonium and HEU that could be used in weapons programs bear special obligations, but there is a role -- indeed, a responsibility -- for every nation. We must move beyond words to deeds. The United States has improved security since the attacks of September 2001. Now we call on other states to take comparable steps, where needed, including for civil nuclear materials. We are prepared to provide expertise and advice where we can. Principle Nine: This is a long-term effort. Many materials security challenges do not lend themselves to short-term solutions. Some of these materials have half-lives of tens of thousands of years. There are multiple dimensions to these problems, and numerous strategies need to be employed -- on multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral levels -- to address them. Resources must be committed, equipment must be procured and facilities built, and all of us must work together to develop solutions that will stand the test of time. And we need to address many aspects of the problem at once. All that said, these problems should not be judged as too overwhelming to address. Any journey must begin with small steps -- this one is no different. Through the cooperative programs I have described, through our leadership in establishing the Global Partnership, and through the personal involvement of the President and his cabinet, the United States is setting in place long-term programs for a long-term challenge. We need others to join us in addressing these threats, however long it takes to achieve success. Which brings me to my last principle. Principle Ten: Success is possible. Two years into my job as Secretary of Energy, I am convinced that despite the enormity of the challenge, success is possible. The risks associated with under-secured nuclear and radiological materials can be reduced. The steps that the international community is taking -- in Russia, with the IAEA, through bilateral relationships and international partnerships such as the G-8, through unilateral efforts -- demonstrate the seriousness with which these problems are being addressed, and that is all to the good. Working together, we can make the world safer. We owe our people, our children, and their children, nothing less. We owe them a world where nuclear and radiological materials are secure, not just in Russia but elsewhere throughout the world. We owe them a world where terrorists have little chance of getting their hands on these materials -- which just might discourage them from trying in the first place. We owe them a world where our borders are secure, and there is little risk of dangerous materials being shuttled about. And we owe them a world where nations work together to achieve these lofty objectives. I have no illusions that such a day is around the corner. But I do believe that through cooperation and determination, it is eventually attainable. And this administration is committed to that objective. Thank you very much, and best wishes for a successful conference. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)