21 August 2005
These are excerpts from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Freedom of Information Office:
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1109171437562
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Iraq%20and%20security%20contracts.doc
[Released 15th June 2005]
Information concerning meetings about Iraq with security companies and private military companies since March 2003.
Meetings prior to Iraq Conflict
We have found no records of any meetings with Private Security Companies or Private Military Companies about Iraq in the six months leading up to the Iraq conflict.
Post-conflict /March 2003 Meetings
In Iraq, our officials work closely with Armorgroup and CRG as they provide services under current UK Government contracts. There are frequent daily and weekly routine meetings to review operations and performance. A range of Embassy staff is involved in these.
Our officials in Iraq have also met the following companies:
Aegis:· June 2004 with Security Strategy Unit, British Embassy· 17 June 2004 - with British Embassy officials
· 17 July 2004 - with British Embassy officials
· 19 July 2004 - with British Embassy Officials, Republican Palace, Baghdad.
· 26 September 2004 -with British Ambassador - all at British Embassy, Baghdad.
· 9 March 2005 - with British Embassy officials & Security Strategy Unit, British Embassy
Kroll - April 2005 and 3 June 2005 - with British Embassy officials, British Embassy
Hart - 9 May 2005 - with British Embassy officials
Global - April 2005 (no exact date) - with British Embassy Officials, British Embassy.
In the UK, since March 2003, officials from the FCO's Iraq Directorate, Procurement Strategy Unit and Security Strategy Units have held regular meetings with representatives of Armorgroup and Control Risks Group to discuss the management of contracts with these two companies for services provided in Iraq.
The FCO Procurement Strategy Unit has also met or had dealings with Group 4, Olive, Kroll, Janusian, Blue Sky and Hart in respect of various tenders in recent years. All such communications are undertaken in line with Public Procurement Guidelines and best practice.
Officials from the Iraq Directorate met Erinys Security in London on 18 Nov 2004.
Details of FCO contracts worth over £250,000 with Security companies can be found at:
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/KFile/procurement_fcocontractsover250k.pdf
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PMCs%20guidance%20Iraq%20and%20general%20-%20master%20version.doc
[Released 14 July 2005]
DEALING WITH PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES IN IRAQ
INTRODUCTION
1. Private Security Companies play an important role in protecting UK citizens, including officials, in Iraq. However, it is important that our dealings with such companies are transparent and that we can account for them to Parliament and the public. These guidelines take account of the operational requirements of working in Iraq and are intend to supplement the recently issued general guidance which requires officers to seek prior permission, where possible, for contacts with Private Military/Security Companies (PMCs/PSCs).
SCOPE
2. This guidance applies to all FCO officers in Iraq, whether working directly for the FCO or seconded to any other agency. It applies to all members of Other Government Departments working in FCO posts. Individuals contracted by the FCO for secondment to any other organisation should also be asked to observe this guidance.
3. This guidance applies only in Iraq. In other posts in the region officers should follow the guidance in Circular 040/004.
OPERATIONAL CONTACTS
4. Officers may have free contact with any contractor working directly for HMG to provide security, in the context of that security contract. The two companies currently employed by HMG to provide security in Iraq are ArmorGroup and Control Risks Group.
5. Where required for operational or security reasons, officers may have contact with any PMC/PSC providing security services in Iraq, without seeking prior permission. This includes contact with PMC/PSCs who are providing security services to an agency to which an official is seconded or responsible for the security of a location that an FCO official is visiting. It also includes day to day exchanges of information on the security situation in the country. Any substantive discussions (e.g. on policy, political or legal issues) should be reported to Iraq Directorate and United Nations Department (UND). In most cases a brief summary will suffice.
6. Officers may have free contact with UK nationals (and other nationals for which we have consular responsibility) employed by any PMC/PSC in order to supply the normal range of consular assistance. Officers may also have contact with PSC/PMCs to discuss Consular issues e.g. with a PMC employing an injured UK National.
7. When these contacts take place officers should be alert to:
- the legal framework in which the companies are operating, including UK national legislation (e.g. on export controls), Iraqi law and applicable international law (e.g. the terms of the UN arms embargo on Iraq) and International Humanitarian Law;- how the activities in which the companies intend to engage will impact on conditions in the wider context of Iraq (e.g. respect for human rights and the rule of law);
- the potential for HMG's contact with PMCs/PSCs to be scrutinised by Parliament, the media, foreign governments and, potentially, in legal proceedings;
8. Officers should note in particular that private security contractors may be covered by the immunities set out in CPA Order 17, which remains in force as part of Iraqi law. This applies to contractors who are providing security services to diplomatic missions, the Multinational Force, international consultants and other contractors defined in the Order, and their personnel. Private security companies must also comply with all CPA Orders and Memoranda, including CPA Memorandum 17, which obliges all such companies operating in Iraq to obtain a Business License from the Iraqi Ministry of Trade and an Operating License from the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (MOI). The MOI will monitor the actions of such companies and can revoke their Operating License. The contracting State has the right to waive the immunity of such companies.
9. Where, as a result of their contacts with companies, officers become aware of a PMC/PSC operating illegally or unethically, they must alert Iraq Directorate and UND immediately, who will inform Ministers.
COMMERCIAL CONTACTS
10. Where a company is seeking commercial advice or assistance in bidding for work in Iraq, prior permission for new contacts should be sought from Iraq Directorate/UND, in accordance with the guidelines in Circular 040/004. Where officers are concerned that an operational conversation may touch on commercial issues, they should make clear they cannot discuss such matters without prior permission. Once permission has been granted for contacts with a particular company, officers should be alert to the factors outlined above, and report any substantive issues of concern to Iraq Directorate and UND.
SOCIAL CONTACTS
11. Social contacts with PSC/PMCs can be easily misinterpreted, particularly when they are with senior members/sales people of a PSC/PMC seeking a contract. When a social contact is anticipated e.g. when officers have been invited to a reception, clearance should be sought from HMA Baghdad, who will at his own discretion seek advice as appropriate from Iraq Directorate and UND.
12. Where a social contact is unavoidable officers must be careful not to discuss sensitive issues and should report substantive contacts to HMA Baghdad, who will inform Iraq Directorate and IPU as appropriate.
GENERAL
13. This guidance is a public document and may be referred to in explaining why any requested contacts are being delayed or refused.
14. The Embassy in Baghdad and the British Embassy Office in Basra should draw this circular to the attention of all staff and all new arrivals as defined in paragraph 2.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
7 July 2004
___________________
[30 April 2004]
GUIDANCE ON CONTACTS WITH PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES
SUMMARY
1. This circular sets out revised guidance on contacts with and official support for private military and security companies. It applies to all members of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department of Trade and Industry, UK Trade and Investment (UKTI), and to staff of other Whitehall Departments serving in Missions overseas, including Defence Attaches and Advisers. It has been prepared in consultation with other Government Departments.
DETAIL
SCOPE
2. This guidance is intended to apply to a broad range of companies involved in the supply of all types of security and military activities, including the provision of support and training, to commercial or governmental interests. There is, however, no accepted definition of Private Military or Private Security Companies (PMC or PSC), and no clear line of divide between the two categories. If in doubt, you should act in accordance with this guidance and seek further advice.
3. The guidance also covers contacts with individuals or companies known to be connected with, associated with, or acting on behalf of such companies, including their solicitors or legal advisers. It includes contacts with these companies or individuals about the supply of military equipment or other controlled goods and services.
4. This guidance does not apply to companies providing security services in the UK and to FCO posts overseas.
GENERAL GUIDELINES
5. Private military and security companies are entitled to conduct their business within the law. They should be given access to the support that Government Departments provide to British citizens and companies on the same basis as other companies. However, private military and security companies are also in a business that can in certain conditions have a direct and sensitive impact on Government policy, on international relations, and on Parliamentary and public opinion.
6. In any dealings with companies that fall within the scope of this guidance, you should be alert to:
- the legal framework in which the companies are operating, including UK national legislation (e.g. on export controls), local laws and applicable international law (e.g. UN arms embargoes);- how the activities in which the companies intend to engage will impact on conditions in the country where they will be operating, bearing in mind particularly the likelihood of armed conflict, and the wider context (e.g. respect for human rights and the rule of law);
- the potential for HMG's contact with and support for such companies to be scrutinised by Parliament, the media, foreign governments and, potentially, in legal proceedings;
- the impact of such companies' activities on HMG's relations with foreign host governments;
- any available information about the propriety of activity undertaken by the company elsewhere, including any record of misuse or misrepresentation of contacts with HMG.
PERMISSION FOR CONTACTS WITH COMPANIES
7. United Nations Department (UND) at the FCO has the policy lead on the generic subject of private military and security companies. However, judgements on individual cases primarily fall to FCO geographical departments.
8. When possible, you should always seek prior approval for any contact with representatives of companies that might fall within the scope of this guidance. This should be sought from the Head of the relevant FCO geographical department, who will consult UND and Ministers as necessary. Heads of UK Diplomatic Posts (where relevant) should always be informed of any proposed contacts. When prior approval cannot be sought (e.g. due to an unexpected encounter or telephone call), you should nonetheless follow as far as possible the procedures in paragraphs 10-13 below.
9. Companies may be informed that permission is being sought for contacts to go ahead, making clear that this is standard practice in the sector. You can refer to this guidance, which is an unclassified, public document.
10. In deciding whether to give permission for contacts with PMCs/PSCs, Heads of Department should have in mind the criteria in paragraph 6 above. Where there is a clear potential for the actual or proposed activities of a company to have a detrimental effect on HMG's policy goals or on international relations, Ministers should be consulted before approval is given for contacts. Decisions should be made on a case by case basis on their individual merits. There is no centrally-held database or list of approved companies, nor any black list of companies with which posts should not deal.
CONDUCT OF CONTACTS
11. If at all possible, a colleague should always be present at any meetings with private military or security companies. To prevent causing the Government embarrassment or prejudicing the interests of justice, it is vital that, in any contacts with private military companies, you do not say anything which could be construed as giving approval for their actions.
12. Many companies in this sector employ former members of the Armed Forces or of the Diplomatic Service. You should ensure that this does not give the companies privileged access beyond that available to other companies, or outside the terms of this guidance (see in particular paragraph 18).
13. It is important that you keep a reliable record of any contact. This applies to both informal social encounters with such companies, and to formal business meetings. A full written record should be sent to the lead geographical department and to UND. Where there is any possibility that the meeting could be misconstrued by a company, you should write to the company after the meeting setting out your understanding of the subjects discussed, clearing the letter with the geographical department, UND and FCO Legal Advisers as appropriate.
14. If there is any suspicion of illegal activity by any company, including supply of military equipment or other controlled goods and services contrary to UK legislation or international obligations, you should inform the lead geographical department and UND. The lead FCO department should alert the appropriate authorities (e.g. HM Customs and Excise) and inform Ministers.
HOSPITALITY
15. You should not accept hospitality from companies (or their representatives or employees) presumed to fall within the scope of this guidance without the prior approval at SCS/SMS level from the relevant part of your UK parent department (who should consult UND) and from your Head of Diplomatic Post (where relevant). Any hospitality accepted is to be recorded as set out in Civil Service Guidance. Particular care should be taken in approving the offering of official hospitality to such firms or their representatives or employees, since this could be seen as indicating approval of the activities of the company concerned.
HMG SUPPORT FOR PMCS AND PSCS
16. Companies operating in the private military and security sector are entitled to the same support as other UK companies, in so far as their activities are legitimate and do not conflict with HMG's foreign policy goals. Any applications by companies for support (e.g. participation in trade missions, market research, introductionsto contacts) should be considered against the same criteria as those from all other companies and on their own merits. However, you should additionally have in mind the guidelines in paragraph 5 above. Ministers should be consulted if there are concerns that support for a particular company runs the risk of embarrassment to HMG or could run counter to wider policy interests.
17. In taking decisions on whether to offer support to companies, officials should bear in mind the possibility that the basis of decisions may be challenged, including in legal proceedings.
SECURITY
18. You are reminded of the need to ensure that no classified information is disclosed to companies covered by this guidance.
ADVICE
19. Further advice on the contents of this guidance can be obtained from United Nations Department in the FCO. UKTI officials can also speak to UKTI HQ's Policy, Ministerial and Corporate Support Unit for advice on relevant FCO contact points.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
30 April 2004
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Contacts%20with%20PMCs%20minute.doc
[Released 14 July 2005]
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES IN IRAQ (ADDITIONAL)
1. The Minister should be aware that FCO officials dealing with Iraq in the UK are receiving frequent enquiries from Private Military and Security Companies (PMC or PSC), and individuals or companies known to be connected with, associated with, or acting on behalf of such companies, including their solicitors or legal advisers. Given public and parliamentary interest in the role of PMCs/PSCs in Iraq, we would be grateful for confirmation that the Minister is happy with the way officials are handling these contacts.
2. Although the DTI are the normal point of contact for general enquiries about export licence applications (ELAs), some exporters also call Iraq Directorate directly. Some of these exporters are supplying equipment for PMCs/PSCs providing protection to UK officials and British nationals or other reconstruction contractors working in Iraq, or supplying Iraqi Security Forces. Telephone enquiries range from general questions on the FCO's policy for ELAs to exploring procedures for hypothetical applications and requests for support (e.g. requests to lobby third parties). One recent example is David Stuart Gay, Managing Director of RMZ Ltd (an exporter) who has contacted FCO/DTI on a daily basis concerning two ELAs submitted by his company.
3. UND guidelines advise on how to handle contacts with PMCs/PSCs in the UK (Flag A) and in Iraq (Flag B). The guidelines for contacts in the UK instruct officers to seek prior approval for any contact, but recognise that such approval cannot be sought in the case of unexpected contacts and were not written with a situation like Iraq in mind. In the case of Iraq we have a real interest in helping PMCs/PSCs with legitimate operations. Given the number of telephone enquiries, the Minister should be aware of the procedures we have adopted in agreement with UND:
· A reliable record is kept of all telephone calls, detailing caller, date, subjects discussed and what response, if any, was given by the official. Details are registered by Iraq Directorate.· Unless the official has reason for concern, s/he will not report further on the contact. If there is any suspicion of illegal activity, the official will inform Ministers
· For general ELA enquiries, we explain the general process and remind the caller that the DTI should be the first point of contact
· The official does not discuss hypothetical applications, ways to circumnavigate the system, or speculation on the possible outcome of any application
· If pressed, officials make clear that they cannot discuss issues where there may be a commercial angle without prior approval.
· Any requests for support (e.g. to lobby third parties) will be considered against the same criteria as those applied to other companies, and each case considered on its own merits.
· Officials are alert to the legal framework, the impact of the proposed activities and the impact of HMG's involvement as set out in more detail in UND's guidelines.
4. ArmorGroup and Control Risks Group have contracts with the FCO to provide security in Iraq. Officials n the UK have contact with these companies where required for operational reasons.
5. There is continuing Parliamentary and media interest in the handling of ELAs and work of PMCs/PSCs in Iraq, and potential for HMG's contact with, and support to, such companies to be scrutinised by Parliament, the media, foreign governments and in legal proceedings. Recently, there was some media interest in the US decision to award the PCO security contract to Aegis in Iraq, owing to the naming of Aegis' Chairman and CEO Tim Spicer in the Legg report into the Sandline affair in 1998.
6. Guidelines on contacts with PMCs/PSCs are public documents and the Secretary of State announced revised guidelines for dealing with PMCs/PSCs in Iraq to Parliament on 12 July 2004. In the event of parliamentary or media interest, we would take the line that the FCO has an established set of public guidelines used in all contacts with PMCs/PSCs.
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/FCO%20&%20Security%20contractors.doc
[Released 20th July 2005]
1. Use of contractors instead of British Military
It is not standard practice to use British military personnel to protect diplomatic posts and personnel abroad. Primary responsibility normally resides with local authorities augmented where necessary by the employment of specialist security contractors. Depending on the nature of the threat and a security assessment, selected Heads of Mission are given protection by the Royal Military Police (RMP) under the terms of a Service Level Agreement between the FCO and MOD
2. Nature of the duties these companies perform
These companies provide a range of static guarding and personnel protection roles. Under the exemption provisions of Section 24 (National Security) of the Act, we decline to provide specific information relating to the precise nature of these duties as putting this information into the public domain could compromise the security arrangements at our Missions.
Section 24 requires the balance of the public interest. When the requester like yourself are asking for very sensitive detailed information about the exact nature of the duties provided by our sub contractors like ArmorGroup.
If this information were to be released and fall into the wrong hands, we could be putting the lives of our personnel and the security of our buildings at risk, and possibly endanger the very people the company is contracted to protect. For these reasons the public interest in disclosure are outweighed by the public interest in maintaining national security.
3. Ensuring that contractors follow agreed standards
The provisions of these contracts have been very carefully drafted by FCO Contract Advisers. Overseas Security Managers and other FCO staff meet regularly with representatives from these companies to review the contracts to ensure that they continue to meet our changing needs.
Also one of our requirements is that all security companies working on our behalf, that there staff working directly on our projects must be received security clearance from us before they start working on our projects. It is also part of our requirement in all our contracts too.