15 December 2000
US Department of State
International Information Programs
Washington File
_________________________________
13 December 2000
(Cites drugs, terrorism connections in Colombia and Afghanistan ) (3350) There has been an "overall decrease of state financial support" for terrorism in the last two decades, which means that terrorists "have looked to alternative sources of funding," including organized crime as well as narcotics production and trafficking, says the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism. Michael Sheehan told a House Judiciary subcommittee December 13 that "Some terrorists have developed loose mutually beneficial relationships with drug traffickers to support both the terrorists and drug traffickers' interests." He cited in particular the cases of Colombia and Afghanistan. "We have seen evidence," he said, that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), "one of the world's deadliest terrorist organizations...is now involved in the export of cocaine," and that FARC guerrillas supplied cocaine to the Mexican drug cartel "in exchange for cash and possibly weapons." The FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) "also generate income by kidnapping Colombians and foreigners," he said. To deal with the Colombia problem, Sheehan said the State Department supports Plan Columbia -- a large-scale program designed by the administration that includes economic assistance and the aerial eradication of drugs -- as "a balanced strategy" to deal with the country's multiple problems. In Afghanistan, Sheehan said, the Taliban's control over most of the country "has resulted in a haven of lawlessness, in which terrorists, drug traffickers and other criminals live with impunity." He urged passage of a new resolution being considered this week by the U.N. Security Council that would impose an arms embargo against the Taliban and "reiterates the demand that the Taliban turn over Usama bin Ladin," who was indicted for masterminding the attack on U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, "so he can be brought to justice." "There are no magic solutions" in the effort to counter terrorist fund raising, he said. "We have to keep up the diplomatic and political pressure, bolster our allies' will and capability to help, and maintain strong diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement and training components." Following is the text of Sheehan's prepared testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime: (begin text) Statement of Michael A. Sheehan Coordinator for Counterterrorism U.S. Department of State before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime December 13, 2000 Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the threat posed by the convergence of drugs, terrorism and organized crime. Let me start by paying tribute to your work on one of the U.S. Government's major counterterrorism laws in recent years, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 1 You and your staff, and Chairman (Henry) Hyde of the full Committee, have played such an important role in enacting the 1996 legislation. That bill contains major provisions making it illegal to provide funding and other forms of material support for specific terrorist acts and to groups formally designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This has become a key aspect of our counterterrorism tools. Let me express my thanks for your strong effort. It is great to have such an advocate on the Hill. TERRORISM IS A CRIME Mr. Chairman, in looking at the broad picture of narcotics, terrorism and international crime, we should start with the basic fact that terrorism itself is a crime, not a political statement. Hijacking aircraft, kidnapping innocent people, and bombing busses, buildings or ships are all forms of a crime, which must be viewed separately from the so-called "cause" that prompts some people to commit this crime. This is a long-standing U.S. policy, one that is shared by the international community and demonstrated in a dozen international conventions and treaties. 1 Public Law 104-132 BAD NEIGHBORHOODS ATTRACT BAD PEOPLE Terrorists tend to live, operate, and derive support from the lawless corners of the world, including the jungles of Colombia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, and the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, to name a few. Narcotraffickers and drug producers, like international criminals, also seek out those corners of the world where their behavior will not be subject to government control or punishment. So it is not surprising that there is often an overlap between those that engage in terrorism and those engaged in other internationally unacceptable behavior. FUNDING - DIVERSIFIED FUNDING SOURCES Many terrorist organizations have engaged in low-level local crime to finance their activities. Some groups, such as the IRA and now defunct German Red Army Faction raised money "the old fashioned way," such as robbing banks. The Kurdish terrorist group (PKK) engaged in extortion against Turkish Kurdish workers and businessmen. And groups throughout the world -- from Latin America to the Philippines -- have taken hostages to obtain ransom money from the victims' families or employers. Historically, many terrorist groups, especially in the Middle East, looked to state sponsors of terrorism for funding. This source of funding has decreased significantly in the last couple of decades. With the exception of Iran -- which continues to actively support groups that seek to undermine the Middle East peace process terrorist states provide very limited funding to terrorist groups or individuals. Hizballah, the major international terrorist group operating in Lebanon, receives most of its financing from Iran. CIA Director George Tenant has testified before Congress that Iran remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Given the overall decrease of state financial support, and in some cases because of the nature of their organization, terrorists have looked to alternative sources of funding, which have included narcotics production and trafficking. Some terrorists have developed loose mutually beneficial relationships with drug traffickers to support both the terrorists and drug traffickers' interests. That said, I would caution against thinking that international terrorism generally is dependent upon funds from drug trafficking or international crime. There have been reports that some individuals involved in Middle East terrorism have profited from the drug trade through Lebanon. But most terrorist groups or their supporters are not dependent on drug revenues -- they usually have "diversified portfolios" of fundraising. Sources include their ideological supporters, money siphoned off of legitimate and illegitimate charities, legitimate companies that are used to generate profits and transfer funds for terrorist groups, and ordinary crime, such as extortion and robbery. Let me turn now to two cases in which drug trafficking does significantly impact terrorism, Colombia and Afghanistan. In both cases, there is a convergence of terrorists, drug producers and traffickers, and other criminal activity. Most importantly, there also is a lack of governmental control. This lack of control and rule of law is what allows these criminals to converge, and sometimes cooperate, in certain corners of the world. COLOMBIA - Convergence of Terrorism and Narco-Trafficking Colombia is the strongest example of what is meant by the phrase "narco terrorism," and where the drug trade is a major factor. In the guerrilla and paramilitary controlled areas of Colombia, a cycle of terrorism and narco-trafficking has spiraled into a mutually dependent relationship. The terrorists and paramilitaries gain funding from the drug-traffickers who, in turn, look to these illegal armed groups for "protection." Major actors include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), one of the world's deadliest terrorist organizations and the Colombia self defense forces, or AUC. The FARC recently sought to establish a monopoly over the commercialization of cocaine base across Colombia. We have seen evidence that the FARC is now involved in the export of cocaine. In a November 29 statement, the Department's press spokesman, Richard Boucher, noted that since late 1999, Mexican and Colombian officials have exposed a major link between the Mexican drug cartel and the FARC. Evidence shows FARC guerrillas supplied cocaine to the cartel in exchange for cash and possibly weapons. Meanwhile, the Colombian paramilitary groups are not only funding themselves, but trying to hit the FARC where it hurts by aggressively attempting to establish control over the prime coca and heroin-growing areas currently controlled by guerrillas. Paramilitary leader, Carlos Castano, frankly acknowledges that the narcotics trade provides the bulk of the paramilitaries' financing. Mr. Chairman, estimates of profits by the FARC and paramilitaries run into hundred of millions of dollars. But as I stated earlier, narco-trafficking is not the only source of income for terrorist groups. The FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) also generate income by kidnapping Colombians and foreigners. During a recent trip to Colombia, I was taken aback by the "kidnapping industry" that has developed. Kidnapping has increased every year since 1990 to its current level of more than 3,000 persons a year -- half the world total. Since the early 1980's, the FARC has been responsible for kidnapping 30 Americans. Thirteen were either killed or remain unaccounted for, representing a 43% mortality rate. The FARC was responsible for taking three New Mission missionaries hostage in 1993, but has failed to account for their whereabouts. One American was kidnapped by the FARC in November. FARC spokesmen have consistently vowed to continue the practice of kidnapping, referring to it as a war tax on Colombia's elite. The kidnapping problem has become so severe that local criminals are even now kidnapping people and transferring them to the FARC, which in turn extorts money -- and a profit for themselves -- from families and businesses. These criminal activities help finance their attacks against the country's electric grid and oil pipeline, affecting local as well as American commercial interests. The paramilitaries have not only targeted Americans or American businesses; they also routinely kill scores of civilian non-combatants suspected of being guerrilla sympathizers. AFGHANISTAN Let me now turn to Afghanistan, a country that has been at the heart of our counterterrorism efforts throughout my tenure as Coordinator for Counterterrorism. The Taliban's control over most of Afghanistan has resulted in a haven of lawlessness, in which terrorists, drug traffickers and other criminals live with impunity. The Taliban naturally benefits from the resources brought in by these sources, and thus has little incentive to change their own or their "guests" behavior. Afghanistan is different from Colombia in that it harbors terrorists with an international reach, including Usama bin Ladin, indicted for masterminding the attack our embassies in East Africa in 1998. While we do not have full information on who planned and carried out the attack on the USS Cole, we do know that numerous people immediately left Yemen for Afghanistan, the safe haven where they could hide out with little fear of Taliban intervention. The list of terrorists that live in or have lived in, have trained in, are headquartered in, or financed from Afghanistan gets longer all the time. To name a few: -- Usama bin Ladin - indicted for terrorist attacks, including 1999 attack on US embassies in East Africa -- Mir Aimal Kansi - 1993 attack on US CIA workers -- Ramsi Youssef - 1996 Bombing of the World Trade Center -- Ayman al-Zawahiri, Muhammed Atef, Mohammad Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, and Fazul Abdullah Mohammad - all -- indicted for the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa -- Ahmed Ressam - 1999 planned attack launched from Canada -- Raiz Basra - 1999 would-be assassin of former Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif -- Abu Hawshar, cell leader of 1999 thwarted attack in Jordan; Raid Hijazi, deputy cell leader; and Khalil Deek and Abu Qatadah also wanted for the thwarted attack in Jordan -- Taha Musa - of the Egyptian Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya organization -- Ibn al Khattab field commander in Chechnya -- Shami Basayav field commander in Chechnya -- Tohir Yuldashev - IMU commander These and others with an Afghan connection are wanted in many counties. It is quite a notorious list of current or former " guests." At the same time, in recent years, Afghanistan under the Taliban has become the world's largest producer of illicit opium, which is refined into heroin. The narcotics production and trafficking victimize the population of Afghanistan and attack the political stability of the entire region. To give an idea of the dimensions of the problem: -- Afghanistan's opium crop of 3,656 metric tons accounted for 72% of the world's illicit opium in 2000. -- Since 1997 over 96 percent of the opium-poppy crop has been cultivated in Taliban-controlled areas. -- For the last three years, opium-poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has continued to increase, in spite of a devastating drought and decrees from the Taliban leadership banning poppy cultivation. -- Poppy is cultivated at the expense of wheat and other food crops desperately needed by the people of Afghanistan, and is planted on the best available land with productive soils, irrigation, and fertilizer, not on previously uncultivated or marginal lands. -- Drug abuse is increasing steadily in the region, in Eastern Europe and Russia, and probably Afghanistan itself, with huge social costs. -- Regional criminal syndicates with a global reach are linking up with the Afghan drug trade. -- These conditions favor the development of parallel drug-based economies and new centers of drug production and trafficking, compounding exponentially our drug containment efforts. -- Governments in Central and South Asia are ill equipped to battle the well-financed Afghan drug trade. Narcotics-linked income strengthens the Taliban's capacity to provide support for international terrorism. The Taliban admit to imposing the same "ushr", a 10 per cent tax, on poppy as they impose on other agricultural crops. There is clear evidence that Taliban officials have to handle opium; from the viewpoint of the farmers, this is a green light to cultivate an illicit crop. The Taliban use the considerable profits from illegal narcotics activity to buy weapons, which are used to fight the opposition groups and maintain control over the territory where training camps are located. These camps train both domestic fighters and terrorists that are launched to any number of corners throughout the world. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION The Taliban so far has refused to withdraw its support for Usama bin Ladin and hand him over to a place where he can be brought to justice. As a result, the United Nations Security Council a year ago imposed sanctions against the Taliban, including freezing assets and imposing an embargo on the Ariana Afghan Airlines, the Taliban-controlled air line. Because the Taliban still have not complied with the Security Council Resolution 1267, a new Security Council resolution is being considered this week. I was in New York last week for consultations with our U.N. Mission and other Security Council Members. The new resolution would impose an arms embargo against the Taliban, hitting the regime -- not the people -- where it hurts. The resolution reiterates the demand that the Taliban turn over Usama bin Ladin so he can be brought to justice, and freezes bin Ladin's financial assets. The resolution also includes a measure to ban the export to Afghanistan of a precursor chemical, acetic anhydride, which is used to manufacture heroin. The international community agrees that this measure is essential because of the Taliban's refusal to put into deeds their empty promise to end opium production, which goes to support the regime and terrorists. The Taliban's acquiescence to or support for poppy cultivation and narcotics manufacture and trade has further exacerbated the humanitarian crisis of the Afghan people. The explosion of poppy cultivation under the Taliban has reduced agricultural land available for food crops at the very time that Afghanistan is suffering the worst drought in a generation. All of this underscores why the UN Security Council resolution is very important to counter this support for terrorists stemming from Afghanistan and why the resolution deserves to be passed. THE WIDER IMPACT Terrorists and drug traffickers rely heavily on a wide international network to keep them in business. This is why the impact of the threat of terrorism -- like the scourge of drugs -- is impacting a wider area, including the neighboring Central Asian Republics. Terrorist groups in Central Asia have been profiting from the drug smuggling and using it to finance their purchase of weapons and other activities. Informed observers also suggest that one tactic employed is the staging of terrorist activities to divert security forces while drug shipments are being made elsewhere. In September, the Secretary of State formally designated a major group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) as a Foreign Terrorist organization under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. This is one of the many steps that we are taking to counter this widening terrorist threat. OUR EFFORTS We are pursuing a number of initiatives to counter the international terrorist threats I discussed. -- In Afghanistan, we will continue to put political, diplomatic, and economic pressure on the Taliban to make them realize that they will not be an accepted member of the international community until they comply with internationally accepted norms on terrorism. -- The U.S. is encouraging the international community to help Afghanistan's neighbors build their national capacities to fight terrorism and the drug trade and its corrosive effects. -- In dealing with the Colombia problem, the Department supports Plan Colombia, a balanced strategy the Administration designed to deal with the country's multiple problems. This large scale program includes economic assistance and the aerial eradication of drugs. On the counterterrorism side, my office and our antiterrorism assistance (ATA) program are looking specifically at breaking the kidnapping industry through increased training and logistical support to Colombian police and judiciary. We will also renew other ATA training to Colombia. -- Implementing the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act provisions against terrorist fund raising, the State Department, after a careful review of the records, has currently designated or redesignated 29 Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Designations require extensive Administrative records and my office has been looking at additional groups for possible designation. -- We worked with other nations in drafting the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, which The President recently submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent. We hope the new Senate will act on this Convention early in the next session. This Convention is a companion piece to our efforts to encourage other countries to strengthen their laws and procedures against terrorist fund raising and money transfers. -- In a related initiative, the Department's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program is working with the Justice Department, FBI and Treasury, to develop training courses for foreign officials in detecting and curbing terrorist fund raising activities and money flows. The first course offerings are being scheduled for early in the new year. -- We are working with individual countries and through the UN to improve regional cooperation against drugs, organized crime and terrorism. -- My office, working with the Department's ATA program has held two regional conferences since June 1999 focused on South Asia and Central Asia terrorism. We also helped conduct an OAS conference to encourage regional cooperation and also helped support security efforts for the Sydney Olympics. We hope to expand the ATA program in the future and develop and expand policy-related and training programs to foster cooperation on a regional basis to counter conventional threats and weapons of mass destruction. -- The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) oversees an extensive worldwide 'pro-gram to counter narcotics trafficking and transnational crime. INL led the Department's contribution to developing the President's International Crime Strategy, which includes expanding the membership of the Financial Action Task Force and taking other steps to strengthen international efforts against money laundering. INL also helps train foreign officials in the latest law enforcement techniques as well as respect for human rights. No Magic Solutions Mr. Chairman, in these efforts to counter terrorist fund raising, whether from narcotics, criminal activities or contributions, there are no magic solutions, easy legislative remedies, or other quick fixes. We have to keep up the diplomatic and political pressure, bolster our allies' will and capability to help, and maintain strong diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement and training components. The key to this is strong political will and commitment. We appreciate Congress' continued support for these counterterrorism efforts. (end text)
13 December 2000
(Perl warns that globalization facilitates criminal activities) (2310) As a result of globalization, "the distinction between drug trafficking, terrorism, and other forms of criminal activity is becoming increasingly blurred," says Raphael Perl, a specialist in international affairs at the Congressional Research Service. Testifying December 13 before a panel of the House Judiciary Committee, Perl described the new "overlapping symbiotic relationship" between drugs, terrorism and organized crime, and outlined a series of possible policy options for governments, including the promotion of international legal harmonization and the adoption of additional restrictions on money laundering and tax havens. He predicted that organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism "are likely to receive increased attention" in the coming decade, and that finding appropriate responses to this new challenge will be complex. Addressing the problem "will require bringing together the diverse elements" of law enforcement, Perl said. Following is the text of his testimony, as submitted to the Subcommittee on Crime: (begin text) Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism in a Changing Global Environment Statement of Raphael Perl Specialist in International Affairs Congressional Research Service before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime December 13, 2000 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I appear today in my capacity as a specialist at the Congressional Research Service [CRS]. I thank the Committee for the opportunity to appear here and address the issue of the threat posed by the convergence of organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism. INTRODUCTION Globalization presents the opportunity for "domestic" crime to transform itself into a national and international security issue. Organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism are nothing new. What most observers see as new is the expanding scale of current operations; the ability of such operations to threaten important national and international interests; and the increasing complexity of responding to transnational criminal activity. The globalization of the international economy, the internationalization of markets, and the integration of organized criminal activity into this changing market structure have transformed largely domestic criminal issues to issues with broader implications. Many nations increasingly live in a world affected by global trends of deregulation, open borders, and freer movement of people, money, goods and services. In today's global economy we have also often witnessed the spread of (1) democracy; (2) capitalism and free trade; and (3) global access to information and new technologies. In this connected world, this global village, traditional time, distance, and spacial barriers are increasingly broken down by advanced technology. This globalization can facilitate the ability of drug traffickers, terrorist, and other criminal organizations to operate in relatively unregulated environments. Moreover, the development of the world economy and modern communications systems have made it possible for relatively small groups and even private individuals to amass wealth at levels generally attainable by nation states. Illegitimate business activity, criminal activity, and terrorist activity, like legitimate business activity, seek new opportunities for expansion, safehaven, and profit. Transnational crime goes where the money is, or where the money or the operations generating it are protected. And terrorists obviously seek soft targets and unregulated or politically friendly operating environments. In today's world, opportunities for profit, protection, and the commission of terrorist acts are often available in a global transnational environment. The distinction between drug trafficking, terrorism, and other forms of criminal activity is becoming increasingly blurred. Increasingly, we see a blurring -- an overlapping symbiotic relationship -- between terrorism, drugs, and organized crime. Terrorism and drug trafficking are both specialized forms of criminal activity. Drugs and terrorism often cut across traditional bureaucratic and subject jurisdictions and structures. Today there are some 50 U.S. agencies with some degree of counterdrug responsibilities and at least 12 federal agencies with important counterterrorism responsibilities. Drug trafficking, terrorism, and other organized criminal activity are generally clandestine activities that share operational similarities. Terrorists, like drug traffickers and other criminal groups, need weapons and engage in violence to achieve goals. Terrorists, like other criminal groups, are often involved in hiding and laundering sources of funds. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other criminal groups operate transnationally and often seek logistical and operational support from local communities. Terrorists and drug traffickers often rely on the criminal community for support: they may need smuggled weapons, forged documents and safehouses to operate effectively. As a practical matter, this means that drug traffickers and terrorists can become increasingly vulnerable to effective law enforcement activity. Differences exist, however, between drugs and terrorism. The drug trade has a strong demand component. In contrast, there is no addiction-based international demand for terrorism. Profit drives the drug trade. Terrorists do need money to operate, but for the terrorist, funding generally is a means to an end and not an end in itself. Political ideology, radical religious viewpoints, alienation, or revenge, and not a desire for financial profit, usually drive terrorist activity. A central characteristic often used to distinguish terrorism from profit-motivated common crime is the willingness of terrorists to go after often random innocent targets in the claimed pursuit of some greater cause. Terrorists increasingly rely on drug money for funding. Terrorists and criminals alike need a steady cash flow to operate. In the case of terrorists, where state sources of funding may be diminishing, drug trafficking is an attractive funding option. Increasingly, terrorist organizations are looking to criminal activity and specifically the drug trade as a source of funding. The FARC in Colombia is but one of many cases in point. It is estimated that drug trafficking activity generates between $400 and $600 million of tax-free dollars a year for FARC guerrilla coffers. In the case of North Korea, some analysts have suggested that North Korean government-supported criminal activity, carefully targeted to meet specific needs, generated at least $85 million in 1997: $71 million from drugs and $15 million from counterfeiting. Estimates vary, but most observers believe that the total figure is at least $100 million. However, there are indications that the figures may be considerably higher: $500 million to $1 billion annually generated by criminal activities. Once engaged in drug trafficking activity, organizations and nations find it hard to stop. One danger facing organizations and governments involved in drug trafficking and criminal activity is that the illicit activity can become institutionalized, and the income generated, addictive. It has been suggested that should organizations such as the FARC or the North Korean regime desire to end drug trafficking and other criminal activities, they might find it difficult to do so. Drug trafficking organizations are increasingly seen as a threat to society because of their corrupting and politically destabilizing influence. To many drug policy analysts, a danger of the drug trade beyond drug use itself is the corrupting power of the organizations engaged in the trade. Funded by drug trafficking, organizations can gain the resources, routes, and networks to engage in a whole series of other forms of criminal activity, including illicit arms trading, possible proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons, technology theft, smuggling of aliens, extortion, and even smuggling of stolen body parts. The policy response to such developments by a number of governments has been to disrupt drug organizations wherever possible, regardless of whether such activity results in a reduction of available drug supply in the involved country. After the collapse of the Soviet empire and as some nations attempt to redefine themselves geographically with borders to accommodate indigenous ethic groups, what is often a loss of centralized control provides fertile ground for breakdowns in law and order. A growth of criminal organizations, particularly those engaged in the illicit production and smuggling of narcotics, can easily follow, especially if financed from without. Such organizations can threaten the stability of fragile governments and subvert emerging democratic institutions. Moreover, opportunities for active expansion of their smuggling activities into the national security-sensitive areas such as weapons proliferation may be available. A related problem arises as members of ruling elites use state-protected channels to facilitate drug-trafficking activities. The possible emergence of such "narcocracies," proliferating criminal organizations engaged in the drug trade could be an increasing problem in the coming decade. Insurgency and limited guerrilla warfare were threats that characterized the cold war environment. Drug trafficking, terrorism, and crime appear to be growing threats in the post cold war environment. And as we move into the twenty-first century, the transnational criminal or terrorist may become a more important actor. Governments often compartmentalize their organizational structures and response to criminal activity when drug trafficking and terrorism are involved. To some degree governments have established a compartmentalized way of looking at drugs, terrorism, and crime as phenomena distinct and separate in and of themselves. In today's environment, these approaches may need to be reexamined. What some have characterized as a new and growing opportunistic relationship between drugs, terrorism, and organized crime could well result in an increased role of law enforcement and counterdrug personnel in counterterrorism, and an expanded role for counterdrug and terrorism personnel in anti-crime policy planning and implementation. Changes of this kind could prompt a reassessment of concepts, responsibilities, capabilities, and methodologies. For example, the incorporation of the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) into the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) could reflect this kind of operational shift. Loss of tax revenue from organized criminal activity is a major global problem. Perhaps even more important to many economies is the issue of tax evasion by groups engaged in large scale criminal activity. Throughout the world, governments are experiencing fiscal deficits. The demand for their services rises; meanwhile, their tax base is often dramatically eroding. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLICYMAKERS Challenges A major challenge facing policy makers is how to develop a less congenial and more costly operating environment for drug traffickers, terrorists, and other organized criminal groups. Such a response is complicated by the fact that although linkages among these groups and their activities are increasing, we are generally not dealing with monolithic groups. Instead, we are dealing with different organizations, structures, activities, operating modes, and agendas. Analysts argue that the aggregate potential threat posed by such groups should not be underestimated. In countries like Russia, the rampant spread of such activity can result in increased popular support for old authoritarian methods, at the expense of weak democratic institutions. Policy Options Numerous approaches for responding to this challenge have been proposed. 1. Enhancing policy emphasis and public awareness concerning the major criminal/drug trafficking/ or terrorist organizations and the threats they pose. In effect, continued implementation of a prioritized "crime kingpin strategy": identifying involved organizations, and their strengths and vulnerabilities. 2. Instituting a requirement for an annual report to Congress, possibly integrating international crime, drug trafficking, and terrorist activity into one strategic document. 3. Creating new mechanisms, or enhancing utilization of existing mechanisms, to facilitate law-enforcement cooperation. This includes increased cooperation between domestic police agencies as well as regional and international law enforcement alliances. Criminal activity knows no borders, but the law enforcement community frequently runs up against many types of jurisdictional boundaries. Increasingly, criminals are forming multilateral alliances and to be competitive, nations may have to do the same. Agendas on the nation state level could include: harmonization of laws, information exchange, customs cooperation, law enforcement cooperation, multilateral training programs, and exchange of personnel, passage and implementation of conventions such as the OAS arms control convention, and conventions to see that exports such as precursor chemicals or weapons go to the correct recipient. 4. Promoting endeavors to encourage international legal harmonization and interoperability of legal systems. 5. Promoting, in a way that respects civil liberties, international law-enforcement tools. Proponents have argued for: -- Training programs to identify and flag non-random criminal activity; -- Hiring of linguists; -- Reward-sharing programs; -- Witness protection programs; -- Waiver of bank-secrecy arrangements; -- Promoting criminal-conspiracy legislation abroad; and -- Promoting asset seizure and forfeiture laws abroad 6. Enhancing linkages between crime-related law enforcement intelligence and crime-related national security intelligence on the strategic and operational levels. 7. Mobilizing the private sector. Much organized crime preys on the private sector, which in turn takes extraordinary measures to protect itself from loss. One proposal calls for more public/private partnership initiatives to combat organized crime. 8. Further restrictions on money laundering and tax havens. This could include barring them from access to international banking clearinghouses. 9. Promoting research to examine the feasibility of international or specialized national criminal courts to handle issues such as money-laundering. 10. Promoting transparency and openness in government and banking. Proponents assert that criminal activity hates openness, for openness could mean exposure. A free and secure press is also seen as playing an important role here. Proponents argue that the murder of journalists is common in countries where organized crime and corruption flourish. Strong money-laundering legislation is seen as central to such transparency. 11. Promoting corruption safeguards worldwide. Instruments can include investigatory commissions, campaign finance reforms, financial disclosure requirements for public officials, special offices in the ministry of justice to deal with corruption, anti-bribery laws, and witness protection programs. Proponents argue it is not enough to have safeguards on the book. To be effective, they believe that such deterrents must be enforced with convictions and jail time. SUMMARY In the coming decade, organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism are likely to receive increased attention in the law enforcement, foreign policy, and national defense communities. The challenges associated with realistically assessing threats, allocating resources, and insuring an effective congressional role in combating organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking are complex. Addressing these problems, according to many observers, will require bringing together the diverse elements of the anti-crime, -drug and -terrorism communities to share information, experiences, ideas, and suggestions about how to deal more effectively with law enforcement, national security, and public policy concerns. (end text)
13 December 2000
(Drugs, organized crime, terrorism all converge, he says) (3630) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) head Donnie R. Marshall testified December 13 that organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorist groups are converging their international activities. "The international drug trafficking organizations that smuggle their poison into our country, and that use terrorist violence to further their criminal activities are, indeed, a threat to the national security of the United States," Marshall testified before the U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime. Marshall pointed to Colombia and the relationships authorities now see between drug traffickers and two insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). "Some insurgent units apparently have assisted drug trafficking groups in transporting and storing cocaine and marijuana within Colombia," Marshall said. Money is the reason for the alliance, the DEA administrator told the congressional panel. "Some insurgent fronts have become little more than bands of well-armed thugs that sell their services to drug traffickers," he said. Drug traffickers and terrorists are also forming alliances in Russia, East Europe, and Eurasia, Marshall said, suggesting that Russian organized criminal groups are forging the link. A different picture emerges in Southeast Asia, where there is little evidence to link the activities of terrorists and drug traffickers, he said. Marshall said DEA is concentrating its efforts on Colombia because of its ranking as the world's number one producer of cocaine. But he said the agency remains devoted to "targeting and arresting the most significant drug traffickers in the world today." Following is the text of Marshall's testimony as prepared for delivery: (begin text) Statement of Donnie R. Marshall, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration before The House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime December 13, 2000 Chairman McCollum, it is a pleasure for me to appear before you one last time. It is, as always, a pleasure to appear before you and the other members of the Subcommittee. We in DEA deeply appreciate your support for our fight against international drug trafficking over the years. Indeed we look forward to continuing our work with the Subcommittee on Crime in the next Congress. I appear before you today to testify on the threat posed by the convergence of organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism. The international drug trafficking organizations that smuggle their poison into our country, and that use terrorist violence to further their criminal activities are, indeed, a threat to the national security of the United States. DEA's mission is to target the powerful international drug organizations that operate around the world, supplying drugs to American communities, employing thousands of individuals to transport and distribute drugs. Historically as well as today, some of these groups do not hesitate to use violence and terror to advance their interests at the expense of law-abiding citizens. We see in these groups today a merger of international organized crime, drugs, and terror. While DEA does not specifically target terrorists, per se, we can and will target drug traffickers involved in terrorist acts, wherever in the world we can find them and track them down. As a law enforcement agency, DEA aims to gather evidence sufficient to arrest, indict, and convict criminals. When DEA operates in foreign posts, we work within the legal systems of our host nations, and of course within the structures of the U.S. legal system and in cooperation with our host nation police agency counterparts. Our evidence must be usable in a court of law, and must withstand severe scrutiny at every level of the criminal justice process. With that in mind, my testimony will be limited to presenting DEA's view from a law enforcement perspective of the evil union of drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. I will also briefly describe some of the steps we are taking to counter this threat. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUGS Members of international drug trafficking organizations headquartered in Colombia, Mexico, and other countries today have at their disposal sophisticated communications equipment. These technologies are being utilized by drug trafficking organizations to oversee the drug business from its raw beginnings in South American jungles to the urban areas within the United States. Modern technology and vast resources enable the leaders of international criminal groups to build organizations that reach into the heartland of America, while they themselves try to remain beyond the reach of American justice. The traffickers also have the financial resources necessary to corrupt enough law enforcement, military, and political officials to create a relatively safe haven for themselves in the countries in which they make their headquarters. The cell or compartmentalized structure of the organizations necessitates a complex system of communications to enable the organizations' leaders to know where their stores of illegal drugs are located, how much profit is being made, and where and when deliveries will take place. These organizations have the resources to take whatever measures they feel necessary to protect their investments through bribery, corruption, intimidation, violence, and terrorism. As complex as these communications arrangements of organized crime groups are, U.S. law enforcement agencies have been able to pierce their communications by using court-approved interceptions. With some of the top leadership of these organizations in hiding beyond the immediate reach of U.S. law enforcement, we have directed our resources at their organizational structure, and their transportation and distribution elements in the United States. By targeting these traffickers' communications, we can disrupt their operations and minimize the violence they are able to perpetrate on innocent citizens. THE COUNTERDRUG SITUATION IN COLOMBIA AND THE REGION Attacking Colombian organizations must be the centerpiece of any coordinated strategy aimed at the union of organized crime, drugs and terrorism. Colombian traffickers control the manufacture of the vast majority of cocaine in South America and their fingerprints are on virtually every kilogram of cocaine sold in U.S. cities and towns. Colombia continues, as it has for a number of years, as the key South American coca source country. Colombia has always been-and remains-the world's number one producer of finished cocaine HCl, producing more than 70 percent of the world's cocaine HCl. The U.S. government estimates the Colombian potential cocaine production from that country's 1999 domestic coca crop at 520 metric tons. This is an increase of 85 metric tons over the 1998 crop. In addition to its central role in coca production, Colombia is now also the world's largest producer of cocaine base (the intermediate coca product that must be further refined into finished cocaine HCl). As recently as 1995, however, Colombia only produced about one-quarter of the world's cocaine base. Each year, hundreds of tons of cocaine base were imported via aircraft into Colombia from Peru or Bolivia. Since 1995, net coca cultivation in Colombia has more than doubled (from 50,000 hectares in 1995 to 122,900 hectares in 1999). In 1999, Colombia produced approximately 68 percent of the world's cocaine base. Accordingly, Colombian traffickers are far less dependent on Peruvian or Bolivian cocaine base sources of supply. Most of Colombia's new coca cultivation, and much of its cocaine processing, occurs in the eastern lowlands and southern rain forest-areas where the national government exerts limited authority. This geographic fact poses a significant challenge to U.S. and Colombian counterdrug policy. It is difficult for the Colombian government to assert any kind of authority in the area, making it possible for Colombian cocaine trafficking organizations with bases of operations in these areas to continue to dominate the international cocaine trade. Notwithstanding the recent dramatic increase in Colombia's potential cocaine production, total Andean Region cocaine production has actually declined in recent years, due to unprecedented reductions in Peruvian and Bolivian cocaine production. Potential cocaine production in Bolivia decreased from 150 metric tons in 1998 to 70 metric tons in 1999, largely due to the Bolivian Government's unprecedented coca eradication n program. In 1999, the Bolivian Government eradicated 16,999 hectares of coca. Potential cocaine production in Peru has decreased from 240 metric tons in 1998 to 175 metric tons in 1999. As a result of coca field abandonment and eradication, net coca cultivation in Peru has decreased from 51,000 hectares in 1998 to 38,700 hectares in 1999. DRUGS AND TERRORISM: INSIDE COLOMBIA There is deep concern in DEA, as in the rest of the Administration and in the Congress, about the connection between the FARC and other terrorist groups involved in the drug trade in Colombia. The Colombian government is now engaged in responding to this armed challenge with assistance from the United States. DEA will continue to pay close attention to FARC involvement in the drug trade. We will, together with our Colombian partners, take whatever steps are necessary to attack the international organized crime groups that are the driving force behind the drug trade and the armed groups that may be protecting them. DEA has in the past demonstrated its ability and willingness to fight drug trafficking even in the face of terrorist activity. For example, we participated in the struggle with Pablo Escobar in Colombia, a trafficker who turned to terrorism when the net was closing around him. The same facts of geography that make it difficult for the Colombia government to exert authority over the traffickers operating in remote areas of the country also make it difficult for the Colombians to confront various terrorist or insurgent groups operating in the same region. There is, naturally, considerable interest in the extent to which the two problems - drug trafficking and terrorism - are intertwined in the region. As I have already stated, DEA does not have a counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency mission. When DEA does, however, acquire relevant information from its active drug investigations and drug intelligence collection programs, we share that information with the appropriate U.S. agencies - ones that do have counter-terrorism responsibilities. DEA passes specific threat information on to the FBI in domestic cases and to the foreign intelligence community in overseas cases. It is well known that two major insurgent groups are active in Colombia. They are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with some 7,000 to 11,000 active combatants, and the National Liberation Army (ELN), with some 3,000 to 6,000 active combatants. It is also known that the presence of the FARC in Colombia's eastern lowlands and southern rainforest-the country's primary coca cultivation and cocaine processing regions-hinders the Colombian Government's ability to conduct counterdrug operations. The presence of the ELN in the northeast, central, and northwestern parts of Colombia impacts on the security of oil pipelines, and hinders eradication operations against opium poppy and marijuana growing areas. Beyond the Farce's and Len's well-established presence in the drug crop cultivation and processing areas, there do appear to be some links between the traffickers and the terrorists. To be sure, there are differences of view in the United States on just how involved the FARC and ELN are in drug trafficking. DEA reporting and analysis demonstrated several areas of just such involvement. Some insurgent units raise funds through extortion or by protecting laboratory operations. In return for cash payments, or possibly in exchange for weapons, the insurgents protect cocaine laboratories in southern Colombia. Some FARC and ELN units are probably independently involved in limited cocaine laboratory operations. Some insurgent units apparently have assisted drug trafficking groups in transporting and storing cocaine and marijuana within Colombia. In particular, some insurgent units protect clandestine airstrips in southern Colombia. An alliance of convenience between guerillas and traffickers is nothing new. Since the 1970s, drug traffickers based in Colombia have made temporary alliances of convenience with leftist guerillas, or with right wing groups. In each case, this has been done to secure protection for the drug interests. At other times, the drug traffickers have financed their own private armies to provide security services. If the traffickers did not buy security from the FARC or ELN, they would buy it from elsewhere -- as they have done in the past. The frequent ground fire sustained by CNP aircraft when engaged in eradication missions over FARC or ELN controlled areas is indicative of the extent to which the terrorists will go to protect the drug interests. Some of these shootings may well have been angry peasants lashing out at a government target. In either case, these shooting incidents pose a threat to personnel conducting counter-lab or eradication operations. The revenues provided by the drug trade have apparently become increasingly important to many insurgent fronts. In fact, some insurgent fronts have become little more than bands of well-armed thugs that sell their services to drug traffickers. Moreover, DEA has no way to assess the total amount or even the gross proportion of the terrorists' revenues represented by drug proceeds. On the other side of the political spectrum from the FARC and ELN, other right-wing paramilitary groups (with some 5,000 active combatants) conduct combat operations and terrorist attacks throughout Colombia against the insurgents and their alleged civilian sympathizers. Northern and central Colombia continue to be the primary base of operations for paramilitary groups. Paramilitary groups have become more active in southern Colombia. Colombia's paramilitary groups do not appear to be directly involved in any significant coca, opium poppy, or marijuana cultivation. However, according to press reporting, certain of the paramilitary leaders have admitted to receiving payments from coca growers in southern Colombia to protect them from guerrillas. Several paramilitary groups may also raise funds through extortion, or by protecting laboratory operations in northern and central Colombia. The terrorists are not the glue that holds the drug trade together. DEA does not believe that the FARC should be considered another drug trafficking cartel. It is, however, certainly true that the "cash cow" represented by the drug trade has taken on a big, and probably growing role in financing the terrorists. It is difficult to assess the extent to which terrorism will play a role as the U.S. expands its presence in Colombia in support of Plan Colombia. FARC leaders have stated in the past that the FARC would conduct attacks against unspecified U.S. targets. DRUGS AND TERRORISM: INCREASED ROLE OF RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME Another possible tie between drug trafficking and terrorism involves Russian Organized Crime. This phenomenon actually involves activities of individuals or groups from Russia, East Europe, or Eurasia in criminal enterprises. Russian Organized Crime groups are involved in a wide variety of crimes, including drug trafficking to and within the United States. They are relative newcomers to the scene in the United States, and that forms the basis for the role they play, since other more well established groups already dominate drug distribution and sales in the United States. Internationally, Russian Organized Crime groups are involved in the heroin trade to Russia, the States of the former Soviet Union, and to Europe. Their involvement has increased as the major trafficking routes to Europe have shifted to the Balkans and through Russia and/or the former Soviet Union. Russian Organized Crime is involved in the trafficking of cocaine to Europe, and trafficking of cocaine to the United States on a generally smaller scale. Russian criminal groups have long-established ties with organized crime groups from other countries, most notably Italian Organized Crime in Italy, and Colombian Organized Crime in the cocaine trade. While Russian Organized Crime is clearly involved in drug trafficking, especially as transportation specialists, links between their drug operations and terrorist activities are less than well established. On September 7, 2000, the Colombian National Police (CNP) seized a partially constructed, steel-hulled submarine from a warehouse outside Bogota, Colombia. All available information suggests the submarine-if completed-could have been used to transport up to ten metric tons of illicit drugs from Colombia to remote off-load sites in Latin America and the Caribbean. It could well be that Russian International Organized crime was involved in this submarine project. Russian nationals were involved in the engineering project, seeming to be organizing the project while Colombian nationals assisted in the construction work. The full extent of Russian involvement in the submarine is unclear. The Russian instruction manuals, with Spanish translations, found in the warehouse suggest that Russians might have been helping to build the submarine. Colombian authorities and DEA are actively investigating leads to determine the identities of the suspects involved in the construction of the submarine. There is, as yet, no established or suggested link between this submarine and terrorist activity. Colombian cocaine trafficking groups do generate billions of dollars in revenues each year, resources that increasingly have been used to purchase the best talent and technology available on the world market. DRUGS AND TERRORISM: SOUTHEAST ASIA In years past, the Muslim separatist groups in southern Thailand and the Communist Party of Thailand dabbled in drug trafficking to raise funds to support their political and operational objectives. Today, there is little if any data linking indigenous terrorists to drug trafficking in Southeast Asia. The Communist Party has not been a viable organization in Thailand for years, and the Muslim separatist movement has fractured into a number of organizations known more for their banditry than their political activities. Drug trafficking does not, therefore, contribute to any significant terrorism on the part of these organizations. In fact, there are no credible reports of any terrorist groups either being based in or conducting terrorist activity within the Kingdom of Thailand. Even the United Wa State Army (UWSA), across the border in Burma, is not a regional organization capable of reaching into Thailand with terrorist activities. The UWSA exists primarily as a separatist organization, seeking autonomy from the central government in Burma. It funds its separatist activities by being the major international drug trafficking organization in the region. The only hint of a link between drug trafficking and terrorist organizations is associated with the Tamil Tigers. There are some Tamil Tigers in the Phuket area of southern Thailand reportedly involved in heroin smuggling. In addition, they are believed to have purchased weapons for transport to Sri Lanka to support their separatist activities there. The drug proceeds may have been used to purchase any weapons actually acquired, but there is no direct evidence of this link between the two activities available to DEA. In Laos, insofar as DEA's reporting suggests, the recent spate of terrorist bombing activity is based in anti-Communist sentiment and is being financially supported not from drug proceeds but from organizations based in the U.S. with ideological ties to the terrorists in Laos. In sum, DEA has no credible information of the Tamil Tigers, or any terrorist group, using drug trafficking as a source of income for destabilizing the local government or any neighboring country's government. CONCLUSION: HOPE FOR THE FUTURE By way of conclusion, we can and should continue to identify and build cases against the leaders of the criminal groups involved in drug trafficking wherever they may be found. These criminals have already moved to make our task more difficult by withdrawing from positions of vulnerability and maintaining a much lower profile than their predecessors. They have not refrained from using violence to protect their interests when they are threatened. As we concentrate our efforts on Colombia, a number of initiatives hold particular promise for success against significant traffickers, even as we face an era of political uncertainty there and possibly even greater levels of violence than we see now: The U.S. Embassy's Information Analysis/Operations Center (IAOC) is being increasingly utilized to coordinate and analyze tactical information regarding the activities of drug trafficking groups active in the Colombian territories south and east of the Andes Mountains. The IAOC is comprised of Embassy personnel from the DEA Bogota Country Office and U.S. Military's Tactical Analysis Team. The Defense Attaché Office and the State Department also provide support and staffing. This organization serves as a central clearinghouse for counterdrug law enforcement cooperation in Colombia. The special unit program, funded under the Andean Initiative, makes it possible to convert existing partially vetted units of the Colombian National Police (CNP) into fully vetted teams. These teams of investigators will work closely with DEA and will conduct high-level drug investigations. There have been several cutting-edge, sophisticated investigations, such as OPERATION MILLENIUM last year, which benefit from the closest possible cooperation between the DEA and CNP. MILLENIUM resulted in the demolition of the "Juvenal" organization, one of the most significant groupings of drug traffickers in Colombia. This type of investigation will lead to the dismantling of even more of the most significant drug trafficking organizations operating in Colombia today. There is funding under "Plan Colombia" for a Bilateral Case Initiative and for creation of new vetted units. These new resources will improve the U.S. government's capability to target trafficking organizations in Colombia. The CNP, with support from DEA, conducted several successful long-term investigations against major drug trafficking organizations in 2000 including: the Carlos Castro Arias cocaine trafficking group, the Ivan de la Vega cocaine trafficking group, and the Nicolas Urquijo Gaviria heroin trafficking group. The DEA remains committed to our primary goal of targeting and arresting the most significant drug traffickers in the world today. In particular, we will continue to work with our partners in Colombia to improve our cooperative efforts against international drug smuggling. The ultimate test of success will come when we bring to justice the drug lords who control their vast empires of crime which bring misery to the nations in which they operate. They must be arrested, tried and convicted, and sentenced in their own countries to prison terms commensurate with their crimes, or, as appropriate, extradited to the United States to face American justice. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have. (end text)