2 November 2000. Thanks to author and publisher.
Source: The China Threat, Bill Gertz; Regnery, Washington, D.C.; 2000.
ISBN 0-89526-281-9.
Selections from several classified and unclassified documents. See another secret document from the book on spying on US nuclear weapons and technology: http://cryptome.org/tct-docs2.htm
Anotations by the author.
[Appendix, pp 246-47.]
A report from the CIA's National Intelligence Daily analyzing Chinese President Jiang Zemin's efforts to consolidate power. (2 pages)
Top Secret
UMBRA
CHINA: Jiang's Position Remains Unconsolidated (S NF)
Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin appears to have weathered criticism of his Taiwan policies but remains unable to parlay his appointment as Deng Xiaoping's chosen successor into the paramount position. The US Embassy reports that rivals are trying to limit his power as next fall's 15th Party Congress nears.press reports say National People's Congress Chairman Qiao Shi has been openly critical of Jiang's Taiwan policy and key appointments and(S NF OC)
In addition, Jiang has been unable to assert his authority in areas he should be able to control after seven years as party General Secretary, six as Central Military Commission chairman, and three as President.
deposed Beijing party secretary and former Politburo member Chen Xitong, whose corruption investigation Jiang spearheaded, will not be brought to trial.military leaders, some of whom Jiang promoted, last summer attacked Jiang's policy toward Taiwan as too lenient.
-- Jiang is still resorting to Deng's theories to provide legitimacy to the Communist Party, suggesting an inability to claim Deng's mantle on his own.(S NF OC)
Jiang's inability to consolidate his power means he will remain focused on domestic issues and is unlikely to initiate any steps to improve relations with the US or Taiwan that could spark internal criticism. Rather, he will pursue less controversial activities -- such as his recent African tour -- to build his own and China's international stature. (S NF) -CIA, DIA-
Top Secret
13
3 June
1996
Top Secret
UMBRA
| China: Jiang's Rivals for Influence
(U) |
||
| Li Peng 67 |
Premier, member, Politburo Standing Committee |
Maintains tactical alliance with Jiang when collective leadership faces threat, such as economic downturn. but working to undercut Jiang's authority behind the scenes has criticized Jiang as too soft on Taiwan, US issues. |
| Qiao Shi 71 |
Chairmam National People's Congress; member, Politburo Standing Committee |
Frequently identified in press, other reporting as Jiang's chief rival . . . criticizes Jiang's policies in private, seldom makes obligatory references tJo him in public speeches attempting to strengthen influence of NPC to boost own political standing past behavior suggests more likely to act as "kingmaker" for another challenger than to take on Jiang directly. |
| Zhu Rongii 67 |
Vice Premier member. Politburo Standing Committee |
Has maintained low profile in recent months but had past disagreements with Jiang over economic policy still frequently cited as likely to hold higher office in future. |
| Li Ruihuan 61 |
Chairman, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Politburo Standing Committee |
Largely sidelined in recent years, but support would add prestige to a Jiang challenger associated with group of Dengist reformers critical of Jiang's performance has input on Taiwan, Hong Kong policy decisions. |
| Tian Jiyun 66 |
Vice Chairman, National People's Congress; member, Politburo |
Has backed Qiao Shi's efforts to bolster influence of NPC, probably shares his views on Jiang associated with Dengist reformers. |
| Yang Shangkun 89 |
Former President | Charged by Deng Xiaoping to support Jiang but has criticized some of Jiang's decisions. according to a variety of reporting often rumored in Hong Kong media to be planning direct challenge . . . probably seeks acknowledgment of preeminent stature among elders after Deng . . . has been courted by Jiang in attempts to ensure his backing. |
| Wan Li 79 |
Former Chairman, National People's Congress |
Rumored to be among group of Jiang opponents criticizing his handling of Taiwan affairs . . . also disagreed with Jiang on some corruption cases. according to press reports among most active of party elders ... has been associated with Qiao Shi, Tian Jiyun, other Dengist reformers. |
| Secret NOFORN | 352629PM5 5-96 |
|
Top Secret
[Appendix, pp. 250-52.]
A proposal by White House National Security Council proliferation specialist Gary Samore that would have allowed China to gain access to missile technology in exchange for agreeing not to sell missile technology to rogue states. The plan was never implemented after it became public. (3 pages)
SECRET SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C, 20504
March 12, 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE HAMEL/JOHN NORRIS, OVP
JOHN HOLUM, STATE/T
ROBERT EINHORN, STATE/PM
SUSAN SHIRK, STATE/EAP
MELINDA KIMBLE, STATE/OES
TED WARNER, DEFENSE
MARC BERKOWITZ, DEFENSE
KEITH CALHOUN-SENGHOR, COMMERCE
CATHERINE NOVELLI, USTR
JEFFREY HOFGARD, OSTP
NORM WULF, ACDA
ROBERT DIEKER, JCS
JOHN SHOEMARKER, NASA
SUBJECT: China Missile Proposal
The attached paper proposes elements of a missile deal with
China, to be presented during U/S Holum's trip to China March
25-26. In essence, we would offer to expand commercial and
scientific space cooperation with China (in limited areas) if
China meets our conditions for joining the MTCR and controlling
its missile-related exports to Iran, Pakistan, etc. (Note that
Article 10 of the draft NASA-SSTCC Agreement for Scientific
Cooperation in the Areas of Earth Observation, Environment, and
Climate Change has been largely deleted.)
Please provide your comments and clearance to me by COB Tuesday,
March 17. Thanks.
[Signature]
Gary Samore
Special Assistant: to the President and
Senior Director for Nonproliferation
and Export Controls
cc: Sandy Kristoff/Jeff Bader
SECRET SECRET
SECRET
ELEMENTS OF THE CHINA MISSILE DEAL
Following are the elements of a missile deal that would be
proposed to China during Bob Einhorn's expert-level talks in
China March 23-24 and U/S Holum's "Global Security" discussions
in China March 25-26. In presenting the package, we would
propose to complete the elements in time to be announced during
the President's trip to China later this year.
What China Does:
1. Establishes effective MTCR export controls, and "catch-all"
controls on items destined for MTCR-class missile programs.
* This meets one of the MTCR's two substantive requirements
for Chinese membership. it would require China to adhere
to the current MTCR Guidelines and Annex, and to
incorporate them into China's export control system.
"Catch-all" is not an MTCR requirement, but is needed to
deter circumvention of MTCR controls and to enforce
limits on Iran (see below).
2. Does not transfer MTCR-controlled equipment and technology
to Category I (MTCR-class) missile programs in any non-MTCR
country, including Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Pakistan,
Syria, Turkey, etc.
* This meets the second of the MTCR's two substantive
requirements.
3. Does not assist ground-to-ground missile programs in Iran.
* This would cover all ground-to-ground ballistic and
cruise missiles, even those below MTCR thresholds, and
would include B610/8610/CSS-8, NP-110, and Shahab-series
missiles.
What the U.S. Does:
1. Support Chinese MTCR membership, upon implementation of 1 and
2 above.
* This would provide China with political prestige, the
ability to shape future MTCR decisions, substantial
protecticn from future U.S. missile sanctions, and would
SECRET SECRET
SECRET
expedite somewhat the consideration of MTCR-controlled U.S.
exports to China.
2. Conclude NASA-SSTCC Agreement for Scientific Cooperation in
the Areas of Earth Observation, Environment, and Climate Change
Research. (See attached.)
* We would table the draft umbrella agreement during the
talks, noting its conclusion would be dependent on a
missile deal. (NOTE: Regardless of whether we reach a
missile deal, we would proceed with the space projects
that were agreed in the context of the Jiang visit.)
3. Issue blanket Presidential waiver of Tiananmen Square
sanctions to coverall future commercial satellite launches.
* Such waivers currently are issued case-by-case. Under a
blanket waiver, we would continue to review case-by-case
the export licenses required to launch U.S. satellites on
Chinese boosters.
4. Increase number of permitted commercial space-launches.
* We would amend the existing Commercial Space Launch
Agreement to increase the launch quota. We would also
make clear to the Chinese that, as a practical matter, a
lack of progress on the missile issue would prevent us
form [sic] increasing launch quotas and could even endanger the
existing quota.
SECRET
[Appendix, p. 263.]
A top secret CIA report on China's weapons sales, including a delivery
of missile-related cargo to Syria. (1 page)
Top Secret
EAST ASIA (continued)
_______________________________________________________________
China: Possible Missile-Related Delivery to Syria
China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation -- China's premier missile sales firm -- delivered what probably is military-related cargo to Syria early this month, according to special intelligence. Though the exact nature of the equipment, described as special and dangerous, remains unclear, the involvement of CPMIEC and the Syrian end user suggests the shipments are missile related.the cargo was destined for the Scientific Studies and Research Center, which is responsible for Syria's ballistic missile, weapons-of-mass-destruction, and advanced conventional-weapons programs.-- SSRC runs Syria's Scud C ballistic missile production program and an upgrade program for antiship missiles. Moreover, in recent years it has sought and received assistance for each of the projects from CPMIEC.
China: Seeking Advanced US Defense Technology
a Chinese firm has illicitly obtained sophisticated US-made millimeter-wave traveling wave tubes, power transmission devices that can be used in a variety of military applications, including airborne missile seeking and fire-control radars, targeting systems, and navigation pods.-- The Chinese will most likely try to duplicate the technology in the power transmission tubes. They have reportedly tried -- with little success -- to produce similar tubes in the past; their efforts have included joint ventures with the Russians.The cost of the tubes -- obtained in the Philippines -- increased fourfold to $80,000 each because of the illegal nature of the transaction, but there is high military and commercial demand for this equipment.
Top Secret
11
17 June 1996
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