2 November 2002
Source: http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=02110101.plt&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml


US Department of State
International Information Programs

Washington File
_________________________________

01 November 2002

Bolton Says Rogue States Seek Weapons of Mass Destruction

(Under Secretary addresses Hudson Institute Nov. 1) (2980)

Continuing evidence over the past 12 months that state sponsors of
terrorism have been stepping up activities involving weapons of mass
destruction has prompted the United States to emphasize compliance
with existing arms control agreements such as the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
Biological Weapons Convention, a senior State Department official
says.

Speaking November 1 at the Second Global Conference on Nuclear,
Bio/Chem Terrorism in Washington, D.C., Under Secretary of State John
Bolton quoted President Bush as saying, "our greatest fear is that
terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw
regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive
scale."

Bolton delivered the keynote morning address on the international
aspects of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

He focused on the WMD activities and programs of Iran, Iraq, North
Korea, Libya and Syria, all state sponsors of terrorism, noting that
Iran, for instance, "is known to be seeking dual-use materials,
technology and expertise for its offensive biological and chemical
weapons programs" as well as trying "to upgrade its large ballistic
missile force.

"Our intelligence clearly shows that Iran seeks to acquire a nuclear
weapons capability, and thus we are extremely concerned about
transfers to Iran of dual-use materials. Once a rogue state's
intentions become apparent, we should assume that the dual-use
technologies it acquires will be used for illegitimate purposes,"
Bolton said.

Turning to Iraq, he said that nation has "an aggressive program to
rebuild the infrastructure for its nuclear, chemical, biological and
missile program," and that "once Iraq acquires fissile material --
whether from a foreign source or by securing the materials to build an
indigenous fissile material capability -- it could fabricate a nuclear
weapon within one year."

As for North Korea, it stands in self-admitted violation of several
international nonproliferation agreements, including the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Bolton said, by telling U.S.
negotiators that it has an active program to enrich uranium. In
addition, it is "the world's No. 1 exporter of missile technology and
equipment," and there is little doubt it has an active chemical
weapons program, he said. Further, the U.S. government "believes that
North Korea has one of the most mature bioweapons programs on earth,"
Bolton said. All this is on top of an army of nearly one million
soldiers, with 10,000 pieces of artillery, he noted.

Bolton also touched on the WMD activities of Syria and Libya, both of
which he says have chemical weapons programs, and both of which are at
least exploring bioweapons programs.

Given these considerations, Bolton said, the United States over the
past 12 months has emphasized compliance with existing arms control
agreements, expressing its strong support for the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons
Convention. That has led to reinvigoration of the State Department's
Bureau of Verification and Compliance, he said, as part of an effort
to "be forthright in letting the public know when states violate their
commitment not to acquire or transfer the tools and materials
necessary for making weapons of mass destruction."

Following is the text of Bolton's remarks:

(begin transcript)

The International Aspects of Terrorism and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction

By the Honorable John R. Bolton
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security,
United States Department of State

To the Second Global Conference on Nuclear, Bio/Chem Terrorism:
Mitigation and Response

Sponsored by The Hudson Institute

Washington, DC

When the United States and other nations began working together on the
problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction over 30 years
ago, the world was a very different place, where the largest source of
the most dangerous materials was contained within two superpowers.
Weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort.
Non-state actors were not yet considered to pose a meaningful threat,
since they were not linked to abundant sources of supply. With the end
of the Cold War, however, the international security environment
changed and the proliferation problem increased. Now, more states are
seeking increasingly advanced WMD capabilities, more states are
entering the supply market, and all of this is compounded by the fact
that terrorists are also seeking weapons of mass destruction. When the
world witnessed the destructive potential of terrorism on September
11, [2001,] we were reminded of the need to remain steadfast in
recognizing emerging threats to our security, and to think one step
ahead of those who wish to do us harm.

Today, the United States believes that the greatest threat to
international peace and stability comes from rogue states and
transnational terrorist groups that are unrestrained in their choice
of weapon and undeterred by conventional means. The September 11th
attacks showed that terrorist groups were much better organized, much
more sophisticated, and much more capable of acting globally than we
had assumed possible. Our concept of what terrorists are able to do to
harm innocent civilians has changed fundamentally. There can be no
doubt that, if given the opportunity, terrorist groups such as
al-Qaeda would not hesitate to use disease as a weapon against the
unprotected, to spread chemical agents to inflict pain and death on
the innocent, or to send suicide-bound adherents armed with
radiological explosives on missions of murder.

A Confluence of Nefarious Motives

Terrorist groups seek to acquire chemical, biological or nuclear
weapons any way they can; state sponsors of terrorism are actively
working to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their missile
delivery systems. Here lies a dangerous confluence of nefarious
motives, and we must prevent the one from abetting the other. As
President Bush said in September, "In cells, in camps, terrorists are
plotting further destruction and building new bases for their war
against civilization. And our greatest fear is that terrorists will
find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies
them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale."

To ensure that terrorist groups and their state sponsors are never
able to gain access to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or
the means to deliver them via missile, the United States is employing
a variety of methods to combat the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, including multilateral agreements, diplomacy, arms
control, threat reduction assistance, export control and other means
where necessary. Most importantly, we must maintain an unvarnished
view of the proliferators, and disrupt their supply of sensitive goods
and technology before it contributes to an increased WMD capability or
falls into the hands of terrorists or other rogue states.

Without question, the states most aggressively seeking to acquire WMD
and their means of delivery are Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, followed
by Libya and Syria. It is no coincidence that these states, which are
uniformly hostile to the United States, as well as to many of our
friends and allies, are among the ones we identify as state sponsors
of terrorism.

Iran, one of the most egregious state sponsors of terror, is known to
be seeking dual-use materials, technology and expertise for its
offensive biological and chemical weapons programs from entities in
Russia, China and Western Europe. It is also seeking to upgrade its
large ballistic missile force with the help of Russian, North Korean
and Chinese firms. Our intelligence clearly shows that Iran seeks to
acquire a nuclear weapons capability, and thus we are extremely
concerned about transfers to Iran of dual-use materials. Once a rogue
state's intentions become apparent, we should assume that the dual-use
technologies it acquires will be used for illegitimate purposes.

Iraq, despite U.N. sanctions, maintains an aggressive program to
rebuild the infrastructure for its nuclear, chemical, biological and
missile programs. In each instance, Iraq's procurement agents are
actively working to obtain both weapons-specific and dual-use
materials and technologies critical to their rebuilding and expansion
efforts, using front companies and whatever illicit means are at hand.
We estimate that once Iraq acquires fissile material -- whether from a
foreign source or by securing the materials to build an indigenous
fissile material capability -- it could fabricate a nuclear weapon
within one year. It has rebuilt its civilian chemical infrastructure
and renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including
mustard, sarin and VX. It actively maintains all key aspects of its
offensive BW [biological weapons] program. And in terms of its support
for terrorism, we have established that Iraq has permitted al-Qaeda to
operate within its territory. As the president said recently, "The
regime has long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist
organizations. And there are al-Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq." The
president has made his position on Iraq eminently clear, and in the
coming weeks and months we shall see what we shall see.

Now let us turn to North Korea.

As you know, last month during official talks between the United
States and North Korea, North Korean officials acknowledged that they
have a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. This constitutes
a violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, North Korea's International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the course of this brazen
admission, the North Koreans declared the Agreed Framework nullified.
As Secretary Powell later said, "When we have an agreement between two
parties and one says it's nullified, then it looks like it's
nullified."

The fact that the North Koreans are seeking a production-scale
capability to produce weapons-grade uranium is a cause of grave
concern to us, to the states in the region and to the world as a
whole. The U.S. intelligence community already assesses that "North
Korea has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two
nuclear weapons." In consultation with the other four nuclear powers,
our allies in the region, and other interested states, we are now
considering what our next steps will be. President Bush has made it
very clear that the North Koreans must comply with its commitments
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and eliminate its nuclear weapons
program immediately in a verifiable manner. He has also stated that he
wants to resolve this matter peacefully and through the exertion of
maximum diplomatic pressure on North Korea. We want to emphasize that
this is a global problem, not simply a regional one. The security of
all nations, as well as the continued credibility of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, hinge on the successful resolution of this
problem.

North Korea poses other dangers. We have long been aware of North
Korea's role as the world's No. 1 exporter of missile technology and
equipment. These sales are one of its major sources of hard currency,
which in turn allow continued missile development and production. As
the CIA publicly reports: "North Korea has assumed the role as the
missile and manufacturing technology source for many programs. North
Korean willingness to sell complete systems and components has enabled
other states to acquire longer-range capabilities."

With regard to chemical weapons, there is little doubt that North
Korea has an active program. Despite efforts to get North Korea to
become a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, it has refused to
do so. In a recent report to Congress, the U.S. government declared
that North Korea "is capable of producing and delivering via missile
warheads or other munitions a wide variety of chemical agents."

The news on the biological weapons front is equally disturbing. The
U.S. government believes that North Korea has one of the most mature
offensive bioweapons programs on earth. North Korea to date is in
stark violation of the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC]. Indeed, at
times North Korea has flouted it. In the 1980s, the North Korean
military intensified this effort as instructed by then-President Kim
Il-sung, who declared that "poisonous gas and bacteria can be used
effectively in war." The United States believes North Korea has a
dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW capability and that
it has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in
violation of the BWC. North Korea likely has the capability to produce
sufficient quantities of biological agents within weeks of a decision
to do so.

Finally, North Korea has one of the world's largest armies -- nearly
one million men under arms. This force has over 10,000 artillery
tubes, many of which can reach Seoul and surrounding areas south of
the De-Militarized Zone. Such a force, far larger than needed for
legitimate defense needs, is capable of inflicting massive damage, as
it would most likely be charged with deploying chemical and biological
weapons during the course of an attack.

In addition to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, other rogue states that
concern us include Libya and Syria. Libya continues to pursue an
indigenous chemical warfare production capability, relying heavily on
foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals, technical expertise, and
other key chemical warfare-related equipment. Moreover, the United
States believes that Libya has an offensive BW program in the
research-and-development [R&D] stage, and it may currently be capable
of producing small quantities of biological agent. It continues
efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials,
technology, and expertise from foreign sources. Further, we are
persuaded that Libya is continuing its longstanding pursuit of nuclear
weapons, and the suspension of U.N. sanctions against it has increased
its access to nuclear-related materials and equipment.

Syria, through foreign assistance, is seeking to expand its chemical
weapons program, which includes a stockpile of nerve agent. We believe
that it is developing biological weapons and is able to produce at
least small amounts of biological warfare agents. Syria is also
pursuing assistance from North Korea and firms in Russia for its
missile development programs. The country has become a major
transshipment point for goods and technology going to Iraq.

Among these regimes flow dangerous weapons and dangerous technology.
States such as these rely heavily on front companies and illicit arms
traders to seek out arms, equipment, sensitive technology and dual-use
goods for the benefit of their WMD programs. A growing concern is that
cooperation among proliferators is increasing, recipients have become
suppliers, and this "onward proliferation" presents yet another
difficult problem. It is on these rogue regimes in particular that
United States and its partners in multilateral nonproliferation
agreements must focus a watchful eye.

An Emphasis on Compliance

To this end, we have placed much weight in our arms control policy on
strict compliance with existing multilateral treaties and agreements.
This Administration strongly supports treaties such as the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the
Biological Weapons Convention. But in order to be effective and
provide the assurances they purport to bring, they must be carefully
and universally enforced among all signatories. It is for this reason
that we are reinvigorating the Department of State's Verification and
Compliance Bureau. The United States must do its utmost to be
forthright in letting the public know when states violate their
commitment not to acquire or transfer the tools and materials
necessary for making weapons of mass destruction.

This has been our aim in particular with the Biological Weapons
Convention. This international treaty, signed by more than 140
countries, prohibits the production, use and stockpiling of biological
weapons. While the vast majority of the BWC's parties have
conscientiously met their commitments, the United States is extremely
concerned that some states are conducting offensive biological weapons
programs while publicly avowing compliance with the agreement. To
expose some of these violators to the international community, a year
ago I named publicly several states the U.S. government knows to be
pursuing the production of biological warfare agents in violation of
the BWC -- including Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Later in the
year I named Cuba, which we believe has at least a limited,
developmental offensive biological warfare R&D effort, and which has
provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states. Such states
will not be given a pass on their violations simply because they are
signatories to the treaty.

We are also concerned about the activities of some states not party to
the treaty, including Syria and Sudan. The administration believes it
is critical to put such states on notice. Should they choose to ignore
the norms of civilized society and pursue biological weapons, their
actions will not go unnoticed.

The United States last fall proposed several important measures to
combat the BW threat. In the past year great progress has been made to
combat the threat posed by biological weapons. National, bilateral,
and multilateral efforts have made it more difficult for those
pursuing biological weapons to obtain the necessary ingredients and
made it easier to detect and counter any attack.

Conclusion

The Bush Administration firmly believes that, as the president said,
"Almost every state that actively sponsors terror is known to be
seeking weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them
at longer and longer ranges." It is not simply coincidence that those
states we know to be seeking chemical, biological or nuclear weapons
are also the states designated as sponsors of global terrorism.

In the past, the proliferation and acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction fell outside the definition of "terrorism." But we are in
a new era. We must be very clear: the U.S. government believes that
the threat of terrorism, the actions of state sponsors of terrorism,
and the proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction
are inextricably linked. As President Bush said last month, "Terror
cells, and outlaw regimes building weapons of mass destruction, are
different faces of the same evil. Our security requires that we
confront both. And the United States military is capable of
confronting both."

America is determined to prevent the next wave of terror. This means
directing firm international condemnation toward states that shelter
-- and in some cases directly sponsor -- terrorists within their
borders. It means uncovering their activities that may be in violation
of international treaties. And it means having a direct dialogue with
the rest of the world about what is at stake.

Thank you.

(end transcript)

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Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)