7 December 2003. Thanks to B.

The Department of Energy Pantex Plant, located at Pantex, TX, is the US's sole nuclear warhead assembly/disassembly facility.

These 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 (in reverse order) excerpts are from Pantex weekly safety reports available from 1996-2003:

http://www.dnfsb.gov/pub_docs/pantex/wr_px.html

Safety reports are also available for other nuclear facilities at Hanford, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Rocky Flats, and Savannah.

"BWXT" is the private contractor which has managed Pantex since late 2000; prior to then the long-time manager was Mason and Hanger ("M-H"). "PXSO" is the The Pantex Site Office. "TSR" is the Technical Safety Requirements for Pantex Facilities. The bracketed [symbols] appear to relate to sections of the TSR.

Pantex eyeball: http://cryptome.org/pantex-eyeball.htm

From the report Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998, by William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris and Joshua Handler, published in March 1998 by the Natural Resources Defence Council.

http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/tkstock/p53-94.pdf

TEXAS

Rank: 10

Nuclear Warheads: 350

Pantex
DOE FACILITY

TEXAS ranks 10th in number of nuclear warheads deployed, a change from 5th place (and 1,365 warheads) in 1992 and 6th place in 1985 (630 warheads). However, nuclear weapons are stored only at the Pantex Plant of the Department of Energy outside of Amarillo on a temporary basis while they await dismantlement. Though the composition is constantly in flux depending upon which warheads are scheduled, the current pool includes some 150 W69 SRAM warheads and 200 W79 8-inch artillery shells.

At the current 1,300 warhead per year retirement rate, it is estimated that some 300 to 400 weapons are present at Pantex at any one time. Warheads in the pipeline to be dismantled are also stored at Kirtland AFB in New Mexico. These include 200 W79s, 1,100 W69 SRAM warheads, and 450 W56 Minuteman II warheads. The last W48 155mm (6-inch) artillery warheads, W70 Lance warheads, W68 Poseidon warheads, and B57 nuclear depth and strike bombs have been completely retired.

Over the ten year period from October 1986 through September 1996, Pantex disassembled 12,514 warheads. It has more than enough capacity to disassemble the entire stockpile at current workload levels and will complete its current work orders in the year 2000. As of the end of 1997 there are approximately 10,750 “pits” (nuclear cores of warheads that have been dismantled) in storage at Pantex.

2003

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 21, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending November 21, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was on site all week. A. Hadjian, T. Hunt, B. Jones and D. Nichols were on site this week.

W56 Procedure Adherence Concern: Personnel conducting W56 operations this week inadvertently skipped a required series of operational steps in dismantling a W56 nuclear explosive package. Personnel on one shift performed three task setups prior to performing the tasks. This is allowed and was done to minimize the time spent in a contamination area. However, an unusual situation with the nuclear explosive package prevented the personnel from accomplishing all of the tasks prior to ending the shift. The shift turnover discussion focused on the unusual condition encountered and not on the precise status of ongoing operations.

Personnel on the following shift began operations after the last stamped-off step in the procedures, which was a setup step. They did not review the procedure to determine the first operational step that was not stamped off and missed performing one task. The error was noted when technicians saw that their attempt to remove a component of the nuclear explosive package was not proceeding as expected. Operations were suspended until a backout procedure was available to reverse the steps that had been completed out of sequence. [II, P3A, P3B, P3C]

Transportation Program: There were several incidents this week involving errors affecting the transportation program. In one case, the failure to properly flow down TSR requirements into procedures and the failure to adequately train all affected personnel led to a bulk quantity of material placarded as a class 3 flammable liquid being on restricted Pantex roadways at the same time as a nuclear explosive convoy. In another incident, failure to adhere to procedures associated with packaging radioactive material and explosives and failure to follow procedures associated with verifying empty cans prior to labeling them led to a classified, radioactive, explosive component being transported and stored in violation of requirements associated with transporting and storing the item. In another case, an explosive component was found in a facility different from the one in which it was located in the Move Right System database. While the significance of these individual incidents varies, when taken collectively, and considered with other transportation-related incidents over past few weeks, they indicate concerns with various elements of the administrative program for transportation. BWXT implemented a series of compensatory measures this week to strengthen the program and will incorporate these compensatory measures into the safety basis. [II, W4]

Upgrade Project for Building 12-64: The Board’s staff met with BWXT and PXSO personnel along with consultants for BWXT to discuss a strengthening option to address the seismic concern raised in the Board’s October 2003 letter. BWXT and its consultants presented a preliminary design that uses fiber reinforced polymer fabric to strengthen the roof, correcting the design deficiency noted in the Board’s letter. The staff provided constructive feedback related to certain aspects of the design and analysis, but overall, the approach seemed feasible. A consultant to BWXT also presented an approach to addressing the concern raised by the Board with respect to the performance of the facility in the event of an internal explosion. The consultant will calculate the weight of explosives that would cause the roof of the facility to fail to meet its performance requirements during an internal blast. If this weight is acceptable from an operational perspective, BWXT will reduce the allowed inventory of explosives to a quantity less than this weight. If not, BWXT and its consultants will consider modifications to the facility structure to improve its performance. [III, E4]

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 14, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending November 14, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was on leave Monday. The Pantex Site Office was closed on Tuesday for Veterans’ Day. W. White was on site for the remainder of the week.

Implementation of Technical Safety Requirements: BWXT completed its contractor readiness assessment this week for the first group of new or revised controls to be implemented from the Technical Safety Requirements Integrated Implementation Plan. The need for these controls was identified in the various documented safety analyses completed as part of the implementation of 10 CFR 830. The implementation of a subset of the controls is a deliverable to the Board in the DOE Implementation Plan for Recommendation 98-2.

The assessment noted pre-started findings for 8 of the 13 controls being assessed for implementation. Many of these findings related to problems with the accuracy of the applicability matrix in the Technical Safety Requirements for the controls being implemented. The majority of the other pre-start findings related to inadequate flow down of the controls into site procedures and training. [II, W3, W4]

Move Right System: On Friday, BWXT personnel initiated the movement of a nuclear explosive during the time window set aside for explosive-only moves. This is another violation of the administrative program to control the movement of nuclear explosives. In this case the Move Right System authorized the movement, and BWXT personnel moved the unit.

The Move Right System authorized the move because a flag associated with the item being moved did not identify it as a nuclear explosive. Personnel who validated this particular flag did so by using a matrix in the transportation safety analysis that identified nuclear explosive configurations authorized for transportation. Personnel verified that each configuration in the safety analysis matrix was also identified in the database used by the Move Right System as a nuclear explosive. However, they do not appear to have understood that certain configurations in the safety analysis also covered lower-level configurations not specifically called out by part number in the safety analysis. In at least this case, the flag for the lower-level configuration was set incorrectly.

Also of concern, personnel initiating and conducting the move should have been aware that the explosive move window was open, but they were not. The error was identified by alert operations center personnel who were validating that all high explosive moves were completed prior to closing the explosive move window. All moves authorized through the Move Right System have been suspended until BWXT personnel verify the nuclear explosive flag is set correctly for every item in the Move Right System database that contains both plutonium and explosives. [II, W4]

SNMCRF Independent Project Review: An independent project review was performed this week for the project to modify an existing, non-nuclear facility for use as the Special Nuclear Material Component Requalification Facility, a category 2 nuclear facility. The project review was performed on behalf of NA-12 to verify the readiness of the project to proceed to construction. The review team found that the project was ready to proceed with construction on facility modifications necessary to convert the building. However, the review team also noted that “the present state of development of the process equipment does not warrant approval to proceed with procurement and fabrication.” Until more complete specifications are available for the process equipment, the review team recommended that NNSA withhold authorization to proceed with procurement and fabrication of workstations to be used in the facility. [III, W2]

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 7, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending November 7, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was on leave Friday and was on site for the remainder of the week.

High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) Filters: In its updated response to the Board in October 17, 2003, regarding HEPA filters used for habitability purposes, NNSA identified that filters in three facilities at the Pantex Plant provide a habitability function. In the BWXT attachment supporting this letter, BWXT committed to providing a cost and schedule estimate by October 20, 2003, for upgrading these systems and putting the filters through the test program at the Filter Test Facility.

This cost and schedule estimate was provided to PXSO on Thursday. The BWXT schedule calls for completion by August 2004 of the necessary items to put the filters through the FTF test program and to ensure the leak tightness of the ventilation systems is commensurate with the quality of the filters. The letter identifies a cost estimate of approximately $100,000 and notes that PXSO approval to proceed with the action items is necessary by December 19, 2003. [II.A, E1]

B61 Seamless Safety Project: The B61 project team briefed the Standing Management Team this week on the seamless safety concept and schedule for the B61 program. The project team currently plans to use a single work stand concept for B61 operations that will eliminate all hoists of the nuclear explosive except the initial lift from the shipping gear to the work stand. The work stand will be used for all mods of the B61 program and will incorporate features to mitigate or eliminate potential personnel safety hazards resulting from human or component electrostatic discharge scenarios.

The current schedule calls for implementation of the new process in April 2005. This is a slip of only two months from the schedule in the current integrated weapons activity plan (February 2005). [II.A, NA]

Quality Assurance Assessment: NNSA headquarters personnel were on site this week to conduct an assessment of the quality assurance programs within PXSO. The assessment is a deliverable under the DOE Quality Assurance Improvement Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities that was forwarded to the Board in November 2002. The assessment noted that the quality assurance function within PXSO is understaffed. The assessment also noted that most internal PXSO procedures are out of date and no longer reflect the PXSO organization.

In previous discussions with PXSO personnel, the site representative has noted that the site functions, responsibilities and authorities manual is also out of date and doesn’t reflect the current PXSO organization. In addition, supplemental directives that previously resided within the Albuquerque Operations Office contain roles and responsibilities for the operations office that have not been reassigned formally in NNSA headquarters or site office procedures and directives. PXSO has also implemented its new line oversight model, in conjunction with the BWXT contractor assurance system, without complete, final documentation on site office roles, responsibilities, and procedures for carrying out that oversight model. [II.A, M1]

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 31, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending October 31, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was on site all week. C. Martin and R. Quirk were on site Monday through Thursday to discuss software quality assurance.

Software Quality Assurance: The staff met with BWXT and PXSO personnel this week to follow up on the Board’s March 2003 reporting requirement related to software quality assurance at the Pantex Plant. BWXT has made significant improvement in this area, although room for continued improvement remains. In particular, the latest revision to BWXT’s software quality assurance standard represents a significant improvement to its predecessor. The standard lacks the level of detail necessary to assure effective implementation, but BWXT is in the process of developing more detailed manuals for use with the standard.

The primary focus of the staff review was on the software quality assurance program for the new interactive electronic procedures planned for use in nuclear explosive operations. The software quality assurance program for this system is much more mature than it was in March. In an effort to trace safety-related requirements through to the associated detailed test procedures, the staff did find that additional test cases were needed for four of the six requirements reviewed.

The staff also reviewed the software quality assurance program for the Move Right System. Unrelated to the staff review, BWXT identified a system deficiency during the week that allowed a nuclear explosive to enter the ramp while high explosive moves were in progress. This was a violation of an administrative program in the technical safety requirements. Alert BWXT personnel (both personnel in the operations center and personnel handling move) realized that the Move Right System had authorized a move incorrectly while the nuclear explosive was still in the vicinity of the originating facility and coordinated the return of the unit to that facility. Production personnel had opened up a dispatch screen while the move right flag for explosive moves was turned off. The system continued to use that flag for the authorization, even though the flag had changed while the dispatch window was open. BWXT initiated a code change to correct this error and implemented it following appropriate system testing. BWXT also intends to complete a failure modes and effects analysis to identify other failure modes that may have been overlooked. [II.A, E4]

Manufacturing Drill Program: In April 2002, the Board sent a letter to NNSA noting several potential areas for improvement in the training program at the Pantex Plant. One of the areas noted was an inadequate drill program for production personnel. In response, BWXT developed a new manufacturing drill schedule that increased the number of planned drills and committed to schedule at least one drill annually for each active weapons program and a portion of the satellite operations.

This week, the site representative met with BWXT and PXSO personnel to discuss the fact that few of the planned drills have actually occurred. BWXT provided a revised schedule for FY04 that identifies at least one drill for every active weapon program (although not necessarily for satellite facilities as committed in the BWXT response). BWXT also noted several corrective actions being taken to ensure actual performance of the drills in FY04. These include increased accountability for responsible personnel and reassignment of the responsibility for the drill program to the weapons training department. The first two drills for FY04 have occurred as scheduled. [II.A, P1]

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 24, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending October 24, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was at Texas Tech University on Thursday and was on site for the remainder of the week. W. Andrews, M. Moury, and D. Gutowski were on site Monday through Thursday to discuss various issues and observe operations. J. Deplitch, C. March, and R. West were on site Tuesday through Thursday to discuss fire protection issues at the Pantex Plant.

Fire Protection: Board staff members discussed various aspects of the fire protection systems and programs with BWXT and PXSO personnel this week. Improvements were noted in several areas. These include the planning and implementation of projects related to the fire suppression and detection systems, the use of system engineers, and addressing the issues raised in the Fire Department Baseline Needs Assessment. Areas in need of continued improvement include the fire department training program and BWXT self-assessment program for fire protection.

There are also areas for improvement in the PXSO oversight of the fire protection program at the Pantex Plant. There has been no subject matter expert in this area for PXSO since January, and PXSO does not have the authority to fill the position. In addition, a PXSO assessment completed in October 2002 of the BWXT fire protection program was not transmitted to BWXT for action until Thursday, following staff discussions. The cover letter transmitting the assessment notes that PXSO had previously given the report to BWXT on an informal basis. The letter also notes PXSO held discussions with BWXT related to proposed corrective actions to address the concerns in the report. The letter asks for a formal response regarding the status of   corrective actions being taken to address the concerns in the report. [II.A, P1]

Inactive Actinide Materials: Plutonium-238 (Pu-238) radioisotopic thermoelectric generators (RTGs) are currently stored at the Pantex Plant. Hundreds of units are on site in a vault without an internal fire suppression system (although fire suppression is present in the warehouse within which the vault is located). The number of these RTGs is expected to double in the near future. No long-term disposition path has been identified for the RTGs, and NNSA is making little progress toward consolidating the RTGs at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Sandia personnel presented data this week showing the internal pressures in the RTGs are increasing with time due to helium generated by alpha decay. The data also contained the results and analysis of burst tests. In a 1010 ºC, two-hour fire the pressures in the RTGs might increase to the point where the units rupture and release Pu-238. For the oldest units, this fire already gives a 1% probability of RTG rupture. Lower temperature, shorter duration fires, which are much more feasible at the Pantex Plant than the analyzed fire, currently do not give a high probability of RTG failure; however, problems at more likely fire temperatures and durations may be possible in the next few years as internal pressures continue to increase.

Sandia also briefed an informal plan to exchange hundreds of newer (i.e., units which have a lower internal pressure) RTGs at the Pantex Plant with those deployed in weapons and then return the older, less safe, units to Pantex. The Board’s staff suggested addressing the final disposition aspect of this initiative and shipping the older RTGs to wherever they will need to be for final processing and disposition (i.e., rather than an interim location such as Pantex). The final disposition plan should include disposition of the units remaining at the Pantex Plant. [II.A, W1]

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 17, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending October 17, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: The Pantex Plant was closed on Monday for the Columbus Day Holiday. W. White was on site for the remainder of the week. D. Nichols was on site Tuesday through Thursday to discuss the seamless safety project for the W87, to observe W87 and W62 operations, and to discuss the use and development of weapon response information.

Pit Temperature Limits: On Thursday, PXSO approved a justification for continued operations (JCO) related to pit temperature limits. The JCO became necessary when the design agencies identified pit temperature limits for certain pits types to prevent breaches of the pit cladding that might lead to the release of nuclear material. In particular, the temperature limits for three pit types (W48, B54, and W55) were identified by the design agencies as being below credible maximum temperatures for pit staging areas at the Pantex Plant. These limits were identified by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in February 2000 and by Los Alamos National Laboratory in July 2002.

The JCO identifies the following compensatory measures for continued operations:

• The pit thermal monitoring system will alert personnel to elevated temperatures. Established monitoring frequencies and an administrative program for relocating pits when necessary will provide personnel with time to cool the facility or relocate the pits.

• The Radiation Safety Program will ensure technicians are trained to recognize potential nuclear material releases, evacuate the area, and call the Radiation Safety Department.

• The Nuclear Material Storage, Handling, and Shipping Program and the Approved Container Program will ensure pits are staged and shipped in approved containers to minimize any nuclear material release that might occur.

A revision to the approved, but not implemented, Nuclear Material Safety Analysis Report [SAR] Module, will be necessary. The SAR identifies a similar accident scenario, but, based on the container configuration, calculates the on-site and off-site consequences as less than the evaluation guidelines. The modified JCO scenario calculates potential worker exposures in excess of 100 rem. BWXT committed to completing the SAR revision by February 27, 2004. The JCO will expire May 30, 2004, by which time the revised SAR module should be implemented. [II.A, W3]

Implementation of Technical Safety Requirements: On Friday, BWXT began its readiness assessment for implementation of the first group of technical safety requirements identified in the Technical Safety Requirements Integrated Implementation Plan, a deliverable to the Board under Recommendation 98-2. Following a thorough readiness verification that was briefed to a team of senior managers, BWXT elected to proceed with its contractor readiness assessment for 13 controls, 9 of which were from the original 19 controls in the first group and 4 of which were moved up from the second group of controls. Based on the readiness verification, BWXT chose not to proceed with a contractor readiness assessment of most of the engineered controls in the first group until improvements can be made in the configuration management and drawings for these systems. Discrepancies also must be resolved between the authorization basis functional descriptions of certain systems and the system drawings. The controls deemed ready for implementation include administrative controls related to transportation and fire protection as well as combustible storage carts and containers. [II.A, W4]

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 10, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending October 10, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was on leave Wednesday and on site for the remainder of the week.

Pit Repackaging: For FY2003, BWXT repackaged 2414 pits into sealed insert containers. This is the second straight fiscal year for which BWXT has successfully maintained the repackaging rate for pits to which the Secretary of Energy committed in the Implementation Plan for Recommendation 99-1. As of the end of this week, BWXT has repackaged approximately 8000 pits into the improved storage environment recommended by the Board.

As part of the repackaging program, two of the technicians involved were found to have exceeded their administrative control levels for radiation exposure for the calendar year. Their exposures were slightly above the 750 mrem administrative level set by BWXT. The manufacturing supervisor had noted the technicians were approaching the administrative control level for annual radiation exposure and identified this as a concern to radiation safety personnel. Radiation safety personnel recommended restricting the work of these technicians to activities with lower potential radiation dose rates to minimize exposure. However, the recommended work restrictions (particularly those related to the handling of bare pits) do not appear to have been fully implemented.

Over the past fiscal year, BWXT has implemented several changes to process systems to minimize radiation exposure. These include the implementation of an integrated imaging station as well as an automated purge and backfill station. For this calendar year, BWXT is considering whether to raise the administrative control level for technicians involved in pit repackaging to 950 mrem. [II.A, W4, M8]

Vital Safety System Assessments: Last week, BWXT finalized its report summarizing baseline assessments of the reliability and operational status of vital safety systems at the Pantex Plant. The assessments were conducted over a four month period beginning in May 2003 and covered all eleven vital safety systems at the Pantex Plant. The assessments were conducted as part of the response to the Board’s Recommendation 2000-2, Configuration Management, Vital Safety Systems.

The assessment identifies significant problems with three of the eleven systems. The uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems and the RAD-safe system (used to provide safety interlocks for LINAC facilities) were identified as having a ‘yellow’ status. The concern with the RAD-safe system related to the obsolescence of certain key components (programmable logic controllers). The concerns with the UPS systems included the failure to close design change packages in a timely manner, the need to evaluate potential embedded software failures that might impact the operation of the UPS systems, and the failure to plan, schedule and close UPSrelated work orders in a timely manner. The Radiation Alarm Monitoring System (RAMS) was the only system identified as having a ‘red’ status. The most serious problem noted with this system related to inaccurate calibration procedures, particularly for the tritium monitors, that impact the ability of the monitors to meet their design specifications (although they should be able to detect significant releases of radioactive material).

There were several additional concerns identified for most of the other systems on the vital safety system list. BWXT has not yet developed specific corrective actions to resolve the identified concerns. [II.A, E1, E2, E4]

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 3, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending October 3, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was on site Monday through Wednesday and was recruiting at Rice University for the remainder of the week.

Cell Leak Path: On Tuesday, PXSO approved the resumption of operations in two of the nuclear explosive cells at the Pantex Plant. All of the cells had been shut down as a result of concerns regarding additional leak path areas not addressed in the current safety basis for the facilities. The cells were first shut down on September 17, 2003, when a concern was noted with the manner in which parts of the door frame were welded. An unreviewed safety question evaluation (USQE) was completed that characterized the additional offsite doses based on the increased leak path area and a restricted facility inventory. As a result of limiting the inventory considered in the calculations to the maximum allowed in current safety basis documents, the calculated off-site releases for postulated accident scenarios were only slightly higher than previously identified, despite the increased leak path area. Based on these calculations, PXSO approved the resumption of operations.

However, prior to resuming operations, BWXT identified additional leak path areas in the cells. Many of these leak paths had been previously identified but were assumed to seal in the event of an explosion. BWXT could not identify, however, a documented technical basis for this assumption. The cells remained shut down until the USQE was revised to account for the additional increases in leak path areas. The potential increase in off-site dose consequences was more significant with the new leak path areas, but it remained below the evaluation guideline of 25 rem to the maximally exposed, off-site individual. The first program to resume operations did so following the PXSO approval of the USQE on Tuesday.

W62 Operations: BWXT resumed operations on the W62 program Wednesday. The disassembly process in the bay had encountered difficulty in extracting the physics package from the first unit to undergo operations with the new seamless-safety tooling. Bore-down tooling was modified to allow correct seating over a slightly elevated physics package, and the maximum torque during the extraction process was increased to allow more force to be applied to the physics package. The physics package was extracted on Wednesday following an additional boring operation.

Once the physics package was extracted, it became clear that one or more of the cutting tools had damaged part of the physics package assembly. This resulted in an evacuation of the facility until radiation safety personnel determined that no spread of contamination occurred in the facility. BWXT is now evaluating potential tooling modifications to minimize the possibility of similar damage during future disassembly operations. [II.A]

High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) Filters: On Wednesday, PXSO submitted to NNSA Headquarters the BWXT response to the Board’s most recent reporting requirement on HEPA filters at the Pantex Plant. This latest response identifies filters in three facilities that provide a habitability function and filters in two facilities that minimize the intake or exhaust of  plutonium particles in postulated accident scenarios. The response also notes that the functional descriptions of certain HEPA filters in Chapter 2 of the Sitewide Safety Analysis Report will have to be changed to identify the actual functions provided by these filters at the Pantex Plant. For the filters identified as providing a habitability function, BWXT will provide a plan and cost estimate for upgrading and maintaining the filters as nuclear-grade (99.97% efficient) filters. [II.A]

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 26, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending September 26, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was at DNFSB headquarters all week. This report is filed for continuity purposes only.

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 19, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending September 19, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was on site all week.

W56 Seamless Safety Tooling: Following discussions with PXSO on the W56 tooling concern discussed in last week’s report, BWXT decided to suspend all cell operations until personnel could validate the correct assembly and the functionality of tools in use in the cells. The completion of this validation effort has been complicated by the issue with the cell leak path area discussed below. BWXT should complete this effort by early next week. [II.A]

Cell Leak Path Area: On Wednesday, BWXT identified that the leak path areas for cell doors were higher than identified in various safety basis documents. The leak paths from the cells are particularly important as the cells are credited with accident mitigation for scenarios involving a violent reaction of high explosives. For explosions which are not sufficiently large to lift the ceilings of the cell round rooms, a minimal leak path out of the cells is credited with reducing offsite accident consequences. Existing safety basis calculations, however, do not take  into account the leak path area from a stitch weld around the door frames.

The increased leak path area was originally recognized in 1997, prior to implementation of the Technical Safety Requirements for Pantex Facilities. At this time, a work order was issued to modify a stitch weld in the cell door frame to a single weld. The stitch welding in the door frames for most of the cells at the Pantex Plant creates an additional 6.45 - 8.65 square inches of leak path area for the cells. The work order was originally issued with a high priority. However, personnel responsible for carrying out the work order reduced its priority. This led to the work order being placed on backlog and never being accomplished. Last month, BWXT personnel cancelled the work order. Earlier this week, the BWXT facilities personnel noted the work order had been cancelled and recalled the reason the work order had been submitted originally. BWXT had already suspended operations in the cells for reasons related to the W56 tooling concern. Operations in nuclear explosive cells will remain suspended until both issues are resolved.

The current path forward is to perform the off-site dose calculations with the increased leak path area, but with a reduced source term that credits current limits on the number of units allowed in each cell. These revised calculations are expected to show small (~1 rem) increases in the off-site consequences of certain accident scenarios. BWXT will submit a positive unreviewed safety question evaluation to PXSO that identifies the increased off-site consequences. BWXT will also provide a plan for completing the work to reduce the cell leak path areas. Provided the calculations do not show off-site consequences increasing above 25 rem, PXSO intends to allow BWXT to resume cell operations prior to completing the work to reduce cell leak path areas. [II.A]

B83 Seamless Safety Program: BWXT presented a schedule this week to the Standing Management Team for completion of the B83 seamless safety program. The implementation of this new tooling is a deliverable to the Board under Recommendation 98-2, Safety Management at the Pantex Plant. The commitment from the Secretary of Energy is to authorize start up of B83 seamless safety operations by May 30, 2004. The current schedule identifies July 30, 2004, as the date for authorization of the improved B83 seamless safety process, a slip of only two months from the original commitment. [II.A]

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 12, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending September 12, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was on site Monday through Thursday and was recruiting in Houston on Friday. D. Burnfield and D. Volgenau were on site Tuesday through Thursday to review work planning.

W56 Seamless Safety Tooling: On Wednesday, BWXT discovered that a seamless safety tool for the W56 program had been sent to the production line after being reassembled incorrectly following an on-site modification. The tool is used to rotate a high explosive component towards a padded cart. The explosive component is then lifted by hand and placed on the cart prior to packaging. In this case, production technicians discovered the tool would not rotate in the appropriate direction. The technicians returned the high explosive component to a safe and stable configuration and contacted the production section manager.

The tool was apparently rebuilt by BWXT personnel in a reverse manner before being sent to the production line. Instead of rotating towards the padded high explosive cart, the tool rotated towards the other side of the workstand. The tool performs several safety functions as identified in the W56 safety basis. Although the rotational direction of the tool is not explicitly identified as a safety function, an inadvertent rotation of the tool in the wrong direction would tilt the explosive component away from the padded cart and increase the likelihood of an explosive drop to the base of the workstand.

The tooling error resulted when BWXT personnel installed part of the tool in the reverse direction following a modification. BWXT is currently evaluating how the tool managed to pass receipt and inspection procedures and what corrective actions might be necessary for the receipt and inspection program and the maintenance and modification programs for tooling.

Also of concern is the fact that the tool was used once prior to the discovery that it would not function normally. It is not clear how production technicians using the tool on an earlier shift failed to notice that the tool did not rotate as required prior to removing the high explosive component. [II.A]

Work Planning: The Board’s staff reviewed the aspects of integrated safety management at the activity level related to work planning and worker protection. The Pantex Plant did not present a documented, robust program to protect its work force. In particular, the areas of hazard analysis and feedback and improvement were weak. The efforts by planners and the engineering staff in each division to write and maintain work procedures for both maintenance and programmatic work were not consistent across the site. In addition, the prepared work procedures reviewed by the staff contained technical errors or omissions.

Several efforts are in progress to improve work planning and to improve the BWXT assessment program for both maintenance and programmatic work. However, these efforts are too recent to be evaluated adequately. [II.A]

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 5, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending September 5, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: The Pantex Plant was closed on Monday for the Labor Day Holiday. W. White was on site for the remainder of the week.

W62 Seamless Safety Tooling: BWXT resumed operations on Thursday with modified tooling for the W62 seamless safety process. The tooling modifications were necessary when the bore down portion of the new seamless safety process left technicians unable to separate the physics package from the reentry shell. The modification allowed the new process to mimic more closely the old bore down process.

As of Friday afternoon, however, use of the new tooling was not yet successful. In attempting to use the tooling, technicians encountered anomalies with both the tooling and the unit being worked. A loose tool required tightening, a latch on the tool had to be held closed on occasion by technicians, and an apparent stress fracture was discovered in a component of the tool following its use. During the use of the new tool, the physics package unexpectedly settled a small distance into the reentry shell. Following this unexpected movement of the physics package, production technicians attempted to separate the physics package from the reentry shell but were not successful.

The process engineer, tooling engineer, production section manager, and design agency representative were present to observe most of the initial effort to use the modified tooling. BWXT personnel will revise the procedure to allow part of the bore down process to be repeated and the extraction process to be attempted again. [II.A]

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: The PXSO manager this week requested that his senior staff and BWXT evaluate potential lessons learned from the recent report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. BWXT will schedule a working session involving BWXT and PXSO senior managers next month to discuss the report and the potential implications of the findings in the report for Pantex Plant operations. Among the items to be discussed include the waiver of required safety factors, the normalization of deviance, the structure and performance of the nuclear explosive safety program, the use of analytical tools outside their original design parameters, the contributions of internal and external drivers towards schedule pressure associated with seamless safety work, etc. [I.C]

Software Quality Assurance: DNFSB staff held a telephone conference this week with BWXT and the PXSO to discuss progress made in addressing the Board’s letter of March 25, 2003, on software quality assurance at the Pantex Plant. A number of significant actions have been completed since March, including the revision of the Plant standard for software quality assurance, completion of a benchmark against industry standards, and completion of an evaluation of Pantex Plant software quality assurance practices by outside experts.

BWXT also discussed the treatment of safety-related software in site safety basis documents. Control descriptions for safety-related systems or administrative controls have been revised to identify clearly where those systems or administrative controls rely on software for execution or implementation. The revised Pantex Plant standard for software quality assurance identifies the specific requirements for software identified in this manner. [II.A]

2002

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 20, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 20, 2002

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was onsite all week. R. Rauch and R. West were on site this week to observe the NNSA readiness assessment for implementation of controls in the Fire Protection Basis for Interim Operation.

Fire Protection Basis for Interim Operation (FBIO): The NNSA’s Pantex Site Office (PXSO) continued its Readiness Assessment (RA) this week for implementation of controls from the FBIO for individual weapon programs and special purpose facilities. BWXT has implemented fire protection controls for 9 weapon systems and multiple facilities. Contractor RAs were performed after the implementation of controls for an individual weapon program or group of facilities. The NNSA RA, a deliverable to the Board under Recommendation 98-2, started after BWXT closed all pre-start findings and made the controls applicable as technical safety requirements.

To assess the implementation of multiple controls for numerous facilities and programs, NNSA sampled the status of implementation by observing three weapon programs. Constraints on the availability of the review team members and the limited two-week assessment schedule limited observations involving the handling of combustible materials. Despite this, significant deficiencies were noted with two of the three sampled programs. Findings addressed adherence to procedures, location and minimization of combustible materials, and adequacy of procedures. This week, the RA team completed field work and drafted findings from the two week review. PXSO has not determined a path forward for finalizing the assessment. The assessment may be extended early next year to evaluate the complexity of the control scheme and determine why some weapon programs appeared more successful at implementation than others. [II.A]

W62 Readiness Assessment: BWXT continues its effort to finalize implementation of the new seamless safety process for W62 disassembly and inspection operations. A verification of readiness by BWXT manufacturing personnel is underway and is expected to conclude in January 2003. A readiness assessment by BWXT is scheduled to begin January 13, 2003, with an NNSA readiness assessment following in early February 2003.

On Tuesday, the Board’s staff held a telephone conference with PXSO and BWXT personnel to discuss the readiness assessment process for W62 operations. BWXT and PXSO proposed conducting contractor and NNSA readiness assessments of the W62 program in training facilities instead of the actual nuclear facilities in which the operations would take place. The primary motivation is that the cell intended for use in the W62 program will not be available until the end of March 2003.

Conducting the W62 readiness assessment in training facilities in January and February will allow BWXT to begin its pilot lot of W62 operations in an actual nuclear facility as early as April, after following the standard plant checklist used to move operations from one set of facilities to another. If this assessment approach is successful, BWXT and PXSO will continue to use training facilities for future program assessments.

The staff expressed concern with potential problems from using a lower fidelity demonstration to assess interactions between operations and the facility, particularly with respect to the implementation of fire protection and lightning protection controls. However, the use of a checklist to move operations from one nuclear facility to another is a standard practice at the Pantex Plant, and the authorization bases for operations and facilities are separate entities. Both BWXT and PXSO indicated they will carefully monitor the adequacy of the W62 readiness assessment process. [II.A]

2001

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 21, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: H. Waugh and W. White, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 21, 2001

DNFSB Activity Summary: H. Waugh and W. White were on site all week.

Maintenance Review: A post-start finding from the recent NNSA W78 readiness assessment noted a “lack of compliance with maintenance and calibration procedures for bays and cells was observed during maintenance activities involving site-wide TSR surveillance requirements.” To gain further insight into the potential scope of this problem, the OASO Director tasked the NNSA facility representatives to observe surveillance activities that implement the surveillance requirements in the Pantex Technical Safety Requirements.

The results of these maintenance observations were briefed to the OASO Director this week. The observations of the facility representatives validated the finding of the NNSA W78 readiness assessment team. Of the thirteen types of maintenance activities observed, the facility representatives found problems with ten of the activities indicating a history of non-compliance with procedures. OASO intends to forward these observations to BWXT with a request for a corrective action plan addressing the observed deficiencies.

In an indication of heightened sensitivity to procedural compliance issues, personnel performing the required weekly surveillance on the electric and diesel pumps for the high pressure fire loop did not complete the maintenance as originally scheduled on December 16. Fire Department personnel performing the maintenance noted the procedure required verifying the tachometer on the diesel engine as indicating between 1710 and 1800 rpm. Since the analog gauge indications are in 100's of rpm, personnel performing the procedure were unable to verify the speed within a range of 90 rpm. The procedure was rewritten to require verification the tachometer indicates a speed of 1700 to 1800 rpm. Fire Department personnel successfully performed the revised procedure on December 18. [II.A]

Authorization Basis Upgrade Program Plan: Earlier this month, BWXT submitted a revision to the existing Authorization Basis Upgrade Program Plan to OASO for approval. This was a revision of the August 2001 version of the plan that had incorporated the latest IWAP milestones. An even earlier revision of the plan (authored by the previous Pantex contractor) was submitted by DOE to the Board in August 2000 as a deliverable under Recommendation 98-2. Some of the changes include the following (dates are for submission of modules to NNSA):

• A delay in the development of the Paint Bay SAR module and the LINAC SAR module as a result of efforts required to finalize bases for interim operation of the computed tomography facility and the paint bay. The revised date for the Paint Bay SAR module is now the first quarter of FY03. Completion of the Paint Bay module was scheduled for the third quarter of FY02 in the plan originally submitted to the Board.

• A delay in the schedule for Phase I of the Transportation SAR module as a result of “delays in receiving the weapon responses from the Design Agencies (scheduled 2/6/01, but received 11/07/01).” The final date for Phase I (full-up configurations only) of the Transportation SAR module is now January 2002. The final date for Phases II and III (transportation of partial configurations and nuclear material) is now February 2003. The date, as originally submitted to the Board, for completion of the entire Transportation module was September 2001.

• The date for completion of the Bays and Cells SAR module is now February 2002. In the plan originally submitted to the Board, the completion date for the Bays module was December 2000 and the completion date for the Cells module was March 2001. [II.A]

2000

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 22, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: H. Waugh and W. White, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 22, 2000

DNFSB Activity Summary: H. Waugh was on site all week. W. White was on site all week, with the exception of annual leave taken on Wednesday.

Robotic Weigh and Leak Check System: DOE completed its second readiness assessment for the new robotic weigh and leak check system (WALS) in Building 12-116. The original assessment was conducted in November 1999. This automated, remotely operated system is designed to replace current weigh and leak check operations in 12-44, Cell 8. DOE has identified several preliminary prestart findings and post-start findings. The final report has not yet been issued, however, and may not be issued until early January 2001. At least one preliminary pre-start finding had site-wide implications.

One pre-start finding involved the use of WALS software as a procedure for operations. Technicians following the standard paper procedures are directed at certain points to follow on-screen instructions and to conduct operations as directed by the software. Some of the software-directed instructions (such as radiological swipes) have potential safety implications. It was not clear to the readiness assessment team, however, how changes to the WALS software would be covered under the unreviewed safety question process at Pantex. Given the use of software at Pantex in several other safety-related applications (lightning detection and warning system and certain nuclear explosive testers), it may be necessary to develop a more formal plant policy addressing change control for software in safety-related applications.

Another pre-start finding identified a conflict which exists between facility procedures on evacuation requirements during fire alarms. This conflict was noted in the original DOE readiness assessment, but was never resolved. Post-start findings included minor procedural inaccuracies and the presence of process hazards in procedures that are not reflected on the facility process hazards board (the hazard in question, alcohol, is not actually used in WALS operations). [II.A]

Pit Repackaging: The new Pantex contractor, BWXT, brought in a team of efficiency experts from the Kansas City Plant to review pit repackaging operations. The team is evaluating the process with an eye towards increasing productivity with existing resources. The review is expected to continue after the holiday break. Coincidentally, on Wednesday, the pit repackaging program met its January 31, 2001, goal of 300 pits repackaged for the fiscal year. The repackaging rate continues to exceed DOE’s modest expectations, but remains well below the 200 pit per month commitment DOE made to the Board in Recommendation 99-1. [II.A]

Fire Protection System Maintenance: Pantex continues to experience difficulties with the maintenance of the safety-class fire protection systems. Last week, the semi-annual surveillance revealed that the specific gravity of the batteries required as back-up to the Detronics panel for the UV-activated deluge system in Building 12-99 was too low. The system was declared inoperable per the technical safety requirements (TSRs). Water was added to the batteries and the system was declared operable approximately one week later. This was within the fourteen day time frame established in the TSRs. It was noted, however, that a probable contributor to the low water levels in the batteries was the absence of the monthly preventive maintenance checks for the batteries. The monthly checks had been suspended during the facility upgrade in February 1999 and were never reinitiated. The monthly preventive maintenance, required under NFPA 72 (a standard contained in the Pantex SRIDs), has resumed.[II.A]

1999

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 24, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 24, 1999

DNFSB Activity Summary: H. Waugh was on site Monday, and on leave the rest of the week. T. Dwyer was on site Monday-Wednesday, and on leave Thursday and Friday.

W62 D&I Program: Preparations for W62 D&I Program start-up continued this week. M&H commenced the redemonstration of the W62 mechanical [bay] disassembly process last Friday, worked through the weekend, and completed the operation before noon on Monday. Redemonstration of the W62 operations in the cell commenced Monday afternoon. By Tuesday afternoon, DOE-AL and AAO personnel determined that they were satisfied with the progress observed, and the redemonstration was terminated. Note that AAO had previously decided that the bore-down process and satellite facility operations need not be redemonstrated. Observers for AAO included Facility Representatives, Production Operations staff, and [briefly] the acting AAO Manager; the DOE-AL Readiness Assessment team leader joined the observer team Monday morning. AAO has begun to validate and approve closure of pre-start findings from both the NESS and the DOE-AL Readiness Assessment. AAO has also assigned personnel to review the adequacy of the closure packages from the contractor Readiness Assessment. As a final “compensatory measure,” AAO and M&H will provide continuous oversight of the 1 two WR st units [a pilot lot], using a team of M&H conduct of operations mentors, and AAO Facility Representatives, Authorization Basis staff, and Production Operations staff. In the mean time, the NESS Revalidation report has reportedly been signed by DP-20. However, delivery of the report and guidance on resolution of its findings have been delayed while DOE-AL and AAO hold internal discussions regarding the NESS finding that requires inclusion of the W62 Nuclear Explosive Safety Rules (NESRs) in the ABCD.[II.A]

Fire Protection Issues: M&H has received the new [acceptable] HE floor matting materials and begun placing them in operational facilities. In particular, the cell being prepared for W62 operations now uses the new material. The new mats are solid and black, easily distinguishable from the old red-brown, honeycomb mats.[II.A]

Contract Issues: DOE has established a website that will maintain up-to-date information on the recompetition of the Pantex, Kansas City, and Y-12 (Oak Ridge) contracts:[I.B]

http://www.dp.doe.gov/nwpp

Future Events Notice: Next week, the Pantex Plant is shut down for the holidays. Therefore, next week’s Pantex Plant Activity Report will be filed for continuity purposes only.

1998

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 25, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 25, 1998

DNFSB Activity Summary: H. Waugh and T. Dwyer were on site Monday through Wednesday. The office was closed Thursday and Friday (Christmas). There will be no Pantex Plant Activity Report filed next week (December 28, 1998 - January 1, 1999).

W87 Life Extension Program (LEP): Fallout from the shortcomings discovered during last week’s W87 LEP SIRR, and the incomplete status of the HAR and ABCD, were brought to a head in a meeting between the Project Team, AAO, and DOE-AL WPD personnel. All parties have acknowledged that the W87 SIRR started prematurely. However, schedule pressure to meet the February 26 FPU deadline is driving DOE to consider allowing the LEP assembly process to be started prior to completion of the HAR and ABCD and implementation of the control set derived therefrom. [Of note, it is not apparent that failure to meet the FPU deadline would jeopardize the actual delivery commitment to the military.] DOE would then direct the SIRR team to remove HAR/ABCD-related findings from their report; HAR/ABCD issues would be dealt with in a later readiness assessment focusing specifically upon phasing in the new control set for the existing W87 D&I and new W87 LEP processes.

W62 D&I Program Hazard Analysis: The W62 D&I Program Hazard Analysis Task Team, Project Team, and Safety Basis Review Team Lead met with DOE-AL, AAO, and M&H senior management Tuesday to try and air their differences and agree on a path forward to complete the W62 HAR and ABCD. It was agreed to let the W62 hazard analysis run its course without attempting to force-fit the new methods being advocated by DOE-AL. Instead, the next existing process hazard analysis will serve as the test of the new methods. It was decided that the W88 program will be up next, instead of the B61 program.

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF): Tuesday, the Secretary of Energy announced that the PDCF would be sited at SRS, not at Pantex.

1997

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 24, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director
FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 26, 1997

DNFSB Activity Summary: Harry Waugh was on site on Monday and Wednesday. Timothy Dwyer was on site Monday through Wednesday.

DOE-AL Personnel Changes: DOE-AL released the selection results for the three SES vacancies in their organization (Weapons Programs Division - WPD, Weapons Surety Division - WSD, Kirtland Area Office Manager - KAO), along with associated personnel moves to support the new Division Directors. WPD is now Richard Glass; WSD, a new division, is Mark Baca; KAO is now Michael Zamorski. The partial organization chart below highlights personnel in their new positions at DOE-AL.

Pit Storage -- AT-400A: M&H ultrasonic inspection of the integrity of the inner container girth welds have been completed on 8 containers. All 8 exhibited anomalies in the weld, apparently near the inner surface. M&H is conducting several parallel investigations of the UT process, standard, and sample welds to characterize the problem. Although permission was granted to begin an additional pilot lot of 20 units, M&H is weighing the risks of beginning this lot before the girth weld issues have been resolved.

Pit Storage -- GAO: Mr. C. Pacheco of the GAO contacted the Site Representatives Office pursuant to a GAO project under the auspices of Congressman Dan Schaeffer, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Committee on Commerce. The GAO is looking into DOE storage of Pu, including pits, and has a working deadline of March 1998 to publish its report.

Attachment

Upcoming Pantex Events:

December 23-29 -- W79 Cell SIRR [in progress]
January 5-6 -- W79 Type 6B (unit #2) Dissolution [target date]
January 8-9 -- W79 Project Team/HATT Meeting to finalize NEHA [@ LLNL]**
January 13 -- Quarterly NMO Program Meeting
January 14 -- W87 LEP Meeting**
January 14 -- W87 ASSET (Graded SS-21) Meeting**
January 14 -- Quarterly Production Meeting
January 23 -- W56 Project Team Meeting**
February 3 -- W79 NESS starts
February 24-March 6 -- B61-11 NESE
March 9-27-- NES Electrical Tester Master Study completion
March 16 -- W79 FDU
[unknown] -- W56 SIRR [delayed due to resource conflict w/ W79]**

NOTES: ** highlights events which are new listings or for which schedule has changed

1996

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 20, 1996

TO: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
FROM: Jim McConnell and Harry Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 20, 1996.

1. DNFSB Activity Summary: Jim McConnell and Harry Waugh were on site all week.

2. New Issues:

1. Independent Safety Walkthrough: This week a group of weapons response experts from LANL, LLNL, and SNL and facility safety experts from DOE (Don Knuth and Roy Sheppens) conducted an informal survey of nuclear explosives areas to identify any high-priority safety concerns. The Site Representatives accompanied the group and provided some insights based on their knowledge. As a result of the review, M&H suspended two additional operations: dynamic balancing and painting. The dynamic balancer was suspended because of the lack of reliable controls to prevent overspeed of the turntable and lack of controls on the socket-head cap screws that secure the weapon holding fixture to the turntable. Operations in the paint bay (Building 12-41) were suspended due to the lack of controls on unnecessary combustibles (there were about 150 gallons of paint in the bay) and the lack of a rigorous analysis of the effects of a fire in the paint bay. These operations join radiography and accelerated aging on the list of activities recently suspended.

Analyses indicate that, with a few safety control upgrades, the radiography operations at Pantex may resume shortly. A joint letter from LANL, LLNL, and SNL indicates that it should be safe to expose nuclear explosives to up to 1000 Rads during radiography without risking a main charge HE detonation caused by static charge build-up on the detonators. The labs' analyses indicate a safety margin of at least an order of magnitude for the dose required to cause a charge separation and subsequent electrostatic discharge initiation of main charge detonators (i.e., exploding bridge wires). The margin of safety may be smaller for other explosives in a WR unit that may be more sensitive to electrostatic discharge, but activation of those charges should not result in unacceptable off-site consequences without a second, unrelated, fault. M&H and DOE must now incorporate this information and whatever new controls are deemed appropriate into the Basis for Interim Operation or a new Justification for Continued Operations before radiography activities can resume.

2. Non-Buoyant Plume Releases from Bays: During this week's walk-down of nuclear explosive operations, the Site Representatives learned that the new radiography bays in Building 12-104A are designed not to vent the pressure from an HE explosion through the bay roof. Large bays such as the radiography bays in Buildings 12-104A and 12-84 are not even built with a frangible roof. In fact, the new radiography bays are so large that pressure from the design explosion is not expected to expel the blast doors from the bay with significant force. This design appears to infer that a release from these bays would result in a non-buoyant plume which generally results in higher off-site consequences than an energetic release. The ground-level release has not been analyzed in the Building 12-104A SAR or the Basis for Interim Operation. Additionally, even though the new paint bay and the environmental chambers bay are built with frangible roofs, an explosion in those bays may result in a non-buoyant release due to their size. The Site Representatives pointed this concern out to DOE for additional analysis.

3. Issue Follow-Up:

1. Nuclear Explosive Operator Qualifications: DOE has completed a detailed review of operator qualifications. Preliminary indications are that DOE will conclude that the M&H system for tracking proficiency is unnecessarily cumbersome and may have resulted in several uncertified or unqualified operators performing work on war reserve units. In a similar effort, M&H completed a thorough review of pre-operational checklists (the forms completed before each shift to guide the conduct of safety system operability checks). The review indicated that many pre-operational checklists were not completed properly and that the Production Technicians (PTs) did not consider the checks to be a fundamental part of the safety envelope. As a result, the Manufacturing Division Manager held an all-hands meeting with the PTs after which each PT was asked to sign a memo acknowledging that he or she had been briefed on the purpose of, and process for, completing pre-operational checklists. Both DOE and M&H are taking strong steps to improve the quality of these checks. This latest effort appears to be a strong signal that failure to complete the checks will not be tolerated and that confusion will not be an acceptable excuse.

2. W69 NESS Single Integrated Input Document: On December 17-20, personnel from DOE, M&H, LANL, and SNL/NM who have been working on the W69 dismantlement project met with the NESS Group to review the draft W69 NESS Single Integrated Input Document (SIID). The group discussed the document, which is now about 2000 pages long plus an addendum of about 1000 pages, in significant detail. Questions raised on issues such as hazard analyses and tooling design should result in an improved final document that will require less time for the NESS Group members to evaluate. As a result of the meeting, the group decided that the NESS should be postponed two weeks and that people should expect the review to last up to three weeks.

[3 not used.]

4. Additional Information: Recently, a PT, who reportedly intended to play a practical joke on another PT, barricaded the entrance to a bay in Building 12-64 with a crowbar. However, the next person to activate the hydraulic door opener was a manager rather than the PT. The "joke" backfired significantly: the hydraulic door wedged the crowbar in place such that it took several minutes to remove it and the PT was subsequently referred to M&H management for disciplinary action. While the PT did receive formal discipline, he was not removed from the Personnel Assurance Program and he has since resumed performing normal PT operations.

[4 not used.]

5. Future Activities:

1. January ? - M&H AT-400A Corporate ORR begins (tentative)
2. January ? - DOE AT-400A ORR (tentative, based on conclusion of M&H ORR)
3. January 7 - W87 NESS Revalidation begins
4. January 8 - Bi-Monthly Production Meeting
5. January 10 - W69 HAR due from LANL
6. January 14 - W84 D&I Safety Evaluation
7. February 4-21 - W69 Dismantlement NESS
8. February 11 - W80 NESS Revalidation begins

Copy to: Board Members

Ron Barton
Joyce Davis
Les Ettlinger
Davis Hurt
Wally Kornack
Steve Krahn
Farid Bamdad
Cindy Miller
Chuck Keilers
Matt Moury
Chip Martin

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 13, 1996

TO: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
FROM: Jim McConnell and Harry Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 13, 1996.

1. DNFSB Activity Summary: Jim McConnell and Harry Waugh were on travel Monday and Tuesday to Albuquerque and Washington, D.C., respectively.

2. New Issues:

1. Nuclear Explosive Operator Qualifications: Mason and Hanger (M&H) requires, as part of the Authorization Basis for nuclear explosive operations, that only qualified Production Technicians (PTs) be allowed to conduct operations on War Reserve units. In fact, M&H requires that all operations involve at least one certified operator. In addition, a fundamental concept of nuclear explosive safety called the two person concept requires the presence of at least two operators knowledgeable of the work to be performed and capable of detecting unauthorized actions. The qualifications of PTs are expected to be tracked closely as a significant safety issue. Recent evaluations of PT qualification records, performed as the result of an employee concern, have identified at least one validated case where a non-qualified PT performed work on War Reserve units. This event was reported as an unusual occurrence. Subsequent reviews have indicated a potential weakness in the process to ensure qualified and certified PTs remain proficient. If PTs do not retain proficiency, then they are also considered unqualified for War Reserve work.

2. W69 NESS Single Integrated Input Document: DOE, M&H, LANL, and SNL/NM have been working to complete the Nuclear Explosive Hazards Assessment (NEHA) portion of the W69 Hazards Analysis Report (HAR) and the other elements of the Single Integrated Input Document (SIID) to support the W69 Dismantlement NESS. The NEHA review has identified several deficiencies, many of which have been previously identified by the DNFSB staff. For example, the NEHA states that the annualized risk of plutonium dispersal caused by an HE detonation/deflagration in a bay is about 4x10-5 while the bay SAR states that such an accident is deterministically impossible. M&H management has indicated that M&H may delay submitting the SIID to the NESS Group due to these difficulties. However, a meeting next week to walk the NESS Group through the SIID has not been canceled.

3. Issue Follow-Up:

1. Safety Basis for Nuclear Explosive Operations: As a result of the recent evaluations of the safety basis for nuclear explosive operations, DOE, M&H, and all three Design Agencies met on Monday with the intent of developing a plan to address the immediate problems and to identify long term solutions to the systemic problems. Cindy Miller and Jim McConnell attended the meeting which actually focussed almost exclusively on short term issues. Cindy Miller provided additional information in her contact report. As a result of that meeting, a group of weapons experts from the Design Agencies and nuclear safety experts from outside the weapons complex will be performing a safety walk-down of Pantex facilities during the week of December 16-20. This review is intended to identify any additional short-term safety questions or problems such as those identified with the environmental chambers and the linear accelerators. It appears that M&H may have already identified another similar issue in Building 12-60. This week M&H identified that the design of the facility for class 1 (i.e., remote) HE operations may be inadequate for class 2 (i.e., moderate hazard contact operations) because the blast doors open in rather than out and do not meet the NFPA 101 requirements for personnel egress. While the Explosive Safety Manual and the General Design Criteria allow for an NFPA waiver in situations similar to this, the operations in Building 12-60, such as dynamic balancing, have been suspended until an optimal solution is identified.

Subsequent to the meeting last Monday, DOE-AL has formed a small task force to evaluate the larger issues of safety integration at Pantex and the proper mix of engineered and administrative safety controls. This group which will include representatives from DOE, M&H, and the Design Agencies has been chartered to evaluate the current level of integration of the SAR process, the HAR/NESS process, the SS-21 process, and the ESP. The team is expected to define a desired end-point and develop a transition plan which will be reflected in a revised Integrated Plan, . The Site Representatives and Cindy Miller will follow this teams actions.

2. Building 12-26 Pit Storage: Last week the Site Representatives reported that Pantex was investigating the possibility that some W55 pits stored in the 12-26 Pit Vault may have exceeded their 140 ·F specified limit. At the Pit Thermal meeting held this week, M&H reported that the maximum temperature had not been exceeded. The temperatures of concern reported earlier were recorded on a strip chart that had been incorrectly installed in the recorder. This incident did point out the need to install improved temperature recording equipment in the 12-26 vault. M&H has already initiated the corrective actions.

3. B61-2 Dismantlement: With last weeks completion of the W55 dismantlement, the only active dismantlement project is the B61-2/5. The B61-2 dismantlement activity appears to be back up to full capacity following the shut-down that resulted from an inadvertent CD activation. As of yesterday, December 12, eighteen units had been successfully dismantled using revised procedures which incorporate the use of a LANL-designed magnetic piston finding tool. The tool should allow the PTs to detect any future command disabled units without spreading contamination.

4. Future Activities:

1. December 17-20 - W69 SIID Meeting
2. January ? - M&H AT-400A Corporate ORR begins (tentative)
3. January ? - DOE AT-400A ORR (tentative, based on conclusion of M&H ORR)
4. January 7 - W87 NESS Revalidation begins
5. January 10 - W69 HAR due from LANL
6. January 21 - W69 NESS Begins
7. February 11 - W80 NESS Revalidation begins

Copy to: Board Members

Ron Barton
Joyce Davis
Les Ettlinger
Davis Hurt
Wally Kornack
Steve Krahn
Farid Bamdad
Cindy Miller
Chuck Keilers
Matt Moury
Chip Martin

[This is the earliest report available.]

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 6, 1996

TO: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
FROM: Jim McConnell and Harry Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 6, 1996.

1. DNFSB Activity Summary: Jim McConnell and Harry Waugh were on site all week. Staff members William White and Chip Martin were on-site to perform a review of nuclear explosive electrical testers.

2. New Issues:

1. Nuclear Explosive Safety Analyses: This week, Mason and Hanger suspended all radiography operations involving nuclear explosives. The shutdown of the linear accelerators follows the shutdown several weeks ago of the environmental chambers. The causes of both shutdowns are similar: safety analyses and identification of safety controls are inadequate; the few engineered safety features that are specified (particularly electrical systems) do not meet generally accepted design requirements for safety systems, structures and components; and procedural operations relied upon for safety are conducted by a single technician. Members of the Board's staff, including Farid Bamdad, Chuck Keilers, Cindy Miller, and the Site Representatives identified similar problems during reviews over the last two months. The deficiencies were validated this week by a DOE-HQ review team led by Vic Stello. As a result of all of these reviews, DOE, M&H, and all three Design Agencies will meet on Monday to develop a plan to address the immediate problems and to identify long term solutions to the systemic problems. This plan will include a reassessment of both the SAR process and the NESS process. The Site Representatives and Cindy Miller will follow this corrective action program, which will undoubtedly affect implementation of Recommendation 95-2 at Pantex.

2. Building 12-26 Pit Storage: Mason and Hanger recently received a joint LLNL/LANL letter expressing concern over storage temperatures in the Building 12-26 Pit Vault. The letter correctly pointed out that temperature recorders were only installed in the vault quite recently and that it appears that some W55 pits may have experienced temperatures several degrees above the 140 ·F specified limit. Pantex and LLNL Tri- Lab personnel are still collecting the facts on this matter and will present the data at the pit thermal meeting next week.

3. Issue Follow-Up:

1. Building 12-79 Justification for Continued Operations: On May 10, 1996, M&H identified that the amount of depleted uranium in Building 12-79 exceeded the limit in DOE-STD-1027-92 for a hazard category 2 nuclear facility. Since the facility is not declared or controlled as a nuclear facility, this discovery was a violation of the authorization basis. DOE subsequently approved a Justification for Continued Operations (JCO) that required certain corrective actions. One of those requirements was to correct the flaws in the fire walls to assure compliance with NFPA requirements by October 31, 1996. On October 29, 1996, M&H sent a letter to DOE asserting that the fire wall repairs were complete. On December 4, DOE-AAO and M&H fire protection engineers walked-down the facility and concluded that the repairs did not satisfy NFPA code. While the holes and cracks had been grouted on one side of the wall, the grout did not meet the seven inch thick requirement for a three hour fire wall. The Site Representatives attended the subsequent critique and identified at least two significant deficiencies. First, the work order to repair the wall did not identify the standards to which the repair should have been performed and did not require a post- repair inspection by a qualified fire protection engineer. Second, Although the JCO included Authorization Basis-level commitments from M&H to DOE, the commitments were not tracked in the M&H commitment tracking system. In fact, the only system that tracked the work was the Maintenance Division work planning system which tracked the job as a non-nuclear, balance-of-plant task.

2. W55 Dismantlement: Following a long and sometimes troubled dismantlement history, the last W55 was finally dismantled this week.

3. At-400A Pit Repackaging: It appears that the problems with the inner containment vessel girth welder have been rectified. However, the back-fill tube crimp and weld is still causing problems. Pantex and the equipment manufacturer have cooperatively designed a new weld head. Pantex has received a new set of drawings which are currently under review. Mason and Hanger is still hopeful that the corporate ORR can be conducted in January.

4. W79 Rocket Motors: All six of the rocket motors selected for evaluation have been shipped to the Picatinny Arsenal as of November 27. Picatinny is planning to begin its evaluation tests on December 11. Pantex personnel will observe the Army tests.

4. Future Activities:

1. December 11 - Pit Thermal Meeting

2. December 17-20 - W69 SIID Meeting

3. January ? - M&H AT-400A Corporate ORR begins (tentative)

4. January ? - DOE AT-400A ORR (tentative, based on conclusion of M&H ORR)

5. January 7 - W87 NESS Revalidation begins

6. January 10 - W69 HAR due from LANL

7. January 21 - W69 NESS Begins

8. February 11 - W80 NESS Revalidation begins

Copy to: Board Members

Ron Barton
Joyce Davis
Les Ettlinger
Davis Hurt
Wally Kornack
Steve Krahn
Farid Bamdad
Cindy Miller
Chuck Keilers
Matt Moury
Chip Martin