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9 May 2008
[Federal Register: May 9, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 91)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 26349-26351]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr09my08-20]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 50
[NRC-2008-0237]
Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants; Draft Statement of
Policy
AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Issuance of draft policy statement and notice of opportunity
for public comment.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering
adopting a statement of policy to improve the licensing environment for
advanced nuclear power reactors to minimize complexity and uncertainty
in the regulatory process. This statement would provide the
Commission's policy regarding the review of, and desired
characteristics associated with, advanced reactors. This policy
statement would be the second revision of the policy statement titled
``Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants; Statement of Policy.''
The purpose of this revision is to update the Commission's policy
statement on advanced reactors to integrate the Commission's
expectations for security and preparedness with the current
expectations for safety. This draft policy statement is being issued
for public comment.
DATES: Comments on this document should be submitted by July 8, 2008.
Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent
practical. To ensure efficient and complete comment resolution,
comments should include references to the section, page, and line
numbers of the document to which the comment applies, if possible.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods.
Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be made
available for public inspection. Because your comments will not be
edited to remove any identifying or contact information, the NRC
cautions you against including any information in your submission that
you do not want to be publicly disclosed.
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and
search for documents filed under Docket ID [NRC-2008-0237]. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 301-415-5905, e-mail
Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
E-mail comments to: Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you do not
receive a reply e-mail confirming that we have received your comments,
contact us directly at 301-415-1966.
Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. (Telephone
301-415-1966.)
Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at
301-415-1101.
You can access publicly available documents related to this
document using the following methods:
NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have
copied for a fee publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Public
File Area O F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):
[[Page 26350]]
Publicy available documents created or received at the NRC are
available electronically at the NRC's electronic Reading Room at http:/
/www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR
reference staff at 1-899-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to
pdr.resources@nrc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wesley H. Held, Office of New
Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, Telephone: 301-415-1583, e-mail: Wesley.Held@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On July 8, 1986 (51 FR 24643), the Commission published a policy
statement on regulation of advanced reactors in the Federal Register.
The Commission's primary objectives in issuing the advanced reactor
policy statement were as follows:
To maintain the earliest possible interaction of
applicants, vendors, and government agencies with the NRC.
To provide all interested parties, including the public,
with the Commission's views concerning the desired characteristics of
advanced reactor designs.
To express the Commission's intent to issue timely comment
on the implications of such designs for safety and the regulatory
process.
On July 12, 1994 (59 FR 35461), the Commission revised the 1986
advanced reactor policy statement by addressing the Commission's policy
on metrication (57 FR 46202; October 7, 1992; as revised June 19, 1996
(61 FR 31169)).
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC has assessed
potential threats and their possible impacts on the Nation's fleet of
operating nuclear power reactors and has required upgrades of physical
security measures and mitigative strategies through the issuance of a
series of security orders and license conditions. For new nuclear power
reactors, the Commission considers it prudent to provide expectations
and guidance on security matters to prospective applicants so that they
can use this information early in the design stage to identify
potential mitigative measures and/or design features that provide a
more robust and effective security posture. Therefore, the Commission
decided to revise the advanced reactor policy statement to integrate
these expectations for security and preparedness with the current
expectations for safety.
The NRC is seeking public comment in order to receive feedback from
the widest range of interested parties and to ensure that all
information relevant to developing this document is available to the
NRC staff. This document is issued for comment only. The NRC will
review public comments received on the document, incorporate suggested
changes as necessary, and issue the final revision.
Commission Policy
Consistent with its legislative mandate, the Commission's policy
with respect to regulating nuclear power reactors is to ensure adequate
protection of the environment and public health and safety and common
defense and security. Regarding advanced reactors, the Commission
expects, as a minimum, at least the same degree of protection of the
environment and public health and safety and the common defense and
security, that is required for current-generation light-water reactors.
Furthermore, the Commission expects that advanced reactors will provide
enhanced margins of safety and/or use simplified, inherent, passive, or
other innovative means to accomplish their safety and security
functions.
The Commission's expectation for advanced reactor designs that
consider the effects of a large, commercial airplane impact is
currently being addressed through rulemaking (Consideration of Aircraft
Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactor Designs--RIN AI19--ID Docket NRC-
2007-0009). The Commission believes that reactors designed with
potential aircraft impact considerations resulting from this rule would
be more robust than if they were designed in the absence of this rule.
Among the attributes that could assist in establishing the
acceptability or licensability of a proposed advanced reactor design,
and therefore should be considered in advanced designs, are:
Highly reliable and less complex shutdown and decay heat
removal systems. The use of inherent or passive means to accomplish
this objective is encouraged (negative temperature coefficient, natural
circulation, etc.).
Longer time constants and sufficient instrumentation to
allow for more diagnosis and management before reaching safety systems
challenge and/or exposure of vital equipment to adverse conditions.
Simplified safety systems that, where possible, reduce
required operator actions, equipment subjected to severe environmental
conditions, and components needed for maintaining safe shutdown
conditions. Such simplified systems should facilitate operator
comprehension, reliable system function, and more straightforward
engineering analysis.
Designs that minimize the potential for severe accidents
and their consequences by providing sufficient inherent safety,
reliability, redundancy, diversity, and independence in safety systems.
Designs that provide reliable equipment in the balance of
plant (BOP) (or safety-system independence from BOP) to reduce the
number of challenges to safety systems.
Designs that provide easily maintainable equipment and
components.
Designs that reduce potential radiation exposures to plant
personnel.
Designs that incorporate the defense-in-depth philosophy
by maintaining multiple barriers against radiation release, and by
reducing the potential for, and consequences of, severe accidents.
Design features that can be proven by citation of existing
technology, or that can be satisfactorily established by commitment to
a suitable technology development program.
Designs that include considerations for safety and
security requirements together in the design process such that security
issues (e.g., newly identified threats of terrorist attacks) can be
effectively resolved through facility design and engineered security
features, and formulation of mitigation measures, with reduced reliance
on human actions.
Designs with features to prevent a simultaneous loss of
containment integrity (including situations where the containment is
by-passed), and the ability to maintain core cooling as a result of an
aircraft impact, or identification of system designs that would provide
inherent delay in radiological releases (if prevention of release is
not possible).
Designs with features to prevent loss of spent fuel pool
integrity as a result of an aircraft impact.
If specific advanced reactor designs with some or all of the
previously mentioned attributes are brought to the NRC for comment and/
or evaluation, the Commission can develop preliminary design safety
evaluation and licensing criteria for their safety-related and
security-related aspects. Incorporating the above attributes may
promote more efficient and effective design reviews. However, the
listing of a particular attribute does not necessarily mean that
specific licensing criteria will attach to
[[Page 26351]]
that attribute. Designs with some or all of these attributes are also
likely to be more readily understood by the general public. Indeed, the
number and nature of the regulatory requirements may depend on the
extent to which an individual advanced reactor design incorporates
general attributes such as those listed previously.
In addition, the Commission expects that the safety features of
these advanced reactor designs will be complemented by the operational
program for Emergency Planning (EP). This EP operational program, in
turn, must be demonstrated by inspections, tests, analyses, and
acceptance criteria to ensure effective implementation of established
measures. The Commission also expects that advanced reactor designs
will comply with the Commission's safety goal policy statement (51 FR
28044; August 4, 1986 as corrected and republished at 51 FR 30028;
August 21, 1986), and the policy statement on conversion to the metric
measurement system (61 FR 31169; June 19, 1996).
To provide for more timely and effective regulation of advanced
reactors, the Commission encourages the earliest possible interaction
of applicants, vendors, other government agencies, and the NRC to
provide for early identification of regulatory requirements for
advanced reactors and to provide all interested parties, including the
public, with a timely, independent assessment of the safety and
security characteristics of advanced reactor designs. Such licensing
interaction and guidance early in the design process will contribute
towards minimizing complexity and adding stability and predictability
in the licensing and regulation of advanced reactors.
While the NRC does not develop new designs, the Commission intends
to develop the capability, when appropriate, for timely assessment and
response to innovative and advanced designs that might be presented for
NRC review. Prior experience has shown that new reactor designs--even
variations of established designs--may involve technical problems that
must be solved to ensure adequate protection of the public health and
safety. The earlier these design problems are identified, the earlier
satisfactory resolution can be achieved. Prospective applicants are
reminded that, while the NRC will undertake to review and comment on
new design concepts, the applicants are responsible for documentation
and research necessary to support a specific application. Research
activities would include testing of new safety or security features
that differ from existing designs for operating reactors, or that use
simplified, inherent, passive means to accomplish their safety or
security function. The testing shall ensure that these new features
will perform as predicted, provide collection of sufficient data to
validate computer codes, and show that the effects of system
interactions are acceptable.
During the initial phase of advanced reactor development, the
Commission particularly encourages design innovations that enhance
safety, reliability, and security (such as those described previously)
and that generally depend on technology that is either proven or can be
demonstrated by a straightforward technology development program. In
the absence of a significant history of operating experience on an
advanced concept reactor, plans for innovative use of proven technology
and/or new technology development programs should be presented to the
NRC for review as early as possible, so that the NRC can assess how the
proposed program might influence regulatory requirements.
Finally, the NRC also believes that it will be in the interest of
the public as well as the design vendors' and the prospective license
applicants to address security issues early in the design stage to
achieve a more robust and effective security posture for future nuclear
power reactors.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of May 2008.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. E8-10443 Filed 5-8-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P