

MFR 04017166

[Redacted]

Event: Barbara McNamara, NSA, SUSLOL 200-2003; Deputy Director 1997-2000; DDO 1994-1997.

Type of Event: Interview

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Special Access Issues: None

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Team Number: 2

Location: Commission's K Street Office

Participants – non-Commission: Barbara McNamara [Redacted] (NSA-OGC)

Participants – Commission: Kevin Scheid (for 1/2 hour), Col. Lorry Fenner, Gordon Lederman

(U) BACKGROUND

(U) She recalls being the last or near-last person who was interviewed by the Joint Inquiry staff, and it was a matter of convenience that she was available due to her having traveled back to the U.S. from Britain. The JI cut the interview short and asked her only three questions: about her view of the DCI's authorities, FISA, and the DCI's declaration of war. She thought that she was blamed by Senator Shelby's JI addendum for not advocating change because she did not advocate amending FISA to allow more surveillance of U.S. citizens.

[Redacted] She spent 40 years at NSA and was initially trained as a linguist/analyst in Chinese. Her first job as an NSA "senior" was Deputy Chief of MENA. She was chief of staff of the operations directorate and also NSA's representative to DoD. She also served as the NSA Executive Director. The majority of her experience has been in the operations directorate (DO).

[Redacted] She took over as DDO in 1994. It was enough after the Cold War ended that she looked at how the DO was postured given the change in the world. The USG's driving focus during the Cold War was the USSR, both for resources and operations. With the end of the Cold War, she looked at the DO to see if it was postured for new requirements, and she concluded it was not. She reorganized to create a group that put analysis and resources against geographic targets and a group for transnational targets. She structured the transnational group to mirror the CIA's centers - [Redacted] - in order to forge a relationship to allow NSA to serve the policy apparatus better on transnational issues.

[Redacted] Transnational issues are different analytically from traditional issues. NSA needed to apply more resources but did not have sufficient resources – there was only a finite group of people who could be moved. NSA looked at transnational issues through the optic of international

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

communications and also through the optic of specific nations' communications. With the stroke of a pen, you can create a new organization, but it takes time for the organization to develop its persona. Over her three years and since then NSA's structure has matured, even though the specific 'boxology' has changed (the A&P shops have matured into product lines of SID). She may not have addressed every issue, but she tried to do so. Regarding the centers, she always thought that they were DCI centers, but they are not DCI centers in that some are in the CIA/DI and some in the CIA/DO - and she could never discern why some centers were in one directorate and some in another. She is not sure in what directorates they are located now; but she knew CTC was always under DO. NSA always had people in the centers. Where the centers were located in CIA did not matter.

The IC did not develop effective processes for how to take advantage of the information that the IC did have and maximize it for a global intelligence capability.

She thought that the reason she was painted as an enemy of change by the Shelby Addendum is that she did not support changes in the law. Today, a U.S. person can be targeted based on sufficient cause with a warrant. NSA does foreign surveillance [Redacted]

[Redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [Redacted] But nothing in government ever works perfectly.

(U) Terrorism against the U.S. domestically is new; terrorism against the U.S. around the world is not new and dates back to the Beirut barracks bombing. The questions always asked of the IC in every case are: what did you know, when did you know it, and what did you do with the information you had to allow someone to take action.

CT was a "high priority." [Redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [Redacted]

Thus, NSA had a substantial effort on CT for some time. When she reorganized the DO, the people who did CT [Redacted]

[Redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [Redacted] NSA needed flexibility. The other parts of the CT mission were done in a transnationally-oriented group because [Redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [Redacted]

[Redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [Redacted] The transnational group was on par with the geographically-oriented group; they got resources, had tasking authority, etc. They were an equal competitor for time and attention.

She never saw any memorandum from the DCI that declared war on anything. The JI interview was the first time she ever heard about it. However, she knew that CT was a top priority - there would be a meeting at the White House because something had gone wrong, and afterward DCI Tenet would call DIRNSA (and others) to let the IC leadership know that the White House cared about CT. NSA was already doing what it could. [Redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there were lots of phone calls in the IC about what went wrong. It is not unusual for RFIs (intelligence requirements) to generate from the above-the-fold story in the *Washington Post*. As DDO, she would look at the *Post* (now it's CNN) first-thing in the morning. Such tasking did not always come from the DCI – they usually came from ADCI/C Charlie Allen, who would call and say that the DCI asked him to stir the pot. It did not matter whether Charlie Allen was actually speaking for the DCI or not, NSA would respond anyway. Charlie Allen brings an energy level – you never ask him to do something that you do not want to get done. Her contact with the ADCI/A&P was less frequent but that was not negative – a lot of people do not think of NSA as an A&P shop, so the fact is that it makes more sense for the ADCI/C to call her as the DDO of a collection agency. The ADCI/A never called her.

[REDACTED] The ADCI/Military Support would cross-over and talk to the NSA ADDO/Military Support. The NSA position was since abolished, which is a bad thing. She had had a group in NSA assess how to improve NSA's provision of military support, and the group recommended creation of the ADDO/MS position. She initially added the military support responsibility to the portfolio of a preexisting position but later she and her staff determined that a free-standing position was needed, which she instituted. The ADDO/MS provided a single point of contact at NSA for military support issues – the ADDO had authorities within the DO but also across data acquisition and infrastructure assurance. She noted that military support is different than support for military operations (SMO). The ADCI/MS is "more cosmetic than substantive" because it is CIA that is charged with not being responsive to the military – but the ADCI/MS is an IC-wide rather than CIA specific job, and the ADCI/MS does not have much ability to affect what goes on within CIA or across the community. In any event, all of these jobs are personality-dependent. General Gordon went from that position to be DDCI, while others in that position have subsequently retired.

[REDACTED] DCI Deutch would sometimes call her when he was unhappy with NSA products. DCI Tenet might call her before he went to a White House meeting on a subject to get information for use at the meeting. When General Gordon was DDCI, he would call the DIRNSA, the DepDIRNSA, or the DDO to get the system moving.

[REDACTED] Regarding the receipt of guidance, her comments about receiving informal guidance are detailed above. There were biweekly formal program managers meetings. She would attend as DepDIRNSA if the DIRNSA was unavailable. If the DepDIRNSA is unavailable, the NSA Executive Director might attend for more resource-oriented issues and the DDO might attend for more substantive issues, she sometimes attended when she was DDO. NIE discussions/coordination is done at the NSA/DDO level.

[REDACTED] She recalled the Hard Targets Study and participated in that.

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[REDACTED] She cannot remember if there were specific substantive foci within those country-focuses. She cannot remember if NSA put together a document regarding the hard targets discussions. She thought the Hard Targets study was a good model for how to focus IC efforts.

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

Regarding relations with DoD, in the Clinton Administration Art Money (ASD/C3I) had meetings in which, more often than not, the NSA representative in the Pentagon would attend due to convenience of location and also because that NSA representatives generally were very senior. These meetings basically were held to update DoD on what Congress cared about and NSA's plans for programs and resources. DoD never called NSA regarding collection. Guidance on substance generally came from the DCI. She cannot remember anything else regarding CT guidance.

Al Qa'ida and [Redacted] became the focus. DCI Tenet would call and ask what are "we" - the Community - doing about UBL. What never got done was to sit down and to figure out how to improve processes. Requirements got articulated in many different ways. People recognize that NSA is one of the few places that can apply assets [Redacted] and provide information back [Redacted]. IMINT can work [Redacted] but HUMINT cannot just due to the nature of HUMINT. NIMA and NSA can change course [Redacted] and provide consumers with [Redacted] or knowledge of collection failure. Consumers who needed SIGINT would call the 24-hour operations center at NSA NSOC [Redacted].

Regarding whether the IC had a strategy for CT, she does not remember when UBL and al Qa'ida became the centerpiece. She has a vague underlying recollection. CT is an analytic expertise for which you cannot just recruit any analyst. At one point, there was an effort to see what organizations were terrorist organizations and which ones should be at the top of the list and so should have resources devoted against them sooner. [Redacted] was set up because there needed to be resources directed against al Qa'ida and UBL. She remembers they sat as a community to decide this. But what was missing was a process for querying the rest of the IC for information; we need leads to cue other parts of the IC. IC involvement grew over time.

(U) She recommended against doing a reorganization unless you know what you want the system to accomplish. The way that the IC is organized today works just fine - each agency grows its experts; SIGINT, IMINT and two pots of analysts with the CIA for national and the DIA for defense. What needs to be examined is the processes that exist that foster or impede the use of each bucket of information for optimizing the global intelligence system. The great thing about NSA is that what it has improved most is its write-to-release posture. NSA is often accused of not sharing information - that is BS. She never hears that the HUMINT community is accused of not sharing information but it's true. People applaud US/UK/Australia sharing - the entire IC should take credit. But sharing is on a national-center-to-national-center basis. Sharing is not freely done to optimize follow-on systems because it is not understood.

For example, most HUMINT information is NOFORN. (NIMA is also trying to get rid of NOFORN). But NSA is the only global SIGINT organization, which makes sense because the U.S. has interests around the globe. NSA runs its global system through confederation - [Redacted]

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money too.

This saves

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[redacted]

[redacted] Rather, analysts must go back to the originator and ask for permission to share it and then take the time to extract the appropriate parts. Given how much analysts have to do since the IC collects so much information, analysts will avoid having to take the extra step of going back to the originator by just not dealing with the NF material in the first place and moving on to something else just as important. Anything that requires an extra step by the analysts may not get done. If processes and procedures such as the NF issue are fixed, the analysts will be able to do their job and we do not need to change structures. She understands the need to protect lives [redacted]

9/11 Classified Information

[redacted], these should be able to be shared. Col. Fenner confirmed that sharing information is also part of ensuring a good collector/analyst feedback loop.

Sometimes analysts want access to tapes, and NSA has granted it in specific circumstances. Secretaries of State have listened to tapes when they wanted to confirm NSA's reporting. It was easier to have SecStates have access when tapes were on literal tapes – it became much harder when recordings went digital. She said that she would have supported greater sharing of NSA information if NSA received greater access to HUMINT operational data – but when she was at NSA she never asked for such access and thus was never turned down. She has been told that [redacted] people assigned to TTIC are not given access [redacted] operational traffic because by virtue of being assigned outside [redacted] does not consider them to be [redacted] any longer and that this will cripple the TTIC. She does not recall being personally to provide about transcripts or raw data for CT. NSA has analysts posted across the community. But sharing of raw data is not done routinely by NSA unless they get a specific request for a specific item. She said that she does not remember people asking for raw data, but if they wanted it then NSA would have provided it, particularly if they were called by the DCI or DDCI or ADCI/C.

[redacted] When asked about an overall strategy, her view is that the DCI and the SecDef go to the White House and hear about the White House's top concerns. The DCI then takes the lead to permeate the IC with the White House's priorities. But there is no adult supervision to bring everything together to maximize efforts. The Hard Target study was an exception and should be a model. For the hard targets discussions [redacted] The issue is how the IC

9/11 Classified Information

[redacted] Without a USG strategy or overall DCI guidance, within each INT – each agency or "tribe" – the people would sit down to decide what was the best that they could do. Col. Fenner noted that Ms. McNamara's conflation of INTs with agencies overlooked the fact that the DDO at NSA does not have control over all of U.S. SIGINT. Ms. McNamara acknowledged that the DIRNSA does not have control over all SIGINT but that the DIRNSA does have a "pretty healthy share" of U.S. SIGINT. [redacted]

9/11 Classified Information

NSA can affect the military system. NSA does not need to worry about tactical issues.

It is hard to talk about CIA as a single agency. DO does collection, and there is much more symmetry between the DO and NSA. The DI just levies requirements. She doesn't even know

[redacted]

where to place the [redacted]. If there is no overall strategy, NSA is left to collect and report as much as it can, and coordination is left to be done by interaction between analysts and involving NSA embeds at CIA. There is a daily feed into NSA of what DoD cares about, what State cares about, etc. She concurred with Col. Fenner's observation that NSA has a current-intelligence focus, responding to RFI's about what is above-the-fold in the *Post* and what the Center's and DI are asking for.

As to why CT analysis is fundamentally different from traditional analysis, CT analysis is like a giant jigsaw puzzle without having the front cover of the box that shows the picture, and you only have bits of information on which to build. [redacted]

[redacted] Putting together a picture of a terrorist group is like doing so for a SOF team, as the SOF team does not correspond to a standard formula. Military targets are a piece of cake as compared to CT. [redacted]

Returning to the topic of why she structured NSA to mirror the DCI centers, she wanted to posture NSA to spark as much dialogue as possible. As to accessing the operational traffic, there were NSA embeds in CIA who could see the operational traffic. However, she doesn't know who made sure that the embeds had the authority to share the information and whether they knew it was their responsibility to ensure that they had to pass information to NSA that would allow NSA to maximize its capabilities. In response to a specific question, she responded that she has no memory of DDCI General Gordon having come to NSA to complain about CTC not having received transcripts/raw data. It was very effective for NSA people to be posted to the DO because they translated NSA-speak into DO language and vice versa. There are no CIA people at NSA. She would complain about how CIA people did not want to come up to the Fort and acted as if the highway only ran one way: south. The only CIA people who would consent to being posted to NSA were people who lived in Maryland. The NSA Deputy Director had a CIA executive assistant (the only one) for ten years (she had 3) - her successor as DepDIRNSA (Bill Black) did not continue it. [redacted] was the last one, and others were [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] The DDO also has a CIA deputy; [redacted] was one, and [redacted] was another. She does not remember whose initiative that was but she thought it was a good idea. It was good to have CIA people at NSA - they opened doors and were very beneficial, although they could not themselves run the SIGINT enterprise since they were not SIGINT people.

Regarding SMO, in her view it is not in competition with national requirements - if there is a military operation, it is a national requirement. There should be no debate about it. To the best of her knowledge, and in her 40 year experience NSA never subjugated national to military support. The CoComs drive military support - the SecDef is as much a player in the policy arena as the SecState and DCI. INR should not be ignored in this inquiry.

Regarding Congressional oversight, Members of Congress were supportive, but while some staffers were good, some staffers were overly intrusive and vindictive. Col. Fenner asked about Dianne Rourke, and Ms. McNamara put her in the latter category. Ms. Rourke would form alliances with individuals in the IC and have them serve as her spies. These spies were easy to spot - they were people who really believed in their own programs as being the best and needing support from Congress. NSA always carried the Administration's view of the budget when NSA built programmatic initiatives. The IC needed but didn't have someone to have the courage to

[redacted]

say that a lot of resources were going to be spent on a particular issue or system since it was a high priority – but it did not happen, so CIA and NSA were left without enough money and had to ask the HPSCI and SSCI for help in solving their problems, which they didn't want to do. The IC needed a consolidated program but the DCI's office didn't create one. Staffers could glom onto programs they liked and punish programs they didn't like. And there is always the "skim factor" with DoD. The IC budget process is not pretty, but we live in a democracy, and also other agencies' budget processes are not necessarily better. There was a terrorism supplemental – when it got built, NSA had done more homework and got more of a chunk of it than anyone else. NSA built their overall budget with a lot of field support – Ms. Rourke did not like it and said that the amount of money spent on field support should be limited (she got the language "you will not..." into the appropriations). The field support was for infrastructure was critically important for sites like [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [redacted] There is a fine line between what is professional disagreement and what is personal animosity. NSA has always had a very detailed program request to the Hill which invites micromanagement. It should be fixed, but having a detailed program has been set in stone for a long time. She could not identify getting more resource from the Hill for Arabic linguists as a sore point in her agency [ref the Rich Taylor charge that he was able to gain billets but he was cut the same number of billets to punish him for having gone to Congress separately].

[redacted] Regarding foreign liaison and her experience as SUSLOL, there are some NSA people at [redacted] but NSA basically only pays their salaries and that is it. The [redacted] basically supports the J2 of EUCOM. It was focused on CT from a [redacted] perspective only. She had much more contact with [redacted] even though it did not report to her/SUSLOL. Her interaction would be to accompany senior British officials and senior US officials who were visiting England to [redacted] If something happened at [redacted] that was of concern to the Ambassador – say that protestors stormed the fence – then she would get involved and would interact with the British MoD. There was a senior British official [redacted] but the MoD would look to her for NSA's position on issues. [redacted]

[redacted] She was not involved with Congress when she was SUSLOL so does not know what Congress thought [redacted]

She does not remember whether Congress killed specific programs.

With respect to how she apportioned NSA's DO resources against CT she confirmed that they took a broad approach using [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

[redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

[redacted] Regarding liaison with the FBI, NSA always had good relations with the FBI because NSA and the FBI were never in competition. [redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

[redacted] 9/11 Classified Information There were of course some bumps in the relationship, but in general it was fine. The FBI/NSA HQ to HQ relationship was not competition, rather a true partnership. [redacted]

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When the FBI started the NIPC, NSA put people there, and it worked well because the FBI and

[redacted]

[Redacted]

NSA.

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9/11 Classified Information

[] In response to Mr. Lederman's question regarding who is responsible for the three failures she identified – failure to develop interagency information-sharing processes, to educate embeds as to their authorities, roles, and responsibilities, and to have the courage to build a sensible, comprehensive IC budget – she replied that it was the DCI's responsibility. The DCI is the one who makes pronouncements (what behavior is acceptable) and holds people accountable. The DCI needs to tell the DO specifically how the DO should perform and behave. There is a conflict between having the CIA Director be the DCI, partially due to location. The DCI has sufficient authority. [Redacted] She noted that the DCI and DDCI have three executive assistants – one [Redacted] and NSA. The NSA executive assistant came about when Admiral Studeman went from being DIRNSA to being DDCI and suggested that NSA have an executive assistant for the DCI. CMS is not much of a reflection of the community – it is populated principally by CIA employees. NSA could not convince its own employees to go take jobs on CMS – she was not sure how to do that. DCI is not of CIA but is at CIA. There are meetings she has attended in which the DCI starts out the meeting as DCI and lapses into being CIA Director. The DCI needs a power base, but she does not know which part of CIA needs to be that power base, maybe the DI. The DCI needs to be able to carry the analysis in support of the policy making apparatus. The DI is what is important, but the DO is what is fun. She analogized the situation to CoComs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – it is much more fun for life-long Servicepeople to be warfighters than to be the Chairman. There is no romance to analysis – the romance is in the operations. The DO has the DCI captured – the DO has all of the romantic stories. The DCI is located at CIA but has the authority to function as the community leader. The DCI needs to have more than just a budget staff to run the community – he needs analytic horsepower to ride behind him. She understands the allure of the DO to the DCI – her most fun job at NSA was DDO .

[Redacted] Regarding her experiences with second parties, NSA has equivalents in Britain and Australia. With Australia, [Redacted] where all of DoD, DCI and State Dept. needs for help in their region [Redacted]

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There have never been problems.

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[Redacted] Terrorism became a hot topic for the Australians after 911 and Bali; the Brits lost people on 911 and have been fighting terrorism for longer than we have (IRA). [Redacted]

9/11 Classified Information

[Redacted] The Brits and Australians were sure that the next attack would be against British interests given 911 and Bali – and indeed, attacks in Turkey recently were against British targets. They are holding their breath

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

about attacks in the UK. The Brits and Australians are with us in fighting terrorism not because of their desire to help us but because of their own national security.

[Redacted] but irrelevant - the Brits own

9/11 Classified Information

The SUSLOL is the DCI's (not NSA's) representative to the UK and has interaction with

[Redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

[Redacted] Her office [Redacted] had [Redacted] NSA people, including two who liaised with the other U.S. representatives

[Redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

[Redacted] She did not talk with the ADCI/Foreign Liaison, Amb. Montgomery, before she became SUSLOL, although she did make the rounds at CIA and other DCI offices before going to London. When she was in London, she did not have much systematic and formal contact with NSA representatives in other countries in Europe except if she happened to know them and if they happened to be coming to London.

[Redacted] 9/11 Classified Information

[Redacted]