

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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How does this interview fit into the DoD story?

MGen Boykin provides an overview of the policy issues that must be considered in deciding whether or not to deploy and employ SOFs and JSOC forces in an operation. He also provides a good background of the history of SOFs, JSOC and Delta Force that helps to understand how these forces operate and their role in the CT efforts. In addition, he provides his own impressions on how these forces have and have not been used in the past as well as an assessment of the interaction of these forces with CIA paramilitary.

Background of Lt General Boykin

Boykin is currently the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. He has been in the military for almost 33 years. He began as an infantry man and in 1978 became a member of the newly created Delta Force where he spent 13 years. He also served time in the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and in CIA, in the Joint Staff in charge of the Joint Special Operations Division, and in the Army Staff working current operations to include the Special Operations Directorate. He also commanded the Army Special Forces Command and then commanded the Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School. In his current position, he is the Deputy to Steve Cambone, who is the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. His responsibilities include addressing the needs of the warfighters and services through resources and policy support as well as through other human resources.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

His current office was created in the last appropriations bill. The rationale was based on a belief by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) that the military must recognize the critical nature of intelligence. Eighty percent of the U.S. national intelligence is subordinate to

the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Secretary of Defense wanted to obtain a better focus and direction for DoD intelligence so DoD could better support the warfighter. Boykin deals directly with the services Chiefs of Intelligence on issues of resourcing, priorities, policy, current concerns, and with the Combatant Commands (CCs) on their requirements, present and future. This includes supporting the intelligence architecture and structure in Iraq. In the global war on terrorism (GWOT), his role is in the form of supporting the warfighters and combat support agencies associated with intelligence.

The DoD intelligence structure support the DCI's requirements. By resourcing and providing policy support to combat support agencies, the services and the warfighting commanders, his office is supporting the DCI. His office is in daily contact with the CIA (specifically the DO) and there is little his office does that does not have some kind of coordination with the CIA.

Decisions to use JSOC and SOF

Boykin was asked what goes into a decision to employ JSOC forces and what are the associated costs of using "boots on the ground?" Boykin responded that this is a broad question and the term "deployment" should be broken down into its elements. These elements consist of deployment of pre-crisis entities that fall into the preparation of the battle space and intelligence/collection area and then there is deployment of an entire force to be used for direct action.

Boykin noted that things have changed from the way things were done in the past. Through the 1980's and 90's, SOFs saw great opportunities to get boots on the ground, to prepare the battleground, to shape the environment, and to collect intelligence. It also had approval for less than 10 percent of the opportunities that existed for SOF activity. The opportunities were missed because of an unwillingness to take risks and a lack of vision and understanding of the benefits for preparing the battle space ahead of time. There was also a fear of consequences. He referred to the case of hostages in Beirut in the mid-80's. Many things that were not done could have been done. While there were forces there, there were many more pro-active and aggressive things not taken on. These additional steps would have better shaped the environment for a rescue.

Regarding a crisis and a target of opportunity, the decision whether to deploy a SOF package is always made in the Pentagon. The execution of those kinds of missions was always made by the President through the NSC, PCs and DCs and all the things that went into the policy formation and execution authority. That was a cumbersome process.

Boykin noted that the decision to deploy a force is easier than to employ a force. The difference is that in four hours, JSOC can be doing something. It can have a robust package with all the C2 elements to normally go to an intervening station base to wait for the decision to employ. An example is TWA 847 that took off to Beirut and went back and forth to Algiers. The force was deployed quickly and was at the Mediterranean station base and was set to go. However, the decision to go into Beirut to rescue the hostages was never made. Ultimately the hostages were released. There were also some

clandestine assets that would have helped the force get into the area. The decision to deploy was made but the decision to employ was not so the force sat and waited. There was a lot of that in the 80's and 90's.

Boykin was a founding member of Delta Force. There was a stated and unstated mission of the force and reason for its creation. It was created to be a CT organization and the thing that prompted the creation was when the Germans went into Mogadishu and rescued German hostages held there in 1977. President Carter turned around in 1977 and asked if the US had the German capability to rescue hostages and target terrorists (this is pre-Desert One). Carter said, "where is my capability" and the direction was to put one together. That is the stated mission requirement of Delta. If this were to be a military mission as it was then, it would have been handled by a Special Forces unit, however, without the capabilities needed. The existing SOFs had not at that time rehearsed aircraft seizures and so they would have rehearsed a plan and did the best they could. It was originally envisioned to be broader than CT, to be a direct action unit for whatever was needed which, in fact, is what has occurred. In Afghanistan and Iraq it expanded. It was also seen to be a direct action entity to work closely with the CIA and have a special relationship with the CIA that other parts of the military did not (these were the visions of Colonel Charlie Beckwith, a major founder of the Delta Force). It would be in a position to share secrets with CIA. On November 19, 1977, the official order was signed and Delta was created.

In 1983 in Grenada, the task was consistent for what the force was trained to do (rescue medical students). It is hard to say that was a CT mission since they were not terrorists. Yet, this shows that the capabilities were being used outside straight CT tasks.

Boykin was asked to give some background on what goes into making a crucial decision on deploying and employing SOF's, and what goes through a commander's mind at this time. Boykin noted that in Iran, for example, the SOFs were a force of 200 – 250 people that would eventually be whittled down to 100 people into a city of about 5.5 million in a country of 40 – 50 million to bring home 53 Americans. That was an enormous task. That meant several things, such as one must be confident in the eventual 100 people to be taken to the center of that operation. Also, they must be willing to take a lot of risk and realize there was a chance they would not come home. Then, recognition that if the operation is successful, it would be extraordinary for the US but if the mission fails, it will be terrible and bring down the US prestige and honor. The Commanders at every level carry this tremendous burden. No one was under any illusions about the risk. The CO had the burden of the lives of their own people as well as the lives of the 53 Americans. At the end of the day, it came down to what Jim Kyle said in his book, that "the only failure is the failure to try." Charlie Beckwith went to the White House and Carter said that the US was out of options. Boykin noted on this point, "they have to either stay in captivity or we make an effort. So, does the U.S. continue along this diplomatic route going nowhere or does the U.S. make an effort to try to get our people?" The decision was to try and bring home the Americans, even if it meant risking the lives of up to 250 people. Those are enormous responsibilities. Eight men died in the operation and it was a terrible tragedy. However, Boykin noted that not one single person who

stood in that desert and watched eight of their buddies die had any regrets whatsoever for being part of that operation.

Desert One

The first training course was March 1978. Beckwith had an agreement with the Army leadership that by July 1978 he would be prepared to have an initial capability and then in two years, Nov 1980, have a full capability. Training began in a permissive environment hostage rescue focused on shooting, breaching, sniping, other hard skills, and close quarters combat. The host government would provide support and there would be low visibility. Then they went through an evaluation in July 1978. Their training continued on airplanes, buildings, trains, climbing, descending, etc. The force trained hard but still predominately focused on permissive environments where the force was invited by the host government and there would be no hostile penetration. The training ended December 4, 1980. Before the troops could get on the plane to go back home, the hostages were taken in Tehran and the force was suddenly in a situation where they had to rescue hostages and where it would be a forced entry. Other issues raised included close air support and other things the force had not been trained for operations. That is when the pendulum began to swing the other way from permissive environment to a non-permissive environment, from close quarter's battle, hostage rescue, and room clearing to new hard skills that would have enabled the troops to enter into a non-permissive environment.

The only force that was organized, trained and equipped for the Desert One mission was Delta. The helicopter entity was not. The fixed-wing was to some degree because it came from the Air Force Special Operations wing and was trained and equipped for that mission but it had not been trained with the Delta Force. So, an ad-hoc organization had to be put together. It was soon realized, however, that it was not done correctly. For example, people were selected to take part in the operation for the wrong reasons. The plan took a long time to develop since many concepts were considered. There were diplomatic problems in finding a nation to allow the force to take off from their territory. Men and machine were also being pushed to their absolute limits. The men held up but the machines did not.

Actionable Intelligence (AI)

Regarding the definition of AI and the need to evaluate the intelligence that is received and if the target will be there 8 hours after it comes in, there are two approaches. One is to position a force in a time-distance situation that can react as soon as it is known that the target is there. The other is to provide a long time surveillance and reconnaissance to allow one to survey a particular target for some time so if it moves, one moves with it. One can choose the time and place of the hit based on current operations.

Knowing where the target is but not knowing where it will be in a few hours does not mean it is not actionable. It falls into the category of a risk. If there is a pattern based on your analysis (e.g., "every day at three o'clock this guy drinks tea at this location and it would be unusual for this person not to be there drinking tea"), in Boykin's view that is actionable. Now, what risk does one want to ensure the confirmation is there is a different

issue. It all goes back to risk. However, there has been in the past a propensity to have someone with a video feed looking directly on UBL and yet the United States seeks a 100% solution. The U.S. wanted to eliminate all the risk.

Boykin was asked, in the deployment of JSOC forces, what are the requirements needed regarding actionable intelligence to ensure a successful mission? Boykin stated he has a personal problem with the term "actionable intelligence." Such intelligence depends upon the mission. If it is to rescue someone, or break someone out of prison, the force would want to know where he is, how he is secured, what the enemy opposition force is around him, what the reaction time of larger forces are, and what are the other threats at various stages and levels (air defense threat, ground threat, mobility threats, etc). He considers intelligence "AI" when he can be told where his target is fairly precisely. He would like more but it is AI if he can be told where the person is. If it is a snatch operation, again it is the same thing. For Boykin, it is AI if he was told where the person is located and is confident that is where he is; not where he was yesterday. Then it is an evaluation of the risk. As the picture develops of the environment, then the evaluation of the risk begins. Also, if one tells the force what is his pattern and it is so definitive that with a reasonable expectation he is going to be there at a particular time, then that is AI.

Boykin believes the requirement for "actionable intelligence" it has been used as an excuse for not doing being more aggressive. DoD would say, "there was no actionable intelligence," so the military did not take action. However, Boykin's view is that if the military takes some action, it will then obtain some intelligence. DoD has blamed and vilified the intelligence community. The DoD intelligence, not CIA, sat back and said this was an intelligence failure. However, the truth is that it was an operational failure because DoD did not go out and do the things needed to do to get some intelligence. "We expected the IC with its billions of dollars to produce intelligence that if DoD had gone out and done something, we would have gotten more intelligence. Give me action, I will give you intelligence."

This excuse has been used across the board, including in the CT area (Boykin did not want to speak for WMD since he spent little time in that area). In many cases, the military should have been more aggressive and proactive in trying to force the terrorists to move, communicate, and let the IC know who they are and where they are.

For example, if there are a group of terrorists operating at a particular place and information operations are run against them with the specific intent to get them to come to the surface, some direct action could achieve the same result. As long as they are in their comfort zone, it will be difficult to find them. One must do something to make them come out. Instead, the military sat back too often and said, "tell us where they are and we will go do something." The IC has been blamed for too long for the military's recalcitrance and risk aversion. It is easy to blame the IC because they are big and expensive and absorbent. Boykin noted that this reflects his views after spending years in Special Operations, and his frustrations after waiting for AI.

Boykin was asked if the SOFs are trained and the CO is called to deploy, what is the strain the forces are under? What is the nature of the training? Does the CO need to know generalities? Is there training of specific scenarios for specific countries? For example, if an order arrives for the force to go to country X to hit a terrorist camp, does the SOFs need more specific information?

Boykin notes that SOFs element deployed would be regionally focused. It would be deployed under the SOFs command for that theatre. So if there is a target in Africa, the assigned SOF unit will be regionally oriented in Africa, and they would deploy under that regional special operations commander. They would have the necessary language requirements. If on the other hand this is a JSOC operation, then the unit will not be one regionally focused but rather functional. JSOC forces train in all environments, weather and terrain (jungle, desert, and high-altitude). Maritime components train in all sea states and weather. So, one would get something different if one goes to JSOC than if one requests Special Forces. Boykin surmised, does it matter if they have a detailed knowledge and understanding of AQL versus Hizballah? He noted that there may be some nuances but as Boykin was training Delta, a great deal of time was not devoted to trying to learn the intricacies of these groups like the analysts because what was the value in that? It was not necessary for the mission. If the theatre had a contingency plan that included JSOC or a SOF unit then in all probability the plan would be taken off of the shelf. The current mission would be read including information on enemy, terrain, time, and troops available and then the plan would be executed. If the SOFs were told of a mission to execute, then the forces will begin to plan from scratch and start to implement it. JSOC is never restrained by contingency plans. What occurred in Afghanistan was probably not based on a contingency plan to jump in and seize air plans and take down targets. That was all developed as the situation was analyzed. Boykin does believe CENTCOM had some contingency plan but he doubts it was what unfolded.

If the order is given, JSOC is ready to go in four hours and has been able to go in four hours since 1978 (Delta). They will need more time if there is a more deliberate mission and will require more lift if they need more materials and vehicles. What is the task and what is the environment are important questions. There is a lot of flexibility in the organization. "They can plan on the fly." They would like the time to rehearse but can do things without too much. In Mogadishu, they were planning in the air, not knowing how things were going to unfold. That comes from a lot of time together training and rehearsing and understanding each other. That is what JSOC does very well.

Taking Risks

Boykin stated that the US government knew there were UBL training camps in Afghanistan. An important question is what is the sense of the costs would have been in human terms and what can go wrong and what can go well. Pre-911 this issue came up a number of times and it was a very real scenario. There is a camp and a training environment and what was going to be done about it? The process for determining if the US would do something was through the JCIS, OSD and NSC process (PCs and DCs). Now some specific decisions would have to be made. For example, is the target to be destroyed? If so, TLAMs, bomb, kinetic (destroy), etc? Second, are there things there the

US would want or someone to bring back to the US or precursor material or WMD, or documents the US wants in its possession? Then there must be someone placed on the ground to retrieve this. The reality is that prior to 9/11, the US never opted for that solution, to go get it. The human dimension is that the US reviews the considerations (TLAMS, bombs dropped from safe airspace) and the risk of lives of people. The value of the information must be weighted against the loss of life.

Boykin noted again that this is his opinion and does not reflect DoD policy, but he believes there are times when the US should have made this personal. The US should have said, "we are going to risk people's lives. Individuals may be lost. We must show them we are willing to take risks." That is where the policy faltered. No one wanted to put boots on the ground. Instead a situation like Grenada or Panama surfaces where the USG is trying to get folks out. It is his view that the U.S. must look seriously at what the risk are: we in the military sign up for this. My view is not popular but that is what it is."

He also noted that no one pre 9/11 wanted to take that kind of risk: to have an American killed and then have to explain why the U.S. did not just drop a bomb or a cruise missile. It is difficult for anyone in a position of responsibility, an elected official, to stand up in front of the American people and say, "we need to make this a personal thing." That does not play well in Peoria. The leadership in this country must stand above that. However, as a soldier, Boykin notes that it has to be personal and there is a point at which soldiers must be put on the ground.

Boykin pointed to the U.S. military that jumped into Afghanistan on October 19th and seize an airfield and then walk away from in 24 hours. Why did the U.S. hit targets in Afghanistan that were of minimal value? That is because the U.S. believed the 69 day air strikes in Kosovo from the air was a war but the U.S. was never willing to put boots on the ground, so the U.S. let Serbs rape, pillage and burn and the U.S. seeded the terrain and called it a war from 30,000 feet. One October 19th when boots were put on the ground, that sent a message to the world that this is a war the U.S. was willing to take risks for and the U.S. was going all the way. This was such a stark contrast to what occurred in Kosovo. Soldiers were parachuting in an airfield in the middle of the desert and hitting targets all over the place. It said, "we are here." It got their attention. When they saw this, A-Q realized they could not just lay low in caves, which is what they probably thought before the 19th of October. They saw that the US was serious.

Boykin was asked about the risks and difficulty in going into that country with its geographic location and other limitations and to provide an assessment of the policy that must be considered to come to this decision. Boykin responded that the first answer would respond to the question of what is it the forces are being requested to achieve? What is the desired effect of putting boots on the ground? To send a message or something different? Where are they going to be staged? From CONUS and recover back to CONUS? That is a long way. Pakistan? Uzbekistan? Iran? An aircraft carrier or off the coast? Where recover to? What if there are casualties or a helicopter is shot down, where do we take the casualties? Back to CONUS is not a good idea because it is too far. So, this is a diplomatic issue. Who will provide air space? So, there are two important

questions that must be addressed: the desired affect (e.g., psychological) and where to launch and recover from? A third issue is who the force works with in the region prior to this to help with the preparation of the battle space. Is this done independently? Does CIA and DoD get together to figure out how to get folks into the battle space. How to develop an infrastructure to, for example, carry out invasions? Is one compromising one's mission by tasking the team to work with Uzbekis? These are key policy issues. And fourth, once this is done, what is the impact on the region as a whole? What are the diplomatic issues associated with the success or failure of this mission?

Boykin was asked to provide an assessment of what can go wrong if a direct action on a camp and we know there are terrorists there? Boykin noted that on October 19, 2001, a helicopter was shot by the Mujahadeen (the wheels got shot). It could have crashed and therefore, a helicopter could have been lost. One can take casualties from a close quarters battle, can get people isolated and do an escape or an invasion or wait it out or troops may become MIA or worse, be a POW, or many other potential bad things. So, these decisions cannot be made lightly.

The policy makers must rely on the military leadership to give them their best military advice in terms of the risks, gains, and possible losses. There have been policy makers that have clearly understood this and others who have not. It is a mixed bag. As one looks at these things, one problem is that no one took terrorism real serious in terms of it being a strategic threat. It was seen as external to the US, and this was not just in DoD. In the 1980's, money was spent in upgrading our embassies instead of being aggressive in going after the bad guys. In addition, the US policy was that was a law enforcement issue. In that situation, the focus is on the rules of evidence, chain of custody, and all the other law enforcement issues. If it is a war, the situation is addressed with rules and principals of war, the first one being offensive. But the military always considered CT to be a law enforcement issue, which is why we considered all the renditions. There were some great renditions, but grabbing one terrorist every few months did not do much in the long run.

In the military, there is a culture difference between the SOFs and JSOC forces and what one finds in other parts of the military of the JCS. However, the SOFs attract aggressive, proactive kinds of people. So, one can expect a difference of opinion. The SOFs do not do defense very well. Their first principal of war is offense.

CT as a DoD Mission

When asked if the military in the early 1990's saw terrorism as its role, Boykin noted that the SOFs did and still do. The military took more of an antiterrorism attitude than a counterterrorism attitude. However, the SOFs were very much focused on the CT mission.

Force Protection

The military approached force protection ("FP") the wrong way in that the military treated it as a mission, which it is not. It is a responsibility of a commander. For example, we send a division to Bosnia in Nov/Dec 1995, and we say to them to stay there for one year and tell the commander not to let the US forces get harmed. That is FP. The real

mission is to bring some peace and stability to this country so the people can get their lives back together so the forces can get out. That was the pinnacle of this focus on FP being a mission itself. It is not a mission or end state. It is critical but part of what the Commander does. He takes care of his troops. In Iraq, the U.S. military lost people and while that is regrettable, the USG has not let the FP become a mission in itself.

The Role of Law Enforcement

Regarding the role of law enforcement, should the U.S. have taken a more comprehensive approach to CT beyond law enforcement. Was our response to the Cole too much of a law enforcement response? Yes. The United States should have been more aggressive to deal with CT. But it is not just direct action, it is CA, intelligence, CT, a variety of things and not just grabbing terrorists, and killing and capturing. It is a lot of what is below the noise level of the media. The US is doing it now. "What is going on today is a model of what the United States should have been doing before. But, would the US public, had they known what we were doing today, understood and supported it? The policy makers at that time did not think they would. Boykin believes the American public would have. The American public is resilient and understands these kinds of things. We should have been more aggressive but more than direct action. The US should have been more comprehensive in its efforts.

The Cole

Regarding the Cole, Boykin was at the time running the Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School. He did not see the intelligence and did not know how much we knew about the perpetrators or much else.

DoD and CIA Paramilitary

Regarding the interaction of the DoD and CIA, Boykin was asked if DoD should have more paramilitary capabilities and to explain the differences in what the two can achieve. In response, Boykin asked the following: what are paramilitary operations? In his view, few people can define that, which is a problem. There is not a good definition. He believes a paramilitary operation is a military operation run by a non-military organization. The CIA decimated its own paramilitary operations after it came out of Southeast Asia and has been playing catch up ever since. The CIA should have had better access to SOCOM and SO entities to use in a paramilitary role for their paramilitary functions. That was a marginally successful effort. Now CIA can either rebuild its own capabilities to where it was during the 1960's when running operations in Laos and Cambodia, or use SOCOM resources to do that mission either under the authorities of the CIA or by Executive Order give the military more authority for those kinds of things. He believes the best solution is for the Director, CIA and the SecDef to have an agreement that would provide what is needed from both agencies and also establish the ground rules on how to go forward.

The military and SOFs have the only credible capability to really go and do unconventional warfare and do a campaign plan. The CIA does have capabilities to go and train security and direct action forces; however, they do not have the capability to do a campaign plan from start to finish. The military has its role and the CIA has its role. If

it is a covert action operation, the CIA has the authority and can call on the military for support. Boykin does not think it is realistic to expect that DoD will take on an expanded role in the future or that the military will take over covert action. DoD does not want that and DoD is happy to have CIA take the lead while DoD supports the CIA. The EO said the CIA has the authorities to deploy people into hostile environments, pre-crisis, and for DoD to do that it must sign up to put people in with the CIA, and Boykin does not believe that is the case because if one gets into the legal reviews of that, one will find DoD has the same authorities. DoD has not used them. DoD has all the authority it needs.

Lessons

What were the lessons learned from the USG in Afghanistan regarding the SOF and CIA lash-up. Also, what recommendations expect for the DoD as to how the military is aligned?

Boykin noted that the relationship between the military and CIA at the operator level has been great. If one talks to the operators on the ground, they say they have been inseparable, they have solved problems, they have shared intelligence, hardships and tragedies, and it has been an excellent relationship and as good as it has ever been. In Afghanistan and Iraq the relationship between the CC and the COS has been excellent. In the beltway, one will see difficulties. However, this is not just unique to DoD and CIA.

As to what ought to be done, Boykin recommends determining better ways for the military to provide support to the COS in terms of the overarching CT tasks they have, with technology, people, and with resources, and there must be a much better understanding among the COS of what the military requirements are for shaping the environment and for carrying out operations in those environments. This should include working closely with COS as they are going through their development and making sure there exists the right kinds of exchanges and opportunities for training.

Final Questions

Boykin was what is needed most in this GWOT? He responded that more human intelligence, more clandestine human intelligence, is needed for the global war on terrorism. What is also needed is a concept for how to penetrate some of the terrorist groups. The USG has set itself up for a war that will take the next 20-30 years. If it takes a long time to develop the adequate HUMINT assets, that should be an adequate price to pay for the necessary HUMINT assets.

Boykin was then asked, what did the military do right pre 9/11? Boykin highlighted the military's success in putting together credible capabilities all the way around, and not just JSOC and Delta. These include long-range strikes and AT programs. Some were in place on 9/11. The military under Goldwater- Nichols Act really became a joint team. This expanded the military's capabilities tremendously and the military began to realize the criticality of being part of the interagency. This has been reinforced post 9/11.

Why have we not found UBL? The USG should have taken the position that one man is not what is most important. What is important is that we disassemble his structure of A-

Q. He believes it is important at this stage but it is not critical to find him, or Saddam for that matter. It would be good if the U.S. could get them both of them. However, the USG must focus on these groups in a much broader way. This is not a body count issue. It is difficult to kill them faster than they can reproduce. The USG should start looking at why these groups are the way they are, where their money comes from, who supports them, where they train, what is their infrastructure, and not at specific personalities and begin to take down these terrorist groups from different perspectives. The U.S. must apply all the elements of national power of the people and nations supporting this effort and the U.S. must go into the areas where they have safe havens and take away some of the root causes. The USG needs to go into Yemen and take civil affairs elements in there and build bridges, wells and schools and take away the root causes of terrorism. If they were given more than the terrorist provides them, such as food and medical supplies, they may not become a terrorist. Personalities are not as important as others believe it is.

Boykin was finally asked, what should he have been asked that he was not asked? Boykin noted that what is important is what the U.S. is going to do now that the USG brought down A-Q's main structure. The administration must think through that very seriously. Is the U.S. going to take sweeping measures not just in Iraq and Afghanistan but worldwide? Or is the U.S. going to let Iraq and Afghanistan be our bold and audacious moves and then we go back to low risk attitude. The USG requires an interagency concept of what the U.S. will do. The U.S. must build the intelligence capabilities of CIA and within DoD and DIA, NIMA and the services. The IC carries a tremendous burden it did not carry previously. If one thinks about it, these are the first wars the U.S. has won where it declared victory. There was no capitulation in Afghanistan or Iraq. The traditional way to wage war is a nation fights until the hostilities are over, and then they stop. That was not done in either Afghanistan or Iraq. The USG went in and declared when hostilities were over. So, think of the burden on the intelligence community for the future because the intelligence community will be the one to tell one when one has reached that stage. It is not the operator or CO on the ground who will determine when all the objectives have been achieved. The USG must have eyes and ears and a ubiquitous presence all over the world so the USG knows what these people are doing and who they are connected to and how they are being resourced and where they get their supplies from. If this is not done, the USG won't have many options.