

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of [redacted]
[redacted] Division

Type of Event: Interview

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Special Access Issues: None

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Team number: 6

Location: FBI Headquarters/SIOC

Participants Non-Commission: DOJ Assistant General Counsel Bob Sinton

Participants - Commission: Caroline Barnes and Peter Rundlet

Background.

[redacted] 9/11 Closed by Statute

spent 24

years with the CIA.

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[redacted] Mark Miller, another CIA detailee to the FBI, became the head of the new Office of Intelligence and the Deputy Assistant Director of the CT Analysis Branch. Twenty-five CIA analysts were detailed to the FBI along with Miller [redacted] 9/11 Closed by Statute became an FBI employee

CIA Analyst Detailees. Most of the detailees had volunteered for the assignment. They had a mix of backgrounds - some were analysts and some were managers/editors. Only a couple of them had CT expertise. They formed a Strategic Assessments and Analysis Unit. From the CIA's perspective, the experience was a negative one. They found the FBI culture and Information Technology (IT) systems frustrating. [redacted] thinks they helped to change the culture with regard to analysis because they produced some good products. The detail assignment was for only one year, and [redacted] thinks it should have been for two years. After the experience of this group, the CIA likely will not detail any more analysts. CIA managers will not force people to come, and at this point no one is likely to volunteer. Only one of the detailees is now working CT matters at the CIA. The Counterterrorism Center is a "closed shop," and the analysts may have been

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"tainted" by their time at the FBI. None of them wanted to go to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), because it's not a "career service" position.

FBI Culture. [redacted] and Miller brought in a consultant (a systems analyst) to review the FBI's intelligence process. While she didn't complete the review, she did advise that it would take 5 to 7 years for the FBI to effect the necessary cultural change. The Office of Intelligence is now reviewing the process.

[redacted] wants to "kill" the "support" terminology.

The Analyst-Special Agent relationship is "uneven," in part because it is still driven to some extent by personalities.

The fact that the FBI has an agent/operational culture is not necessarily bad, but the FBI needs to treat all professional specialties as important.

[redacted] believes that the FBI needs a "top to bottom" educational process on intelligence. They need to educate new agents from the beginning, and have to constantly articulate that this is part of the FBI's mission.

The Office of Intelligence. [redacted] described Maureen Baginski, the Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for Intelligence, as "dynamic," "close to the Director," and "on the right track." Mark Miller didn't have the "clout" to affect change because at that point the Office of Intelligence was part of the CT Division. While Baginski is not an agent, which presents a challenge, she has a direct line to the Director. So she can make things happen "by cracking heads."

Baginski wants to create a Special Agent intelligence position. These agents would specialize in intelligence collection.

All analytic Section Chiefs [redacted] will be dual-hatted, reporting to their own Division heads and to Baginski.

The Office of Intelligence needs come up with a standard policy for rating performance – they need a competitive system. They also need to complete intelligence sharing policies and procedures to ensure that it's happening in the correct way. This would address what the Bureau should send to state and local law enforcement, foreign services, etc. Also, each Division comes up with its own collection requirements now and the Office of Intelligence needs to determine these and prioritize them for the entire FBI.

Information Technology. The FBI's IT systems are antiquated and key to the Bureau's success in the intelligence area. Coming up with a "push" dissemination system is key. It is important that incoming mail get pushed electronically to analysts rather than their having to look through all of it each day for what is relevant to them. He and Miller wrote a "blind memo" (along with a working group of strategic and tactical analysts) containing their recommendations for a new system, and he believes it is informing the

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current information data warehouse effort, which will pull information from many different "buckets," including the Virtual Case File (VCF) system, etc. He said that "Chilead" is the name of the tool that will do this.

ACS is still the FBI's principal information management system. [redacted] contains other agencies' products. [redacted] HQ personnel have access to [redacted] on their desktops, but the field does not. The Field needs resources in order to expand or build SCIFs and purchase the necessary equipment. The Field needs to see this USIC information because it may have relevance to an individual field office, and may generate leads or provide edification.

The Office of Intelligence must ensure that analysts have input into the development of the IT systems – they cannot be geared solely to case management. The FBI is planning to overlay analytic tools on VCF, but it would have been good to build these in from the beginning. [redacted] would like one system with the high and low side together.

When [redacted] arrived, there were 120 Intelink terminals in the building. Now, all CI and CT analysts have access to Intelink on their desktop.

Role of FBI Analyst. [redacted] said that Baginski has an image of an analyst who can perform in all of the three areas she's identified: 1) tactical, 2) strategic, and 3) reports officer. This may work in ideal circumstances, but analysts need to develop core skills in each of those areas. [redacted] has done all three kinds of work in his career and believes not everyone is suited to all three. The FBI may not want the more strategic folks doing reports officer work, for example. He thinks Baginski wants to have to design only one training program due to resource issues, and having one Intelligence Analyst with three work roles allows for this. Baginski also has tried to ensure that there is no hierarchy among the positions by having all three go up to the same GS level. However, it's unclear whether an agent can supervise analysts who are at the same grade as the agent or perhaps higher. He believes that Baginski wants to create a position analogous to the analyst position elsewhere in the US Intelligence Community. Field analysts will be mostly operations specialists (tactical) and reports officers. There might be Intelligence Analysts (strategic) in the New York office, and perhaps elsewhere to provide a regional view, but most strategic analysts will be at FBI HQ.

[redacted] would like to keep analysts in their position for 3-5 years, and this would allow them to develop an expertise and understand the context of a particular area. Once the analysts get over the "learning hump" and they can then be rotated and become "super-analysts."

[redacted] believes that one cannot conduct analysis separately from operations at either the FBI or CIA. It's more finely grained analysis than that done in the rest of the Intelligence Community. Not everything is in a system, so you need to interact with your counterparts, go to meetings with operational personnel, etc., in order to stay plugged in.

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[redacted] believes that the Field Intelligence Group (FIG) structure can be made to work if it is matrix-managed (i.e., by the Office of Intelligence).

FBI agents "get annoyed" when analysts are pulled away to write something for the President.

Analysis can and does drive investigations, but this exercise requires "taking a step back." The point of analysis is to guide decisions, which requires looking to the future – this is where analysts add value. Agents live in an evidence-based world so they are only slowly becoming more comfortable with this.

The historic tension between the strategic and tactical CT analysts has lessened. There was a group of strategic analysts who became tactical analysts but kept doing the strategic work and wouldn't share information with the strategic analysts. Individual personalities got involved.

[redacted] wants to come up with a hybrid product to serve both audiences – internal and external. He doesn't want to duplicate what the CIA does – it's dry and academic and less helpful at the operational level than it is for presidential briefings.

The FBI needs to "beef up" (and is) its operations specialist ranks.

He wants to wait to reach his Full Staffing Level before deciding if he needs more resources (he's at 60 to 70% now).

Reports Officer Position. This position is analytic in terms of its need to look rigorously at FBI information and understand the terrorist an intelligence entities it describes (critical thinking), but its main role is to get information out to customers, both internal and external. The Bureau's own internal information dissemination process is "not where it should be." [redacted]

Dissemination of FBI Analysis. They are using the IIR vehicle now because IIRs can go to other agencies electronically. They also post items on [redacted] which used to be [redacted]. They post items on Intelink as well, but [redacted] is leery about placing US Person information on Intelink because it is available to a much broader audience. They send hard copies of analytical reports to senior executives, and send out FBI Intelligence Bulletins (Law Enforcement Sensitive). They use the FBI intranet to distribute information to the Field. They also send information to the Field in EC form, but few read these. They are concerned about state homeland security entities and JTTFs running to the press with these items, but they know they have to get these things out and simply manage the risk.

Analyst Qualifications. Forty-seven percent of the analyst cadre (most are in the Field) do not have college degrees. Many are good, but are performing mostly tactical support, and with limited sources of information.

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CT Analysis Section. [redacted] 9/11 Closed by Statute He and Miller came up with the structure for this Section in consultation with other leaders and based in part on pre-existing entities. The Section is staffed with strategic analysts. The Operations Specialists in the CT operational sections are putting FISA packages together. Prior to that they were "targeting analysts." The strategic analysts do executive level briefings and some targeting work. All analysts and agents are co-located because the Bureau's IT systems are not what they should be.

The Analyst Hiring Process. The Knowledge, Skills and Abilities (KSA) process is "screwed up." It's a "shock" because other agencies are exempt from some of the civil service requirements (CIA, GSA). [redacted] feels that the Director needs special authorities so that he can hire more quickly. For example, the CIA can move quickly to bring contractors on board (Personal Services Contracts). [redacted] may try to hire contractors. He's trying to get a permanent posting up for analysts as with the agent position. Instead of posting a position for two weeks at a time for each analyst work role, a permanent posting would allow the FBI to hire analysts when good ones applied and then divvy them up according to their skills and Bureau needs. [redacted] wants to hire people who are suited to particular positions, and people with the right degrees for those jobs. He doesn't want to just plug people in anywhere.

Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit. Kevin Giblin is the Unit Chief, and his Unit is responsible for processing information other Units write up. They keep a database to track the status of Bureau documents and get them disseminated.

Threat Assessments. They are discussing what to do with the threat side of things. His Section produces the broader threat assessments (national-level ones), they also produce functional assessments (regarding techniques, etc.). The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Unit in the Domestic Terrorism (DT) Section does some TA work because they must respond when/if these events occur. The FBI's National Threat Center (headed up by Tom Donlon, former ASAC in NY) ensures that the threats are covered.

Training. [redacted] provided input for the College of Analytical Studies Basics Course. He wants a short course on analytic tradecraft to ensure that everyone is on the same page in that area. He also wants a course for analytic managers, and intensive language training for analysts. He's submitted these proposals to Baginski.

Performance Metrics. With regard to source development, if you evaluate success in a purely quantitative fashion, you will get a lot of sources but not necessarily good ones. The process needs to be somewhat subjective, and you need to be careful about what you count. You don't want the rigor of the system to get in the way of the work (i.e., the way an overly robust inspections regimen might). You have to rate performance, but you need to measure impact, and it's hard to measure that in the intelligence area. For example, in the Lackawanna Six case, analysts managed to identify financial elements and the impact was significant, but this doesn't happen all the time. [redacted] has a production plan with he attempts to adhere to, but other things always come up so he cannot really hold people to it.

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National JTTF. This is a data collection effort. For example, NJTTF personnel have interviewed crop duster owners, flight crews, and owners of dive shops. They've done a lot of good work.

Relationship with TTIC, Department of Homeland Security. He understands the TTIC concept, but thinks we keep creating different organizations to do the same thing (CIA/Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA), TTIC, JITF/CT, etc.). He wonders if MI-5's [redacted] is a model. [redacted]

He's not sure it would be a good idea for the US to try to create such an entity, because it might be too large. Moreover, he doesn't think it's a great idea to create a new agency in the midst of a war. The FBI supports TTIC. It has sent a number of analysts there (new ones). Anything of a terrorism threat nature that should go to the President goes to TTIC first (for the President's Terrorism Threat Report or PTTR). The coordination process is difficult, however.

[redacted] believes that "clear lines of authority" are needed between FBI, DHS, TTIC, and CIA/OTA. Competitive analysis is good, but DHS needs to complete vulnerabilities assessments (regarding power outages, etc.). He thinks that with regard to border security, DHS has a brilliant idea because there were too many entities operating in this area.

[redacted] thinks that TTIC should play a limited role, only evaluating threats.

Interaction with the CIA. The CIA doesn't have to worry about the consequences of its reporting because it doesn't have to do anything about it. The CIA has some strong views on its analysis and its correctness, and when they write on threats to the homeland and don't coordinate it with the FBI, that's a problem. Coordination with the FBI always takes longer because FBI HQ has to check with the Field. Despite all this he thinks the FBI and CIA coordinate fairly well in his area - it helps that he knows a lot of his CIA counterparts. And while the CIA still wants to run everything overseas, there are success stories involving joint FBI-CIA cooperation.

The CIA has a more passive approach to handling information because it's all electronic.

With warning, you have to provide the information immediately, you cannot wait to corroborate the threat. There has to be a balance struck here. One cannot disseminate every analytical thought, but must get potential threat information out immediately.

The CIA often classifies its information [redacted] which is really unhelpful. They need to create a tearline portion classified at the lowest possible level for all threat information.

The Future of the FBI. The Bureau can do intelligence, but it will take sustained effort and time. They're on the right track. There are legal and political issues associated with splitting out the intelligence function and creating a domestic spy agency. The FBI is the only law enforcement/intelligence agency around. In many foreign countries they are more comfortable talking with our law enforcement officers than with our intelligence

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officers [redacted] Also, the FBI can offer law enforcement training which helps with liaison in the CT area.

The 315 investigative classification allows the FBI to open an intelligence case and *do* something about it – the agent can use lots of tools available on the criminal side (deport, flip, jail, etc.).

The FBI's CT function must be a centralized, national program. The CIA is run that way.

Other Needs in the Analysis Area.

- Reach their full staffing level and train new hires
- Improve the IT system
- Get information to the Field
- Have reporting processes in place, training people on what is significant
- Create a career path/training program

All of these things will aid in achieving the necessary cultural change. Right now there is a lot of great work being done with lousy tools.

Would Current Structure Have Prevented 9/11? Probably not. There was a massive amount of reporting on the threat *overseas*, and the FBI only had two weeks to locate Hazmi and Midhar. Even if they had located them, there were 17 others involved. Was Moussaoui actually involved in the 9-11 plot? He isn't sure. The 19 hijackers appeared to do nothing illegal, and they came in clean, committed and willing to die. He thinks the FBI would have a better chance now of stopping such an attack, but it would still be tough.

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