5 October 1998 Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html ----------------------------------------------------------------------- [Congressional Record: September 28, 1998 (Extensions)] [Page E1843] From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:cr28se98-34] UNIFIED STRATEGY NEEDED TO FIGHT TERRORISM ______ HON. IKE SKELTON of missouri in the house of representatives Monday, September 28, 1998 Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, the August 7 bombings outside U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, were the latest crimes to be added to a growing list of terrorists attacks where Americans died brutally, without warning, and unnecessarily. These bombings join a list which includes the World Trade Center in New York City, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Our Nation did respond to the killing of 12 Americans and nearly 300 Kenyans and Tanzanians. Based on evidence that further attacks were planned, United States armed forces struck terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan, targeting one of the most active terrorist bases in the world and a factory involved in the production of materials for chemical weapons. Two suspects have been arrested and others are being pursued. But in this tragedy's aftermath, the U.S. must also learn from the incidents and take steps to ensure that our citizens and installations are protected in the future. Since June of 1997, I have released four reports prepared by the General Accounting Office (GAO) detailing U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The first report, entitled, ``Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect its Forces Overseas,'' dealt with anti- terrorism. It concluded that uniform security standards were necessary to ensure the safety of Americans around the world. In September of 1997, GAO released a second report entitled, ``Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Security Policy and Strategy.'' This report focused on counter terrorism--those offensive measures for deterring, resolving, and managing terrorist acts. It outlined specific roles and responsibilities of the 40 Federal departments, agencies, and bureaus involved in counter terrorism, as well as their respective capabilities. ``Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination'' was released in December of 1997. This third GAO report focused on total government-wide spending levels to combat terrorism. While it revealed that a significant amount of resources--more than $7 billion a year--were committed annually to combat terrorism, there were some deficiencies, including the absence of regular government-wide priorities, and the lack of an assessment process to coordinate and focus government efforts. Moreover, the report found that no government office or entity maintained the authority to enforce coordination. In its fourth report, ``Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments,'' GAO reviewed the implementation of the 1996 Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, popularly known as the Defense Department's Nunn- Lugar-Domenici program. It recommended the adoption of a formal threat and risk assessment process to enhance state and local capabilities and suggested that the FBI lead this effort. These GAO reports marked the first attempt by any government agency to take a comprehensive look at federal activities to fight terrorism. While we learned a great deal from these reports, we still have a long way to go. As the work of the GAO has helped us discover, our approach may be fundamentally flawed: Too many different federal agencies and local governments possess existing or emerging capabilities for responding to a terrorist attack; there are uneven and nearly incompatible levels of expertise; and our efforts are complicated by duplication and poor communication. To put it simply, with so many agencies involved, the left hand may not know what the right hand is doing. We must have a unified strategy to fight terrorism--we cannot have agencies fighting turf battles. There has been some movement in the right direction to respond to the threat of terrorism. In May, the Administration announced the formation of ten regional rapid assessment teams. These teams are part of the Defense Department's overall effort to support local, state, and federal civil authorities in the event of an incident involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. Congress has included money in the Fiscal Year 1999 DOD Authorized bill for this program, which is coordinated through the National Guard. The Missouri National Guard will play a leading role as host to one of the ten regional terrorism response teams. The recent bombings are a terrible reminder that we must take the threat of terrorism seriously. We must realize that the struggle against terrorism will be protracted, and moreover, we must resist complacency--we must not too quickly forget the death and destruction that can be wreaked by fanatical extremists committed to waging war on the United States. America has battled terrorism for many years. We have acted to bring terrorists to justice, to penetrate their organizations, to disrupt their plans, and to isolate their sponsors. Nevertheless, it is a virtual certainty that American citizens and American facilities will be attacked again, and not just in the traditional terrorist ways. To a distressing extent, the information and components necessary to build nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction are increasingly and readily accessible. In addition, the dependence of our military services and critical civilian infrastructures on information technology has made us vulnerable to information warfare. This vulnerability requires vigilance and the development of protective and redundant systems so that we can maintain our decisive technological edge. If Congress and the Administration are willing to develop a unified strategy and commit adequate resources, we can prepare an effective defense against terrorism. First, we must give careful scrutiny to the United States counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and policies. In addition, we must insist that our military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic forces are effectively arrayed, equipped, and trained, and that they are given the authority to take action against terrorists. Finally, we must ensure that both anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts are comprehensive and efficient. ____________________ ----------------------------------------------------------------------- [Congressional Record: April 30, 1998 (Extensions)] [Page E717-E718] From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:cr30ap98-7] COMBATING TERRORISM: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE; COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT ______ HON. IKE SKELTON of missouri in the house of representatives Thursday, April 30, 1998 Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, on Thursday, April 23, 1998, I testified before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice; Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. On this occasion, I discussed a series of reports, prepared at my request by the General Accounting Office (GAO). These reports detail the United States' substantial efforts to combat terrorism. I share my remarks with the Members of the House. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, April 23, 1998 Chairman Hastert, members of the subcommittee, it gives me great pleasure to appear before you today. I appreciate the opportunity not only to speak about an important issue to our nation but also to bring attention to a substantial body of work produced by the General Accounting Office (GAO). This ``work in progress''--to date, a series of four report--will eventually produce the most comprehensive overview of our nation's effort to combat terrorism. As Chairman Hastert knows all too well, this is a daunting task. Without his leadership and effort, we would have a far more vague picture of our government's activities. Let me briefly review these recent findings. First, GAO released a July 1997 report entitled, ``Combating Terrorism: Status of DoD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas.'' Dealing with Anti-terrorism, this report concluded that uniform security standards were necessary to assure the safety of Americans around the world. Second, GAO released a September 1997 report entitled, ``Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Security Policy and Strategy.'' Focused on Counterterrorism--or those offensive measures for deterring, resolving, and managing terrorist acts--this second report represents the first comprehensive examination of federal activities to combat terrorism. It pointed out that more than 40 federal departments, agencies, and bureaus, are involved in this activity. It also outlined specific roles and responsibilities of federal agencies, as well as their respective capabilities. GAO released its third report in December of 1997. Focused on total government-wide spending levels to combat terrorism, this product--and the process leading up to its publication-- closely tracked with congressional interest in the subject. As many of you know, during floor consideration of the fiscal year (FY) 1998 Defense Authorization Bill, an amendment--my amendment--was accepted to require the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to disclose overall spending levels directed against terrorism. Known as Section 1051 and taken together with GAO's third report, enough evidence surfaced to offer both encouragement and concern. Although it seemed that a significant amount of resources were annually committed to combat terrorism, the following inefficiencies were exposed: No regular government-wide collection and review of funding data existed; No apparent government-wide priorities were established; No assessment process existed to coordinate and focus government efforts; and No government office or entity maintained the authority to enforce coordination. As a result, the third report recommended that the National Security Council (NSC), OMB, the departments, and agency heads--such as the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)--build upon the new statutory requirement embodied in Section 1051. I am also pleased to report that this remains an annual obligation, requiring by March of each year an annual overview of government-wide efforts to combat terrorism around the globe. Finally, at the request of Chairman Hastert and myself, GAO has recently released its fourth and latest product on the subject, entitled ``Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Investments.'' Again, enough evidence has been provided to question the federal government's level of funding. This last report-- responsible for reviewing the implementation of the Nunn- Lugar-Domenici domestic response program--hopefully will assist with the establishment of consistent national standards and priorities. The Threat Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: In your mind's eye, join me and imagine what it was like in 1995 for the Senior Airman at a remote location in a foreign land, relaxing after a long, hot, stressful day in the Arabian desert; Imagine, too, what it was like in 1996 for the federal employee beginning the day in Oklahoma, pouring coffee, grabbing a breakfast snack, and preparing for morning briefings; Imagine what it was like in 1993 for Americans-- businesswomen, diplomats, tourists, visitors--milling innocently about in the heart of New York City, one of our nation's busiest locations; Imagine, if you can, what it was like for these individuals before these three locations became infamous for the catastrophic events that followed. To a person, none expected anything but completion of an average day; yet all experienced a jolt, a shock, a sense of horror, as chaos and bedlam brought an abrupt halt to their respective routines. The bombing victims at Khobar Towers in Saudia Arabia were trained military professionals in a foreign land. The bombing victims at the Oklahoma City Federal Building and the World Trade Center, were average American citizens--civilians--at home in their communities, totally unprepared for the violence they were forced to experience. Despite the different circumstances, all three events share in common one unavoidable, tell-tale truth: Americans died brutally, without warning, unnecessarily, and in a manner that will almost certainly be imitated in the future. In 1995 and 1996, about one-fourth of all international terrorist acts were against U.S. targets; and although the number of terrorist incidents both worldwide and in the United States has declined in recent years, the level of violence and lethality of attacks has increased. Violent events in the past, may encourage further attempts to strike America in places such as our own yards, back home in our districts, and other places where attacks might be least expected. Enemies of the United States, I fear, have adopted effective methods and means to strike against America. Surely, enemies to America--both foreign and domestic-- recognize the military capabilities of the United States. It is hard to ignore our successes throughout history and around the globe; it is difficult not to marvel at our technological advancements; and it is nearly impossible to overlook our massive military might at sea, in the air, and on the ground. Our naval, air, ground, and Marine forces remain superior and unmatched in today's world. Further, enemies to America--both foreign and domestic-- almost certainly recognize [[Page E718]] the capabilities of our domestic law enforcement and emergency response officials. The Federal Bureau of Investigations, or FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), U.S. Customs, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are highly respected worldwide. Their standards currently set those of the international community. But what of the point at which the responsibilities of these two communities intersect? Do our domestic law enforcement capabilities effectively coordinate with those of the Department of Defense? In the case of another incident on American soil, are Defense Department officials prepared to effectively support local officials? Are existing programs-- such as the Emergency Response Assistance program, the Rapid Response Information System, and the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici ``First Responder Training'' program--adequately funded to handle a future incident, particularly one involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) such as a biological or chemical agent, or nuclear device? We better be sure. Is the threat real? I believe wholeheartedly that it is. Are we in danger of overstating the threat? I am not sure. But, let me share with you something about which there is no doubt. I implore you to consider two lists, one based on capabilities, the other based on alleged activities. I ask you first to consider the list of nations around the globe known to either possess or nearly possess the capability to produce chemical and biological weapons--you are, of course, familiar with the unclassified list: North Korea, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Russia. Second, I ask you to consider the group of nations singled out by the State Department for engaging in state- sponsored terrorism. Again, you are familiar with the list's membership: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Finally, I ask you to look at the correlation between these lists and ask you to decide. Are you willing to risk the potential consequences of not being prepared? The Response To properly prepare for potential terrorist acts we must set forth with a political commitment to attain both efficiency and adequate resource levels across the entire federal government. The recent past offers a bit of optimism. A relatively high level of Congressional support has existed: The 1994 National Defense Authorization Act expressed a sense of Congress that the President should strengthen federal interagency response planning for early detection and warning of--and response to--potential use of chemical or biological agents and weapons. The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 required the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy to submit to Congress a joint report on military and civil defense response plans. The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act required the President to take immediate action to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving WMD and to provide enhanced support to improve both the response and deterrent capabilities of state and local emergency response agencies. More than $50 million in assistance was authorized. And just this past year, the budget request for the Defense Department included $49.5 million for support of the domestic emergency preparedness program. The resulting 1998 authorization provided for this request as well as an additional $10 million for equipment for the Marine's Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force and $10 million to support development of a domestic/biological counter- terrorism mission for the National Guard. But I am concerned about our nation's ability over the next few years to attain efficiency or to sustain such a commitment. The Defense Department rightly assumes a supportive role during a terrorist incident within the United States, leaving the Department of Justice the primary responsibility for response and coordination. Yet even a role supportive in nature has come at a great cost--in both manpower and dollars. Much of the highly specialized expertise resides in DoD; and most of the highly-trained individuals necessary for such tasks are also from the Department of Defense. Unfortunately--for them, for their families, and for our nation--these same individuals are often needed elsewhere, in overseas contingencies around the world. In these strict budgetary times, support and training assistance to domestic authorities is placing Defense personnel under a terrible strain. This year's budgetary constraint is particularly tight and I have not received information to cause me to believe that anything might be different in the near future. This is not to say there aren't several matters to provide encouragement, such as the recent announcement to authorize 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams within the Guard and Reserve components. Indeed, the collocation of these teams with FEMA regional offices just might provide the necessary ``bridge'' between federal and state officials and spawn better coordination. Yet, I am aware of the Defense Department's budgetary struggle to meet existing requirements and must assume that this new effort might also find itself at risk of receiving inadequate resources. We should look closely at this recommendation before committing a large sum of our precious--and increasingly scarce--financial resources. And we should recognize that this resource pool is declining further now that FEMA has recently decided to withdraw itself from any lead-agency role. Without its assistance, the Defense Department must now find additional, previously unanticipated budget authority over the next 4 years to support this requirement. As the work of GAO has helped us discover, our approach may be fundamentally flawed: perhaps too many different federal agencies and local governments possess existing or emerging capabilities for responding to a WMD attack; uneven and nearly incompatible levels of expertise often exists; duplication and poor communication may complicate our effort; and public complacency may threaten to weaken our overall capability. To be sure, if I must leave only one message today, let it be this: coordination problems may exist; but these problems pale in comparison with the potential problems resulting from public complacency. Mr. Chairman, there is a Chinese proverb that states, ``May you live in interesting times.'' We should be thankful that we do. We also live during challenging times. At a time of budget cuts, force drawdowns, streamlining, and reductions in military personnel endstrength levels, we are faced with a familiar threat that is growing in importance. To counter the terrorist threat--to provide as much safety to Americans at home and abroad--we may need to not only strengthen and reinforce existing capabilities but legislate additional resources. If we fail in this calling, we may face another day when--without warning--an innocent American again falls victim to such evil. ____________________