21 June 1997 See related documents: http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4 March 1997 I spoke this morning with William H. Payne in NM (505-292-7037), who confirmed that this NSA suit is authentic. ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3 March 1997 Source: Anonymous ------------------------------------------------------------------ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO ) William H. Payne ) Arthur R. Morales ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v ) Civ No: 97 2266 SC ) FILED 97 FEB 28 Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF ) AM 10:51 Director, National Security Agency ) National Security Agency ) 9800 Savage Road ) Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 ) ) Defendant ) ____________________________________________) COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 1 This is an action under the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA], 5 USC Article 552, for injunctive and other appropriate relief and seeking the disclosure and release of agency records improperly withheld from plaintiff William Payne [Payne] by defendant Kenneth Minihan of the National Security Agency [NSA]. Jurisdiction and Venue 2 This court has both subject matter jurisdiction over this action and personal jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to 5 USC Article 552(a)(4)(B). This court also has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 USC Article 1331. Venue lies in this district under 5 U.S.C. Article 552(a)(4)(B). The Parties 3 Plaintiff Payne was employed by Sandia National Laboratories [Sandia] between 1980 and 1992. Payne was project leader for the Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit [MSCU] at Sandia between about 1982 and 1986. The MSCU was funded by NSA. Payne designed and built the hardware/software data authenticator for the US/USSR Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for Sandia between 1986 and 1992. Payne held SECRET clearance when Payne worked for the Navy, DOE Q clearance, crypto and SCI access while at Sandia. Payne is author of, Machine, Assembly, and System Programming for the IBM 360, New York: Harper & Row, 1969; Programacion en Lenguaje de Maquina, Asemblador,y de Sistemas con el IBM 360, Harper & Row, 197; Implementing BASICs: How BASICs Work, Reston/Prentice-Hall, 1982, with Patricia Payne; and Embedded controller Forth for the 8031 family, Academic Press, 1990. Payne is author of about 38 technical articles in the areas of pseudorandom number generation, machine combinatorics, and human factors. Payne Discovered the Generalized Feedback Shift Register (GFSR) pseudorandom number generator. The GFSR documented in Knuth, D. The Art of Computer Programming, Semi-numerical Algorithms, Vol 2, 2nd edition. Payne's PhD students include: T. G. Lewis, Computer Science. Currently employed as department chairman, Navy Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, two term Editor-in-Chief of IEEE Software, now Editor-in-Chief IEEE Computer and J. S. Sobolewski, Computer Science. Currently employed as Associate Vice President of Computer Information and Resource Technology and Professor of Electrical Engineering, University of New Mexico. Sobolewski is one of the Maui supercomputer center directors. Payne's work experience includes: National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Navy Electronics Laboratory, San Diego, CA; Computer Science and Psychology professor at Washington State University, Pullman, WA; Visiting Research Associate Professor of Computer Science, Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL. Plaintiff Arthur R. Morales, joining as a concerned citizen, is employed as an electrical engineer by Sandia National Laboratories. Morales started and lead a class action lawsuit against Sandia National Labs on behalf of Hispanics. Settlement of this lawsuit in October 1993 resulted in compensation for hundreds of minorities and women for employment mistreatment. 4 Defendant Kenneth Minihan of the NSA is an establishment within the Department of Defense. NSA is an agency within the meaning of 5 USC Article 552(e). NSA has primary responsibility for government cryptography and electronic espionage. The Documents at Issue and Plaintiff Payne's FOIA Requests 5 April 5, 1986 the West Berlin La Belle discotheque, which was a popular hangout of American serviceman, was bombed. Two American soldiers and a Turkish woman were killed. More than 200 people, including 50 Americans, were injured. Washington charged that the bombing was directed by diplomats in the Libyan mission in East Berlin. Nine days later, U.S. warplanes retaliated by swooping down on "terrorist centers"and military bases in Libya. [SPY MASTER, The real-life Karla, his moles, and the East German secret police, Leslie Colitt, Addison-Wesley, 1995] Former president Ronald Reagan announced on TV the the US was justified on the attack on Libya because the US was reading Libyan communications. This initiated in an international effort by those involved in espionage to discover the technical details. NSA employee Tom White was Payne's NSA liaison contact for the US/USSR seismic data authenticator. White told Payne in 1986 that NSA regarded Ronald Reagan as America's greatest traitor. For the reason Reagan announced to the world that the US was reading supposedly-secret communications. 7 In 1992 Sandia supervisor James Gosler told Sandia employees about Gosler's work for NSA on the "covert Channel" in meetings attended by Payne. Payne also arranged a software course for Gosler's employees. NSA Sandia visitor Donald Simard taught portions of the course. Simard and Gosler's employee told Payne about the work they were doing for NSA at Sandia. Writing computer software viruses. 8 In 1992 Sandia transferred Payne to break electronic lock for the Federal Bureau of Investigation/ Engineering Research Facility. Gosler attempted to transfer Payne to work on an NSA project. Payne refused. 9 Gosler told Payne he violated the agreement, WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CONCERNING RESEARCH IN CRYPTOGRAPHY AT SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the National Security Agency (NSA) have established a working relationship which has grown substantially over the last decade. Currently, there exist several joint project areas of mutual interest. Different policies and administrative procedure exist at SNL and NSA which govern the handling of sensitive and classified material, and the documentation and dissemination of such work. It is the purpose of the Agreement to specify the general guidelines under which work will be administered in the area of cryptography research at SNL. First, SNL, in its role as systems integrator, requires and indigenous cryptographic capability to support its Department of Energy mission in the design and development of safe and secure nuclear weapons and in treaty verification. SNL and NSA agree to a cooperative effort to support SNL's needs in a manner consistent with the role of such work to national security. Second, NSA, in its role as the U.S. Government approval authority for cryptographic systems developed for and used in national security applications, recognizes its responsibility to provide support and guidance to SNL's activities in applying cryptography. Third, SNL will regard cryptographic research work as classified when it is initiated or created, i.e., will protect such work as "created classified", and will consult with NSA prior to handling such work as unclassified. Periodic technical and managerial discussions between SNL and NSA will be held to increase the awareness of the security concerns of both organizations and to develop and maintain an SNL cryptographic classification guide which will protect the national security interests of both organizations. This working agreement shall be effective on the date of the last signature and will be reviewed annually by SNL and NSA. It will be valid until terminated by mutual agreement. AGREED: ALBERT NARATH RADM JAMES S. MCFARLAND (USN) President Plans and Policy TITLE TITLE SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY June 10, 1991 22 July 1991 DATE DATE Payne denied this. 10 Payne was fired from Sandia National Laboratories on July 27, 1992. This is to advise you that effective July 27, 1992, you will be terminated from Sandia National Laboratories. This action is the results of your flagrant attack on a valued Sandia customer and repeated insensitivity to security/classification requirements. These acts violate Sandia National Laboratories Code of Conduct, specifically the Personal Conduct section,, and the Safeguarding Information and Records Section." ... 11 Payne sued but Sandia was given summary judgment. Payne eventually filed a criminal complaint affidavit on judge John Conway. CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT: JOHN E. CONWAY New Mexico judge John E. Conway (The Court) assumed control from magistrate judge, William Deaton, before trial in a federal lawsuit brought by complainant William H. Payne, case CIV 92 1452 JC/WWD. On May 10, 1993 The Court halted Plaintiff- Appellant's Discovery pending Defendants' motion and ruling on Summary Judgment. July 6, 1993 The Defendants' finally submit MOTION by defendants for summary judgment. Docket sheet entry 93. September 23, 1994 The Court accepts ex parte affidavits in open court regarding classification from Defendant Gosler. Docket sheet entry 134. Excerpt from the transcript reads: MR. FRIEDMAN ... I think that Mr. Gosler will be able to describe the type of items that are in each these pleadings that, in fact, have been deemed classified, or to use a phrase, classifiable, meaning that an official has not yet had the opportunity to put a stamp on it. THE COURT: Is this all in the affidavit? MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, sir. And I believe if Your Honor asks for independent corroboration of what's in his affidavit, he is prepared to present that also. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, VOLUME I, September 23, 1993, beginning page 5, line 21, ending page 6, line 3. The Court concludes the proceedings with: THE COURT: All right. I'll read that affidavit Monday morning at 9:00. We'll be in recess. (Proceedings concluded.) (Page 12 line 10-12)" On information and belief NO transcript of Monday was apparently made. Next entry on the Court docket sheet is 10/6/93. October 18, 1993 The Court blanket seals all documents including documents The Court has, or should not have, in its possession. Docket sheet entry 139. Conway, on information and belief,any documents he ordered sealed evaluated for proper classification by the DOE Office of Declassification pursuant to U.S.C., Title 3 - The President, EO 12356, National Security Information, Section 3.4, Mandatory Review for Declassification using DOE classification guidelines [EO 12356, Sec. 2.2 states, Classification Guidelines] August 10, 1994 Plaintiff's lawyer Stephen D. Aarons finally files MOTION to reconsider protective order. Aarons writes: 1 Whether by inadvertence, the press of federal caseloads, or design, the court suggested at a pretrial conference in May 1993, that both parties suspend further discovery until it ruled on defendants' summary judgment motion. Discovery has ceased ever since. 2 Nearly one year ago, on August 19, 1993, the court issued its amended protective order, effectively sealing all substantive pleadings in this case. 3 Before issuing that order, the court considered plaintiff's written response against sealing. Judge Conway informed all counsel in open court that James R. Gosler would be permitted to deliver unknown documents to Judge Conway at time and place certain. 4 Judge Conway apparently reviewed those documents in camera without counsel for plaintiff. 5 The communication with Gosler constitutes an improper, ex parte communication with the one defendant who has been charged in plaintiff's amended complaint with the most outrageous and culpable acts. 6 Given the nature of this lawsuit, where defendants allege some sort of security infraction by plaintiff as justification for his firing, such communication under the guise of national security violated plaintiff's due process rights. Plaintiff has been prejudiced by this improper communication coupled with protracted delays. ... WHEREFORE Plaintiff William H. Payne requests that: A Judge Conway recuse himself from further participation in these proceeding, based on improper communication with defendant Gosler, B The newly designated judge reconsider the standing protective order without recourse to ex parte communications with a named defendant, or in the alternative, allow counsel for plaintiff to review and respond to such communications, and, C The court deny defendants' long-standing motion for summary judgment, set new discovery deadlines under the circumstances, and grant such further relief as justice requires. Aarons Law Firm Counsel for Plaintiff ... 12 Swiss national Crypto AG salesman Hans Buehler was arrested for espionage in Tehran in March 1992. Buehler spends 9.5 months in an Iranian prison before he is released for $1,000,000 US. 13 Buehler phones Payne on December 31, 1994. Payne and Buehler exchange information regarding "spiking" of crypto units. 14 Baltimore Sun reporter phoned Payne on June 22, 1995. Payne provides the Sun, A Documents and an audio cassette of a Swiss radio international tape of broadcasts of May 15 and July 18, 1994 telling of the case of Hans Buehler. B A name and phone number of someone who Payne guesses will talk. 15 The Baltimore Sun publishes a sixteen page six-part series between December 3-15, No Such Agency AMERICA'S FORTRESS OF SPIES by Scott Shane and Tom Bowman Part Four RIGGING THE GAME o Spy sting: Few at the Swiss factory knew the mysterious visitors were pulling off a stunning intelligence coup - perhaps the most audacious in the National Security Agency's long war on foreign codes. tells of the case of Swiss Crypto AG communications engineer, Hans Buehler and the spiked crypto units. Shane and Bowman write in Part Four of their series, Engineers 'turning white' IF CRYPTO AG WAS OFFERED a deal by NSA in return for rigging its products, it would not be alone. The approach to American firms usually come during discussions with NSA's export licensing office. "It is not unheard of for NSA to offer preferential export treatment to a company if it built a back door into its equipment," says one person with experience in the field. "I've seen it. I have been in the room." NSA's pitch varies. "Generally with high-level executive it's an appeal to patriotism - how important it is for us to listen to the world," this source says. "With the midlevel commercial types, it's 'Do this and we'll give you preferential export treatment.' To the real technical people, it's 'why don't you do this?' And you don't realize what's being suggested until you see the engineers are turning white." In addition to the carrot of export approval, NSA also can brandish a stick, this source says. "There's the threat" You'll never get another export approval if you don't start to play ball." NSA employee Nora Mackabee was linked to Crypto AG by the Sun. Journalist Loring Wirbel in the January 22, 1996 issue of Electronic Engineering Times wrote, Next in my in-basket was a set of reprints from the Baltimore Sun from the paper's NSA series, which ran in early December. The series reveals the setup by the NSA and CIA of a new covert collection agency, the Special Collection Service, and details the case of Hans Buehler, an employee of Crypto A.G. who was thrown into an Iranian Prison after getting snared in Crypto/NSA string against that country. 15 Swiss, Germans, Americans put the story together. Cryptographic units were "spiked" so that the crypto key was transmitted ['covert channel'] with the cipher text. The method of reading Libya's secret messages referenced by former President Reagan was finally explained. 16 Payne shares this information with a Japanese colleague. ====================================================== BBS: The Albuquerque ROS Date: 03-23-95 (01:59) Number: 5152121 From: INTERNET: FUSHIMI@MISOJIR Refer#: NONE To: BILL PAYNE Recvd: YES (PVT) Subj: Tape Conf: (0) E-mail ------------------------------------------------------ Dear Bill, I have received a cassette tape and other information. Thanks. Your Japanese writing is fine, and I can understand it. Best regards. Masanori Fushimi Postcard from Tallinn, Estonia received Monday March 11, 1996 indicates that recipient received similar materials which were forwarded from Cumberland, MD. 17 Payne does not use Internet for one year beginning September 1995. Friday January 12, 1996 Payne is informed that Sandia's Gosler, Childers, and Hagengruber along with NSA employee Simard were personally involved in "spiking" work has been put on the Internet in three forums. Phone message left on Payne's recorder stated that messages were read in Tehran 5.5 hours later. 18 July 16, 1996 Payne forwards certified criminal complaint affidavits to DC chief judge Harry Edwards naming Gosler, Childers, and others involved in "spiking" work for violating Payne's civil rights. 19 John R. MacArthur author of Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War, 1992 puts together what happened to the Iranians. Chapter 2 Selling Babies For to say the press does things conceals the fundamental truth that the press, strictly speaking, can scarcely be said to do anything. It does not act, it is acted upon. - WALTER KARP "All the Congressmen's Men" Harper's Magazine, July 1989 MUZZLING THE MEDIA during wartime was one thing. Using the media to start a war was quite another, though just as important to the White House. While one public relations specialist, the Pentagon's Pete Williams, was lulling the bureau chiefs to sleep, a host of others work tirelessly to awaken the docile journalist to a previously little know danger named Saddam Hussein. This was no easy task. The Canadian military analyst Gwynne Dyer was largely correct when he remarked that in the fall of 1990 was "Saddam Hussein was not a problem that kept anybody awake in July." Before his seizure of Kuwait, the Iraqi dictator was regarded by many politicians and journalists as merely another unpleasant Third World strongman for whom the U.S. foreign-policy establishment had a necessary affinity. From 1980 to 1988, Hussein had shouldered the burden of killing about 150,000 Iranians, * in addition to at least thirteen thousand of his own citizens, including several thousand unarmed Kurdish civilians, and in the process won the admiration and support of elements of three successive U.S. Administrations. While it might overstate the case to * This number is an Iranian government estimate. In his book, The Longest Day, author Dilip Hiro cites conservative Western estimates of 260,000 Iranian dead. suggest that in 1980 the Carter Administration encouraged Hussein to attack Khomeini's Shiite legions, one can safely say that no one in the Carter camp seemed to object very loudly. In those days (and through most of the eighties), Khomeini's Islamic revolution was regarded by the U.S. as the greatest threat to peace in the Middle East and to a steady supply of cheap oil. The semisecular Hussein, cognizant of his own restive Shiite majority, viewed Khomeini with equal unease, and he hungered after Iranian oil and ports. This happy confluence of interests, coming on the heels of the Iranian kidnaping of the U.S. embassy staff in Tehran, guaranteed at the very least official U.S. neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. In this case, however, neutrality rapidly metamorphosed into quiet backing for Iraq, which eventually led to military support. At first, practical dealings and the hostage crisis were thought to require military aid for Iran as well, but by 1984 the Reagan Administration "tilted" toward Iraq and against Iran. Better the mustachioed Saddam, with whom one could deal, the thinking went, than the bearded Khomeini, who actually meant what he said when he called America the "Great Satan." As Germaine Greer put it in London's The Independent Magazine, the West "saw Iraq as sort of a repulsive friend in that it was slaughtering the sons of a worse enemy." Outside the Washington establishment, there was genuine concern about Hussein's penchant for killing people without due process. Human rights groups were well aware of the Iraqi President's violent behavior and had carefully documented his crimes. In March 1990, for example, the Committee to Protect Journalists expressed its alarm when Hussein hanged Farzad Bazoft, an Iranian journalist who was arrested after taking soil samples from the grounds of an Iraqi weapons plant in full view of Iraqi soldiers. Bazoft was said to be investigating a massive explosion at the facility for the Observer on London. Hussein also periodically made threats to annihilate Israel, but this sort of rhetoric hardly distinguished him from most of his fellow Arab leaders. At such behavior official Washington yawned. Human rights groups were always yowling about this or that Middle Eastern despot; whether it was Hafez Assad of Syria or Khomeini or Hussein or the Emir of Kuwait or King Fahd of Saudi Arabia made little difference to the realpoliticians. What mattered was "What have you done for me lately?" and lately Iraq had done a lot to check Iran. ... The willingness to give Hussein the benefit of the doubt extended into the high echelons of the Bush Administration, which often seemed devoted to cleaning up his bad-boy image. Sometimes the Administration offered direct advice of its vilified client. In her famous meeting with Hussein on July 25, 1990, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie tried her best to help out with the dictator's questionable character. After consoling Hussein over a "cheap and unjust" profile by ABC's Diane Sawyer, Glaspie wished out loud of an "appearance in the media, even for five minutes," by the Iraqi President that "would help [the Administration] explain Iraq to the American people." She also noted wistfully that if George Bush "had control of the media, his job would be much easier." ... Another example of Administration PR support for Hussein concerned Iraqi use of chemical weapons. As recently as May 1990, he had been portrayed by the Pentagon as rather ordinary Middle Eastern dictator who happened to kill political opponents with poison gas. Just four months later he was cast by the Administration as the uniquely evil equivalent of Adolph Hitler; suddenly the Iraqi President relished the use of gas on ethnic minorities, particularly Kurds and - if he could get away with it - Israeli Jews. Among those who actually cared about such things, Hussein was, in fact, infamous for his use of chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds who exploited the Iran-Iraq war to further their dream (doomed as always) of independence. The most notorious of these Iraqi massacres occurred at Halabja, in March 1988. There, according to human rights monitors, about four thousand Kurdish civilians, including women, children, and the elderly, were killed in a chemical attack allegedly order by Iraqi forces to punish the Kurds for helping Iran. But in spring 1990, Pentagon leaders appeared eager to convey another perspective: they said the victims of Halabja were killed in a crossfire of Iraqi and Iranian gas. The new version of events suggested you could flip a coin when it came to atrocities by the two combatants. Such are the rules of realpolitik ... Later, in the summer, the Bush Administration would cynically beat back attempts by members of Congress, disturbed by Hussein's violent conduct and belligerence toward Israel, to place stricter controls on U.S trade with Iraq. And in the meeting between Ambassador Glaspie and Hussein, the U.S. strongly suggested it would not intervene in a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. 2. Selling Babies The Reagan Administration tilt toward Iraq - both military and diplomatic - was as cynical a display of realpolitik as one can find in recent U.S. history. It began in March 1982, when the United States removed Iraq from the State Department's list of nations that support international terrorism, and twenty-two months later added Iran to it terrorist blacklist. This permitted the Administration to guarantee U.S. Bank loans to Iraq for the purchase of American grain and opened to door to future sales of military technology at the same time that the Administration's Operation Staunch was attempting to slow worldwide arms sale (not withstanding Oliver North's future efforts) to Iran. Following a meeting between Reagan and Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz in November 1984, according to Dilip Hiro's The Longest War, the U.S. set up direct links between the CIA and the American embassy in Bagdad to aid the Iraqi war effort; thus, the intelligence shared with the Bagdad government helped defeat the Iranian offensive of March 1985. Collaboration between Washington and Bagdad increased to the point where, by early 1987, U.S. Navy ships were guiding Iragi missiles to their Iranian targets, according to BBC correspondent John Simpson. In his book From the House of War, Simpson reports for the first time that the USS Stark was hit by two Iraqi Exocet missiles on May 17, 1987, because the Iraqi pilot "homed in accidentally on the radio beam from the Stark which was directing the pilot to his [Iranian] target." The incident killed thirty-seven American crewmen and, Simpson writes, the White House "did not even ask Iraq for compensation..." On May 29, Hiro says, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage stated publicly, "We can't stand to see Iraq defeated." In The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict by Dilip Hiro states on the cover text, How was Iraq - at a 3 to 1 disadvantage in population - able to sustain an eight year war and arm one-tenth of its entire population? ... It had been a bloody and expensive conflict. Conservative Western estimate put the total number of war dead at 367,000 - Iran accounting for 262,00 and Iraq 105,000. With more than 70,000 injured, the total casualties were put at over million. The official figures, given a month later by minister of Islamic guidance in a radio interview, put the Iranian dead at 123,220 combatants, and another 60,711 missing in action. In addition 11,000 civilians had lost their lives. Tehran's total of nearly 200,000 troops and civilians killed was in stark contrast to Bagdad's estimate of 800,000 Iranian dead." page 250. And we get an idea of magnitude of the effect of the US spy stings. CNN, War in the Gulf, 1991, tells of the losses by the Iranians, While the Iragis were building their army, the Iranians were proclaiming the mobilization of 200,000 more men for an offensive that would end the war by January 21, 1987 - the Iranian New year. "The last campaign," as it was billed, began on December 24, 1986, when a large Iranian force tried to take the small island of Umm Rassas in the Shatt al-Arab. The Iranians planed to use the island as a staging area for an assault of Basra. The loss of Basra would mean the loss of southern Iraq and, most inevitably, the loss of the war. The Iraqis defended Basra in a series of battles that demonstrated a new flair for maneuvering large forces. It was as if the Iraqis were fighting a World War II-style battle of armor and movement, while the Iranians were fighting a World War I-style engagement of frontal assaults and slaughter. The Iraqis methodically trapping and annihilating isolated units, killed as many as 70,000 Iranians while suffering about 10,000 killed or wounded. and of Iranian resolve, In November 1981, at the town of Bostan, the Iranians shocked even the battle-hardened Iraqis with an incredibly brutal human-wave attack. First came hundreds of youths, some of them children only 12 years old. They ran trough a mine field blowing themselves to pieces to clear a path for the Basij, who hurled themselves against the barbed- wire of the next line of defense. Most of the Basij were mowed down by the Iragi fire, but wounded and dying Basij crawled to the entanglements and cut through them. Over the corpses of the Basij came thousands of Pasdaran in waves. The Iraqis retreated at the sight of such fanaticism. 20 June 10, 1996 Payne issues a FOIA to NSA administrator Bruce Bottomly, ... I request access to, 3 all NSA intercepted Iranian messages and translations between January 1, 1980 and June 10, 1996, 4 all NSA intercepted Libyan messages and translations between January 1, 1980 and June 10, 1996. 5 USC 552(b) permits withholding only properly classified documents from a Freedom on Information Act (FOIA) request. ... Therefore, I ask NSA to perform the mandatory declassification review ordered by EO 12356 if NSA feels that any of the documents are properly classified under its required published classification guidelines which I cannot find. ... It appears that NSA/US government was giving Iranian tactical war messages to Iraq during the Iran/Iraq war. ... Payne does not receive a response. 21 Sandia issues technical report SAND91-2201 Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System authored by Payne in which Payne alerts NSA to generic deficiencies in NSA's crypto algorithms. APPENDIX T Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies This draft memorandum was circulated at NSA. No final copy was required. Sandia Labs received one new algorithm. OFFICIAL USE ONLY 181 [ ] is used to indicate penciled changes in the typed text. Appendix T reads, DRAFT June 21, 1989 Dr James J. Hearn Deputy Director of Information Security National Security Agency Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 Dear Dr. Hearn: The National Security Agency provided an approved data authentication algorithm for the SALT II seismic verification program in the middle 1970's. It is called the National Seismic Station - unmanned [U] Seismic Observatory data authentication algorithm and [ .It] is authored by Ronald Benincasa. The algorithm is currently being used for the Deployable Seismic Verification System. Data rates increased so the NSS-USO algorithm implementation technology is upgraded. The algorithm continues to serve well [well is crossed out] for this particular program. We considered using this approved algorithm for other treaty verification programs but is has several major [major is crossed out] deficiencies which make it awkward to apply. These deficiencies are: [include is penciled above 'are'] 1. The algorithm is bit oriented as opposed to bye, 16 bit word, 32 bit double word or 64 bit quad word oriented. 2. The algorithm required stepping two of its internal registers at a rate many times the data rate. This limits the maximum rate at which data can be authenticated. 3. The algorithm, because of deficiency 2, is only suitable for implementation in hardware. 4. The hardware implementation requires too much hardware using low technology chips releasable to treaty participants. The device is too big and expensive. 5. The original algorithm specification was amended by NSA to handle resynchronization in event of data transmission errors. It requires additional information to be added to a data frame to preserve adequate security. DRAFT 182 OFFICIAL USE ONLY DRAFT 6. The algorithm is currently classified SECRET although its declassification to a level so its details can be given to the Soviet Union has been promised. 7. We expect to have data authentication applications with bilateral and multilateral treaties. We feel it is [is is crossed out] advisable to use different algorithms for different treaties. We need a number of unclassified data authentication algorithms which apply to different data widths and speeds. The algorithms should permit inexpensive implementation in small packages. I ask that NSA assist us by providing us these algorithms. Sincerely, TBD by DOE DRAFT To: Mark and Ed, R From Bill FAX 505-846-6652 phone 505 -292 [292 is crossed out. 884 is penciled above] -6847 Tom read and approved this. We wait for you comments. When we all agree we'll forward this to Doug at DOE. cc Amy Johnston [ in pencil] Appendix T was apparently interpreted as "flagrant attack on a valued Sandia customer" which, of course, is NSA. 22 Payne revealed to the public the value 31. "The algorithm required stepping two of its internal registers at a rate many times the data rate." NSA believes that 31 is classified. Payne believes that this is classification abuse. Therefore, Payne issued a FOIA to NSA crypto-mathematician Brian Snow also on June 10, 1996. I found no evidence that NSA possesses any special crypto skills, and apparently hides its deficiencies behind the veil of classification abuse. To the contrary, I discovered generic deficient crypto work. We brought this to the attention of NSA. Sandia even offered to help NSA fix its deficient crypto work. And NSA attempted to correct its deficient crypto work. Therefore, under 5 USC 522b I request access all technical documentation on, 1 Benincasa's original NSS/USO algorithm, 2 Benincasa's revision of 1, 3 The Unkenholtz - Judy GRANITE algorithm, 4 Your MSCU algorithm, 5 the clipper algorithm, 6 the STU III algorithms. I feel that published analyses of the above 6 algorithms will show the Clinton administration, congress, and the public that NSA possess no superior knowledge of crypto matters. Payne received no response from NSA. 23 October 24, 1996 Payne appeals the non-response FOIA denial to NSA's director Minihan. 31 December 1996 NSA FOIA/PA Appeals Authority, William P. Crowell, writes, Because the process of your request has not progressed to a point where there have been any initial, substantive Agency determination of the release or withholding of responsive records, I can offer you no administrative remedy. 24 To date, defendant Minihan of NSA has not released any information responsive to plaintiff's requests. 25 Plaintiff Payne has exhausted the applicable administrative remedies. 26 Defendant Minihan of NSA has wrongfully withheld the requested records from plaintiff. Requested Relief WHEREFORE, plaintiffs prays that this Court: A order defendant Minihan of NSA to disclose the requested records in their entirety in machine-readable form and make copies available to plaintiffs; B provide for expeditious proceedings in this action; C award plaintiffs its costs and reasonable fees incurred in this action; and D grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Respectfully submitted, _________________________ William H. Payne 13015 Calle de Sandias NE Albuquerque, NM 87111 505-292-7037 _________________________ Arthur R. Morales 1024 Los Arboles NW Albuquerque, NM 87107 505-348-1381 Pro se litigants ------------------------------------------------------------------ [End]