30 April 1998
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 1998 09:59:55 -0400 To: "Carl M. Ellison" <cme@acm.org> From: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com> Subject: Re: Director of Central Intelligence on Trust Cc: cryptography@c2.net At 11:38 PM +0100 4/29/98, Carl M. Ellison wrote: > >At 13:05 -0400 4/29/98, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote: >>Tenet says the need now is for trust systems rather than security systems: > >He's right, in a way -- but his plans are wrong, if he thinks gov't >experience with key management is applicable. After all, with the gov't, >all authority is delegated down a hierarchy and keys are usually generated >in a central place (the NSA?) and handed out to users. > >He needs to start following the SPKI WG and adding his $0.02 I agree, that is why I posted those excerpts. Sorry the formatting got messed up. If you are interested in NSA's approach to key management (and a lot of other stuff) check out http://ste.xservices.com/briefings/ste_briefings.html This site has an extensive set of slides from a conference held in February on STE (Secure Terminal Equipment), the NSA's replacement for the STU-III secure telephone in wired environments. Some tidbits I found interesting: About 370,000 STU-IIIs have been shipped About 290,000 Fortezza cards have been delivered STE shipments have just begun with the Navy as the first customer (300 sets). STE, which requires an ISDN line or military equivalent, can set up a secure call in 1.9 seconds. STU-III takes 17 seconds. Audio is high quality and users can set up three-way conference calls. STE requires a third version of Fortezza, Fortezza plus (KOV-14), for classified use. On STEs, the previous Fortezza Plus (KOV-8) is rated for Sensitive But Unclassified use only. Original strength Fortezza cards cannot be used with STE. STE boxes are "releasable" (unlike STU-III sets). All crypto algorithms are in the Fortezza KOV-14 card. These include the traditional Fortezza algorithms like Skipjack and SHA, plus "high grade algorithms:" BATON, FIREFLY, SDNS signature, STU-III. STE desk sets start at around $3200, KOV-14 cards are $255. Key management is baroque. Apparently STE incorporates the same key management approach as STU-III, with the Crypto Ignition Key (CIK) initially loaded on the KOV-14 at a central Electronic Key Management System facility, and shipped as classified material via courier to the user location. The user then transfers the CIK into the STE. The KOV-14 then becomes unclassified, but still needed to make calls. Electronic key distribution is planned, but two years out. If you want to travel, you can off load the CIK onto a separate "travel" Fortezza card. NSA's root CA is located in a place called Finksburg. Arnold Reinhold
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 1998 12:23:02 -0400 (EDT) From: [Removed] To: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com> cc: "Carl M. Ellison" <cme@acm.org>, cryptography@c2.net Subject: Re: Director of Central Intelligence on Trust Some more references to STU-III, EKMS, Finksburg and NSA keys: http://www.dtic.mil/dodsi/sab3e.html http://www.jya.com/don-ekms.htm http://infosec.navy.mil/TEXT/EKMS/ http://www.fas.org/irp/facility/finksburg.htm [Removed]