14 March 1997 ------------------------------------------------------------------- From the House Documents Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] 105th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-10 CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION __________ COMMUNICATION from THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES transmitting NOTIFICATION THAT THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (``WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION''--(WMD)) AND THE MEANS OF DELIVERING SUCH WEAPONS IS TO CONTINUE IN EFFECT BEYOND NOVEMBER 14, 1996--RECEIVED IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NOVEMBER 12, 1996, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 1622(d) January 7, 1997.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed The White House, Washington, November 12, 1996. Hon. Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Speaker: On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass destruction''--(WMD)) and of the means of delivery such weapons, I issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice of its continuation. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. Therefore, I am hereby advising the Congress that the national emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 1995, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1996. Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 and have sent the attached notice of extension to the Federal Register for publication. The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the most recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182). During the last 6 months, the three export control regulations issued under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remained fully in force and continue to be applied in order to control the export of items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. The threat of chemical weapons is one of the most pressing security challenges of the post-Cold War era. With bipartisan support from the Congress, the United States has long been a leader in the international fight against the spread of chemical weapons. Democrats and Republicans have worked hard together to strengthen our security by concluding the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC). The CWC bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. It is both an arms control and a nonproliferation treaty that requires total elimination of chemical weapons stocks, prohibits chemical weapons-related activities, bans assistance for such activities and bars trade with non-Parties in certain relevant chemicals. This treaty denies us no option we would otherwise wish to exercise and is a critical instrument in our global fight against the spread of chemical weapons. The CWC provides concrete measures that will raise the costs and risks of engaging in chemical weapons-related activities. The CWC's declaration and inspection requirements will improve our knowledge of possible chemical weapons activities, whether conducted by countries or terrorists. The treaty's provisions constitute the most comprehensive and intrusive verification regime ever negotiated, covering virtually every aspect of a chemical weapons program, from development through production and stockpiling. These provisions provide for access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more difficult, more risky and more expensive. Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated and banned from trading with States Parties in certain key chemicals. Indeed, major chemical industry groups have testified before the Senate that our companies stand to lose millions of dollars in international sales if the United States is not a State Party when the treaty enters into force. That could happen if we fail to ratify the CWC promptly. It is nearly four years since the Bush Administration signed the Convention and three years since this Administration submitted the CWC to the Senate for its advice and consent. All our major NATO allies have deposited their instruments of ratification, as have all other G-7 members. The CWC will enter into force 180 days after it has been ratified by 65 countries. By mid- October 1996, 64 of the 160 signatory countries had done so. It therefore seems likely the CWC will enter into force as early as April 1997. Further delay in securing U.S. ratification of this vital treaty serves only the interests of proliferators and terrorists. Delay may well also endanger the international competitiveness of the chemical industry, one of our largest exporters. In the interim, pressures are increasing in unstable regions to acquire and use chemical weapons. We need to ratify this convention urgently to strengthen our own security, affirm our leadership in nonproliferation and to protect our chemical industry. Ratification must be a top priority of the new Congress in early 1997. During the reporting period, the United States continued to be active in the work of the CWC Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in The Hague. The Prepcom is developing the vital technical and administrative procedures for implementation of the CWC through a strong organization to ensure compliance when the convention enters into force. The United States is working hard with the international community to end the threat from another terrible category of weapons of mass destruction--biological weapons. We are an active member of the Ad Hoc Group striving to create a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (The Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). The Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The Group held meetings in July and September with the goal of preparing for the late November 1996 Fourth BWC Review Conference. Concluding a new BWC protocol is high on our list of nonproliferation goals. We should aim to complete such a protocol by 1998. The United States continues to be a leader in the Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation regime. The United States supported the entry of the Republic of Korea (South Korea)--a country with an important chemical industry--into the AG. The ROK became the group's 30th member in late Sepgember--a tribute to the continuing international recognition of the importance of the Group's effort in nonproliferation and to the commitment of the ROK to that goal. The United States attended the AG's annual plenary session from October 14-17, 1996, during which the Group continued to focus on strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address the threat of CBW terrorism. At the behest of the United States, the AG first began in-depth discussion of terrorism during the 1995 plenary session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack earlier that year. The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief that full adherence to the CWC and the BWC will be the best way to achieve permanent global elimination of CBW, and that all states adhering to these Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities support this goal. Australia Group participants continue to ensure that all relevant national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC, and CWC, and will be fully consistent with the CWC upon its entry into force. The AG believes that national export licensing policies on chemical weapons-related items fulfill the obligation established under Article I of the CWC that States Parties never assist, in any way, the acquisition of chemical weapons. Inasmuch as these measures are focused solely on preventing activities banned under the CWC, they are consistent with the undertaking in Article XI of the CWC to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemical materials and related information for purposes not prohibited by the CWC. The AG also agreed to continue its active program of briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on export controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of national policies in these areas. During the last year, the United States imposed chemical weapons proliferation sanctions on one individual. On November 17, 1995, sanctions were imposed under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 on Russian citizen Anatoliy Kuntsevich for knowingly providing material assistance to a foreign chemical weapons program. The United States carefully controlled exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, exercising restraint in considering all such proposed transfers consistent with the Guyidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In May 1996, the United States imposed missile technology proliferation sanctions against two entities in Iran and one entity in North Korea for transfers involving Category II MTCR Annex items. MTCR Partners continued to share information about proliferation problems with each other and with other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for use in missile programs of concern. The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to encourage non-members to export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since my last report, we have continued our missile nonproliferation dialogue with the Republic of Korea and Ukraine. In the course of normal diplomatic relations, we also have pursued such discussions with other countries in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In June 1996, the United States was an active participant in discussions at the MTCR's Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting on Regional Missile Proliferation Issues. This meeting resulted in an in-depth discussion of regional missile proliferation concerns and actions the Partners could take, individually and collectively, to address the specific concerns raised by missile proliferation in regions of tension. In July 1996, the MTCR held a Seminar on Transshipment Issues. The Seminar was held in Washington and hosted by the United States on behalf of the Regime. It brought together foreign policy makers and experts from twelve MTCR Partner countries and seven non-MTCR countries for the first joint discussion of ways to address the proliferation threat posed by transshipment. The seminar was successful in focusing attention on the transshipment problem and fostered a productive exchange of ideas on how to impede proliferators' misuse of transshipment. Seminar participants also identified several areas for possible follow-up, which the United States pursued at the 1996 Edinburgh MTCR Plenary. The MTCR held its Eleventh Plenary Meeting at Edinburgh, Scotland, October 7-11. At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners reaffirmed their commitment to controlling exports to prevent proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. They also reiterated their readiness for international cooperation in peaceful space activities that could not contribute to WMD delivery systems. The MTCR Partners also were supportive of U.S. initiatives to follow up on the success of the June 1996 Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting on the regional aspects of missile proliferation and the July 1996 Seminar on transshipment issues. The Partners undertook to be proactive in encouraging key non-Partner transshippers to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex, and in providing them with practical assistance in implementing transshipment controls on missile technology. The Partners also agreed on steps they could take to enhance the MTCR's effectiveness in impeding missile proliferation in South Asia and the Persian Gulf. Finally, the MTCR Partners agreed to increase the transparency of Regime aims and activities, and to continue their efforts to develop a dialogue with countries outside the Regime to encourage voluntary adherence to the MTCR Guidelines and heightened awareness of missile proliferation risks. We also continued vigorous pursuit of our nuclear nonproliferation goals. In May 1995, Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreed at the NPT Review and Extension Conference to extend the NPT indefinitely and without conditions. Since the conference, more nations have acceded to the treaty. There now are more than 180 parties, making the NPT nearly universal. In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, the 50th UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996, adopted and called for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiated over the past two and a half years in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this UN resolution (158- 3-5) demonstrates the CTBT's strong international support and marks a major success for United States foreign policy. On September 24, I and other national leaders signed the CTBT in New York. The United States played a leading role in promoting the negotiation of this agreement by declaring a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992 and calling on all the other declared nuclear weapons states to enact their own moratoria, and by announcing in August of 1995 our support for a complete ban on all tests no matter how small their nuclear yield--a so-called ``zero-yield'' CTBT. The United States also insisted on an effective verification regime to ensure that the treaty enhances rather than reduces the security of its adherents. The CTBT will serve several United States national security interests in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT marks an historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer world. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continues efforts to upgrade control lists and export control procedures. By October 1996, NSG members confirmed their agreement to clarifications to the nuclear trigger list to accord with trigger list changes agreed to by the members of the NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee. The NSG also is actively pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the export regime in accordance with the call in Principles 16 and 17 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The NSG is also continuing efforts to enhance information sharing among members regarding the nuclear programs of proliferant countries. NSG membership increased to 34 with acceptance of Brazil, the Republic of Korea and Ukraine at the 1996 Buenos Aires Plenary. Members continued contacts with Belarus, China, Kazakhstan and Lithuania regarding NSG activities and guidelines. The ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of all suppliers, including nations not members of the regime, to control nuclear and nuclear-related exports in accordance with the NSG guidelines. Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the period from May 14, 1996, through November 14, 1996. Sincerely, William J. Clinton. Notice ---------- Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, I declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass destruction'') and the means of delivering such weapons. Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, the national emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 1995, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1996. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938. This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress. William J. Clinton. The White House, November 12, 1996. ------------------------------------------------------------------- Source: http://library.whitehouse.gov/?request=ExecutiveOrder --------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary ________________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release November 14, 1994 EXECUTIVE ORDER #12938 - - - - - - - PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), Executive Orders Nos. 12851 and 12924, and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of America, find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass destruction") and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat. Accordingly, I hereby order: Section 1. International Negotiations. It is the policy of the United States to lead and seek multilaterally coordinated efforts with other countries to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering such weapons. Accordingly, the Secretary of State shall cooperate in and lead multilateral efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Sec. 2. Imposition of Controls. As provided herein, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall use their respective authorities, including the Arms Export Control Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to controlany exports, to the extent they are not already controlled by the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,that either Secretary determines would assist a country in acquiring the capability to develop, produce, stockpile, deliver, or use weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. The Secretary of State shall pursue early negotiations with foreign governments to adopt effective measures comparable to those imposed under this order. Sec. 3. Department of Commerce Controls. (a) The Secretary of Commerce shall prohibit the export of any goods, technology, or services subject to the Secretary's export jurisdiction that the Secretary of Commerce determines, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate officials, would assist a foreign country in acquiring the capability to develop, produce, stockpile, deliver, or use weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. The Secretary of State shall pursue early negotiations with foreign governments to adopt effective measures comparable to those imposed under this section. more (OVER) 2 (b) Subsection (a) of this section will not apply to exports relating to a particular category of weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons) if their destination is a country with whose government the United States has entered into a bilateral or multilateral arrangement for the control of that category of weapons of mass destruction-related goods (including delivery systems) and technology, or maintains domestic export controls comparable to controls that are imposed by the United States with respect to that category of goods and technology, or that are otherwise deemed adequate by the Secretary of State. (c) The Secretary of Commerce shall require validated licenses to implement this order and shall coordinate any license applications with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. (d) The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall take such actions, including the promulgation of rules, regulations, and amendments thereto,as may be necessary to continue to regulate the activities of United States persons in order to prevent their participation in activities that could contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery, as provided in the Export Administration Regulations, set forth in Title 15, Chapter VII, Subchapter C, of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 768 to 799 inclusive. Sec. 4. Sanctions Against Foreign Persons. (a) In addition to the sanctions imposed on foreign persons as provided in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, sanctions also shall be imposed ona foreign person with respect to chemical and biological weapons proliferation if the Secretary of State determines that the foreign person on or after the effective date of this orderor its predecessor, Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, knowingly and materially contributed to the efforts of any foreign country, project, or entity to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire chemical or biological weapons. (b) No department or agency of the United States Government may procure, or enter into any contract for the procurementof, any goods or services from any foreign person described in subsection (a) of this section. The Secretary of the Treasury shall prohibit the importation into the United States of products produced by that foreign person. (c) Sanctions pursuant to this section may be terminated or not imposed against foreign persons if the Secretary of State determines that there is reliable evidence that the foreign person concerned has ceased all activities referred to in subsection (a). (d) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury may provide appropriate exemptions for procurement contracts necessary to meet U.S. operational military requirements or requirements under defense production agreements, sole source suppliers, spare parts, components, routine servicing and maintenance of products, and medical and humanitarian items. They may provide exemptions for contracts in existence on the date of this order under appropriate circumstances. Sec. 5. Sanctions Against Foreign Countries. (a) In addition to the sanctions imposed on foreign countries as provided in the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and 3 Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, sanctions also shall be imposed on a foreign country as specified in subsection (b) of this section, if the Secretary of State determines that the foreign country has, on or after the effective date of this order or its predecessor, Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, (1) used chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law; (2) made substantial preparations to use chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law; or (3) developed, produced, stockpiled, or otherwise acquired chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law. (b) The following sanctions shall be imposed on any foreign country identified in subsection (a)(1) of this section unless the Secretary of State determines, on grounds of significant foreign policy or national security, that any individual sanction should not be applied. The sanctions specified in this section may be made applicable to the countries identified in subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3) when the Secretary of State determines that such action will further the objectives of this order pertaining to proliferation. The sanctions specified in subsection (b)(2) below shall be imposed with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury. (1) Foreign Assistance. No assistance shall be provided to that country under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or any successor act, or the Arms Export Control Act, other than assistance that is intended to benefit the people of that country directly and that is not channeled through governmental agencies or entities of that country. (2) Multilateral Development Bank Assistance. The United States shall oppose any loan or financial or technical assistance to that country by international financial institutions in accordance with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d). (3) Denial of Credit or Other Financial Assistance. The United States shall deny to that country any credit or financial assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality ofthe United States Government. (4) Prohibition of Arms Sales. The United States Government shall not, under the Arms Export Control Act, sell to that country any defense articles or defense services orissue any license for the export of items on the United States Munitions List. (5) Exports of National Security-Sensitive Goods and Technology. No exports shall be permitted of any goods or technologies controlled for national security reasons under the Export Administration Regulations. (6) Further Export Restrictions. The Secretary of Commerce shall prohibit or otherwise substantially restrict exports to that country of goods, technology, and services (excluding agricultural commodities and products otherwise subject to control). (7) Import Restrictions. Restrictions shall be imposed on the importation into the United States of articles (that may include petroleum or any petroleum product) that are the growth, product, or manufacture of that country. more (OVER) 4 (8) Landing Rights. At the earliest practicable date, the Secretary of State shall terminate, in a manner consistent with international law, the authority of any air carrier that is controlled in fact by the government of that country to engage in air transportation (as defined in section 101(10) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. App. 1301(10)). Sec. 6. Duration. Any sanctions imposed pursuant to sections 4 or 5 of this order shall remain in force until the Secretary of State determines that lifting any sanctionis in the foreign policy or national security interests of the United States or, as to sanctions under section 4 of this order, until the Secretary has made the determination under section 4(c). Sec. 7. Implementation. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce are hereby authorized and directed to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. These actions, and in particular those in sections 4 and 5 of this order, shall be made in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and, as appropriate, other agency heads and shall be implemented in accordance with procedures established pursuant to Executive Order No. 12851. The Secretary concerned may redelegate any of these functions to other officers in agencies of the Federal Government. All heads of departments and agencies of the United States Government are directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order, including the suspension or termination of licenses or other authorizations. Sec. 8. Preservation of Authorities. Nothing in this order is intended to affect the continued effectiveness of any rules, regulations, orders, licenses, or other forms of administrative action issued, taken, or continued in effect heretofore or hereafter under the authority of the International Economic Emergency Powers Act, the Export Administration Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, Executive Order No. 12730 of September 30, 1990, Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, Executive Order No. 12924 of August 18, 1994, and Executive Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994. Sec. 9. Judicial Review. This order is not intended to create, nor does it create, any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, officers, or any other person. Sec. 10. Revocation of Executive Orders Nos. 12735 and 12930. Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, and Executive Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994, are hereby revoked. Sec. 11. Effective Date. This order is effective immediately. This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register. WILLIAM J. CLINTON THE WHITE HOUSE, November 14, 1994. # # # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Executive Order 12938 Signed: Nov. 14, 1994 Fed. Register page and date: 59 FR 59099; Nov. 16, 1994 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction Revokes: EO 12735, Nov. 16, 1990; EO 12930, Sept. 29, 1994 See Notice of Nov. 8, 1995; Notice of Nov. 12, 1996