24 September 1998 Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Congressional Record: September 22, 1998 (House)] [Page H8148-H8198] From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:cr22se98-24] [[pp. H8148-H8198]] CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 3616 [National Defense Authorization Act for 1999] [Snip] TITLE XV--MATTERS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL, EXPORT CONTROLS, AND COUNTER- PROLIFERATION Subtitle A--Arms Control Matters Sec. 1501. One-year extension of limitation on retirement or dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery systems. Sec. 1502. Transmission of executive branch reports providing Congress with classified summaries of arms control developments. Sec. 1503. Report on adequacy of emergency communications capabilities between United States and Russia. Sec. 1504. Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Subtitle B--Satellite Export Controls Sec. 1511. Sense of Congress. Sec. 1512. Certification of exports of missile equipment or technology to China. Sec. 1513. Satellite controls under the United States Munitions List. Sec. 1514. National security controls on satellite export licensing. Sec. 1515. Report on export of satellites for launch by People's Republic of China. Sec. 1516. Related items defined. Subtitle C--Other Export Control Matters Sec. 1521. Authority for export control activities of the Department of Defense. Sec. 1522. Release of export information by Department of Commerce to other agencies for purpose of national security assessment. Sec. 1523. Nuclear export reporting requirement. Sec. 1524. Execution of objection authority within the Department of Defense. Subtitle D--Counterproliferation Matters Sec. 1531. One-year extension of counterproliferation authorities for support of United Nations Special Commission on Iraq. Sec. 1532. Sense of Congress on nuclear tests in South Asia. Sec. 1533. Report on requirements for response to increased missile threat in Asia-Pacific region. Subtitle A--Arms Control Matters SEC. 1501. ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT OR DISMANTLEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS. Section 1302 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1948) is amended-- (1) in subsections (a), (b), and (c)(2), by striking out ``during fiscal year 1998'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``during the strategic delivery systems retirement limitation period'' ; (2) in subsection (c)(1), by striking out ``during fiscal year 1998''; (3) in subsection (d)(1)-- (A) by striking out ``for fiscal year 1998''; and (B) by striking out ``during fiscal year 1998''; and (4) by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) Strategic Delivery Systems Retirement Limitation Period.--For purposes of this section, the term ``strategic delivery systems retirement limitation period'' means the period of fiscal years 1998 and 1999.''. SEC. 1502. TRANSMISSION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH REPORTS PROVIDING CONGRESS WITH CLASSIFIED SUMMARIES OF ARMS CONTROL DEVELOPMENTS. (a) Reporting Requirement.--The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (or the Secretary of State, if the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency becomes an element of the Department of State) shall transmit to the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives on a periodic basis reports containing classified summaries of arms control developments. (b) Contents of Reports.--The reports required by subsection (a) shall include information reflecting the activities of forums established to consider issues relating to treaty implementation and treaty compliance. SEC. 1503. REPORT ON ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA. Not later than three months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a report on the status and adequacy of current direct communications capabilities between the governments of the United States and Russia. The report shall identify each existing direct communications link between those governments and each such link that is designed to be used, or is available to be used, in an emergency situation. The Secretary shall describe in the report any shortcomings with the existing communications capabilities and shall include such proposals as the Secretary considers appropriate to improve those capabilities. In considering improvements to propose, the Secretary shall assess the feasibility and desirability of establishing a direct communications link between the commanders of appropriate United States unified and specified commands, including the United States Space Command and the United States Strategic Command, and their Russian counterparts. SEC. 1504. RUSSIAN NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. (a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings: (1) The 7,000 to 12,000 or more nonstrategic (or ``tactical'') nuclear weapons estimated by the United States Strategic Command to be in the Russian arsenal may present the greatest threat of sale or theft of a nuclear warhead in the world today. (2) As the number of deployed strategic warheads in the Russian and United States arsenals declines to just a few thousand under the START accords, Russia's vast superiority in tactical nuclear warheads--many of which have yields equivalent to strategic nuclear weapons--could become strategically destabilizing. (3) While the United States has unilaterally reduced its inventory of tactical nuclear weapons by nearly 90 percent since the end of the Cold War, Russia is behind schedule in implementing the steep tactical nuclear arms reductions pledged by former Soviet President Gorbachev in 1991 and Russian President Yeltsin in 1992, perpetuating the dangers from Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the President should call on Russia to expedite reduction of its tactical nuclear arsenal in accordance with the promises made in 1991 and 1992. (c) Report.--Not later than March 15, 1999, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the nonstrategic nuclear weapons of Russia. The report shall include-- (1) estimates regarding the current numbers, types, yields, viability, and locations of those weapons; (2) an assessment of the strategic implications of Russia's nonstrategic arsenal, including the potential use of those weapons in a strategic role or the use of their components in strategic nuclear systems and the potential of Russian superiority in tactical nuclear weapons to destabilize the overall nuclear balance as strategic nuclear weapons are sharply reduced under the START accords; (3) an assessment of the extent of the current threat of theft, sale, or unauthorized use of the warheads of those weapons, including an analysis of Russian command and control as it concerns the use of tactical nuclear weapons; (4) a summary of past, current, and planned efforts to work cooperatively with Russia to account for, secure, and reduce Russia's stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and associated fissile material; (5) a summary of how the United States would prevent, or plans to cope militarily with, scenarios in which a deterioration in relations with Moscow causes Russia to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons or in which Russia threatens to employ, or actually employs, tactical nuclear weapons in a local or regional conflict involving the United States or allies of the United States; and [[Page H8169]] (6) an assessment of the steps that could be taken by the United States to enhance military preparedness in order (A) to deter any potential attempt by Russia to possibly exploit its advantage in tactical nuclear weapons through coercive ``nuclear diplomacy'' or on the battlefield, or (B) to counter Russia if Russia should make such an attempt to exploit its advantage in tactical nuclear weapons. (d) Views.--The Secretary of Defense shall include in the report under subsection (c) the views of the Director of Central Intelligence and of the commander of the United States Strategic Command. Subtitle B--Satellite Export Controls SEC. 1511. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) United States business interests must not be placed above United States national security interests; (2) United States foreign policy and the policies of the United States regarding commercial relations with other countries should affirm the importance of observing and adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); (3) the United States should encourage universal observance of the Guidelines to the Missile Technology Control Regime; (4) the exportation or transfer of advanced communication satellites and related technologies from United States sources to foreign recipients should not increase the risks to the national security of the United States; (5) due to the military sensitivity of the technologies involved, it is in the national security interests of the United States that United States satellites and related items be subject to the same export controls that apply under United States law and practices to munitions; (6) the United States should not issue any blanket waiver of the suspensions contained in section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246), regarding the export of satellites of United States origin intended for launch from a launch vehicle owned by the People's Republic of China; (7) the United States should pursue policies that protect and enhance the United States space launch industry; and (8) the United States should not export to the People's Republic of China missile equipment or technology that would improve the missile or space launch capabilities of the People's Republic of China. SEC. 1512. CERTIFICATION OF EXPORTS OF MISSILE EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA. The President shall certify to the Congress at least 15 days in advance of any export to the People's Republic of China of missile equipment or technology (as defined in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c)) that-- (1) such export is not detrimental to the United States space launch industry; and (2) the missile equipment or technology, including any indirect technical benefit that could be derived from such export, will not measurably improve the missile or space launch capabilities of the People's Republic of China. SEC. 1513. SATELLITE CONTROLS UNDER THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS LIST. (a) Control of Satellites on the United States Munitions List.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all satellites and related items that are on the Commerce Control List of dual-use items in the Export Administration Regulations (15 C.F.R. Part 730 et seq.) on the date of the enactment of this Act shall be transferred to the United States Munitions List and controlled under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778). (b) Defense Trade Controls Registration Fees.--Section 45 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2717) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)-- (A) by striking out ``$700,000'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``100 percent''; and (B) by striking out ``(a) Defense Trade Controls Registration Fees.--''; and (2) by striking out subsection (b). (c) Effective Date.--(1) Subsection (a) shall take effect on March 15, 1999, and shall not apply to any export license issued before such effective date or to any export license application made under the Export Administration Regulations before such effective date. (2) The amendments made by subsection (b) shall be effective as of October 1, 1998. (d) Report.--Not later than January 1, 1999, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to Congress a report containing-- (1) a detailed description of the plans of the Department of State to implement the requirements of this section, including any organizational changes that are required and any Executive orders or regulations that may be required; (2) an identification and explanation of any steps that should be taken to improve the license review process for exports of the satellites and related items described in subsection (a), including measures to shorten the timelines for license application reviews, and any measures relating to the transparency of the license review process and dispute resolution procedures; (3) an evaluation of the adequacy of resources available to the Department of State, including fiscal and personnel resources, to carry out the additional activities required by this section; and (4) any recommendations for additional actions, including possible legislation, to improve the export licensing process under the Arms Export Control Act for the satellites and related items described in subsection (a). SEC. 1514. NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON SATELLITE EXPORT LICENSING. (a) Actions by the President.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President shall take such actions as are necessary to implement the following requirements for improving national security controls in the export licensing of satellites and related items: (1) Mandatory technology control plans.--All export licenses shall require a technology transfer control plan approved by the Secretary of Defense and an encryption technology transfer control plan approved by the Director of the National Security Agency. (2) Mandatory monitors and reimbursement.-- (A) Monitoring of Proposed Foreign Launch of Satellites.-- In any case in which a license is approved for the export of a satellite or related items for launch in a foreign country, the Secretary of Defense shall monitor all aspects of the launch in order to ensure that no unauthorized transfer of technology occurs, including technical assistance and technical data. The costs of such monitoring services shall be fully reimbursed to the Department of Defense by the person or entity receiving such services. All reimbursements received under this subparagraph shall be credited to current appropriations available for the payment of the costs incurred in providing such services. (B) Contents of monitoring.--The monitoring under subparagraph (A) shall cover, but not be limited to-- (i) technical discussions and activities, including the design, development, operation, maintenance, modification, and repair of satellites, satellite components, missiles, other equipment, launch facilities, and launch vehicles; (ii) satellite processing and launch activities, including launch preparation, satellite transportation, integration of the satellite with the launch vehicle, testing and checkout prior to launch, satellite launch, and return of equipment to the United States; (iii) activities relating to launch failure, delay, or cancellation, including post-launch failure investigations; and (iv) all other aspects of the launch. (3) Mandatory licenses for crash-investigations.--In the event of the failure of a launch from a foreign country of a satellite of United States origin-- (A) the activities of United States persons or entities in connection with any subsequent investigation of the failure are subject to the controls established under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, including requirements for licenses issued by the Secretary of State for participation in that investigation; (B) officials of the Department of Defense shall monitor all activities associated with the investigation to insure against unauthorized transfer of technical data or services; and (C) the Secretary of Defense shall establish and implement a technology transfer control plan for the conduct of the investigation to prevent the transfer of information that could be used by the foreign country to improve its missile or space launch capabilities. (4) Mandatory notification and certification.--All technology transfer control plans for satellites or related items shall require any United States person or entity involved in the export of a satellite of United States origin or related items to notify the Department of Defense in advance of all meetings and interactions with any foreign person or entity providing launch services and require the United States person or entity to certify after the launch that it has complied with this notification requirement. (5) Mandatory intelligence community review.--The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State shall provide to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence copies of all export license applications and technical assistance agreements submitted for approval in connection with launches in foreign countries of satellites to verify the legitimacy of the stated end-user or end-users. (6) Mandatory sharing of approved licenses and agreements.--The Secretary of State shall provide copies of all approved export licenses and technical assistance agreements associated with launches in foreign countries of satellites to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (7) Mandatory notification to congress on licenses.--Upon issuing a license for the export of a satellite or related items for launch in a foreign country, the head of the department or agency issuing the license shall so notify Congress. (8) Mandatory reporting on monitoring activities.--The Secretary of Defense shall provide to Congress an annual report on the monitoring of all launches in foreign countries of satellites of United States origin. (9) Establishing safeguards program.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish a program for recruiting, training, and maintaining a staff dedicated to monitoring launches in foreign countries of satellites and related items of United States origin. (b) Exception.--This section shall not apply to the export of a satellite or related items for launch in, or by nationals of, a country that is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or that is a major non-NATO ally of the United States. (c) Effective Date.--The President shall take the actions required by subsection (a) not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 1515. REPORT ON EXPORT OF SATELLITES FOR LAUNCH BY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. (a) Requirement for Report.--Each report to Congress submitted pursuant to subsection (b) of section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (22 [[Page H8170]] U.S.C. 2151 note; Public Law 101-246) to waive the restrictions contained in subsection (a) of that section on the export to the People's Republic of China of any satellite of United States origin or related items shall be accompanied by a detailed justification setting forth the following: (1) A detailed description of all militarily sensitive characteristics integrated within, or associated with, the satellite. (2) An estimate of the number of United States civilian contract personnel expected to be needed in country to carry out the proposed satellite launch. (3)(A) A detailed description of the United States Government's plan to monitor the proposed satellite launch to ensure that no unauthorized transfer of technology occurs, together with an estimate of the number of officers and employees of the United States that are expected to be needed in country to carry out monitoring of the proposed satellite launch; and (B) the estimated cost to the Department of Defense of monitoring the proposed satellite launch and the amount of such cost that is to be reimbursed to the department. (4) The reasons why the proposed satellite launch is in the national security interest of the United States. (5) The impact of the proposed export on employment in the United States, including the number of new jobs created in the United States, on a State-by-State basis, as a direct result of the proposed export. (6) The number of existing jobs in the United States that would be lost, on a State-by-State basis, as a direct result of the proposed export not being licensed. (7) The impact of the proposed export on the balance of trade between the United States and the People's Republic of China and on reducing the current United States trade deficit with the People's Republic of China. (8) The impact of the proposed export on the transition of the People's Republic of China from a nonmarket economy to a market economy and the long-term economic benefit to the United States. (9) The impact of the proposed export on opening new markets to United States-made products through the purchase by the People's Republic of China of United States-made goods and services not directly related to the proposed export. (10) The impact of the proposed export on reducing acts, policies, and practices that constitute significant trade barriers to United States exports or foreign direct investment in the People's Republic of China by United States nationals. (11) The increase that will result from the proposed export in the overall market share of the United States for goods and services in comparison to Japan, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia. (12) The impact of the proposed export on the willingness of the People's Republic of China to modify its commercial and trade laws, practices, and regulations to make United States-made goods and services more accessible to that market. (13) The impact of the proposed export on the willingness of the People's Republic of China to reduce formal and informal trade barriers and tariffs, duties, and other fees on United States-made goods and services entering that country. (b) Militarily Sensitive Characteristics Defined.--In this section, the term ``militarily sensitive characteristics'' includes antijamming capability, antennas, crosslinks, baseband processing, encryption devices, radiation-hardened devices, propulsion systems, pointing accuracy, kick motors, and other such characteristics as are specified by the Secretary of Defense. SEC. 1516. RELATED ITEMS DEFINED. In this subtitle, the term ``related items'' means the satellite fuel, ground support equipment, test equipment, payload adapter or interface hardware, replacement parts, and non-embedded solid propellant orbit transfer engines described in the report submitted to Congress by the Department of State on February 6, 1998, pursuant to section 38(f) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(f)). Subtitle C--Other Export Control Matters SEC. 1521. AUTHORITY FOR EXPORT CONTROL ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. (a) Functions of the Under Secretary for Policy.--Section 134(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(3) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary shall have responsibility for supervising and directing activities of the Department of Defense relating to export controls.''. (b) Establishment of Deputy Under Secretary for Technology Security Policy.--(1) Chapter 4 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 134a the following new section: ``Sec. 134b. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy ``(a) There is in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy. ``(b) The Deputy Under Secretary serves as the Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration (or any successor organization charged with similar responsibilities). ``(c) The principal duties of the Deputy Under Secretary are-- ``(1) assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in supervising and directing the activities of the Department of Defense relating to export controls; and ``(2) assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in developing policies and positions regarding the appropriate export control policies and procedures that are necessary to protect the national security interests of the United States. ``(d) The Deputy Under Secretary shall perform such additional duties and exercise such authority as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.''. (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 134a the following new item: ``134b. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy.''. (c) Time for Implementation.--The Secretary of Defense shall complete the actions necessary to implement the amendment made by subsection (a) and to establish the office of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy in accordance with section 134b of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (b), not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (d) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a report on the plans of the Secretary for implementing the amendments made by subsections (a) and (b). The report shall include the following: (1) A description of any organizational changes that are to be made within the Department of Defense to implement those amendments. (2) A description of the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the export control activities of the Department of Defense after those subsections are implemented, together with a discussion of how that role compares to the Chairman's role in those activities before the implementation of those subsections. SEC. 1522. RELEASE OF EXPORT INFORMATION BY DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE TO OTHER AGENCIES FOR PURPOSE OF NATIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT. (a) Release of Export Information.--The Secretary of Commerce shall, upon the written request of an official specified in subsection (c), transmit to that official any information relating to exports that is held by the Department of Commerce and is requested by that official for the purpose of assessing national security risks. The Secretary shall transmit such information within 10 business days after receiving such a request. (b) Nature of Information.--The information referred to in subsection (a) includes information concerning-- (1) export licenses issued by the Department of Commerce; (2) exports that were carried out under an export license issued by the Department of Commerce; and (3) exports from the United States that were carried out without an export license. (c) Requesting Officials.--The officials referred to in subsection (a) are the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of Central Intelligence. Each of those officials may delegate to any other official within their respective departments and agency the authority to request information under subsection (a). SEC. 1523. NUCLEAR EXPORT REPORTING REQUIREMENT. (a) Notification of Congress.--The President shall notify Congress upon the granting of a license by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the export or reexport of any nuclear-related technology or equipment, including source material, special nuclear material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special nuclear material. (b) Applicability.--The requirements of this section shall apply only to an export or reexport to a country that-- (1) the President has determined is a country that has detonated a nuclear explosive device; and (2) is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. SEC. 1524. EXECUTION OF OBJECTION AUTHORITY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Section 1211 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1932) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) Delegation of Objection Authority Within the Department of Defense.--For the purposes of the Department of Defense, the authority to issue an objection referred to in subsection (a) shall be executed for the Secretary of Defense by an official at the Assistant Secretary level within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In implementing subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that Department of Defense procedures maximize the ability of the Department of Defense to be able to issue an objection within the 10-day period specified in subsection (c).''. Subtitle D--Counterproliferation Matters SEC. 1531. ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION AUTHORITIES FOR SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ. (a) Amount Authorized for Fiscal Year 1999.--The total amount of assistance for fiscal year 1999 provided by the Secretary of Defense under section 1505 of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5859a) that is provided for activities of the Department of Defense in support of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, may not exceed $15,000,000. (b) Extension of Authority To Provide Assistance.-- Subsection (f) of section 1505 of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of [[Page H8171]] 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5859a) is amended by striking out ``1998'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``1999''. SEC. 1532. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NUCLEAR TESTS IN SOUTH ASIA. The Congress-- (1) strongly condemns the decisions by the Governments of India and Pakistan to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998; (2) calls for the Governments of India and Pakistan to commit not to conduct any additional nuclear tests; (3) urges the Governments of India and Pakistan to take immediate steps to reduce tensions between the two countries; (4) urges India and Pakistan to engage in high-level dialogue aimed at reducing the likelihood of armed conflict, enacting confidence and security building measures, and resolving areas of dispute; (5) commends all nations to take steps which will reduce tensions in South Asia, including appropriate measures to prevent the transfer of technology that could further exacerbate the arms race in South Asia, and thus avoid further deterioration of security there; (6) calls upon the President, leaders of all nations, and the United Nations to encourage a diplomatic, negotiated solution between the governments of India and Pakistan to promote peace and stability in South Asia and resolve the current impasse; (7) encourages United States diplomatic leadership in assisting the governments of India and Pakistan to seek a negotiated resolution of their 50-year conflict over the disputed territory in Kashmir; (8) urges India and Pakistan to take immediate, binding, and verifiable steps to roll back their nuclear programs and come into compliance with internationally accepted norms regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and (9) urges the United States to reevaluate its bilateral relationship with India and Pakistan, in light of the new regional security realities in South Asia, with the goal of preventing further nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, diffusing long-standing regional rivalries between India and Pakistan, and securing commitments from India and Pakistan which, if carried out, could result in a calibrated lifting of United States sanctions imposed under the Arms Export Control Act and the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994. SEC. 1533. REPORT ON REQUIREMENTS FOR RESPONSE TO INCREASED MISSILE THREAT IN ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a study of the architecture requirements for the establishment and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region that would have the capability to protect key regional allies of the United States. (b) Report.--(1) Not later than January 1, 1999, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report containing-- (A) the results of the study conducted under subsection (a); (B) the factors used to obtain such results; and (C) a description of any United States missile defense system currently deployed or under development that could be transferred to key allies of the United States in the Asia- Pacific region to provide for their self-defense against limited ballistic missile attacks. (2) The report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form. -------------------------------------------------------------------