15 July 1998
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html

105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-271

To the Congress of the United States:

As required by section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I transmit herewith a 6-month report on the national emergency declared by Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994, in response to the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass destruction'') and of the means of delivering such weapons.

William J. Clinton.

The White House, June 9, 1998.

(ii)

                   Report to the Congress on
               the National Emergency Concerning
                  Weapons of Mass Destruction

On November 14, 1994 in light of the dangers of the
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons
("weapons of mass destruction" -- WMD) and of the means of
delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order No. 12938,
and declared a national emergency under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary
date of its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal
Register and transmit to the Congress a notice of its
continuation. Because the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy
of the United States, on November 13, 1997, I extended the
national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12935.

The following report is made pursuant to Section 204 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703)
and Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent in the
last six months pursuant to the emergency declaration.
Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical
and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is
contained in the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation
of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Weapons, provided to Congress pursuant to Section 1097
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992
and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the "Nonprolifera-
tion Report," and the most recent annual report provided to the
Congress pursuant to Section 303 of the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 ~Public haw
102-132), also known as the "CBW Report."

Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW)

The export control regulations issued as part of the Enhanced
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remained fully in force
and continue to be applied in order to control the export of
items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons or
unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.

Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat
to our security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
(the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) entered into force with
87 of the CWC's 165 signatories as original States Parties.
The United States was among their number, having deposited its
instrument of ratification on April 25. Russia ratified the



                              (1)



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CWC on November 5 1997 and became a State Party on December 5
1997. As of April 15, 1998, 107 countries have become States
Parties.

The implementing body for the CWC -- the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) -- was established at
entry-into-force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997.
The OPCW, located in The Hague is responsible for implementing
the CWC. It collects declarations, conducts inspections, and
serves as a forum for consultation and cooperation among States
Parties. It consists of the Conference of States Parties, the
Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS).

The EC consists of 41 States Parties (including the
United States) and acts as the governing body for the
OPCW between meetings of the Conference of States Parties.
Since EIF, the EC has met numerous times to address issues
such as scale of assessments, CW production facility conversion
requests, facility and transitional verification arrangements,
and staff regulations.

The TS carries out the verification provisions of the CWC, and
has a staff of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors
trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial facili-
ties throughout the world. The OPCW has conducted nearly 200
routine inspections in some 20 countries. Nearly 50 of those
inspections were conducted in the United States. The OPCW
maintains a permanent inspector presence at operational U.S.
CW destruction facilities in Utah, Maryland, Nevada, and
Johnston Island.

The United States is determined to seek full implementation of
the concrete measures in the CWC that will raise the costs and
the risks for any states' or terrorists' attempting to engage
in chemical weapons-related activities. The CWC's declaration
requirements will improve our knowledge of possible chemical
weapons activities. Its inspection provisions provide for
access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus
making clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling
more difficult, more risky and more expensive.

Due to the lack of implementing legislation, the U.S. has not
submitted its industrial declaration to the OPCW, and therefore
is in non-compliance with the Convention. The implications of
U.S. non-compliance are serious. It has, among other things,
undermined our ability to get other States Parties to make
complete and accurate declarations, and to submit their
declarations on time.

Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically
isolated and banned from trading with States Parties in certain
key chemicals. The relevant treaty provision is specifically




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designed to penalize in a concrete way countries that refuse to
join the rest of the world in eliminating the threat of chemical
weapons.

The United States also continues to play a leading role in
the international effort to reduce the threat from biological
weapons (BW). We are an active participant in the Ad Hoc
Group (AHG) striving to create a legally binding protocol to
strengthen and enhance compliance with the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction (The Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). This
Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 CWC Special
Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November
1996, urged the AHG to complete the protocol as soon as possible
but not later than the next Review Conference to be held in
2001. Work is progressing on a draft rolling text through
insertion of national views and clarification of existing text.
Four AHG working sessions were scheduled for l998. Two have
been completed and two are scheduled: one for the summer
(June 22-July 10), and one in the fall (September-October).

On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union Address, I
announced that the U.S. would lead the effort to erect stronger
international barriers against the proliferation and use of
BW by strengthening the BWC with a new international system to
detect and deter cheating. The U.S. is seeking to conclude the
framework for a strong BWC protocol by the end of 1998. The
U.S. will work closely with U.S. industry to develop and reach
international agreement on: declarations, voluntary visits,
non-challenge clarifying visits, and challenge investigations.

The United States continued to be a leading member of the
30-member Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime.
The U.S. attended the most recent annual AG plenary session
from October 6-9, 1997, during which the Group continued
to focus on strengthening AG export controls and sharing
information to address the threat of CBW terrorism. At the
behest of the United States, the AG first began in-depth
political-level discussion of CBW terrorism during the 1995
plenary session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack
earlier that year. At the 1996 plenary, the U.S. urged AG
members to exchange national points of contact for AG terrorism
matters. At the 1997 plenary, the AG accepted a U.S. proposal
to survey all AG members on legal and regulatory efforts each
has taken to counter this threat.

The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief
that full adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way
to achieve permanent global elimination of CBW, and that all
states adhering to these Conventions have an obligation to
ensure that their national activities support this goal.




                               4  


AG participants continue to seek to ensure that all relevant
national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC
and CWC. The AG nations reaffirmed their belief that existing
national export licensing policies on chemical weapons-related
items fulfill the obligation established under Article I of the
CWC and Article VI of the BWC that States Parties never assist
in any way, the acquisition, retention, transfer, or use of
chemical or biological weapons. Given this understanding, the
AG members also reaffirmed their commitment to continuing the
Group's activities now that the CWC has entered into force.

The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue its
active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries,
and to promote regional consultations on export controls and
nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of
national policies in these areas.

During the last six months, we continued to examine closely
intelligence and other reports of trade in chemical weapons-
related material and technology which might require action
including evaluating whether sanctions under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991
were warranted. In February 1998, the U.S. Government imposed
trade sanctions on Berge Aris Balanian, a fugitive from justice
previously residing in Germany and last known to be in Lebanon.
We determined he knowingly and materially contributed to the
Libyan CW program.

The United States continues to cooperate with its AG partners
in stopping shipments of proliferation concern. By sharing
information through diplomatic and other channels, we and
our AG partners have been successful in interdicting various
shipments destined to CBW programs.

Missiles for Weapons of Mass Destruction Delivery

During the reporting period the United States carefully
controlled exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery
systems for weapons of mass destruction and closely monitored
activities of potential missile proliferation concern. We also
continued to implement missile sanctions provisions in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993 in cases where sanctionable activity was determined to
have occurred. In August 1997, we imposed sanctions against
two North Korean entities determined to have engaged in missile
proliferation activities. Similar sanctions imposed in May 1996
remain in effect against two entities in Iran and one entity
in North Korea for transfers involving Category II Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex items. In April 1998,
we imposed sanctions on a North Korean and a Pakistani entity




                               5  


involved in the transfer of MTCR-controlled equipment and
technology from North Korea to Pakistan.

During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share
information about proliferation problems with each other, and
with other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment
states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing
effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted
in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for
use in missile programs of concern.

The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's
Twelfth Plenary Meeting in Tokyo, Japan, November 2-7, 1997.
At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners reaffirmed their commitment
to controlling exports to prevent the proliferation of missiles
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. They also
recognized the need to build additional support for the Regime,
and issued an appeal to all countries to support the MTCR's
nonproliferation goals and abide by its Guidelines. In
addition, the Partners undertook to continue to increase their
efforts to promote openness and transparency through enhanced
dialogue with countries outside the Regime. In particular, the
Partners recognized the utility of expert level workshops at
which Partners and non-members work side-by-side to increase
their understanding of priority missile nonproliferation
issues -- such as risk assessment in licensing and combating
proliferators' misuse of brokering -- and devise practical
solutions. They also recognized the usefulness of contacting
non-members via regional security fora.

At Tokyo, the MTCR Partners also recognized that missile
proliferation presents a serious threat to regional stability
and global security and agreed to continue to give priority to
this issue. Regional proliferation issues will be a key topic
of discussion at the MTCR's May 1998 Reinforced Point of Contact
(RPOC) meeting. The Partners also decided at Tokyo to continue
to share information about activities and programs of missile
proliferation concern and to consider additional steps they
can take, individually and collectively, to prevent the
proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction.

In addition to their policy discussions, the MTCR Partners
also reviewed technical issues at Tokyo. They agreed to several
changes to the MTCR Annex including adopting a U.S. proposal
to control titanium-stabilized duplex stainless steel (TI-DSS)
under Category II, Item 8. TI-DSS is used to produce SCUD
missiles.




                               6  


As noted above, regional proliferation will be a key agenda
issue for the MTCR's RPOC meeting. The United States plans
to encourage the Partners to pay special attention to the
missile proliferation threat posed by Iran's ongoing pursuit
of an indigenous missile production capability. We also will
encourage the MTCR Partners to adopt concrete steps that they
can take individually and collectively to address the Regime's
regional proliferation concerns.

During this reporting period, the United States also continued
to work unilaterally and in concert with other MTCR Partners
to combat missile proliferation and to encourage non-MTCR
countries to adopt responsible export control practices and
to adhere unilaterally to the MTCR Guidelines. Since the last
report, we have continued our missile nonproliferation dialogue
with China, the Republic of Korea, and North Korea. We also
have pursued missile nonproliferation talks with Egypt, India,
Pakistan. and Ukraine.

In addition, in response to reports that Iranian entities
continued to seek sensitive items from Russian firms for use
in Iran's missile program the United States continued its
intensive, high-level dialogue with Russia on Russia-Iran
missile cooperation. We remain concerned about this issue,
and we are working closely with Russia to halt all cooperation
between Russian entities and the Iranian missile program. This
effort has achieved some significant results. For example, on
January 22, Russia took an important step by issuing an execu-
tive order that substantially strengthened the Russian export
control system and provided the GOR with new authority to stop
all transfers of goods and services to foreign missile programs
and programs of weapons of mass destruction.

Putting this legal authority in place was an important step,
but problems remain. Our focus now is on implementation and
enforcement. The United States and Russia are working together
bilaterally to continue to strengthen Russian export controls,
including implementation of the new "catch-all" authority.
We will monitor closely progress in this area.

Nuclear Weapons

In May 1998, after this report was written but before it was
submitted, India and then Pakistan conducted a number of nuclear
tests. A complete analysis of these disturbing events and of
the U.S. and international response will be provided in a
subsequent report.

Notwithstanding these developments, the past few years have
witnessed progress in our efforts to curb the broader spread of
nuclear weapons. In a truly historic step, the 50th UN General




                               7  


Assembly on September 10, 1996, adopted and called for signature
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiated
in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The overwhelming
passage of this UN resolution (158-3-5) demonstrates the
CTBT's strong international support and marks a major success
for United States foreign policy. On September 24, 1996, I
and other national leaders signed the CTBT in New York.

During 1997 and the first part of 1998, CTBT signatories have
conducted numerous meetings of the Preparatory Commission in
Vienna, seeking to promote rapid completion of the International
Monitoring System established by the Treaty. On September 22,
1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, requesting prompt
advice and consent to ratification.

In banning all nuclear explosions, the CTBT will serve several
United States national security interests. It will constrain
the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons;
end the development of advanced new types; contribute to the
prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear
disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security.
The CTBT marks an historic milestone in our drive to reduce the
nuclear threat and to build a safer world.

Formal preparations for the year 2000 Review Conference for
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
continued in 1998 with the second of three annual Preparatory
Committee meetings of the Parties to the Treaty. The U.S.
is committed to working to ensure that the 2000 NPT Review
Conference will further strengthen the NPT and reinforce
global nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Since the 1995
NPT Conference, eight additional states have joined the NPT,
leaving only five states worldwide currently outside the NPT
regime. The NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee added China to
its membership in 1997.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continued its efforts
to upgrade control lists and export control procedures.
NSG members confirmed their agreement to clarifications to
the nuclear trigger list to accord with trigger list changes
agreed to by the members of the NPT Exporters (Zangger)
Committee, and the International Atomic Energy Agency published
these understandings on September 16, 1997. The NSG also is
actively pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the
export regime in accordance with the call in Principles 16
and 17 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

The NSG held an export control seminar in Vienna on October a
and 9, 1997, which described and explained the role of the NSG
(and the Zangger Committee) in preventing nuclear proliferation.
The NSG also continued efforts to enhance information sharing




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among members regarding the nuclear programs of proliferant
countries by (1) "officially" linking the NSG members through a
dedicated computer network allowing for real-time distribution
of license denial information, and by (2) creating a separate
session for exchange of information on the margins of NSG
plenary meetings.

NSG membership increased to 35 with the addition of Latvia.
The ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of
all suppliers, including nations not members of the regime,
to control nuclear and nuclear-related exports in accordance
with the NSG guidelines.

Expenses

Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1641 (c)), I report that there were no expenses
directly attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred
by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order
12930 during the period from November 14, 1997, through May 14,
1998.

[End]

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