9 October 1998: Add message 5, message 6 and message 7

4 October 1998: Add message3 and message4

3 October 1998


Date: Thu, 01 Oct 1998 21:57:19 -0400
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Subject: Echelon's Origin

The NSA released during the summer a Top Secret memorandum 
by Truman in 1952 establishing NSA as the lead COMINT agency 
for the USG:

   http://jya.com/nsa102452.htm

After the dry description of decisionmaking procedures there 
are tantalizing pointers to the means NSA is to use to spy on 
foreign governments' communications, with reference to 
accommodating allies at NSA facilities -- read it carefully.

Also, it's chilling to read that COMINT was so vital that
Truman declared it to be free from any constraints placed 
on all other forms of intelligence. And the DIRNSA was given
authority to command any military department or civilian
agency for COMINT purposes.

It would be helpful to learn what directives superceded this 
memo for authority to engage in global COMINT. Yes, we accept
anonymous contributions from present and former COMINTers.

Erich Moechel writes that France has its version of Echelon
and wiretapping, and shares its fruits with Germany, in 
competition with the Echelon-Five: 

   The French have built up an Echelon-like wiretapping system 
   of their own, operating from Dordogne (France), French Guayana 
   & Nouvelle Caledonie.

Would anyone have more information on this program? And what
about other Echelons around the world?



From: Anonymous To: <jya@pipeline.com> Subject: COMINT Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1998 Probably one reason that COMINT was held in such "reverence" was the unparalleled successes of WW2 in deciphering both the Japanese and German traffic. Add to that, VENONA and the impression that must have made on Truman in revealing the horrid penetration of the US nuclear community by the Soviets during and after WW2. Up through the 60's COMINT'S successes were even greater. When Martin & Mitchell defected, they revealed that the US had broken almost all major and minor allies ciphers. While not a lot has been said about it until fairly recently, this was apparently in no small part due to the collusion of NSA with the Germans in producing Enigma variants, which were sold to naive foreign governments to encrypt their diplomatic, and possibly, military traffic. The one area in which still almost nothing ever is said was our own efforts to penetrate Russian ciphers. The amount of money allocated to NSA with "no questions asked" may be a hint to our success in that area. The level of success, if any, in this area is probably one of the few great secrets that still remain secret to this day. COMINT can also be widely overrated. At the highest levels, if success is profound you seldom can use the information for fear the source will be compromised. COMINT failed [but not because it didn't forewarn] on Chinese intervention in Korea. The US Navy's most EXTREMELY sensitive communications were read like a comic book by the Russians thanks to the Walker spy ring. This didn't do a thing in preventing the collapse of the Soviet Union. I find it amusing to witness the arrogance of the American government and its own COMINT community who were "certain" that in spite of all our success, that our own ciphers remained unreadable. They were wrong. As history has shown, this level of arrogance is typical for all governments. As to how far back ECHELON like systems have been in use, it's hard to be sure. Probably since the 60s.
4 October 1998: Anonymous writes that the French-German interception program is known among intelligence circles and suggests that the queries on the program be made at EuroIntel98 as well as other intelligence conferences.
4 October 1998: Date: Sun, 04 Oct 1998 19:22:36 +0200 To: jya@pipeline.com From: interception <interception@ii-mel.com> Subject: http://jya.com/ECHELON-GO.htm French centers of electronic interceptions are in: 1 - Agde 2 - Rohrbach-les-Bitch 3 - Domme 4 - Mützig, 5 - Alluets-Feucherolles 6 - Celar (Army) (fax, scramble,...): 950 people in Rennes 7 - Security Squad and electronic war (4 squads) in Metz 8 - Plateau d'Albion: 150 people 9 - Boat: Cargo le Bercy 10- Bouar (Central African Républic) 11- Solenzara (Corsica) 12- St-Barthélemy (Guadeloupe) 13- Réunion 14- Mayotte, Djibouti 15- Kourou Spatial Base (Guyana) 16- United Arab Emirates 17- New Caledonia In spite of Echelon http://www.ii-mel.com/interception/echelongb.htm French electronic interception are practiced in the USA. Masson http://www.ii-mel.com/interception
9 October 1998: Date: Wed, 07 Oct 1998 14:42:11 -0400 From: Sunder <sunder@brainlink.com> To: cypherpunks@algebra.com Subject: [Fwd: [Spooks] British Telecom-Menwith Hill connection] Date: Tue, 06 Oct 1998 23:32:36 -0500 From: Bob Margolis <rttyman@wwa.com> To: Spooks <spooks@qth.net> Subject: [Spooks] British Telecom-Menwith Hill connection BT condemned for listing cables to US sigint station      4 September, 1997      A judge has lambasted BT for revealing detailed information about top secret high capacity cables feeding phone and      other messages to and from a Yorkshire monitoring base. BT admitted this week that they have connected three digital      optical fibre cables - capable of carrying more than 100,000 telephone calls at once - to the American intelligence base      at Menwith Hill, near Harrogate.      Menwith Hill is run by the US National Security Agency (NSA), which monitors the world's communication for US      intelligence. NSA acknowledges that "the Hill" is the largest electronic monitoring station in the world. Over 1,200 US      civilians and servicemen work round the clock at the base, intercepting and analysing communications mainly from      Europe, Russia and the Middle East.      Much of the information reaching the base comes from spy satellites. The base has 26 large white golfballs or "radomes"      for space communications, making it an inescapable landmark in the Yorkshire dales.      In a courtroom fiasco this week, British Telecom's solicitors first sent documents and a witness to give details of the      cables to York Crown Court, where two women campaigners were appealing against conviction for trespassing at the      station. The next day, they sent a second solicitor to attempt to silence their own witness and to withdraw evidence      already given.      Judge Jonathan Crabtree agreed to grant public interest immunity "BT had no business whatsoever to disclose anything      of the kind", he said. He then ordered Mr R.G. Morris, BT's head of emergency planning, not to give any more evidence      about the secret cables.      After being privately briefed in his chambers by BT's second solicitor, the judge said that it was immaterial if Menwith      Hill was spying on British citizens and commercial communications and may have cost British companies in billions of      dollars of lost sales.      "The national interest of the United Kingdom, even if if is conducted dishonestly, requires this to be kept      secret", said Judge Crabtree.      "The methods of communicating to and from Menwith Hill, whether military intelligence or commercial spying, is clearly      secret information. The governments of the United States and United Kingdom do not want this information to be      divulged", he explained.      But he said that BT's list of secret cables in and out of Menwith Hill could not be withdrawn from the case. "Half the cat      is out of the bag. The contents of the letter are now in public domain. I just don't know what BT think they were doing",      he added.      According to the letter, the Post Office (now BT) first provided two high capacity "wide bandwidth" circuits to Menwith      Hill in 1975. They were connected on a coaxial cable to the BT network at Hunters Stones, a microwave radio station a      few miles from the US base.      During the 1970s and 1980s, almost all Britain's long-distance telephone calls were carried on the microwave network      of which Hunters Stones is part. The existence of the cables connecting the network to Menwith Hill has been known      since 1980, but the authorities have always refused to comment. BT now claims that the cables were connected directly      to the United States via undersea cable, and did not link to other parts of the British system.      The system was upgraded in 1992, says BT, when a new high capacity optical fibre cable was installed. This linked to a      different part of the BT network, but was also carried directly to the United States via undersea cable. Since then, BT      revealed, the capacity of the system has been trebled by adding two more optical fibre links. These could carry more      than 100,000 simultaneous telephone calls.      Lawyers for the two women campaigners, Helen John and Anne Lee, say they were astonished by the company's      sudden change of heart. They said that the letter giving details of the cables may have been written for PR purposes, and      appeared intended to suggest that BT wasn't helping NSA tap telephones. This, BT said, was a "misapprehension which      is damaging to this company's reputation".      BT staff also hinted that other British communications companies are supplying tapping capacity to the American base.      Even as BT's solicitor was seeking to have his evidence prohibited, BT's witness was outside court giving further      information to the women's solicitor implying that other British communications companies were also involved in the      spying activities at Menwith Hill. "You should ask me about other companies", he said before he was silenced.      Tony Benn - who was the Postmaster General at the time cables were first installed connecting Menwith Hill to the      British communications network - also gave evidence. He said that although a Cabinet minister and privy councillor, he      had been told nothing of the secret arrangements with the Americans.      BT were ordered to pay the legal costs caused by their change of heart. The judge accused them of giving away      confidential commercial information and national secrets. "If I had a burglar alarm system, I would now think twice about      having it operated by BT", he said. --- Submissions should be sent to spooks@qth.net To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe spooks" to majordomo@qth.net
9 October 1998: Date: Wed, 7 Oct 1998 19:13:35 -0700 (PWT) From: Max Inux <maxinux@bigfoot.com> To: cypherpunks@algebra.com Subject: Echelon @ Menwith Hill [was Re: [Fwd: BT + menwith conn These are some echelon and menwith hill related sites....  though the last one is the best anti-menwith hill one (and most informitive i think... http://www.fas.org/irp/facility/menwith.htm
http://www.gn.apc.org/cndyorks/mhs/index.htm
http://www.fas.org/irp/facility/onizuka.htm
http://www.fas.org/irp/facility/index.html
http://www.bsnet.co.uk/chris/nsa.txt
http://www.fas.org/irp/facility/nroceeta.htm
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/an-flr-9.htm
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/flr9_380is.jpg
http://users.neca.com/cummings/wullen.html
MenWith:::(CND's site)
http://www.gn.apc.org/cndyorks/mhs/index.htm
I know for the most part the fas.org sites are redundant, but those are my favorite links rgwew -- Max Inux <maxinux@openpgp.net> Hey Christy!!! KeyID 0x8907E9E5 Kinky Sex makes the world go round O R Strong crypto makes the world safe        If crypto is outlawed only outlaws will have crypto Fingerprint(Photo Also): 259D 59F7 D98C CD73 1ACD 54Ea 6C43 4877 8907 E9E5
9 October 1998: Date: Thu, 8 Oct 1998 22:30:21 +0200 Message-Id: <199810082030.WAA12450@replay.com> From: Anonymous <nobody@replay.com> To: jya@jya.com, cypherpunks@toad.com Is there an offhand reference to ECHELON in the second paragraph? National Counterintelligence Center Counterintelligence News and Developments Volume 3 September 1998 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ http://www.nacic.gov/cind/SEPT98.htm More on French Spying The French magazine Le Point reported in mid-June that France systematically listens in on the telephone conversations and cable traffic of many businesses based in the United States and other nations. The article also reports the French Government uses a network of listening stations to eavesdrop and pass on commercial secrets to French businesses competing in the global economy. The article goes on to state that the French secret service, DGSE, has established listening posts in the Dordogne (Southern France) and also in its overseas territories, including French Guiana and New Caledonia. The article attributes to an unnamed "senior official within this branch of the French secret service" the claim, "This is the game of the secret war," adding that U.S. listening posts do the same. The magazine report says Germans who bought into the French Helios 1A spy satellite system are being given access to political and economic secrets as part of a Franco-German agreement to compete with a commercial information agreement between the United States and Britain.
Additional contributions welcome: jy@jya.com For a summary of reports on ECHELON: http://jya.com/echelon-dc.htm