This is one of five Defense Trade News on this site:
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January 1994: http://jya.com/dtn0194.htm
April 1994: http://jya.com/dtn0494.htm
July/October, 1994: http://jya.com/dtn0794.htm
October 1995: http://jya.com/dtn1095.htm
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US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEFENSE TRADE NEWS
THE BULLETIN OF THE CENTER FOR DEFENSE TRADE
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1, JANUARY 1994
BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS
Defense Trade News (ISSN 1051-2845) is a quarterly
publication (January, April, July, October) of the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S.
Department of State. Its purpose is to provide
American industry, the public, and Congress with
information on defense trade policy, licensing
practices, and compliance issues. Contents include
official policy statements and other official
documents. Special features, articles, and other
materials (such as maps, charts, graphs, tables, and
photographs) provide additional information on
current issues but should not necessarily be
interpreted as official U.S. policy statements. The
Secretary of State has determined that the
publication of this periodical is necessary in the
transaction of public business required by law.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Policy
Non-Proliferation and Export Control Policy -- White
House Unveils New Framework
The Export Control Agenda -- Under Secretary of
State Davis Testifies
Operations
Fine-Tuning the ITAR -- Questions and Answers on the
Revised International Traffic in Arms Regulations
Don't Just Carp; Turn to SARP -- A New Licensing
Appeal Mechanism at State
DTSA's Role in the Export Review Process -- An
Introduction to the Defense Technology Security
Agency
ELLIE Comes on Line -- DTC Introduces Electronic
License Submission
State Tiger Team Unleashed -- Reorganizing for
Efficiency at the Office of Defense Trade Controls
Departments
Defense Trade Advisory Group Developments
Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations
Suspensions & Debarments
Personnel Updates
Tips and Tidbits
Feedback Questionnaire
ELLIE User Application
Training Form
Editor's Note
Beginning this issue, we plan to broaden our
coverage of policy issues handled by the Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs--issues such as non-
proliferation, government-to-government defense
relations, and technology transfer--which we believe
to be of interest to the defense trade community.
Accordingly, Defense Trade News now sports the
subtitle Export Policy Bulletin.
Our goal is to help you to keep abreast of the
broader framework of U.S. non-proliferation and
export control policy, while continuing to provide
detailed information to facilitate the defense trade
process.
Finally, this issue introduces an expanded Feedback
questionnaire, designed to provide more detailed
analysis of your reaction to the magazine. We rely
upon your input to make the publication better
suited to your needs. Please take a few minutes to
let us know how we can do better. (###)
Defense Trade News On-Line
If you have a PC and a modem, you can have 24-hour
electronic access to U.S. Government publications
via the Federal Bulletin Board. Download Defense
Trade News before your hardcopy reaches you. Keep
abreast of U.S. foreign policy with the Department
of State Dispatch. Track modifications to the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations with the
Federal Register.
Non-Proliferation and Export Control Policy
White House Unveils New Framework
The following statement was released by the White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington,
DC, September 27, 1993. Reprinted from the U.S.
Department of State Dispatch.
The President today established a framework for U.S.
efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.
He outlined three major principles to guide our non-
proliferation and export control policy.
-- Our national security requires us to accord
higher priority to non-proliferation and to make it
an integral element of our relations with other
countries.
-- To strengthen U.S. economic growth,
democratization abroad, and international stability,
we actively seek expanded trade and technology
exchange with nations, including former adversaries,
that abide by global non-proliferation norms.
-- We need to build a new consensus--embracing the
executive and legislative branches, industry and the
public, and friends abroad--to promote effective
non-proliferation efforts and integrate our non-
proliferation and economic goals.
The President reaffirmed U.S. support for a strong,
effective non-proliferation regime that enjoys broad
multilateral support and employs all of the means at
our disposal to advance our objectives. Key
elements of the policy follow.
Fissile Material
The U.S. will undertake a comprehensive approach to
the growing accumulation of fissile material from
dismantled nuclear weapons and within civil nuclear
programs. Under this approach, the U.S. will:
-- Seek to eliminate where possible the
accumulation of stockpiles of highly enriched
uranium or plutonium and to ensure that, where these
materials already exist, they are subject to the
highest standards of safety, security, and
international accountability;
-- Propose a multilateral convention prohibiting
the production of highly enriched uranium or
plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside
of international safeguards;
-- Encourage more restrictive regional arrangements
to constrain fissile material production in regions
of instability and high proliferation risk;
-- Submit U.S. fissile material no longer needed
for our deterrent to inspection by the International
Atomic Energy Agency;
-- Pursue the purchase of highly enriched uranium
from the former Soviet Union and other countries and
its conversion to peaceful use as reactor fuel;
-- Explore means to limit the stockpiling of
plutonium from civil nuclear programs and seek to
minimize the civil use of highly enriched uranium;
and
-- Initiate a comprehensive review of long-term
options for plutonium disposition, taking into
account technical, non-proliferation, environmental,
budgetary, and economic considerations. Russia and
other nations with relevant interests and experience
will be invited to participate in this study.
The United States does not encourage the civil use
of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself
engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear
power or nuclear explosive purposes. The United
States, however, will maintain its existing
commitments regarding the use of plutonium in civil
nuclear programs in Western Europe and Japan.
Export Controls
To be truly effective, export controls should be
applied uniformly by all suppliers. The United
States will harmonize domestic and multilateral
controls to the greatest extent possible. At the
same time, the need to lead the international
community or overriding national security or foreign
policy interests may justify unilateral export
controls in specific cases. We will review our
unilateral dual-use export controls and policies
and eliminate them unless such controls are
essential to national security and foreign policy
interests.
We will streamline the implementation of U.S. non-
proliferation export controls. Our system must be
more responsive and efficient and not inhibit
legitimate exports that play a key role in American
economic strength, while preventing exports that
would make a material contribution to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
missiles that deliver them.
Nuclear Proliferation
The U.S. will make every effort to secure the
indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
in 1995. We will seek to ensure that the
International Atomic Energy Agency has the resources
needed to implement its vital safeguards
responsibilities and will work to strengthen the
IAEA's ability to detect clandestine nuclear
activities.
Missile Proliferation
We will maintain our strong support for the Missile
Technology Control Regime. We will promote the
principles of the MTCR Guidelines as a global
missile non-proliferation norm and seek to use the
MTCR as a mechanism for taking joint action to
combat missile proliferation. We will support
prudent expansion of the MTCR's membership to
include additional countries that subscribe to
international non-proliferation standards, enforce
effective export controls, and abandon offensive
ballistic missile programs. The United States will
also promote regional efforts to reduce the demand
for missile capabilities.
The United States will continue to oppose missile
programs of proliferation concern and will exercise
particular restraint in missile-related cooperation.
We will continue to retain a strong presumption of
denial against exports to any country of complete
space launch vehicles or major components.
The United States will not support the development
or acquisition of space launch vehicles in
countries outside the MTCR.
For MTCR member countries, we will not encourage new
space launch vehicle programs which raise questions
on both non-proliferation and economic viability
grounds. The United States will, however, consider
exports of MTCR-controlled items to MTCR member
countries for peaceful space launch programs on a
case-by-case basis. We will review whether
additional constraints or safeguards could reduce
the risk of misuse of space launch technology. We
will seek adoption by all MTCR partners of policies
as vigilant as our own.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
To help deter violations of the Biological Weapons
Convention, we will promote new measures to provide
increased transparency of activities and facilities
that could have biological weapons applications. We
call on all nations--including our own--to ratify
the Chemical Weapons Convention quickly so that it
may enter into force by January 13, 1995. We will
work with others to support the international
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
created by the Convention.
Regional Non-Proliferation Initiatives
Non-proliferation will receive greater priority in
our diplomacy and will be taken into account in our
relations with countries around the world. We will
make special efforts to address the proliferation
threat in regions of tension such as the Korean
Peninsula, the Middle East, and South Asia,
including efforts to address the underlying
motivations for weapons acquistion and to promote
regional confidence-building steps.
In Korea, our goal remains a non-nuclear peninsula.
We will make every effort to secure North Korea's
full compliance with its non-proliferation
commitments and effective implementation of the
North-South denuclearization agreement.
In parallel with our efforts to obtain a secure,
just, and lasting peace in the Middle East, we will
promote dialogue and confidence-building steps to
create the basis for a Middle East free of weapons
of mass destruction. In the Persian Gulf, we will
work with other suppliers to contain Iran's nuclear,
missile, and CBW ambitions, while preventing
reconstruction of Iraq's activities in these areas.
In South Asia, we will encourage India and Pakistan
to proceed with multilateral discussions of non-
proliferation and security issues, with the goal of
capping and eventually rolling back their nuclear
and missile capabilities.
In developing our overall approach to Latin America
and South Africa, we will take account of the
significant non-proliferation progress made in these
regions in recent years. We will intensify efforts
to ensure that the former Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe, and China do not contribute to the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and missiles.
Military Planning and Doctrine
We will give proliferation a higher profile in our
intelligence collection and analysis and defense
planning and ensure that our own force structure and
military planning address the potential threat from
weapons of mass destruction and missiles around the
world.
Conventional Arms Transfers
We will actively seek greater transparency in the
area of conventional arms transfers and promote
regional confidence-building measures to encourage
restraint on such transfers to regions of
instability. The U.S. will undertake a
comprehensive review of conventional arms transfer
policy, taking into account national security, arms
control, trade, budgetary, and economic
competitiveness considerations. (###)
The Export Control Agenda
Under Secretary of State Davis Testifies
Under Secretary of State for International Security
Affairs Lynn E. Davis testified before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe
and the Middle East on November 10, 1993, addressing
non-proliferation and export control issues. An
excerpt from Under Secretary Davis's opening
statement follows.
Thank you very much. . . for the opportunity to
appear before your committee to discuss an issue of
great importance to the Clinton Administration. As
you and your committee appreciate, non-proliferation
is the arms control priority of the post-Cold War
world. The proliferation of dangerous weapons
represents the most critical security threat we
face. As a result, the Clinton Administration is
placing a very high priority on non-proliferation.
Let me briefly describe the Clinton Administration's
non-proliferation agenda, which spans the whole
range of proliferation dangers and which we are
pursuing with a global diplomatic effort.
Secretary Christopher recently returned from a
visit, a trip to Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and
Belarus. In addition to pledging U.S. support for
democratic reform, Secretary Christopher focused on
the nuclear danger and our goal to prevent the
threats posed from the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.
U.S./N.I.S. Partnership
The United States and Russia, now as partners, are
consulting very closely on the goals of negotiating
as quickly as possible a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, achieving the indefinite extension of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, a global ban on the
production of fissile material for the production of
nuclear weapons, and the elimination of chemical
weapons. In Moscow, we worked together to ensure a
smooth entry into force of the Bilateral Missile
Technology Control Regime Agreement.
Kazakhstan committed to accede to the NPT as a non-
nuclear weapons state by the end of this year. In
Ukraine, President Kravchuk reaffirmed the goal of a
non-nuclear Ukraine and his personal commitment to
ratify the START Treaty and to proceed to the NPT as
a non-nuclear weapons state. He made clear that the
Lisbon protocol covers all nuclear weapons in the
Ukraine, including the SS-24 missiles.
But much remains to be done. . . particularly on the
3,000 former Soviet nuclear warheads that need to be
eliminated from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.
The U.S. is working actively to facilitate
agreements to transfer all these nuclear warheads to
Russia for dismantling and to provide compensation
for the highly enriched uranium in them.
Through the Nunn-Lugar program, we will assist in
the elimination of strategic offensive arms in all
four states. Such assistance is already flowing to
Russia and Belarus and we aim to put the necessary
agreements in place with Ukraine and Kazakhstan in
the coming weeks. To prevent these nations from
becoming a source of dangerous arms and
technologies, we are working with them to establish
effective export control systems.
Our activities in the Newly Independent States
demonstrate the many diverse elements which
constitute the Clinton Administration's overall non-
proliferation policy. Let me describe our overall
goals with respect to our non-proliferation policy.
The spread of nuclear weapons is clearly the
greatest proliferation danger we face. Our foremost
goal is universal NPT membership. We are actively
urging all NPT parties to join us in extending the
Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely and
unconditionally in 1995. And I can report. . . that
support is growing for these goals.
Critical Initiatives
The Clinton Administration has announced two
critical initiatives in support of our overall
nuclear nonproliferation strategy: to achieve a
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by 1996, and
to put in place a global convention cutting off
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
purposes.
I can report again momentum towards a CTBT is
growing. Last summer, the Conference on Disarmament
reached consensus on beginning formal negotiations
in Geneva in January of 1994.
Since then, we have made good progress on drafting a
specific CD negotiating mandate for the Conference
on Disarmament. And in addition, in New York at the
General Assembly, for the first time. . . we will
achieve a consensus resolution supporting test ban
negotiations. So we see movement and momentum
towards a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
But we also need measures to strengthen the global
nuclear non-proliferation regime with a regional
focus. And here let me describe to you briefly one
particular area of concern and one particular set of
policies that are very important to our
Administration. And this has to do with North
Korea.
North Korea Concerns
President Clinton made clear that North Korea cannot
be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb. We are thus
working very closely with the IAEA, with Japan,
South Korea, and other interested parties to bring
North Korea into compliance with all of its
international obligations. This is not an easy
process but we remain committed to our goal of
having North Korea comply with its safeguards
obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
implement the North-South Denuclearization
Declaration.
Recent North Korean behavior has been disappointing.
The U.S. has made clear its readiness to address
legitimate North Korea concerns. But unless the
North Koreans take the necessary steps to persuade
the world community that it is not pursuing a
nuclear weapons option, we will have no choice but
to end our bilateral dialogue with North Korea and
pursue further steps in the United Nations Security
Council.
Let me turn, then, briefly to. . . the progress we
have made with respect to tightening export controls
to prevent the spread of the materials necessary to
produce chemical and biological weapons.
MTCR Successes
With respect to missile proliferation, the
multilateral missile technology control regime will
continue to be the primary tool of United States
missile nonproliferation policy. It works and has
enjoyed several recent successes which this
committee has learned about through our past
consultations.
In South Africa, Argentina, Hungary and in Russia we
are achieving successes with respect to the flow of
missiles and missile technology. We now intend to
move the regime into the future, beyond a group of
responsible suppliers that seeks to ensure that its
own industries do not inadvertently contribute to
missile proliferation, to a group that works
actively together to deal with the missile
proliferation problem worldwide.
We have also demonstrated that we are prepared to
pursue our non-proliferation goals vigorously even
when such efforts involve sanctions and may risk
frictions in critical bilateral relationships.
Again. . . to point out the breadth and range of the
Clinton Administration's overall non-proliferation
policies, we are in the process of reorienting
export controls in the post-Cold War world to meet
the new dangers and security concerns that we see in
the world that we now live in.
Reorienting Export Controls
There is general agreement that the COCOM controls
on trade with Russia and the other states of the
former Warsaw Pact should be phased out, and a
partnership offered to Russia and other Newly
Independent States in a new regime. The partnership
will be based on clearly defined criteria concerning
adherence to export controls and non-proliferation
norms. We and our allies are discussing now how
best to structure a new regime in partnership with
Russia and the other Newly Independent States to
enhance transparency and coordination of controls on
exports of arms and sensitive dual-use and military
technologies. Our approach is multilateral, focused
on new dangers, and particularly focused on the
dangers we see in Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North
Korea. . . .
Let me conclude by a few observations with respect
to how to think about our non-proliferation goals in
the new world.
We very much appreciate the complex nature of the
task of promoting non-proliferation. It is not
simply stopping the flow of technologies, weapons,
or hardware. Rather, it deals with the tough and
interrelated issues of security, economics, jobs,
and trade. It also cuts to the fundamental
prerogative of states and that is their sovereignty.
Non-proliferation requires global engagement.
Success will also require regional strategies
tailored to the specific security concerns of
individual countries. Diplomacy, backed up by
American power, represents our primary tool in
attaining our non-proliferation goals. At the same
time, we will ensure that U.S. and allied forces are
prepared to cope with possible threats if our non-
proliferation efforts were to fail.
American Leadership
Success will require American leadership. The
Clinton Administration is poised to undertake that
leadership around the world. We also recognize that
we cannot shoulder all non-proliferation
responsibilities alone. We will require the help of
others to succeed, first in controlling trade in
dangerous arms and technologies which are available
now around the world.
But let me conclude. . . that as important, if not
more important, will be that the Administration and
the Congress will work as a team. We share the same
non-proliferation goals, and working together, in my
view, we will be able to achieve these so the world
knows that the United States stands firmly for these
goals and that we are prepared to take the steps
necessary to achieve those goals. (###)
OPERATIONS
Fine-Tuning the ITAR
Questions and Answers on the Revised International
Traffic in Arms Regulations
A revised version of the International Traffic in
Arms Regulation (ITAR) entered into force on July
22, 1993. This article provides informal guidance
and clarification of some of the changes in the new
ITAR. Only changes printed in the Federal Register
constitute official modifications to the ITAR.
Exemptions and Registration. While the new ITAR
allows for many new exemptions and reduced
paperwork, companies in the business of defense
trade must still fulfill the requirements of
registration. All U.S. manufacturers of defense
articles, as well as exporters of defense articles
and persons furnishing defense services, are
required to register with the Office of Defense
Trade Controls. This is true even if they will be
exporting articles or services that, in the specific
circumstances, are exempt from licensing
requirements.
Public Domain Exemptions (¤120.11 (5). The public
domain exemption for technical data does not apply
to patents protected by secrecy orders.
Hierarchy (¤120.1 (b). The revised ITAR provides
that all authorities conferred upon the Director of
the Office of Defense Trade Controls may be
exercised at any time by the Under Secretary of
State for International Security Affairs, the
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military
Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Export Controls.
Transfer or Disclosure to Embassies (¤120.13). The
new ITAR expressly provides that disclosure or
transfer of any defense article to a foreign embassy
in the U.S. is to be considered an export for the
purposes of these regulations.
Satellites (¤120.17 (6). Transfer of a U.S.-origin
satellite between foreign countries, or from the
U.S. to a foreign country, requires a license.
However, the launch of a satellite from the U.S. or
from a foreign country (once the license for
transfer has been approved) does not require a
license. Once in space, a satellite is still
covered by the ITAR; the transfer of ownership,
control, or use of a satellite in orbit from one
country to another requires a license.
Free Trade Zones (¤120.18). Any transfer of an item
covered by the USML to a foreign country through a
free trade zone requires a license or other written
approval, whether or not the item originates in the
U.S.
"NATO Plus" Exemption (¤123.9). The ITAR, under
certain circumstances, grants an exemption from the
general requirement for State Department retransfer
authorization to transfers to the governments of
NATO members, Japan and Australia of U.S.-origin
components incorporated into a foreign defense
article. This exemption does not apply to parties
ineligible under ¤126.7(a)(2)-(7), ¤127.7(c), or
¤128. These parties must apply to DTC for specific
exemption to legally retransfer defense items to any
recipient, including the governments of NATO
countries, Japan and Australia.
Empowered Official Defined (¤120.25). The ITAR
defines the criteria a company officer signing a
license application or other written request for
approval must meet to qualify as an "empowered
official" for the purposes of registration. All
these criteria must be met. In submitting a license
application, other request for approval or
registration form, an empowered official does not
need to demonstrate evidence of fulfillment of the
criteria unless specifically requested.
Questions have been raised as to whether an
"empowered official" needs to have a "power of
attorney." An employee need not hold a power of
attorney for a company to be designated an empowered
official for the purposes of the ITAR.
Records Maintenance (¤122.5). Companies must hold
records of defense trade for 5 years from the
expiration of the license or other approval, down
from 6.
Intermediate Consignees (¤123.9 (c) (d). DTC must
be informed of all intermediate consignees, or any
other consignees, involved in any export of defense
articles. Even when an exemption is claimed for a
U.S.-origin defense article shipment, all companies
at each stage of the shipment must be informed that
the article is of U.S. origin and may not be
retransferred except with the prior written approval
of the Department of State.
Proscriptions (¤126.1). In addition to those
countries listed in ¤126 as proscribed, other
countries may from time to time be subject to the
denial, suspension, or revocation of licenses to
export to them. These decisions will be announced
in the Federal Register.
ITAR Qs & As
Q: Will licenses approved before July 22, 1993 now
be valid for 4 years (new ITAR), instead of 3 years
(old ITAR)?
A: No.The provision concerning validity of export
licenses is not retroactive to previously issued
licenses.
Q: Does the new ITAR extend the validity of DSP-94
licenses (for authority to export under the Foreign
Military Sales program) from 2 years to 4 years?
A: No. However, it is the intent of DTC to amend
the ITAR to do so.
Q: ¤122.4 (c) (1) - (3) requires certain
information to be provided to DTC when a new entity
is formed in a merger or acquisition. Is there a
specific time period within which DTC must be
notified?
A: DTC must be notified of any material changes in
the registration statement, including any material
changes in the information required by ¤122.4 (c)
(1) (3), within 5 days of the event, as specified in
¤122.4 (a) (2).
Q: Is a registrant required to notify DTC in
advance of any intended sale or transfer to a
foreign person of ownership or control of the
registrant or entity thereof?
A: Yes, in accordance with ¤122.4 (b). A
registrant must notify DTC in writing at least 60
days in advance of any such intended sale or
transfer. (###)
DTC invites questions and comments on the new ITAR
and its implementation. Please fax your thoughts,
queries, and ideas to (703) 875-6647. (###)
To order a copy of the revised ITAR, call the
Government Printing Office at (202) 783-3238 from
8:00 - 4:00 EST. Cite stock number 069-001-000-58-
1. (###)
Don't Just Carp; Turn to SARP
A New Licensing Appeal Mechanism at State
The Office of Defense Trade Controls, on the
recommendation of the Department of State's Defense
Trade Advisory Group (DTAG), has implemented an
informal appeal process for license applications for
which it has made a preliminary determination of
denial. The process is known as the State Appeal
Review Process, or SARP.
An additional appeal mechanism. The SARP will not
replace the formal appeals process provided for in
ITAR ¤126.7(d). The goal is for the Director of DTC
to augment the regulatory system by ensuring
industry has the opportunity to understand the U.S.
Government position on any case which DTC intends to
deny.
Eligibility. Cases eligible for review in the SARP
include applications which DTC licensing officers
recommend for denial either in the initial review
process or following interagency referral. Not all
cases are eligible for the SARP.
For example, any ineligible case include those for
which there clearly exists published foreign policy
or national security guidelines. This would include
publication of denial criteria in the regulations,
Federal Register, DTN or any MTEC case where the USG
has requested MTEC assurances and the foreign
government has either not responded or refuses to
provide the required assurances.
Grounds for denial. In accordance with ITAR ¤126.7
(a) (1), applications for export licenses will not
be approved when such exports are deemed not to be
in furtherance of world peace, national security, or
the foreign policy of the United States. Factors
that may lead to a denial include human rights
concerns, regulatory interpretation, technological
sophistication, bona fides of the end use and end
user, and concerns related to the Missile Technology
Control Regime.
Step one--notification. The SARP process will begin
with DTC notifying the applicant by phone and fax of
the intent to deny, explaining the rationale for the
denial. DTC will request a written response as to
whether the applicant wishes to implement a SARP
review. If the applicant does not reply within 3
working days of transmission of the notification,
DTC will proceed with a formal written denial. To
reply, the applicant need only complete the bottom
of DTC's fax notification form.
Step two--the ASID test. If the applicant requests
a SARP, the applicant has 7 working days, dating
from DTC's notification, to submit a paper known as
the "Applicant SARP Information Document (ASID)."
The ASID should address and counter DTC's denial
rationale; thus it must contain new information not
included in the original application.
The ASID paper, at this time, has no format
requirements. However, if the Department of Defense
has held a "Day in Court" review of the application,
the applicant should attach a copy of the "White
Paper" which was prepared for the Day in Court.
Step three--the meeting. Within 2 working days of
receiving the ASID, DTC will review it and decide
whether the additional information presented
warrants a follow-up meeting. If so, DTC will
coordinate with the applicant to establish a meeting
date, time, and place. DTC may invite other
interested agencies to participate, in which case
DTC will request that the applicant provide copies
of the ASID directly to all U.S.G. personnel who
will participate in the SARP.
Step four--decision. DTC will not rule on the spot,
but will notify the applicant in writing of its
decision within 5 working days. (###)
DTSA's Role in the Export Application Review Process
An Introduction to the Defense Technology Security
Administration
Approximately 25% of the arms export license
applications submitted to the Office of Defense
Trade Controls involve issues of national security
that require Department of Defense (DOD) review.
The Defense Technology Security Administration
(DTSA), established in May 1985 by DOD Directive
5105.51, is responsible for developing the DOD
position on munitions license applications and
Commodity Jurisdictions. Within DTSA, this function
is delegated to the License Directorate (DTSA/LD).
Why DOD reviews applications. DOD reviews arms
export license applications to assess their impact
on U.S. national security. Among the factors in that
evaluation:
-- Commodity sophistication
- potential operational risk to U.S. troops
- valid needs of the end user
-- End use
- stated end use
- possible alternate end uses
-- End user
- ability to use the commodity
- status; not debarred or suspended
-- Security classification of commodity
- accordance with National Disclosure Policy
-- International agreements
- disclosure guidance
-- Foreign availability
- capability to manufacture production
quantities
- exportability
-- FMS-only proviso
- must be fully justified in accodance with
existing DOD policy
-- False impression
- if export of the end item cannot be approved,
DTSA normally cannot approve technical marketing
data or a hardware demonstration.
Details, details, details. Twice each week, DTSA
picks up applications from DTC and records the
pertinent details of each license application in a
computer system. There is a direct relationship
between the accuracy and completeness of an
application and the quality and timeliness of the
DOD response. The following items are critical to
DOD in reviewing a case:
Commodity description. A technical description of
hardware and/or data must be attached to enable
technical personnel to understand the item's
functional capabilities.
End-use description. A thorough description of the
end-use must be provided to give reviewers a
complete understanding of the transaction.
Precedent cases. A history of previous cases,
including denials, involving the identical commodity
is important in obtaining a fair and accurate
review. Applicants should attach copies of any
precedent applications and related State Department
letters.
Foreign availability. For an item with no precedent
release history, applicants should attach any
available documentation indicating an equivalent
foreign item is in production, plus any available
documentation indicating that the government of the
foreign producer would permit export. It may be
advisable to consult with DTSA on this issue prior
to submitting an application to State.
When DOD receives an application without supporting
technical data, DTC is advised that the application
will be Returned Without Action if DOD does not
receive the data in 3 working days. If technical
data accompanying an application is insufficient,
the applicant has 10 working days to provide the
data. If the applicant does not do so, the
application is Returned Without Action to DTC.
How DOD reviews applications. To save time, DTC
provides copies of applications to pertinent DOD
offices. (Refer to chart on following page.)
DTSA/LD reviews opinions received from these DOD
entities and formulates a single DOD position. A
DOD office that disagrees with a DOD position
proposed by DTSA/LD can request DOD's International
Technology Transfer Coordinating Committee, chaired
by an Assistant Secretary of Defense, to consider
the issue.
National Disclosure Policy. The National Disclosure
Policy (NDP) is a classified document that governs
the release of U.S. classified military information
to foreign governments and international
organizations. A request for exception to NDP may
be sponsored by State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air
Force, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
How DOD views Commodity Jurisdiction determinations.
Determination of whether an item or service is under
the jurisdiction of the Department of State's U.S.
Munitions List (USML) is provided by the Office of
Defense Trade Controls, Department of State upon
receipt of written request. The determinations are
based on interagency consultations, including
technical evaluations from the Departments of
Commerce and Defense and other cognizant agencies.
A Commodity Jurisdiction request should contain a
complete technical description of the item, the
reason it was developed, whether U.S. Government
funds were used in its development, a description of
any military and/or commercial usage, and any other
facts the applicant deems appropriate.
Commodity Jurisdiction determination is based
primarily on whether the item was specifically
designed or modified for a military application. A
narrow exception to this policy exists for items
which have commercial applications but also have
significant military or intelligence applicability;
see ITAR ¤120.3. Use of an item by the U.S.
military and the intended end use of an item
proposed for export are not factors.
Responsiveness. To respond to State Department
referrals within 20 calendar days, DTSA has recently
begun transmitting its positions to DTC via
computer, saving up to 3 days of processing time.
Case status. Exporters can download case status
information from DTSA's computer by calling the
Export License Status Advisor (ELISA) at (703) 697-
6109. Case information remains in ELISA for three
weeks after DOD closes a case. ELISA maintenance
assistance is available by calling (703) 697-7840.
Case status information is also available by calling
(703) 697-5336, Mondays and Wednesdays from 2:00 to
4:00 pm and Fridays from 9:00 to 10:30 am.
Objections. When DOD intends to object to a
transaction, DTSA contacts the designated applicant
contact. Objections based on established release
policies or a determination by the cognizant service
that it does not wish to sponsor the required
exception to National Disclosure Policy are not
usually subject to further discussion with DOD.
Other types of DOD objection rationales may be
questioned through "Day in Court" procedures.
For information on the Day in Court, contact DTSA's
License Directorate at (703) 697-5336.
Questions concerning this article should be
referred to Nancy Hindman, DTSA/LD, at (703) 614-
7761.(###)
License Directorate
Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA)
Suite 302, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA
22202
Position Name Phone
Acting Director Jim Woody (703) 695-3554
Policy Analyst Nancy L. Hindman 614-7761
Secretary JoAnne L. Brown 695-3554
Secretary Cheryl Barnett 614-7398
Admin Support SMSGT Ricky B. Cooksey 697-5336
Chief, Munitions Branch Janet L. Michel 697-3429
Senior Analyst Leonard H. Altman 693-1127
Analyst Julia Kortum 614-7756
Export Control Specialist Mary Gressette 614-7399
Analyst Howard Gardiner 693-1126
Export Control Specialist Paula Harris 614-7399
Analyst MAJ Brien McNamara 693-1125
Export Control Specialist (vacant) 693-1129
Senior Analyst Jim Stofferahn 614-7754
Analyst Linda Randall 614-7753
Export Control Specialist Paula Harris 614-7399
Analyst Natalie Pechanski-McRoy 697-5335
Export Control Specialist Janet Smith 693-1129
Analyst Susan Webster 614-7392
Export Control Specialist Mary Gressette 614-7399
Admin NCO TSGT Joseph Brooks 614-7398
(###)
[EDITOR'S NOTE: The chart on "DOD Review of License
Applications" that appears in the hard copy version
of this pubication cannot be duplicated in this
electronic format]
ELLIE Comes On Line
Office of Defense Trade Controls Introduces
Electronic License Submission
Following up the success of ROBB (DTC's Remote On-
Line Bulletin Board), the Office of Defense Trade
Controls has inaugurated a pilot program to test the
feasibility of electronic license submission.
The centerpiece of the system is the ELectronic
LIcense Entry system, ELLIE, designed and
implemented by DTC's in-house Computer Support Staff
under Jim DePalma. With ELLIE, applicants can fill
out applications on the personal computers in their
offices, dial up DTC's computer via modem, and
submit the applications electronically.
Easy application. ELLIE users fill in the face of
the application (DSP-5s only, at this stage) on the
computer screen. The system features continuation
sheets, to continue an item on the form or to add an
attachment (e.g., a list of freight forwarders). A
template feature allows users to store repetitive
data such as company name and address. Companies
with divisions at multiple locations could create a
template for each, selecting the appropriate one for
each application.
Error-resistant processing. All information
submitted via ELLIE is automatically entered into
DTC's licensing data base eliminating data entry
errors, further speeding the licensing process.
Easy tracking. Licenses entered electronically
show up in ROBB the following morning, referenced by
license number and by a transaction number generated
to facilitate cross-referencing with paper
attachments.
Quick turnaround. Building the efficiencies
inherent in electronic licensing, our aim is that
companies using ELLIE will receive approved licenses
back much more quickly than with traditional
methods. During our test phase, a number of the
most straightforward applications were processed 2 -
3 days quicker.
Outstanding issues. Operational questions remain to
be solved for ELLIE to achieve her full potential.
For example, backup material for complex
applications cannot be entered electronically on
ELLIE's continuation sheets; it still must be
submitted--by mail, courier, or fax--and a paper
file married up to the information provided via
ELLIE.
Now recruiting. From an initial test group of five
selected companies, the ELLIE project has grown to
include more than forty. User reaction has been
overwhelmingly positive, and DTC is eager to expand
the number of users as well as the system's
features. (###)
For more information, or to sign up for ELLIE,
please call DTC's Computer Support Staff at (703)
875-6650 or use the rear application form on page
28.
State Tiger Team Unleashed
Reorganizing for Efficiency at the Office of Defense
Trade Controls
If you have submitted a license application to the
Office of Defense Trade Controls since December,
1993, you may have gotten it back stamped with the
phrase "TIGER TEAM." Those licenses are part of an
organizational experiment underway at DTC--one
aspect of a multi-pronged effort to improve
productivity, increase job satisfaction within the
office, and increase customer satisfaction with case
processing.
Enhanced computerization. A major thrust of the
change is an emphasis on greater computerization at
DTC. Two examples are the implementation of license
application through "electronic data interface,"or
EDI (in which the applicant submits a license
application electronically via the ELLIE system),
and the expansion of electronic staffing of cases to
other agencies and other State Department offices.
DTC is already using electronic means to staff
cases to the Department of Defense, and will expand
electronic staffing to State Department offices
early in 1994. This will enable DTC to get cases
staffed instantaneously and on a daily basis, and
will combat the problem of paper files going astray
as they travel between DTC and other offices and
agencies.
Organizational change. Perhaps the most intriguing
element of the change at DTC involves use of a
"Tiger Team" experiment to test the utility of
"Total Quality Management" (TQM) theory in
organizing the office as a whole and in approaching
license processing.
Tigers in the vanguard. The thrust of the TQM
approach as applied to DTC is to combine licensing,
compliance, and administrative specialists into
largely self-managed work teams, improving inter-
functional coordination and cutting down on the
transfer of cases among DTC divisions.
Licensing officer Ken Peoples has been appointed to
head this team for a three-month trial period. Dan
Cook and Major Bob Kovac join the Team as licensing
analysts (Bob also as the Team's "quality control"
officer), Jim DePalma as computer and electronics
expert, Danielle Mack as administrative assistant,
and Eva Tyler as compliance analyst.
Since December 6, license applications assigned to
Peoples, Cook, or Kovac have been processed using
this teaming approach, with a processing system
which the team has designed itself. Licenses which
they process in this fashion are being marked "TIGER
TEAM" when issued.
Fewer hands, quicker handling. The Tiger Team
expects to reduce case processing time by minimizing
the number of people handling each case, maximizing
the amount done to a case each time someone handles
it (e.g., having licensing officers type in license
provisos instead of passing cases off to secretaries
for typing), and emphasizing use of electronics
(ELLIE, electronic staffing).
Towards paperless licensing. The Team is also
looking at several proposals to improve processing
speed and reduce opportunities for human error--
e.g., eliminating manual processing of applications,
computer-generating licenses at the end of the
process. If possible, the Team wants to use such an
approach as part of the experiment. Note that this
will be possible only with cases submitted
electronically (another reason for companies to sign
onto the ELLIE pilot project).
You be the judge. Eventually, the Tiger Team will
seek industry reaction and comments from those
customers affected by the process. At the end of
the 3-month trial period, a neutral observer will be
called in to evaluate the Team's performance;
customer satisfaction will be one of the criteria
used in that evaluation. In the meantime,
applicants should not be surprised if they receive a
call from Bob Kovac seeking feedback on a case the
Tiger Team has handled.
Investment in training. Finally, training will be
an important aspect not only of the Tiger Team
project, but of the customer service and processing
enhancements DTC seeks to implement in the near
future.
All DTC employees are scheduled to take a 2-day
course in "customer service" at the State
Department's National Foreign Affairs Training
Center in January. In addition, all DTC employees
will receive basic training in TQM theory, and
selected employees will receive advanced TQM
training.
This training is being scheduled so everyone will be
given adequate "back-up" while out of the office on
training, but callers seeking a specific person in
the office might be delayed. Any delays or
inconveniences will be short-lived and, we expect,
minor--and worth it. (###)
Questions on the Tiger Team project can be addressed
to Ken Peoples at (703) 875-6619, Dan Cook at 875-
5674, Bob Kovac at 875-5199, or Jim DePalma at 875-
7391.
Landmine Moratorium Extended Through 1996
On November 10, 1993, Congress extended for an
additional three years the moratorium on exports of
anti-personnel landmines established in the 1993
Defense Authorization Act. The original one-year
moratorium took effect on November 23, 1992,
prohibiting the sale, transfer, or export under the
Arms Export Control Act of any anti-personnel land
mine. In November 1992 the State Department
announced via the Federal Register (57 FR 55614) the
revocation or suspension of previously-issued
licenses. (###)
DEPARTMENTS
DTAG DEVELOPMENTS
The Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG) convened its
semi-annual plenary session on October 6, 1993 at
the Department of State. Highlights from the
session:
Reorganization at State
Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs
Robert L. Gallucci discussed how the Department of
State has redirected its export control priorities
to reflect President Clinton's emphasis on non-
proliferation and U.S. economic security.
State export control functions have been centralized
within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. The
restructuring advances one of the Bureau's key
goals--to prevent arms diversions and exports which
fuel proliferation, while promoting transfers
consistent with U.S. national security and foreign
policy concerns. Assistant Secretary Gallucci
concluded by reaffirming the Administration's
commitment to facilitating legitimate U.S. defense
exports.
New Priorities
In her keynote address, Under Secretary for
International Security Affairs Lynn E. Davis
commented on the Administration's proposed
international affairs budget reforms. Evolving
relations between countries and new U.S. priorities
require the Administration to re-examine the way it
allocates scarce resources.
Although it is proposed that the Economic Support
Funds (ESF), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
programs will no longer exist, the activities they
have sustained will continue. The administration
will instead redraft the Foreign Assistance Act
according to five policy objectives, and will link
funding levels to the attainment of these goals:
- promoting economic prosperity and development;
- building democracy;
- promoting peace;
- providing emergency humanitarian assistance;
and
- refining the bilateral and multilateral
negotiating skills of U.S. diplomats.
Arms Transfer Policy
Dr. Davis remarked that the Administration is
reviewing its conventional arms transfer policy.
She confirmed the U.S. Government's commitment to
actively support U.S. manufacturers' efforts to
increase their exports, saying that State will take
into account a proposed export's economic
consequences and effect on the U.S. industrial base.
Dr. Davis cautioned, however, that support for U.S.
business must be balanced against other policy
concerns, such as non-proliferation.
Whither COCOM?
Under Secretary Davis concluded by commenting on the
future of COCOM. An institution which formulates
export controls based on the former East-West divide
is not consistent with post-Cold War conditions. The
Administration favors a new institution through
which responsible supplier nations would address
dual-use technologies on a world-wide basis, and
restrain countries engaged in proliferation. The
United States is participating in sensitive
negotiations with its COCOM partners on how to
reorient export controls.
Working Group Reports
Policy Working Group suggestions for future projects
include: initiating a joint DTAG/DOD study on how
increased U.S. arms exports can strengthen our
industrial base; developing a foreign availability
database on specific defense articles and
technologies to assist the arms export licensing
process; revising DTAG Chairman William Schneider's
paper on arms transfer policy; and requesting State
to organize a briefing on USML exports to and
imports from the former Soviet Union. After
further discussion, some of these suggestions may be
incorporated into formal DTAG recommendations to the
Department.
The Department has completed action on several
Regulatory Working Group recommendations, including:
upgrading DTC's Remote On-Line Bulletin Board;
improving licensing forms; establishing a pilot
project on the electronic submission of license
applications; agreeing to establish a State Appeal
Review Process; and identifying MTCR equipment in
the ITAR.
The Technical Working Group made no formal
recommendations to the Department, but continues to
examine jet engine hot sections, commercial aircraft
prior to certification, software source code, and
encryption. It is working to develop criteria to
determine whether specific technologies belong on
the U.S. Munitions List or the Commodity Control
List.
Taiwan Briefing
Officers from State's Taiwan Coordination staff and
Office of Export Control Policy and the Department
of Defense spoke in closed session on U.S. arms
transfer policy toward Taiwan. They noted that our
policy has resulted in Taiwan being more secure,
prosperous, and democratic than at any time during
its history. U.S. arms sales policy since the 1980s
has fully met Taiwan's legitimate defensive needs
while remaining consistent with our commitments
under the August 1982 communique. U.S. defense
firms are in a good position vis-a-vis foreign
competitors, as U.S. manufacturers have the highest-
quality, most interoperable, and lowest-priced
equipment to offer. (###)
DTAG-related questions can be directed to Linda Lum
of the DTAG Secretariat at (202) 647-4231.
Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations
The following chart lists selected recent Commodity
Jurisdiction (CJ) determinations. We have described
the commodities in general terms to ensure the
confidentiality of proprietary information related
to individual cases. Determinations apply only to
the specific commodities reviewed. If you believe
one of your products is similar to one listed here
as having been placed on the Commerce Department's
Commerce Control List (CCL) and wish to have your
product reviewed, please submit a CJ request letter
following the guidelines set forth in ITAR ¤120.4.
Refer to Defense Trade News articles "Guidelines for
Preparing CJ Requests" and "CJs for Mass Market
Software" (Vol. 3, No. 4, Oct 1992) and "Class and
Multiple CJ Requests" (Vol. 3, No. 1, Jan 1992), or
call (703) 875-5655 for guidance.
COMMODITY JURISDICTION
Accelerometers
Specifically Designed or Modified
for military use USML XII(d)
Not Specifically Designed or
Modified for military use CCL
Acoustic Charge Transport Devices, Processors,
Modules and Development Stations USML XI(d)
Actuators, Electric Motor Operated Valve,
Specifically Designed for Military Use USML VI(b)
Armor, Level IV
Aluminum Oxide Ceramic Inserts USML X(a)
Aerial Targets Specifically
Designed for Military Gunnery Training USML IX(a)
Aerial Targets Associated Equipment USML IX(b)
Aerial Targets Technical Assistance USML IX(c)
Ammunition Demilitarization System USML XXI
Antennas Specifically
Designed for Military Use USML XI(d)
Artillery Fuze Part USML
III(b)
Artillery Fuze Part Manufacturing Equipment
USML III(d)
Batteries, Lithium USML XI(d)
Braided Textiles
Specifically Designed, Modified,
or Configured for Military Use USML XIII(d)
Not Specifically Designed, Modified, or
Configured for Military Use CCL **
Bullet Casting Machines
Automated USML III(d)
Non-automated CCL 1B96G
Bullet Lubricant CCL 1C96G
Bullet Molds
Designed, Modified, or Configured for
Automated Bullet Casting Machines USML III(d)
Not Designed, Modified, or Configured for
Automated
Bullet Casting Machines CCL **
Camera, Military Thermal Imaging USML XII(c)
Camera System, Infrared USML XII(c)
Collators
Specifically Designed, Modified, or
Configured for Bullet Manufacturing
USML III(d)
Not Specifically Designed, Modified, or
Configured for Bullet Manufacturing
CCL 1B96G
Compasses, Navigation, Specifically Designed
for Military Use USML XII(f)
Computers , Microcomputers, Monitors, and Keyboards
That Are Ruggedize
TEMPEST Models USML XI(b)
Non-TEMPEST Models CCL **
Cones, Copper and Molybdenum,
Used in Research of Shaped Charge Liners
USML III(b)
Dies, Lubricating and Sizing USML III(d)
Document Analyzer, Fraud Investigations CCL 3A96G
Fire Detection Kit CCL **
Flight Loads Recording Systems,
Designed for Military Aircraft USML VIII(j)
GPS Mission Planning Station CCL 7A94F
GPS Receiver, Miniaturized Airborne CCL 7A25B
Gyro, Vertical, Specifically Designed for
Commercial Use CCL 7A94F
Headsets, Specifically Modified for
Use with Armored Vehicles USML X(a)
Intelligence Surveillance System USML XI(b)
Image Intensifier Tube, Military,
Second Generation USML Xl(c)
Imaging Equipment, Thermal USML XII(c)
Metal Matrix Composites Production Process CCL **
Micro-peripheral Devices, Specifically Designed
for Commercial Spacecraft USML XV(d)
Nuclear Thermal Rocket Engine USML IV(d)
Oil Filtration Kit, Not Specifically Designed
for Military Engines CCL 9A94F
PBAN Polymer
Printer, Continuous CCL 6A96G
Processor, Single Board Signal USML XI
Radar, Site Security Surveillance CCL 6A96G
Radiation-Hardened Components
Designed for Military Systems USML XI(a)
Radioactively-Contaminated Scrap Metals
(Depleted Uranium, Beryllium, etc.),
Non-Military Recycling, Manufacturing
Technology for CCL **
Radio Controller and Data Modem Not
Specifically Designed for Military Application
CCL **
Radio Frequency Target Generator CCL 6A96G
Receiver, GPS CCL **
Receiver HF, Designed for Military Use USML XI(b)
Receiver System, Wide-band, Not Designed, Modified,
or Configured for Military Application CCL **
Reflector Assembly for Communications Antenna
CCL 5A96G
Schottky Rectifier Semiconductors Not Specifically
Designed for Military Application CCL 3A96G
Signature Reduction Material USML XIII(e)
Silicon Carbon-Aluminum Alloy Metal Matrix
Composites
Production Process CCL **
Silicon Nitride Rolling Contact Bearing Materials,
Generic CCL **
Software, Electronic Catalog CCL 5D13A
Software, Employing DES for Data Encryption
USML XIII(b)
Software, Employing DES for Password Encryption
Object Code CCL 5D13A
Source Code USML XIII(b)
Software, Military Communications USML XI(e)
Software, Simulation and Analytical Modeling
CCL 4D96G
Steel Plate, Not Designed, Modified, or Configured
for Use as Armor for Defense Articles CCL **
Suppressors, Data Line Transient, Not
Designed for Military Use CCL 3A96G
Surge Protection Modules, High-Power
Specifically Designed, Modified, or
Configured for Military Application
USML XI(d)
Not Specifically Designed, Modified, or
Configured for Military Application CCL**
Switch, Automatic Bus Transfer CCL 8A94F
Tachometer, DC CCL 2A96G
Tape Recorders, Remote Sensing Satellite USML XV(d)
Technical Data Related to AZT CCL **
Technical Data Related to Equipment Specifically
Designed to Detect, Analyze, and Jam
Communications Signals USML XI(e)
Technical Data Related to a Mortar USML I(d)
Technical Data Related to Military Multilevel
Database Systems USML XIII(k)
Telecommunications Switching System
Limited Access Feature CCL 5D13A
Television Receiver/Decoder System With N
Digital Encryption Capability and With the
Digital Decryption Limited to Video and
Audio Functions CCL 5A95F
Test Set for Military Aviation Oxygen Mask
USML X(d)
Vehicle, Remotely Operated, Specifically
Designed for Inspecting Nuclear and
Hydroelectric Power Plants CCL 2A50B
Voice Transmitter CCL 5A80D
Zirconium
Zirconium 93, 95, and 97 NRC, App F
Zirconium Alloy Powder of
Particle Size 60 Micrometers or Less
Manufactured from Material With a
Zirconium Content of 99% or More USML V(a)
Zirconium Sponge Compacts USML *
Zirconium, Other Forms CCL **
* USML category is the same as the item for which
this part or component was designed.
** A specific Export Commodity Classification
Number (ECCN) was not provided by the Department of
Commerce. For the ECCN number, please file a
commodity classification request with the Bureau of
Export Administration (BXA), Department of Commerce,
P.O. Box 273, Washington, DC 20044 (###)
Suspensions & Debarments
Eliyahu Cohen, a.k.a. Eli Cohen
On September 26, 1993, Assistant Secretary Robert L.
Gallucci, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
suspended all existing licenses and other approvals
(including all activities under manufacturing
license and technical assistance agreements),
granted pursuant to ¤38 of the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA), that authorized the export or transfer
of defense articles or services by, for or to
Eliyahu Cohen a.k.a. Eli Cohen, Netanya, Israel;
A.V.S. Armoured Vehicles Systems Inc. a.k.a. A.V.S.
Inc., New York; A.V.S. Armoured Vehicles Spares
Ltd. a.k.a. A.V.S. Ltd., Netanya, and any of their
subsidiaries, associated companies or successor
entities.
In addition, it shall be the policy of theDepartment
of State to deny all export license applications and
other requests for approval involving, directly or
indirectly, Eliyahu Cohen a.k.a. Eli Cohen; A.V.S.
Armoured Vehicles Systems, Inc. a.k.a. A.V.S., Inc.;
A.V.S. Armoured Vehicles Spares Ltd. a.k.a. A.V.S.
Ltd., and any of their subsidiaries, associated
companies or successor entities. Also, these persons
are precluded from using any exemptions from license
or other approval included in the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
Notice of this suspension was published in the
Federal Register (October 13, 1993, Vol. 58, Page
53015, Public Notice 1887). (###)
PERSONNEL UPDATES
Out...
Marsha Finley (Major, USA), completed her 3-year
tenure as Managing Editor of Defense Trade News and
retired from the Army in November 1993.
Foreign Service Officer Charles A. Ray, formerly
Special Assistant to the Director of DTC and
Executive Editor of Defense Trade News, is now
Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy Freetown,
Sierra Leone.
Martin "Tex" Maier (Major, USAF) after completing a
2-year tour as a DTC licensing officer, moving to a
similar position at USAF.
DTC licensing officer Sue Plant departed in November
to join her husband who will be employed in the US
Embassy in Bonn.
In...
Philip S. Kosnett joined DTC in July, 1993 as
Special Assistant to the Director and Executive
Editor of Defense Trade News. A Foreign Service
Officer, he has served in Ankara, Turkey; Nagoya,
Japan; and State's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research.
Christopher R. Elder joined DTC's new Research and
Analysis Branch in March, 1993 as a Compliance
Specialist. He previously handled Commodity
Jurisdictions in the Arms Licensing Division.
Robert Huffman also joined DTC 's Research and
Analysis Branch in March 1993 as a Compliance
Specialist. He has worked for DTC since October
1991, when he started as a clerk in the Compliance
Analysis Division.
The Office of Export Control Policy (formerly the
Office of Defense Trade Policy) welcomed a new
director and four officers:
William P. Pope assumed direction of EXP in August,
after a tour as Deputy Political Counselor at U.S.
Embassy Pretoria, South Africa. A member of the
Senior Foreign Service, he has served in Paris;
Belgrade; Zagreb; and Gaborone, Botswana. In
Washington, he has served in the Legislative
Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, African Affairs, and
Intelligence and Research bureaus.
Paul S. Aronsohn handles industry outreach and
intergovernmental issues. Before coming to State,
he worked in the White House Communications Office.
During the Clinton Administration transition he
served as a liaison to the Commerce Department's
Bureau of Export Administration.
John C. Clarkson is responsible for the Western
Europe, NATO and United Nations Arms Register
portfolios. A Foreign Service Officer, he has
completed tours in Helsinki, Finland; Damascus,
Syria; and Kingston, Jamaica. He has also served in
State's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs.
Foreign Service Officer Julie L. Kavanagh covers
East Asia and represents the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs on the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the U.S. She has served in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil and Montevideo, Uruguay.
Jeffry R. Olesen, also a Foreign Service Officer, is
responsible for the Middle East and South Asia. He
has served in Guadalajara, Mexico; Abu Dhabi, United
Arab Emirates; and Lahore, Pakistan. (###)
TIPS AND TIDBITS
'NATO' Not Enough
The use of the word 'NATO' as the ultimate
destination is not adequate identification for
multiple countries on a license application. When
completing Block 3 on the DSP-5, block 4 on the DSP-
73, or block 4 on the DSP-85, please list each
country separately.
Are Your Suppliers Registered?
Exporters should request manufacturers from which
they purchase defense articles to confirm that they
are registered with the Office of Defense Trade
Controls. Checking this before submitting an
application can help to avoid processing delays.
Recognizing Carbonless Forms
Remember that the newly revised DSP application
forms are printed on carbonless paper. Please do
not insert carbon paper between the pages when
completing the forms. How to recognize the new
forms:
-- There is no short carbon interleaf at the
top;
-- The numbers 11-92 appear under the word
"Form" at the bottom left;
-- An expiration date of 12-31-95 or 3-31- 96
appears at the bottom right corner; and
-- The ITAR ¤126.13 certification and ¤130
statement are on the back of copy 1 of the form.
New Forms - No More ¤126.13 and ¤130 Letters
It is not necessary to submit a separate ¤126.13 or
¤130 letter with the new forms. Simply have an
empowered official sign the front of the form, and
check the appropriate boxes on the back of copy 1.
Rounding Off Dollar Values
License applicants are encouraged to include only
whole dollar values when completing applications.
Please round off cents to the nearest dollar. For
example, enter $100.45 as $100. Round $100.50 up to
$101. This will simplify processing and reduce the
potential for processing errors.
Did I Miss Defense Trade News Volume 4, Number 4?
We didn't publish one. In 1993 we published two
issues: "Volume 4, Numbers 1 & 2" dated
January/April, and "Volume 4, Number 3" dated July.
We plan four quarterly issues for 1994. (###)
FEEDBACK
Please circle or fill in your responses, add any
comments, and fax it to (703) 875-6647.
1. Your organization is a...
1. Manufacturer
2. Exporter
3. Consulting or law firm
4. Freight Forwarder
5. U.S. Embassy or Consulate
6. U.S. Customs element
7. U.S. DOD/Military element
8. Other U.S. Government element
9. Foreign government element
10. Other (please explain in Comments)
2. How many people will read this issue?
1. 1 person
2. 2-5 people
3. 6-10 people
4. 11+ people
3-14. Please rate the usefulness of each article on
a scale of 1 (worst) to 5 (best). Rate as "0" any
articles you did not read.
3. White House Statement ___
4. The Export Control Agenda___
5. Fine-Tuning the ITAR___
6. Don't Just Carp; Turn to SARP___
7. DTSA's Role___
8. ELLIE Comes on Line___
9. Tiger Team___
10. DTAG Developments___
11. Commodity Jurisdiction ___
12. Suspensions & Debarments___
13. Personnel Updates___
14. Tips & Tidbits___
15-26. Please rate each article's readability
(style and physical presentation) on a scale of 1
(worst) to 5 (best); rate as "0" articles you did
not read.
15. White House Statement___
16. The Export Control Agenda____
17. Fine-Tuning the ITAR___
18. Don't Just Carp; Turn to SARP___
19. DTSA's Role___
20. ELLIE Comes on Line___
21. Tiger Team___
22. DTAG Developments___
23. Commodity Jurisdiction___
24. Suspensions & Debarments___
25. Personnel Updates___
26. Tips & Tidbits___
27-29. Please circle the numbers of the three topics
you would most like to see covered in the magazine.
1. Defense trade policy
2. Non-defense trade policy
3. Country-specific trade issues
4. Trade legislation
5. Licensing procedures
6. Regulatory and legal issues
7. Licensing case studies
8. Compliance case studies
9. Other (please explain in Comments)
30. This magazine is provided to DTC registrants and
others free of charge. If we were to change to a
paid subscription basis (at c. $20/year), how would
your organization react?
1. We would pay for one subscription.
2. We would pay for more than one
subscription.
3. We would not pay to subscribe.
4. Don't know.
Comments:
____________________________________
____________________________________
____________________________________
We welcome lengthier comments, suggestions, and
criticism. (###)
Contacting the Office of Defense Trade Controls
Postal Address
Office of Defense Trade Controls
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
PM/DTC, SA-6, Room 200
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20522-0602
Express Mail/Courier Delivery Address
Office of Defense Trade Controls
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
PM/DTC, Room 200
U.S. Department of State
1701 N. Fort Myer Drive (Nash St. Entrance)
Arlington, VA 22209-3113
Fax Numbers
Director; Licensing Division; Defense Trade News:
(703) 875-6647
Compliance Division;info on ROBB or ELLIE: (703)
875-5663
General Telephone Numbers
General Information: (703) 875-6644
Office Director & Deputies: (703) 875-7050
Defense Trade News: (703) 875-5671
Licensing Division:(703) 875-6644
Registration/Compliance: (703) 875-6650
Commodity Jurisdiction: (703) 875-5655
Status Inquiry Telephone Numbers
General Status Inquiries: (703) 875-6652
Congressional Case Status: (703) 875-6641
Automated License Status System: (703) 875-7374
Remote On-Line Bulletin Board: (703) 875-6650
Contacting the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export
Controls
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Controls
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
PM, Room 7325A
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520-7325
Contacting the Office of Export Control Policy
Office of Export Control Policy
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
PM/EXP, Room 2242
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520-2242
Telephone (202) 647-4231
Fax (202) 647-4232
(###)
END OF VOL 5, NO 1
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