15 October 1998
Source: Hardcopy from US Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Virginia;
(703) 299-3700. Thanks to MP.
See related court docket: http://jya.com/dsb101498.htm
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, ARREST
WARRANT, AND SEARCH WARRANTS
I, Stephanie Douglas, being duly sworn, hereby state the
following under penalty of perjury:
1. I am a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and have been so employed for approximately
nine years. I am currently assigned to the Washington Field
Office to a squad responsible for foreign counterintelligence
matters; I have worked in this field for approximately four
years. As a result of my involvement in counterintelligence
investigations, and foreign counterintelligence training I have
received, I am familiar with the tactics, methods and techniques
of foreign intelligence services and their agents.
2. As more fully described below, DAVID SHELDON BOONE, an
American citizen and retired United States Army Non-Commissioned
Officer, has acted clandestinely, corruptly, and illegally as an
agent of the Committee for State Security (Komitet
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosty or KGB) of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR), and for its direct successor agency,
the Russian Federation foreign intelligence service, Sluzhba
Vneshney Razvedki Rossii (SVRR), jointly referred to herein as
the KGB/SVRR. By his actions, BOONE has committed violations of
18 U.S.C. § 794(a), that is, with reason to believe that it was
to be used to the injury of the United States and the advantage
of a foreign nation, he knowingly and unlawfully communicated,
transmitted and delivered to a foreign government, specifically
the USSR, documents relating to the national defense of the
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United States. The investigation reveals that since September
1988, the USSR has paid BOONE more than $60,000 for his unlawful
acts, and that during 1998 BOONE accepted an additional payment
of $9,000 from an agent he believed to be acting for the
KGB/SVRR.
3. Information in this affidavit is based on my personal
knowledge and on information provided to me by other
counterintelligence investigators and law enforcement officers
during this investigation, which is being conducted jointly by
the FBI and the United States Army Intelligence and Security
Command (INSCOM). This affidavit also relies on information
provided by agencies of the United States Intelligence Community,
which have cooperated with this investigation, and on
consensually-monitored meetings and conversations involving
BOONE. This affidavit is not intended to be an exhaustive
summary of the investigation against BOONE, but is for the
purpose of setting out probable cause in support of:
a. a complaint charging DAVID SHELDON BOONE with a
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(a)
(espionage);
b. an arrest warrant for DAVID SHELDON BOONE;
c. a search warrant for Room 1431 of the Washington
Dulles Airport Marriott Hotel, and any luggage and personal items
of DAVID SHELDON BOONE which are within Room 1431 of this hotel
located at Dulles Airport in the Eastern District of Virginia;
and
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d. a search warrant for a laptop computer and computer
carrying case belonging to DAVID SHELDON BOONE, which are either
in his personal possession or within Room 1431 of the Washington
Dulles Airport Marriott Hotel located at Dulles Airport in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
BACKGROUND
4. DAVID SHELDON BOONE is a United States citizen (SSAN
547-98-0810), born on August 26, 1952, in Flint, Michigan. He is
divorced from his first wife, with whom he had two children; he
remarried and currently resides in Germany with his second wife,
who is a German citizen.
5. I have reviewed BOONE's United States Army records.
These records show that BOONE enlisted in the United States Army
in October 1970, and served continuously until retiring as an E7
Sergeant First Class effective June 1, 1991. Upon enlisting, on
October 15, 1970, Boone signed an oath in which he swore that:
"I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true
faith and allegiance to the same, and that I will obey the orders
of the President of the United States and the orders of the
officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God."
6. Pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and its predecessor
Executive Orders, information which if disclosed without
authorization could reasonably be expected to cause
"exceptionally grave damage to the national security" must be
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classified as TOP SECRET and properly safeguarded. When a
classified document can be released to a particular country, the
originating agency will usually place markings at the top of the
document to show that it is releasable to that country.
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) is classified
information concerning or derived from intelligence sources,
methods, or analytical processes which is required to be handled
within formal limited-access control systems established by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
7. United States Army records show that BOONE held TOP
SECRET clearances beginning in 1971, was indoctrinated for access
to SCI in 1976, and had regular, frequent access to sensitive
classified information. I know that a person who receives such
clearances and access is required to be briefed on the procedures
for properly handling classified information and the penalties
for failing to do so, and that such a person must sign
certifications of understanding and agreement in connection with
those briefings. I have reviewed a "Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreement," which BOONE signed on March 28, 1986,
in which he acknowledged that he was aware that unauthorized
disclosure of classified information could cause irreparable
injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a
foreign nation, that he would never divulge such information to
an unauthorized person without prior written authorization, that
he understood he was obligated to comply with laws and
regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of
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classified information, and that he further understood such an
unauthorized disclosure could constitute a violation of United
States criminal law. I have also reviewed a "Certification Upon
Indoctrination for Access to Critical Nuclear Weapon Design
Information," signed by BOONE and dated September 4, 1987, in
which he certified that he fully understood the provisions of a
Department of Defense Directive regarding Access to and
Dissemination of Restricted Data as it Pertains to Critical
Nuclear Weapon Design Information, and agreed that he would not
make unauthorized disclosure of such information.
8. During most of his Army service, BOONE was a signals
intelligence analyst. He received training in crypto analysis,
and took two Russian language training courses at the Defense
Language Institute. BOONE was assigned as a crypto analyst to
the United States Army Field Station (USAFS) in Augsburg,
Germany, from August 1974 to December 1976, and again from July
1979 to May 1985. From June 1985 until October 1988, BOONE was
assigned as a Senior Cryptologic Traffic Analyst at the National
Security Agency (NSA) at Fort George G. Meade ("Ft. Meade") in
Maryland. At NSA, BOONE was assigned to a unit which analyzed
and produced reports on Soviet Fire Support Operations; among
other things, he had access to sensitive information about the
capabilities and movements of Soviet forces, and about Soviet
tactical nuclear weapons. From October 1988 to June 1991 he
served for a third time at USAFS Augsburg.
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THE INVESTIGATION
9. The FBI/INSCOM investigation has revealed that in 1988
BOONE was undergoing severe financial and personal difficulties.
In February 1988, BOONE took a signature loan for $2,000.
According to United States Army records, during 1988 BOONE and
his wife had become estranged. On October 19, 1988, BOONE and
his wife entered into a voluntary separation agreement. The
agreement provided that BOONE's entire United States Army pay
would go to his wife, who would then furnish him with $250 per
month; BOONE had no other known legitimate source of significant
income. BOONE's wife received custody of both their children.
Neither she nor the children accompanied BOONE on his assignment
to USAFS Augsburg in 1988. According to Boone, for financial
reasons he petitioned the Army in 1988 to allow his family to
reside on a military base in the United States while he served in
Germany, but the request was denied. Before leaving for
Augsburg, BOONE took an advance of three months' pay. BOONE's
last performance evaluation while assigned to NSA, which he
signed on October 21, 1988, rated his overall performance as
"fair" and his promotion potential as "marginal." The evaluation
noted BOONE had a "lack of self-motivation," and that he "lacks
attention to detail and tenacity in areas outside of his
technical specialty" and "fails to lead by example."
10. At USAFS Augsburg, BOONE was assigned as the senior
enlistee in an Army Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE)
unit. According to Army publications, the TCAE is responsible
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for assisting in the technical management and tasking of military
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Electronic Warfare (EW)
systems. TCAE personnel also analyze and report signal
intercepts, and maintain an extensive technical data base to
support SIGINT agencies. The TCAE unit at USAFS Augsburg was
located within a limited-access Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facility (SCIF). BOONE's duties brought him in
regular contact with highly classified and extremely sensitive
national defense information.
11. Shortly after arriving in Germany, BOONE met a female
German citizen, and in March 1989 he began living with her at her
home in Augsburg. BOONE disclosed this relationship to Defense
Investigative Services (DIS) investigators in June 1990 during
his security clearance background reinvestigation.
12. In June 1990, one of BOONE's supervisors informed DIS
investigators that BOONE was severely in debt and owed money to
creditors, and that BOONE's estranged wife had written to BOONE's
commander claiming BOONE was wrongfully retaining, from his pay,
funds that were due her. BOONE acknowledged to the DIS
investigators that he owed creditors, and told them he had
deliberately allowed the debts to accumulate to cause his
military pay to be garnished, and thus to deprive his wife of the
money.
13. In June 1990, BOONE's access to classified information
was suspended because of his lack of personal and professional
responsibility. BOONE was reassigned to serve as Sergeant of the
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Guard in a United States military hospital at Augsburg, where he
remained until his retirement effective June 1, 1991.
14. Since retiring from the United States Army, BOONE has
continued to reside in Germany. Since September 1991, BOONE has
been employed as a sales engineer, a product support employee,
and a support account manager for three successive German
computer companies. His divorce was final in December 1991, and
in 1994 he married the German woman with whom he had lived since
1989.
September 5, 1998 Conversation, and Subsequent Trip to London
15. On September 5, 1998, an FBI operational asset
(hereafter "OA") had a telephone conversation with BOONE. The OA
indicated to BOONE that he (the OA) was associated with the
KGB/SVRR and wanted to meet with BOONE to discuss some proposals
that BOONE had previously made, to discuss the status of BOONE's
reserve account, and to get BOONE's expert opinion on another
matter. BOONE replied: "Where and when?" The OA suggested BOONE
meet the OA in London, England, the following weekend, and BOONE
agreed to do so. The OA instructed BOONE to check into a hotel
in London on September 11, 1998, and await the OA's call the
following morning.
I know from my training and experience that "reserve
account" is a term used by the KGB/SVRR to refer to an escrow
account in which espionage payments are set aside for future
disbursement to a person acting as an agent for the KGB/SVRR.
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16. On September 11, 1998, BOONE traveled to London,
England, checking his luggage at the airport and carrying a black
canvas bag that appeared to be a laptop computer case; the
luggage and computer case were with BOONE when he checked into
the hotel in London.
September 12, 1998, Meeting
17. On the morning of September 12, 1998, the OA phoned
BOONE at the hotel and instructed him to come to a second hotel.
There, BOONE met the OA for approximately four hours and forty-
five minutes. The OA specifically identified himself to BOONE as
a KGB/SVRR officer, explaining that BOONE's previous contact with
the KGB/SVRR (identified by BOONE as "Igor") had retired and was
no longer available, but that the OA had reviewed BOONE's
KGB/SVRR file and had been tasked to re-contact BOONE. BOONE
told the OA: "I'm at your disposal."
18. BOONE freely provided the OA with specific details as
to how and why he volunteered to the Soviets in 1988, including
the following:
a. BOONE walked into the Soviet Embassy on 16th
Street, Washington, D.C., during 1988, when he was finishing his
tour of duty at the NSA at Ft. Meade, and before he left on
assignment to USAFS Augsburg. BOONE described the inside of the
Embassy with specificity. Based upon information provided by
persons having actual knowledge of the interior of that Soviet
Embassy, I know that BOONE's description was accurate.
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b. BOONE gave his Ft. Meade and Army photo
identification badges to an Embassy employee and, after waiting
for some time, was interviewed by three or four Soviets. BOONE
gave them a classified document that he had written based on
decrypted NSA intercept information, and they paid BOONE $300.
c. The Soviets scheduled a second meeting and provided
BOONE with a wig and mustache to use as a disguise when he
returned for the second meeting. He was driven out in a closed
van and dropped off some blocks away.
d. On a later date, as pre-arranged with the Soviets,
BOONE rode his motorcycle to approximately six to seven blocks
away from a Soviet building complex located in a residential area
of Northwest Washington, D.C.
e. After parking his motorcycle, BOONE, wearing the
wig and moustache, walked to the Soviet complex and entered it.
BOONE was led through underground corridors and tunnels, and into
a room. BOONE was interviewed by the Soviets for numerous hours,
during which time BOONE provided additional NSA documents which
he had selected to demonstrate his access to such information.
The Soviets and BOONE discussed where BOONE was going in Germany
and "when and where to make the first meeting in Germany," and
the Soviets gave BOONE approximately $1,500. Afterwards, BOONE
was taken out of the complex in a closed van, again wearing his
disguise, and was dropped off near his motorcycle.
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f. BOONE told the OA that to get documents through
security and out of the NSA building at Ft. Meade he would fold
up to 15-20 pages of documents and conceal them under the half-
liner of his Army windbreaker.
g. BOONE told the OA that he had first approached the
Soviets because: "I needed money. Plus, well, plus I was
extremely angry."
19. BOONE told the OA that, after arriving in Germany in
October 1989, he was contacted by a KGB/SVRR officer whom he came
to know as "Igor." During their first meeting, BOONE gave "Igor"
classified documents, and "Igor" gave BOONE a communications plan
that included an emergency meeting site and signal sites.
20. BOONE told the OA that, between late 1988 and the time
he retired in 1991, he met with "Igor" approximately four times a
year at various locations along the Rhine River. At each
meeting, BOONE gave "Igor" classified documents he had obtained
since the previous meeting, "Igor" gave BOONE money for the
documents BOONE had previously passed, and they would schedule
their next meeting. BOONE told the OA that he received $5,000 to
$7,000 at each meeting, and once received a $5,000 bonus, and
that these payments amounted to $20,000 to $22,000 a year, for a
total of more than $60,000 for the period he was associated with
the KGB/SVRR. BOONE told the OA that he did not deposit the
money in a bank, explaining: "It's called a paper trail. Don't
leave something for anyone to track. It's called, it's called,
uh, paranoia." BOONE told the OA that he used the cash "for
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normal living expenses." BOONE explained that his separation
agreement required him to give his entire pay check to his
estranged wife, who was supposed to then give BOONE $500 per
month for living expenses, but that his wife never actually sent
him any money. (I have ascertained that the separation agreement
actually required BOONE's wife to give him $250 per month.)
21. BOONE told the OA that on one occasion he left
documents in a "drop," following instructions "Igor" had given
him, and BOONE described the "drop" procedure in detail.
I know from my training and experience that a "drop" or "dead
drop" is a prearranged location where a foreign agent and
intelligence officer may use impersonal, clandestine means of
communication to exchange tangible objects. For example, an
agent may pass classified documents to his handling officer by
placing them in a trash bag and secreting the bag in a log or
pipe; later, the handling officer can retrieve the bag without
having had personal contact with the agent. Such a technique can
reduce the chance that illegal clandestine activity will be
detected.
22. BOONE told the OA that during the three-years he worked
for the KGB/SVRR, he chose classified United States Government
documents to give to the KGB/SVRR based on three factors: 1)
their value to the KGB/SVRR, 2) the amount of detailed
information they contained, and 3) the variety of information
they represented. BOONE told the OA that "Igor" would task BOONE
for documents he knew BOONE had access to or for documents that
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were referenced in documents the KGB/SVRR had previously
obtained. On one occasion, "Igor" told BOONE that the KGB/SVRR
had access to United States Signals Directive (USSID) Zero, which
was an index of all other USSIDs, and from this index IGOR asked
BOONE to obtain specific USSIDs. I have ascertained that USSIDs
are classified NSA publications for use in providing Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) support to the United States military.
23. BOONE told the OA that he had given "Igor" a photocopy
of an NSA document entitled "United States Signals Intelligence
Directive (USSID) 514," dated May 6, 1988. BOONE told the OA
that this USSID was unusual because it was one of few USSIDs to
be classified TOP SECRET rather than SECRET. BOONE told the OA
that USSID 514 was not widely disseminated but that one copy had
been at USAFS Augsburg. BOONE told the OA that he further
particularly recalled this document because of its "frightening"
topic, which he described as "tasking the targeting of U.S.
nuclear weapons against Soviet targets." BOONE told the OA that
he provided USSID 514 to the KGB/SVRR because it would furnish
the Soviets with information regarding United States intentions
concerning the potential use of nuclear weapons.
The FBI/INSCOM investigation has determined that one copy of
USSID 514, dated May 6, 1988, was distributed to USAFS Augsburg.
Each page of USSID 514 is marked as classified TOP SECRET and
"NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS."
24. BOONE volunteered to the OA that on one occasion in
1989 he gave "Igor" an original document which BOONE said was
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entitled "Joint Tactical Exploitation Manual" and was probably
produced in 1988. BOONE explained that although this document
was strictly controlled, BOONE had access to two numbered
originals at USAFS Augsburg and believed one would not be missed.
BOONE told the OA the document was classified TOP SECRET UMBRA,
and described the document as 300 to 400 three-hole-punched pages
long. BOONE told the OA that he had told "Igor" he thought this
document was "especially valuable" and that he asked "Igor" for an
increased payment for it; at the next meeting, "Igor" gave him a
$5,000 bonus. BOONE told the OA that, based upon his having
provided this document, a reserve fund was set up for him in a
Soviet bank, into which additional funds were deposited.
The FBI/INSCOM investigation has ascertained that in 1988 a
limited quantity of a manual called the "Joint-Service Tactical
Exploitation of National Systems (J-TENS) Manual" had been
distributed to military facilities, including two numbered
originals to USAFS Augsburg. The J-TENS consists of approximately
300 double-sided pages and is three-hole punched. Each page is
marked TOP SECRET UMBRA, NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION, and bears
other SCI access-restriction markings. The J-TENS is the
handbook of United States reconnaissance programs and collection
systems. It is for use by United States military units in
obtaining critical time-sensitive information to support tactical
military operations. The J-TENS contains a statement that:
"Disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons would
gravely damage the national security of the United States."
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25. BOONE told the OA that when he lost his access to
classified information and was arranging to retire, his
cooperation with the KGB/SVRR ended. At that time, BOONE let
"Igor" know that "I would be willing to help," although BOONE did
not specify any particular things that he could do.
26. At the end of their meeting on September 12, 1998,
BOONE agreed to meet with the OA again on the following day to go
over additional questions and to affirm future plans. BOONE also
agreed to prepare a written proposal of the information and
assistance he felt he could provide to the KGB/SVRR in the
future.
September 13, 1998, Meeting
27. On September 13, 1998, BOONE met with the OA at the
second hotel for approximately one hour and forty-five minutes.
BOONE brought with him his luggage and the black canvas laptop
computer case.
28. During this meeting, BOONE provided more detailed
information about having obtained classified materials for the
KGB/SVRR between 1988 and 1991. BOONE also brought, and gave to
the OA, a handwritten page on which he had noted how he could
assist in providing information to the KGB/SVRR in the future.
29. BOONE asked the OA if their business arrangement would
be on a part-time or full-time basis. BOONE suggested that if
the KGB/SVRR had in mind a full-time position for him, he would
be willing to move with his wife back to the United States to
live. BOONE suggested that he could set up a business at home as
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a cover for him to travel to various locations and to meet
different people on behalf of the KGB/SVRR, if needed. BOONE
told the OA that he thought it might be cheaper this way. BOONE
included this suggestion on the proposal page he gave to the OA.
30. At the end of this meeting, BOONE accepted $9,000 in
pre-recorded United States currency from the OA. BOONE also
agreed to travel to the United States on October 2, 1998, to meet
again with the OA. BOONE agreed to fly to Dulles International
Airport, in the Eastern District of Virginia, on October 2, 1998,
check into the Washington Dulles Airport Marriott Hotel located
at Dulles Airport, meet with the OA the next day, and fly back to
Germany on October 4, 1998.
31. While planning the October 2, 1998, meeting, BOONE took
a laptop computer out of the black canvas bag, and logged on to
check his schedule. The OA asked: "You have your computer here?"
BOONE replied: "I always take it with me." BOONE entered the
agreed-upon travel and meeting dates into his computer. When the
OA sought to confirm that BOONE had the OA's phone number, BOONE
referred to the computer and stated that he had previously
entered the number incorrectly; BOONE corrected the number and
told the OA: "Just so you know, you're listed as Georgi Bucharich
[phonetic transcription] from Intertrust in London." This is
neither the OA's name or his affiliation, and the OA had not
provided that name or affiliation to BOONE.
32. BOONE then left the OA and took a taxi to the airport;
while BOONE rode in the taxi, he worked on his laptop computer.
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At the airport, BOONE checked his luggage and carried the black
canvas laptop computer case on board.
September 18 and 21 1998, phone calls
33. On September 18, 1998, BOONE left a voicemail message
on the telephone bearing the number which the OA had given him.
In the message, BOONE advised that "the 2nd to the 4th might be
difficult" for "the seminar," and that "the 9th, 10th and 11th"
would be preferable. BOONE asked the OA to call him.
34. On September 21, 1998, the OA phoned BOONE and they
agreed that BOONE would travel to Dulles on October 9, 1998, and
check into the "the hotel that we discussed," where the OA would
call BOONE at 9:00 am on October 10, 1998.
BOONE's Travel to the Eastern District of Virginia
35. On October 9, 1998, BOONE was brought into the Eastern
District of Virginia when he flew non-stop from Munich, Germany,
to Dulles International Airport. FBI personnel observed BOONE
leave the airport with his luggage and a black canvas computer
case similar to the one he carried to London for his September
1998 meetings with the OA.
36. In the course of their last contact, the OA instructed
BOONE to check into the Washington Dulles Airport Marriott Hotel
upon arrival, where Room 1431 has been reserved for him. At their
London meeting, BOONE followed the OA's instructions and checked
into the hotel that the OA had directed him to check into. The
Washington Dulles Airport Marriott Hotel is located at 45020
Aviation Drive, Dulles, Virginia. It is a three-story building
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located at the intersection of Aviation Drive and Autopilot
Drive. Displayed in the front of the building is a sign reading
"Marriott Hotel." Room 1431 is located on the ground floor of
building number four of the complex. Room 1431 is accessed from
a common hallway. Facing room 1431, one sees a wood-grain door
with a "Non smoking" sign affixed to the door. Underneath this
sign is a peephole. Adjacent to the door on the right-hand side
is a beige block bearing burgundy numbers "1431."
37. In preparation for a past meeting with the OA, Boone
prepared a handwritten note describing how he could assist the
KGB/SVRR, and the OA suggested Boone do the same in preparation
for the October 10, 1998 meeting. Furthermore, Boone did not
take his laptop computer to the first London meeting with the OA,
leaving it behind, presumably in his London hotel room. Based on
these facts, I have probable cause to believe that Boone will
have on his person or among his possessions similar notes (either
in hard copy or computer format) and/or documents describing how
he believes he can continue to assist the KGB/SVRR.
PROBABLE CAUSE BASIS FOR COMPLAINT AND ARREST WARRANT
38. Based on the above facts and circumstances, there is
probable cause that DAVID SHELDON BOONE has committed espionage,
in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(a).
ITEMS TO BE SEARCHED FOR AND SEIZED
39. Based on my experience and training, and on information
provided by other law enforcement agents experienced in this
field. I know that:
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a. Agents of foreign intelligence services are not
unlike any other person in our society in that they maintain
documents and records, often for long periods of time regardless
of whether their value to the agent has diminished. These agents
maintain documents and records which will identify and
corroborate travel made in connection with clandestine espionage
activity, including personal meetings with foreign intelligence
officers. These documents and records include passports, visas,
calendars, journals, date books, telephone numbers, address
books, credit cards, hotel receipts, airline records,
correspondence, carbon copies of money orders and cashier's
checks evidencing cash expenditures, and accounts and records in
fictitious names.
b. Agents of foreign intelligence services often
maintain and conceal identity documents, including those
utilizing fictitious identities, U.S. and foreign currency,
instructions, maps, photographs, U.S. and foreign bank account
access numbers and instructions, and other papers and materials
relating to emergency contact procedures and escape plans.
c. Computer hardware and software may be utilized to
store records which include but are not limited to those relating
to business activities, criminal activities, associate names and
addresses, and the identity and location of assets illegally
obtained through criminal activity.
40. Based on information provided to me by law enforcement
agents experienced in the field of computers, I know that
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searches and seizures of computers commonly require law
enforcement agents to seize all computer items (hardware,
software, and instructions) to be processed later by a qualified
computer expert in a laboratory or other controlled environment.
This is necessary because of the following:
a. Computer storage devices (like hard disks,
diskettes, and others) can store the equivalent of tens of
thousands of pages of information. Especially when the user
wants to conceal criminal evidence, he or she often stores it in
random order with deceptive file names. This requires searching
authorities to examine all the stored data to determine whether
it is included in the warrant. This sorting process can take
weeks or months, depending on the volume of data stored, and it
would be impractical to attempt this kind of data search on site.
Moreover, searching computer systems for criminal evidence is a
highly technical process requiring expert skill and a properly
controlled environment. Most computer experts specialize in
certain systems and applications, so it is difficult to know
before a search which expert should analyze the system and its
data. The search of a computer system is an exacting scientific
procedure which is designed to protect the integrity of the
evidence and to recover even "hidden," erased, compressed,
password-protected, or encrypted files. Since computer evidence
is extremely vulnerable to tampering or destruction (either from
external sources or from destructive codes embedded in the system
as a "booby trap"), the controlled environment of a laboratory is
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essential to its complete and accurate analysis.
b. In order to fully retrieve data from a computer
system, the analyst needs all magnetic storage devices as well as
the central processing unit. In addition, the system software
(operating system or interfaces, and hardware drivers) and any
applications software (which may have been used to create the
data, whether stored on hard drives or on external media), would
also be needed.
DESCRIPTION OF ITEMS AND PLACES TO BE SEARCHED
41. Based on the facts and circumstances stated herein, I
believe there is probable cause that evidence, fruits,
instrumentalities, and proceeds of these offenses, as described
above, and as further described in ATTACHMENT A, which is
incorporated herein, are located in:
a. Room 1431 of the Washington Dulles Airport Marriott
Hotel and any luggage and personal items of DAVID SHELDON BOONE
which are located in Room 1431 of this hotel located at Dulles
Airport in the Eastern District of Virginia; and
b. a laptop computer, computer peripherals and black
canvas computer carrying case belonging to DAVID SHELDON BOONE,
which are either in his personal possession or located in Room
1431 of the Washington Dulles Airport Marriott Hotel located at
Dulles Airport in the Eastern District of Virginia.
AFFIDAVIT AND ACCOMPANYING PAPERS UNDER SEAL
42. I ask that this Affidavit and the accompanying
Complaint, applications, and warrants be placed under seal until
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BOONE's initial appearance pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 5, or until
further order of this Court. Disclosure of these documents
before arrest and execution of the search warrants could cause
BOONE to destroy evidence and flee the United States.
43. The above facts are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
[No signature]
_______________________________
Stephanie Douglas
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 9th day of October, 1998.
[No signature]
_______________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Alexandria, Virginia
22
Attachment A
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
1. Documents and records related to travel made in connection with
clandestine espionage activity, including personal meetings with
foreign intelligence officers or persons believed to be foreign
intelligence officers. These documents and records include
passports, visas, calendars, journals, date books, telephone
numbers, address books, credit cards, hotel receipts, airline
records, correspondence, carbon copies of money orders and
cashier's checks evidencing cash expenditures, accounts and records
in fictitious names, handwritten notes and other documentary items
reflecting espionage activities, whether found on Boone's person,
in his computer or computer peripherals, in his hotel room, or in
his luggage.
2. Any identity documents, including those utilizing fictitious
identities, U.S. and foreign currency, instructions, maps,
photographs, U.S. and foreign bank account access numbers and
instructions, and other papers and materials relating to emergency
contact procedures and escape plans, whether found on Boone's
person, in his computer or computer peripherals, in his hotel room,
or in his luggage.
3. Any and all tapes, cassettes, cartridges, computer software
and hardware, computer disks, computer disk drives, disk
application programs, system disk operating systems, magnetic media
floppy discs and any other computer peripherals utilized to store
records which include but are not limited to those relating to
business activities, criminal activities, associate names and
addresses, and the identity and location of assets illegally
obtained through criminal activity, whether found on Boone's
person, in his computer or computer peripherals, in his hotel room,
or in his luggage.
4. Any and all books, ledgers, address books, names, and lists of
names of individuals, code words, diaries, notebooks, notes and
records bearing on or potentially relating to espionage activities,
espionage plans (either in the past or in the future) emergency
contact procedures, escape plans, or financial transactions
relating to espionage activities, whether found on Boone's person,
in his computer or computer peripherals, in his hotel room, or in
his luggage.
(The foregoing constituting evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities
of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(a)).
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U.S. Department of Justice
United States Attorney
Eastern District of Virginia
2100 Jamieson Avenue
(703) 299-3700
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OCTOBER 13, 1998
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA
FORMER UNITED STATES ARMY CRYPTO ANALYST ARRESTED ON CHARGES OF
SPYING ON BEHALF OF THE FORMER USSR AND RUSSIA
HELEN F. FAHEY, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA AND JIMMY CARTER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE
OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY COMMAND ANNOUNCED TODAY THE ARREST OF DAVID SHELDON
BOONE ON CHARGES THAT BOONE, DURING THE YEARS 1988 THROUGH 1991,
DELIVERED TO AGENTS OF THE KGB, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE
SOVIET UNION, HIGHLY CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES.
ACCORDING TO A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT UNSEALED TODAY IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, BOONE
SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY FROM OCTOBER 1970 UNTIL HIS
RETIREMENT IN JUNE OF 1991. DURING MOST OF HIS ARMY SERVICE, BOONE
WAS A SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST. BOONE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE
UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD STATION IN AUGSBURG, GERMANY, FROM AUGUST
TO DECEMBER 1976, AND THEN AGAIN FROM JULY 1979 TO MAY 1985.
AFTER HE SPENT THREE YEARS WORKING AS A SENIOR CRYPTOLOGIC TRAFFIC
ANALYST AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA), HE WAS REASSIGNED IN
1988 TO AUGSBURG, GERMANY. DURING HIS SERVICE AS A CRYPTO ANALYST,
BOTH IN AUGSBURG AND IN THE UNITED STATES, BOONE HAD REGULAR ACCESS
TO HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND EXTREMELY SENSITIVE NATIONAL DEFENSE
INFORMATION INCLUDING DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE CAPABILITIES AND
MOVEMENTS OF SOVIET FORCES, AND ABOUT SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.
ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT, BOONE BEGAN SPYING FOR THE SOVIET
UNION IN 1988 AFTER HE WALKED INTO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN
WASHINGTON, D.C. AND VOLUNTEERED HIS SERVICES. IN THIS INITIAL
MEETING BOONE PROVIDED TO SOVIET EMBASSY EMPLOYEES A CLASSIFIED
DOCUMENT THAT HE HAD WRITTEN BASED ON DECRYPTED NSA INTERCEPT
INFORMATION. THE SOVIETS PAID BOONE $300 FOR THIS DOCUMENT.
IN A LATER MEETING WITH THE SOVIETS, BOONE AND THE SOVIETS
MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOONE TO CONTINUE HIS ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES
OVERSEAS WHEN HE WAS REASSIGNED TO AUGSBURG. HE WAS PAID
APPROXIMATELY $1,500 DURING THIS SECOND MEETING.
AFTER BOONE WAS REASSIGNED TO AUGSBURG HE WAS CONTACTED BY A
SVRR (THE SVRR IS THE SUCCESSOR ORGANIZATION TO THE KGB)
OFFICER WHOM HE CAME TO KNOW AS "IGOR." DURING THEIR FIRST
MEETING, BOONE DELIVERED TO "IGOR" CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS, AND
"IGOR" GAVE BOONE A COMMUNICATIONS PLAN THAT INCLUDED AN EMERGENCY
MEETING SITE AND SIGNAL SITES. ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT, BOONE
MET WITH HIS SOVIET HANDLER "IGOR" APPROXIMATELY FOUR TIMES A YEAR
BETWEEN LATE 1988 AND THE TIME BOONE RETIRED FROM THE ARMY IN 1991.
DURING EACH OF THESE MEETINGS BOONE PASSED CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE TO HIS SOVIET HANDLER. ACCORDING
TO THE COMPLAINT, BOONE RECEIVED $5,000 TO $7,000 AT EACH MEETING,
AND ONCE RECEIVED A $5,000 BONUS, FOR A TOTAL PAYMENT OF MORE THAN
$60,000 FOR THE PERIOD HE COMMITTED ESPIONAGE ON BEHALF OF THE
SOVIETS.
ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT, DURING THE TIME PERIOD BOONE SPIED
ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIETS HE PASSED TO THEM HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND
EXTREMELY SENSITIVE DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY
CAUSE GRAVE HARM TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.
ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT, BOONE PASSED TO THE SOVIETS, AMONG
OTHER THINGS, DOCUMENTS DETAILING THE UNITED STATES' TARGETING OF
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CASE OF NUCLEAR ATTACK BY THE SOVIETS
AND DOCUMENTS DETAILING THE UNITED STATES MILITARY'S USE OF SIGNALS
INTELLIGENCE. MANY OF THE DOCUMENTS BOONE DELIVERED TO THE SOVIETS
WERE CLASSIFIED AT THE "TOP SECRET" LEVEL AND DESIGNATED AS
"SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION."
ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT, IN SEPTEMBER OF 1998, BOONE WAS
CONTACTED BY AN INDIVIDUAL WORKING ON BEHALF OF THE FBI WHOM BOONE
BELIEVED TO BE AN AGENT OF THE SVRR. ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT,
DURING TWO SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL BOONE AGREED TO
WORK FULL-TIME ON BEHALF OF THE SVRR AND CONTINUE HIS ESPIONAGE
ACTIVITIES. BOONE WAS ARRESTED AT A LOCAL HOTEL ON OCTOBER 10,
1998 WHEN HE FLEW INTO THE UNITED STATES TO MEET WITH THE PERSON HE
BELIEVED TO BE HIS SVRR CONTACT.
BOONE WILL REMAIN IN CUSTODY PENDING HIS INITIAL APPEARANCE
WHICH IS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 4 P.M. OCTOBER 13, 1998, BEFORE
THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE WELTON C. SEWELL. IF
CONVICTED OF THE ESPIONAGE CHARGE FOR WHICH HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED,
BOONE FACES LIFE IMPRISONMENT, OR THE DEATH PENALTY IF CERTAIN
STATUTORY CONDITIONS ARE MET.
MS. FAHEY WISHES TO COMMEND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
COMMAND FOR THEIR WORK IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE, AND SHE
EXPRESSES HER GRATITUDE TO THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
FOR ITS FULL COOPERATION IN THIS MATTER. THIS CASE IS BEING
PROSECUTED FOR THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE BY ASSISTANT
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS THOMAS O. CONNOLLY AND CHARLES P.
ROSENBERG.
FURTHER INQUIRIES MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE.
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