7 February 1999
Source: http://www.senate.gov/~appropriations/commerce/2499jr.htm

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INTRODUCTION

 I am pleased to appear before you today to continue the dialogue between the Department of Justice and the Committee on our efforts to combat terrorism.  At the outset, I would like to thank the Chairman for his leadership and express my appreciation to the Subcommittee for your interest and support in counter- terrorism matters.

 Since my testimony last March we have made progress on developing strategies to deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist acts.  We have enhanced our process of interagency cooperation and consultation with state and local authorities to prepare for, respond to, and investigate terrorist incidents in the U.S. and abroad.  I would like to highlight for you what we have accomplished on these fronts in the last year.

 As you know, under Presidential Decisional Directives  (PDDs) 39 and 62, roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in counter-terrorism activities have been clarified.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency for responding to acts of domestic terrorism.  The FBI continues to work to identify, prevent, deter, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur.  We will not always be able to prevent every incident and we will have to respond to terrorist incidents here and abroad.  In these instances the FBI will lead the federal response to a domestic terrorist incident through the coordinated crisis response mechanism of its Counter-Terrorism Section.  In addition, the FBI works with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead agency for consequence management.  Building on this framework the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) in the FBI is now a reality and is working to detect and respond to cyber-based attacks on our critical infrastructures.

 Under its role as the designated lead agency for domestic terrorism, the FBI and the Department are taking positive steps to ensure state and local communities are prepared in the event of a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  We convened a stakeholders conference last August to get input and expertise from our federal agency partners in this effort, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and FEMA, as well as from the state and local first responder communities.

 Through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program first responders are receiving valuable training and communities are being provided protective, detection, and communications equipment.

 We have proposed the establishment of the Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSDLPS) within the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) to coordinate the delivery of training, equipment and technical assistance to state and local first responders.

 We have also proposed the establishment of the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) to be led by the FBI in partnership with OJP to provide a national-level coordinating office and single point of contact for the state and local responder community to access federal domestic preparedness programs, including those under the Department of Justice and other federal agencies.

 In order to provide a coordinated capacity to respond to terrorist incidents, the FBI has created -- through funding provided by this Committee -- the Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC).  The SIOC is staffed 24 hours a day as a command post to direct special operations and to respond to terrorist incidents.

 Working in coordination with state and local law enforcement the FBI has established 18 Joint Terrorism Task Forces operating in major cities.  These task forces serve to enhance coordination and cooperation among federal, state and local law enforcement.  Over 200 members of state and local law enforcement participate on these task forces with the FBI and other representatives from federal law enforcement to investigate terrorism incidents.

 With the support of and at the direction of this Committee, we worked with other agencies to prepare the Administration's Five-Year Counter Terrorism and Technology Crime Plan (Five-Year Plan) which was submitted on December 30, 1998.  The Five-Year Plan serves as a baseline strategy for coordination of a national policy and capabilities to combat terrorism in the United States and against American interests abroad.  As this Committee directed, the Five-Year Plan was developed in partnership with other federal agencies, and with the input of academia and state and local law enforcement.  The resources required by the actions set forth in this Plan will be presented in a separate Budget Addendum.  I consider this Plan a living document and I am committed to working with you and your staff to update this Plan on a regular basis and to address issues as they arise either in the context of our strategy or individual incidents.

 Secretary Albright will discuss the issue of international terrorism in greater detail.  As you know, PDD 39 provides that the State Department is the lead agency for coordinating the U.S. response to acts of international terrorism like the bombings in East Africa. The FBI works with the State Department and other agencies to provide support and crisis management assistance through the FBI's International Terrorism Section.  This coordination was evident in the aftermath of the bombings in East Africa last August when the FBI and the State Department worked together to rapidly deploy personnel to the scene and collaborate with local law enforcement officials to identify those responsible and begin the process of bringing them to justice.  Immediately upon notification of the bombings a coordinated effort began under the State Department's lead to deploy two  multiagency Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST).  The FBI supplied representatives on the two FEST teams.  In addition, the FBI deployed Evidence Response Teams and activated the SIOC at FBI Headquarters.  Through this coordinated effort we worked with Kenyan and Tanzanian authorities to mount the investigation that has resulted in the indictment of 10 individuals, including Usama Bin Laden.  But our work continues.

 Both the report of the Accountability Review Board on the Embassy Bombings and the Five-Year Plan underscore the need to improve training and contingency planning to deal with mass casualties and major destruction from terrorist bombs.  In these types of incidents, saving lives and treating the injured is our first priority.  Yet, as we experienced in East Africa, necessary medical and emergency equipment was not always ready and available.  We need to improve our planning and stockpiling for contingencies so that we can tailor our response for individual incidents.

 I would like to briefly describe the nature of the existing terrorist threat.  Terrorists will continue, in the near term, to employ conventional weapons and methods, such as bombings, firearms and kidnapings.  We must continue to enhance our readiness to withstand and respond to such attacks at home and abroad.  This continuing need was graphically demonstrated by the horrific attacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania last August.  The devastation and senseless loss of life caused by the terrorists responsible for these events were wrought by the use of conventional explosives in large vehicle bombs — the same type of weapons used to attack the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993 and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995.  As the Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam clearly indicates, we must continue our efforts to detect and defeat such conventional weapons and to secure our citizens here and abroad.

 Terrorists will not confine themselves to the use of conventional weapons.  Our intelligence and investigative efforts indicate increasing interest in biological and chemical weapons.  A terrorist attack using a biological weapon may not be immediately apparent, and the resulting impact on victims, police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel -- the first responders on the scene -- could be far reaching.  In fact, as we have found recently the mere threat of the use of unconventional weapons can cause concern and panic.  Threats to release harmful biological or chemical substances cannot be ignored; they require a sizable commitment of law enforcement investigative resources before they can be discounted.

 This underscores the need to train and equip first responders and emergency medical personnel adequately to deal with a range of unconventional weapons including dual use substances — those which have a benign, legitimate use as well as potential use as weapons — which pose an added risk.  We are working with the Department of Health and Human Services, especially with the Public Health Service, to strengthen the preparedness of our public health and emergency medical resources to recognize and respond to terrorist events involving biological and chemical agents.

 Because we are increasingly reliant upon interdependent networks we face the threat of cyber attacks on our infrastructure and information systems which could significantly harm our military power and our economy.  The networks that connect our utilities, transportation, and telecommunications systems rely on the National Information Infrastructure (NII).  These may prove to be attractive targets to cyber-terrorists looking to exploit the global nature of the Internet.

 In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in East Africa last August, the threat posed by the network of loosely affiliated individuals associated with and inspired by Usama Bin Laden has received substantial public attention.  Through cooperation with other agencies we have made progress on this investigation.  I know Director Freeh and Secretary Albright will speak more about the scope of the existing threat to Americans both at home and abroad and our coordinated efforts to prepare for and respond to these threats.  But, I would like to emphasize today my commitment to continuing to use the full panoply of our resources to bring terrorists like Osama Bin Laden and those like him to justice.

 I would like to discuss in more detail all the steps we have taken and the solid advances we have made in developing and implementing a comprehensive approach to combat terrorism.  In so doing I want to address directly the issues of mutual concern that have arisen in the numerous discussions we have had with you and your staff.

 I share the Committee's concern that state and local officials be fully and continuously involved in our counter- terrorism planning efforts. I want to focus on what we are doing to include state and local first responders and to build trust and partnership relationships with those on the front lines who will be the first to respond in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.

 We have looked to the state and local responder community to provide us valuable input throughout our planning efforts for instance in the stakeholder's conference, and in preparing the Five-Year Plan.  In the proposed NDPO effort, an advisory committee of state and local authorities will be the bridge between the federal domestic preparedness program planning and the needs and priorities of the states and local emergency response and health care community.

 In order to establish effective partnerships at the state and local level we must get state and local officials the information they need to protect the public and themselves and to aid their preparedness and response efforts.  Through the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the Regional Terrorism Task Force concept, we are working to provide a means of sharing classified information on case-related matters with state and local law enforcement officials.  These task forces, by themselves, do not address all of the situations in which state and local officials need access either to classified information or to information derived from classified material.  We are developing a process investigating how to provide the appropriate security clearances so that state and local officials will get the information they need.  In taking these steps, we are building on the FBI's thorough and efficient success in making threat warning information about specific threats to particular jurisdictions available in a timely manner.  State and local officials who work side-by-side with federal officials, as in the NIPC and in the proposed NDPO, will hold appropriate security clearances.

 In addition, first responders absolutely need access to the information necessary to protect the public and themselves, even when that information is classified.  In many instances, the source or method by which the information was obtained, and which requires it to be classified, can be removed and the information declassified before it is shared with state and local officials.  In the case of an actual or threatened terrorist incident, state and local personnel who need access to classified information will be provided clearances on an expedited basis.  Finally, state and local officials participating on the advisory committee of the proposed NDPO will also be eligible to receive classified information, as needed, to help make policy recommendations.

 Information sharing is critical to our preparedness efforts.  As you know, the Five-Year Plan was classified in its entirety.  We have recently made available to you a 50 page unclassified excerpt from the Five-Year Plan which addresses strategies to enhance state and local capabilities to respond to terrorist acts.  We are making this document widely available to state and local authorities.  This report and the results of the state and local questionnaire will serve as the basis of a continuing dialogue with these officials on how we can implement, improve, and expand upon the initiatives in the Five-Year Plan in ways that will best strengthen the capabilities of states, cities, and local communities across the country.  As we update the Plan annually, we will incorporate the views of state and local officials and of emergency responders.

 As we learned from the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, domestic terrorism incidents have their initial and most devastating impact at the state and local levels.  It is the first responder and emergency worker who must literally begin to pick up the pieces: locate, extricate, and treat the victims; put out the fires; and take the first steps to begin to restore order out of chaos.  We owe it to these vital personnel and to ourselves to enable them to be adequately trained and equipped for these tasks.  We cannot measure our preparedness to deal with terrorist acts without measuring the degree to which we have prepared first responders.  Accordingly, we must continue to do everything we can to enhance the capabilities of state and local emergency responders, managers and officials who will play a critical role in the immediate response to such events.

 We must recognize that there is no single template for interaction with state and local authorities since under our federal system there is considerable variation in how local governments are structured and organized.  In the wake of a terrorist incident there may well be initial confusion as we organize ourselves and bring all our resources to bear on an effective response.  But make no mistake, there is no confusion that the first priority of all concerned is the saving of lives.

 I know there is concern that during a terrorist incident our communications infrastructure could be disabled -- thereby encumbering the ability of first responders to communicate by radio or telephone.  Fortunately, such an occurrence would not cripple the Department's communications capacity.  Some degree of infrastructure-independent radio communications, with security features intact, would still be feasible.  We are dedicated to maintaining this core capacity.  In addition, in our dealings with state and local public safety agencies, we emphasize their need to develop and maintain communications systems that are not wholly reliant on the existence of a communications infrastructure.

 The confusion that inevitably follows in the wake of a terrorist incident makes it essential that federal, state, and local responders work together to plan and execute exercises that can help the responder community understand each other's functions in the event of a terrorist attack and in particular a WMD incident.

 Since I last testified before you, we conducted a tabletop exercise in the District of Columbia using a WMD scenario.  As this committee has recognized, exercises and training must include senior level officials to achieve senior level coordination.  Thus, government officials and emergency response personnel in the various jurisdictions within the District of Columbia metropolitan area participated in this exercise.  This exercise demonstrated areas where we need to clarify our respective roles and improve communication so that we can function more effectively in the event of a terrorist incident.  This is one of the important purposes of such exercises, and I am committed to continuing to conduct and participate in these exercises in order to improve our unified operational capabilities.

 We have made significant progress in our efforts to deter, prepare for and respond to terrorist activity.  In all of these efforts our goals are clear.  First and foremost we want to detect and prevent terrorist acts before they occur.  If they do occur, our highest priority is to save lives and provide help to the injured. Finally, we will work tirelessly to hold accountable the perpetrators of terrorist acts and bring them to justice no matter how long it may take.

I.  PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO TERRORISM

 A. National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)

 Within the last year the NIPC was established to deter, detect, analyze, investigate and provide warnings of cyber threats and attacks on the critical infrastructures of the United States, including illegal intrusions into government and private sector computer networks.  The NIPC will also evaluate, acquire, and deploy computer equipment and cyber tools to support investigations and infrastructure protection efforts.  NIPC will play a major role in the national plan for cyber protection, which the President has tasked in PDD 63.  The national plan will be finalized shortly.

 The NIPC continues to recruit personnel at FBI Headquarters and in the field.  The NIPC currently has representatives from several government agencies including DOD, DOE, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Secret Service, the Postal and Inspection Service, as well as state law enforcement.  The NIPC is also seeking private sector representatives.

 As computers pervade our lives and culture, they play an ever-increasing role in a wide variety of criminal activity, not just cyber terrorism or other sorts of illegal intrusions.  Thus, computers can be used in fraud schemes on the Internet or to disseminate child pornography.  In order to improve our ability to deal with these sorts of computer-facilitated crimes we must raise the general level of computer competence among all agents and prosecutors, not just those in the NIPC and National Infrastructure Protection and Computer Intrusion (NIPCI) field squads and the small cadre of specially trained prosecutors.  We need to aggressively train existing staff across the board, so that all personnel in DOJ and FBI have the requisite expertise to carry out these investigations.

 In order to build up state and local capabilities, the NIPC, in conjunction with NDPO, plans to conduct outreach and training efforts for local first responders and state and local law enforcement.  The NIPC seeks to train investigators and at least one trainer from state-level investigative agencies in each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia.  The NIPC also plans to train investigators from the municipalities represented in the Major Cities Police Chiefs' and the Major Sheriffs' Associations and has been consulting on this possibility with the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the National Sheriffs Association.  A larger effort to include the training of 500 state and local law enforcement personnel at a one week hands-on course will be launched in the second half of this fiscal year.  In addition, the Administration has proposed the Cyber Corps program to address the shortage of highly skilled computer science expertise in the government.  This program will encourage agencies to recruit an expert class of computer security workers through existing scholarship and financial assistance.  Finally, the newly-created National Cybercrime Training Partnership, an organization consisting of federal, state, and local cybercrime trainers, is developing a comprehensive set of courses, pursuant to rigorous academic standards, to ensure that the cybercrime training available can meet the ever-increasing demand.

 B. Federal Crisis Response Structure

 In the event of a domestic terrorist incident, under PDDs 39 and 62 the FBI is the lead agency for responding to terrorist threats and incidents occurring within the United States.  As the lead agency for domestic terrorism response, the FBI will utilize its investigative and law enforcement expertise in the crisis management of a terrorist attack.  The FBI will work with FEMA which has the lead responsibility for consequence management.

 Responsibility for operational coordination of resources and information within the FBI during a terrorism event depends on the nature and venue of the crisis and the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.

 If a terrorist incident occurs, the FBI's SIOC is immediately activated.  If necessary the new SIOC is capable of managing multiple crises simultaneously.  The SIOC has been recently utilized and tested during recent alerts in response to intelligence developed in past weeks. During a crisis, the SIOC functions as the conduit for information and expertise at the headquarters level of all pertinent agencies and components.

 In a WMD incident, consequence management personnel from FEMA, EPA, DOE, NDPO, and DOD will supplement FBI personnel in the SIOC just as they would supplement FBI personnel in the field in the Joint Operations Center (JOC).  During a non-WMD incident, the SIOC structure closely resembles the structure of the FBI Command Post in the field.

 If a terrorist attack affecting U.S. interests overseas occurs, SIOC will be activated immediately to facilitate communications and prompt evaluation of the appropriate FBI response.  As Director Freeh will discuss, the FBI Legats  stationed abroad are ready to offer support and assistance to the Chief of Mission and to advise me as to the situation at the scene.  Likewise, deployment of the FEST by the State Department will include FBI representation.

 If an attack occurs overseas against U.S. persons or property, or within the U.S. with foreign involvement, then the FBI's International Terrorism Operations Section will coordinate the FBI's response.  If a WMD incident in the U.S. that is perpetrated by foreign terrorists, the WMD Operations Unit will coordinate the federal response in support of the International Terrorism Operations Section which would focus on the actual investigation.

 If there is a terrorist attack against our critical infrastructures that is cyber in nature, the NIPC will coordinate crisis response activities with the Counter-Terrorism Section or the International Terrorism Section using the resources of the SIOC.  To respond in a coordinated fashion, a crisis action team comprised of criminal investigators, computer scientists, analysts, watch standers, and other federal agency representatives will be formed.  The crisis action team will attempt to determine the scope of the attack, the technology employed, and the possible source and purpose of the attack.  The NIPC Watch and Warning Unit will continually assess the situation and issue warnings, as necessary, to federal agencies, state and local authorities, and the private sector.  In the event of a physical attack on an infrastructure, the NIPC will support the investigation using its key asset network.

 In the field, the FBI Field Office in the jurisdiction where a terrorist incident occurs will establish a Command Post under the direction of the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) to manage and coordinate the crisis response.  If the terrorist incident is of the magnitude which requires the involvement of other agencies, the SAC will expand the Command Post into a Joint Operations Center (JOC).  The FBI's Critical Incident Response Group will assist the field office in establishing the Command Post/JOC by providing tactical advice and equipment, and the Attorney Critical Incident Response Groups will provide additional advice and keep me informed at all critical stages of our response.  If a crisis warrants it, Director Freeh may ask that I seek interagency approval for the deployment of the Domestic Emergency Support Team, also known as the DEST, to draw on specific federal agency expertise, to transport these additional experts to the field, and to incorporate them into the JOC.  The composition of the DEST is tailored to the particular incident.  In the event of chemical, biological or nuclear terrorism, HHS, EPA, DOD and DOE might be represented on the DEST.

 The FBI is developing a comprehensive approach to all states which will help prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist threats by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence broadly and consistent with security concerns.  The FBI has established Joint Terrorism Task Forces in 18 major metropolitan areas composed of state and local officials and local representatives from the FBI and other federal agencies such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Customs Service, the Secret Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.  Participants, including state and local law enforcement officials, hold security clearances and work together, usually on a full-time basis to share information and investigate terrorist activities.  Recognizing that not all terrorist activity is centered in urban areas, the FBI has developed the "Regional Terrorism Task Force" concept to serve several rural states with common terrorism concerns.  Two such task forces have recently been established.
 

II.  DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS

 A. Office of Justice Programs and the National Domestic Preparedness Office

 We are working to streamline and improve our current and future abilities to work effectively with state and local authorities toward our common national goal of improved readiness.  As you know, OJP is responsible for specific financial and technical assistance to state and local authorities under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Justice Department's FY 1998 and FY 1999 Appropriations Acts.  OJP has served as the Justice Department's principal link to state and local jurisdictions in the areas of criminal and juvenile justice and victims services.  OJP is now bringing that expertise and experience to the area of domestic preparedness. We have proposed the establishment of the Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS) within OJP to provide funds for equipment, training and technical assistance to state and local authorities and emergency responders.  OSLDPS is proposed as one mechanism through which we will implement the mandate given to the Justice Department by this Committee to enhance the capabilities of state and local jurisdictions to better respond to incidents of domestic terrorism.

 Additionally, we have proposed the creation of the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) which will be lead by the FBI working in partnership with OJP and all federal agencies engaged in WMD preparedness efforts.  The NDPO is proposed as an interagency effort aimed at enhancing government-wide coordination among federal programs offering terrorism preparedness assistance to state and local communities.  As such, the NDPO and OJP will work together as a team in a unified Justice Department effort to streamline access to federal preparedness assistance programs.  The NDPO, in coordination with OJP, will serve state and local authorities as the single federal point of contact they have requested to facilitate their access to federal programs and resources which suit their preparedness needs.  As the NDPO is established, we seek the active involvement of participating federal agencies, including FEMA, the DOD, HHS, DOE, and the EPA, as well as state and local authorities and emergency responder organizations.  The participation of these agencies will be needed in staffing and in otherwise supporting this effort. I want to stress that the NDPO is not intended to be another layer of bureaucracy.  Rather, it is intended to streamline access to federal domestic preparedness assistance programs.

 With the NDPO we plan to build upon OJP's considerable expertise and experience in providing assistance to state and local authorities on a range of issues.  With regard to equipment in the domestic preparedness effort the major federal response to state and local needs has been through the Nunn-Lugar equipment loan program which provides WMD-related training equipment.  In 1998, the Justice Department through OJP provided $12 million for grants to local jurisdictions for personal protection, chemical/biological detection, decontamination and communications equipment.  In 1999, OJP will award grants in partnership with the standards, policy and guidance of the NDPO.  Under the OJP First Responder Equipment Acquisition Program, $69.5 million in grant monies will go out to the 157 largest cities and counties in the 50 states.  An additional $4 million will fund equipment to support training provided through the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium.  The Consortium was formally organized on June 11, 1998, in order to bring together various existing national assets, as identified in the Department's FY 1998 and 1999 Appropriations Acts, into a singular, coordinated, and integrated training architecture.  The Consortium is comprised of the Center for Domestic Preparedness at Fort McClellan; the National Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology; the National Center for Bio-Medical Research and Training located at the Louisiana State University; the National Emergency and Response and Rescue Training Center located at the Texas A & M University; and DOE's National Exercise, Test, and Training Center (Nevada Test Site).

 The Municipal Fire and Emergency Services program provides $16 million to jurisdictions to provide specialized equipment to fire and emergency service agencies.

 Key to the equipment grant program will be the Standardized Equipment List (SEL), developed jointly by DOD and FBI, to define the types of equipment for which grant funds can be utilized within the four categories of personal protective equipment, detection devices, decontamination equipment, and first response communications equipment.  The FBI and DOD drew upon the expertise of state and local emergency responders in drawing up the SEL so it meets their needs.  OJP's FY 1999 application cycle will not be executed until the Needs Assessment, due for initial reporting on March 1, 1999, is completed and the application kit reviewed to ensure consistency with the findings of the Needs Assessment.  OJP will also initiate a technical assistance program to provide state and local jurisdictions with hands-on, on-site expertise and guidance to better enable these jurisdictions to make well-founded decisions relating to both domestic preparedness planning and response.  OJP projects distribution of the application kits to the selected jurisdictions by April 1, 1999.

 Through OJP and NDPO's joint efforts, state and local first responders will be able to access technical assistance for their response personnel to help them in making decisions about equipment grants and training.

 It is through these initiatives, and the initiatives and programs to be developed and expanded over the next fiscal year, that OJP — in tandem with the FBI and our other federal agency partners in the NDPO — will continue to fulfill the mission of assisting state and local jurisdictions to better prepare and respond to incidents of domestic terrorism.
 

 B. The Five-Year Plan and Federal Agency Coordination

 Let me lay out for you the mechanisms we have developed to ensure that federal agencies will work together and with the state and local community in the event of a terrorist incident within the U.S.

 On December 30, 1998, I submitted to you the Administration's Five-Year Interagency Counter-Terrorism and Technology Crime Plan.  Consistent with the direction you gave us in the Conference Committee Report accompanying the 1998 Department of Justice Appropriations Act, the Plan sets forth a baseline strategy for our nation's counter-terrorism efforts.  The long-range goal of the Five-Year Plan is to achieve readiness nationwide and with respect to our interests abroad.  The Plan addresses critical technologies for targeted research and development, preventing and deterring terrorism, integrating crisis and consequence management, protecting our National Information Infrastructure, and improving state and local capabilities.  It represents our best thinking as to where we are now, where we need to go, and how we are going to get there in terms of national preparedness.  For example, the Plan recognizes that it is not enough to provide initial training for first responders in select jurisdictions.  We must make such initial training available to first responders in all fifty states and the territories, and we must provide refresher and follow-up training as well.

 The Five-Year Plan is consistent with the PDDs issued last year. PDDs 62 and 63, set forth goals for national security, counter-terrorism and infrastructure protection.  These directives specify and clarify lead agency roles in strengthening our preparedness for combating terrorism, protecting our critical infrastructures, and managing the consequences of terrorist acts, particularly those involving weapons of mass destruction.  These directives establish the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism to oversee program coordination and to aid the National Security Council in carrying out its advisory role on issues of national security to the President. The National Coordinator does not direct the activities of the agencies, rather, he serves a coordinating function for the policies and programs on threats to the U.S. and to U.S. interests abroad, including attacks on our infrastructure, cyber systems, and government operations; terrorism; and defense against covert delivery of WMD.

 We have closely coordinated our efforts in developing the Five-Year Plan with the PDD 62 and 63 implementation efforts of the Office of the National Coordinator in order to minimize duplication of effort and to assure a consistent national approach in these vital areas.  This approach of coordinating and integrating related efforts must continue as the Plan is updated in the coming years.  We are working with the Office of the National Coordinator to establish procedures that will facilitate these updates and merge our efforts in overlapping areas.

 As this Committee has recognized, state and local input is essential to our counter-terrorism planning.  In developing the Five-Year Plan, we sought the input of state and local authorities through a questionnaire sent to public officials and organizations representing first responders and emergency response personnel.  Also, at my direction, OJP convened a state and local stakeholders conference in August 1998, in Washington, D.C.  Together with state and local stakeholders, we brought together the expertise of the DOD, HHS, DOE, the EPA, FEMA, the National Security Council and the FBI which have all worked with state and local responder constituencies in response to a variety of crises and catastrophes.

 The PDDs set out specific crisis and consequence management responsibilities in the event of a terrorist attack.  PDDs 39 and 62 outlines the responsibilities of law enforcement and other agencies in responding to a terrorist incident.  Numerous federal, state and local agencies have devoted considerable resources in recent years to the development of crisis and consequence management plans.  We must work to integrate these plans so that in the event of a terrorist incident all those involved in the response and mitigation efforts work together.

 One of the planning documents developed over the past year to further refine our interagency efforts in regard to domestic terrorism is the Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN).  The CONPLAN seeks to establish a structure for a systematic, coordinated, effective national response to threats and acts of terrorism.   The CONPLAN describes how the FBI crisis response structure, the Federal Response Plan, the Federal consequence management mechanisms and state and local Incident Command Systems will coordinate their activities in the event of a WMD incident.

 By educating themselves as to the scope and provisions of each agency's and jurisdiction's plan, and by exercising and training together, federal, state, and local entities can learn to work together more effectively.  This education, exercising and training process must include senior level officials to achieve senior level interagency coordination.  The Top-Off exercise, which this Committee has required, is a significant and necessary step in this direction.

 The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism plays an important coordination role in our preparedness and response to events involving international terrorism and WMD.  The National Coordinator does not have an operational role, rather, the Attorney General advises him with regard to national security information when a terrorist event occurs.  The National Coordinator is responsible for coordinating the government's policies and programs concerning unconventional threats within the United States and to Americans abroad. These unconventional threats include attacks on our infrastructure, cyber systems, and government operations; terrorism; and the covert delivery of WMD.  He is also responsible for coordinating the development of interagency procedures for deployment of specialized crisis assets.

III.  TOOLS

 As we enhance our readiness nation-wide to deal with terrorism, we must have the right tools and personnel to improve our capabilities across the broad spectrum of WMD and threats to our nation and its critical infrastructures.

 A. Expedited Procurement

 I want to acknowledge the leadership of this Committee in this effort and the recent authority granted to me to purchase or lease necessary equipment or services on an expedited basis to support ongoing counter terrorism, national security, or computer crime investigations or prosecutions.  It will enable me to quickly access additional resources, should the need arise, to supplement federal capabilities as well as to assist emergency responders first on the scene, whether they are from federal, state, or local agencies or from the private sector.

 Also, with the leadership of this committee, the Department and the FBI Laboratory are capitalizing on national laboratory resources for the development and deployment of new applied science and engineering capabilities to support counterterrorism, intelligence activities and criminal investigations.

 B. Legislation

 Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 provided many necessary and additional legal tools, some modifications to existing laws would clarify and strengthen these tools.  Draft legislation currently under review within the Department includes proposals which would strengthen investigative tools, clarify and supplement existing criminal and immigration statutes relating to terrorist offenses and offenses involving WMD, and promote prompt federal interagency cooperation in responding to terrorist incidents.

 One of the items under review is clarification of the removal ground of "engage in terrorist activity" in order to facilitate removal of terrorists who engage in fund-raising or otherwise provide material support to terrorist organizations. We are also considering the addition of terrorist offenses as predicate offenses to the federal racketeering and money laundering statutes.  Also under review is clarifying the definitions in the biological weapons statutes and expansion of these statutes to provide better controls over biological agents. For example, an amendment could be proposed outlawing the possession of biological agents that could be used in weapons of mass destruction by those with no legitimate purpose for possessing these agents.

 In addition, the Department is considering a High-Technology Crime Bill to address several technical and procedural infirmities that inhibit effective investigation and prosecution of cybercrime.  While not all cybercrime is perpetrated by terrorists, improving our overall capabilities to combat cybercrime will improve our readiness to address cyber terrorism.

   The High-Technology Crime Bill could contain proposals to clarify and expedite routine procedures used in the investigation of computer crimes.  Today, investigators must place multiple trap-and-trace devices and execute multiple search warrants in the many jurisdictions through which relevant information passes.  Consequently, law enforcement often finds itself well behind the criminals who traverse international networks with the touch of the keyboard.

 In this digital age of Internet-based communications, signals do not travel along straight lines, thus the traditional trap and trace or pen register is not effective.  Signals are often broken up and may pass through many providers, in several different jurisdictions, en route to their destination.  In order to obtain key prosecution information about a telephone call that is routinely provided in response to an authorized court order, law enforcement officers must obtain orders in each successive jurisdiction through which a signal passes in order to trace the communication to its source.  This consumes valuable time and scarce resources and impedes identification of the perpetrator.  A possible amendment to existing statutes could allow federal judges to direct cooperation among successive communications providers that carry a particular communication in tracing a call to its ultimate source or destination.

 C. Encryption

 Court-authorized electronic surveillance (wiretaps) and search and seizure are two of the most critically important investigative techniques used by law enforcement to prosecute crime including terrorism.  The growing use of strong, commercially-available, non-recoverable encryption will significantly impair our ability to effectively use wiretaps and conduct searches and seizures.

 Encryption is extremely beneficial when used legitimately by individuals and corporations to protect the privacy and confidentiality of voice and data communications and sensitive electronically stored information (computer files).  In order to provide individuals and corporations with greater privacy protections as the world moves into the information age, both industry and government are encouraging the use of strong encryption.  But the use of strong encryption by criminals and terrorists poses a significant risk to public safety and national security.

 Law enforcement has steadfastly expressed its concern about the adoption of an encryption policy based solely on market forces.  Law enforcement, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriff's Association, the National District Attorneys Association, the National Association of Attorney Generals and the Major City Chiefs, continues to call for the adoption of a balanced encryption policy -- one that meets the commercial needs of industry as well as the needs of the public for effective law enforcement.

 The Administration is not currently seeking mandatory controls on encryption, but instead is working with industry to find voluntary solutions that meet privacy, electronic commerce and public safety needs.  We remain optimistic that such a voluntary approach will be successful in addressing our public safety needs.

IV.  RESOURCES

 The Department currently spends approximately $738.5 million for counter terrorism and anti-terrorism activities.  In FY 2000, the Department is seeking an increase of 319 positions
(60 agents and 66 attorneys) and $122.6 million for counter- terrorism/cybercrime programs to enhance our ability to deter, detect, investigate and prosecute violations committed by terrorists and other computer criminals.  This reflects our concern that the interdependent systems that support every critical aspect of American life, including telecommunications, power delivery, transportation, delivery of government services and banking and commerce, are vulnerable to terrorist groups, organized criminals and, simply, lone hackers.

 For the FBI, our request includes counterterrorism/ technology crime program increases totaling 207 positions      (60 agents) and $45.7 million.  Of the total amount, we seek    $9 million to modernize the Hazardous Devices School at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, where state and local bomb technicians are trained and certified.  This request also includes 108 positions (60 agents) and $11.3 million to allow the FBI to establish up to 12 field NIPCI Squads to investigate cyber intrusion cases, address infrastructure protection matters, support computer facilitated crime investigations, and provide equipment for     26 other field offices; 79 positions and $9.9 million to increase the number of Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) examiners who provide forensic support in cases involving computers, and provide CART members with appropriate equipment and training;    7 positions and $4.2 million for data network interception support and development; $7 million for counter-encryption equipment and services; 13 positions and $2.6 million for protocol analysis and processing staffing and equipment; and, finally, $1.7 million for NIPC operations.

 We continue to require additional technologically proficient personnel who are capable of protecting the security and integrity of government systems and of enabling us to stay a step ahead of those who would attack or otherwise compromise our capabilities.  We will seek to accelerate our efforts to hire, train and retain specialized and technologically skilled personnel, not only for the NIPC and field squads, but also for critical positions throughout the Department of Justice.  Using the authority provided by the exemption to Title 5 for certain positions that was approved by this Committee, we will augment our existing staff with specialized and technologically skilled personnel.

 To increase the United States' ability to protect its businesses and its citizens, we are requesting 87 positions    (55 attorneys) and $7.3 million for the U.S. Attorneys.  The Administration is committed to protecting the nation's businesses and citizens from terrorists and other computer criminals.  But, to meet this commitment, there must be additional attorneys and support staff for the investigation and prosecution of computer crime in its various manifestations.  The U.S. Attorneys require additional staffing to handle significant cases of national interest which are due, in part, to terrorism, computer and other high tech crime generated by the steadily accelerating role of computers in businesses, the personal lives of our citizens, the exploding growth of on-line services and Internet use, the vulnerabilities of computer systems to attack and abuse, and the ability of terrorists and computer criminals to attack anonymously and from locations throughout the world.

 For the Criminal Division, the Department requests an increase of 13 positions (9 attorneys) and $1.8 million for Counter terrorism/cybercrime in the FY 2000 budget.  This enhancement will permit the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the Criminal Division to focus additional resources on 3 areas: 1) infrastructure protection; 2) international computer crime; and 3) intellectual property rights enforcement.  These resources will permit the Criminal Division to investigate and prosecute attacks on the National Information Infrastructure, and to assist in assuring the integrity of systems that are integral to our telecommunications, power delivery, transportation, delivery of government services and banking and commerce.  The global nature of the Internet, and the rapid expansion of international commerce, have been accompanied by a globalization of computer-related crime.  Our need to address these international crime problems calls for enhanced resources to coordinate global solutions.  Finally, the protection of intellectual property rights will expand significantly in the 21st century, as this country's intellectual capacity becomes, perhaps, our greatest resource.  In all these areas, the Criminal Division's Computer Crime attorneys will be critical in the effort to combat successfully terrorism/cybercrime.

 For the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, we seek an increase of 5 positions (2 attorneys) and $357,000.  This includes resources to handle additional Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) applications, especially those in support of counterterrorism work, as well as increased workload resulting from revision of the FISA statute, which allows for separate "pen register" and "trap and trace" FISA warrants.

 Our request includes an overall increase of 7 positions and $38.5 million to expand the OJP domestic preparedness efforts.  We propose transferring the $135 million appropriated in the Counterterrorism Fund in 1999 for state and local domestic preparedness assistance to OJP in 2000. In addition, we propose restructuring $31.5 million of these resources, which, when combined with the requested increase of $38.5 million, will allow funding to be provided for the following enhancements: $6 million to expand the First Responder Equipment Acquisition Grant Program; $45 million to provide local bomb technician squads with the specialized equipment necessary to allow them to detect and react to a chemical or biological weapon threat or release;     $7 million for a Law Enforcement First Responder Training Program to train local law enforcement officers on the basic skills necessary to fulfill their roles as first responders to a weapons of mass destruction terrorist incident; $9 million for the Center for Domestic Preparedness at Fort McClellan, Alabama, to continue training at the U.S. Army's installation after the planned closure on September 30, 1999; and $3 million to expand the technical assistance component of OJP's domestic preparedness efforts.  In addition, OJP's request includes $1.9 million for the National White Collar Crime Center to provide training and technical assistance relating to computer crimes to state and local law enforcement and regulatory agencies.

 The Department also seeks $27 million for the Counterterrorism Fund.  These resources will be used to reimburse departments and agencies of the Federal government for costs incurred in support of countering, investigating, or prosecuting domestic and/or international terrorism; finance reward payments in connection with such activities; restore operational capacities of offices destroyed or damaged by domestic or international terrorist acts; ensure continuance of essential government functions during an emergency; protect the Nation's critical infrastructure; provide for costs associated with the NDPO; and provide for costs associated with design of the Federal Intrusion Detection Network.

 In 1999, the Department did not receive any new funding for responding to extraordinary circumstances, but did receive    $145 million for earmarked initiatives.  Since the Department expects to use all 1998 carryover funding, approximately       $25 million, for the extraordinary costs of countering, investigating and prosecuting terrorists in 1999, the need for new funding is critical.

 As I have mentioned before, having the right computer infrastructure is more and more critical in our investigative work.  While this issue is much larger than counterterrorism, it warrants attention here.  The Department of Justice's 2000 request includes:  $38.8 million for the Federal Bureau of  Investigation's (FBI) Information Sharing Initiative (ISI),    $13 million for the Drug Enforcement Administration's Firebird System, and $37 million for the U.S. Attorneys' Justice Consolidated Office Network (JCON).

 While these enhancements support basic office automation related to the missions of these agencies, I want to emphasize that to do our job effectively, whether it be addressing counterterrorism or fighting violent crime in general, we have to have up-to-date computer systems.  For example, it will be through the ISI system, once implemented, that the FBI will be able to tie its intelligence information and case documentation together in order for the appropriate analytical work to be accomplished.  The implementation of ISI is critical, to ensure that the millions of pages of documents the FBI handles worldwide can be shared among appropriate field offices and headquarters divisions.

 Furthermore, to ensure the integrity of our computer infrastructure, we must develop systems that can link our different offices and agencies together, while ensuring a secure environment.  Most of today's computer software and network systems cannot function on outdated hardware and legacy systems, which unfortunately is what many of our investigators and attorneys are still using.  Without these systems, neither our investigators nor our prosecutors can adequately address our complicated counterterrorism casework.

 This Committee has been very supportive of efforts to build and enhance law enforcement capabilities to deter, detect and defend against acts of terrorism.  We greatly appreciate this support and we look forward to continuing to work together on this critically important issue.