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The first International Meeting of Inspectors General of
Intelligence and Security was held in Canberra, Australia, in November 1997.
Office holders responsible for reviewing the activities of all or parts of
the security and intelligence community of their respective countries were
present from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States,
South Africa and Canada. The South African delegates were afforded a warm
welcome given that their country's national institutions, particularly their
security and intelligence agencies, are in transition following the end of
apartheid.
The meeting was held at the initiative of the former Australian Inspector
General, in honour of the tenth anniversary of his Office. It provided a
welcome opportunity for participants to exchange information and ideas, to
discuss trends and to compare models for effective review and oversight.
A broad array of options and alternatives was apparent in the mandates and
organizational arrangements of the Inspectors General represented at the
meeting. Some have legislated mandates, such as those in Australia, New Zealand
and Canada's Inspector General of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(csis). Others are independent of, or embedded in, the agencies they oversee.
The mandates of Inspectors General in the United States run the gamut of
these alternatives, and there do not appear to be hard and fast rules regarding
the scope of their responsibilities or their degree of independence from
the agency under their review.
It was also interesting to note the array of options for parliamentary review
and oversight mechanisms. Representing the parliamentary review model were
members of the United Kingdom's Parliamentary Intelligence and Security
Committee, described as a committee of parliamentarians rather than a formal
statutory committee of Parliament; Canada's Security Intelligence Review
Committee, composed of three to five Privy Councillors appointed by the
government to review the activities of csis; and members of the Joint Standing
Committee on Intelligence, a committee of parliamentarians in South Africa
where the government is in the process of identifying a model for intelligence
oversight. In addition, participants met with Australia's Parliamentary Joint
Committee on the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (asio) as
part of the program.
While there were obvious commonalities, a wide range of mandated review or
oversight activities was evident among the participants. These included such
responsibilities as
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monitoring the lawfulness of the agency's activities,
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safeguarding the rights of citizens,
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investigating incidents and operational activities that generated public
controversy,
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investigating complaints received from a variety of sources,
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investigating security practices, access to information and privacy concerns,
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monitoring activities and reporting findings to the legislative or the executive
arm of government, and
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providing assurance to the responsible Minister or member of Cabinet.
Some participants had responsibilities as diverse as investigating fraud,
waste and abuse of resources and uncovering criminal activity.
Each country's review and oversight mechanisms tend to be structured according
to the division of roles, mandates and powers between their parliamentary
and non-parliamentary bodies, or their executive and legislative branches
of government. The division of these elements is influenced by a variety
of factors, such as
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the presence or absence of enabling legislation for the agencies under review,
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the nation's preference for parliamentary versus non-parliamentary (or executive
versus legislative) responsibility for review and oversight of security and
intelligence agencies,
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the existence of other statutory bodies (in Canada, for example, the Information
and Privacy Commissioners and the Auditor General).
It was clear that in each country represented, a determination had been made
regarding the best means of achieving effective review or oversight, drawing
from the pool of expertise represented by elected officials, parliamentary
appointees and bureaucrats.
There was consensus that review and oversight had evolved over the years
and would continue to evolve, particularly in those countries where enabling
legislation has been enacted most recently. Of particular note was the general
agreement that the very presence of review and oversight mechanisms tends
to alter the dynamics of security and intelligence agencies, causing them
to assess and, if necessary, modify the way they conduct business. Over time,
these agencies have begun to appreciate that there are benefits to review
and oversight, including the capability to identify and resolve problems
within their own walls.
Despite the differing review and oversight mandates of those present, a number
of common issues and themes emerged. For example, increased demands for greater
transparency and accountability in government were a common backdrop to the
activities of all participants.
Independence and objectivity were identified as essential to successful review.
Overall, relationships between the review or oversight bodies and their
respective agencies were characterized as formal, proper and generally cordial.
All participants agreed that maintaining independence and building confidence
and credibility, not only with the agency being reviewed but with the public,
is a constant and delicate balancing act. They also acknowledged the inherent
difficulty of maintaining public confidence on those occasions when they
find no fault in the activities of the bodies they oversee or review. There
was consensus, however, that maintaining the right balance was facilitated
by time and experience.
The Canberra meeting opened the door for further discussions during the year.
In March, I had the opportunity to pursue some of these themes in further
detail when the members of the United Kingdom's Parliamentary Intelligence
and Security Committee visited Ottawa as part of their North American agenda
of consultations. Subsequently, in April, my staff had fruitful discussions
with some of my American counterparts in Washington, D.C.
To sum up, it was clear from these discussions that review and oversight
mechanisms are relatively new features in the security and intelligence community
worldwide, and that they continue to evolve. They play an important role
in responding to calls for greater transparency and accountability in government.
By their very presence, these mechanisms encourage security and intelligence
agencies to assess and, if necessary, modify the way they conduct business.
I am of the opinion that our small community of independent monitors can
continue to reap significant benefits by sharing their collective wisdom
on these topics. |
