19 April 1997
Source:
http://www.dtic.dla.mil/execsec/adr96/chapt_27.html
INTRODUCTION
The world is undergoing a fundamental restructuring in many dimensions and at an extraordinary pace. Changes in technology and the rapid assimilation of that technology in the marketplace are resulting in quantum changes to products, services, and organizations. Information ownership, stewardship, access, and possession are recognized as measures of power and influence. Technology is rapidly diffusing this power downward to individuals, and outward to those organizations and nations best equipped to exploit it. This pattern of change represents both an important opportunity and a demanding challenge for establishing and meeting DoD command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) requirements.
Through C4ISR programs, DoD collects, processes, produces, disseminates, and uses information. DoD must have agile, sustained access to and control of the information and the information environment needed for mission execution and support. Military commanders must be able to synchronize and integrate, both in time and battlespace, high-tempo operations anywhere in the world. Global end-to-end information connectivity among U.S. and allied forces will be a critical mission capability and force enhancer for worldwide readiness, mobility, responsiveness, and operations. System interoperability and information integration must be achieved on the battlefield to maximize warfighter benefits, to significantly improve joint and multinational operations, and to support the National Command Authorities. Modernized information systems must be implemented to support reengineered functional processes.
DoD must accelerate the harnessing of information to improve military power. The Department's overarching C4ISR goal is to establish and maintain information dominance for DoD in support of military operations and the National Security Strategy. Through application of C4ISR capabilities, DoD will dramatically improve information quality and allow a comprehensive streamlining of decision making processes. Cross-functional program integration is a key element of C4ISR, and a major initiative underway is development of an integrated C4ISR architecture. Program integration ties together initiatives within each C4ISR function to:
C4ISR ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION
The Department of Defense needs a unified approach for development and evaluation of information and architectures. To meet this need, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) formed the C4I Integration Support Activity (CISA) in 1995. CISA is developing and coordinating a common set of Architecture Terms and Definitions, and supporting the working group that is developing the Standard Data Element-Based Automated Architecture Support Environment and the Automated Architecture Tool Suite.
CISA's first architecture effort supporting the C4ISR functional area is generating a Capstone C4I Architecture. As a preliminary step, CISA will develop an overarching framework for C4ISR operational and systems architecture creation by DoD components. By adhering to this framework, CISA and DoD components can analyze architectures consistently, and determine information exchange requirements, as well as the frequency, timing, and conditions affecting those exchanges. CISA is supporting development of an integrated C4I systems architecture at the U.S. Southern Command. The C4I Systems Architecture will be a template for further command-level C4I systems architecture integration. A joint C4I Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures architecture is also being developed for command and Service use as a guidepost for conducting joint C4I operations. CISA will compare and contrast operational, systems, and technical architectures to develop a set of common architecture generation practices, enabling consistent comparison of future architectural efforts by any DoD component.
INFORMATION WARFARE
The importance of information warfare (IW) extends far beyond military operations. The United States, perhaps more than any other nation, has embraced the use of information technology. Virtually every facet of American life is affected by electronic media -- television, radio, banking, communications, and the entire range of manufacturing, energy, and service industries. Each of these, in turn, affects national security. The enormous U.S. dependence on information and its supporting infrastructure simultaneously enables fielding and effective employment of the world's premier military force, and creates significant IW vulnerabilities for the United States, which DoD's IW initiatives are addressing.
IW seeks to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, and information systems while defending one's own information, processes, and systems. Driven by rapidly advancing technology, the Department's IW strategy provides a force which can operate with measured lethality and increased precision across the entire conflict spectrum far more effectively than any potential adversary. Defensive IW addresses the vulnerabilities inherent in DoD's information systems and processes, while offensive IW addresses the opportunities presented by an adversary's dependence on information systems and processes. IW is based on the need for, and use of, information in all phases of national activity -- from peacetime operations through conflict.
The Office of the ASD(C3I) is the central DoD point of contact to establish IW policy and provide guidance and program oversight; centralize planning, coordination, and cross-service IW program management; and in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, ensure IW coordination with other federal agencies and the civilian community. Joint Staff and Service organizations address specific IW issues. The Army Land IW Activity, the Navy IW Activity, and the Air Force IW Center are examples of Service initiatives to prepare their forces for the IW environment. The Air Force has gone further; its first IW squadron, activated in June 1995, will reach initial operational capability in August 1996.
Effective intelligence support is crucial to achieving IW goals. A National IW Intelligence Estimate is underway, while an Intelligence Community Assessment has been completed and published. The Defense Intelligence Agency has realigned resources to provide detailed assessments of critical nodes and information infrastructures to support deliberate planning and target selection under a variety of scenarios. The Service schools, as well as other Defense-related educational institutions, are introducing IW into their curricula. The National Defense University (NDU) graduated its first IW-educated class in 1995, doubled the number of students in the 1995-1996 program, and will incorporate IW into all NDU college curricula. IW is now being included in wargame scenarios and in modeling and simulation initiatives.
DoD is updating its IW policies and strategies. Several operational commands have undertaken defensive IW projects, and Service and agency red teams completed initial assessments of the National and Defense Information Infrastructures. DoD is studying the commercial sector's IW impact on the military and vice versa, and defining strategies to improve this relationship.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and control (C2) systems provide the facilities, sensors, and equipment necessary to manage strategic, conventional, and special operations forces. Global end-to-end C2 information exchange among United States and allied forces will be provided by the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), which will provide the warfighter a fused picture of the battlespace, and support deployment and employment of forces. GCCS is being fielded to the warfighting CINCs, Service headquarters, and other components.
DoD continues restructuring, consolidating, and downsizing strategic C2 systems to provide effective C2 of nuclear forces while achieving significant cost savings and manpower reductions. Preliminary findings from a broad Nuclear C3I Review shows Nuclear C3I can reduce further dependence on the Defense Satellite Communications System, and rely on Milstar for survivable connectivity requirements, but that DoD should continue with the current command center architecture of air, mobile ground, and fixed ground nodes. Also, the Department continues acquiring and improving theater and tactical C2 capabilities critical to respond rapidly to regional crises. For example, the Department is improving Airborne Warning and Control System radar range and reliability, identification, communications, and navigation to help ensure future responsiveness of this vital platform.
DoD must have assured access to and use of the radio frequency spectrum for both effective C4ISR and weapon system employment and execution. Private sector requirements must be addressed in a logical, systematic manner without jeopardizing military readiness and national security. Consideration of the impacts of spectrum reallocation on cost, military operations, and ultimately on national security, must be a priority.
The Department is proceeding with Battlefield Digitization to enhance situational awareness. DoD also expanded and reinforced its 1991 common data link policy by establishing Link 16 as the Department's primary data link for C2, intelligence and, where practical, weapon system applications. This permits standardized, interoperable, data link support directly to the battlefield operator, providing integrated tactical C2 situation awareness never before available. The Army's Battlefield Combat Identification (Combat ID) System will be included in a combination of studies and demonstrations to determine long-term Combat ID solutions for the ground environment. For the air, DoD is cooperating with NATO in developing a new waveform for the Mark XII friend or foe system.
DoD participates actively in NATO's consultation, command, and control restructuring process to improve system integration, coordination, and overall effectiveness and efficiency, and achieve significant resource savings. The Department is discussing interoperability issues with NATO Partnership for Peace nations, and is also preparing for operations with nontraditional partners.
DEFENSE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
The Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) is the shared or interconnected system of computers, communications, data, applications, security, people, training, and other support structures serving DoD's local and worldwide information needs. By addressing DoD's information technology infrastructure as a single entity, the DII focuses planning on interoperability, efficiency, and end-to-end user services. The DII provides information transfer (communications) and processing (computer infrastructure) resources that: (1) connect DoD mission support, C2, and intelligence computers and users through voice, data, imagery, video, and multimedia services; and (2) provide information processing and value-added services to Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) subscribers. The DII is DoD's portion of the National Information Infrastructure (NII).
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and the Services share DII management and operations responsibility. DISA provides overall systems engineering and end-to-end management, and also manages and operates DII common user elements. The Services manage and operate DII elements providing an information technology infrastructure on Service facilities.
Communications
DISN is DoD's consolidated worldwide enterpriselevel telecommunications infrastructure, made up of the sustaining base, a long-haul and deployable transfer utility, as well as information service applications. The long-haul transfer utility connects DoD locations worldwide and provides the basic telecommunications infrastructure. It is comprised of terrestrial and satellite communications assets (government and commercial), supporting DoD's peacetime requirements, while allowing for a surge in capacity to meet crisis or wartime needs. DISN information service applications provide value-added service to the user, or interface with user-owned equipment, such as secure and unsecure voice, data, electronic mail, video teleconferencing, imagery, and directory services.
Early phases of DISN implementation involved adopting common standards and integrating several separate, disparate DoD networks and services. Currently, the program is acquiring and implementing a synchronous optical network backbone service providing high bandwidth, improved interoperability, greater reliability, and enhanced information transfer. DISN will maintain technical currency through the prudent insertion of new technologies and leading edge services (LES). At this time, DISN-LES consists of interconnected asynchronous transfer mode switches supporting both classified and unclassified services and users throughout the continental United States. Once mature, and determined cost effective, these LES will be incorporated in core DISN service.
A landmark of interagency and industry cooperation, the Defense Message System (DMS) is a DISN information service application providing all electronic messaging services for DoD. DMS will allow phase-out of the existing, archaic Automatic Digital Network message system. DMS will provide high grade secure services, and reliable leading edge e-mail messaging and directory services, supporting deployed warfighters, theater commanders, and individual messaging users throughout DoD.
The Department is upgrading and improving its Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI) infrastructure to provide a single EDI interface to industry, and a standard interface for legacy systems. DoD's EC/EDI infrastructure currently supports many Federal Agencies, and includes links to industry through value-added networks (VANs). Accomplishments this year include network entry point enhancements, standard legacy system gateways, expanded problem resolution procedures, updated VAN license agreements, and preparations for migration to the DMS for business quality messaging.
The Department continues enhancing tactical communications to provide secure, survivable, and interoperable systems for joint and combined operations of conventional forces. Acquisition of new tactical communications systems continues, such as the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), for which DoD has approved a second full-rate production source. Preplanned product improvements and system enhancements for fielded systems such as the SINCGARS, Mobile Subscriber Equipment, and Tri-Service Tactical equipment will ensure continued interoperability, capacity, and new information exchange capabilities that will enhance efforts to digitize the battlespace.
Computer Infrastructure
Operation of the Department's information systems relies on the computer and communications infrastructure. In the 1993 Base Realignment and Closure process, the President and Congress approved the consolidation of 59 Service and agency data centers into 16 DoD megacenters to improve information processing and reduce costs. DoD established a phased implementation approach to minimize risk and customer service disruption during an efficient and cost effective consolidation process. Currently, DISA is migrating workload to the megacenters from sites identified for consolidation. Approximately 60 percent of the workload has been transferred, with completion planned by the end of FY 1996. After the transfer is complete, DISA will optimize megacenter performance. Data center consolidation net savings for FY 1994 to FY 1999 are projected to be in excess of $470 million.
Consistent with the objectives of data center consolidation, as well as recommendations by the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, the Department is assessing additional opportunities for achieving megacenter operational economies and efficiencies. DoD is currently developing and evaluating a series of options to effectively provide global information processing services to meet peacetime, crisis, and wartime requirements into the next century. Options being considered include further megacenter consolidations, outsourcing megacenter operations and maintenance (e.g., government-owned, contractor-operated facilities), or some combination thereof. Study results are being readied for presentation to Congress.
Data
In 1995, the Department shifted data administration emphasis from developing procedures to establishing a common DoD vocabulary. The Department approved over 8,500 data standards, and incorporated them in the DoD Enterprise Data Model. DoD's functional communities are developing data models within their own areas, and integrating them into the DoD Enterprise Data Model.
Information about DoD data is maintained in the Defense Data Repository Suite (DDRS), which also provides the electronic approval process for DoD data standards. DoD moved DDRS to a larger computer and implemented software upgrades to improve support to a growing user population. Also, DoD continues investigation to find a commercial product satisfying the majority of DoD data repository requirements. DoD functional areas are doing extensive work to improve data quality through business process reengineering, migration system selection, procedural guidance, and development of data migration plans. In the future, DoD will emphasize using standard data in information systems, and storing standard data in shared databases.
Information Systems
In 1993, the Secretary of Defense directed all functional areas to select standard information systems and applications, and eliminate legacy systems. To date, the Department has identified 1,849 information systems, of which functional communities have selected 247 as migration systems. DoD will eliminate at least 1,079 of these legacy systems by the year 2000.
In 1995, the Department established the Software Management Initiative to improve software management for both weapon systems and information systems, and to enhance DoD's ability to acquire and deliver software that meets or exceeds user requirements and expectations. The initiative encompasses all aspects of software management from acquisition and development through implementation, operation, migration, termination, or replacement. A Software Management Executive Board, and supporting Software Management Review Council, oversee improvements in software policy, education, reuse, application of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software, and adoption of commercial best practices.
Information Systems Security
Growing dependence on an unprotected information infrastructure creates vulnerabilities and operational readiness risks that have been highlighted by the Joint Security Commission, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, and other independent reviews. The security of information systems and networks is one of the major security challenges of this decade and beyond. To meet this challenge, the Department has an information systems security (INFOSEC) strategy to protect the confidentiality, availability, integrity, and authenticity of national security and other Defense-related information produced and exchanged electronically. DoD is significantly expanding its ongoing efforts with other government departments and agencies, and with industry, to:
DoD must guide development of security technologies by sharing systems security expertise with industry to ensure integration of security functionality into COTS products and services. This will require stronger partnerships among defense components and other government departments and agencies to focus government-funded INFOSEC research and development on seeding technologies in the COTS market, and to develop government and commercial standards promoting interoperability and consistency.
Additionally, the Department will champion creation of INFOSEC policies mandating adequate protection for sensitive as well as classified information within the national security community and in national information technology policy venues. This will require continued participation in the NII Task Force and implementation of the security recommendations in the National Performance Review's information technology report. DoD intends that INFOSEC technologies, services, products, and mechanisms developed to meet DII needs will also be adaptable to NII applications. DoD is also working with the user community to better understand security requirements, to improve implementation of security solutions, and to provide INFOSEC implementation support to civil agencies.
BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING
DoD established the Business Process Reengineering (BPR) support program to redesign the Department's business processes and to achieve improvements in measures of performance. BPR is a major challenge in an organization as large and as complex as DoD, but one promising dramatic improvement in the way DoD carries out its missions. The ASD(C3I) manages the overall BPR support program, including cost effective training, methods, tools, hotline support, and a variety of other support services. Organizations throughout DoD conduct BPR projects using these capabilities. BPR tools and techniques can be used to analyze and improve virtually any kind of process or activity, and BPR projects are underway at all levels and within all DoD functions. Some of the Department's BPR projects are oriented toward mission effectiveness and increased readiness, while others target management improvements and cost savings. DoD has achieved significant improvements in effectiveness and efficiency through reengineering individual functional activities.
DoD, the National Academy of Public Administration, the National Performance Review, and several other partners established joint linkages to BPR information, training, government reinvention materials, including a new BPR CD-ROM developed by DoD as a self-contained College of Process Innovation. The CD-ROM features the latest government and industry information on BPR and a toolset called TurboBPR, to facilitate completing BPR projects at the desktop. TurboBPR performs all the steps of planning, baseline analysis, activity costing, and business case development.
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Intelligence
Intelligence capabilities infuse the policy process with a better understanding of the capabilities and intentions of adversaries and rivals, and are essential to planning and executing successful military operations. Intelligence assists in defining requirements for new weapon systems, doctrine, organizations, and training, and the threats these are likely to face.
In 1995, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) formalized their joint intelligence review process by agreeing to use the overall Defense review process to examine and resolve intelligence issues. The Defense Resources Board (DRB) was expanded to include appropriate representation from the intelligence community. The expanded DRB provides the Secretary of Defense with recommendations for final decisions regarding intelligence programs, and ensures decisions affecting both intelligence and non-intelligence activities are made in relation to one another. Decisions affecting National Foreign Intelligence Program resources are made in coordination with the DCI.
DoD and the Intelligence Community reviewed intelligence and defense advanced research and development (AR&D) investment trends and strategy in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. They identified and addressed important issues, problems, and investment gaps in critical technology and applications areas. DoD also formed a technical advisory committee to improve management of the Advanced Sensor Applications Program (ASAP), an AR&D program addressing a spectrum of promising nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare (NAASW) and undersea warfare technologies. With additional congressional support, the DoD Foreign Materiel Program (FMP) acquisition and exploitation fund continued a major acquisition program begun in FY 1994. To enhance intelligence support to civilian agencies responding to natural and technological disasters, the Department led development of a prototype Pacific regional disaster center, and tasked the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to be the single continuously-manned point of contact to receive requests for assistance and alert Washington-area defense and intelligence elements of disaster relief and recovery requirements.
Foreign governments continue practicing denial and deception techniques against United States intelligence collection efforts. Early in 1995, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the DCI directed renewed efforts, supported by Congressional language, to develop strategies and systems to neutralize these emerging threats.
The Defense Science Board (DSB) examined DoD-wide mapping and geospatial information needs, and recommended expediting the move away from hardcopy maps and charts, toward digital geospatial databases as the geospatial foundation for military information systems. An integrated product team under Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance is reengineering the mapping requirements process to focus on information needs, contingency responsiveness, and expansion of the geospatial database, and to establish metrics linking geospatial needs to force readiness measurements.
A task force was established to identify and study options for improving the management of imagery-related activities. As a result of this study, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) is being established by consolidating the Defense Mapping Agency, the Central Imagery Office, and other activities into a single organization. NIMA will achieve full operational capability by October 1, 1996. Although under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, it will support all national intelligence customers.
Counterintelligence
The DoD Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP) combines operational and analytical elements of the DoD components, and provides counterintelligence (CI) support for protection of forces, military operations, systems development, and critical technologies. CI is also a full partner in counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and IW programs.
CI components are critical to the security of deployed operational forces. DoD CI components respond to specific CI investigation requests, provide defensive antiterrorism services, satisfy CI information collection requirements, perform counterespionage operations to dissipate foreign intelligence service resources, and provide CI input to command contingency plans. CI personnel regularly accompany battle groups at sea and military units exercising in foreign countries, provide dedicated support to the defense agencies, and have on-call responsibilities for locations designated in military contingency plans. DoD's CI customers include the National Command Authorities, all DoD components and functions including CI itself, the Security Countermeasures community, other intelligence disciplines (especially signals intelligence and human intelligence), the law enforcement community and the court system (for neutralization and prosecution of national security crimes), Congress, and other members of the national CI community.
The Department is reengineering and restructuring all CI processes to enhance mission effectiveness and achieve efficiencies. DoD is developing the Defense CI Integrated Information System (DCIIS) to achieve the interoperability and unity of effort required in the joint operating environment, and provide rapid and consistent CI information delivery to satisfy Service and On-Site Inspection Agency requirements. The Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package, the COTS-based tactical front end of the DCIIS, is already being fielded to provide the CI agent in the field with capability to send and receive reports and digital imagery through a variety of defense and national-level communication systems.
While DISA and the Air Force Information Warfare Center continue expanding their C2 protection missions, DoD has had a limited capability to conduct CI investigations into computer intrusions to determine who the perpetrator is (foreign intelligence service, hacker, etc.), and to develop a case for prosecution. DoD is exploring the means to stand up a DoD computer intrusion forensic laboratory, which will combine with DoD's current protection capability to significantly improve the Department's ability to determine the threat to DoD information systems, and provide a viable deterrent.
SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE
The focus of surveillance and reconnaissance is directly supporting warfighter dominance of the battlefield. Battlefield dominance requires: (1) battlespace awareness to provide warfighters with better, missionfocused and tailored understanding of all force dispositions, capabilities, and intentions; (2) an advanced C4ISR infrastructure to disseminate battlespace awareness information rapidly; and (3) precise targeting information for precision guided weapons, and other lethal and non-lethal offensive systems. Improved intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance provides the tools to counter the fog of war, and to enable operations to take place within the opponent's decision cycle time. Thus, United States forces can take and hold the initiative, increase operational tempo, and concentrate power at times and places of their choosing.
In FY 1994, DoD created the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO), jointly manned by the USD(A&T) and the ASD(C3I), to unify airborne reconnaissance architectures, and enhance the acquisition of manned and unmanned airborne assets and associated ground systems. DARO developed an Integrated Airborne Reconnaissance Strategy for a comprehensive defense-wide airborne reconnaissance capability. In concert with space-based assets, this capability will meet warfighter needs through the year 2010.
Extended reconnaissance -- providing responsive and sustained intelligence
data from anywhere within enemy territory, day or night, regardless of weather,
as warfighter needs dictate -- is the strategy's cornerstone. A defense-wide
objective architecture that is an integral part of the C
DARO oversees the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program, which consists
of U-2, RC-135, and EP-3 aircraft programs, non-lethal tactical and endurance
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS),
advanced reconnaissance technology and sensors, and the common data link.
DARO develops, demonstrates, and acquires improved airborne reconnaissance
capabilities, and performs system-level tradeoffs for manned aircraft and
UAVs, sensors, data links, data relays, and associated processing and
dissemination systems. DARO establishes and enforces commonality and
interoperability standards for airborne reconnaissance systems.
The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) allow DoD to demonstrate
and evaluate promising concepts through early user involvement in realistic
operational scenarios. ACTDs were initiated in FY 1994 for the Medium Altitude
Endurance UAV (Predator), the Conventional High Altitude Endurance (HAE)
UAV (Global Hawk), and the Low Observable HAE UAV (DarkStar). Each ACTD is
progressing on schedule within its rigid cost objectives. The Department
has terminated the Hunter UAV program and initiated a Tactical UAV (TUAV)
ACTD in place of the Maneuver UAV program. The TUAV ACTD will develop and
demonstrate a reliable, supportable, and maintainable system to satisfy the
warfighter's top priority requirement for a timely and accurate battlefield
picture. Pioneer continues providing a much-needed interim capability and
operational capability. The Predator UAV demonstrated its military utility
by effectively supporting Operations Provide Promise and Joint Endeavor in
the Bosnia theater of operations. The Predator UAV ACTD ends in mid-1996,
and the program will transition to production.
DARO led the restructure of the Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS)
to introduce a more cost effective, functionally equivalent system. The
restructuring plan was presented to and accepted by Congress. DoD is migrating
ground processing station development to a common, interoperable architecture
called the DCGS. Through the DCGS framework, DoD is integrating common imagery
ground and surface systems, airborne reconnaissance signals intelligence
(SIGINT) ground systems, and multi-intelligence reconnaissance ground systems.
DARO is leading DoD's advanced airborne SIGINT architecture assessment to
develop an integrated approach to providing advanced SIGINT capabilities.
DARO developed the Airborne Reconnaissance Technology Program Plan as a
comprehensive technology roadmap for transitioning into operational use new
technologies to improve reconnaissance and intelligence.
SECURITY AND CLASSIFICATION
Defense security programs include activities required to prevent or deter
espionage, sabotage, subversion, theft, or unauthorized use of classified
or controlled information, systems, or war materiel in the custody of the
Department.
Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, provides
new opportunities to revamp DoD's information security practices to enhance
effectiveness and achieve savings. DoD created two structures to help achieve
declassification efficiency. One structure, including private sector historians,
will advise DoD on the most historically desirable records requiring the
highest review and declassification priority. The other structure will ensure
declassification consistency throughout the Department. The Central Imagery
Office (CIO) and DIA led the declassification review of historical intelligence
and mapping imagery. DoD began delivering declassified imagery to the National
Archives and Records Administration in mid-1995 and will complete the transfer
by early 1996. The eventual declassification of more than 866,000 images
will provide public access to imagery to support environmental studies and
other civilian applications.
Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information, signed in August
1995, strengthens personnel security for all government agencies and contractors,
while ensuring fair treatment for the men and women entrusted to protect
the nation's secrets. It requires reciprocal acceptance of facilities and
personnel clearances by all agencies; clearances only for those with a job-based
need; and uniform standards for clearance investigation and adjudication.
The order completes a process of careful honing, spurred by Joint Security
Commission findings, by intelligence and defense agency reviews of espionage
cases such as that of Aldrich Ames, and by the FY 1995 Intelligence Authorization
Act, which contains the legislative underpinnings of several of the order's
provisions.
C4ISR ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT
As the Department's senior information management official, the
ASD(C3I) establishes management and oversight policy and procedures
for DoD AISs and Federal Information Processing (FIP) resources.
Oversight
Major automated information systems (AISs) are selected for OSD oversight
if more than $25 million will be spent in one year for system acquisition,
if the total system investment cost is greater than $100 million, if the
total life-cycle cost is greater than $300 million, or if the system is
designated of special interest. There are currently 43 major AISs in the
Department. Of these, 31 are reviewed by DoD's Major AIS Review Council (MAISRC),
while oversight of the remaining 12 is delegated to the responsible Service
or agency. During 1995, the MAISRC completed 18 major system reviews.
Agency Procurement Requests
While the ASD(C3I) has redelegated oversight authority for FIP
resource acquisition to the Military Services, he still reviews major FIP
resources acquisitions ($100 million or more during the full contract life),
and retains oversight and approval authority for DoD components. In FY 1995,
the ASD(C3I) conducted oversight reviews of 15 major FIP resources
acquisitions with an estimated cost of $7.5 billion, and granted Delegation
of Procurement Authority (DPA) or received DPA approval from the General
Services Administration (GSA) for 57 acquisitions with an estimated cost
of $3.6 billion over the life of the contracts.
In June 1995, GSA raised the DoD agency procurement request (APR) authority
threshold to $100 million per contract. This allowed DoD to streamline its
APR oversight process, and refocus acquisition oversight around DoD's AIS
Strategic Plan. The Office of the ASD(C3I) will periodically review
AIS strategic plan initiatives with the DoD components to identify their
direction, objectives and performance measures, and all acquisitions that
support them. Ideally, the ASD(C3I) will provide one initial
acquisition approval and one DPA for each initiative, authorizing interim
acquisitions needed before the initiative's implementation. DoD intends raising
the competitive acquisition threshold from $2.5 million to $10 million, and
the sole source or specific make and model threshold from $250 thousand to
$1 million.
In January 1995, the Department issued the DoD Nunn-Warner Exempt FIP Resource
Acquisitions Policy to life-cycle manage high-value or special interest
Nunn-Warner FIP contracts. The ASD(C3I) now reviews a synopsis
of future Nunn-Warner FIP contracts 45 days prior to release of the Request
for Proposal or contract award as part of a comprehensive policy framework
to manage and assure accountability for these programs and contracts. To
stimulate competitive pricing and technology upgrades throughout the life
of hardware and COTS software contracts, DoD mandated use of multiple awards
and price reduction clauses for indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity
contracts, and for requirements contracts.
Life-Cycle Management Reform
Consistent with National Performance Review objectives and DoD acquisition
reform efforts, the Department is reengineering the AIS acquisition and
life-cycle management oversight process. For example, many of the major AIS
review decisions now result from staff-level reviews, without a formal meeting
of the MAISRC principals. MAISRC oversight also emphasizes tailoring oversight
to the individual characteristics and strategies of each AIS, rather than
forcing a one-size-fits-all approach. Integrated product teams will further
improve and formalize the flexible, tailored oversight process, ensuring
teamwork and early interaction. New policy directives will reflect these
improvements, and will integrate the 5000 series weapon system acquisition
directives and the 8120 series AIS acquisition directives.
Information Resources Management Performance Assessment
DoD is developing an Information Resources Management (IRM) Performance
Measurements Guide. Management must set program objectives; establish lines
of accountability and measurable program cost, schedule, and performance
criteria; and focus on results and customer satisfaction. The Department
is committed to ensuring that well defined, meaningful, measurable, and useful
performance measurements are incorporated into IRM strategic plans; acquisition,
oversight, and management processes; budget decisions; and performance reviews.
Performance measurements will be used to sustain improvement and institutionalize
a results-oriented focus.
The ASD(C3I) is developing the IRM Program Management Performance
Management Tracking System (PMPMTS) to link planning, acquiring, and developing
AISs and other C4ISR functions to measurable performance management
criteria, and to track program performance. PMPMTS will provide an online
performance management toolset to track and assess cost, schedule, performance,
and any deviations from the performance baseline of selected C4ISR
acquisition at any program phase. PMPMTS is consistent with congressional
direction to develop and implement performance measures and tools to assist
Federal agencies in managing government programs.
Information System Acquisition Policy, Practices, and Reviews
DoD developed a guide for assessing component IRM activities, addressing
all critical IRM management areas. The guide forces IRM process evaluation
based on mission objectives and the financial, technical, and human resources
available to achieve those objectives. It includes a scoring template providing
immediate feedback on the organization's posture in each IRM area, as well
as the Agency's total IRM program.
Personal Computer Plan for 1995-2000
The goal for satisfying DoD personal computer needs is to ensure continuous
sources of technologically advanced COTS personal computer hardware and software.
Because of rapid changes in microcomputer technology and the inherent
difficulties in awarding large contracts and resolving protests, DoD now
requires that personal computer contracts be of relatively small scope, limited
to a two year maximum ordering term. The military departments must award
separate contracts to satisfy their requirements; however, each contract
will be open to ordering by the other defense components. To publicize these
contracts, the ASD(C3I) publishes an annual Personal Computer
Policy Implementation Plan. The plan ensures there will be sufficient sources
to meet the vast majority of anticipated Department-wide needs, and promotes
streamlined acquisition of current technology that is compliant with existing
standards. It profiles major existing and future DoD personal computer contracts,
and identifies alternatives to indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity
acquisitions.
INTEGRATION OF C4ISR
The C4I Integration Support Activity (CISA) is responsible for
integration of all C4ISR functional areas, C4ISR
architectures, programs, and cross-program evaluations. CISA's mission focus
is ensuring C4ISR systems are integrated, interoperable, standardized,
efficient, and effective, and that they provide maximum benefit to warfighters
and decision makers.
The Department aggressively reviews current and planned C4ISR
systems, using management oversight and the budget process to resolve problems,
and will establish review procedures for new or modified C4ISR
systems to assure adherence to approved standards prior to contract award.
CISA reviews DoD component programmatic submissions to ensure capture of
interoperability issues and concerns in budget and system proposals. The
Department also assesses C4ISR programs to identify activities
of marginal value that may be reduced or eliminated in order to fund higher
value programs, and will identify programs and activities that should be
protected from reductions.
C4ISR-RELATED DEFENSE AGENCIES
Central Imagery Office (CIO)
Jointly chartered by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI as the functional
manager for imagery, CIO satisfies warfighter imagery needs, as well as those
of the nation's military and civilian policymakers. In 1995, CIO provided
high-priority, real-time, imagery for targeting and battle damage assessments
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, monitoring activities in North Korea and Iraq,
several human and natural disaster relief incidents, ongoing drug interdiction
operations, and weapons transfers and proliferation. CIO implemented a more
flexible access policy permitting greater imagery sharing with NATO in support
of Bosnian operations. KH 1-6 satellite imagery declassification was of
tremendous benefit to the military and scientific communities. Imagery support
to military exercises also received special attention. For example,
national-level imagery assets supported over 125 military exercises in 1994,
and nearly 150 in 1995 -- more than ever before.
CIO also began a major enhancement to the imagery requirements process by
starting the transition to the Requirements Management System (RMS) as a
replacement for the COMIREX Automated Management System. With 80 sites worldwide,
RMS will provide 3,000 users with immediate feedback on requirements status.
Half of the system's users were trained during 1995, and the remainder will
be trained in FY 1996. Also, CIO directed an in-depth examination of the
exploitation process by the imagery community, and laid out a framework for
building an improved, flexible, and more effective imagery exploitation system.
CIO fielded the first major system element under its pilot Accelerated
Architecture Acquisition Initiative (A3I), installing an innovative
Image Product Library (IPL) at U.S. Atlantic Command Headquarters in Norfolk,
Virginia. Additional IPLs also came online in the Washington, DC, area, and
at U.S. Central Command.
Despite these successes, challenges remain. Among them are integrating new
information technology tools, and implementing meaningful training programs
for personnel community-wide. These will enable the imagery community to
address the programmed imagery collection surge to meet the warfighter's
year 2000 needs. Also, as discussed earlier, by October 1996, CIO will be
consolidated with DMA into the single organization, NIMA.
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
DIA responded to the real world challenges that emerged during 1995 while
downsizing and posturing for the future environment. DIA is a combat support
agency as well as a major producer and management element in the defense
intelligence community. DIA provided operational forces, defense decision
makers, and the U.S. weapons development community with comprehensive
intelligence data. DIA also guided the continuing evolution of defense
intelligence toward more efficient structures and practices.
DIA provided timely intelligence information on enemy capabilities and intentions
for the planning and conduct of military operations under United States,
NATO, and United Nations auspices. Operations supported include strike and
search and rescue operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia; United
Nations inspection and monitoring missions in Iraq; and peacekeeping in Haiti.
DIA pushed intelligence forward to consumers. DIA coordinated the deployment
of multi-agency National Intelligence Support Teams, providing the necessary
information flow between the Washington-area and operational elements during
periods of crisis, heightened tension, and military operations other than
war. The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System and the Joint
Deployable Intelligence Support System were used to provide a seamless
communication capability and access to critical information at all decision
making levels.
DIA established an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Joint
Warfare Capability Assessment team to study future force structures for joint
operations and to assess the application of emerging technologies. The results
have already changed joint warfighting and intelligence doctrine, and point
to ways to optimize mutually supporting intelligence operations.
DIA made significant improvements in Defense intelligence collection
capabilities. The consolidation of DoD human intelligence (HUMINT) activities
continued under the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), whose initial operating
capability was reached on October 1, 1995. HUMINT support elements were
established at all unified commands to improve responsiveness to command
requirements. The Agency also operated the Central Measurement and Signature
Intelligence (MASINT) Office, which integrated national and DoD efforts to
collect the precision data required to effectively develop and employ smart
weapons and other advanced warfighting technologies.
DIA focused on high priority, high national interest production topics. The
Agency conducted extensive analyses to identify the critical nodes and pathways
in communications and data handling infrastructures to support Information
Warfare campaign planning and target selection. DIA continued as the Department's
lead element in providing warning of the potential terrorist threat to DoD
citizens and interests worldwide. In the management arena, DIA established
the DoD Intelligence Production Program to make the intelligence production
community more efficient and responsive to the needs of all DoD consumers.
The Agency is also the lead element for establishing a virtual production
environment that will allow electronic linking of production resources, leading
to a vast improvement in making timely, tailored intelligence available for
operational needs. The Joint Military Intelligence College is working with
the Department of Education and Congress to award the degree of Bachelor
of Science in Intelligence.
Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
DIS provides personnel security investigations and oversight of defense industry
security administration. DIS conducted an estimated 116,000 investigations
of military personnel, DoD civilians, and industrial contract personnel during
FY 1995 for Top Secret access, and an estimated 420,000 investigations for
Secret access and military service entrance. The objective of the personnel
security program is to safeguard classified information and deter acts of
espionage. Investigations develop information to assist adjudicators in assessing
an individual's eligibility for a clearance or a sensitive position.
DIS provides industrial security services to DoD and twenty other federal
agencies. The objective of industrial security is ensuring that defense
contractor security systems: (1) deter and detect acts of espionage, and
(2) counter the threat posed by traditional and nontraditional adversaries
who target classified information in industry's hands. The Industrial Security
Program (ISP) has shifted from traditional compliance-based industrial security
oversight to a customer service approach. DIS works with industry to establish
and maintain security systems at over 11,000 contractor facilities, providing
rational, threat-appropriate, and cost-effective protection for classified
information. A principal focus is providing threat information to assist
contractors in resisting foreign intelligence service targeting.
Over the last few years, DIS has undergone major reductions in force while
demands for services have remained the same. To meet these demands, DIS has
restructured and consolidated organizationally, reengineered its work processes,
and automated the reengineered processes to achieve more cost-effective DoD
investigative and industrial security programs. Modernization efforts include
deployment of an automated system to collect personnel security data from
background investigation subjects and development of a system to process
personnel security investigations and industrial security clearances.
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) The force multiplier
effect of information systems is increasingly important for sustaining effective
defense capabilities as forces are downsized and missions become more varied.
DISA is the combat support agency responsible for planning, developing, and
providing information services to support the National Command Authorities
and the warfighter.
Warfighter information must be integrated seamlessly and passed to the theater
and ultimately to the warrior's battlespace. This is the C4I For The Warrior
vision, implemented in the Defense Information Infrastructure and the Global
Command and Control System. GCCS will embody a network of systems providing
the warfighter with the full complement of C4ISR capabilities, while reducing
the number of C4ISR systems from 154 to 59. As it matures, the GCCS will
form the capstone of the DII.
To make more effective use of its information resources, DoD is launching
the Global Combat Support System (GCSS) initiative. GCSS is a joint initiative
to facilitate and, where possible, accelerate delivery of improved C4ISR
combat support capabilities to the warfighter in the form of DoD-wide combat
support systems sponsored by Services and defense agencies. GCSS will deliver
an infrastructure allowing the warfighter to have a fused real-time combat
support view of the battlespace. This will provide the ability to order,
respond, and coordinate vertically and horizontally to the degree necessary
to prepare, support, and sustain assigned missions.
The DII provides information processing and value-added services to users
over DISN, into which individual service-level networks such as the Marine
Corps Data Network are being integrated. DISA integrated the European Theater
Transmission Backbone to improve connectivity and interoperability among
existing networks. DISA has released to the telecommunications industry requests
for proposal for new consolidated DISN service contracts. DISA also awarded
the contract for providing Defense Message System (DMS) capabilities this
past summer. DMS initial operational capability will be in early 1996. DISA's
INFOSEC Incident Support Team, which supports the Department on a round-the-clock
basis in protecting DII elements from intrusion, responded to 27,000 assistance
requests and resolved nearly 400 attacks against DoD systems in 1995.
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)
DMA provides the Unified Combatant Commands and Services with global geospatial
information and services (GGI&S) for operational missions, safety of
flight and navigation, training, and weapon system development. DMA's digital
data is used for precision weapons guidance, mission planning and rehearsal,
modeling and simulation, and wargaming. DMA also supports military and civilian
marine navigation safety with nautical charts, navigation data, and
round-the-clock update notices.
DMA is developing the capability to use alternate sources for GGI&S
production, such as commercial vendors and foreign national sources, including
the former Soviet Union. During crises, DMA supports deployable forces with
a wide array of accurate, timely information and products. Leading edge
technology deployed in support of Bosnia and Herzegovina operations and Bosnian
peace negotiations demonstrates DMA's unique capability to substantially
contribute to operational success and preservation of life.
DMA is populating a large global geospatial information data base to provide
direct electronic user access to new GGI&S. DMA is also migrating its
digital production system to exploit new sensors that will replace its primary
data source at the end of the decade, and to sustain productivity with a
reduced workforce. DMA will pursue technology to improve advanced targeting
system accuracy.
Cooperative accords with over 100 countries augment DMA's internal production,
establish DMA products and specifications as de facto standards, and provide
access for potential supporters during crises. DMA is updating or establishing
agreements with Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea. New
initiatives are also underway with Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Russia.
DMA reinvented its operations in 1995 to get closer to its customers, improve
readiness and responsiveness, and organize around core business processes.
In recognition, the National Performance Review awarded DMA the Vice President's
Hammer Award for government reinvention. As a further improvement in managing
imagery activities, DMA, CIO, and other agencies will consolidate into a
single organization, NIMA, by October1996.
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
NRO, a joint DoD and intelligence community organization, provides time-sensitive
critical information to policymakers and warfighters. NRO on-orbit reconnaissance
systems support U.S. decision makers and warfighters worldwide. Recent examples
range from intelligence support for contingency operations such as Deny Flight
in the former Republic of Yugoslavia and Provide Promise in Somalia, to support
of other government agencies involved in disaster relief and humanitarian
missions.
With a firm commitment to strengthening and expanding support to a growing
and diverse customer base, NRO has focused on understanding customer requirements
and tailoring systems and products to satisfy them. NRO assigns representatives
to every CINC to ensure the command's needs are addressed. For selected CINCs,
NRO assigns In-Theater Support Representatives who serve on the CINC's staff
and provide real-time, two-way communications between the NRO and CINC staffs.
They facilitate improved insight into theater requirements, while giving
the CINCs broader understanding and expanded access to national assets.
These strengthened relationships have resulted in a number of specific efforts
to improve use of NRO products. NRO products provide improved training and
education tools tailored to support real-world operations and exercises.
NRO trainers deployed for over 950 staff days supporting 90 military elements
in FY 1995. Greater integration of NRO systems into military exercises is
designed to realistically portray systems and train operators. NRO's exercise
support has increased from six exercises in FY 1992 to over 70 in FY 1995,
and is projected to exceed 80 in FY 1996. NRO has also expanded its involvement
in technology demonstrations and combat integration efforts, such as the
Global Broadcast Service employed during the 1995 Joint Warrior Interoperability
Demonstrations. This advanced commercially developed technology will enable
the military customer to receive video and data at unprecedented rates in
diverse locations with small, low-cost, portable receive terminals.
National Security Agency (NSA)
During the past year, NSA personnel supported operations such as Provide
Promise and Deny Flight, providing tailored intelligence support through
forward representatives and internal crisis response cells. With other
intelligence organizations, NSA also participated in deployable National
Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs), for which NSA provides the infrastructure.
Through NIST, the intelligence community provides warfighters with direct
access to intelligence resources and data. Cryptologic support groups of
highly experienced analysts provide dedicated support to the Joint Staff
and to some permanently established headquarters and commands.
NSA is developing interoperable satellite broadcasts to deliver fused,
actionable, and sanitized graphical intelligence information to users. Today,
NSA provides high volumes of critical data to warfighters over existing
broadcasts, with limited alternate delivery of graphical fused SIGINT through
its Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System user interface. This increases
SIGINT utility and impact by delivering it at the time and in the format
best suited to meet warfighter needs. To improve tactical system interoperability
and application of state-of-the-art technologies, NSA will take a larger
role in managing all tactical SIGINT investment programs funded through Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities and the Joint Military Intelligence Program
beginning in FY 1996.
NSA provides information systems security leadership, products, and services,
as well as technical support to the government's efforts to incorporate INFOSEC
into the national information infrastructure. NSA customers include national
security community members handling classified and sensitive information,
Civil government agencies and, when requested, private sector organizations
providing vital national services. NSA assesses the INFOSEC needs of this
customer base, delivers INFOSEC solutions, and creates advanced INFOSEC
technologies. NSA promotes NII security through work in INFOSEC policy and
standards, public INFOSEC advocacy and education, and shaping commercially
available security technology.
CONCLUSION
DoD is evolving from a Cold War posture to a smaller, more mobile, and more
flexible force and infrastructure capable of projecting power anywhere in
the world on short notice. At the same time, the Department is positioning
itself to engage in a much broader spectrum of missions, ranging from deterrence
and regional conflict to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. The Department
is aligning and focusing its C4ISR programs, capabilities, and
systems to maximize warfighter benefits in this changing environment. As
it downsizes from its late 1980s posture, DoD must attain technological
superiority and operational flexibility through a combination of better
intelligence, sophisticated C2, highly motivated and trained
C4ISR personnel, and global defense information access. Within
the realities of downsizing and reduced defense spending, the Department
has a C4ISR program in place to meet these requirements.