12 July 2003
Original Word Perfect version: http://cryptome.org/jdb-v-usa-106.wpd (632KB)
James Dalton Bell
Pro Se
Reg. # 26906-086
U.S. Penitentiary Atwater
P.O. Box 019001
Atwater, California 95301
Charles Bruce Stewart
Pro Se
39275 Hood Street, Apt. D
Sandy, Oregon 97055
Michael Hunter
Pro Se
Richard Leroy Lancial
Pro Se
1914 E. 8th Street
Vancouver, Washington 98661
- as filed July 14, 2003
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
||
| JAMES DALTON BELL, CHARLES STEWART,` RICHARD L. LANCIAL, MICHAEL HUNTER, AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, - vs -
DISTRICT COURTS OF TACOMA AND SEATTLE, JACK E.
ALL OF THE ABOVE ACTING IN THEIR OFFICIAL Defendants. ____________________________________________________________ |
) |
CASE NO. 02-1052BR |
I.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This is a Civil Action authorized by Title 42 of the United States Codes §1983, §1985, §1986 and §1988 to redress the deprivation under color of State Laws, and due to a Civil Rights conspiracy, of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution. The Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code §§1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 1343 (civil rights), 1337 (anti-trust), 1361 (mandamus jurisdiction), 1402 (U.S. as defendant), 1494 (accounts), and 1495 (unjust correction and imprisonment). The Court has personal jurisdiction over Federal Government employees under 28 USC § 1391. There is additional jurisdiction under 5 USC §§ 504 (Equal Access to Justice Act), 551, 552a (Privacy Act) and 702 (Judicial Review). The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388, 29 L.Ed. 2d 619, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971) otherwise known as a "Bivens Action." The Court has additional jurisdiction under Title 18 USC §§1961, 1962, 1964, 1965 et seq. ("Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act," hereinafter “RICO”). There is additional jurisdiction under 18 USC §§286 and 287, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730, et seq. (Civil False Claims Act), for False Claims against the Federal government. There is additional jurisdiction under 18 USC §§ 201, 241, 242, 1341(mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud), 1503, 1509, 1510, 1512, 1513, 1514, 1951, 1952, 1589, 2314, 2510(6), 2520 and 2707. The Court also has jurisdiction under 28 USC §§ 1651 (writs), 1658 (limits), 1961 (interest), 2401(limits), 2412 (costs), 2514, 2671 et seq. (Tort claim), 18 USC §§ 1495 and 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 et seq (Sherman Anti-Trust Act); and 15 USC §§ 15, 16, 22, 26 (Clayton Anti-Trust Act).
There is additional jurisdiction under 28 USC §§ 1332 (diversity of citizenship), 1346, 1357, 1367 (supplemental), 1395 (fines), 3072, 42 USC § 2000aa (Privacy Act), and 42 USC § 2000aa-(6) (Waiver of Immunities). Also 18 USC § 2261A, 2264 (Restitution). Plaintiff Bell claims a $500,000 award under 18 USC §§ 3071-3072 for reporting terrorism by government employees acting in various capacities. There is also jurisdiction under 18 USC § 2333, Civil remedies for international terrorism. This court has habeas corpus jurisdiction, 28 USC § 2241, over plaintiff James Dalton Bell and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, his putative custodian and defendant.
The amount in controversy exceeds (exclusive of costs and interests) the amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00 US).
This action arises under Constitutional and statutory law that was well-established, and was known or should have been known to the defendant-actors at the times of these offenses.
Class Action Jurisdiction
This is a class-action complaint under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical, and there are questions of law and/or facts common to the class, and the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class. The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, if they are allowed to do so (by removing obstructions to this case wrongfully imposed on plaintiffs by defendants) and in light of proper funding of attorneys fees under 42 USC § 1988. Prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class. Also, adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
Also, the parties opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. The questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The existence of intimidation and threats by the defendant class have and will deter potential plaintiffs from joining the suit as named plaintiffs, making class action status essential to ensure all victims receive justice.
Tort Claim Compliance
The claims presented herein and by the prior civil case between the parties filed in this District, case number 01-1085, were served upon and presented to the appropriate federal agencies on or about August, 20, 2001, in compliance with the notice provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 2671, et seq., and 28 USC § 1346. No reply by the Defendants or the relevant federal agencies has been received regarding those claims since the date of notice.
Relief Sought
Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment under Title 28 of the United States Code §§ 2201, 2202, and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This action arises under the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and particularly under the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the U.S. Constitution.
Plaintiffs will be seeking reasonable attorney fees under Title 5 USC § 552a(g), 15 USC §15(a), 18 USC § 1964(c), 18 USC § 2333(a), 42 USC §§ 1997a (b), 2000aa-6(f), 2000e-5(k), 1988, 28 USC §§ 2412(b), 2466 and treble damages under 18 USC § 1964 (RICO) as well as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 et seq (Sherman Anti-Trust Act), also treble damages under 18 USC § 2333 (Civil Remedies for Terrorism) and 31 USC § 3729-30. Plaintiffs seek reimbursement including under 5 USC § 702. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, both temporary and permanent. Plaintiffs seek equitable relief as well as money damages against all defendants. Plaintiffs seek restitution under 18 USC § 2264 and § 2412. Plaintiffs seek interest including pre-judgment interest against all defendants. Plaintiffs seek civil forfeiture of assets under civil RICO laws (18 USC § 1963(a), (c)). Plaintiff Bell seeks double damages including interest on back pay lost, under 18 USC § 1031(h). Plaintiff seeks reward under 18 USC §§ 3071-72. Plaintiffs seek release under 28 USC § 2241, from illegal confinement.
Effects Doctrine Personal Jurisdiction
The Court has "Effects Doctrine" personal jurisdiction over each and all of the Defendant class, and each of them in their official, color-of-law, conspiratorial and individual capacities pursuant to Supreme Court case Calder v. Jones, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) and Keeton v. Hustler, 79 L.Ed. 790 (1984).
RICO Personal Jurisdiction
The Court has personal jurisdiction over each and all of the Defendant class due to 18 USC § 1965 (b), and the fact that at least one of the defendants either resides, is employed, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs within the District of Oregon.
General and Specific Personal Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs allege that all defendants, and each of them, resides, is found, has an agent, transacts his affairs, or owns property within the District of Oregon, or acts to influence events and cause other effects there. The cause-of-action began in Oregon. No other venue is correct for all defendants.
Plaintiffs cite the Oregon Long-Arm Statute (ORCP 7) and ORCP 4. The defendants have a local presence; the action is governed by special jurisdiction statutes; the defendants have committed acts within the state of Oregon causing injury; the defendants have done acts outside of Oregon causing injury within the state; the action involves local services, goods, and contracts; the action involves local property; other circumstances exist where exercise of the court’s jurisdiction is not inconsistent with the constitutions of the United States or Oregon.
Oregon Agents Supporting Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants
Plaintiffs allege that all the defendants have employed numerous agents, both openly and secretly, and under false pretenses, to act on their behalf within the District of Oregon. These agents include, but are not limited to the following: Steve Walsh, acting under the false name and alias “Steve Wilson”; Jeff Gordon and IRS/TIGTA employee; agents of the Portland Police Bureau and its employees, acting on the streets of Portland, Oregon; unknown-named operators and employees of an unknown-named aircraft-related operation located in a building at the southeast corner of Troutdale Airport in Troutdale, Oregon, who managed and flew harassing surveillance craft against Plaintiff Bell and other plaintiffs from 1996 to the present date, in violation of 18 USC § 2261A and 18 USC § 1952.
The agents also include unknown-named agents who approached the management of “Tote-N-Stow” trailer storage park in Tualatin, Oregon on or shortly after April 1, 1997, and wrongfully instructed the management to deny Bell and his family access to their property. These agents also include unknown-named agents who engaged in stalking Bell on the roads of Multnomah and Washington counties, Oregon, on June 22, 1998, and Bell and other plaintiffs on other dates. These agents also include “Dr. Maletsky” in Portland, Oregon in 1998, when Plaintiff Bell was ordered by Defendants to cross into Oregon to meet him in 1998.
These agents also include Ryan Thomas Lund, who acted on behalf of the Defendants while in Oregon during an unknown time but including July to October, 1997 in violation of 18 USC § 2261A. The agents also include unknown-named agents who followed Bell on his release from prison, following Bell on scheduled interstate airline flights, and while subsequently passing through Portland International Airport in Portland, Oregon in violation of 18 USC § 2261A and 18 USC § 1952.
These agents also include Federal Public Defender investigator Sharon Callas, who, on instructions from defendant lawyer Avenia, traveled to Portland, Oregon to investigate Bell’s accusations about the crimes and misbehavior of government agents including Defendants in late January, 1999. The agents include those who contacted Bell’s attorney Solovy in the summer of 2000; agents who continued to improperly and illegally possess Bell’s property in the District of Oregon, and attempted to induce Bell to cross into the District of Oregon intending and threatening to falsely arrest him.
These agents also include those who contacted Scott Mueller and non-government employee “Jeff Gordon” in October and November, 2000, giving them false and misleading information, and intending to cause them to claim to be fearful, when they would not otherwise have done so absent such tampering, in violation of 18 USC § 2261A.
These agents also include those who contacted the Clackamas County Sheriff’s department and unknown-named deputies, and that department and deputies themselves, who were wrongly instructed to illegally stop Bell without probable cause or reasonable suspicion and to wrongly and illegally continue to stop Bell for longer than otherwise justifiable, which became an illegal and false arrest. These agents did this in Clackamas County, Oregon on or about November 10/11, 2000.
These agents also include government agents who traveled from the District of Oregon to the Southwest District of Washington at various times but including April 1, 1997, June 23, 1998, and November 6, 2000 to participate in searches at Bell’s residence, in violation of 18 USC § 1952: These agents also include those possessing and handling Bell’s property at various times, keeping it in the District of Oregon during the period of 1997 to present.
These agents also include unknown-named agents including Jeff Gordon who electronically stalked Bell and then contacted the Vancouver Police Department on or about November 17, 2000, instructing them to improperly arrest Bell without probable cause and to illegally search his car without probable cause or a search warrant in violation of 18 USC §§ 1951 and 1952.
These agents also include unknown-named agents which contacted and harassed various friends and family of Plaintiffs during 1997-present within the district of Oregon, interfering with their lives and livelihoods.
The defendants also employed numerous vehicles licensed in the District of Oregon to follow Bell at various times, but including June 22, 1998, both within Oregon and in the Western District of Washington, in violation of 18 USC § 1951.
Defendants also illegally recorded numerous telephone calls, involving plaintiffs, made within and between the District of Oregon and the Western District of Washington during the period 1996-present.
Defendants, including agent Jeff Gordon, made numerous telephone calls from the District of Oregon to the Western District of Washington, in violation of 18 USC § 1952, to contact various agents who were spying on and stalking Plaintiff Bell.
Defendant/RICO enterprise Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) operates employees, and operations within the District of Oregon; for example, Sheridan FCI.
Defendants tampered with the proper functioning of the Portland Federal Court to improperly and illegally cause case #01-1085 to be dismissed in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based on intentionally-false assertions of “lack of personal jurisdiction” and intentionally-improper application of Supreme Court case “Heck v. Humphreys” [sic].
These agents include those illegally recording and disclosing telephone calls between Plaintiff Bell and the District of Oregon during 1996-present, in violation of laws including 18 USC §§ 2511, 2515 and 2520.
In addition to the agents of the Defendants in or sent to the district of Oregon, agents of the Defendants, including in the Seattle/Tacoma metropolitan area and surroundings, acted to control, regulate and manipulate actions and activities within the District of Oregon, In October or November, 2000, they accepted and took control over a supposed “criminal case” maliciously initiated against Plaintiff Bell, promoted by Oregon District agents including Jeff Gordon and Philip Scott, and other unknown-named agents based upon the actions occurring solely within the District of Oregon, or based upon false assertions intending to wrongly and fraudulently shift jurisdiction to the Western District of Washington state.
Defendants failed to bring Plaintiff Bell to trial in Oregon (a double violation of the 6th Amendment) within a reasonable time.
Jurisdiction In Light of Heck v. Humphrey,
512 US 477, 129 L.Ed.2d 383, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994)
This Civil Complaint alleges (see pages 151 - 159; Claims #307 - #323 ) that the Defendants improperly and illegally sought and achieved the dismissal of case #01-1085 based on the intentionally-incorrect application of Heck v. Humphrey (id.)
Plaintiff alleges that Heck:
(1) Does not affect claims by any other Plaintiff, including class plaintiffs, as a consequence of Bell’s cases;
(2) Does not limit Bell’s claims based on reasons they are associated with case #97-5270, due to Spencer v. Kemna, 523 US 1, 140 L.Ed.2d 43, 118 S.Ct. 978 in which five Justices agreed that there is no “favorable termination” requirement to 42 USC 1983 claims by plaintiffs not in custody on the specific charge. Bell is not in custody on case #97-5270. Bell’s current custody is not as a legal consequence of case #00-5731, either;
(3) Does not limit Bell’s claims as a consequence of case #97-5270 because termination of that case was by plea agreement because of Heck...;
(4) Does not affect ANY of Bell’s claims unless such a claim would NECESSARILY IMPLY invalidity of the underlying conviction; (A plea agreement in #97-5270 wouldn’t NECESSARILY be invalid unless Plaintiff Bell states (at the outset) that there is no way to resolve this case short of invalidating #97-5270’s agreement. That he does not (yet) do. Heck does not prohibit Bell from asking for the overturn of #97-5270 for equitable reasons;
(5) Requires (see Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2000)) an individual assessment of each claim to determine whether it would NECESSARILY imply the invalidity of any particular criminal conviction or sentence. Claims which do not are in no way barred by Heck (id.); No such assessment was done for case #01-1085 before dismissal.
(6) Does not prohibit Plaintiff Bell from making claims (false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, tampering with witnesses, extortion, obstruction of justice, denial of due process, simulation of legal process, etc.) based on three dismissed counts 1, 4 and 5 from case #00-5731JET;
(7) Does not apply to claims made under 42 USC § 1985 (conspiracy against rights) and 18 USC § 1964 (RICO). Heck (id.) also does not limit 5 USC § 552a, §702 (Privacy Act, Administrative Procedures Act) and/or 31 USC §§ 3729, 3730 (Civil False Claims Act), for false claims against the Federal Government;
(8) Does not apply to the fraudulent and malicious “Trojan-horse” claims of violation of 26 USC § 7212(a) made in November, 2000 for purposes of fraudulently obtaining a search warrant, because they were never charged and thus those issues were terminated in Bell’s favor;
(9) In addition, Plaintiffs including Bell assert that the trial Court (Defendant Tanner) clearly lost jurisdiction of case #00-5731 on March 27, 2001 due to Plaintiff Bell’s filing of an interlocutory appeal notice with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (case #01-30143), and did not retroactively regain jurisdiction thereafter. Further, the trial Court separately lost jurisdiction to proceed with a “sentencing” due to filing of a second Interlocutory Appeal notice (01-30296). It was an invalid, “void judgment”. Thus it is Plaintiff Bell’s contention that case #00-5731JET has simply never been adjudicated past the pretrial stage and Bell has been illegally denied a trial, fair or otherwise;
(10) Heck allows only a dismissal without prejudice pending the overturn of the underlying conviction. A Heck bar means only that the claim is not yet ripe. The statute of limitations has not yet begun to run and the plaintiffs claim remains gestational. Therefore, plaintiffs allege that even if the dismissal of #01-1085 on September 12, 2001 was erroneous, it tolled the statute of limitations for all causes of action. See Amaker v. Weiner, 179 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1999);
(11) Void judgments can be attacked at any time, directly or indirectly or by collateral attack in any proceeding including civil cases. This complaint (and #01-1085) is such an attack; and
(12) Further, Plaintiffs note that two of their causes of action are “abuse of process” and “malicious prosecution” and footnote 5 of Heck at 129 L.Ed.2d 383 clearly indicates that these may proceed to suit in § 1983 cases. As for abuse of process:
“It is true that favorable termination of prior proceedings is not an element of that cause of action-but neither is an impugning of those proceedings one of its consequences. The gravamen of that tort is not the wrongfulness of the prosecution, but some extortionate perversion of lawfully-initiated process to illegitimate ends.” Heck, 129 L.Ed.2d at 394, n. 5.
In these two actions as well as others, no favorable termination, and thus exhaustion, requirements exists. Heck is irrelevant to this.
Plaintiffs further contend that they have a right to present evidence supporting their claim that United States v. Bell, CR00-5731 was actually terminated in Bell’s favor on or after March 27, 2001, by actions, or failures to act, of the officers of the Tacoma federal court, pursuant to their loss of jurisdiction due to Bell’s interlocutory appeal filing. Quite literally, after this jurisdictional fact, prosecution terminated, and the defendants were well aware of this fact. That they continued to take actions motivated to harm Plaintiff Bell is precisely the issue raised in this civil Complaint. Were the defendants to admit that they knew that they had lost jurisdiction but proceeded anyway, it is then established not simply that the a conviction would have been invalid, but in fact that it never occurred at all!. Without a facially valid conviction, Heck is not implicated and is irrelevant.
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction
Plaintiff Bell is being illegally held for reasons described supra and infra, ostensibly the basis of judgment in case 00-5731 JET, which is itself a "void judgment". Void judgments are legal nullities, and they can be attacked at any time. "A void judgment includes judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court", Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1999). It is the unique nature of a "void judgment" which allows this. Neither Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 US 475, 36 L.Ed.2d 439, 93 S.Ct. 1827 nor Heck v. Humphrey (supra) are to the contrary, because they did not address void judgments, merely erroneous (voidable) ones. Being challengeable in "any court", they are also challengeable here under 42 USC §§ 1983/1985 as well as Bivens. See also In re Center Wholesale, 759 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
In the instant case, there was neither a jurisdictional sentencing nor conviction nor trial. Thus a filing under 28 USC § 2255 is inappropriate, because no "conviction" exists to reverse. Such a filing is also inappropriate because even in cases where it is appropriate, 28 USC § 2255 go to the judge who entered the original conviction, and the judge in case 00-5731JET (Tanner) is currently a defendant in this civil action and is thus possessed of a conflict of interest under 28 USC §§144 and 455. So, there is no adequate remedy at law under §2255.
What DOES exist, however, is an illegal detention. Plaintiffs allege that this court also has jurisdiction under 28 USC 2241, “Great Writ” habeas corpus, to order Bell's release. Bell's physical presence in the District of Oregon is not required. See Braden v. Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 US 484, 35 L.Ed.2d 443, 93 S.Ct. 1123 (1973). Jurisdiction of the custodian, or someone in the chain of command, is necessary. See Braden, 35 L.Ed.2d at 452. "So long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ `within its jurisdiction' requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim, or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself is confined outside the court's territorial jurisdiction." Such service is the only requirement.
In the instant case, Bell's custodian is the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), which is also a defendant in this lawsuit and will have been reached by service of process according to law. The BOP possesses facilities and agents (personnel) within the District of Oregon (inter alia, the Federal Prison in Sheridan, Oregon) and is thus subject to that jurisdiction. The BOP and its agents are subject to personal jurisdiction for numerous reasons stated within this civil complaint: For example, 28 USC § 1391; RICO (18 USC § 1965); Effects Doctrine (Calder v. Jones, supra); Oregon Long Arm (ORCP 4, 7). In addition, see "Oregon Agents Supporting Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants." The BOP as an agency, as well as its personnel, are thus properly before the court, so this court can order it to comply. The BOP has the power to order its agent Paul M. Schultz (warden of USP Atwater, California) to release Bell. Also, Schultz has been properly served in his official capacity, because the actions of his facility and himself support and assist the goals of the RICO and civil rights conspiracy. This is not a case where the only basis for personal jurisdiction over Bell’s custodian derives from the habeas corpus filing itself, and thus this case is distinguishable from the usual habeas filing. The relevant issue is not whether personal jurisdiction can be acquired by habeas; the issue is whether personal jurisdiction, once legally acquired, can be used to invoke habeas. Braden says yes: “...since the respondent was properly served in that district, see Strait v. Laird, 406 US 341, 32 L.Ed.2d 141, 92 S.Ct. 1693 (1972).” Braden 35 L.Ed.2d at 455-56.
Strait explains: “Strait’s commanding officer is “present” in California through the officers in the hierarchy of the command who processed this serviceman’s application for discharge.” Similarly, in the instant civil case, the Attorney General is “present” within the district of Oregon, through the hierarchy of employees who colluded to bring an criminal case, apparently originating in Oregon, in a court 150 miles away in Tacoma, Washington, and who sent Bell illegally and without a jurisdictional trial, conviction, or sentencing to Atwater, California. It would be an extreme case of “forum shopping” to allow the government to force a hearing in California, in which no witnesses or evidence are present, when they could have brought Bell to Sheridan, Oregon, where there would clearly be habeas jurisdiction.
As stated in Braden, i.d. supra: "In enacting these amendments, Congress explicitly recognized the substantial advantages of having these cases resolved in the court which originally imposed the confinement OR IN THE COURT LOCATED NEAREST THE SITE OF THE UNDERLYING CONTROVERSY." [emphasis supplied]. In the instant case, the site of the underlying controversies (both the civil controversy in this lawsuit and the criminal charges that became case #00-5731 JET) are indisputably within the District of Oregon, and especially Multnomah and Clackamas counties. It is therefore not merely lawful but also equitable that the habeas issue be considered in Portland, Oregon.
Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Bell's continued illegal detention is highly prejudicial to this civil complaint, and it impedes their access to this court. This civil complaint does not (yet) contain a full habeas filing, although this court could and should construe this action as being under habeas. See Franklin v. State of Oregon, 662 F.2d at 1348 (9th Cir. 1981), and Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc)(cert. denied). Herein, Plaintiff Bell has made allegations of numerous events which constitute “ineffective assistance of counsel,” and in fact far worse. These events easily satisfy even the previous “farce and mockery of justice” standard finally superceded in Cooper. Plaintiffs request a statement from this court that it would receive and consider such a petition. Plaintiffs also request an order from this court to the defendants to show cause why plaintiff Bell should not be immediately released under reasons such as habeas corpus.
Equitable and Injunctive Jurisdiction Due
To Lack of Adequate Remedy At Law
Plaintiffs assert that due to a serious and repeated tampering with and wrongfully denying plaintiff’s procedural (including appellate) rights, plaintiffs including Bell have no adequate remedy at law.
Plaintiffs cite:
1. The sabotage by Avenia denying an appeal on case #97-5270;
2. The forcing of sabotaging attorney Mandel onto Bell, and the wrongful denial of an attorney after Mandel was allowed to resign (June 1999). The fraudulent denial and concealment of an appeal on the result of the June 2, 1999 probation revocation hearing. The “appeal” eventually seemed to have occurred, due to Bell’s efforts during the summer of 2000;
3. The presence of false “facts” in the appeal decision of Bell’s probation revocation case, despite the fact that Bell’s contractual rights had been violated in that case;
4. The denial of an honest attorney in criminal case #00-5731JET, and the denial of an attorney in appeal cases #01-30143 and #01-30296;
5. The denial of proceeding with appeal case 00-5731JET, engendered by the court’s failure to assign an attorney who could and would act for Bell, or to respond to Leen’s refusal to be assigned; the improper dismissal based on false allegations of lack of jurisdiction, when no such investigation had occurred;
6. The failure of the district court to respect the existence of appeal case #01-30143, by proceeding with “trial” in spite of that appeal case;
7. The refusal of betraying attorney Leen to assist with the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari on case #01-30143;
8. The refusal of the court clerk to accept Bell’s new filing, as an appeal, on or about June 8, 2001;
9. The failure of the court to assign Bell an attorney in case #01-30296, and the district court’s repetition of disrespect for the appeal by proceeding with a non-jurisdictional “sentencing” and without a jurisdictional “conviction” on which to sentence;
10. The assignment of a corrupt attorney, Juergens, who proceeded to “hijack” non-jurisdictional appeal case #01-30303 and to wrongfully abandon appeal case #01-30296, despite Bell’s numerous and serious complaints to the appeals court. The inclusion of false “facts” in the Opinion of that case, despite objections; and inclusion of a fraudulent jurisdiction statement in Juergens’ Brief; and
11. Attorney Juergens failed to comply with the dictates of Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) before abandoning case #01-30296, and she requested (and was allowed) to resign from case #01-30303 without doing the Anders brief that Ninth Circuit Local Rule 4-1(e) requires.And, of course, Juergens had delayed her request to resign until two (2) months after she had been sued and served by Plaintiff Bell, intentionally denying Bell the representation to which he was entitled during the consideration of case #01-30303.
The preceding incidents clearly and unambiguously establish that Plaintiff Bell is being totally and repeatedly denied an “adequate remedy at law” in complete violation of proper rules and procedure in all of these court and appeal matters. This entitles Bell to claim for equitable and injunctive relief. See also “Extrinsic Fraud”, infra.
SUPPLEMENTAL (PENDENT) JURISDICTION
The Court has Pendent jurisdiction in this case over violations of the Oregon and Washington State Constitutions, as well as violations of Oregon and Washington Statutory Law, and common law. There is also pendent jurisdiction over negligent, malicious, and tortious acts by Defendant class, including but not limited to legal malpractice, fraud, abuse of process, extortion, kidnap, conversion, perjury, libel and slander, contract fraud, false imprisonment, torturing (intentional infliction of emotional distress), simulation of legal process, obstruction of access to courts, initiating a false report, obstruction of governmental or judicial administration, theft, trespass, bribing a witness, tampering with a witness, assault, battery, tampering with physical evidence, planting evidence, forgery, hindering prosecution, jury tampering, malicious prosecution, wire fraud, blackmail, mail fraud, false arrest, official misconduct, misuse of confidential information, menacing, coercion, duress, reckless endangerment, burglary, robbery, criminal impersonation, interference with social, contractual and business relationships, interference with right to services, interference with property rights, misfeasance and malfeasance in their performance of their contractual relationships, malicious publication of non-defamatory falsehoods calculated to cause harm, obstruction of access to evidence, spoliation of evidence, unjust enrichment, breaking and entering, wiretap, property damage, negligence, fraudulent inducement of wrongful termination, and others, such acts done officially, under color of law, and individually, and done as agents and co-conspirators of the conspiracy.
II.
P L A I N T I F F S
All named plaintiffs, including James Dalton Bell, Charles Stewart, Richard Lancial, and Michael Hunter are American citizens. All class plaintiffs are believed to be American or Canadian or Mexican citizens. Bell is presently incarcerated at the USP Atwater in Atwater, California. Hunter is a resident of Washington state. Stewart is a resident of Clackamas County, Oregon. Lancial is a resident of Clark County, Washington.
Plaintiff subclass 1 consists of all attendees, participants and all negatively-affected friends and family, as well as negatively-affected employers and employees, and associates of attendees and participants (and improperly deterred attendees) of the Multnomah County Common Law Court (hereinafter MCCLC) meetings from 1996 to present. This class was harmed, and was intended to be harmed, by the infiltration of the conspirators, including defendants’ efforts to cover up the infiltration, and ultimately cover up the actions of those who subsequently attempted to continue to conceal the defendants actions.
This harm was intended by the defendants and made to happen very extensively and broadly: friends and family were approached by government agents, including defendants, intimidated and threatened. Friends and family lost their jobs and other financial opportunities due to such wrongful activities. Government agents engaged in improper and illegal bugging, wiretapping, tracking, following and other harassing surveillance of Plaintiffs, including Plaintiff Class 1, including employing the information thus obtained to cause direct or indirect harm to them.
Defendants also wrongfully approached, lured, manipulated and threatened gullible news media individuals and organizations in order to libel plaintiffs and their family, friends, including employers and employees, and associates and this was intended to be accomplished to harm Plaintiffs, including Bell, and was done. This was planned to and did cause a large amount of wrongful and unjustified bad publicity for these individuals, and was improperly intended to cast the government in a good light, or at least a better light than what would have occurred had the public known the truth.
Certain friends and family of Plaintiffs were also intimidated into consenting under threats to allow entries and/or searches of their property without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of any crime, motivated by illegally obtained information. Other friends and family of the Plaintiffs had property or money stolen from them, or their property irreparably broken, by agents of the government, including unknown-named defendants. Much of this harm was carefully hidden to be difficult to link with the defendants’ illegitimate actions: Certain friends and family had various government agencies, including federal, state or local, sicced on them.
The defendants’ motivation for this widely-spread harm was to retaliate against people for talking to or associating with the class of those who would participate in organizations such as the MCCLC, in order to intimidate all of them and chill the exercise of their constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights of free speech, press and freedom of association, and freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances and freedom of access to courts.
Plaintiff subclass 2 are or were incarcerated at Seatac FDC in Seatac, Washington state. They were denied proper access to the law library and tools to prepare their cases, and were wrongfully subject to arbitrary, capricious and outrageous limitations on their constitutional rights done by Seatac FDC personnel. Friends and family of Plaintiffs may reside in any state; however, they are believed to be primarily from the states of Oregon and Washington. Plaintiff sub-class 2 also includes inmates at Phoenix FCI, Seatac FDC, Lompoc USP, and Atwater USP whose conversations were illegally recorded in violation under 18 USC § 2510 et seq. without notice or consent.
Plaintiffs allege that, contrary to appearances, plaintiff Bell is not a “prisoner” within the meaning of 28 USC §§ 1915, 1915A and other legal tests, rules and conditions, including those which would harm or limit his right to representation or recovery for damages, costs, and legal fees. (For example, the law PLRA, 42 USC § 1997e) Bell has neither been jurisdictionally charged, tried, nor convicted or sentenced, a conclusion which is supported separately and together by both law and facts. Bell is entitled to present evidence supporting these allegations of fact and law.
Further, Bell is neither “awaiting sentencing” nor “serving a sentence”, including within the meaning of 28 USC § 1346(b)(2). Bell is being illegally detained on baseless, illegal, unconstitutional, wrongful and malicious instructions of Defendant Tanner acting as agent for the conspiracy and in his other non-absolute-immunized capacities. Plaintiffs allege that all other defendants are or should be aware of and desired the wrongful nature of Bell’s confinement, and they intended and agreed and worked to accomplish this.
Nevertheless, because Bell is being treated AS IF he is convicted, he is entitled to all benefits and rights (such as tolling of statutes of limitation) that would accrue normally as a consequence of such status and treatment.
III.
DEFENDANTS
Plaintiffs state that this complaint is served on officers or employees of the United States, sued in an individual capacity, but that some of the claims are NOT based on acts or omissions occurring in connection with the performance of duties on behalf of the United States. Return service of an answer is required in twenty (20) days, therefore.
Defendants are all citizens of the United States and reside in both the Western District of Washington and the District of Oregon, California or other states or are governmental agencies or municipalities. All defendants are “associated with” their employer(s).
Tacoma and Seattle Federal Courts are judicial operations in Tacoma and Seattle, Washington, respectively. They contain personnel acting in judicial, administrative, ministerial, color-of-law, and individual capacities, as well as being agents and co-conspirators of the conspiracy.
Defendant Jack E. Tanner is and was at all times herein a United States District Court judge, acting variously in his official, color-of-law, administrative, ministerial, and agent of the conspiracy or individual-capacity roles, as well as a co-conspirator with the other defendants. Tanner acted despite loss/lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendant Franklin Burgess is and was at all times herein a United States District Court judge, acting variously in his official, color-of-law, administrative, ministerial, and agents of the conspiracy or individual-capacity roles, as well as a co-conspirator with the other defendants.
11.0pt'> Defendants Rob London and Annmarie Levins were and are Assistant United States Attorneys employed in the Office of the United States Attorney for the Western District of Washington at Seattle/Tacoma.
They both acted individually, in their administrative and color-of-law, and official capacities, and acted in an investigative capacity outside the scope of their official duties. They also acted in a capacity as co-conspirators with the other defendants and others, and as agents of the conspiracy.
Defendants Robert Leen and Peggy Sue Juergens are and were at all times herein mentioned, private attorneys acting as agents for the other defendants, acting in the Western District of Washington. They were also contract employees of the federal government. They also acted individually, under color-of-law, and in official and/or administrative capacities as Officers of the various Courts that they served. They also acted in a capacity as co-conspirators with the other defendants and others. They also pretended to act as legal counsel for Plaintiff Bell.
Defendant Jeff Gordon is and was at all times herein mentioned, an agent employed by the United States Treasury, and variously under the Internal Revenue Service and the Inspector General for Tax Administration ("TIGTA"). He acted in his official and color-of-law, individual capacities, as well as a capacity of agent and co-conspirator with the other defendants and others.
Defendant Steven Walsh (a/k/a "Steve Wilson") is a Federal employee and is believed to be a resident of California. He acted in an official capacity, and color-of-law, and individual capacity within the District of Oregon and elsewhere, as well as a capacity as agent and co-conspirator with other defendants and others.
Defendant Peter Avenia is and was a Federal Public Defender in the Seattle/Tacoma area, acting in an official, color-of-law, and individual capacities, as well as being an agent and co-conspirator of the conspiracy, and a contract employee of the federal government.
Defendants Leslie Spier and Michael Markham and Matt Richards were and are employees of the Federal Probation Office in the Seattle/Tacoma area, acting in official, color-of-law, and individual capacities, as well as agents and co-conspirators of the conspiracy.
Defendant Judith Mandel is a private attorney in the Seattle/Kitsap County area, acting in an official, color-of-law, and individual capacity, as well as being an agent and co-conspirator of the conspiracy. She was and is a contract-employee of the United States.
Ryan Thomas Lund is a private citizen believed to reside in the Portland, Oregon/Vancouver, Washington area, acting individually an agent and co-conspirator of the conspiracy, including under color of law, when following instructions to assault Plaintiff Bell.
William Martin is a resident of Kitsap County, Washington, acting individually and as an agent and co-conspirator in the conspiracy. Martin engaged in on-going conspiracies with agents of the Federal government to wrongfully infiltrate, intimidate, falsely incriminate, and to help destroy what was recognized to be legitimate, but unwelcome, political opposition to the prevailing government policies.
Jill Sjodin, J.Gustin, A.Wolfe, and "Ortiz" are and were counselors at Seatac FDC, acting in their official, color-of-law, and individual capacities, as well as being agents and co-conspirators of the conspiracy.
S. Young, Nicole Cunningham, "Mesler are employees of the Federal government in the Education department at Seatac FDC, acting in official, color-of-law, and individual capacities as well as being agents and co-conspirators in the conspiracy.
Warden W.J. Jusino is a Warden at Seatac FDC, acting in his official, color-of-law, and individual capacity, as well as being an agent and co-conspirator of the conspiracy. Jusino is believed to be currently Warden at Victorville USP in Victorville, California.
"Montoya" is a lawyer at Seatac FDC, acting in official, color-of-law, and individual capacity, as well as being an agent and co-conspirator of the conspiracy.
McNeil is a Seatac FDC guard, acting in official, color-of-law and individual capacities, as well as being an agent and co-conspirator of the conspiracy.
"Germain" is a Seatac FDC Lieutenant, acting in official, color-of-law, and individual capacities, as well as being an agent and co-conspirator of the conspiracy.
The Vancouver Police Department is the police agency for the city of Vancouver, Washington, and acted as agents of the conspiracy.
Tacoma Federal Prosecutor's Office and Seattle Federal Prosecutors office are Federal Government agencies.
Tacoma Federal Probation office is a Federal government agency.
Internal Revenue Service Agents are Federal government employees acting in their official, color-of-law, and individual capacities, as well as being agents and co-conspirators of the conspiracy.
Portland Police Bureau is the police agency for the city of Portland, Oregon, acting with its employees as agents of the conspiracy.
Multnomah County Sheriff is the police agency for the Oregon County of Multnomah.
The Internal Revenue Service is a Federal government agency, a subsidiary of the Department of the Treasury. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is its employee and agent, acting in official, color-of-law, and individual capacities, as well as being an agent and co-conspirator of the conspiracy.
Sergeant David King is a police officer employed by the city of Vancouver, Washington, acting in his official, color-of-law, and individual capacities, as well as being an agent and co-conspirator of the conspiracy. King may now be a Lieutenant.
Clackamas County Sheriff's Department is the police agency for Clackamas County, Oregon, acting as an agent of the conspiracy.
Clackamas County Sheriff's deputies are unknown-named employees of the Clackamas County Sheriff's Department, and acted as agents of the conspiracy, including their supervisors acting in their official capacities.
Pierce County Sheriff is the law enforcement agency for Pierce County, Washington, and operates the Pierce County Jail.
TIGTA (Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration) is an agency of the Department of the Treasury.
Department of the Treasury is an agency of the Federal Government of the United States.
"ATF" is the "Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms" agency of the Department of the Treasury.
Phillip Scott is a government employee of the ATF, acting in official, color-of-law, and individual capacity as well as being an agent and co-conspirator of the conspiracy.
Mike McNall is a government employee of the ATF, acting in official, color-of-law, and individual capacity as well as being an agent and co-conspirator of the conspiracy.
Bureau of Prisons is an agency of the Department of Justice [sic], which is itself an agency of the Federal Government.
Seatac FDC is an operation of the Bureau of Prisons in Seatac, Washington, and holds inmates including those under the control of the US Marshals Service.
Peter L. Shaw is the Appellate Commissioner for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, acting in official, color-of-law, administrative and individual capacity as well as being an agent and co-conspirator of the conspiracy.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is a judicial operation headquartered in San Francisco, California, employing administrative, ministerial, and judicial personnel. It operates a branch in Seattle, Washington.
Personnel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals are employees including administrative personnel acting in official, color-of-law, administrative, ministerial and individual capacities as well as being agents and co-conspirators of the conspiracy.
Lompoc USP is a Bureau of Prisons operation in Lompoc, California.
Phoenix FCI is a Bureau of Prisons operation in Phoenix, Arizona.
Seatac FDC is a Bureau of Prisons operation in Seatac, Washington.
Atwater USP is a Federal penitentiary in Atwater, California. Warden Paul M. Schultz is its warden. Schultz is sued ONLY in his official capacity.
Unknown-named personnel of the Federal government are employees acting in official, color-of-law, and individual capacity as well as being agents and co-conspirators of the conspiracy.
Charles Vollmer, Lisa Stevenson, and Ernie Grizzell are or were U.S. Marshals acting in all capacities.
Pacific Northwest National Labortories is a government owned, privately-operated scientific/engineering operation in Richland, Washington.
Unknown-named Federal Marshals are employees of the U.S. Marshals Service, an agency of the Department of Justice personnel acting in official, color-of-law, administrative, ministerial and individual capacities as well as being agents and co-conspirators of the conspiracy.
Vancouver Probation Office is a Federal operation in Vancouver Washington and was the former place of employment for Matt Richards.
Sundown Development Construction is a “front” operation located at 7302 Corregador, Vancouver, Washington, engaged in illegal surveillance under color of law. Daniel J. Saban and Dori J. Saban are the owners-of-record of the house at 7302 Corregidor, acting under color-of-law, individual, conspiratorial, and agent of the conspiracy roles.
Steven L. Lane, John McKay, and Helen Brunner are employed as attorneys for
the Federal government, and Lane acted as an unlicensed attorney in the
preparation of a fraudulent “Response Brief” in non-jurisdictional
case #01-30303. They acted individually, under color of law, and in official
and/or administrative capacity as Officer of the court of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and as co-conspirators with the other defendants and others,
as well as being agents of the conspiracy.
Christine Milligan is a counselor at Atwater USP in Atwater,
California.
Ron Brown is a case manager at Atwater USP in Atwater,
California.
Immunities and Estoppels
Plaintiffs are aware of Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985) which established (in the Fifth Circuit) special pleading requirements of suit against potentially absolutely immune actors (“But, that, however, is not the law in [the Ninth] Circuit”. Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1986)). These special pleading rules may not survive Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 US 163, 122 L.Ed.2d 517, 113 S.Ct. 1360 (1993). Nevertheless, plaintiffs here choose to plead a prima facie case of loss or non-existence/non-applicability of immunities. Plaintiffs reserve the right to extend this pleading on challenge. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that a defendant must raise on Answer.
Plaintiffs allege that there are no applicable immunities or estoppels to bar suit or recovery against any defendant. All Defendants including the United States (which was sued; because suits against federal government employees in their official capacity are construed as against the United States) are estopped from asserting immunities due to their failure to respond with an Answer when served with summons and complaint on civil case #01-1085 when that case was neither fully nor properly dismissed. This constituted waiver of sovereign immunity. All Defendants including the United States are also estopped from asserting defenses not raised, particularly those not raised on claims not (or not completely or properly) dismissed, made by plaintiffs not (or not properly) dismissed, or against Defendants not (or not properly) dismissed, or not dismissed in all their capacities. All Defendants are generally estopped due to their unclean hands in procuring the wrongful September 12, 2001 dismissal of case # 01-1085. Plaintiffs allege that all served defendants remained obligated to respond with an Answer subsequent to September 12, 2001, and failure to do so constituted default.
Plaintiffs allege Defendants including the United States have waived objections to venue due to their failure to answer: See 28 USC § 1406 (b). Plaintiffs allege there has also been a waiver by all defendants including the United States, by failure to answer, of objection to that Complaint based on Statutes of Limitation, Sovereign Immunity, absolute and qualified immunities, estoppel (e.g. "tort claim", "Heck v. Humphrey"), jurisdiction, exhaustion of administrative remedies, limits on damages, limits on types of damages, immunities from punitive damages, limits on attorney’s fees, and other issues. Plaintiffs allege there has been a waiver, under Rule 8 F.R.Civ.P. of all denials and all affirmative defenses Rule 8 (b),(c),(d) of claims made in case #01-1085, by failure to answer.
Plaintiffs also allege that all actors who might ordinarily assert any claim of "absolute immunity" or "qualified immunity" in their official or other capacity also acted and agreed to act (or were negligent) individually, in color-of-law, in an administrative or a ministerial capacity, as an agent or co-conspirator with the conspiracy in an un-immunized capacity. Under Supreme Court decision Dennis v. Sparks, 449 US 24, 66 L.Ed.2d 185, 101 S.Ct. 183 (1980) non-immunized actors acting in conspiracy with immunized actors are liable under 42 USC § 1983, and under well-established principles of law co-conspirators are liable for the actions of other co-conspirators. (Pinkerton liability) This includes themselves in other capacities. Therefore, Plaintiffs allege that all actors have regained their liability due to their multiple roles of action including un-immunized.
Breaches of Qualified Immunities
Plaintiffs also allege that all qualified immunities have been breached by bad-faith, intentionally malicious or grossly and recklessly negligent acts that the actors knew or should have known would violate the Constitutional and statutory rights of the plaintiffs, and they acted with impermissible motivations and extreme disregard for such rights. Plaintiffs also allege that each defendant knew or should have known of the bad faith, intentionally malicious or recklessly negligent actions and intentions of each of the other defendants and thus cannot claim a good-faith reliance on or belief in their propriety.
Plaintiffs also allege that all defendants became aware of the bad-faith, intentionally malicious and recklessly negligent acts of the other defendants, and knew they were part of a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-85 et seq. and Bivens, and intentionally failed and refused to report these actions to competent, ethical authority, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
In addition, no immunities exist on declaratory and injunctive actions and relief, as are sought in this Complaint, and holders of even absolute immunities are nevertheless liable for attorney's fees and court costs. See Supreme Court decision Pulliam v. Allen, 466 US 522, 80 L.Ed.2d 565, 104 S.Ct. 1970 (1984). Generally, such costs are awarded in a 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985 or Bivens complaint where the plaintiff(s) win on any issue, so dismissal of even immunized defendants is improper if declaratory or injunctive relief is requested, as it is here. See 42 USC § 1988.
Breaches of Judicial Immunities
Federal courts sited within the fifty states are courts of “limited jurisdiction”. See A.L. Rowan & Son, General Contractors, Inc. v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 611 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964). Also, federal courts are “composed of ‘inferior courts and one Supreme Court’.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 US 211, 227, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995). See also U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 1 (“...such inferior courts as the Congress may... establish.”).
Randall v. Brigham, 74 US 523, at 535-36 (1868) held that contrary to the immunities of judges of superior and general authority, “judges of limited and inferior authority ... are protected only when they act within their jurisdiction”, strictly construed. In agreement on this point, Bradley v. Fisher, 20 L.Ed. 646, 13 Wall. 335 (1871) also held that “when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible.” See also Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d at 849 (9th Cir. 1980), quoted infra.
Also, appeals courts do not possess subject-matter jurisdiction over the merits of cases in which the lower court did not possess jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 US 83 at 95, 140 L.Ed.2d at 227, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (1998), quoting a long line of Supreme Court cases holding to this principle, back to United States v. Corrick, 298 US 435, 440, 80 L.Ed. 1263, 56 S.Ct. 829 (1936) “[When the lower Federal Court] lack[s] jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, NOT OF THE MERITS but merely for the purpose of correcting error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.” [Corrick at 440; emphasis supplied]
Plaintiff Bell informed the Tacoma Federal Court of its loss of jurisdiction to hold a trial because of his March 27, 2001 filing of an interlocutory appeal (which became case #01-30143), and separately on April 3, 2001. Bell also informed the Tacoma District Court at least ten days before and again on August 24, 2001 of the filing of appeal case #01-30296, and of the fact that this action divested jurisdiction to hold a “sentencing”. See Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d at 1246 (9th Cir. 1996), quoting Davis v. U.S., 667 F.2d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 1982). Civil judicial immunity was lost.
Bell, as appellant, separately informed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals of its lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (due to the pendency of case #01-30296 at the time the lower court “sentenced” Bell in case #00-5731) over the merits of case #01-30303 with his many pro-se filings in February-March, 2002. That appeals court acted ostensibly on the merits despite this known lack of merits jurisdiction and despite the resulting loss of civil judicial immunity. So that court acted in the face of clearly valid statutes and case law expressly depriving it of jurisdiction. As stated in Rankin (id) at 849:
“But when a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 US (13 Wall.) at 351 (“when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible.”); Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1980)(Stump is consistent with the view that “a clearly inordinate exercise of unconferred jurisdiction by a judge-one so crass as to establish that he embarked on it either knowingly or recklessly-subjects him to personal liability.”).”
Plaintiffs including Bell allege that, in furtherance of a scheme by the defendants, Judges Tanner and Burgess engaged in tampering with Bell's Sixth Amendment right to unconflicted, independent, and non-betraying legal counsel by inflicting corrupt attorneys on Bell who were illegally and unethically conspiring with the judges and the other defendants against Bell's interests. These attorneys, in turn, acted to impede Bell's right to challenge the improper proceedings and the improper actions of Tanner and Burgess themselves. Those judges acted in the face of clearly valid statutes and case law expressly depriving them of jurisdiction.
Assignment of a public defender attorney is NOT a task which can only be done by a judge: in fact, it is usually done by an administrator; therefore, absolute judicial immunity cannot apply. Further, even where a judge is the only person who can hire or fire court personnel, judges do not have absolute immunity for such personnel-selection decisions. See Forrester v. White, 484 US 219, 98 L.Ed 2d 555, 108 S.Ct. 1099 (1988).
Defendants Tanner and Burgess possessed the administrative or ministerial power to replace Bell’s lawyers. They failed to exercise this power. The failure to exercise this power is negligence, in this case unimmunized negligence, and is a violation of 42 USC §§ 1985, 1986, and Bivens.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Tanner's mis-handling of the court calendar, including failure to de-schedule the "trial" despite the known-pending interlocutory appeal #01-30143 (which divested jurisdiction from the district court) constitute formal, ministerial, or administrative acts (or failures to act) which are unimmunized. Further, the act of scheduling and not de-scheduling a "sentencing" absent a jurisdictional trial and conviction, and the act of proceeding with that “sentencing” (including issuing a commitment order) despite loss of jurisdiction (due to the pendency of appeal # 01-30296) are also purely formal, ministerial, or administrative acts with no immunity.
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Judge Tanner did not have subject matter jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed within the District of Oregon, and he was aware of this, yet he proceeded anyway.Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Tanner’s co-conspirators especially London and Leen came to a private and wrongful agreement with Tanner to, for example, wrongfully have Tanner rule against Bell (by treating him as if he’d been convicted) and do nothing themselves to interfere with this malicious and wrongful process, and in fact to assist its accomplishment. Plaintiffs allege that these agreements provided that Defendant Tanner would take (and fail to take) actions in his administrative, ministerial and individual capacities in order to harm Bell, including (for example) failure to investigate Bell’s complaints about Leen and to fail to replace Leen.
Extrinsic Fraud
Discussions of judicial immunities repeatedly cite the existence of a (properly functioning) appeals system as being the justification for and the key enabler of a policy which grants broad immunities to judges. Forrester v. White, 98 L.Ed.2d at 564 (1988). However, such mollifying references would be utterly meaningless unless, by negative implication, the ABSENSE of (or the collusive denial or disabling of) such appeals procedures established that no immunity should apply. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) provides that extrinsic fraud prevents a court from obtaining subject-matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs allege that in numerous ways, defendants in coordination with Tanner explicitly, repeatedly, and outrageously acted to deny plaintiff Bell’s access to all appeals and relief procedures and their benefits; including:
1. Bell was defrauded of an appeal on case #97-5270FDB;
2. Bell was defrauded of an appeal on the June 2, 1999 probation hearing for a period in excess of one year; the docket for appeal case 99-30210 was forged and fraudulent;
3. They ignored their loss/lack of jurisdiction 4/3/01 to hold a trial, and proceeded anyway;
4. Leen failed and refused to do the interlocutory appeal or a writ of certiorari, based on case #01-30143, or have another attorney appointed for these necessary tasks;
5. The appeals court wrongfully failed to proceed with the interlocutory appeal promptly, and then dismissed it for wrongful reasons 5/22/01; in collusion with district and appellate court personnel, they assigned Leen and failed to de-assign him aware of Bell’s complaints and the impossibility of Leen’s representing Bell;
6. Failed to accept that the return of jurisdiction on or about 5/22/01 was not retroactive to 4/3/01, and thus a “new” trial was necessary, if it was possible at all;
7. Ignored Bell’s June 8, 2001 second interlocutory appeal notice;
8. Failed to assign Bell any attorney on the August 13 re-filing of the June 8 interlocutory appeal notice, despite the fact that it was docketed #01-30296, intending to deny Bell benefit of that appeal;
9. Proceeded with the “sentencing” of August 24, 2001 despite loss of jurisdiction and despite lack of a proper, jurisdictional trial and conviction;
10. Caused Bell’s civil case #01-1085 to be egregiously and prematurely wrongly dismissed, for numerous blatantly-improper reasons; acted to prevent the defendants from being obligated to respond, preventing them from having to admit personal jurisdiction; dismissed plaintiff Stewart despite the fact that plaintiffs had 120 days to amend with his signature;
11. Caused and allowed Bell’s appeal case #01-30296 to be ignored by defendant Juergens in order to harm Bell; and
12. Caused and allowed Juergens to “hijack” Bell’s appeal case #01-30303 for the defendants’ (Tanner, Leen, London, etc) benefit, and Bell’s detriment;
13. Denied Bell’s pro-se filings in case #01-30303, despite specific rules and Ninth Circuit case law allowing a person to represent himself and file pro-se supplemental briefs (See Local Rule 4-1(d) and 28 USC § 1654, Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667 at 677 (9th Cir. 1981)); and
14. Refused and failed to act on Bell’s repeated serious complaints about Juergens, and denied Bell an attorney after Juergens’ withdrawal in intentional violation of rules and case law;
15. Juergens continued to pretend to “represent” Bell for over two (2) months after she had been sued and served in civil case #02-1052BR, denying Bell his right to unconflicted counsel; and
16. Bell was fraudulently denied petition for a writ of certiorari on case #10-30303, or an attorney after Juergens resigned.
Therefore, plaintiffs including Bell allege that defendants acted individually, ministerially, administratively, and together to disable and deny Bell’s access to virtually any appeal or similar remedy. They prevented Bell from bringing his own true case before each tribunal: This is “extrinsic fraud.”(Even if there is some positive action on appeal case #01-30303, that case WILL STILL BE A SHAM, due to the actions of the civil defendants herein, covering up their own wrongful actions.) The existence of “extrinsic fraud” prevents a court from possessing subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, which also leads to loss of civil judicial immunity. See F.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3).
Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ repeated and serious tampering with substantive and procedural rights of plaintiffs constitute a constructive waiver, estop and bar of any “qualified immunity” they could otherwise assert, for such tampering is obviously in violation of clearly established federal rights.
Breaches of Prosecutorial Immunities
Defendant Rob London acted in furtherance of defendants' conspiracy by the preparation (on or about December 27, 2000 through January 3, 2001) of a set of phony allegations that were intended (and succeeded) in getting Defendant Tanner to order a "mental evaluation" for Plaintiff Bell. This was done partly to falsely discredit Bell, which was fraudulent concealment with respect to the plaintiffs, but was primarily done to obtain an illegitimate delay in Bell's trial to enable Defendant attorney Robert Leen, who had been assigned to Bell despite the (known to the civil defendants; unknown to Bell) fact that his schedule already would have interfered in Bell’s previously scheduled trial date, to continue to inflict himself on Bell.
London's false allegations resulted in the "evaluation," which produced a delay under the Speedy Trial Act (see 18 USC § 3161 (h)(1)(A)), enabling a re-scheduling of the trial. This ruse allowed Leen to continue to victimize Plaintiff Bell. London thus made a statement for the purpose of obtaining a continuance which he knew to be false and which was material to the granting of the continuance; thus he violated 18 USC § 3162 (b)(3). He assisted the conspiracy by committing a violation to which he was not immune.
The court filing which led to the granting of the "evaluation," and thus the improper delay, was not a document which could solely be filed by a prosecutor. See 18 USC § 4241(a). For example, such a document could be filed by the defendant, a defense attorney, or by amicus curae ("Friend of the Court”). See U.S. v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Manning v. U.S., 371 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1967). Thus filed, the Defense or Amicus filer would not possess "absolute immunity.” Nor do complaining witnesses possess immunity.
London also tampered with the psychologist witness, telling him to not show up for the hearing on February 16, 2001, so he did not. This interferred with this witness’ presentation of the report, mandated by 18 USC 4247(c), at the hearing mandated by 18 USC 4247(d). Plaintiff (then Defendant) Bell’s right to testify, to present evidence, to subpoena witnesses, and to cross-examine witnesses was violated due to London’s wrongful actions.
In Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 US 118, 139 L Ed 2d 471, 118 S.Ct. 502 (1997) it states (139 L Ed 2d at 479): "Thus, in determining immunity, we examine 'the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.' Forrester v. White, 484 US 219, 229, 98 L Ed 2d 555, 108 S Ct 538 (1988)."
Acts taken by a prosecutor which could be done by another, unimmunized person are not immunized simply because a prosecutor does them. Therefore, by filing that motion Defendant Rob London assisted the defendants' conspiracy in an unimmunized role, and has assisted and become liable for all the actions of his co-conspirators. Plaintiffs also allege that in doing so, defendant London (acting in that unimmunized role) having become liable for all the acts of the conspiracy, this liability also includes any actions he took in furtherance of the conspiracy in an immunized capacity.
Defendant London also interfered with Plaintiff Bell's attempt to replace attorney Robert Leen, both verbally (in hearings January 3 and 5, and February 16, 2001) and in writing (in an improper response and opposition to Bell's own pro-se written requests to defendant Judge Tanner), under circumstances where he had no legitimate role as prosecutor: The subject of Bell’s representation was not an adversarial matter, and London had no function as advocate here. Likewise Tanner’s role was not adjudicative.
Defendant London induced defendant lawyer Leen to withhold discovery from Bell, beginning in November/December 2000, an unethical act which is an illegal function for which he was not immunized, tampering with Bell’s representation. London failed to “work it out” as ordered by Judge Tanner on February 16, 2001, to disclose discovery to Bell, and does not possess prosecutorial immunity for this. See White by Safford v. Gerbitz, 860 F.2d 661, at 663 (6th Cir. 1988).
Defendant London on December 12, 1997, acted as spokesman for the conspiracy, requesting that Judge Burgess approve their desire to deny Bell the return of all of his property especially hard-disk information. This request could have been made at any time, by any government employee, so under Kalina no prosecutorial immunity applies.
In May or June, 1998, Defendant London induced lawyer Avenia to deliver a threat to Plaintiff Bell that if Bell did not approve the release of a medical test, he (London) would cause Bell to be arrested without justification. London had no proper role as prosecutor at this point.
These numerous examples show that defendant Rob London was thoroughly involved in the conspiracy in an unimmunized capacity. London also wrongfully participated with the other defendants before charges were contemplated, and thus no “absolute immunity” applies.
Defendants London and Leen also failed and refused to act in their administrative, ministerial, or individual capacities to openly and explicitly inform defendant Tanner (in his various capacities) of Tanner’s repeated and continuing absence of/loss of judicial jurisdiction, which they were entitled and indeed obligated to do. They did so in order to harm Plaintiff Bell, and to cause and allow Tanner to harm Bell, and to help conceal Tanner’s legal inability to proceed due to clear loss/absence of jurisdiction.
Breaches of Miscellaneous Immunities
Probation department officers acted in investigatory (such as during searches), administrative, or executive capacity, which would have merited at most a qualified immunity, but they acted in ways a reasonable person would have known were violations of plaintiff’ rights. They participated in a search of Bell’s residence in violation of clear and specific terms (“a probation officer”, rather than many officers of various kinds) whose obvious and true meaning was later confirmed by Judge Burgess. They obtained and disseminated information to persons outside the probation system. See Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1983). They prepared documents and filled out reports in such capacity. See Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1984). These documents violated the terms of a plea agreement that bound the government to terms, but they sought and acted to violate those terms, which violated Bell’s contractual rights.
They sought and obtained information from other government agencies that they knew had been illegally obtained, and they used this information to harm Bell. They attempted to enforce court orders they knew or should have known were illegal, such as extorting Bell’s compliance with an order to disclose a medical report that was made conditioned on its non-disclosure.
Immunity of such officers is derived from that of the court. Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 1995). These personnel were or should have been aware of the loss of jurisdiction of Tanner’s and Burgess’s court, and that their derivative immunity was lost. They engaged in a “pre-sentence investigation” and issued a report (PSR) in a case when they knew there had been no jurisdictional trial or conviction, and thus no jurisdictional sentencing could occur. They were thus aware of the defects in any administrative or ministerial instructions they purported to follow. See Malik v. Arapahoe County Dept. of Social Services, 191 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 1999). They acted to conceal their knowledge of the court’s loss of jurisdiction and thus to harm Bell.
Breaches of Court Clerk Immunities
Court clerks, who act in administrative or ministerial capacities, possess only qualified immunity. See Antoine v. Byers and Anderson, 508 US 429, 124 L.Ed.2d 391, 113 S.Ct. 2167 (1993). Clerks exercise administrative, not judicial, discretion, and in their ministerial roles they exercise no discretion at all. They do not “resolv[e] disputes between parties, or [] authoratitively adjudicat[e] private rights.” Burns v. Reed, 500 US at 500, 114 L.Ed.2d at 567-68. Even if, arguendo, a portion of court clerks’ acts are properly described as “quasi-judicial”, such acts are only entitled to qualified immunity, not absolute immunity. See Burns, 500 US at 500-1, 114 L.Ed.2d at 567-68. To the extent that the Ninth Circuit Court believed otherwise in Antoine, 950 F.2d at 1474-74 (1991), that decision was overturned by a unanimous Supreme Court.
Furthermore, plaintiffs allege that some or all of the wrongful clerks’ actions complained of in this case involve administrative or ministerial functions, not “quasi-judicial” one. (Forging dockets and docket items, misdirecting mail, etc.) Plaintiffs allege that these actions were not taken at the direction of a judge. Alternatively, if it is alleged the court clerks were ordered to do so and possessed some derivative form of absolute immunity, they were still negligent in their administrative roles by failing to alert higher or alternate authority of the improper tampering with the court records, and by failing to alert plaintiff Bell of this improper manipulation of the court record.
Common Law Reliance Estoppel/Judicial Estoppel
Plaintiffs allege that defendants are estopped from simultaneously claiming the existence of "absolute immunities" while denying the existence, authority and jurisdiction of common law courts from which they are derived, and in particular the Multnomah County Common Law Court. "Absolute judicial immunity" is not a product of the US Constitution or any Congressional act. It was said in Pierson v. Ray, 18 L Ed 2d at 294 (1967):
“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted this doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 2 L Ed 646 (1872).” [underline supplied]
Oddly, this "solidly established" doctrine was affirmatively accepted by judicial decision in only 13 of 37 states by 1871. (79 Yale L.J., at 326-327.) Nevertheless, common law and common law courts are the only source for this doctrine, other than perhaps "The King can do no wrong." Pierson (id), at 301. (Douglas in dissent.)
Defendants must take the bitter with the sweet. The American revolution returned the King's power to form common law courts to the American citizens, who chose not to delegate the authority to form and run those courts to the Federal or state governments. (See the 9th and 10th amendments to the US Constitution.) If people choose to form such courts today, government has no proper choice but to accept this. Also, Defendants are judicially estopped from challenging the jurisdiction and authority of the MCCLC due to their agent’s (Steve Walsh/Wilson) participation and operation of that organization under color of its apparent authority.
IV.
STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND TOLLING
Plaintiffs note that pursuant to 28 USC § 1658 the general statute of limitations for civil actions is 4 years after the cause of action accrues (based on 18 USC § 2264, added 1994), and according to 28 USC § 2401 the limitation is 6 years after the right of action first accrues. Plaintiffs claim that some of them have been under legal disability and thus benefit from a 3-year extension under 28 USC § 2401(a) after the legal disability ceases, but as yet the disability continues. Plaintiffs claim that certain laws such as PLRA (42 USC 1997e) constitute, in themselves, a “legal disability”, in that they limit and restrict access to the courts and limit remedies which may be available, including restricting and limiting amounts and types of damages and attorneys fees.
Plaintiffs allege that no defendant has ever withdrawn from this conspiracy until and including the present date. Plaintiffs allege that the relevant statute of limitations for RICOand anti-trust actions (18 USC §§ 1964, 1965, 15 USC § 15) is four years (see Agency Holding v. Malley-Duff Associates, 483 US 143, 97 L.Ed.2d 121, 107 S.Ct. 2759 (1987)), appropriately tolled by the ongoing fraud and concealment by defendants and all of them.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants, and all of them, have continuously and fraudulently concealed their wrongful acts from plaintiffs' reasonable discovery, and plaintiffs have been diligent in researching and discovering the causes of action mentioned herein. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants, and each of them, have taken actions officially, under color-of-law, individually, and as agents and co-conspirators of the conspiracy, to impede and prevent the discovery of the causes of actions by plaintiffs, as well as impeding, harassing, threatening, deterring, and preventing plaintiffs from proceeding with the investigation of facts and learning the law necessary to write this Civil Complaint. Plaintiffs allege that the events in this complaint are related, that one or more falls within the limitations period, and the maintenance of an unlawful system both before and during the period. See Gutowsky v. County of Placer, 108 F.3d 256, 259 (9th cir. 1997).
Examples of Fraudulent Concealment
Defendants’ improper acts include illegally taking and improperly-prolonged keeping property and data of plaintiffs, filing false and improper criminal charges against plaintiffs or causing this to be done, engaging in secret and illegal surveillance of plaintiffs for improper and impermissible reasons, concealing and failing to disclose this surveillance when legally required, interfering with and colluding with plaintiffs' legal counsels to cause obstruction of justice, destroying and tampering with and fabricating evidence to achieve improper convictions or adjudications, denying access to evidence in violation of law, using false names, using false vehicle registrations, testifying falsely, harassing or tampering with witnesses, falsely discrediting plaintiffs using improper means, extorting fraudulent agreements from plaintiffs, denying plaintiffs access to information sources such as the Internet for the illegitimate purpose of impeding their ability to discover cause of action and evidence, illegally avoiding their obligation to appear and testify by ruses, subterfuges, and collusion, and many other false, illegal and improper acts.
Plaintiff Bell cites the existence and handling of criminal and appeal cases 97-5270, 00-5731, 01-30143, 01-30296, 01-30303, and the wrongful dismissal of 01-1085 as fraudulent concealment.
Plaintiff Bell cites active and libelous government and defendant efforts to discredit him publicly as being part of this Fraudulent Concealment. (Summer 1997; sent to Springfield Mo. August 1998 for an “evaluation” after Bell merely claimed that he'd been spied on by government agents for "a couple years."; yet another fraudulent evaluation in January 2000, which was also a successful attempt to achieve an improper trial delay.)
These efforts were intended to get other victims of the defendants' actions to ignore or disbelieve Bell and his accusations, a key part of the fraudulent concealment that actively delayed the production of this complaint. Also, the government's wrongful restrictions fraudulently imposed on Bell after his first release in April 1998 in violation of the terms of the negotiated plea agreement (No use of the Internet, no use of computers). This, plus the government's and defendants' refusal to return Bell's computers' data were intended to, and did, keep Bell from: Identifying and communicating with other victims efficiently, including those that would know more about what the government and the defendants actually did; Uncovering further evidence of the defendants' wrongful activities; and actively fight the government's and the defendants' massive libelous attempts to discredit Bell.
The defendants also engaged in a wrongful and illegal recording and sharing undisclosed (to Bell) of Bell's telephone conversations, to keep defendants alert to Bell's progress at uncovering defendants' crimes and other misdeeds. And, of course, they continued to give Bell corrupt attorneys who were told to (and did) sabotage Bell's cases to impede his progress, and they did so.
Plaintiffs allege that the government's and defendants' fraudulent warrant and intentionally over broad search on November 6, 2000 and his arrest 11 days later were actually intended to impede, harass, deter, and disable Bell from doing research and preparing this Civil Complaint, and they did so.
Plaintiffs allege that this was retaliation against Bell for investigating criminal and wrongful acts of the defendants and others, and was meant in part to send a message to the other victims/plaintiffs-to-be that they should not dare investigate or sue the infiltrators/current defendants, or assist or associate with Bell. This is fraudulent concealment against all plaintiffs, intending to threaten, deter, impede, and delay them, and it did so.
Also, plaintiffs assert that confinement (legally or illegally) as prisoners or probationers tolls the relevant statutes of limitation, see 28 USC 2401 (a) , and particularly because this confinement was intended (Nov. 2000; by Jeff Gordon and other defendants) as retaliation for actions by a plaintiff (Bell) to research and bring this complaint, and also because the conditions of confinement were wrongfully set and adjusted by denial of access to adequate law library time, attempts to prevent Plaintiff Bell on various dates, including July 6, 2001, from utilizing law-library time to prepare the initial revision of this complaint, intended to impede and delay the prosecution of this civil action, and it did so.
Further, as recently as April 2001 government agent and co-conspirator Steven Walsh gave false and misleading testimony designed and intended by the conspiracy to disguise his true actions and intentions during the 1996-7 time frame with regard to the conspiracy. He also avoided key questions due to his collusion with Judge Tanner and attorney Leen to thwart Bell’s questions. Also, other agents of the conspiracy at the Seatac FDC facility have tampered with and diverted and destroyed U.S. mail from courts (Including the Portland Federal Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) that was addressed to plaintiff Bell, mail which they had a ministerial duty to forward to plaintiff Bell.
This manipulation of the mail was intended to and succeeded in concealing the fact of the improper partial dismissal of this action (# 01-1085 KI) from plaintiffs including Bell until late January 2002. Plaintiffs including Bell were harmed by this partial dismissal, but were particularly harmed by the illegal diversion of the mail intended by defendants to conceal this event from plaintiffs. This diversion, which was part of the conspiracy and done by Seatac FDC co-conspirators, was done as late as approximately December 31, 2001, and is continuing to the present day as a harassing, impeding, and intimidating tactic of the defendants in furtherance of the conspiracy. Plaintiffs allege this partial dismissal was wrongfully and collusively treated as complete by the defendants.
Conspirators/Defendants at Seatac FDC also interfered with Plaintiffs' right to communicate with each other, after co-plaintiff Michael Hunter was transferred to a "halfway house" in Seattle, Washington. Counselor Ortiz and unknown-named other Seatac FDC personnel repeatedly denied the right of Plaintiff Bell to write letters to Hunter, and refused to allow Hunter to likewise communicate with Bell, when they knew or should have known that Bureau of Prisons policy did not restrict such communications because plaintiff Hunter was not charged or convicted of a crime. Counselor Ortiz, in fact, repeatedly admitted to plaintiff Bell that Bell and Hunter were legally entitled to communicate, even not considering the existence of the filed lawsuit to which both were a party, but Ortiz still failed and refused to allow this communication for vague, specious, and illogical reasons. This was intended to impede the progress of the Complaint, and it did so during the August and September 2001 time frame. It was also Mail Fraud under RICO laws. It was a Bivens-type violation as well as a violation of 42 USC § 1985. It was extrinsic fraud, as well.
Therefore, plaintiffs allege that all applicable statutes of limitation have been and should be tolled until such improper behavior among the defendants ceases and the actions of the government personnel are fully disclosed and admitted. Plaintiffs contend that this is a continuing offense due to intimidation.
Plaintiffs allege that because civil case #01-1085KI was treated and dismissed in September 2001 as if 42 USC 1997e applied (even if and where this treatment was incorrect) the plaintiffs of that and this civil Complaint have been under a “legal disability” since July 2001 for purposes of tolling statutes of limitation.
Plaintiffs allege that they have been forced to come to agreements with various government agencies, (inter alia Bell in 1997 and Lancial in 1997) which rendered them under legal disabilities that could cease, but have not yet done so.
Plaintiffs allege that on or about February 5, 2003, employees of agency TIGTA (defendant) wrote a letter to co-conspirator Juergens threatening to destroy Bell’s property that had been illegally taken and improperly kept since 1997. They were aware that this property was evidence and would be a part of this civil case against them. This is extortion, fraudulent concealment, tampering with evidence, and mail fraud.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants are and should be equitably estopped from pleading the affirmative defense of statute of limitations, due to defendants’ extensive fraud and oppressive and wrongful control over plaintiffs, particularly those held illegally or threatened with false criminal charges. Defendants’ actions include deliberate misrepresentations and other affirmative actions designed to intimidate, mislead, or lull the plaintiffs into a sense of security or futility. Further, under circumstances where defendants were under an affirmative duty to speak or act or make a disclosure, they failed to do so.
State Tolling Statutes
Plaintiffs, including Bell, also assert that either Washington or Oregon statutes of limitations, including their respective tolling statutes, must be used if they are more generous than the federal limitations. The Washington state tolling statutes are RCW '' 4.16.100 and 4.16.080, and they toll the limitations for prisoners in custody. Plaintiffs, including Bell, assert that Bell’s false arrest on or about May 17, 1997, was tolled at least until his release on or about April 13, 2000 and tolling resumed on or about November 17, 2000. Plaintiffs assert the appropriate statute of limitations is at least four (4) years so none of those limitations have run.
Plaintiffs further cite their own filing of case # 01-1085 in the Portland, Oregon federal court, on or about July 10, 2001, as per Supreme Court case Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 101 L.Ed.2d 245, 108 S.Ct. 2379 (1988). This demonstrates due diligence by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also cite the improper September 12, 2001 dismissal, combined with the lack of notice of this dismissal (caused by defendants), as fraudulent concealment.
RICO ORGANIZATIONS
Plaintiffs name the following as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations as described in 18 USC § 1961 et seq (hereinafter “RICO”), jointly and separately, the organizations and/or their personnel, having been guilty of at least two distinct instances of statutorily-defined and chargeable or indictable criminal activity as defined by § 1961 et seq., including but not limited to the following predicate acts under RICO: Bribery; Extortion; Obstruction of Justice; Identification fraud; wire fraud; obstruction of criminal investigations; tampering or retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant; interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion; racketeering; interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles or stolen property.
These acts, done by agents for these organizations, were and are a part of a pattern of racketeering activity, at least one act occurring after the effective date of 18 USC §1961 (RICO) and at least one act occurring within 10 years of a prior act of racketeering.
a) TIGTA: "Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration."b) Tacoma/Seattle Federal Prosecutor's Office.
c) Tacoma and Vancouver (WA) Federal Probation Office.
d) Internal Revenue Service
e) Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)
f) Portland Police Bureau and Multnomah County (OR) Sheriff.
g) Federal Public Defenders Offices of Seattle and Tacoma.
h) Federal Bureau of Prisons.
i) The courts of Jack E. Tanner and Franklin Burgess.
j) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
k) The Racketeering Enterprise formed by defendant Jeff Gordon and unknown named government agents and eventually including all defendants, acting in their official, color-of-law, and individual capacities, as well as being agents and co-conspirators in the RICO conspiracy and a conspiracy to violate plaintiffs' and other citizens civil rights under 42 USC §§1983, 1985, et seq, including Bivens.
Victim Organizations
Multnomah County Common Law Court (MCCLC).
Plaintiffs identify the Multnomah County Common Law Court (hereinafter “MCCLC”) as a victim organization under 18 USC § 1962 (a)-(c). The MCCLC is an enterprise within the meaning of RICO laws, being a legal association-in-fact of individuals for the purpose of setting up and maintaining a "common-law court," which is itself an alternative dispute-resolution system operated according to historic principles dating back to the 1400's in England, and which actually pre-dates the "equity court system" that is the forerunner of the more-commonly known courts in existence today.
A brief explanation of the legal basis for the Common Law Court system in America is in order. Common-law courts and equity courts existed side-by-side in England since about 1500. The King appointed the Judges for both court systems, and they operated in parallel with a good deal of rivalry for hundreds of years. Common-law courts were seen to serve the interests of the common man; the Equity Court system was apparently instituted to serve the rich. The legal effect of the American Revolution was to seize political and social control from King George III. (Naturally, the King viewed this as an illegal usurpation of his God-given powers and his armies resisted for a few years.) Once that power was wrenched from George, it was considered returned to the citizens. Those writing the proposed United States Constitution had no power to impose their document: It had to be ratified by all regions that wished to become states in the "United States of America", and they did so, through their regional (subsequently, “state”) legislatures.
All powers previously vested in the King were still maintained by the citizens, except that a few very specific powers to form and maintain the "Federal Government" were transferred to that "Federal Government" by the actions of those regional (state) legislatures. Indeed, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were specifically put there to remind us that NOT ALL powers were deeded to the Feds. Some were retained by the citizens. One of these retained powers was the power to form and maintain these Common Law Courts, and to appoint the judges thereof. American law is based on English law, specifically, English Common Law, and thus the effect of the American Revolution was NOT to extinguish the right of the citizens to form, staff, and operate these Common Law Courts, should they choose to do so. During 1996, citizens in and around Multnomah county, Oregon, chose to form, staff, and operate such a court, calling it the Multnomah County Common Law Court (MCCLC).
Other Victim Organizations
Plaintiffs allege that there are other unknown-named victim-organizations, particularly in the Portland Oregon/Vancouver Wash. metro area. Defendant Walsh attempted to lure plaintiff Bell to what Walsh said was a meeting, about May 1997, of a group at the now-closed Vancouver restaurant "Uncle Milt's Pipe Organ Pizza," for example. It is known to plaintiffs that one illegitimate tactic of these corrupt "law enforcement" officers is to "justify" the further investigation of any given individual or organization merely by the attendance at those meetings of anyone else they have already claimed was under "investigation." Luring plaintiff Bell was intended by Walsh, and unknown-named others to "justify" yet further investigations which Walsh and the others knew to be unjustifiable. They intended to conceal the fact that Bell was specifically lured to that other meeting, and thus mislead others as to the true facts.
This constitutes "obstruction of justice," a RICO predicate act. The luring of Plaintiff Bell was intended to allow the violation of constitutional rights, including those of the unknown-named attendees. This was a violation of 42 USC §1985 and is actionable under Bivens.
RICO PERSONS
Plaintiffs name as "RICO Persons" any and all of the list of defendants who is "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." 18 USC § 1961(3). This may include some or all of the RICO Enterprises named previously, by this definition. Plaintiffs assert that defendants (including organizations) may be and are RICO Persons under some or all of their various roles, such as Official, color-of-law, individual, or as agents and co-conspirators of the conspiracy, whichever applies. Plaintiffs allege that all such defendants/RICO persons are associated with one or more of the RICO organizations listed supra.
Respondeat Superior
Plaintiffs allege that each RICO Person acted to benefit his knowing employer, owner, parent agency, or other such authority, by plan and action, so every such latter entity may be held liable for the actions of its employee, subsidiary, subsidiary agency, agent, or co-conspirator. Plaintiffs allege that all RICO Persons control their various RICO Enterprises, at a local or greater level, by rule, custom, or practice, sufficiently to bind their respective enterprises under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior.
Plaintiffs allege that all RICO Persons acted through their RICO Enterprises and were empowered by those specific associations and their positions of power therein. Plaintiffs allege that the RICO Persons, and each of them, caused the damage that was caused partly or completely through their RICO Enterprises and the power and influence they provided.
Plaintiffs allege that all RICO Persons acted according to a common scheme and plan (briefly) first to infiltrate and manipulate, intending later to destroy the Multnomah County Common Law Court and harass and victimize its founders, operators, and attendees, and later to conceal the fact of and the specifics of their prior wrongful operations from the public, as well as to punish those (e.g. Plaintiff Bell) who were actively acting to investigate and expose the fact of the prior actions of all RICO Persons and RICO Enterprises.
Plaintiffs allege that all RICO Persons and Enterprises acted separately and together in their various capacities, in furtherance of this common plan and scheme, and to achieve the same wrongful goals. These goals included the violation of the Constitutional rights of each of the Plaintiffs, and others, in violation of 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985 and 1988, as well as being actionable under Bivens.
Plaintiffs allege that all these RICO Enterprises were knowingly benefited in various ways, directly and indirectly, by the existence of and operation of this conspiracy, including the avoidance of serious harm that would have flowed from the public revelation of the previous and current illegal acts of the RICO Persons in their association with the RICO Enterprises. The MCCLC represented a form of "competition" to other, existing RICO Enterprises, including Equity Court systems (Tacoma and Seattle Federal Court, and the respective judges), prosecutors and police agencies (Tacoma/Seattle Federal Prosecutors, IRS, ATF, Portland Police, Vancouver Police, Clackamas County Sheriff’s Department) and various hangers-on Federal Public Defenders of Seattle and Tacoma, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Seatac FDC Warden and staff, Seattle and Tacoma and Vancouver Probation Departments, CJA Attorneys such as Leen, Mandel, Avenia, and Juergens, and informants such as Ryan Thomas Lund and William Martin). These RICO Enterprises and Persons would have and did have a powerful though illegitimate motivation to act, alone and together, to attack the MCCLC, its founders and operators and attendees, and they did so at least as early as 1996.
Plaintiffs allege that the RICO Persons also benefited, and they knew and intended to be benefited, through the acts to shut down the MCCLC and to punish and harass its associates. Most of these RICO Persons were openly or secretly employed by government at one level or another, including Federal, County, or City. This includes CJA ("Criminal Justice Act") attorneys who were contract employees of the Federal government. The informants, Lund and Martin, either were bribed using a scheme to pay them pursuant to a phony "slip and fall" accident and subsequent fraudulent lawsuit (Lund) or they were paid through some other ongoing illegitimate benefit that has been so-far concealed. (Martin.) These RICO persons benefitted because their employers (Including RICO Enterprises) did not suffer the massive loss of funding that emergent competition in the Dispute Resolution marketplace would have produced: They retained their jobs when those jobs should have and would have been eliminated.
INTERSTATE NEXUS
Plaintiffs allege that the Multnomah County Common Law Court, an association-in-fact operating normally within Multnomah County, Oregon, would be considered to be engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. Indeed, government infiltrator Steven Walsh (under the fake name Steve Wilson) traveled across state lines (California to Oregon) to do his infiltration. He used the telephone to receive orders and relate information. He sent emails (e.g. false and misleading ones to Plaintiff Bell) constituting Wire Fraud, a RICO predicate act.
Plaintiffs allege that all RICO Organizations which are an agency or department of the Federal Government (TIGTA, Prosecutor's Offices of Seattle/Tacoma, Tacoma and Vancouver Probation Offices, Internal Revenue Service, ATF, Federal Bureau of Prisons), Tanner and Burgess’ courts, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals all affect interstate commerce, virtually by definition and by reasons too obvious and numerous to list beyond their mere Federal Government connection. The Federal Public Defenders of Tacoma and Seattle accepts interstate-nexus cases, sends and receives information interstate, sends investigators interstate (Sharon Callas), uses facilities of interstate communication (telephone, fax, Internet) and has clients which move in and affect interstate commerce. The Portland Police Bureau and Multnomah County Sheriff interface with Federal officers and agencies, handle certain Federal-case functions including arrests and detentions of suspects, use facilities of interstate communication (telephone, fax, Internet), share information with police agencies both interstate and foreign. They use radio facilities of communication which are licensed by the Federal Government. They operate according to standards and rules and laws defined by the Federal government. All of these agencies receive Federal funds for various reasons and functions.
The Racketeering Enterprise formed by Jeff Gordon and unknown-named government agents and defendants affects interstate commerce by moving agents interstate, engaging in interstate communications, moving property interstate, moving people (Defendant Walsh, Plaintiff Bell, Defendant Lund) interstate either voluntarily or involuntarily. The agents of the Racketeering Enterprise communicate with each other interstate, using the U.S. mail, telephone, fax, email and radio.
CURRENT PLAINTIFF REPRESENTATION
Plaintiff James Dalton Bell is acting pro se and for the benefit of the plaintiffs and the plaintiff classes in the preparation and filing of this complaint. See 28 USC 1654 (appearance personally or by counsel).
Under 42 USC §§1983, 1985 and 1988, grant of attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff is usual if the plaintiff prevails. "We therefore hold that a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party under §1988...Therefore, to qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim." Farrar v Hobby, 506 US 103, 121 L.Ed.2d 494, at 503 (1992).
Plaintiffs including Bell would like to maintain and prosecute this case as it should be maintained. Plaintiffs request a determination initially to establish that they will prevail on at least a single substantial issue which will change the legal position between plaintiffs and defendants See Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978). See also Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School Dist., Tex. , 109 S.Ct. 1486, 489 US 782, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989), on remand 874 F.2d 242.
In anticipation of an affirmative answer to this, Plaintiffs also request sufficient funds to maintain this action on behalf of the class according to F.R.Civ.P. Rule 23, to support the interests of the Plaintiffs and the plaintiff class. Therefore, Plaintiff Bell requests the grant of reasonable attorney fees that will be used to hire and maintain competent unbiased co-counsel (in addition to Bell himself) with the expertise to prosecute this complaint on behalf of the plaintiffs and the plaintiff class.
SPECIAL STANDARDS FOR A PRO-SE COMPLAINT
This Complaint has been written by James Bell, Plaintiff, and is therefore a "pro-se" complaint. Pro se complaints (those not written by attorneys) are to be held to less stringent standards that formal pleas drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519, 30 L Ed 2d 652, 92 S.Ct.594 (1972). Further, even for lawyer-drafted complaints, in headnote 2 of Haines, it states:
A complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. 2A Moore, Federal Practice 2d Ed. 12.08; Conley v. Gibson, 355 US 41, 45-46, 2 L.Ed 2d 80, 78 S.Ct 99 (1957). And the September 12, 2001 dismissal of case #01-1085KI wrongly did not allow for amendment, and the fact of the dismissal was concealed from Plaintiffs by wrongful acts of the defendants.
In reviewing a pro-se civil complaint, in order to comply with this requirement of Haines, the reviewing court is required to take notice of and incorporate relevant statutes and rules and precedents even if not pleaded. In contrast, however, case 01-1085 was dismissed without consideration of 28 USC § 1391 which provides for personal jurisdiction over defendant Federal Government employees in any district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides or, (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. All the foregoing was met and is true.
The dismissal also disregarded 18 USC § 1965, which provides for nationwide service of process in a RICO lawsuit if a single defendant has proper venue in the Court, a condition that was true for 01-1085KI.
Please be assured that Plaintiff Bell does not intend to rely excessively on the "less stringent standard" rule of Haines. Nevertheless, that rule exists and Bell would appreciate having it respected where and when it applies.
V.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs hereby re-allege all previous paragraphs herein, inclusive.
TIGTA is a Federal Government agency, in the Treasury Department, an "enterprise" under RICO laws, represented in the Oregon area by one person, Jeff Gordon. He has no immediate supervisor in the area, and he operates his local agency according to his own whims and desires. He sets local policy and acts on this policy, and he "checks" his work. There is nobody to tell him otherwise. He is a "loose cannon."
Gordon is inadequately supervised; his parent agency allows him to remain so. In fact, it is to the parent agency's BENEFIT to let him do whatever he wants: They, and he, know that when he does wrong, acts abusively, targets innocent citizens for political and anti-civil/individual rights reasons, he will almost certainly get away with it. He IS the law, where he works, when he works. In short, nobody can "call the cops" on Jeff Gordon.
The parent TIGTA agency actually benefits from his abuses and excesses: In America, a country which is supposed to be free, there are a lot of things that the government is not allowed to do to the people. By law, government is forbidden to do many of the things that most tyrannies around the world, and throughout history, regularly did and do. But governments are made up of people, and being people they are subject to the same inner desires all around the world. Contrary to the story about how the American government and its employees are supposed to be our servants, everyone knows that deep down, they behave as though they our masters. They are more important, more powerful, better than the rest of us. We exist for their benefit, not the other way around.
The national TIGTA organization knows that if Jeff Gordon is left to his own devices, he will not follow the rules, the laws, the restrictions that are supposed to control and limit both the agency as a national organization, and the local acts of Jeff Gordon. He knows what they want. He will, in effect, follow the rules that they'd LIKE to give him, if they weren't legally prohibited from doing so. They give him the institutional equivalent of a "wink and a nod" and he does their dirty work. This includes breaking laws, where it is needed and when it is needed.
Jeff Gordon follows in a long line of so-called "law enforcement agents" who do not primarily enforce laws, statements voted on by legislatures that can be found in dusty books, but in fact identify "political" and social opponents of what might be thought of as the American Ruling Class. Gordon enforces unwritten laws, rules which are and should be distasteful to the American Constitution and the people who wrote it. TIGTA and Jeff Gordon are probably America's closest equivalent to the ex-Soviet Union's KGB or Nazi Germany's Gestapo. Like them Gordon is quite literally a “secret policeman.” He enforces secret, unwritten laws against people who oppose him and everything he actually stands for. He punishes people merely for investigating him and his colleagues. He punishes people for their political and social beliefs. He spies on people that he believes may one day make a difference in society that goes against his own interests, and the interest of the government. He commits crimes and frames innocent citizens if he finds this to be useful. His main power is that he can bring false criminal charges whenever he wants to, and he does.
But there's a problem with being a secret policeman in America. We're not supposed to have such people. They are not supposed to exist. There are laws, they are public, and we're not supposed to have secret laws. You can't enforce them in court, at least not directly. Gordon knows this. But he also knows that there are thousands of laws on the books, and he knows that when he's trying to "get" somebody, somebody he doesn't like, it's not all that hard to find some crime that either exists, or LOOKS like it exists, or perhaps can be MADE TO exist perhaps by planting evidence, spying on people, sending spies to political meetings, sending "agent provocateurs" (people who try to cause confusion, dispute, or even illegal activity). One improper and illegal (or, at least, it should be illegal!) tactic that is well-known among people like Jeff Gordon involves sending an agent provocateur into meetings of a group which is generally considered opposed to the current government policies. Such a group may have tens or even hundreds of attendees, very few of whom know each other. They have come because they are feeling that the government has broken numerous laws, perhaps on a continuing and extensive basis. These groups may be organized by hard-working, well-meaning individuals who want to see that illegal government actions stop, and possibly the government employees who do this fired or otherwise punished, perhaps civilly (by a lawsuit) or criminally. (By criminal charges. But the latter won't happen, because the government protects itself and its own people.)
Why you are reading this...
The reason you are reading this is that a few years ago, probably during mid-late 1996, America's version of the KGB and the Gestapo, IRS/TIGTA, learned of the meetings of a nascent organization called the "Multnomah County Common Law Court." This much they've already admitted, although they may still wish to mislead people on exactly HOW and WHEN they learned of those meetings. It wasn't as if the meetings were secret: In fact, they were open to the public in a public location (in a meeting room of a restaurant called "Stark Street Pizza" on east Stark Street in Portland, Oregon) and the meeting notices were publicly posted on the Internet and other computer networks. Anybody and everybody was invited. Names were not taken at the door, and there was no record of attendance made. Most people probably didn't know most of the other attendees. It was an ordinary, “politically”-motivated meeting. (Not "political" in the sense of selecting or voting for candidates for political office; It was motivated by a desire to "repair" the way the society was being misused by reviving an old form of "government," in a sense, and jurisprudence, called a "common-law court.") See, supra, “Victim Organizations.”
The defendants decided to infiltrate this organization for no legitimate reason, and simply because it was expected to be a source of political/ideological opposition in the future. The defendants decided and agreed to harm and punish the attendees and participants in the MCCLC due to their exercise of their constitutional rights, and they did so.
The defendant's main infiltrator, Steven Walsh (under the fake name "Steve Wilson"; why did he use a false name?) was forced to admit under oath on April 3, 2001, that although the government's story previously was that their operation into MCCLC was based on a law-enforcement investigation of Plaintiff Bell, in reality Walsh said that Walsh had attended "a couple dozen" such meetings, and in fact had gotten himself into a position of control over the MCCLC, he also said Bell had only attended "maybe three" such meetings.
Had the investigation REALLY been of Bell, not an illegal attempt to infiltrate the MCCLC, there was no reason to attend about ten times as many meetings as Bell, and clearly there was no reason for Walsh to try to get into (and succeed, at that) a position of power and control over the MCCLC organization. In fact, Walsh lied on the witness stand, that’s perjury.
Walsh also illegally participated in at least one jury action, acting as a juror under a false name in violation of Federal and Oregon state law in his effort to obstruct justice. He signed his (false) name, "Steve Wilson", to a jury verdict form that would later be called by his co-defendants, the Portland Police Bureau, a "forged" or fake document from a different court, and they and others used this document to threaten and prosecute Dick and Thor Lancial, class-plaintiffs. Walsh knew that this form was a genuine MCCLC document, NOT a forged document from a different court. Walsh and the Portland Police Bureau engaged in extortion, jury tampering, retaliation against witnesses (the Lancials), at least the first and last are RICO predicate crimes. The whole affair was also "obstruction of justice," from whatever point of view you come to. If Walsh felt the work of the MCCLC improper, he shouldn't have participated, certainly not as a juror. Having participated in the jury, he should have recognized that its product was legitimate.
The Portland Police Bureau had an even more sinister role, however. During MCCLC meetings, Portland Police hid in hidden locations around the neighborhood, laying in wait, and they were directed by Walsh and unknown others to stop and harass the MCCLC attendees as they left the building, using cell-phone or radio. (This is Wire-Fraud, a RICO predicate act.) This harassment required a great deal of coordination between the agents, because it was necessary to identify from close-in who was actually attending the meetings as opposed to who was merely visiting the restaurant. Then, as these people left, it was necessary to relay their car descriptions, including license plate, and their directions to the various police lying in wait, who by previous arrangement were to stop and harass them on a pretext, or perhaps no pretext at all and they did so. It was intended that the MCCLC victims would quickly "get the message" that they, both individually and as a group, were being spied on, stalked and followed, and that they could and would be stopped at any time. This was extortion and intimidation of people for exercising their constitutional rights.
By involving the Portland Police, who have responsibilities to investigate and solve REAL crimes, Walsh and Gordon were taking their time and thus engaging in "obstruction of criminal investigations," a RICO predicate act. In fact, by merely participating in this vendetta themselves, taking time from their own responsibilities, Portland Police were also "obstructing criminal investigations." By stopping those people, they and the Portland Police were engaging in extortion, and they knew that the people they stopped were or could have been witnesses at the court, which constitutes "tampering or retaliating against a victim, witness, or informant." This is yet another RICO predicate act.
Walsh and unknown others also used a "wire," a hidden microphone which transmitted its signal by radio waves, to record the conversations not only of himself but of others, which is a crime under Oregon law. It's also Wire Fraud, because he used this to further his and their scheme of harassment, and to defraud citizens of their constitutional rights.
Walsh gave the MCCLC a false phone number, which was actually a Federal Government phone number connected to an answering machine. He knew and intended that anyone calling him would not call his true phone number, and this concealment was intended to further his scheme of harassment and intimidation and infiltration; furthermore, using caller i.d., he wrongfully obtained information about callers. This is more Wire Fraud, a RICO predicate act.
Walsh also furthered his scheme by sending and receiving emails to and from others, including Plaintiff Bell. Walsh sent false and misleading emails where he claimed to be alarmed at the things the Federal government was doing, lies he had no need to tell if he had been doing a legitimate investigation.
Walsh and unknown others engaged in retaliation against others including plaintiff Bell for participating in a MCCLC jury action, a RICO predicate act. Plaintiff Bell, in reaction to the illegal actions of Walsh and others, retaliated against Walsh's infiltration by "odorizing" the Vancouver IRS office and thus shedding light on the illegal actions of the local IRS/TIGTA operations. Had Walsh, at this point, been engaging in a legitimate operation he would have stayed where he was, helping to run MCCLC, and (perhaps) pick up some evidence about what had happened. However, in keeping with the fact that what he and unknown-named others were doing was illegal and improper under United States laws and agency rules and regulations, he knew he had to leave quickly and never return to the MCCLC. He ran away, having been thwarted in only some of his illegal intentions.
As of March of 1997 the situation was relatively simple compared with today. The reason for this is that the government-employee actors, including Steven Walsh and Jeff Gordon, began to try to use their positions and government powers to cover up what had happened, so that they and their deeds would not be discovered and so they would not lose their jobs, pensions, and other numerous benefits. To do this, they began to add small numbers of people to their conspiracy, just a few at a time, in order to help patch up their past mistakes.
The fact that you are reading this civil complaint is evidence that they didn't, ultimately, succeed in covering up their actions. But they tried, and they did virtually everything they could think of, no matter how illegal or unethical, in order to win. They brought false charges against people, had them assaulted and mistreated, engaged in perjury, did illegal searches, violated laws, engaged in extortion and bribery, wrote fraudulent plea agreements, defrauded the Federal government, stole property from people, bribed criminals to attack far less blameworthy people, corrupted a half-dozen lawyers, a few prosecutors, even three or four Federal Judges, as well as administrators and other personnel of an Appellate Court system. They put on an illegal trial, an illegal sentencing, with the assistance of numerous Prosecution and Probation personnel, and repeatedly perverted the administration of "justice" whenever to do the correct thing would have exposed their past misdeeds.
VI.
EVENTS
All previous pages and paragraphs herein are incorporated inclusive. Some claims below are labeled ds being violations of specific statutes and rights: Labels are not intended to be complete or exclusive as to violations. All events include unknown-named government agents, agencies. (For each claim, Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege all previous allegations.)
Claim #1
Beginning at a concealed time unknown to plaintiffs, various government agents including Defendants Jeff Gordon and Steven Walsh but not limited to these, with the assistance of unknown-named private citizens, began to act as individuals and as groups and as a group, in all their respective capacities, in a collusion and a conspiracy against private citizens including the plaintiffs in a scheme or plan in order to deny and violate their Constitutional rights.
These victim private citizens included attendees of a Portland, Oregon political/social/legal group called the "Multnomah County Common Law Court", (hereafter MCCLC), which met during the late 1996 through 1997 time frame, and continued until a date and time unknown to Plaintiff James Dalton Bell. The group of government agents and private-citizen co-conspirators is hereafter in some cases referred to as the Infiltrators, and the group of MCCLC attendees and other victims is referred to as Citizens.
Claim #2
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants decided and agreed amongst themselves to approach, spy on, infiltrate, and violate the constitutional rights of the attendees of the MCCLC because defendants recognized that the attendees were among a class of people dissatisfied with the actions and behavior of existing government and courts, and defendants believed those attendees likely wished to supplement and/or replace it with other government and/or other courts. The defendants, all of whom either work for or otherwise depend on some level of government, hated the beliefs of the attendees and feared having their "gravy train" derailed, and they desired to harm, deter, and put fear into the minds of those attendees and to warn all other people of like opinion. This is class-based animus for ideological, civil rights, and social reasons under 42 USC § 1985. Plaintiffs further allege that having initiated this attack on MCCLC, the defendants discovered that they had been detected and wished to prevent public exposure of their improper and illegal actions They were motivated to spy on, harass, attack, falsely arrest, falsely charge, wrongfully convict and otherwise harm Plaintiff Bell, in order to prevent him from exposing their acts and, thus, preventing Bell from reducing or eliminating the harm the defendants had done to the MCCLC and they did so. This was a further violation of 42 USC § 1985, was obstruction of justice, and extrinsic fraud. (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3).
Claim #3
It was the special intent and effort of the infiltrators to violate the rights of the citizens, particularly under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and they repeatedly did so in numerous ways until and including the present. The infiltrators agreed to initiate, and did initiate, a Civil Rights conspiracy under 42 United States Code §1985 for the purposes of violating the rights of these and other citizens, and they carried out this civil rights conspiracy and violated the rights of these and other citizens. They agreed to violate the Federal constitutional and statutory rights of these and other citizens under color of state law using state agents in violation of 42 United States Code § 1983, and they began a scheme and plan to carry out this rights violation as they agreed. They also conspired under color of federal law, actionable under Bivens.
Claim #4
These conspirators agreed to use, and did use, their powers including their Official powers, to carry out and complete the conspiracy, but they also agreed to act individually, and in their color-of-law capacities, and to act as agents for each of the other co-conspirators on an as-needed, where-needed basis. They also agreed to recruit and incorporate into the conspiracy other people and entities, primarily government employees and government agencies, as they were needed or as they became otherwise involved. And they did so.
Claim #5
These conspirators also agreed to engage in a conspiracy to violate the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) Act, § 1962 (a), (b), (c), and (d). (18 United States Code §§ 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965).
Claim #6
More specifically, these co-conspirators violated 18 USC § 1962 (a) by using income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity (as defined in 18 USC § 1961) in which they participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly and indirectly, some or all of this income in the acquisition of interest in, and/or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce: the Multnomah County Common Law Court.
Claim #7
Even more specifically, and for a specific example, defendant Steven Walsh and Jeff Gordon, and unknown others, agreed to transport Walsh from his normal home and location of work in California, using government funds and supported by a government paycheck, for the purposes of engaging in racketeering activity against the Multnomah County Common Law Court (MCCLC). Defendant Walsh and the other defendants agreed that he would use his income and expense reimbursement to allow him (Walsh) to take time and expend effort in order to take control of the MCCLC, establish it, and operate it illegally using racketeering methods. Subsequently they carried out this plan, over a period of months, with Walsh expending this income in these ways and for these purposes. This was all in violation of 18 USC § 1962 (a). Walsh participated as a principal in the activity for which he was paid, as well as being a principal in the acts investing in and controlling the MCCLC.
Claim #8
These co-conspirators, through their scheme and plan, violated 18 USC§ 1962 (b), specifically by using a pattern of racketeering or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly, or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. Again, the organization was the MCCLC.
Claim #9
More specifically, and for a specific example, defendants Steven Walsh, Jeff Gordon and unknown others, agreed to acquire an interest in and take control over the MCCLC using racketeering methods, and they proceeded to carry out this plan with the assistance of other defendants including but not limited to the Portland Police Bureau acting in their color-of-law and other capacities, using racketeering methods. They employed mail fraud, wire fraud, tampering with witnesses, obstruction of justice, obstruction of criminal investigations, robbery, extortion, and interference with commerce.
Claim #10
In doing this activity against the MCCLC, they were also carrying out their scheme to violate 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1985 and Bivens. Specifically, these co-conspirators were trying to control, warp, misuse, manipulate, and ultimately destroy the MCCLC in order to violate the Plaintiffs (and others) First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, freedom to assemble and petition their government for redress of grievances, and freedom to publish papers and documents that disagreed with the policies of the government. Defendants were also violating, planning and attempting to violate plaintiffs' freedoms under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, and their common-law rights (which pre-date the U.S. Constitution and were not extinguished by it) to form and operate "common-law courts" and to enforce their verdicts. They did so. These violations were done under color-of-law, both state and federal, in their official and individual capacities, and by agents of the co-conspirators acting in furtherance of the goals of the conspiracy.
Claim #11
These co-conspirators violated 18 USC § 1962 (c), specifically conducting or participating, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of their employer's (or their parent agency, or the enterprise with which they are associated) affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt, when that employer or parent agency or associated enterprise affects interstate or foreign commerce.
These specific employers, or parent agencies, or enterprises which the defendants were associated with include, but are not necessarily limited to, the named RICO Organizations (see Enterprises; supra: TIGTA, Tacoma/Seattle Federal prosecutor's office, Tacoma and Vancouver (WA) Federal probation offices, Internal Revenue Service, ATF, Portland Police Bureau and Multnomah County (OR) Sheriff, Federal Public Defenders Offices of Seattle and Tacoma, Federal Bureau of Prisons, the courts of Jack E. Tanner and Franklin Burgess, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Racketeering Enterprise formed by Jeff Gordon and Steven Walsh and unknown-named government agents and defendants, acting in all capacities.
These organizations were not the "victims" of this activity, however, and they were not harmed by this racketeering activity. In fact these organizations, and all of them, were actually knowingly benefitted by this activity, including and to the extent (for example) that they were able to control, intimidate, and harm ordinary citizens (including plaintiffs) in ways that were illegal yet these organizations and their personnel, including management, desired to do. This benefit includes such effects achieved by violation of civil and constitutional rights that these agencies could accomplish in no other way than to violate the laws and rules they ostensibly must follow.
Claim #12
These defendants had specific control of these organizations, either at their local or national level, through official channels, and they were allowed to control these organizations as a matter of custom, policy, and course, and the higher levels of control of these organizations were or should have been aware of the actions that these agents of the conspiracy were doing.
Claim #13
Plaintiffs allege that the continuing series and extensive pattern of serious violations committed by the defendants described in this Civil Complaint were caused or aided by a historic pattern of improper or inadequate training of personnel by their respective employers and agencies. Even more seriously, however, Plaintiffs allege that these agencies and their personnel had and have developed an atmosphere and environment tolerating and even encouraging and rewarding personnel for their abuse of citizens, particularly those citizens whose political views are seen to be "anti-government." (Citizens of that kind in foreign countries are traditionally referred to as "dissidents," and when they are jailed they are often called "political prisoners." Oddly, and apparently revealingly, the terms "dissident" and "political prisoner" are virtually unknown in the American press when referring to Americans in America. Why?)
Claim #14
Plaintiffs allege that the pattern of incidents in this Civil Complaint have occurred over a period from 1995 to the present, and the employees and supervisors of each and all of the defendants were or became or should have became aware and involved in the incidents mentioned. These supervisors have either failed to properly act to stop the abuse and misbehavior, or they have actually requested, encouraged, approved or assisted these acts, and did nothing to stop them. These violations, including their associated cover-ups, have continued and will continue into the future. These violations by the RICO persons are indictable, including under multiple legal theories as well as Federal and State and Common Law jurisdictions.
Claim #15
Plaintiffs allege that with proper supervision of the defendants, the harms described in this Civil Complaint either would not have occurred at all, or they would have been attenuated or stopped, or they would have been repaired or the victims appropriately compensated. This has not happened. Plaintiffs allege that there are affirmative links, therefore, between the supervisors and the acts of those supervised. Defendants and their agencies were in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Plaintiffs allege that the supervisors actually assisted in performing these violations.
Claim #16
The plaintiffs allege, therefore, that all of these parent agencies (or employers, or enterprises with which they were associated) did become and have become liable for the wrongful plans and actions of their employees/agents/associates under theories such as respondeat superior or vicarious liability, agency liability, and such.
Claim #17
These co-conspirators also violated 18 USC § 1962 (c), with respect to operating the MCCLC as a victim organization. Unlike the previously-described violation of §1962 (c), the MCCLC was intended, and its unsuspecting attendees were intended, to be and become victims of this wrongful control, and be harmed in a pattern of various ways violating their constitutional rights including under various Amendments One, Four, Five, Six, Eight, and Fourteen to the United States Constitution, as well as to suffer the loss of effectiveness and usefulness of the MCCLC. This all occurred.
Claim #18
These defendants, and all of them, agreed to have one of their number, Steven Walsh acting under the false name “Steve Wilson,” engage in racketeering methods to insinuate himself into a position of malicious and abusive control and authority over the actions of the MCCLC, and to then operate the MCCLC by illegal and racketeering methods, for illegal and improper purposes, all of which include the violation of the rights including constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and others unknown. The defendants carried out this plan, using Walsh ("Wilson") as an agent and co-conspirator, and including the Portland Police Bureau as co-conspirators acting under official, color-of-law, and individual capacities and as agents of the conspiracy, enforcing (or claiming to enforce) state or county or municipal laws and regulations but doing so at times and in ways to stalk, harass, and intimidate various attendees of the MCCLC meetings. They engaged in selective enforcement of laws motivated by impermissible distinctions, such as political opinions and attendance at political meetings.
Claim #19
This was a scheme or plan by the defendants to defraud the attendees as well as the public of the forum and the services of an honest, functioning Common-Law Court. Part of this scheme was accomplished by each violation of the various rights of the organizers and the attendees (including Bell) and their friends, family and others, using threats, intimidation, fraud, illegal undercover surveillance, and agent-provocateur activities, and other wrongful tactics as listed in this civil complaint. Plaintiffs allege that all actors acted with a specific intent to execute and carry out the fraudulent activities when they engaged in or caused these communications to occur.
Claim #20
The co-conspirators, including defendants, agreed that Walsh ("Wilson") would bribe his way into the MCCLC using offers of volunteer labor, money (as needed) and office space, when he and they knew or should have known that this would entice and lull the then-current organizers and attendees of MCCLC into a position of dependency and control, and was also intended to deter and prevent them from seeking, finding, and obtaining other forms of support and assistance from trustworthy individuals and organizations. This scheme and plan was all intended to cause the MCCLC to become and remain under the hidden control of the co-conspirators and defendants, using Walsh ("Wilson") as a secret agent. The defendants did these things, and caused these wrongful effects. This was a RICO violation.
Claim #21
The scheme continued with a pattern of corrupt activity designed and intended to conceal these wrongful activities from the victims and the public, including numerous corrupt and illegal acts by colluding government employees.
Claim #22
Plaintiffs allege that this scheme and plan existed, and there was use of the mail in furtherance of that scheme or plan constituting Mail Fraud. Likewise, plaintiffs also allege that there were interstate or in-state uses of the telephone, fax, radio, email, telex, telegraph, internet, local net, microwave, or surveillance system that employs such communications, that was done in furtherance of that scheme or plan, constituting Wire Fraud.
Plaintiffs allege that every example in this civil complaint identified in the text as or amounting to "Mail Fraud" or "Wire Fraud" is part of and in furtherance of this scheme or plan. Plaintiff alleges that under Mail Fraud (18 USC § 1341) and Wire Fraud (18 USC § 1343) statutes, these forms of fraud occur whether or not the defendants mailed or caused others to mail, and whether the defendants communicated (by radio or wire, etc) or caused others to communicate. Plaintiffs allege that all defendant actors acted with a specific intent to execute and carry out the fraudulent activities when they engaged in or caused these communications to occur.
Claim #23
The co-conspirators and defendants, including Walsh, also agreed that Walsh was going to "volunteer" his way into a position of control over the MCCLC, which he did. Their plan was to deter the other attendees from seeking, finding, and obtaining other personnel who could have been trusted, and further to prevent honest people from volunteering or being selected subsequent to Walsh's ("Wilson's") placement. This violated the plaintiffs freedom of association, actionable under 42 USC § 1983. They employed deceitful statements of half-truths and the concealment of material facts, which constitutes actual fraud. This scheme was reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension. This scheme also involved and intended the deprivation of intangible rights, such as the right to honest government, the right to privacy, and to defraud an employer of his employee’s loyal services; and to cause a breach of the fiduciary duty of persons and organizations leading to harm; and to cause a deprivation of a client’s right to the undivided loyalty of an attorney who possessed an undisclosed conflict of interest.
Claim #24
Their plan was also to put in place other secret agents into a position of control and authority over the MCCLC, so that the organization would eventually be entirely staffed by the co-conspirator's and defendant's people from top to bottom, or to whatever extent Walsh and his co-conspirators wished to maintain. This was obstruction of justice, a RICO predicate act.
Claim #25
These co-conspirators agreed, also to use the harassment power of their co-conspirator, the Portland Police Bureau, against various MCCLC attendees on a specific and selective basis, and they did so. It was their intention to have certain attendees stopped and harassed, in order to scare and intimidate them and others to whom they told of these stops, in order to prevent and deter some fraction of them from coming to the meetings, so as to make the organization appear and be much less successful than it would otherwise be, and they did so in violation of 18 USC § 1507. Their intention was also to "select" the membership/attendees that the co-conspirators wanted, which they would allow, particularly because they later intended to victimize and punish the leaders and organizers and the most valuable, enthusiastic, hard-working, and dependable attendees and volunteers. This was easily accomplished by harassing a very specific and select fraction of the attendees, and they did carry out this plan, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. See Benigni v. City of Hemet, 868 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1988 ).
Claim #26
This targeted harassment required and included a high degree of organization and effort, which was achieved by methods including placing Portland Police Bureau agents in various hidden locations in the neighborhoods around the Portland restaurant where the MCCLC initially met. By radio, an exercise in Wire Fraud, the co-conspirators informed the police of the descriptions and license plate numbers of the vehicles of the specific attendees who were supposed to be harassed. This also obstructed the Portland Police’s ability to conduct criminal investigations. This was also a scheme to deny the citizens of Portland the loyal services of its police employees. These are violations actionable under RICO and 42 USC §§ 1983/1985 and Bivens.
Claim #27
The co-conspirators also violated 18 USC § 1962 (d), having conspired to violate subsections (a), (b), and (c) of 18 USC § 1962.
Claim #28
The eventual goal of these defendant co-conspirators was to warp and distort the function of the MCCLC, intending to violate the rights of the attendees to engage in free speech, assembly, petition, and numerous other constitutional rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and Bivens, as well as RICO, and they did this.
Claim #29
The improper and impermissible motivations of the infiltrators and all defendants included hate for the opinions and philosophies espoused or believed espoused by the Citizens and in particular those Citizens who formed the MCCLC, promoted it, publicized its meetings, and subsequently attended those meetings. The defendants and all of them either believe that common-law courts are or should be illegal, and they have acted as if those courts should be mistreated along with their attendees, by government personnel, and they acted to achieve this mistreatment and to violate the rights of the attendees.
Claim #30
One wrongful goal of the Infiltrators was to dissuade and discourage non MCCLC attendees (members of the public at large) from attending or considering attending MCCLC meetings by putting fear, uncertainty, and doubt into their minds, including fear of improper intimidation, harassment and unjustified and oppressive legal actions against them or their family or friends, and they did so. They stopped those attendees after meetings on specious and vague reasons and this was intended to engender this fear: "Big Brother is watching you!" To do this it was necessary to incorporate the Portland Police, acting under color of state law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 because the Portland Police was the only police agency that would have had the usual opportunity and authority to do such traffic stops, and they did so. Using the Portland Police as a "goon squad" took time away from their usual tasks, thus interfering with criminal investigations, and this is a RICO predicate act. They also hindered and prevented the state of Oregon from giving and securing to all persons the equal protection of the law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The Portland police engaged in selective enforcement of statutes or ordinances on the basis of unreasonable distinctions, inter alia, attendance at a “political”, social, or ideological meeting. See Almendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir. 1996). Also Navarro v. Block, 75 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 1996).
Claim #31
Another purpose of this spying and takeover of the MCCLC was to deter prevent, and suppress the ability of the Citizens to peaceably assemble and discuss political issues free from oppression and fear, and the defendants did so. MCCLC meetings were on the cutting edge, as it were, of political dissatisfaction with the government, and it was an illegitimate interest of the co-conspirators including all of the defendants to shut down any sort of outlet that would not only allow people to speak, but to allow them to know that there were others with similar opinions. Plaintiffs were denied this, by this pattern and scheme of fraud. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 622, 82 L.Ed.2d 462, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3252 (1984). See also IDK, Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 1988) and Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, 481 US 537, 95 L.Ed.2d 474, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 1945 (1987).
Claim #32
Another illegitimate purpose for this infiltration and control of the MCCLC was to gather the names of all of the attendees into a master "enemies list" that would enable the government in general, and the defendants and their agencies in particular, to carefully and selectively target the relatively few "hard core" political dissidents in the Portland, Oregon and Vancouver, Washington metro area for later harassment and targeting, and they did so.
Claim #33
The fact that attendees were being stopped shows that enough information was being collected on them to identify their vehicles, and they were being stopped to remove whatever ambiguity remained about the identities of the people who had actually attended the meetings. (The Portland Police required the people in the car to show their identification, so if they were attending those meetings under a false name, or a name not even given, the government would still learn later who they were). Plaintiffs allege that thus, they have suffered severe and, as yet, unknowable harms due to the fact that their identities have been collected by malicious government officials and defendants for illegal purposes.
Claim #34
During the MCCLC meetings, Steven Walsh ("Steve Wilson") wore a concealed microphone with a radio transmitter using Federally-regulated radio frequencies to further the conspirators' illegal scheme, which is Wire Fraud.He gave a false telephone number to the MCCLC, intending that others call it, which is another count of Wire Fraud. This was intended to capture and identify the telephone number of the people calling it, so more information (including unlisted phone numbers) of politically-active people could be obtained and later misused. And that was done.
Walsh's use of the hidden microphone was a crime, because he intended to, and did record the conversations of people which did not include Walsh himself, and he intended this outcome.
Walsh participated in multiple juries under his false name, intending to obstruct and contaminate its deliberations, and he did so. This constitutes jury tampering, witness tampering, and is obstruction of justice.
Claim #35
Walsh admitted on or about April 3, 2001, in testimony that he knew of no legitimate law-enforcement reason for doing this infiltration. There was no such reason. Walsh also admitted not making any notes concerning his attendance at such meetings, counting "a couple dozen" based on his own testimony. This omission was for the purpose of concealing his and other operations from the official record then and in the future: Had he made such records officially he would have been obligated to submit them to his agency as official records, and they would have been archived, saving the evidence of his and others' crimes. They were not. Had he been there for a legitimate, official reason he would have taken notes. But he was not.
Claim #36
Walsh attempted to get MCCLC members to buy and collect guns for a vague future conflict intending to use their actions wrongfully against them, illegally. Walsh attempted to get plaintiff Bell to supply him a radio transmitter for the purpose of building an illegal unlicensed radio station. Defendant Walsh, despite his employment with the Federal Government, fraudulently bad-mouthed the Federal government both in emails and in person at such meetings, for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiffs, and concealing the existence of the civil rights and RICO conspiracies. Walsh expressed an opinion not honestly entertained for purposes of promoting the defendants’ scheme.
Claim #37
Plaintiffs allege defendants agreed that once a suitable level of fraudulent and malicious control over the MCCLC had been achieved, the defendants would secretly act to encourage, trick and promote illegal acts on the part of some of the weaker-willed, overly-enthusiastic and inflamed attendees. This was intended and agreed to occur without the knowledge of the large majority of the MCCLC attendees. These crimes would be designed and chosen by the defendants so that when they were "discovered" and misleadingly publicized by government "law enforcement" agents, a maximum amount of false publicity value would beneficially accrue to the government and defendant agencies and personnel. It was the defendants' intent, purpose, and agreement that this bad publicity would falsely and maliciously put founders and operators, as well as the attendees of the MCCLC in a bad light, and to wrongly make it appear that those people had tolerated, encouraged or assisted those acts, despite the fact that they were unknown except to the few manipulated individuals and government agents, and in fact they had been manufactured by the defendants.
Claim #38
Plaintiffs allege defendants agreed to illegally collect information about the attendees including their names and vehicles and home addresses, and to keep information about these attendees in order to determine the ones who were likely to make a political and social difference in the future. These key people were to be targeted for improper and illegal actions in the future, as the defendants agreed. They did this. This is class-based claims under 42 USC § 1985, and constitutes tampering with witnesses.
Claim #39
It was the intent, goal, and agreement of the defendants that when the suitable criminal act (planned or otherwise) had been induced or manufactured, the government agents who were brought in to openly prosecute those actions would select and target and arrest MCCLC attendees who they knew were in no way involved with or aware of the crime(s) to be charged. By defendants' agreement, this would be the innocent key people involved in the MCCLC, in order to violate their constitutional rights. This is obstruction of justice.
Claim #40
The government agents including defendants planned and agreed and intended to artfully and deceptively utilize the open, innocent, and unconcealed facts of the open meetings of the MCCLC, including the innocent targets who were to be wrongfully harassed, threatened, arrested, falsely charged, and (if necessary and possible) wrongfully convicted. These agents including defendants agreed to combine this with the secret acts and intent of the manipulated "sucker" the government had selected through its secret agent provocateur activities, in order to victimize the innocent attendees.
Claim #41
The defendants agreed and intended that they would cause wrongful, unjustified arrests and false prosecutions by this method, a large and key part of which was to be the (easy) concealment of their actual knowledge of the true facts about the MCCLC and the innocence of those they were primarily targeting.
Plaintiffs allege that the intent and effect of these activities was to have achieved by slightly indirect means the illegal ends that were more readily done in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia: The harassment, abuse, arrest, prosecution, confinement, and punishment of anyone who dared to oppose and criticize the policies and practices of the existing regime, in violation of their constitutional rights.
Further, Plaintiffs allege that this intended scenario, far from being an exception or fluke, was and is actual practice on the part of not only these defendants, but also other government agents all across America. Plaintiffs allege that many such operations were begun in the 1995-97 time-frame, as well as other times, targeting innocent though dissatisfied citizens who believed that they could do something to make the country better by exposing government corruption.
Claim #42
The Infiltrators, in retaliation for plaintiff Bell's participation in the MCCLC and in particular the jury action which awarded the Lancial’s the return of their car, and to threaten and deter Bell from disclosing and publicizing the Infiltrators' illegal actions concerning the MCCLC, had government agents seize Bell's car on a false pretext, acting in color of federal and state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and Bivens. This was intended to further their conspiracy, by deterring the primary opponent to their illegal actions, and they attempted to do so. The Infiltrators were also retaliating for Bell's prior and then-current exercise of his First-Amendment freedom--of-speech rights as expressed in person and correspondence, as well as on the Internet and another computer network (Fidonet) during the 1994-97 time frame. This was also retaliation against Bell for participation in the MCCLC.
Claim #43
The Infiltrators were motivated to and did harass and vex plaintiff Bell due to Bell's discovery that Steven Walsh was acting as an infiltrator in late January 1997, and he (Walsh) and they (the infiltrators) wished to intimidate Bell into remaining silent, if they could achieve this with extortion. They attempted this. This extortion was and is a RICO predicate act. It was also retaliation against a juror (Bell) and a witness (Lancial), also RICO predicate acts. Walsh's false emails to Bell were Wire Fraud, his phone calls to Bell were also Wire Fraud, particularly because they were intended to get Bell to help commit a crime, specifically to set up an illegal unlicensed radio station.
Claim #44
Walsh also exchanged emails with other MCCLC attendees, with similar illegal intentions: to provoke the defendants’ wrongful scheme, which were also examples of Wire Fraud, RICO predicates. Walsh also used email to contact his co-conspirators, now co-defendants.
Claim #45
Plaintiff also allege that at an unknown time but before 1997, the defendant-conspirators including unknown named government agents and employees, as well as private citizens, began to stalk and spy on Plaintiff Bell for illegal and unconstitutional reasons. These reasons include their hate for Bell's political beliefs, controversial writings including communications on the Internet and other computer networks, and associations. Their actions were, and when revealed will show a desire and intent and efforts to violate Bell's constitutional rights, and these violations were accomplished, especially Bell's First Amendment rights to speech and press and association, his Fourth amendment right to privacy, his Fifth Amendment right to due process, and his Sixth Amendment right to loyal legal counsel, and/or to represent himself under circumstances which allow this. Also seriously violated by the intent and acts of the defendants and others were Bell's Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law. Plaintiffs allege that defendants actions in each of the claims in this complaint were in retaliation for Bell’s writings, and to conceal prior violations, and to interfere with plaintiffs’ rights to seek redress in court suit. Plaintiffs allege that defendants acquired and acted upon a new and improper motive to act against and harm plaintiffs, and especially Bell: They wanted to “get” plaintiffs for identifying and opposing defendants secret, improper and illegal actions, and for attempting to expose the actions of defendants. In the course of doing so, they intended and acted to obstruct the access of all plaintiffs to the courts, in violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
Claim #46
Plaintiffs allege that this spying and stalking included acts by the residents of 7302 Corregidor, Vancouver WA, including Daniel J. and Dori J. Saban and unknown-named other residents at that address. These residents allowed their property to be used as an illegal electronic and photographic surveillance “forward-base” against Bell. In addition to the surveillance, unknown-named residents and/or visitors to 7302 Corregidor engaged at various times in various harassing and intimidating actions against Bell and his parents. These actions included throwing heavy rocks onto the roof of Bell's residence, damaging the roof structure. These actions also included cutting an antenna wire on Bell's property. The residents of 7302 Corregidor engaged in illegal electronic surveillance, including intercepting the content of cellular and/or cordless telephone communications in violation of various Federal Statutes. They did so operating under the guise of a company, “Sundown Development Construction” located at this address.
Claim #47
At an unknown time but before 1997, a Richland, Washington research laboratory called "Pacific Northwest National Laboratories," acting for the benefit of the conspiracy, made a job offer to the previous resident of 7302 Corregidor, John Hauer. They made contact with Mr. Hauer by mail and telephone, constituting mail fraud and wire fraud. This offer was made for the purpose of luring Mr. Hauer away from the Vancouver, Washington area and so that his house would be put onto the market so it could be purchased by confederates of the conspiracy, Daniel J. and Dori J. Saban. This occurred. Thus, it was purchased by the Sabans for the wrongful purpose of engaging in illegal surveillance and harassment of James Bell and his parents, and the Sabans acted in furtherance of this intent. The Sabans and other unknown-named confederates engaged in these wrongful activities, intending to assist their government-employee defendant-co-conspirators in violating the constitutional rights of the Bells.
Claim #48
Plaintiffs allege that this was a conspiracy against Bell's Federal constitutional and statutory rights, which was a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, as well as actions done by agents under color of state law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These were also such violations by agents acting under color of Federal law, actionable under Bivens. Further, the defendants in the RICO organizations which engaged in these actions used racketeering techniques in violation of RICO statutes, particularly Wire Fraud, including illegal electronic and radio intercepts, disclosures, and surveillance in violation of Federal and state laws. Plaintiffs further allege that all defendants’ uses of the mails or wire and radio communications listed in this Complaint were done to promote this scheme and plan of fraud against Plaintiffs’, including Bell’s federal rights, and are thus Mail or Wire Fraud, respectively.
Claim #49
Defendant Steven Walsh and his co-conspirators intended and planned and acted to defraud the MCCLC, and all of its attendees, of a meeting place, a forum to discuss and debate, and also a forum to take part in proceedings and jury actions whose verdicts might have gone against the interest of not only the Federal government but also the agencies and individuals making up the conspiracy. Their pattern of interference with the First Amendment rights of attendees and the MCCLC was intended to be and was both a conspiracy against civil rights under 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985 and are actionable under Bivens. The only goals they did not achieve were the ones they were interrupted from doing by their decision to run away made in late March, 1997. And they ran away because they were afraid of being caught committing these crimes and rights violations. Their actions denied the participants the value of jury actions that could have been brought had this infiltration and harassment not occurred. Defendants are estopped from impugning the value of those proceedings due to Walsh’s/Wilson’s participation and thus apparent approval.
Claim #50
Plaintiffs allege that, in violation of 42 USC § 1985, the defendants: (1) entered into a conspiracy (2) for the purpose of depriving persons including the Plaintiffs including class plaintiffs in the Portland, Oregon/Vancouver, WA metro area of clearly established constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and (3) that one or more of the conspirators, and in fact all of them, acted in furtherance of the conspiracy such that (4) the plaintiffs were injured in their persons and property and they were deprived of rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States. Further, these persons (defendants) obstructed the rights of the plaintiffs to seek redress in court suit.
Claim #51
Plaintiffs also allege that, in violation of 42 USC § 1983, the defendants, each of them, and together as co-conspirators, were acting in their various capacities (official, color-of-law, individual, and as agent(s) of the conspiracy) to deprive the plaintiffs, and each of them, of their rights and privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, acting under color of Oregon state and Washington state laws, using state agents such as the Portland Police Bureau, Vancouver Police, and Clackamas County Sheriff, Pierce County Sheriff, and their employees.
Claim #52
Plaintiffs also allege that, in violation cognizable in a Bivens Action, the defendants, and each of them, and together as co-conspirators, acted in their various capacities (official, color-of-law, individual, and as agent(s) of the conspiracy) to deprive the plaintiffs, and each of them, of their rights and privileges and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and laws, while acting under color of Federal Law and authority, and came under the false guise of enforcing laws as agents of various government agencies including but not limited to the IRS, ATF, DEA, FBI, Secret Service, EPA, et al.
Claim #53
In further retaliation against plaintiff Bell, the Infiltrators used as a pretext the innocent contents of Bell's seized car, which contained numerous political pamphlets and other publications and floppy-disk documents primarily openly obtained from the Internet, and they intentionally misrepresented this material in order to publicly libel Bell to the media and make the possession of this material seem suspicious and incriminating when it was not. No reasonable judge would have issued the warrant under the actual circumstances. In using this material in this way they attempted to and succeeded in denigrating and punishing Bell for his political beliefs and his choice of reading material, which is what they and all of them intended to accomplish. The defendants and each of them were aware that nothing found in the car was evidence of any crime, and no crime was properly alleged. This was a violation of Bell’s First Amendment rights, including associational, and Fourth Amendment rights to be secure in effects. A loaded gun was pointed at Bell during the seizure of his car, which is assault under State and Federal laws. Bell was illegally arrested without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Claim #54
The defendants agreed to obtain a fraudulently-obtained search warrant in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2235 based on intentional misrepresentations and omissions for the purposes of getting access to Bell's property and robbing Bell of it, looking at material not specified in the warrant, searching for evidence not specified in the warrant, planting illegal “bugs” whose existence was later illegally denied to Bell by various co-conspirators (especially defendants Avenia, Mandel, and Leen). And they did these things in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2234. No reasonable person could have believed the warrant was legally obtained or issued. No reasonable person could have believed that the resulting search was executed legally.
Another improper purpose of the illegal search warrant was to retaliate against Bell and to intimidate him from the further exercise of his constitutional rights, and for his participation in a jury action that returned the Lancial’s car to them. And they did this. This constituted selective enforcement of laws for improper ideological reasons, actionable under 42 USC § 1983 and Bivens, since both State and Federal agents were present at the proceedings.
Claim #55
Yet another illegal purpose and result of the wrongfully obtained search warrant was to take numerous objects that were not specified in the warrant, for example Bell's guns, in violation of the Second and Fourth Amendment, and more particularly reports of these guns and other items wrongly taken or seen (not specified in the warrant) were later used to libel Bell and were illegally used (as photographs) in a later trial (April 2001) despite the fact that these guns were illegally taken and never played any sort of role in any alleged or even suspected crime, and in fact no crime at all. The purpose of taking the guns (which were not listed in the search warrant) was to wrongly deprive Bell of them, and the only purpose of mentioning those guns at “trial” was to discredit and harm Bell because of their ownership. Plaintiff Bell alleges that this constitutes malfeasance and a clear violation of the Second and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, because Bell was and is punished simply due to his exercise of a constitutional right. (At “trial” in April 2001, co-conspirator judge Jack E. Tanner further disparaged Bell's right to own guns, indicating that the using of the guns in that "trial" was for the purposes of punishing Bell.) Plaintiffs allege a continuing wrongful pattern and practice of over-executing warrants, intentionally done, which was or should have been known by all supervisors. The execution of the warrant was coordinated using telephone calls and radio communications, which became Wire Fraud. It was also a violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 USC § 1951, as the searchers “obtain[ed] property from another...induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”
Claim #56
Another illegal purpose of the search was to rob Plaintiff Bell of his computers, which still remain unreturned as of February, 2003. Plaintiffs allege Federal agents frequently, intentionally and illegally seize computers not based on any genuine belief and knowledge that there is evidence in them, but in fact merely because of the POSSIBILITY that there is evidence, in clear and distinct violation of the Fourth Amendment. These agents, including all Federal government agents who are defendants, agreed to deny their rightful owners access to them, wrote the warrant to include the reference to the computer equipment simply for the purpose of taking a look at Bell's computer data which they knew or should have known was not the evidence of any crime, and for the purpose of depriving it from Bell for an indeterminate, and in fact, unlimited time frame. They then did this. No reasonable person could have believed this was legal.
Claim #57
Their desire to permanently deprive is established by the illegal yet successful attempt by defendant Rob London, who asked after Plaintiff (then defendant) Bell was sentenced on December 12, 1997, for permission from co-conspirator judge Burgess to erase information from Bell's hard drive, before it was supposed to be returned (which, of course, has never happened) to Bell. He was seeking and attempting to tamper with the contractual rights of Bell. The illegality of this request is established and proven by the fact that this was not made a part of the June, 1997 plea agreement which was itself fraudulently written by the government including defendants Prosecutor Anne Marie Levins, lawyer Peter Avenia, Jeff Gordon, and unknown-named others. A plea agreement is supposed to be evaluated as a contract, and each of these co-conspirators, acting as agents in the conspiracy, agreed to harm Bell by not enforcing the already-fraudulent plea agreement terms to Plaintiff Bell's benefit. And they did so. This was in violation of Bell’s First Amendment right to communicate and possess information.
Claim #58
The items taken from plaintiff Bell's residence, April 1, 1997, bore little or no resemblance to the list of material ostensibly justified by the itself-fraudulent search warrant, establishing the pretextual and illegal nature of this search, and also demonstrating that the state-of-mind of the searchers had nothing to do with the warrant. This constitutes abuse of process, and evidences malicious prosecution. The searchers behavior, and the voluminous material taken, would and will establish that these searchers intended to take, and did take, virtually anything that struck their fancy, without regard to any legal justification that the warrant represented. The searchers, in fact, were behaving as if they were serving an illegal "General Warrant" that has been in violation of the U.S. Constitution ever since the adoption of the Fourth Amendment well over 200 years ago. These searchers were intentionally and maliciously acting with complete disregard for plaintiff Bell's rights. (This malicious searching activity against Bell’s rights would repeat itself, as if on cue, on June 23, 1998 and November 6, 2000). Bell was denied the right to read the warrant and attached affidavit, and he was illegally denied the right to inspect, supervise, and challenge the propriety of the material taken, which was his right.
Claim #59
In all such cases plaintiff Bell was intentionally and maliciously denied any evidentiary hearing to establish the illegal nature of these searches, by agents of the conspiracy (Judges Burgess in 1997 and 1998, and Tanner in 2000/1) for the intentional benefit of the other co-conspirators who stood to be in serious trouble if such an evidentiary hearing were to happen. Other co-conspirators, betraying lawyers Avenia, Mandel, and Leen, who each had solemn responsibilities and a duty of loyalty to plaintiff (then defendant) Bell as his attorney, repeatedly, maliciously, intentionally and negligently betrayed Bell's interest by denying him the benefit of their expertise and in fact they used their critical positions to sabotage Bell's legal position and rights. They illegally worked to prevent Bell from challenging the legality of the search, as well as the propriety of its execution. Plaintiffs hereby allege defendants agreed to wrongfully take, and wrongfully keep this material and wrongfully misuse it to libel Plaintiff Bell with it to select news media representatives. Defendants made contacts with these organizations and individuals by telephone, fax, email, and U.S. Mail, which is wire fraud and mail fraud. These were violations of Bell’s First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights.
Claim #60
Also on April 1, 1997, unknown-named defendants including federal government agents placed secret and illegal electronic search and wiretap devices in Bell's residence due to the same illegal political motivations which were previously demonstrated in their actions at MCCLC meetings. These agents maliciously intended and succeeded in violating Bell's rights and those of his parents, by placing those devices, which to this day have never been disclosed by the government, or any co-conspirator, or anyone else. No warrant was obtained or served for those bugs, and their illegal transmissions were picked up by equipment placed within the residences and homes of nearby private citizens (including the Sabans) acting in an illegal conspiracy with the co-conspirator, which became wire fraud. (Later, in June of 1998, the co-conspirators acted to illegally search Bell's residence again, without a warrant, for purposes of planting evidence and handling those and other illegally-planted wiretap and bugging devices). This was a First and Fourth Amendment violation.
Claim #61
Other agents of the conspiracy (Judge Burgess, Prosecutor Rob London, Lawyer Peter Avenia and later lawyer Judith Mandel, Robert Leen and others) acted to conspire to keep this and these facts from being exposed to the public. Also concealed were the illegal actions of these and other co-conspirators, and the fact that the criminal case made against Plaintiff (then defendant) Bell was malicious and fraudulent and based on lies and malfeasance, misrepresentations, phony "evidence" and warrants, extortions, and frauds done by the co-conspirators including numerous government agents and especially Federal government agents. These violations were all compounded and made far more serious, and more dangerous and harmful to plaintiff Bell, because the conspiracy controlled and made up essentially all the parties to the "dispute", including “Bell's” corrupt attorneys, and all were acting against Bell's interest in concert and with the utmost unethical and illegal coordination. This was also a RICO conspiracy to deprive plaintiff Bell of the right to the undivided loyalty of his attorneys: Avenia, Mandel, Leen, and Juergens. See U.S. v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1981) cert. den. 456 US 915.
Claim #62
Shortly after the wrongful April 1, 1997 search at Bell's residence, government agents including Defendants demonstrated their contempt for the Constitutional and property rights of Plaintiff Bell and his family. These agents discovered the fact that Bell's family stored a camping trailer at a Tualatin storage yard named "Tote and Stow." These agents, acting without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that evidence of any crime would be in this trailer, and in particular acting without a search warrant, asked, intimidated, and induced the operators of that storage yard to place a lock on the door of the camper in order to deny Bell access to that camper. These government agents including Defendants knew or should have known that their act was illegal, and they proceeded knowing this but also knowing that their illegal and abusive actions would be difficult for Bell and his family to reverse. This was a blatant Fourth Amendment violation. This was deliberate interference in the contractual rights of Bell and “Tote and Stow”, and an attempt to procure the breach of a duty by Tote and Stow personnel to the Bells.
Claim #63
They demonstrated their knowledge of the impropriety by falling to even attempt to get a legitimate search warrant for the trailer, but abusively they intentionally neglected to contact the operators of "Tote and Stow" to have the illegally-placed lock removed. Their use of intimidation to get the operators of the yard to violate the rights of Bell's family constitutes extortion, a RICO predicate act. It is also a conspiracy against possessory 4th amendment rights, a violation of 42 USC § 1985. It is also a Bivens action constitutional violation. It is also a violation of the April 1, 1997 search warrant, because these agents wrongly employed illegally-taken papers and records that were not a legal and proper part of the search warrant.
Claim #64
Also in the days subsequent to the improper April 1, 1997 search, intimidating Federal government agents including Defendants approached and acted in an intimidating and threatening manner towards numerous friends, family, and acquaintances of Plaintiff Bell and his family, intending to induce them to act against Bell's interests and rights, and to punish them illegally for their prior friendship with Bell. These contacts constitute a pattern of violations under RICO laws, including tampering with and intimidating witnesses, and extortion.
Claim #65
Federal government agents including Defendants approached the City of Portland and illegally induced and caused them to act maliciously and abusively towards their employee Gregory P. Daly, who happened to have been a friend of Bell's for 15 years. These agents acted to induce the City of Portland to fire Daly from his job for no cause, and Daly was harmed in his business or property because of this malicious action. This constitutes extortion, a RICO predicate act, and Daly is entitled to back-pay, including interest, for his loss of that job. See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 US 121, 142 L.Ed.2d 502, 119 S.Ct. 489 (1998).
Claim #66
Further, Federal government agents approached Milo Wadlin (Bell's brother-in-law) at his business in an intimidating and threatening manner, intending to harm Bell and cause dissension in Bell's family for no reason. As a consequence of this improper intimidating and threatening approach, it was eventually necessary for Wadlin to sell his interest in that business which he had jointly founded 7 years previously, and he lost the opportunity to make four (4) million dollars in profit that he could have made had he not been forced out. This was a RICO violation.
Claim #67
Federal government agents also approached Michael Boyd, a friend of Bell for 16 years, in an intimidating and threatening manner, in order to further harm Bell.
Claim #68
Federal government agents also approached Bell's employer, Controltek, in a threatening and intimidating manner, intended to cause them to be afraid to continue to employ Bell, and eventually (after Bell was eventually released) to force them to refuse to re-hire Bell after he was released. This was a First Amendment violation of Bell’s freedom of association. The owners of Controltek suffered irreversible damage to their business operation as a result of the loss of Bell's employment, and Controltek was harmed in its business and property under RICO laws. This was intentional interference in the contractual rights of Bell and Controltek, intending to cause harm to both.
Claim #69
Federal agents including Defendants also approached other friends, family, and acquaintances of Bell and other class-plaintiffs in an intimidating and threatening manner, and those who were thus threatened were harmed including in their business and property as a consequence of their abusive actions. These acts were part of a pattern of extortion, a RICO predicate. See Haddle v. Garrison, supra. It was also intentional interference in personal, social, and business relations.
Claim #70
Also on April 1, 1997, unknown-named government agents including Federal and local government employees and co-conspirators did a search on the Portland, Oregon residence of Richard and Thor Lancial, also participants in the MCCLC meetings, in retaliation for their political philosophies and the exercise of their constitutional rights including the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This search was also in retaliation against the Lancial’s use of the MCCLC to obtain a jury verdict and court order to affect the return of a car illegally seized. The search was well-publicized by government agents, to chill the exercise of these rights among the attendees of the MCCLC, and to put fear and doubt into their minds, and to deter them from continuing to attend the MCCLC and participate freely, and this chilling effect was intended and achieved by the co-conspirators including government employees acting in their various capacities including violating 42 USC §§1983, 1985, and Bivens actions, and was intended to thwart the continued use of MCCLC juries and verdicts. The government agents violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 2233 & 2234. Defendant Walsh’s participation on the jury in that case constituted jury tampering, and the defendants’ harassment of the Lancial’s constituted intimidation of witnesses and victims, which is also a RICO predicate act, and a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 & 1513.
Claim #71
The search of the Lancial’s residence was fully pretextual and fraudulent, and involved as part of the fraud the obtaining of a fraudulent search warrant that was obtained by intentional misrepresentation of the facts. Those who obtained the warrant, unknown-named defendants and other government employees, acting under color of state and Federal law in violation of 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985 and Bivens misrepresented, and intentionally misrepresented, a genuine MCCLC document, claiming that it was a forged document from a different court, in order to bring false, harassing and intimidating charges against the Lancial’s, and to cast illegitimate doubt on the authenticity of the MCCLC documents and legal process. That document was signed by defendant Steve Walsh (Wilson). The defendants are estopped from challenging the propriety of that document due to Walsh’s participation.
Claim #72
The reason for this ruse on the part of these co-conspirators and their agents, including defendants, was that they knew there was nothing illegal about the genuine MCCLC documents, whereas the false allegations of a "phony" or "forged" document was intended and needed to improperly obtain jurisdiction and a reason to obtain a malicious search warrant and engage in an illegal, improper, and abusive libelous publicity campaign, as the co-conspirators (including defendants) intended. The purpose of getting the improper warrant was to appear to get justification to act in an intimidating and threatening and disruptive manner under color of state and Federal law, and they did this. The larger purpose was to violate the Lancial's First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as to intimidate, libel and deter the management and attendees of the MCCLC, and to obtain an illegitimate public-relations advantage and benefit by falsely portraying the MCCLC and participants and to put fear into the minds of past, current, and future attendees and potential attendees. This was done. It was also intended to obstruct the operation of the MCCLC, and it did so.
Claim #73
During times unknown but during the 1996-7 time frame, the Portland Police Bureau engaged in similar stalking and harassing investigations and contact against other politically-motivated groups and individuals, based on excuses as flimsy as the mere attendance of an individual at a meeting of an organization already under "suspicion", or the attendance of an already-under-suspicion individual at yet another group not (yet) suspected. Somewhat akin to a viral infection, police quickly were able to declare virtually every politically-unpopular group "infected" by this too-convenient process. Defendant Steve Walsh's attempt to get Plaintiff Bell to attend meetings of an unidentified political organization at the Vancouver restaurant "Uncle Milt's Pipe Organ Pizza" was intended, and but for Bell's refusal almost succeeded, in casting their net even wider. At all times all these co-conspirators were well aware how fraudulent their "suspicions system" was, but they used it because it conveniently allowed them to justify whatever actions they wanted to justify. These practices violated the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs including Bell and others, and other unknown-named victim-citizens in the Portland/Vancouver metropolitan area. It was an intentional violation under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and Bivens, for the ultimate goal of this "suspicioning" of every politically-active group was to “justify” a pervasive investigation against essentially everyone they wanted to investigate.
Claim #74
Infiltrator Steven Walsh, again under the phony name "Steve Wilson," visited a meeting of a group of Libertarian individuals in Vancouver, Washington on the Third Thursday of May, 1997, for the purpose of infiltrating and harassing that group as well, in violation of their and Bell's constitutional rights as well as a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. Walsh illegally wore a “wire” and transmitted sound, which is Wire Fraud, under RICO since it was intended to further the goals of the conspiracy, and it is also a violation of Washington state law. (Since Walsh denied in April 2001 that he was aware of any legitimate law-enforcement reason to be doing an investigation, Plaintiffs including Bell assert that Walsh is estopped from claiming, five years later, that he was legally entitled to commit a crime under Washington state law.) It was also a violation of 18 USC § 2510 et seq.
Claim #75
Later, the Infiltrators made other attempts to wrongfully infiltrate and illegally surveil this regular meeting of politically-motivated citizens, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of any crime, but motivated yet again by the same illegal and unconstitutional goals as the infiltration of the MCCLC, to deter and frustrate and prevent the exercise of freedom of association and speech, and to put fear and doubt into the minds of the attendees of these meetings. This was in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and is actionable under 42 USC §1985 and Bivens. This extortion is also a RICO predicate act, and the use of a hidden microphone is Wire Fraud, also a RICO predicate act.
Claim #76
Infiltrator Defendant and co-conspirator Steven Walsh made interstate telephone calls to plaintiff Bell in Vancouver Washington at various times in an illegitimate attempt to further his goals and those of the co-conspirators. He illegally recorded those phone calls, and that recording and the making of the calls themselves were Wire Fraud. These calls were intended to (but failed to) induce Bell to agree to commit a crime, which is attempted conspiracy, for the purposes of later putting pressure on Bell. This is also extortion, a RICO predicate. Wilson was offering money for a radio transmitter, to be used for illegal purposes, which is bribery, another RICO predicate. Walsh was conspiring to obtain the completion of a crime, which is in itself a crime under Washington state and Federal law. This was in violation of Bell's constitutional rights, under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and was a violation of Bell's rights under the Washington state Constitution. These recordings were later denied to Bell multiple times, due to the unethical and illegal collusion of defendants/co-conspirators including especially lawyer Avenia, Mandel, Leen, Levins, London, and judges Burgess and Tanner, as well as other unknown-named government agents. This violated Bell’s right to legal discovery, which is obstruction of justice and extrinsic fraud.
Claim #77
Federal agents, acting under color of Federal law, violated Bell's and his parents' possessory rights by placing tracking devices into the cars of Bell's parents illegally, and lying about this fact to Bell through betraying lawyers Avenia, Mandel, and Leen up to and including the present time. They did so in collusion with, and to the benefit of, all the other co-conspirators including all defendants, who did and do not want to see their secret illegal activities unraveled and exposed publicly. The information collected traveled by electronic means, through interstate links, and over federally-regulated radio frequencies. This was wire fraud.
Claim #78
These lawyers were assisted by the two coconspirator judges Burgess and (later, in 2000-2001) Tanner, who (acting in their individual and/or administrative and/or ministerial capacities, and as agents of the conspiracy) forced lawyers Mandel and Leen on Bell so that Bell would be unable to expose illegal acts of the co-conspirators.
Assignment of lawyers is an administrative task that does not possess “absolute immunity,” and these judges lost any "qualified immunity" by knowingly violating the rights of plaintiff Bell and by colluding with their co-defendants that were acting to harm Bell and violate his rights. This was in violation of 42 USC §1985 and is actionable as well under Bivens actions. Further, knowingly violating the constitutional rights of a witness (Bell) constitutes witness-tampering, which is a RICO predicate act.
Judges Burgess and (later) Tanner, by conspiring with the conspiracy under their administrative, ministerial, or individual capacity became liable for each and all of the acts of their numerous co-conspirators, under vicarious liability, agency liability, and respondeat superior. Further, since they conspired with themselves while acting in judicial as well as administrative/individual/ministerial/co-conspirator capacity, they regain liability for their in-court actions and all of them, albeit by a different route.
Claim #79
Federal agents arrested plaintiff Bell on or about May 17, 1997, on a pretext ostensibly based on material (improperly and illegally) taken in the pretextual April 1, 1997 search of Bell's residence, but in fact based on secretly and illegally-obtained evidence not disclosed to Bell (in violation of his right to evidence) until even the present time. (June, 2003) That evidence includes that from illegally-planted listening and tracking devices, and monitoring devices used illegally by coconspirators in Bell's neighborhood. This evidence was collected illegally, constituting Wire Fraud, a RICO predicate act. It was collected illegally, also, because it was collected with the intention of violating plaintiff Bell's First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth amendment rights, but also violating those rights of Bell's friends and family collateral to Bell's victimization. This harassment was also done in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. Bell’s arrest and later harassment during the period 1997 to date caused him to lose his job and future earnings pretrial, a RICO violation.
Claim #80
This evidence was also later illegally withheld from plaintiff Bell multiple times (December, 1997, June, 1998-June, 1999, and again December, 2000 to the present), in violation of Bell's Constitutional rights to discovery. This is obstruction of Justice, a RICO predicate act.
The Defendant actors (particularly lawyers Avenia, Mandel, and Leen, as well as prosecutor Defendant Levins and Rob London, and defendants Leslie Spier of the Probation office, and Jeff Gordon) colluded to make this happen. The foregoing violated Plaintiff Bell's Constitutional rights. The purpose of this evidence-denial includes the continuing concealment of the Infiltrators' illegal activities, a fraudulent concealment which would not have been possible had the evidence been disclosed as required by law, and to frustrate and deny plaintiff Bell's ability to defend himself by casting doubt on the adequacy, motivation, and the legitimacy of the evidence and case against him. This was extrinsic fraud.
Claim #81
Beginning within a day or two of plaintiff Bell's arrest on or about May 17, 1997, defendant Jeff Gordon, and other unknown defendants/agents, acting on behalf of the conspiracy, made telephone calls from Oregon to the Pierce County Jail where he knew Bell would be held, in Pierce County Washington, and thus across state lines. His wrongful purpose was to ask the personnel of Pierce County Jail to treat plaintiff Bell very badly, in order to punish Bell without and before any sort of trial. These calls constitute effort to accomplish the conspiracy, and constitute Wire Fraud. His attempt (successful) was to get the Pierce County Staff to put Bell in a tiny double-barred/steel-doored room in which the lights were left on 24 hours per day and was intended to extort and harass plaintiff Bell, which is intimidation of a witness/victim and tampering with a victim/witness, both RICO predicate acts. No reasonable person could have believed that this treatment was justified.
Claim #82
The extortion of Bell was itself a RICO predicate act. This was intended and succeeded in torturing plaintiff Bell so that he had difficulty sleeping, and to drive plaintiff Bell into an extremely depressed, terrified panic. Bell was illegally kept under these inhumane conditions for at least ten (10) days, continuously torturing Bell for his past exercise of his constitutional rights, and to warn him to remain quiet about the government employee crimes. These co-conspirators and defendants were aware of plaintiff Bell's condition, for his phone calls to his family were taped and sent to agent Gordon and others for their amusement. This disclosure violated 18 USC § 2510 et seq.
Claim #83
These incidents were a violation of Bell's constitutional rights, and are actionable under 42 USC § 1983 as Bell was being kept by agents of the conspirators acting through Washington state personnel, and they were abusing Bell under color of law, but in fact acting also in their individual and agent-of-the-conspiracy roles. It is also a violation of 42 USC § 1985, since it was in furtherance of the federal-agent co-conspirators' plans to violate Bell's Constitutional rights. There is also Bivens liability, because these federal and state actors were ostensibly following federal rules and regulations, as well as orders, in keeping plaintiff Bell. Bell’s treatment was also wire fraud and mail fraud, because it was foreseeable that Bell would have to employ the telephone and U.S. Mail in order to defend himself, and he did so on numerous occasions.
Claim #84
At a time unknown to plaintiff Bell but beginning before June 30, 1997, government agents including defendants Jeff Gordon, Anne Marie Levins, Leslie Spier, lawyer Peter Avenia, and unknown-named others colluded to fabricate a fictitious and legally improper set of criminal charges against Bell based on knowingly-false claims and evidence that was illegally obtained. These charges were carefully written to conceal the source of the information illegally obtained and used, and were intended, and did, not merely to threaten and punish plaintiff Bell for his participation in the MCCLC and his past exercise of his First Amendment rights, but also to deter such activities in the future, and also to threaten and deter plaintiff Bell from disclosing and publicizing the government agents illegal infiltration of the MCCLC. This was then a then successful attempt to violate plaintiff Bell's constitutional rights, and was also intended to violate the constitutional rights of MCCLC attendees and participants. The substance of this agreement was delivered to Bell by telephone and mail, which is wire and mail fraud.
Claim #85
Plaintiff (then defendant) Bell was denied by Defendants including London, Avenia and Levins the opportunity to edit this set of criminal charges to remove the fictitious charges and claims, and in fact Bell was threatened by these actors with further fraudulent and fabricated charges should he not immediately plead guilty. These threats constituted extortion, a RICO predicate act, and the false charges constituted "Obstruction of Justice," which are also RICO predicate acts. This was also a violation of Due Process and other constitutional rights including violation of Bell's Sixth Amendment right to unbiased and un-conflicted counsel.
Claim #86
In mid-June 1997, while plaintiff Bell was incarcerated at Pierce County Jail, another inmate (6 ft; skinny; dirty-blond hair; unintelligent) who was apparently working for the conspirators/defendants and told Bell that in exchange for the plea agreement, Bell would have to falsely (but in a promised-confidential meeting) claim that there had been an implausible attack on a Portland lawyer at an unspecified time, but apparently in the 1985-1990 time frame. After confirming with Defendant Attorney Avenia that no such attack had actually occurred, Bell reluctantly agreed to do this. This was extortion and tampering with a witness.
Claim #87
The plea agreement fraudulently offered was wrongfully intended by the Defendants to result in a phony and fabricated "criminal offense level" which would give Bell the improper sentence they had already determined Bell would improperly receive, which is an illegal practice. The sentencing included knowingly false and misleading claims of "physical contact" that were not true and fraudulently indicated violent action which they knew had not occurred, and the Defendants were aware and caused this sham. There was also a knowingly false claim of a "special skill" which was not actually used, and all involved Defendants (including Levins, Avenia, Burgess, Spier, Gordon, etc) were aware of the phony nature of these charges and claims. There was also a knowingly false claim that Bell's motive was to impede agents' official duties, in a fraudulent attempt by Defendants to cover up the agents' illegal acts including the infiltration of the MCCLC and other illegal acts by government people which were actually being deterred. The plea agreement offered constituted an express or implied contract with the United States under 28 USC § 1346, which was violated. The government’s offer of the plea agreement, knowing and intending that it be enforced in federal court, constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Claim #88
The charges of "obstruction" based on 26 USC 7212(a) were fraudulent, also, because these Defendants knew or should have known of a 1995 Supreme Court decision, United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995) , which held that "obstruction" required there to be an investigation, that the "obstructor" was supposed to know about, which the actions taken by the "obstructor" were calculated to obstruct. None of these prerequisites were present in Bell's case, as all the Defendants knew and know. The “crime” charged simply did not exist.
Claim #89
There was also a false claim that two government agents (Treosti and Rose) were to be harassed, when all government agents including Defendants were aware that there was no evidence of any such intent, and they had invented this known-false claim.
Claim #90
The plea agreement was a sham as was known by all Defendant actors, and it was never intended to be enforced to Bell's benefit by the Defendants, and this fact was known and intended by all participants (now Defendants) except for Plaintiff Bell. Co-conspirator/lawyer Avenia made numerous intentionally false claims to Plaintiff Bell that the plea agreement would actually be enforced, that Bell would get all of his property back, and that the government couldn't add more terms to the agreement detrimental to Bell after it was signed. All other Defendants were aware that Avenia was making these false assertions to Bell, and they had agreed and intended that this happen in order to trick Bell into signing the plea agreement. This was fraud and obstruction of justice, the latter was a RICO predicate act, the fraud was a continuation of a violation of 42 USC § 1985 and Bivens. The plea agreement was delivered to Bell on or about June 30, 1997, by U.S. mail or telephone, which was mail fraud or wire fraud. It was anticipatible that Bell would have to call or write his lawyer, Avenia, to discuss it (and he did so) so defendants are guilty of mail fraud and wire fraud.
Claim #91
Numerous intentional violations by the government actors including all Defendants occurred within the July-December 1997 time frame as illegally orchestrated by all Defendants including Gordon, Levins, Spier, Burgess, Avenia, and unknown-named others. These actors attempted to conceal the existence of these violations, as well as their seriousness, such as the intent to order the improper disclosure of the contents of a medical exam, the improper use of disclosed information for sentencing, a fraudulent claim to Plaintiff (then defendant Bell) that these violations would be challenged and corrected before sentencing, and improperly added “Special conditions of release” would be removed.
Claim #92
These false claims, promises, and reassurances were known to be false at the time they were made by all of the government actor defendants, and especially lawyer Avenia. These Defendants desired and intended that Plaintiff (then defendant) Bell sign the plea agreement, at which point they all planned and agreed to (and did) violate every term beneficial to Plaintiff Bell, and to illegally and improperly "add" terms detrimental to Bell, without limit, and in clear violation of Bell's contractual and constitutional rights. This was a violation of 42 USC § 1985 and Bivens, and their intent to defraud and extort Bell was a RICO predicate act. The defendants were violating Bell’s right to a fair trial, access to evidence, and adequate representation.
Claim #93
Further misdeeds and false claims by the defendants included denial of Plaintiff Bell's access to his property (1997-present), denial of access to exculpatory evidence to Bell for purposes of sentencing and further hearings (obstruction of justice, a RICO predicate; based on illegally-obtained bugging and tracking- device evidence, wiretap record evidence, and more).
Claim #94
Plaintiff Bell was fraudulently told by Defendants in the plea agreement that one of the terms was "three years of supervised release" when in fact such terminology was intentionally false and misleading, and it actually and fraudulently was intended to disguise and conceal a much more complicated, restrictive, and onerous probation scheme and sham dramatically more arduous and harmful to Bell, and one that actually did not terminate at any certain date. In addition, this scheme was far more susceptible to misuse and abuse by dishonest government personnel than the wording itself indicated: The subsequent June 23, 1998 search of Bell's residence was illegally done without a warrant and in violation of even the fraudulently-"adjusted" terms of the agreement, and evidence was planted and illegally-planted "bugs" were handled on that date. Showing how fraudulent the "deal" actually became, even that illegal search never resulted (yet) in any punishment for the government agents who participated in it, and in fact Defendants/ conspirators' lawyers Avenia and Mandel carefully worked to protect the other Defendants from punishment that they should have received for this. Bell would never have accepted this sham deal had its true terms been disclosed ahead of time; This is fraud, as was intended by all Defendants. No reasonable person could have believed that the deal offered was legitimate given the actual facts. No reasonable person could have believed that Bell was actually afforded the deal as it was disclosed to him. Bell was subject to extortion to force him to agree to the deal.
The Defendants illegally denied Bell’s right to appeal this illegal and fraudulently imposed sentence, and as a consequence of their actions no appeal occurred. This obstructed Bell’s access to the courts.
Claim #95
Bell was harmed severely by having to do a 24-month extra time in prison to get out of that fraudulently-inflicted "supervision," time and circumstances he had not known about before and at the December 12, 1997 sentencing hearing, and certainly not before he signed the fraudulent plea agreement, June 1997. Bell had a right to know about such factors, and the plea agreement was and is null and void absent Bell's explicit prior knowledge and agreement under principles of contract law. Bell is entitled to be fully compensated for this fraud. All Defendants have conspired to keep Bell unaware of his right to reverse this 1997 conviction, and they acted to deny Bell an appeal on case #97-5270, and moreover they have acted to violate that right, which are extortion and obstruction of justice, two RICO predicates. It is also collusion to violate Bell's Constitutional rights, a violation of 42 USC § 1985 and Bivens.
Claim #96
At an unknown date but before October 25, 1997, Defendants including government agent Jeff Gordon approached Probation Officer defendant Leslie Spier with the intent of violating the terms of recently-signed plea agreement, in order to increase Bell's punishment and denying Bell his rights, and Gordon and Spier agreed to conspire to accomplish this improper, illegal, and unconstitutional activity. This is obstruction of justice, a RICO predicate, and is also a conspiracy against civil and constitutional rights, a violation of 42 USC § 1985 and Bivens.
Claim #97
Gordon and unknown others induced Defendant Spier and unknown others to propose to add numerous improper and illegal terms and conditions to the sentence already agreed-upon, both by adding (against the negotiated terms of the plea agreement) material that had already agreed would not be used, and by falsely increasing the sentence by including onerous and non-negotiated release terms that increased the severity of the sentence and were planned to be used (and eventually were used in 1998) to cause Bell to be wrongly re-arrested. Defendants, including Gordon and Spier, knew that they could not get away with this improper activity without the knowledge and assistance of conspiring co-Defendants Peter Avenia, Franklin Burgess, and others, and they obtained illegal "approval" and wrongful assistance from these Defendants for this improper activity in furtherance of the conspiracy. Bell was defrauded of any benefit of the plea agreement by all defendants. They caused or anticipated that these improper terms would be delivered to Bell by U.S. mail, and they were. This was mail fraud. Bell contacted Avenia by telephone, which was anticipatible by defendants, thus becoming mail fraud.
Claim #98
All Defendants conspired to insist that Plaintiff Bell pay a large amount of money for "back taxes" that he did not owe, and they did this to put Bell into financial straits and to further harm him. These Defendants illegally made the plea agreement fully conditional on such payments, which is extortion, a RICO predicate, and Bell was harmed in his business and property (including money assets) by this. Bell is entitled to the return of these fraudulently and extortionately-obtained payments not merely because they were illegally obtained, but also because the terms of the plea agreement were violated against his rights (including contractual rights).
Claim #99
It was also extortionately demanded that Bell reveal his "PGP passphrase" as condition of accepting the plea agreement, which was extortion, a RICO predicate, and also fraud, because those making those demands (the Defendants, especially Levins, Spier, Avenia, Burgess, Gordon) never intended to benefit Bell's part of the "bargain." This is fraud and constitutes unjust enrichment. Bell is entitled to a payment equal or greater than the amount it would have cost for the government to derive the “PGP passphrase” openly and legally by decryption and absent his agreement, as well as punitive damages.
Claim #100
All Defendants were well aware and intended that Plaintiff Bell would almost certainly never be able to enforce any of the terms of the plea agreement beneficial to him and certainly not in any prompt fashion. The fact that this lawsuit (originally written June, 2001 and re-written July, 2002) contains complaints of 1997 frauds by government actors (frauds which could have been prevented or cured by co-conspirators Avenia or Mandel in 1997-1999, but weren't due to legal malpractice and their intentional malice) shows that the "legal system" is set up to give these government actors what THEY want, immediately, and to only give others what they (such as Plaintiff Bell) are entitled to after long delays, and highly unusual and "heroic" efforts, and with much opposition and fraud by the government. This fraud was and is intended by all Defendants and they worked to accomplish this end.
Claim #101
Defendant Avenia, acting for himself and on the behalf of the other defendants, failed and refused Plaintiff Bell's request and right to challenge the "PSR Report" which Bell had told Avenia contained numerous serious errors harmful to Bell. On or about October 27, 1997, Avenia fraudulently claimed he could not make this challenge, which Avenia knew or should have known was untrue. Avenia also fraudulently stated to Bell on or about October 27, 2001 that he (Avenia) would challenge the proposed "Special Conditions of Release" that had just been revealed, whose very existence violated the plea agreement: The agreement had been fraudulently represented to Bell by Avenia in late-June, 1997 as being binding on all government employees, including Defendants Gordon, Spier, Levins, and London, yet those newly-proposed conditions were an attempt (ultimately successful) by those conspirators to cause changes in Bell's sentence which were not negotiated with Bell nor approved by Bell. Bell was harmed by being fraudulently convicted based on terms not agreed-upon. This is contract fraud, and extortion. The latter is a RICO predicate act. It was also a violation of Bell's Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth amendment rights, particularly Bell’s right to access to counsel. It was obstruction of justice.
Claim #102
Avenia also secretly and wrongfully failed and refused Bell's instruction to obtain sentencing discovery of various forms of electronic surveillance Bell believed existed, and which in fact did exist, including wiretapping (both "legal" and illegal), bugging, interception of radio transmissions including illegal interception of cordless-telephone transmissions, and tracking devices. Plaintiffs allege Defendant Avenia colluded with other defendants, especially Levins, London, Gordon, and Burgess, to intentionally conceal discovery information whose release would both help Bell and hurt the conspiratorial defendants, and Bell was harmed as a consequence of this collusion. Avenia fraudulently claimed that no such evidence existed, and he falsely claimed to have believed an answer by government officials about this, when he knew or should have known that the information did exist. Avenia collusively failed to insist on getting the government’s denial in writing, intending to protect his co-conspirators, the defendants in this lawsuit.
Claim #103
The Defendants, especially Avenia, became aware on or about late October 1997 that Plaintiff Bell was objecting to violations of his rights, including violations of the plea agreement, and was planning to withdraw his approval of the extorted plea agreement, a withdrawal which was his right due to the fact that the deal was fraudulently and extortionately foisted on him and was wrongfully and extortionately changed and repeatedly violated after his initial agreement. The Defendants secretly agreed that Bell must not and would not be allowed to withdraw his approval of the deal, because they had already violated terms and that would have legally prevented a trial and subsequent "conviction" without further government fraud. The Defendants, and each of them, agreed that they would act to violate Bell's right to withdraw the plea agreement, even for good cause. They did so.
Claim #104
To force Bell to continue to "approve" the plea agreement, some time on or before November 25, 1997, unknown-named government agents began to include another person in the conspiracy, a violent 4-time felon named Ryan Thomas Lund. These government agents made an illegal deal with Lund (by telephone, becoming wire fraud, asking him to assault Bell (which he did on November 25, 1997) for the purpose of intimidating Bell and forcing Bell to continue to "accept" the much-violated (by government) plea agreement. These government agents/defendants intended that Bell be put into SHU ("the hole") to cut him off from access to attorney/co-conspirator Peter Avenia, Bell's family and friends, the news media, and others, in order to threaten and subdue him. Defendant Lund carried out this assault as was requested by the other Defendants, in violation of 18 USC § 1959, and 18 USC § 2261A.
This act constituted extortion and obstruction of justice, both RICO predicate acts. It was also tampering with a witness (Bell) another RICO predicate act. It was also a conspiracy against rights in violation of 42 USC § 1985, including retaliating against a person (Bell) by threat, force, or intimidation, from attending such court or testifying in a matter pending therein. See Haddle v. Garrison, 119 S.Ct. 489 (1998). The illegal instructions to Lund were sent over the telephone, which is Wire Fraud, yet another RICO predicate act. Federal agents acted under color of law, actionable under Bivens. Lund was transported across state lines to do this illegal extortion. Lund was held by state agents in Oregon to coordinate this violation of Bell’s constitutional rights, actionable under 42 USC § 1983.
Claim #105
Plaintiffs allege that the personnel of Seatac FDC jail operate a "snitch line" feature in the inmate-accessible telephone system. The concealed purpose of this system is to allow informants and agents (such as Defendant Ryan Thomas Lund) to call and contact their "handlers" including government investigators, and to relay information and obtain instructions, including illegal commands. Plaintiffs allege that on or before November 25, 1997, Lund contacted unknown-named government agents on this telephone, and they instructed Lund to assault Plaintiff Bell for illegal and unconstitutional reasons, and he did so. This was wire fraud, because it was in furtherance of defendants’ scheme to defraud plaintiff Bell of his constitutional rights.
Claim #106
Plaintiffs allege the “snitch line” was installed for the specific purpose of causing or allowing harm to some portion of the inmate population, as was known and intended by all Seatac staff, including defendants, and it was used to do so. Plaintiffs allege that Seatac FDC personnel were or should have been aware of the possibility that the agents to which Lund talked were corrupt or acting pursuant to improper motivations, and they were giving instructions to dangerous felons who would carry out even illegal orders, yet they continued to allow such unmonitored and unrecorded contacts unprotected from serious misuse. Plaintiff Bell was harmed due to their reckless disregard for the rights of the inmates, including Bell. This caused Bell not merely immediate physical pain and potential serious injury, but also long-term legal disability achieved by this successful extortion and malfeasance. This harm was known, intended and accomplished by all defendants.
Claim #107
As a bribe, in case # 97-5492FDB, Defendant Lund illegally received more than 100 months off his sentence as illegal "payment" for his cooperation including this assault, as was known and intended by all Defendants especially Avenia, Mandel, and (later) Robert Leen. This was accomplished fraudulently and illegally by ignoring two prior of Lund's felony drug convictions, which brought his apparent sentencing range down to allow that illegal 27-month sentence. These government conspirators also fraudulently "stipulated" that Lund did not possess a gun in connection with the distribution of illegal drugs or other felonies, when in fact he did so and they knew it, which should have added at least four “offense level” points to Lund's sentence. This was bribery, and a conspiracy to violate Bell’s rights. Lund’s attorney, Robert Gombiner, and government attorneys, Katrina Pflaumer and Joanne Y. Maida, were aware of the attack and the fraud.
Claim #108
Further, on or about December 31, 1998 Lund and Jeffery B. Tuttle, 705 Second Avenue, 10th Floor, Hoge Building, Seattle, Washington 98104, attorney, filed a knowingly fraudulent lawsuit and claim against the BOP and the Federal government, Seattle Federal Court case no. C98-1866L, with the knowledge and collusion of the Defendants in the fraud including all Federal government employees, as agreed by them, for the purpose of providing an excuse or "cover" for paying off Lund illegally in cash as an additional reward for assaulting Plaintiff Bell and for keeping him silent. Lund set up an "accident," or at least claimed that there was an accident, while he was alone in the SHU (special housing unit"): A "slip-and-fall" accident unwitnessed and unreported on or about December 15, 1997. This lawsuit was filed in Seattle Federal Court with the knowledge and collusion of officers of that Court, and Lund was eventually paid-off an unknown-amount of money based on a fraudulent settlement on or about August 2000. Paying off Lund constituted bribery and extortion: RICO predicate acts. It was also a conspiracy to violate Bell’s rights under 42 USC 1985 and Bivens, and constituted a “false claim” against the government, under 31 USC 3721, et seq, the Civil False Claims Act. Proceedings in that case were accomplished by U.S. Mail, telephone, fax, and email, which became mail fraud and wire fraud.
Claim #109
Plaintiff Bell wrote a letter to Defendant/Attorney Peter Avenia on or about December 1, 1997, including specific instructions on the subject of Bell's property (Bell’s need to write such a letter was anticipatible by defendants, so they are guilty of mail fraud). Bell recognized that those government agents including Defendants doing the search of his residence on April 1, 1997 had engaged in an abusive, vastly over broad search intentionally taking virtually every item in violation of the search warrant that was itself improperly issued. Bell, although he was not a lawyer, understood that such an act was wrongful and should have had serious implications.
Bell carefully explained to Defendant Avenia, who he did not realize was unethically betraying him to the other to-be-Defendants, that it was very important that Bell's property be returned to Bell in such a way as to preserve the incriminating nature of the material against the government agents. It was important, for example, to be able to show that the material taken did not qualify under the descriptions listed in the Search Warrant. Bell explained, further, that he wanted the inventory of items taken to be correlated to specific items and sets of items in the search warrant. Avenia, however, acted intentionally to assist his government co-conspirators and thwart Bell’s request.
Claim #110
Bell carefully explained to Avenia that it was his intent to prove the improper taking of these items, and to work to incriminate the government and Defendant agents and show their improper and illegal activity.
Defendant and betraying lawyer Avenia knew or should have known that Plaintiff Bell had a right to the return of all of his property, in fact no later than his release from prison in April 1998. Defendant Avenia intentionally betrayed Plaintiff Bell by informing the other Defendants that Bell was intent on exposing their misbehavior with regard to the returned property, and Avenia and the other Defendants agreed that they and in particular Avenia would sabotage Bell's ability to object to the Defendants' actions and to use the returned property to incriminate the Defendants. They did so.
Claim #111
Avenia and the other Defendants agreed to do this sabotage in various ways. They thwarted Plaintiff Bell's reasonable request (and his right) that the material taken from Bell be returned in such a way as to preserve the incriminating nature of the evidence against those doing the search(s) (and associations of the evidence, as listed on property receipt forms). The Defendants agreed that essentially all of the paper and other non-gun/non-computer property be simply dumped into a set of boxes and returned to Bell, helping and hoping to ruin the anti-government agent evidentiary value of this material. This was done. It was intended that once this material was returned to Bell, all record of which particular item was associated which any particular line item of any inventory list be irretrievably lost, intending to protect the government agents from being incriminated. This is “spoliation” of evidence, and constitutes obstruction of justice, a RICO predicate act. It was also obstruction of Bell’s access to the courts.
Claim #112
Having illegally delayed this return for over three years, agents for the Defendants in the government did exactly this, eventually in the summer of 2000, severely violating Bell's right to the prompt return of his property, and violating his right to preserve evidence against the government and Defendant agents. One of the improper and unethical reasons that Defendant Avenia resigned in February/March 1999 was that he was obligated by numerous promises to Bell, including being ethically obligated to assist Bell to protect his rights, yet he repeatedly violated this with regard to Bell’s rights and property. He resigned to deny Bell his rights.
Claim #113
Plaintiff Bell, at the time unaware of the full nature of the collusion of the Defendants, informed Defendant Avenia (by telephone) on or about December 1, 1997 that Lund had assaulted him for purposes of forcing Bell to continue to "accept" the plea agreement. Defendant Avenia failed and refused to deal properly with this information, claiming merely that he "didn't know anything about that." He lied. In fact, however, Defendant Avenia was fully aware of the sham nature of the plea agreement and the violations subsequent to the signing of the agreement, including Avenia's own refusal to challenge the “PSI report” and the “special conditions of release,” and Avenia was also fully aware of Bell's insistence and right that the agreement either be followed, "repaired" if this were possible, or abandoned altogether. Defendant Avenia, however, was an active part of the conspiracy, and his interest lay with assisting the other co-conspirators in forcing the plea agreement on Bell, so he did nothing before, during, or after the December 12, 1997 sentencing to assist Plaintiff Bell, in violation of Defendant Avenia's legal and ethical obligations. Defendant Avenia intentionally made no effective attempts until as late as his eventual resignation in February, 1999 to get the plea agreement enforced to Bell's benefit, and Avenia concealed his failures to act and ethical and legal obligations from Bell. Each of Defendant Avena's actions and inactions were by prior arrangement with Defendants especially Prosecutor Levins, London, Burgess, and Jeff Gordon and unknown-named others.
Claim #114
Defendants coordinated a fraudulent hearing on the day before the sentencing hearing, December 11, 1997, at which point they misleadingly "disclosed" the fact that they had improperly included improper material to the Judge prohibited by the plea agreement, as if this were the only violation of the plea agreement that had occurred up to that time. This inclusion was (secretly) intentional, the defendants intending to either force Bell to accept the fraudulent agreement or trick Bell into rejecting it and triggering the imposition of even more corrupt Judge Jack Tanner. These Defendant actors, who included Burgess, Avenia, Levins, London, Gordon, and Spier, and unknown others, were actively colluding to conceal the other violations and to delay their resolution until Plaintiff Bell had been tricked (and, eventually, extorted by Defendant Lund as well) into expressing his final "approval" of the plea agreement. Plaintiff Bell on Dec 11, 1997 DID NOT give a blanket approval or acceptance of the numerous violations that had occurred up until that point, and Defendant Avenia was still falsely and fraudulently claiming to Bell that the other violations would be addressed before sentencing. They were not, by prior arrangement of the defendants, including Avenia. This was fraud.
Claim #115
Defendant Prosecutor London displayed his further intent to violate the plea agreement by, after the December 12, 1997 sentencing hearing was concluded, by requesting "permission" on behalf of Defendant Gordon and other co-conspirators to delete various information from Bell's computers' hard drives before returning them to Bell. (These computers have never been returned to Bell, however.) Burgess did not have any authority to "approve" such a newly-revealed violation of the specific and agreed-terms of the plea agreement, and the idea of information being deleted from any of Bell's property had never before been raised in any negotiations Bell was aware of. This was an intentional and collusive action by the Defendants, and all of them acting in concert, to further violate the plea agreement long after it was signed, and particularly after Plaintiff Bell was intended and made to have no further ability to object to these newly revealed violations. It was also a wrongful attempt to shift the onus and responsibility for this denial-of-evidence to a person (Burgess) who might have claimed immunity for this wrongful act.
In requesting the data erasures, Defendant London acted in an administrative, investigative or government capacity that was unimmunized: He was also acting as an agent for the conspirators particularly Jeff Gordon, and London had no more immunity in this request than Gordon himself would have had if Gordon had made this specific request himself. See e.g., Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 US 118, 139 L Ed 2d 471, 118 S Ct 502 (1997). The defendants were conspiring with defendant Burgess, a frequently-immunized person, and they are liable under Sparks v. Dennis, 449 US 24, 66 L Ed 2d 185, 101 5 Ct 183 (1980).
Claim #116
By careful prior coordination by all Defendants, the December 12, 1997 sentencing hearing fraudulently addressed the plea agreement FIRST, despite Defendant Avenia's fraudulent promises to Bell to eliminate those "special conditions of release" and other violative components of the proposed sentencing. By delaying his challenge to the day of sentencing, Avenia was guaranteeing that Bell would receive no relief and Bell’s rights would be violated. Bell had a (violated) right to insist on enforcement of the terms of the plea agreement, or a withdrawal of both the plea and the charges, since the government had (fraudulently) obtained “payment” in ways they intended could and would not be reversible.
Claim #117
Later, Defendants including BOP employees of Seatac FDC engaged in a fraudulent “hearing” on Defendant Lund’s assault on Bell, colluding to place the blame for this incident on Bell himself, despite the clear testimony of one inmate who fully backed up Bell’s account, and despite the refusal of the Seatac FDC administration to allow the testimony of another inmate who was also a witness. Seatac FDC staff violated Bell’s Due Process rights by a violation of Bell’s rights to a prompt UDC hearing, and these staff violated their own policies by refusing to allow Bell his choice of a staff representative. This hearing constituted Obstruction of Justice, a RICO predicate, and further a violation of 42 USC § 1985 and Bivens. The wrongful results of that hearing were used to Bell’s detriment. They helped conceal the other defendants’ extortion. Bell was denied the opportunity to appeal this wrongful result.
Claim #118
Defendants including employees of the Seatac Federal Detention Center (FDC) fraudulently mis-classified Plaintiff Bell in order to improperly send him to Phoenix FCI in late January, 1998. Such a false classification was engineered by false claims as to the existence of a “prior” conviction, and a false claim of “violence” when the staff knew that it was false. Such a false classification was intended to put Bell into contact with and become at the mercy of hardened criminals. Bell had, at most, one security level point, but he was sent to Phoenix when that should have required at least nine security level points. Plaintiff Bell was fraudulently denied the opportunity to challenge this classification, and he was made aware of Defendants' malicious intent only after he had arrived in Phoenix, where he had "only" 2.5 months left to do on the sentence. It was the intent of the Defendants that Plaintiff Bell be harmed by being improperly classified and delivered to Phoenix FCI. This mistreatment and misclassification constitutes extortion, a RICO predicate act, as well as a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment, as well as a violation of Due Process. This is also obstruction of justice and is a RICO predicate and a Bivens violation. This misclassification was accomplished by U.S. Mail, fax, email, or telephone, which is mail fraud or wire fraud.
Claim #119
Subsequent to his first release in April, 1998, Plaintiff Bell was threatened with re-arrest by Defendants London, Michael Markham and Avenia, if he did not "approve" the release of a previously-negotiated-confidential medical examination, an act which further violated the plea agreement. This was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203. It also constituted extortion, a RICO predicate act, as well as a violation of Due Process, and it was also a contractual violation since plea agreements are supposed to be enforced analogous to contracts. London was acting in his investigative, individual and conspiratorial capacities, unimmunized.
Claim #120
Plaintiff Bell was also illegally stalked by agents of the Defendants, both physically and electronically, motivated by the Defendants' knowledge of their own illegal activities and their fear that Plaintiff Bell would investigate and expose their actions. Their purpose was to threaten and intimidate Bell and his friends and relatives, as well as to deter and prevent Bell from investigating not merely the Defendants’ illegal infiltration of the MCCLC, but also the numerous subsequent violations of Bell's rights including Ryan Lund's assault on Plaintiff Bell and the fraudulent plea agreement. This was fraudulent concealment.
Claim #121
Plaintiff Bell was denied his right to use computers and the Internet, a fraudulent “add-on” in the "special conditions of release" which was added months AFTER Bell had signed the plea agreement. This was a violation of Bell’s First and Fourth Amendment rights and contractual rights, and was intended to inhibit Bell’s ability to investigate the co-conspirators’ actions against him and MCCLC. It constituted obstruction of Bell’s access to the courts.
Claim #122
Unknown-named government personnel including Defendants specifically and extensively stalked and harassed Plaintiff Bell and his family and friends in the days before and on June 22, 1998, for the purpose of intimidating Bell and these other people including class Plaintiffs. They did this stalking both physically, by approaching Bell numerous times both in cars and on foot, and did this not for any legitimate or legal purpose. Such events included the following: sending a stalker to approach Bell and his family at Wintler County Park in Vancouver, Washington; sending two stalkers to approach Bell and his mother at David Douglas Park in Vancouver, WA,; and to continue their stalking and harassing contacts at a school in northern Vancouver, WA. In doing so, they violated 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. Colluding attorneys, Avenia and Mandel later obstructed Bell’s right to expose and use the harassing fact of these events to demonstrate the government’s violation of the plea agreement and the fact that Bell was actually the victim of defendants’ stalking.
Claim #123
This stalking was assisted by the illegal installation of tracking devices on the vehicle owned by Bell's friends and family, in violation of their possessory rights and without a warrant. See Soldal v. Cook Co., 506 U.S. 56 (1992). Further, the knowledge and evidence of this illegal and secret installation was illegally denied to Bell from 1997 to the present day, in violation of Bell's rights to Discovery, by the collusion of Defendants and especially Avenia, Mandel, and Leen. This was done without probable cause nor reasonable suspicion of any crime, and was done to illegally retaliate against them and to wrongfully “protect” the defendants from lawful court action by plaintiffs.
Claim #124
On or about June 21, 1998, Plaintiff Bell's mother, Lou Bell, class Plaintiff, had a stroke due to the pressure and threats of these harassing contacts and stalking by these Defendants and their agents, harassment and harm that Defendants and each of them intended and desired. She is affected to this day, and in continuous pain.
Claim #125
On or about June 22, 1998, Plaintiff Bell made a trip by car from his Vancouver, Washington residence, intending to drive directly to his sister's house in Hillsboro, Oregon. Bell discovered that he was being stalked by unknown-named people in vehicles registered in Oregon, and they were following him in a harassing fashion. They were the agents of the defendants, conspiring to violate Bell’s rights under 42 USC § 1985 and Bivens. They were using radio communications to stalk Bell, which is wire fraud.
Claim #126
These people were government agents, and agents for the conspiracy of the defendants. They had agreed to use a pretext of an arrest warrant to justify following Bell, but they had no intention of immediately arresting Bell, as the events soon made clear. Bell followed one of them, and was soon himself followed by another vehicle with more than one agent in it, but none of these agents made any moves to arrest or stop Bell, with the exception of a momentary blockade performed by a small number of Portland Police Bureau agents on foot (who were manning a roadblock to re-route traffic for a parade) who were instructed by radio to briefly impede Bell's progress at following that agent. That gave the hapless agent enough time to leave, so Bell proceeded to Hillsboro, Oregon while ignoring other stalking vehicles.
Claim #127
Bell had taken a license plate number and photographs of that agent's vehicle, and government agent defendant Jeff Gordon two years later (November 6, 2000) robbed Bell of the picture and a set of hand-written pages containing that license plate number (Oregon plate UVT983, last registered by Hans Rapp, owner of Northwestern Mold and Die Company of Gladstone, Oregon.). Defendant Jeff Gordon was not able to rob Bell of his memory, however. This was obstruction of justice, intending to block or delay Bell’s access to the courts. See Delew v.Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998).
Claim #128
Later in the day, Plaintiff Bell left his sister's house in Hillsboro, and over the next few hours he was repeatedly followed at various times by a number of other stalking vehicles in Washington County, Multnomah County, Oregon, and finally Clark County, Washington, cars driven by unknown-named defendants. Bell wrote down license plate numbers and was eventually (summer of 2000) able to determine the last registered owners of most of these vehicles. Those driving (not necessarily those registered owners) were in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A & 1952(a).
Claim #129
During that day, Bell on many occasions gave his crowd of stalkers an opportunity to arrest him should they want to do so, eventually repeatedly leaving his own car at various stops and walking up to a group of them who had gathered by pre-arrangement. These agents pretended not to know who Bell was, because they had agreed beforehand that they needed to illegally search Bell's residence to plant evidence and handle illegally-planted "bugs" and wiretap devices, and arresting Bell miles from his residence would obviously not have come close to “justifying” an otherwise-illegal and pretextual search of the house. They had planned and conspired all along to do that illegal search, which they eventually did on June 23, 1998. They violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A & 1952(a). They endangered Bell and others on the road with their harassing behavior.
Claim #130
On June 23, 1998, six unknown-named agents of the Defendants, acting in their various capacities including color of law, including three US Marshals (Vollmer, Grizzell, Stevenson and two probation officers), and a Vancouver Police officer "David King" did an intentionally illegal and pretextual search of Bell's residence. First, they illegally entered the house at 7214 Corregidor despite their lack of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, arrested Plaintiff Bell maliciously and without probable cause, based on allegations which were not merely false but were themselves based on improperly-added terms-of-release that had been illegally added to Bell's conditions of release. This was a violation of Bell's Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth amendment rights, and also a violation of 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985 statutes. It was also an exercise of extortion in violation of the RICO predicates, and all of these violations were planned and intended by the participants including Defendants. They used the telephone to determine when to attack Bell, which is wire fraud.
Claim #131
These officers, after having emptied the house of people and after knowing that the house was fully emptied, wrongfully returned and re-entered the house, and knowingly did an illegal search of the house without a search warrant. They knew this was improper and a violation of both Plaintiff Bell's rights but also the rights of the other residents of the house. They did not ask for permission to do the search, and they were knowingly acting illegally. This was intended to intimidate the residents, and did so, and that was extortion, a violation of RICO predicates and a conspiracy to violate rights under 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985, as well as Bivens. These agents also violated 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a). Their wrongful purpose was to “flood” the house with their agents so that their handling of illegally-planted “bugs” could be concealed from residents Sam and Lou Bell.
Claim #132
In doing so, also, they violated a known specific (and later upheld) term of the plea agreement which allowed "a probation officer" (only one), not six agents of various kinds, to do a search. Even that was only allowed while Bell was actually released, which at the time he was not.
Claim #133
These agents of the Defendants did a full, and fully-illegal "pretextual search" of the house, planted evidence illegally, and took numerous items which were in no way justified by any arguable rule or law. (These items taken were not, in fact, even arguably evidence of any crime or release violation). No receipt for these items was left. This constituted abuse of process, which constitutes obstruction of justice, and evidences malicious prosecution by defendants.
Claim #134
Later, agents of the conspiracy, especially Avenia, London, Mandel, and Burgess colluded to deny Bell the right to challenge the legality of that search, the planting of evidence, or call the United States Marshals as witnesses, in violation of their ethical and legal obligations. This was Obstruction of Justice, a RICO predicate, and a 42 USC § 1985 conspiracy against rights and Bivens.
Claim #135
Over the next 11 months, while waiting for a hearing that had been illegally delayed numerous times by the Defendants' improper desires and efforts to get Plaintiff Bell to accept a fraudulent hearing without those Marshal witnesses, Bell was denied even a list of the items taken, by these co-conspirator/Defendant lawyers Avenia and Mandel. Bell eventually discovered the existence of this evidence list in lawyer Mandel's pile of paperwork, during the second day of the hearing in June 1999, and the items fully confirmed Bell's suspicion that this search had been fully pretextual and illegal. Moreover it proved that Bell was being illegally denied evidence that would have proven the illegal and pre-textual nature of the search. All the Defendants, but especially Avenia and Mandel, colluded in concealing the illegal nature of the search. Items taken without a valid warrant, or items taken that are not described by a valid warrant, also support a civil claim of "malicious prosecution" and “abuse of process.” This was also a conspiracy against civil rights under Bivens and 42 USC § 1985.
Claim #136
The searchers on June 23, 1998 also handled illegally-planted wiretapping and listening devices (assisting in wire fraud), and it was their “need” to retrieve those illegally-planted devices lest they be discovered and exposed which made their illegal re-entry into the house "necessary." Defendants, especially Avenia, Mandel, Burgess, London, and others colluded to deny Bell the right to call witnesses to expose these illegal activities, including three US Marshals whom they could not allow to testify for fear of being exposed by being questioned by Plaintiff Bell. This was obstruction of justice, a RICO predicate. The aforementioned acts also constituted tampering with a witness, a RICO predicate.
Claim #137
These colluding Defendants also acted to deny Bell access to the information that the revelation of such wiretaps and bugs would have revealed, exposing the illegal nature of the search, which violated Bell's right to a fair hearing in May/June, 1999. This was Wire Fraud, a RICO predicate, and obstruction of justice.
Claim #138
The searching officers knowingly, illegally and improperly used the search for far more than the limited function that a probation search is allowed to do, which was their illegal intent. Another illegal purpose of the search was to determine how Plaintiff Bell identified the government stalkers loosed on him by Defendants on previous days, and especially during the road trip Bell took to Oregon on June 22, 1998. Evidence was also planted to ensure that Bell would appear "guilty" of something, anything, and the non-planted items taken were taken illegally, and without even reasonable suspicion, such as an integrated circuit (called a “circuit card,” showing the searchers' extreme ignorance of technology as well as law and proper search procedure), a VISA card and others. This was a violation of 18 USC § 2236, and is actionable under Bivens and 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1985.
Claim #139
Defendants including Avenia, London, Mandel, Burgess, and unknown-named others colluded to deny Plaintiff Bell the ability and evidence necessary to expose this illegality and misbehavior of government personnel including Defendants, and allowed the detrimental and illegally-obtained and illegally-modified plea agreement (as well as terms later illegally added in violation of Bell's contractual and constitutional rights) to be wrongly enforced against Bell. They also acted (and failed to act) to prevent Bell from exposing these violations against Bell's rights, or to defend Bell, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986 and Bivens. They also colluded to deny Bell the right to enforce the plea agreement against the government.
Claim #140
The purposes of such concealment was to prevent the public disclosure of illegal and fraudulent government-agent and Defendant activity by these actors prior to Plaintiff Bell's sentencing, December 1997. They were attempting to prevent the disclosure of not merely the Defendants' illegal infiltration of the MCCLC and their illegal intent, but also other secret and illegal surveillance and stalking done against Plaintiff Bell during the 1995-1998 time frame done for wrongful and ideological reasons. They achieved this by their wrongful acts.
Claim #141
Defendants including especially Avenia, London and Burgess maliciously and illegally delayed the hearing an astounding 11 months, in violation of Bell's contractual and constitutional rights. During a hearing in late July, 1998, Defendant Avenia, acting on the wrongful orders of the other Defendants, made an intentionally-false promise to Plaintiff Bell that he (Avenia) would have Bell's accusations and suspicions investigated, and as a direct result of this fraudulent and unfulfilled promise Bell was defrauded of his right to have a prompt and fair hearing. Defendant Burgess assisted by instigating a phony and unjustified “evaluation” against Bell, based solely on an undenied (by defendants) assertion by Bell that government agents had been spying on him for “a couple of years”. Defendants knew this assertion was true, but they acted to attempt to wrongfully discredit Bell.
Claim #142
In mid to late November, 1998, Plaintiff Bell discovered that Defendant Avenia had lied about his promise about doing the investigation, and Bell continued to confront and press Avenia to fulfill his promises and obligations. In early January 1999 Defendant Avenia wrote an intentionally-inadequate and misleading letter to co-conspirators/Defendants including government officials including Defendant Rob London and Gordon, making inadequate inquiries with the intent of glossing over Avenia's prior failure to fulfill his promises. Avenia carefully and maliciously fabricated that letter of inquiry to ensure that the government and all Defendants would be effectively allowed to conceal the illegal and improper and secret activities of its employees and agents. Defendant Avenia structured the letter and made the "inquiry" to ensure that it would not be forwarded to those government agencies which he knew or believed actually had the information that needed to be exposed. Avenia posted that letter by U.S. Mail, which is mail fraud. Defendants anticipated that Bell would call Avenia to discuss that letter, so defendants are guilty of wire fraud.
Claim #143
Bell saw through this sham, however, and expressed his dissatisfaction in mid-January, 1999 to Avenia. Avenia, finally pretending to be bound by his prior promise to Bell, eventually sent an investigator (Sharon Callas) to Vancouver, Washington and Portland, Oregon to look into some of Bell's suspicions and accusations, in late January 1999. Plaintiffs allege that this was an intentionally-inadequate inquiry, deliberately avoiding issues that were "sensitive", but even so investigator Callas learned some information that was incriminating about Defendants, especially Ryan Lund and his contacts with the other Defendants during his 1-week stay in Portland, Oregon jail while being transported from Eugene, Oregon to Seatac FDC in November, 1997. The defendants planned and acted to conceal this information from Bell.
Claim #144
Investigator Callas, after she returned from this investigatory trip, was very shortly said by the Defendant Public Defenders' office to have “resigned" and "disappeared." Plaintiff Bell responded by telephone to that office by insisting that he be given a copy of Callas' investigational report, but this request was met simply by the claim that no such report had ever been written and filed before her "resignation" and "disappearance." Such a claim was highly unlikely, since investigators routinely write and file those reports as a normal part of their efforts.
This investigatory "negligence" was in violation of Bell's due process rights, as well as other Constitutional rights, and Bell's contractual rights which led from the (albeit phony) plea agreement. This claim was also fraudulently intended to conceal from Bell the information Callas had collected which was incriminating to the Defendants including Gordon, Spier, Burgess, Avenia, Lund, and Levins and unknown others.
Claim #145
Shortly after investigator Callas' "disappearance" Defendant attorney Avenia resigned from his representation of Bell, because of Avenia's realization that continued representation would require that he (Avenia) disclose information to Bell that would incriminate the other Defendants. Avenia resigned, making false claims in his letter of resignation to disguise the actual reasons for his departure, and Bell was denied the opportunity to challenge Avenia's mis-statements in his resignation, or obtain the enforcement of Avenia’s promises. Avenia resigned to harm Bell.
Claim #146
Defendant Avenia was replaced. Against Bell’s wishes, Defendant Mandel took Avenia’s place without any assurance that she would act in any more ethical or legal fashion than Avenia. Mandel was instructed by the other Defendants to refuse to do any investigation of Bell’s allegations, including obtaining any investigatory report by "disappearing" investigator Callas. Mandel was also instructed by the defendants to not prepare for the hearing, and to refuse and fail to call any defense witnesses for Bell's benefit, despite the fact that Bell had been insisting (since July, 1998) on the testimony of those three US Marshals (defendants Vollmer, Grizzell and Stevenson) who had been present at the illegal search of Bell's residence on June 23, 1998, and were suspected and accused by Bell of planting evidence and handling illegally-planted wiretap devices and other "bugs." Mandel accomplished this sabotage and betrayal.
Claim #147
Mandel followed the orders of the other Defendants in these respects, failing and refusing to prepare, and lying to Bell and concealing from him her utter lack of preparation for the hearing and her unethical conflict of interest. She also concealed her refusal to enforce Bell's rights, and her refusal to raise issues which would establish that Defendants (and other unknown-named government-employee actors) had been engaged in illegal and fraudulent activity against Bell from 1995-1999.
Claim #148
The selection of Mandel, who was a private attorney and not a full-time Public Defender, reveals that the Defendant Public Defenders office realized that they could not legally assign one of their own (since they all had a serious conflict of interest against Bell at this point) to "represent" Bell. This was absolutely in contradiction to the usual method, to simply replace one Public Defender with another. This establishes their knowledge that their own personnel (Avenia) had engaged in improper activity, and a conflict of interest had accrued. These defendants knew and intended that Mandel would not fulfill her ethical and legal obligations, and that Bell would be harmed as a consequence, and he was harmed.
Claim #149
One key and carefully-crafted method used by Defendants used to deny Bell a fair hearing in May/June 1999 was this: Defendant Mandel theatrically submitted her resignation at the beginning of the first day of the hearing, when in fact she would be ethically and legally obligated to have done so many days or weeks before, when she decided to no longer work to Bell's benefit. Mandel knew that witnesses would have to drive long distances to the hearing, for example. Delaying her resignation until the beginning of the hearing was intended (and was secretly and collusively agreed to be "played" by Defendant/Judge Burgess) as an invitation to Burgess to "force" Mandel on Bell, but in a way carefully calculated to provide "ethical cover" for Mandel and to rely on Burgess' ostensible immunities. Co-conspirators/Defendants Burgess and Mandel, being experienced with courtroom procedure, knew and agreed that if their actions were ever challenged, Mandel would "blame" her continued assignment on Burgess' wrongful order, and Burgess could "blame" the "need" for the improper order on Mandel's "failure" to inform the Court of the need for her resignation days or even weeks earlier. Defendants including Burgess and Mandel agreed and saw this coordination as essential to the preservation of their ethical "reputations" since they knew what they were intending was highly illegal and unethical. This is obstruction of justice, a RICO predicate, as well as a conspiracy against rights under 42 USC § 1985 and Bivens. It was also violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and a Sixth Amendment violation. It denied Bell witnesses, contrary to his right. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US 471, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972).
Claim #150
Defendant Judge Burgess had done no inquiry as to why there was a problem with the representation, and in fact he was obligated to do this inquiry in an ex-parte (without the participation of the prosecution, who had no legitimate function here) hearing. He did not do so, and thus failed to act in his administrative capacity, in collusion with the other defendants, a violation of Bivens and 42 USC § 1985.
Claim #151
By the beginning of the first day of the hearing May 21, 1999, Mandel had failed and refused to call three US Marshals who had been present at the June 23, 1998 illegal search and were accused by Bell of planting evidence. Mandel falsely claimed to Plaintiff Bell, on the first day of the two-day hearing, that these Marshals hadn't entered into the house on June 23, and thus (she claimed) were not part of the "chain of evidence" and they could not have planted the evidence or tampered with the evidence, or handled illegally-planted wiretaps that needed to be dealt with. Mandel was intentionally lying to Bell. Bell's consistent and vociferous position to both Defendants Avenia from June 1998 through his resignation in February 1999, and to Mandel in February 1999 and through the hearing days on May 21, 1999, June 2, 1999 was quite clear: Bell reminded both these Defendants/lawyers that he (Bell) was, of course, present at the scene of the search, albeit outside in a car, and he saw that all personnel at the scene entered, at one time or another, into the house. Mandel intentionally and maliciously refused her ethical and legal obligations by denying Bell an arguable (and, in fact, correct) legal position.
Claim #152
Mandel, in collusion with the other Defendants and for the benefit of them, including the three incriminated US Marshals in particular, failed and refused to interview those Marshal witness/participants, because she knew or should have known or suspected that they had planted the evidence and/or manipulated the illegal bugging devices as Bell accused, and because she knew or believed that they would tell her they had gone into the house, and she wanted to continue to fraudulently claim to believe they had not.
Claim #153
In spite of her sham “offers” to resign, Mandel was improperly imposed on Bell by Defendant Judge Franklin Burgess on the first day of the hearing on May 21, 1999, without the necessary ex-parte hearing. Defendant Mandel had failed and refused to interview, let alone call any witnesses on Bell's behalf, partly (ostensibly) because of her claim that those Marshals hadn't participated. However, Mandel's own questioning of the other participants of the search on the first day of the hearing revealed answers that, contrary to Mandel's prior false claims to Bell, ALL personnel present at the search actually did enter the house, including those Marshals, further confirming Bell's recollection. Thus, the entire basis for Mandel's refusal and failure to call those witnesses was utterly disproved.
Claim #154
Judge Burgess failed to act in his administrative or ministerial capacity to replace Mandel, despite his knowledge that she was manipulating and sabotaging Bell’s defense, and he failed to de-schedule the second day of the hearing. The second day of the hearing was scheduled more than a week away. Plaintiff Bell, after being returned to Seatac FDC at the end of the first day, May 21, called Mandel at about 4:30 PM by telephone and pointedly reminded her that the testimony that day had clearly confirmed Bell’s recollection of the matter, and Bell repeatedly demanded the testimony of these three U.S. Marshals.
Mandel, continuing to display her unending loyalty to the other Defendants of the conspiracy, astonishingly repeated her thus-disproven claim that those three US Marshals hadn't entered the house. Bell instantly told her, in no uncertain terms, that she was clearly wrong, and Bell reminded her that the day's testimony directly contradicted her false claim. Bell confirmed his recollection, further, with his parents who were present at the June 23, 1998 search. Bell then left a message before 5:00 that day reminding Mandel that there was no doubt among anyone present at the search: The only one claiming that the Marshals didn't enter the building was Mandel herself. Her claim was a fraud. She was not there.
Claim #155
It was clear at this point that Mandel was intentionally sabotaging Bell's rights and legal position. Bell had a right to the testimony of those three US Marshal participants, but Mandel was bluntly acting (and failing to act) to deny Bell's rights. (Bell later, in the year 2000, obtained the transcripts for the first day of the hearing, and they clearly confirmed Bell's recollections in this regard). Mandel, at this point, knew or should have known that she could have ordered transcripts of that day's hearing in plenty of time for the second day in early June, but she chose to not do so because she was already aware that Bell was right and she wished to deny Bell that critical testimony. Mandel knew that such transcripts, had they been ordered, would have totally destroyed Mandel's false claims, and she would have then been ethically obligated to call those three US Marshal witnesses as Bell had been demanding for the previous 11 months. Mandel was engaging in betrayal and fraud, on the instructions of the other defendants. Plaintiffs allege that this enormous 11-month delay, and especially the delay from about November 18, 1998 to the date of the first hearing day, May 21, 1999 (over 6 months total delay) was entirely fraudulent and collusive, and was intentionally engineered by the defendants to extort some kind of settlement out of Bell.
Claim #156
Mandel continued to fail and refuse to call those Marshals who Bell had accused of planting evidence and manipulating bugs, and on the second day of the hearing she again made a phony belated offer to resign, but again by careful pre-arrangement Defendant Judge Burgess refused. Mandel had continued to collude with the other Defendants by failing to call those Marshals. In brief, Mandel and Burgess had engineered a total denial of Plaintiff Bell's Constitutional rights to witnesses in his favor; and also his right to challenge witnesses against him. Mandel helped to conceal the illegal use of tracking devices against Bell and others, obstructing Bell’s access to the courts.
Claim #157
In fact, Mandel colluded by calling NO defense witnesses at all during the two-day hearing, as requested improperly and unethically by the other Defendants. Mandel intentionally failed and refused to inquire about illegal listening and bugging devices planted and/or removed during that search, or other “sensitive” issues that her co-conspirators/defendants instructed her to avoid. Mandel was acting intentionally for the benefit of her friends in the government, not Bell. This was a conspiracy under 42 USC § 1985 and Bivens, and accomplished a violation of Bell’s First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights.
Claim #158
Defendants Franklin Burgess, in either his Administrative, ministerial, or personal capacity, but in either case also in his capacity as co-conspirator and agent of the conspiracy, and Defendant Mandel continued to act to deny Bell's rights, including by "allowing" Mandel to resign, WITHOUT REPLACEMENT, after the second and final day of the hearing on or about June 2, 1999. This was done by prior arrangement of the Defendants: Mandel was allowed to resign when she had done all the harm (by action or inaction) to Plaintiff Bell that could be accomplished at that point. Bell had a right to appeal this hearing's fraudulent result, and Defendant Burgess was aware that Bell had a right to honest representation to do so, so he intentionally violated Bell's rights to preserve the harm he and Mandel had caused to Bell. An appeal case number, #99-30210, was initiated, but the fact of it and the rights it represented were fraudulently concealed from Bell, and the case was illegally suppressed and hidden. The purpose of this was to deny Bell the ability to challenge and appeal the improper and intentionally-illegal and abusive hearings, but also to ensure that Bell could not further attempt to enforce (to his benefit) the increasingly-violated plea agreement, and to not allow Bell to protect his property rights by having his property returned. This obstructed Bell’s access to the courts, as was intended and attempted by all defendants.
Claim #159
Plaintiff Bell was given an improperly long sentence that amounted to false imprisonment, a violation of Bell's contractual and Constitutional rights. It was also fraudulent concealment of the events previously described. Bell was fraudulently denied the right to appeal this conviction: A case was instituted on July 6, 1999 (case #99-30210) but it was secretly and illegally concealed and suppressed by the defendants and colluding court personnel.
At an unknown time, unknown-named Ninth Circuit Court personnel acting in their administrative, ministerial, clerical or other capacities began acting on the corrupt instructions of the other defendants: Specifically, they began corruptly falsifying, forging, and improperly adding to and deleting from the Ninth Circuit Court documentary record (the docket, individual forged docket items) with regard to appeal #99-30210. They did this to fraudulently conceal and manipulate that court record and to violate and deny Plaintiff Bell’s constitutional, statutory, and procedural rights. In violation of 18 USC 1503, which is a RICO predicate act, they endeavored to and did corruptly obstruct, impede, and influence the due administration of justice within the enterprise known as the “Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals”, in order to deceive that court as well as to deceive the rest of the government as to the correct record of the case and to thereby harm Bell. See U.S. London, 714 F.2d 1558, 1566-67.
Thus, in violation of 18 USC 1962(c) and (d) (RICO), these defendants including unknown-named employees conspired to and did conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the Ninth Circuit Court’s affairs through and extensive pattern of racketeering activity. See U.S. v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 1993). See also U.S. v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 597 (9th Cir. 1993), U.S. v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1982).
Claim #160
Defendants including Gordon, London, and Burgess continued to violate Bell's rights, even after Bell's release in April, 2000 by denying him the return of his property. The denial of Bell's rights to his computers' data and hardware was intended to continue to violate Bell's First Amendment rights, which as violations continue to the present day. Defendants including Gordon continued and continue to improperly keep the computers without ever seeking any sort of legal authority to do so, which was and is illegal and in violation of Bell's Constitutional and contractual rights, as well as violation of 42 USC § 1985, Bivens and extortion as a RICO predicate, and 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a).
Claim #161
Defendant Burgess acting in his non-immunized personal, ministerial or administrative capacity violated Bell's right to representation, and in doing so he conspired with the other Defendants and as himself acting in his judicial capacity. Thus Burgess is liable for all his acts, with no immunities. Burgess failed to act in his administrative capacity to replace Mandel.
False Administrative Charges
Claim #162
The staff at Seatac FDC gave Bell a sham "UDC" (Unit Disciplinary Committee) hearing based on false charges in August, 1999. During the UDC hearing, the staff member(s) reviewing the incident falsely and blatantly filled out the UDC hearing report form with intentionally false answers to questions asked of Bell: 1) "Would you like witnesses" and 2. "Do you want a staff representative?" Bell answered verbally "Yes" to both these questions, but immediately the staff member wrote "No" as an intentionally-false answer to those questions on the stock form. Plaintiff Bell immediately noticed the false reporting in front of him and immediately and specifically objected to the writing of the false “answers.” The staff failed and refused to correct the "answers," and later falsely claimed that Bell had been "upset," when in fact that they knew that this reaction was a simple but powerful reaction to the false information they had just written. Within minutes after Bell was returned to his cell, these staff members falsely and maliciously told Bell to sign the document, which still contained the false "answers." Bell refused, again citing the false answers as a good reason to refuse to sign the phony document. Again, the staff members failed and refused to correct the record.
Claim #163
Then, on or about August 20, 1999, at the subsequent "DHO" (Disciplinary Hearing Officer) a Lieutenant "Germaine" falsely and dishonestly dealt with this matter, hearing Bell's accurate description of the UDC hearing fraud, but refusing to act on Bell's reports on false-dealing by his fellow staff members in the UDC hearing. Lt. Germain was then fully aware of the fraud and he immediately acted to "rubber-stamp" the sham. Bell was violated in his right to Due Process.
Claim #164
Lt. Germain maliciously found Bell "guilty" despite Germaine's knowledge that Bell was not guilty, but also because of Bell's objection to the UDC staff’s fraud. Germaine set punishment, but such punishment specifically DID NOT include any loss of “GCT” ("good-conduct-time".) Lt. Germaine failed to deliver a copy of the DHO report to Bell within the required 10 days, which further violated Bell's due process rights.
Within days, on or about September 2, 1999, Bell was transferred away from Seatac FDC and eventually was sent again to Phoenix FCI. Bell's right to challenge any loss of GCT was violated at this point since he wasn't informed of any such loss.
Claim #165
In early March 2000, however, Plaintiff Bell was given a "sentence calculation sheet" which falsely showed an incorrect date for Bell's proposed release. Bell immediately noted the discrepancy of 15 days in his disfavor, and he objected to Phoenix FCI staff Phoenix staff responded to Bell's objection by obtaining a copy of the August, 1999 DHO hearing, which clearly showed the lack of any reference to a loss of "GCT". Bell immediately noted and pointed out to Phoenix staff this fact, that no "GCT" time was lost. Phoenix staff's reaction was to call Seatac FDC back. Within a day or two, Seatac staff had generated a phony, "updated" document (yet it was dated early March, 2000) which was claimed to be a "corrected" document which DID refer to a loss of GCT. However, this new document itself evidenced numerous violations of BOP rules, including missing appropriate signatures and showing no evidence (obviously!) that it had been presented to inmate Bell within ten (10) days of the DHO hearing in 1999. (Since it wasn't made until six months later, it couldn't possibly have been presented to Bell within 10 days of the DHO hearing).
In doing so, Seatac FDC and Phoenix FCI staff violated Plaintiff Bell's right to challenge this new and phony document. It was not possible to go through normal, lengthy channels to "fix" this fraud, since there was about a month remaining in Bell's sentence. The fraudulent concealment of this ostensible “loss” of GCT until March 2000 intentionally prevented Bell from correcting this wrong.
Claim #166
Therefore, Bell was illegally and intentionally kept 15 days longer than the BOP should have done, and Bell is entitled to maximum compensation for this intentionally-illegal act. The foregoing was a gross violation of due process, and a conspiracy against rights 42 USC §1985 and Bivens and false imprisonment. Since Bell was held against his will with threats of further punishment if he tried to leave, it was also extortion which is a RICO predicate act. It was false imprisonment, and a violation of due process. It was a violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 USC § 1951.
Claim #167
On Plaintiff Bell’s release in April, 2000, he had made public statements of his intent to openly investigate and publicize the crimes and misbehavior of various people (mostly government employees, including Defendants) in connection with the illegal MCCLC infiltration, the phony and violated plea agreement, and later the stalking by government agents including Defendants, and subsequent serious incidents mostly mentioned here above. In retaliation for Bell's audacity, unknown-named government agents including Defendants acting in each of their capacities including color-of law, and as agents and co-conspirators of the conspiracy, and unknown-named private citizens acting in league with them and at their direction, continued to spy on and stalk Plaintiff Bell. This stalking was done both physically (by representatives of the Defendants in Bell's neighborhood) and also electronically, and was in violation of Bell's privacy as well as his possessory rights to his automobile. This was intended to punish Bell for exercising his First Amendment rights as he had quite recently exercised them, including his right to investigate and publicize and criticize the criminal activities of other citizens including government employees and Defendants.
These co-conspirators were also motivated by their malicious desire to monitor the progress of Bell's investigations so as to be able to know when to resume and continue to physically stalk and harass Bell should he get too close to the truth. They did this.
Claim #168
An automobile tracking device had been illegally planted in Bell's car, a violation of his possessory rights, and particularly a violation because these Defendants and government agents had no probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to believe that any law had been or would be violated. To the contrary, they were completely aware that they were themselves going to be exposed to both criminal and civil liability (this civil Complaint, for example) and they chose to misuse the power and assets of government to “protect” themselves using unconstitutional means and for illegal ends. This was obstruction of justice, and extrinsic fraud.
Claim #169
The evidence of this illegal government stalking, spying, and harassment against Bell was later illegally denied to Plaintiff Bell due to the collusion of Defendant Attorneys Robert Leen and Peggy Sue Juergens, acting at the behest and orders of the other Defendants especially Rob London, Jack Tanner, and Jeff Gordon, all acting in individual, co-conspiratorial, and other capacities.
Claim #170
Government agents had illegally placed at least one other tracking device in the car of a friend of Bell's, and others in the cars of Bell's family members as early as 1997, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that any crime had been or would be committed, motivated by the agents' goal to help continue to protect the secrecy of their ever-growing history of illegal and improper actions, and to harm Bell. This was done by burglary. They were also attempting to violate and defraud the Constitutional rights of Bell and his friends and family, such as the freedom of speech, travel, and association. These actions were all in violation of 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985, and Bivens, and they involved actions by Oregon and Washington state actors assisting with the electronic stalking.
Claim #171
These tracking device placements and uses were intended to and acted to promote and protect the overall plans to defraud the MCCLC and its attendees, including its management, and all of their friends and family, of their various constitutional and statutory rights. As such, this was Wire Fraud and these actions were RICO predicate acts. It was also fraudulent concealment, intending and achieving the denial of access to the courts.
Claim #172
Since an unknown time but before 1997, Defendants including unknown-named government personnel, government contractors and their private personnel have implemented and operated an increasingly sophisticated and abused tracking and location system, one that allows them to quickly and easily detect and store all movements of target vehicles. A GPS-receiving "bug" is secretly and (usually) illegally placed onto the target vehicle, which calculates its location and retransmits this information and retransmits it to satellites, aircraft, and land vehicles. While this system is ostensibly used for legal purposes, in fact it actually used illegally for the purposes of tracking, stalking, and ultimately harassing, attacking, and harming political opponents who are seen to be the enemy of the current government in power. The data is transmitted in interstate links. The system is also extensively used to help commit crimes, including in foreign countries, with the knowledge and approval of the operators of the system. The records of the usage of this system, and the rare instances in which warrants are obtained or disclosed, will establish the unconstitutional and illegal intent of the operators and users of this system.
Claim #173
The transmitters are illegally placed in privately-owned vehicles without the knowledge or permission of the owner, in violation of his possessory rights under the Fourth Amendment, which are separate and independent of rights to privacy. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 US 56, 121 L. Ed.2d 450, 113 S.Ct. 538 (1992). This is spying, done against people neither known or suspected of committing any crime; In fact, this happens when no crime has occurred or is believed will occur. This is a blatant 4th Amendment violation done for political reasons.
Defendants including government agents, contractors, and their personnel plant and operate these transmitters without regard to issues of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and generally act without search warrants, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, and 18 USC § 2117. Such warrants, even if they are obtained, are never actually served on the victim, allowing those operating this system to develop and maintain corrupt practices since they remain concealed. This is fraudulent concealment. The planting of these transmitters is burglary, breaking and entering, and interference with property rights.
The data constituting the location and movements of the vehicle is acquired and stored, and is intended to be (and, later, is) illegally denied to victims of such surveillance who may later become criminal defendants facing false charges or needing alibi information. Even the very existence of and operation of these transmitters is later (falsely) denied, and colluding appointed "defense attorneys" (such as in this case betraying attorneys Peter Avenia, Judith Mandel, and Robert Leen) carefully and wrongfully restrict and adjust their requests for information ("discovery") to government in order to avoid any explicit requirement to release information and expose this illegally-operated system. In doing so they betray their clients’ interest, and collude to violate their clients’ civil rights. Bell was and is a victim of these improper practices. This is legal malpractice.
Claim #174
These colluding "defense attorneys" including Avenia, Mandel, and Leen, are careful to act solely in the interest of government, subject only to the easy condition that this betrayal of their ostensible clients is well-concealed. These colluding "defense attorneys" are careful to avoid putting requests for such specific discovery on paper, for fear of generating a paper trail which will incriminate both themselves and their government contacts. Avenia, Mandel, and Leen all consistently failed and refused to ask for discovery about surveillance and tracking devices on paper, and colluded by refusing to ask (contrary to Plaintiff Bell's repeated demands) the government for its replies in writing to produce a paper trail. Bell’s access to the courts was obstructed by these practices. This was legal malpractice.
Claim #175
These colluding "defense attorneys" make extensive use of pre-canned, "boilerplate" discovery requests which have been carefully studied and approved by prosecutors and government investigators to ensure that they don't mandate release of this wrongfully and secretly obtained information. These colluding "defense attorneys" were and are carefully instructed and learn not to, and do not, add to these "boilerplate" discovery requests, particularly when those additions would risk requiring government and its agents to reveal their illegal actions and practices.
Plaintiffs including Bell allege that the vast majority of the victims of this illegal surveillance never learn of it due to illegal government/defense attorney collusion, as in this US v. Bell, CROO-5731 and CR 97-5270. Further, in the few cases where such surveillance is intended to be disclosed it has been carefully and illegally "compartmentalized" to appear limited and "legal" and the illegal portions remain concealed, also as in CR00-5731. This was done on or about November 3, 2000, by the defendants fraudulently obtaining a warrant for the placement of such a device when government had already done so illegally. The purpose of the warrant was to fraudulently conceal the existence of the prior “bug”, not to obtain information. This makes the warrant affidavit a fraud, because it misrepresents the “need” to obtain the information, and also the “need” to have a warrant to obtain that information. The defendants understood their actions were illegal.
Claim #176
Plaintiffs allege that on at least four occasions’ unknown-named government personnel (but including defendants Gordon and Phillip Scott) wrongfully utilized information derived from the tracking devices illegally planted on Bell's car to contact, harass, and intimidate people during or after Bell's travels. Bell himself was also stalked with this information in 1997, 1998, 2000 and possibly earlier. Plaintiffs allege that such a purpose was illegally inconsistent with the ostensible and claimed purpose of placing the tracking devices.
Plaintiffs further allege, however, that the ability to accomplish this stalking and harassment of Bell and others was a large part of the actual illegal intent of those desiring, causing, and doing the placement of those devices. This is abuse of process, evidencing malicious prosecution.
Claim #177
Plaintiffs further allege that the entire tracking-device system is improperly lacking in controls, restrictions, limitations, and protections that could have easily been provided. For example, rather than tell the (potentially malicious) user everywhere the victim's car goes, the system could and should be limited to "record" only if the car is within a specific distance (say, 1/4 mile) of some particular location (or locations). Or, the information would not be available until an hour after real-time, helping to prevent malicious users such as Jeff Gordon from using this information to coordinate an attack on the victim on the road, as Gordon actually did to Bell on multiple occasions. This was a violation of 18 USC § 2518(5). The lack of such features has harmed Bell. See United States v. Kahn, 415 US 143, 39 L.Ed.2d 225, 94 S.Ct. 977 (1974).
Plaintiffs allege that none of these limiting and protective features are acceptable to those who wish to wrongfully use this system, because they would make the system dramatically less abusable, which is why such features are either unimplemented or unused. Plaintiffs allege that abuses of this kind can and will continue, because the large majority of people tracked will never learn of it and therefore cannot complain; the few who do learn of it are those who are labeled "criminals" and the system won't listen to their legitimate objections. This lack of notice violates the principles of 18 USC § 2518(1)(b)(iv) and § 2518(8)(d).
Claim #178
Plaintiffs including Bell allege that the defendant "defense attorneys," especially Avenia, Mandel and Leen, were and are well aware of the common use of this kind of surveillance in criminal cases in general, and they are also aware that this surveillance is also commonly done illegally and for illegal reasons. Plaintiffs allege that these colluding "defense attorneys" could easily (indeed, trivially) modify their pre-canned and "boilerplate" discovery requests to ensure that all such surveillance is and must be exposed by government in discovery: However, they did and do not, solely because they are and know they are improperly protecting the illegitimate and even illegal interests of the government and its personnel. (Including all Defendants in this Civil Complaint)
Plaintiffs allege that only the uniform and continued assurance that these colluding "defense attorneys" will and do continue to “play ball” by helping conceal this illegal surveillance allows this illegal surveillance and similar practices to continue unabated. Bell was victimized by their collusion. This was a conspiracy under 42 USC § 1985, and also a violation of 42 USC § 1986.
VIOLATIONS OF 18 USC § 2520
Claim #179
Plaintiffs allege that at numerous times during the period of 1995-current date defendants and their government-employed co-conspirators have engaged in various forms of wrongful forms of electronic surveillance against Plaintiffs, including class plaintiffs. These forms may include body-wires, wiretaps, recorded phone calls, "bugs," interception of cordless and cellular/PCS phone transmissions, tracking device monitoring, Van Eck computer-screen monitoring, "keyboard bugs," third-party recorded-data disclosure, "Carnivore," microwave motion-detection, amplified-audio recording, satellite electronic photography, synthetic aperture radar, land and aircraft-based "bug" monitoring, radio-acquisition of stored-data in surveillance devices, and others.
Plaintiffs claim damages under 18 USC § 2520 (c)(2)(A) and §2520 (c)(2)(13), claiming the greater.
Claim #180
Plaintiffs further allege that defendants are estopped from any good-faith reliance on any court warrant or order, grand jury subpoena, legislative or statutory authorization due to:
1. Failure and refusal to disclose all such incidents and material (including authorization) at times when plaintiffs (particularly Bell) requested this in discovery, or when Bell was "hijacked" by colluding and betraying counsel and prevented from requesting full discovery that could have included this material.
2. Refusal or failure to correctly comply with the terms of 18 USC § 2518(7) and 18 USC § 2511(3).
3. Failure to actually serve (and thus disclose) the warrant
4. "Sham" and pretextual applications for warrants or permissions, etc., including fraudulently asking “permission” to do what was already being done illegally.
Claim #181
In the summer of 2000, in order to further harass Plaintiff Bell, Defendants Jeff Gordon and Phillip Scott and other defendants agreed to misuse their official power and to expose Bell to the abuse of numerous other government agents. To do so, Gordon and Scott agreed to make false claims that Bell had somehow been violating the law. They agreed to take false and illegal advantage of their illegally-obtained electronic tracking data, but they also knew and agreed that the fact of the existence of this illegally-obtained information could not be exposed. They agreed, along with unknown-named Defendants, to fabricate a false claim of a crime ostensibly committed by Bell, and they agreed to "manufacture" a crime (to be blamed on Bell) in the event that they could not find anything incriminating. They also agreed that they would illegally search Bell's residence under false pretenses, and take virtually anything they wanted to take in violation of a search warrant, and to use that illegally-obtained information to harm Bell. They agreed and acted to continue to stalk Bell using sophisticated techniques, and later to fraudulently and illegally conceal the fact of this stalking from Bell despite their obligation to reveal it in the discovery process. They did so.
Claim #182
Initially, however, they agreed that they needed to fabricate a false claim of a "crime" in order to illegally obtain a search warrant. They harassed and extorted Bell by threatening to destroy some of his illegally-taken and illegally-kept property. They agreed to falsely claim that Bell's investigatory visit to an address in Clackamas County, Oregon on October 23, 2000 was for an improper purpose, and they agreed to conceal the legal significance of Bell's "map-making for a process server" remark on the Internet. They knew or should have known that Bell had a right to investigate crimes by government agents, including the assault on Bell by Ryan Lund, who had been investigated by ATF agent Mike McNall. They knew or should have known, from Plaintiff Bell's postings on the Internet (because of Gordon's stalking of Bell on the Internet) that Bell was investigating this assault and government agents with contacts to Lund, and intended to file a lawsuit. They intended to and agreed to violate Bell’s right to do so by impeding, harassing and threatening Bell. This was also a violation of Bell’s right to investigate and report violations of law to appropriate authorities, a violation under 42 USC § 1985. This obstructed Bell’s access to the court, which is also fraudulent concealment.
Claim #183
The conspirators also agreed to violate Bell’s right to interstate travel: they falsely alleged a state of mind for Bell, and they falsely and perjuriously claimed to “fear” as a result of Bell’s travel, and used these intentionally wrong claims to subject Bell to malicious and unjustified punishment. They knew or should have known that Plaintiff Bell was legally and constitutionally entitled to locate, approach, and question government agent Mike McNall about this matter, but they desired to and chose to violate this right and punish Bell for exercising it.
Claim #184
These government agents/Defendants intentionally mischaracterized Bell's actions, including falsely claiming that Bell had "trespassed" when he had not (and no such charge or claim had been made or could have been made under Oregon law) and falsely mischaracterized Bell's approach as anything other than legitimately investigatory.
Claim #185
Defendants directed defendant Phillip Scott to prepare a false and abusive application for a search warrant, making these and other false claims about Bell, and intentionally and maliciously omitting their and Scott's knowledge of Bell's right and publicly-stated intent to investigate Agent McNall and other government agents for legal purposes. Scott and the other government agents intentionally and fraudulently omitted the fact of their secret illegal electronic stalking of Plaintiff Bell, including the fruits of that electronic stalking, which they knew would (if disclosed) easily establish that Bell was in fact engaged in an extensive investigation of numerous prior crimes by various government agents against Bell himself, many of which are documented in this civil Complaint.
Claim #186
Defendants Gordon, London and Scott, however, understood and agreed that they needed to fraudulently move the location of the prosecution to the Western District of Washington, where their co-conspirators were primarily located, in particular corrupt Judge Jack E. Tanner and malicious prosecutor Rob London and the corrupt Tacoma Federal Probation Office, rather than the District of Oregon. They agreed that it was necessary, therefore, to carefully engage in investigatory and prosecutorial fraud to engineer the false charges in such a way as to bring them from Tacoma. This required not merely that a "crime" be falsely made to appear to exist, but critically that "crime" had to be wrongfully prosecuted in Washington, NOT Oregon. They accomplished this amazing fraud.
Claim #187
The Defendants, aware of Plaintiff Bell's determined investigations, through their secret surveillance, agreed that in the summer of 2000, they would begin to threaten Bell in hopes of getting some sort of reaction out of him that could be misrepresented, possibly to be used to improperly "justify" some sort of further investigation, secret warrant, or other abusive actions, or perhaps even a false claim of some sort of crime. The Defendants, including Jeff Gordon, began by delivering an interstate threat to Bell, using Bell's lawyer Jonathan Solovy as a conduit, that they would begin to destroy Bell's property if he did not pick it up from government by an arbitrary and particular date, November 1, 2000. This was extortion. Further, they transmitted yet another malicious and harassing threat, again through lawyer Solovy, saying to the contrary that if Bell merely showed up at the Portland, Oregon Federal building to pick up his property, they would immediately arrest Bell for that, despite the fact that Bell was not guilty of any crime. This was also extortion. This also obstructed Bell’s access to the illegally-taken and improperly-kept property, which itself obstructed Bell’s access to the courts.
Claim #188
These threats were calculated and intended to, and had the effect of informing Plaintiff Bell that no matter what he did, he would be harmed (in his property and/or other rights) by these government agents in whatever way they could engineer. These threats were delivered by U.S. Mail, telephone, fax, and email, thus mail fraud and wire fraud. Defendants anticipated that they would be forwarded by these means as well. Since Bell had been threatened to not show up at the Federal Building to pick up his property, Bell mildly offered in a fax on October 31, 2000 to pick up the property elsewhere, since the government agents' threats apparently did not include arresting him everywhere in the state of Oregon. But it turned out they did. This was extortion, and a conspiracy to violate Bell’s civil rights under 42 USC § 1985 and Bivens. These threats constituted violations of 18 USC § 2262(a)(2) as they caused Bell’s travels. It was also a violation of 18 USC § 1951, the Hobbs Act.
Claim #189
The unethical government agents/Defendants, desperate for something (anything!) to hold against Bell, decided and agreed that this note could be used, at least temporarily, to falsely claim a "threat" but more importantly, to falsely claim that they knew this “threat” came from the Western District of Washington: This, they agreed, would achieve their essential and desired goal of putting Bell's fate into the hands of the corrupt Washington co-conspirators including all Defendants. They did this.
Claim #190
The colluding defendants/agents agreed that these two occurrences would be manipulated and distorted to "justify" a search warrant. These agents/Defendants recognized and knew, from past experience and their intent, that once they had access to Plaintiff Bell's property, papers, and records, they could invent just about any claim against Bell they wished to make, including by planting evidence as they did June 23, 1998. They also knew and agreed they could take anything they wanted regardless of the law, and deny this material to Bell. They did this.
Claim #191
At the time of Defendant Phillip Scott's fraudulent Search Warrant Affidavit, however, there were serious problems that these Defendants agreed to illegally conceal. First, they agreed that Bell's visit to Clackamas County, Oregon could in no way be considered "threatening" and certainly was not evidence of any sort of crime. They agreed that this was no obstacle to their goals, however, and they agreed that they would simply misrepresent the facts to falsely assert a "threat" and to conceal Bell's legitimate acts and intent, and to disguise the rights that Bell was exercising (including First Amendment). ATF agent Mike McNall agreed to lie and claim that he felt fear when at that point he was uninvolved, and to conceal his awareness that Bell’s legal investigation was in no way actionable, and he did so. This is malicious prosecution, and perjury under 18 USC § 1621. It was also a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights under 42 USC § 1985 and Bivens.
Claim #192
Further, Defendants Phillip Scott (and uncredited Jeff Gordon) and others agreed they needed to make, and did make, a temporary and fraudulent allegation of a violation of 26 USC § 7212(a) for a very specific reason; Both of them were agents of the Department of the Treasury, and as such they did not have the general authority and jurisdiction necessary to investigate and prosecute just any crime. They had no authority to investigate alleged violations of the Interstate Stalking statute, 18 USC § 2261A. It was only the temporary, false and fraudulent allegation of the violation of 26 USC § 7212(a) which enabled them later to move against Bell themselves. These agents agreed to conceal, and did conceal, the fact of their lack of authority to investigate.
Claim #193
Before or about November 3, 2000, Defendants Scott and Gordon (and other unknown-named co-conspirators including defendants) produced a false, misleading, and fraudulent application for a search warrant which misrepresented the extent of Scott's authority, the location of the alleged "crimes," as well as misrepresenting the kind of authority and jurisdiction that would actually be necessary to investigate a claimed violation of 26 USC § 7212(a). In that document, Scott and Gordon intentionally misrepresented the elements of that crime. Defendant Scott further misled by identifying ATF agent Mike McNall (the agent ostensibly "obstructed", when he was not) as having the authority to do Title 26 investigations, when in fact Scott knew or should have known (but he concealed) that McNall was not actively doing any investigations that were being "obstructed." None of the requirements were met.
Obstruction charges simply could not be brought due to US v. Aguilar, 132 L.Ed.2d 528 (1995); The requisite investigation under Title 26 did not exist; Plaintiff Bell was not (nor alleged to be) aware of any such investigation; and Plaintiff Bell had not done (nor was even alleged to have done) anything calculated to or intended to obstruct any such investigation. "Obstruction" simply could never have existed within the legal meaning of 26 USC § 7212(a) and Aguilar. The defendants knew this.
Plaintiffs allege that no reasonable officer (who is charged with the knowledge of US v. Aguilar, id. (1995)) could have believed that the warrant should have been issued with the affidavit’s serious factual and legal errors, omissions, and misrepresentations. No qualified immunity applies. Defendants actions were violations of 18 USC §§ 2234 & 2235. Plaintiffs allege that no reasonable Magistrate would have issued this improper search warrant because there was no articulable probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to believe that statute 26 USC§ 7212(a) had been violated.
Claim #194
In most criminal cases, this would have been an enormous defect. However, the co-conspirators including Scott, Gordon, and the others were assured and confident, both by prior illegitimate agreements and by pervasive fraudulent practices, that Bell's efforts to defend himself would be destroyed by being assigned a betraying, sabotaging attorney (who turned out to be Robert Leen). These investigators were even more confident due to the fact that due to their own fraudulent efforts, the prosecution had been "hijacked” to the Western District of Washington, where by unethical and collusive prearrangement among them and the officers of that court it was set to occur in the Tacoma, Washington court of corrupt judge Jack E. Tanner. These defendants had been assured that Defendant Tanner would ensure that Plaintiff Bell would never be able to challenge their vast, numerous misbehaviors including their fraudulent temporary allegation of violation of 26 USC § 7212(a), nor their illegal and abusive execution of the search warrant on November 6, 2000. And Bell was not, at least during the "criminal case", nor during the fraudulent sham appeal. This was “extrinsic fraud”.
Claim #195
In fact, there was no evidence then or now that Bell's visit was intended to do anything except engage in a legitimate investigation that Bell freely claimed. However, it was agreed by the co-conspirator Defendants Scott and Gordon that the claim of "obstruction," 26 USC § 7212(a), would only be a temporary sham whose only function was to, quite literally, "get their foot in the door": Plaintiff Bell's door, that is. These Defendants collusively agreed that once they had obtained that fraudulent search warrant and done the search illegally and improperly, they would then abandon their false claim of violation of 26 USC § 7212(a) and convert it to false claims that didn't depend on their prior false assertions of "interference" or “obstruction” which did not exist.
Claim #196
That is exactly what happened. After the improper and illegally-done search of November 6, 2000, the co-conspirator Defendants including prosecutor Rob London knew or should have known that the search warrant had been obtained illegally based on false claims and executed illegally, so he and the other Defendants agreed to focus on a different claimed violation, 18 USC § 2261A. The Defendants knew or should have known that this new charge had no "element of the crime" which required the existence of an investigation, and it did not require that Bell be aware of such a investigation, and (finally) it did not require that Bell committed any act calculated to impede that investigation.
Claim #197
However, there was one "element of the crime" that 18 USC § 2261A did have, which showed why it was (temporarily) necessary to engage in the fraud concerning a claim of violation of 26 USC § 7212(a): § 2261A requires that there be "interstate travel".
The Defendant co-conspirators knew or should have known that they either had no evidence of any claimed “interstate travel” on the part of Bell, or if they would have had it they had obtained it by illegal means, and in addition that evidence showed Bell did not cross a border to do what they wanted to claim. (And they subsequently concealed it; such as planting tracking transmitters secretly in Bell's vehicle, violating Bell's possessory rights.). Revealing their criminal acts with respect to a relatively-recently planted tracking device, they agreed, would have been bad enough, but it would also have exposed a tactic that they had been using secretly and illegally since early 1997 or even earlier, and one which they had repeatedly and fraudulently concealed. They refused to allow this disclosure. Bell was denied their secret evidence by later collusion of the defendants. This was “extrinsic fraud.”
Claim #198
This change of charge was made possible by the illegal collusion of various of the other co-conspirators, and these planners knew it. Normally, it is necessary to have an "evidentiary hearing" for "evidence" taken in a search. One of the many purposes of such a hearing is to establish if those doing the search have illegally and improperly taken advantage of an improperly-obtained warrant to go on a "fishing expedition," to take numerous items not specified in the warrant. The November 6, 2000 search was exactly such a vastly overbroad search, with between 95% and 100% of the items taken not being described in the already-illegally-obtained warrant. The searchers took what was “interesting” to them, not what they were instructed to take by the warrant itself. They did not even possess such a list at the time of the search. This evidences malicious prosecution. Bell’s right to inspect the material taken was violated, intentionally.
Claim #199
This would have normally been a very serious problem: Defendants knew or should have known that not only was all of the "evidence" illegal and inadmissible, but their malicious and illegal intent in taking those items would have led to serious criminal and civil exposure for them. However, these Defendants already had a solution to this problem, one which actually encouraged them to obtain the illegal warrant and to serve it illegally as well: They had already agreed that Plaintiff (then soon to be defendant) Bell would have a colluding lawyer foisted on him, the lawyer becoming yet another assistant in the conspiracy, and they agreed that this lawyer (who turned out to be Robert Leen) would not act to get an evidentiary hearing for Bell, and would in fact thwart Bell's efforts for one. And Leen did this. There was no evidentiary hearing, due to Leen’s sabotage and Judge Tanner’s collusion.
Claim #200
They also knew and agreed that co-conspirator/Defendant/Judge Jack Tanner would assist Leen in denying Bell an evidentiary hearing, virtually guaranteeing that those participating in the search (and obtaining the search warrant) would never be legally called to account for their unethical and illegal efforts. And given the fact that this lawsuit has only come about by extraordinarily unusual efforts by Plaintiff Bell to learn the law and write the lawsuit, it is quite understandable that the co-conspirator Defendants believed themselves immune from punishment from their acts. They were almost right.
Claim #201
Defendant Jeff Gordon improperly, unethically, and illegally participated in the November 6, 2000 search, despite the fact that he and the other Defendants had agreed that he would be calling himself a "victim." Defendant Gordon put himself into a position to be able to plant and tamper with evidence, and he did so, and to observe and study materials that were not properly described in the search warrant, and to intentionally take items that were not justified by the search warrant, and he engaged in these improper activities, in collusion with Philip Scott and unknown-named others. Gordon thus spied on Bell. Gordon employed his secretly-obtained knowledge, not merely the wording of the warrant itself, to help decide what to take. This was illegal, and intentionally so. And through collusion of the defendants, and all of them, all of Bell’s rights to challenge the search were intentionally violated. The execution of the search constituted a violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 USC § 1951.
Claim #202
Jeff Gordon and the other Defendants engaged in worse than "malicious prosecution": Gordon and the others were aware of the requirements of the various Counts of the improperly-obtained criminal indictment of Plaintiff Bell, and Gordon knew or should have known that in order for there to have been a crime under 18 USC § 2261A, a number of "elements of the crime" had to exist.
Moreover, and critically, those elements of the crime had to have been done or caused BY THE DEFENDANT. Gordon, and the other defendants, however, recognized that one of the "elements" was supposed to be that the "victims" "feared" as a result of Bell's travel. Gordon and the Defendants were aware that all four so-called "victims" of those five counts did NOT fear as a result of the travel. But they acted to wrongfully harm Bell despite their knowledge. Plaintiffs further allege that there were unanticipatible (by Bell) yet known (by the malicious defendants) intervening events and circumstances which were the actual proximate causes of any elements of the alleged “crimes”. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants illegally and unethically manipulated Bell’s “representation” (by Leen and Jurgens) to intentionally prevent Bell from exposing this malfeasance and thereby successfully defending himself from the fake and malicious charges.
Claim #203
ATF agent Mike McNall was tampered with by Agent Jeff Gordon, Phillip Scott, and other defendants. Bell did not inform McNall of Bell's visit to McNall's former residence, and nothing Bell did during that visit could itself have caused the government's vast over-reaction, or any feeling of fear by McNall. To the contrary, Jeff Gordon and Scott made false claims to Mike McNall about Plaintiff Bell, and (if McNall "feared" at all?) McNall "feared" solely as a consequence of the defendants’ false fabrications or willingness to lie. They themselves manufactured elements of the “crime”. Knowingly false charges were brought against Bell as a consequence of this fraud. Defendants, including Leen and Juergens, fraudulently prevented Bell from properly being able to defend himself against these charges. This was “extrinsic fraud.”
Claim #204
Bell was accused of visiting the residence of another person, also named “Jeff Gordon” (but not the government agent). That other "Jeff Gordon" was likewise not aware of Bell's travel and did and could not "fear," and later government-employee Jeff Gordon tampered (along with other defendants) with the other "Jeff Gordon" and his family members, again reciting false claims about Plaintiff Bell, with the intention of causing worry and fear to appear in the minds of those people. Thus, it was not Bell's travel that caused the fear: If they "feared," it was Gordon's intentionally false stories. This constitutes "Tampering with a witness" which is a RICO predicate act, and a Bivens violation, and subornation of perjury. Knowingly false charges against Bell were brought as a consequence of this fraud. Bell was harmed as a wrongful consequence of these false charges. Defendants, especially Leen and Juergens, fraudulently prevented Bell from properly defending himself from these false charges. This was extrinsic fraud.
Claim #205
Jeff Gordon also tampered with "victim" Scott Mueller, who (like McNall) was unaware of Plaintiff Bell's travels. Defendants Gordon, Phillip Scott, and all defendants were aware that Bell had a right to travel to Bend, Oregon to take photographs and look at property, but they sought to harm Plaintiff Bell as a consequence of Bell's “disrespect” for government and for investigating and publicizing information on a person who might have been a government employee or might simply have been a “victim” of a practical joke by a government employee, friend or family member. They were or should have been aware that Bell had not contacted Mueller during the visit, and thus Mueller had no ability to "fear" and certainly had no reason to do so as a consequence of anything Bell had done. Agents Scott, Gordon, and other defendants tampered with Scott Mueller, which is a RICO predicate act, giving him false and misleading information as well as speculation and supposition, intending to cause and induce Mueller to claim to fear and worry when he would not otherwise have done so, a Bivens violation, and subornation of perjury, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1622. Knowingly false charges were brought against Bell as a consequence of this tampering and fraud. All defendants, especially Leen and Juergens, fraudulently prevented Bell from properly being able to defend himself against these charges. This was “extrinsic fraud.”
Claim #206
Plaintiff Bell revisited Clackamas County to leave notes for the current residents of McNall's former rental house. Agent Jeff Gordon and the malicious Defendants (including London) falsely caused Bell to be charged through their improper actions when they knew that McNall was uninvolved with this incident, particularly because they knew that Bell had already been told that McNall was no longer a resident there. Gordon and the other Defendants did this fraud, naming McNall as a second-time "victim," despite the fact they knew that no crime had actually been committed (and they knew McNall was in no way involved) but they knew and intended that they would get McNall to lie and to claim that he was yet again a "victim." They requested this, and McNall did so. This is malicious prosecution, and in fact much worse, by defendants especially McNall and Gordon. Knowingly false charges were brought against Bell as a consequence of this tampering and fraud. All defendants, especially Leen and Juergens, fraudulently prevented Bell from properly being able to defend himself against these charges. This was “extrinsic fraud.”
Claim #207
Gordon's, Scott’s and the other defendants actions, in fact, actually constituted multiple incidents of CAUSING "crimes" that, absent their actions, did not and would not have occurred. Quite simply, if a "crime" existed, it was their crime and not Bell's, yet Gordon, London, and the other Defendants were misusing their positions of power to cause Bell to be subject to harm as a consequence of their own crimes. This is a Bivens violation, 42 USC § 1985 violation, as well as obstruction of justice and tampering with witnesses.
All the Defendants thus “framed” Bell for a set of “crimes” Bell did not commit. Plaintiffs allege that the investigators were fully aware at all times that the evidence did not show that Bell intended the alleged “victims” to learn about his travels and investigations, which totally disproves the element of the “crime” which required that the defendant cross a state border INTENDING to cause fear and harm. Plaintiffs allege, therefore, constructive or actual fraud, perjury, and bad-faith by Gordon, Scott, McNall, and the other defendants in this matter, on all five counts. Prosecutor London failed in his investigational capacity to determine that responsibility for these “victims” reactions lay with Bell, as opposed to Gordon or others.
Claim #208
Plaintiffs allege that there has been no jurisdictional trial or sentencing, and that thus there has been a favorable outcome to Bell. Plaintiffs also allege that even if the “conviction” were assumed to be valid, there is no common-law bar to this malicious prosecution case. From King v. Goldsmith, 897 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 130 L.Ed.2d 882:
“Nothing in the formation or rationale of the common law rule bars relitigation of the issue of the plaintiff’s criminal guilt if the prosecution in the criminal proceeding had procured the plaintiff’s conviction by fraud, as the plaintiff in this case charges. Otherwise police officers could procure a conviction by fraud and then-irrespective of whatever exceptions a state’s law of res judicata and collateral estoppel had created for such cases—use that conviction to bar their victim’s effort to redress the fraud by means of a tort action, whether for false imprisonment, or for malicious prosecution, or for violation of civil rights.” [King at 887]
Plaintiffs including Bell allege virtually no end of fraud in pre-trial and “trial” proceedings of case CR00-5731.
Claim #209
Affiant Phillip Scott further fraudulently asserted a belief in a violation of 26 USC § 7212(a) when he was or should have been aware of Bell's Internet statement (later quoted by Defendant Rob London) that Bell was "map-making for a process server", a comment that could have no other meaning but that Bell was planning and preparing to file a lawsuit, which of course is a legally-protected activity. It was the intention of Phillip Scott, London, and other Defendants that they falsely arrest and discredit Plaintiff Bell at what they assumed would be their last chance before a lawsuit was filed, in hopes of wrongfully protecting themselves from civil liability. All this was in violation of Bell's constitutional rights, violation of 42 USC § 1985 and Bivens. These agents used extortion and obstruction of justice to intimidate, harass, and obstruct Plaintiff Bell, in violation of RICO statutes 18 USC §§ 1962, 1964, and 1965. No reasonable judge could have issued the warrant given the enormous defects of the warrant affidavit. No reasonable officer could have believed that the issued warrant(s) was valid.
Claim #210
These agents were also motivated to engage in a false and malicious search, November 6, 2000, of Bell's property based on their desire to steal from Bell his carefully-obtained evidence against government agents, and they were motivated to deny Bell permanent access to it in a very similar fashion to the way they were continuing to violate Bell's access to his computers originally taken April 1997. This was obstruction of justice. (And to date, they have never been returned.) Bell was wrongfully handcuffed during the search, which was false arrest. Contrary to his rights, Bell was not permitted to inspect and supervise the collection of evidence, intentionally preventing him from challenging the illegal nature of the search and the wrongful taking of materials not listed in the warrant.
Claim #211
Those doing the November 6, 2000 search violated the terms of the illegally-sought improperly-granted search warrant, by improperly taking much material not described in the warrant, which supports this civil action for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. The objects taken were virtually totally unrelated to the legal descriptions in the warrant, as was intended by the searchers, in violation of Bell's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Bell was not shown the list of items to be taken, a violation of proper procedure. The searchers claimed not to have it. The search was therefore illegal. This fraud was orchestrated by Defendants Jeff Gordon, Phillip Scott, and others. The searchers intentionally violated 42 USC § 2000aa, because they searched for and seized materials they knew and believed were being acquired and prepared in order to be included as part of a lawsuit by plaintiffs including Bell. Bell was denied his rights, as a product of the defendants’ collusion, to challenge this search and seizure under 42 USC § 2000aa(c).
Claim #212
The searchers’ including Gordon’s illegally-obtained knowledge of Bell's intended investigation was improperly used to assist them in the identification and taking of materials which were the products of Bell's investigations. These “extra” materials were taken to obstruct Plaintiffs’ access to the courts. These materials were NOT listed as part of the materials which were not listed in the warrant that could "legally" be taken, but these dishonest agents knew and agreed that their ability to improperly take this material would be corruptly "protected" by other co-conspirators at a later date, including by Rob London, Jack Tanner, and by Bell's "defense lawyer" who turned out to be Robert Leen. This was done. Attorneys Leen and Juergens helped conceal their illegal actions, and to prevent Bell from obtaining legal recourse. This was “extrinsic fraud.” No reasonable officer could have believed that the execution of this warrant was done according to applicable rules.
STALKING BY GOVERNMENT
Claim #213
Bell, being aware that the agents had used the search warrant to take numerous items they weren't entitled to take, concluded that these actions confirmed his suspicions that they had been spying on him over the Summer of 2000. Bell further realized that his visit to McNall's former residence had probably been fraudulently used to "justify" the warrant, almost certainly by making false claims about what Bell had said and done. Bell decided that either the person he had met at McNall's former residence had contacted the authorities and lied, (lying which seemed unlikely since he would not have had any obvious motivation to do so), or those agents who had been electronically stalking Bell had, themselves, both contacted the current resident and lied about what he said. Bell concluded that given that agents, including Jeff Gordon, had begun to re-start a "propaganda war," having maliciously released news of the search of Bell's residence, Bell should react by getting the news media in touch which those who could best establish that the agents had lied.
At or about 11 PM on November 10, 2000, Plaintiff Bell drove away from his house to leave messages at McNall's former residence, asking the residents in writing to contact a (sadly, incompetent) Vancouver, Washington reporter named John Branton the next day. Less than a mile from Bell's house, Bell began to be followed by a Federal government agent who had parked on the westbound off-ramp of Highway 14 onto Lieser Road. Bell passed by on Lieser, to take the eastbound on-ramp to Highway 14, and the agent began to follow Bell, in a replay of the on-the-road stalking that had happened June 22, 1998. Approximately thirty seconds later, the agent had no choice but to pass Bell and Bell followed a couple dozen car-lengths back, crossing into Oregon. The unknown-named, apparently-panicked agent eventually "escaped" at an unrecollected-named exit one or two exits south of the Portland International Airport off-ramp of 1-5 southbound. Undeterred by this government stalking and attempted harassment, Bell proceeded south to Clackamas County, Oregon. This was stalking under 18 USC § 2261A, by government agents with Bell as a victim.
Claim #214
Interestingly, colluding "defense" attorney Robert Leen later acted on behalf of the conspiracy during Bell's "trial," refusing and failing to ask detailed questions about this matter or even to allow Bell to relate this incident, to prevent Bell from showing that (contrary to the charges that claimed Bell was "stalking" others) in fact these government agents were actually stalking Bell. In a 10:00 AM on Sunday, April 8, meeting with Leen before Bell testified, Leen said, "You will be allowed to show that you BELIEVE that you were being stalked, but you won't be allowed to PROVE that you were being stalked by the government." The implications of Leen's shocking and unethical statement were vast, revealing in one sentence collusion with government agents and total betrayal. Later, Attorney Leen intentionally prevented Bell from exposing the criminal activity of these various government agents, or obtaining legal relief and recourse. This was extrinsic fraud, to prevent Bell from bringing his true case to court.
Claim #215
On or about 12:00 midnight on November 10, 2000, Plaintiff Bell's car was illegally stopped for fraudulent and pretextual reasons by the Clackamas County Sheriff on specific and improper instructions from the co-conspirators including especially Jeff Gordon and unknown-named others. No defendants including Gordon had probable cause nor reasonable suspicion that ANYONE had violated the law, and they were not even certain who was driving that vehicle, but Gordon and the other defendants were attempting to precipitate a violent incident at which Plaintiff Bell would be hurt or killed. This was menacing, stalking, violation of right to travel, and kidnap.
Claim #216
Defendants including Gordon did this by misusing (using for purposes other than originally claimed) his knowledge of Bell's car's real-time position, and Gordon (or other defendants) took the opportunity to call the Clackamas County Sheriff's office and give them false information and make false claims of threats and dangers which they knew did not exist. Defendants including Gordon were attempting to terrify and alarm the personnel of the Clackamas County Sheriff; putting fear into their minds, and inducing them to falsely and improperly over-react to Bell's presence and actions. Defendants including Gordon knew and intended that such an over-reaction could result in Bell's being harmed or even killed, and they desired and worked for this outcome.
Claim #217
In doing so, defendants including Gordon improperly used the information provided them about Bell's car's location, as they had long planned to do. This was in violation of Bell's right to interstate travel and freedom of association, and was an attempt to cause Bell's death or to inflict serious harm. This is also wire fraud, a RICO predicate, and a violation of 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1985 and Bivens.
Claim #218
On these wrongful orders from defendants including Gordon, Clackamas County Sheriff's deputies falsely stopped Plaintiff Bell, and improperly kept him for over 45 minutes, handcuffed painfully behind his back and sitting in the back of police car on a hard seat, with no justification or legitimate purpose. Bell was kept long after any reasonable or plausible function of the pretextual stop might have been concluded, so this stop transitioned into a violation of Bell's constitutional rights against false arrest and false imprisonment, on orders of the defendants. No reasonable officer could have believed that the stop was legally done.
Claim #219
These agents also improperly searched the contents of Bell's car using means to disclose material that was not in plain sight under the nighttime conditions of the search, and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. This was an illegal search, and the officers present knew this.
Claim #220
One illegitimate purpose of keeping Bell excessively at the stop was to allow Mike McNall to drive to the location and look at Bell, which he did. Plaintiffs allege McNall knew that this pretextual stop and excessive detainment of Bell was wrongful, unconstitutional, and for an illegal purpose, but he chose to participate in and increase this abuse by informing the officers that he was coming to the site of the stop, and as requested by McNall and as a predictable consequence of that communication (which was Wire Fraud) the Sheriff's deputies detained Bell at least 40 minutes longer than they otherwise should have done. McNall understood that this would happen, and he intended, requested, and wanted it to occur, and made it occur. This was false arrest, false imprisonment, kidnap, abuse of process, and obstruction of justice, the latter being a RICO predicate act. It also violated 42 USC §§ 1983/5 and is actionable under Bivens. The officers attempted to question Bell while he was arrested and handcuffed, and while denying Bell access to a lawyer, and without having read Bell his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
Claim #221
Defendants including Jeff Gordon, Rob London, Jack Tanner, and Robert Leen including unknown others later maliciously punished Plaintiff Bell for attempting to protect himself against current and future illegal use of the tracking-device information by increasing his punishment for that effort. These Defendants including particularly Leen, London, and Tanner colluded to deny Plaintiff Bell the right to challenge the false and misleading information present on his "PSI Report", including material illegally obtained or illegally used.
Claim #222
On or about November 19, 2000, Plaintiff Bell was arrested 20 feet away from his parked and locked car, by agents of the conspiracy including agents of the City of Vancouver or Clark County, Washington in a further illegal and abusive usage of tracking-device information. On illegal instructions from unknown-named Federal agents, but including Jeff Gordon, the arresting officers executed a knowingly illegal search of Plaintiff Bell's vehicle without a search warrant or probable cause or reasonable suspicion. This was done in a knowingly illegal fashion, because it was not done "pursuant to the arrest" as was known by all defendants present or aware of the proceedings. It was, however, strikingly reminiscent of the illegal June 23, 1998 search of Bell's residence, showing a repeating pattern of illegal searches, and searches that are intentionally designed to go far beyond what the searchers would be entitled to do should they follow the law. A further part of the illegal pattern was the denial of Bell’s right to expose and challenge the legality of the searches, which was extrinsic fraud.
Claim #223
Officers illegally removed objects from the car, illegally and intentionally failed to generate and deliver a receipt for these objects as would normally be done on a legal search, reflecting their knowledge that the search was intended to be illegal. This was a violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985, Bivens, and it was accomplished by Wire Fraud. This illegal and illegally done search was requested by the other defendants, and no defendant could have believed the search was legal or legally done. This was breaking and entering.
Claim #224
On November 10, 2000, Bell had been fraudulently assigned betraying and colluding attorney and Defendant Robert Leen by defendant Federal Public Defenders. Bell was fraudulently denied a Preliminary Hearing by false promises by attorney Leen, who claimed that Bell would, in fact, get a preliminary hearing and would not be indicted.
Claim #225
Bell's arrest and indictment was in knowingly illegal and malicious retaliation by defendants for his public Internet postings referring to "map-making for a process server" which was a clear indication to all defendants particularly government personnel and co-conspirators/Defendants that he planned legal action such as a lawsuit. (Defendant Prosecutor Rob London admitted his (and the other Defendants') knowledge of this “map-making" comment at the non-jurisdictional "trial" in April 2001.) The intent of the arrest and premature indictment was to chill Bell's rights to use legal action to protect Bell's rights, and to keep him away from honest lawyers who could have prepared and filed this kind of legal action, and to deny Bell access to evidence Bell had collected, evidence that would support such a lawsuit. No defendant could have reasonably believed that the arrest or charges were justified.
Claim #226
Defendants including Rob London, Jeff Gordon and Phillip Scott, brought the prosecution in bad faith, and for the purpose of chilling Plaintiff Bell's exercise of First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, access to the courts, and interstate travel. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 US 489, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 1525 (1999). London was also aware that Bell was anticipating filing a lawsuit in which he (London) would be named as a defendant, and he brought criminal charges to harass and intimidate Bell, to dissuade him from filing that lawsuit, and to make it more difficult for Bell to protect his constitutional rights. See US v. Bell CROO-5731JET. This was obstruction of Bell’s access to the courts. (Plaintiff Bell has been acquitted of some or all of the charges from that suit, and thus has the right to bring a "malicious prosecution" and "abuse of process" civil complaint against Defendants, as well as other claims. Jurisdiction for prosecution was terminated before “trial,” as well, so all proceedings have terminated in Bell’s favor.) Bell’s right to enter the State of Oregon to investigate corrupt government employees was violated using 18 USC § 2261A for purposes of harassment. London and the other defendants were aware that they had actually fraudulently generated the “elements of the crime”, and they and London failed and refused to act in their investigative capacity to disclose that the “crimes” were their crimes, not Bell’s crimes.
Claim #227
Unknown-named Defendants but including Jeff Gordon and London had engaged in witness tampering and intimidation of witnesses, and in doing so he caused many "elements of the crime" to ostensibly occur that would not have occurred without his malicious tampering actions. This constitutes extortion, malicious prosecution, planting evidence, abuse of process, obstruction of justice, and other acts which are RICO predicate actions under 18 USC §§ 1961-5. Actions of the Defendants including Gordon are also violations of 42 USC § 1985, as they are a conspiracy to violate Bell's civil rights. They are also a violation actionable under 42 USC § 1983, because state-actors were employed acting in their official, color-of-law, and individual (as well as conspiratorial) capacities, including Clackamas County Sheriff, Portland Police, and the Clark County (Washington) Sheriff, in order to knowingly violate plaintiff’s rights.
Claim #228
Since a time unknown to Plaintiff Bell, a practice has developed in Defendant Jack E. Tanner's and Franklin Burgess’ courts and at their direction in their administrative capacities, and in collusion with certain prosecutors and corrupt "defense" attorneys, to intentionally violate the rights of defendants. These defendants are improperly "steered" into those courts by collusion of the officers and administrative personnel of the Tacoma Federal Court including clerks. Tanner and Burgess are instructed to ask for these cases and they do so.
The practice is to impose upon certain criminal defendants particular pre-selected "defense" attorneys who will willingly and do sabotage their clients' cases by failing to accomplish normal and essential steps, such as requesting and disclosing full discovery of exculpatory and other evidence, and many other processes including direct sabotage. All prosecutors, for example, defendants London and Levins, are aware of, assist, and agree with this corrupt practice, and participate in and utilize this fraud to perform unjust prosecution and obtain wrongful convictions.
Due to the confidential nature of the relationship between a defense attorney and his typical clients, who are uneducated in law and who may be unaware of the extent and seriousness of their attorney's betrayal, evidence of the attorney's intentional misdeeds and failures to act will often be scarce: And it is frequently the acts which the attorneys fail to do which damage the clients, and under most circumstances the client will have little or no education in the law, and he will not be able to easily or quickly identify malicious patterns in his attorney's behavior. Attorneys Leen, Mandel, Avenia, and Juergens are among those who did and do engage in these improper practices to harm their clients.
Clients, and in particular first-time clients, don't usually know what's happening, and they are in no position to document, prove, or let alone remedy such a situation, and certainly not before it's too late and they are usually illegally convicted. Normally, documentation to their lawyer's unethical actions and failures to act simply does not exist.
Claim #229
Beginning in early December, 2000, Plaintiff Bell became a highly unusual exception to the general case: Attorney/Defendant Leen had begun to refuse to accomplish normal, essential steps to prepare a credible defense, so Plaintiff Bell attempted to fire Leen, a step with should normally be easily accomplished with good cause. The defendants (especially Tanner, Leen and London) wrongfully colluded to prevent this, in their administrative capacities. They also acted and failed to act in order to help conceal this fraud, and to wrongly prevent plaintiff Bell from documenting and proving this misbehavior, including by obstructing Bell’s access to the courts.
Claim #230
Plaintiff Bell had good cause: In addition to lying to Bell about his getting a "preliminary hearing," on or about November 22, 2000, Leen at first improperly resisted and quickly began to refuse to expand and extend the "discovery" request that he had copied from his "boilerplate" ("canned" document) file, and one Plaintiff Bell knew was and would be entirely inadequate for the trial. Within a period of a few minutes at a meeting, attorney Leen first attempted to falsely claim to Bell that he "could not" extend the discovery, a claim that Bell easily understood was quite false and intentionally misleading, to claiming that he "had to wait" until the currently requested discovery was delivered before asking for more, which was also quite and intentionally false. Then, Leen further dissembled by saying that he would ask for more discovery "later," despite the fact that this never occurred and there was simply no reason for any delay other than to trick or impede Plaintiff Bell. Plaintiffs allege Leen had agreed with defendants to sabotage Bell’s rights in every way they could, and he and they did so. This was legal malpractice, as well. Leen was acting illegally and unethically on behalf of the other defendants.
Claim #231
Thus, it quickly became obvious to Bell that Leen was solidly engaged in fraud, to Bell's detriment, and it was a highly serious situation that had to be immediately remedied by replacing Leen. On or about December 1, 2000, Bell had acquired a copy of the "Attorney’s Local Rules of Professional Conduct", ethical rules that Attorney Leen was obligated by federal law to follow, and Bell showed Leen Local Rule 1.2(a) which stated that an attorney had to agree with the objectives of representation of his client. Leen responded that he would not obey that rule, and said "no-one would make me." This was an extraordinarily astonishing prediction, which in fact came true, a prediction which he couldn't have known except for the prior knowledge he obtained by collusion between Attorney Leen and Judge/Defendant Jack Tanner as well as other officers of the court. Plaintiffs allege that such collusion had and continued to occur.
Claim #232
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Judge Tanner and Leen (ostensibly, Bell's attorney) therefore came to a specific and illegal agreement that Tanner would make all of his rulings against Bell, no matter what they were, and Leen would fail to act to Bell’s benefit and in fact he would sabotage Bell’s case. Plaintiffs further allege that this agreement also established that Leen would never allow Bell to replace Tanner for bias or misbehavior, nor would Tanner allow Bell to replace Leen, nor allow Bell to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tacoma Court for "crimes" fraudulently prosecuted in Washington, yet claimed to have occurred in the District of Oregon. This illegal agreement also led and “allowed” Defendant Leen to unethically refuse to support Bell's position that Tanner would have lost jurisdiction to proceed with the “trial” subsequent to Bell's interlocutory appeal notice filing, intentionally crippling Bell’s legal rights. This was “extrinsic fraud”, to prevent Bell from presenting his true case, and it did so. The defendants “honored” this illegal agreement until and including Leen’s eventual resignation in late August 2001, by action and inaction.
Claim #233
Plaintiffs also allege that Leen and Tanner's wrongful agreement required Leen to fail to challenge Tanner's total lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the case: The "crimes" were alleged to have occurred in Oregon, in violation of 18 USC § 2261A. Defendant Judge Tanner possesses no subject-matter jurisdiction to hear such cases out of Oregon. 18 USC § 2261A is not a "continuing crime," because no overt action of the "elements of the crime" was begun nor completed in the Western District of Washington. See US v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966).Plaintiffs cite Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844(1980): “Requirements of subject matter and personal jurisdiction are conjunctional, as both must be met before a court has authority to adjudicate rights of parties to a dispute.”
Claim #234
On or about December 1, 2000, Plaintiff Bell told Attorney/Defendant Leen that he was "fired" for his misbehavior and unethical actions in lying to Bell and attempting to deny Bell adequate discovery as well as attempting to mislead Bell. Leen immediately responded by refusing to be fired, a refusal he could not legally or ethically make, and by refusing to seek this outcome (his replacement). Over the next few days, including by telephone, Plaintiff Bell repeatedly told Leen that he was fired, and Leen continued to refuse to be fired. Finally, on December 8, 2000, Bell wrote a letter to Defendant (Leen’s co-conspirator) Jack Tanner stating that Bell requested that Leen be replaced for good cause. This letter was docketed on December 11, 2000, but it was never acted upon by Defendant Tanner, who neglected this matter in his administrative capacity in violation of Bell's rights to unbiased and unconflicted representation. In late December 2000 Plaintiff Bell followed up with another letter expanding on the problem, sent to Defendant Tanner. Had Tanner acted administratively at this point, he could have had Leen replaced, but he did not do so in order to harm Bell, on instructions of the other defendants.
Claim #235
During December, 2000 Defendant Robert Leen sent at least two misleading motions to the Tacoma Federal Court, however by prior arrangement they were to be ignored by Defendant Jack Tanner acting (and failing to act) in his administrative capacity, and also his individual and co-conspirator/agent of the conspiracy capacities.One motion intentionally mis-stated and understated the seriousness and cause of the dispute between Plaintiff Bell and Leen, and also misleadingly suggested that Bell wished to represent himself.
Claim #236
In reality, Bell's consistent position was that the circumstances of his improper confinement (having been illegally refused bail associated with his fraudulent denial of a preliminary hearing in November 2000) simply did not allow self-representation which violated Bell’s rights. The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution was being violated, because Bell was being denied adequate access to the law library by arbitrary and capricious decisions of Defendants/administrators of Seatac FDC. Bell was also denied access to secure document storage equivalent to what an attorney would have, and confidential access to witnesses and investigators equivalent to what an attorney would have. Plaintiff Bell was personally aware that Seatac FDC staff routinely rifled through and studied documents in the possession of its inmates in violation of their rights of privacy and their right to represent themselves, and this further violated Bell's (and the other Seatac FDC inmates') opportunity and right to represent themselves.
Claim #237
Seatac FDC staff carefully limited inmates' access to the law library to an amount entirely inadequate for even an experienced, trained lawyer to accomplish a defense: About 2.5 hours per week. This was vastly more inadequate for a person to actually begin to learn the law in preparation to do a defense, and these Defendant FDC Staff members as well as other defendants were well aware of this fact and intended and worked for this to be true, intending to harm and prejudice defendants who they viewed as “enemies”.
Seatac FDC staff ostensibly offered extra times that could be requested for more law library time, but they denied it for arbitrary and capricious reasons even during times when the library itself (with an approximate capacity of 10 inmates) was nearly empty. This was obstruction of Bell’s, and class plaintiffs’, access to the courts.
Claim #238
To get that extra time, Defendants/Seatac FDC Staff variously and inconsistently claimed that a person had to be "pro-se" in a case, later changing that to "pro-se in a criminal case," or initially allowing sign up with fewer restrictions, but later severely cutting back on access in late May, 2001 when they were told to do so by other Defendants including Jeff Gordon, who knew Plaintiff Bell was planning and preparing a lawsuit against all Defendants, to further deprive the inmates of law library time and to obstruct their access to the courts. All defendants knew this was a violation of plaintiff’s rights.
Claim #239
In engaging in this persistent and careful deprivation of right of access to the law library, these Seatac FDC Defendants were attempting and generally succeeding in denying all inmates at Seatac FDC the realistic opportunity to defend themselves, but also denied them the opportunity to learn enough law to begin to discover fraud and misbehavior by their assigned attorneys. Anyone considering representing himself (such as Bell) was effectively being given a "Hobson's choice," a choice between equally bad alternatives which really isn't a choice at all. Plaintiff (then defendant) Bell understood that he wasn't actually being offered the opportunity to represent himself he was actually merely being offered the ability to CALL HIMSELF "pro se" under sabotaged circumstances which denied Bell the possibility of “meaningful and effective” representation. This was known, intended, and accomplished by the actions of all defendants.
Claim #240
Plaintiffs allege that Leens’ entire “representation” of Bell was an enormous sham designed to violate Bell’s 6th Amendment and other constitutional rights, and Leen’s every action and inaction was designed to maximally harm Bell at the request of the Defendants. This was legal malpractice and betrayal. Defendants put Plaintiff Bell in a position where he had to contact lawyers and others by mail and telephone, in order to prevent their RICO conspiring. This was Mail and Wire Fraud. Leen colluded by failing to exercise and exhaust remedies to being “forced” on to Bell. See Mallard v. U.S. District Court of Iowa, 490 US 296, 104 L.Ed.2d 318, 109 S.Ct. 1814 (1989).
Claim #241
Appointing an appointed attorney is a purely administrative act by an administrator in the criminal justice system: For example, most Defense attorneys are ostensibly selected and appointed by the Public Defender's office. Defendant Jack F. Tanner chose to interfere with this process by imposing himself in his administrative or individual capacities, also acting as co-conspirator and agent of the conspiracy, to deny Plaintiff Bell the ability to have Defendant Leen replaced. Once this was done, Defendant Leen recognized that his unwanted (by Bell) control of the case was being forced on Plaintiff Bell, and Defendant/Attorney Leen began an extraordinary period of ever-increasing unethical and illegal activity to deprive Bell of a competent, unbiased defense and ultimately to deny Bell a fair trial. This was known, wanted, and assisted by all defendants.
Co-conspirator Defendants other than Defendant Jack Tanner are liable under 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986 for actions taken by Defendant Tanner in furtherance of their conspiracy. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 US 24, 66 L.Ed.2d 185, 101 S.Ct 183.
Claim #242
Leen, by his own admission on or about December, 2000, was colluding with Defendant London to keep "discovery" information away from Bell in violation of Bell's rights to a fair trial. Leen repeatedly refused to expand and extend discovery as Plaintiff Bell insisted as early as November, 2000. To Bell, Defendant Leen claimed repeatedly to be acting on "illegal orders" from Defendant Jack Tanner, acting in his individual or co-conspiratorial capacities, but Leen did not explain why he (Leen) was actually obeying those illegal orders. These "orders" were intended to violate Plaintiff Bell's First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and in carrying out these orders Leen accomplished those violations as were requested and intended by the other Defendants including Jack Tanner, Rob London, Jeff Gordon, and the others. This was a RICO conspiracy involving the violation of Leen’s fiduciary duty to act on behalf of Bell’s best interests by disclosing discovery, which is a violation of the Mail fraud and Wire fraud statutes. See U.S. v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1983).
Claim #243
Defendants Leen, London, Tanner and others agreed to and continued to collude during the January, 2001 time frame, along with unknown-named government agents and court personnel acting illegally and under all their capacities, to deny Plaintiff Bell access to any discovery by promulgating Defendant Jack Tanner's illegal order of January 5, 2001. This order, to deny discovery, was apparently and ostensibly not the product of any overt, on-the-record request by either the government (Defendant Rob London) or Defendant Leen, because the conspiratorial agreement between them (Leen and London) perhaps a month earlier never officially was revealed to Defendant Tanner. In reality, however, these three co-conspirators agreed to act and acted in concert because that illegal agreement between London and Leen could not last without official, on-the-record replacement, so that is what was done on January 5, 2001. Transcripts confirm that the illegal January 5 Order must have been prompted by something other than an open, on-the-record request: There must have been improper ex parte communication. Plaintiss allege that defendants were tampering with Bell’s representational rights, in non-immunized roles.
Claim #244
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Jack Tanner and Franklin Burgess in 1997-2000 at all relevant times possessed the administrative power to act in order to replace Bell's attorney with an unconflicted, unbetraying one, but they did not do so. Plaintiffs allege that their failures to act, as well as their acts, were both negligent and malicious, intending to cause illegal harm to Bell, or acting with reckless disregard for Bell's constitutional and statutory rights of which an ordinary person in their positions would have been aware. Bell was severely harmed due to their actions and their failures to act in an administrative capacity.
Claim #245
Plaintiffs allege Tanner and Burgess, as well as the defendants, also violated 42 USC § 1986, since they were aware of actionable wrongs conspired to be done that were about to be committed, and they had the power (in their administrative or other capacities) to prevent or ameliorate these wrongs, and they neglected or refused to act to prevent the wrongs, and the wrongful acts were committed and Bell was harmed.
Claim #246
Plaintiff Bell wrote a series of pro se legal motions during the January-April 2001 time frame in order to help protect his rights. All were ignored and denied by Defendant Jack Tanner, acting in collusion and on orders of the other defendants in the conspiracy. Bell continued to be denied discovery, evidence-exclusion hearings, change of venue, and other ordinary and necessary legal procedures on orders of the other co-conspirator defendants acting through Defendant Jack Tanner.
Claim #247
Defendants and personnel of the Seatac FDC refused at least five (5) written requests by Plaintiff Bell that his sessions with betraying attorney Robert Leen be audio-taped for future evidence against Leen. These requests were denied for arbitrary and capricious reasons, and in fact they were denied in violation of BOP (Bureau of Prisons) policy which specifically allows such procedures. Seatac FDC personnel denied this procedure specifically and intentionally because they wished to allow and assist co-conspirator lawyer Robert Leen to continue to sabotage Bell's case, and they knew that the recording of Bell's sessions with Leen would incriminate Leen and his co-conspirators and all other defendants including themselves. Leen himself stated to Bell that if Bell succeeded in getting such recording provisions allowed, he (Leen) would simply be forced to stop coming to visit Bell due to the collection of this evidence against him.
This denial violated Bell's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth amendments to the US Constitution, as was planned and accomplished by all Defendants.
Claim #248
Defendant Robert Leen continued to refuse to show discovery material to Plaintiff Bell during December, 2000. Bell wrote another letter to Defendant/Judge Tanner in late December, 2000 saying serious problems existed with Leen. However Tanner intentionally "ignored" these letters and neglected his legal obligations to investigate, in his administrative capacity, because he was already aware of the problem and in fact desired (along with the other Defendants) it to exist.
Claim #249
Quite surprisingly, on December 25, 2000 Defendant Leen came to Bell at Seatac FDC, displaying a stack of "discovery" that had heretofore been withheld from Bell. Leen then proceeded to attempt to extort Bell's signature on a "Speedy Trial Waiver" form which the Defendants (and particularly Defendants London, Tanner, and Leen) wanted Bell to sign. He said he wouldn’t show Bell any more discovery unless Bell signed the document. These Defendants needed to get Bell to sign this voluntary delay of the trial, because Defendant Attorney Leen had been knowingly (to the Defendants) assigned to Bell (but without Bell's knowledge) despite the fact that Leen's schedule was already filled at what would otherwise had to be Bell's trial. Leen's fraudulent participation at the trial was going to be necessary for them: if the trial wasn't rescheduled Leen would have to be replaced, and the Defendants could not deal with that. It was necessary for the Defendants Tanner, Leen, and London to re-schedule this, at all costs. Thus, Leen's attempted extortion of Bell was "necessary" for the interests of the conspiracy, and all the defendants knew and intended that it occur.
Claim #250
However, Bell refused the threat by Leen, to refuse to show Bell the discovery material unless Bell signed the Speedy Trial Waiver. Defendant Leen left, and proceeded to work to ensure that Bell's trial was delayed improperly, taking the discovery, having kept his threat to keep it from Bell. Leen never disclosed this material to Bell, and thus he carried out his threat.
Claim #251
On the next day, December 26, 2000, Defendant Leen intentionally violated Bell's attorney-client privilege, and engaged in legal malpractice, improperly and falsely claiming in a letter to the court and London that Bell had reneged on his prior "promise" to sign the Speedy Trial Waiver. The alert of this fact was delivered to Defendant Prosecutor London that day, December 26, as Leen and London had offices in the same building. The purpose of this alert was to unethically and illegally assist the other defendants to harm Bell.
Claim #252
Either that day or December 27, prosecutor London and the Defendant Prosecutor's office, assisted by the other defendants, began a "crash" program to illegally accomplish the re-scheduling of Bell's trial without Bell's approval. These Defendants agreed to falsely and fraudulently use a condition in the Speedy Trial requirements, one that allowed a trial delay if a criminal defendant was given a psychological evaluation. In a desperate effort, London and others compiled a knowingly false and fraudulent set of claims about things that Bell was supposed to have said have done, or have believed. It was virtually all third and fourth-person false and misleading commentary that was either a lie, or severely distorted the truth. London acted in his unimmunized administrative and investigative capacity, and he filed a knowingly-false affidavit with the court. No reasonable person could have believed that their procedure was legally proper.
Claim #253
An “emergency” hearing that was scheduled specifically by the Defendants to accomplish this fraud was quickly scheduled (on or about December 27, 2000, with the hearing to be held January 3, 2001) a truly extraordinary effort that reveals the extent of the coordination behind the fraud. (There was actually no emergency, except for the Defendants' need to improperly re-schedule Bell's trial so Leen could abusively participate and further victimize Bell.) The January 3, 2001 hearing ignored defense motions that had been filed long before December 27, establishing that Prosecutor London was getting improper priority treatment that evidences a bias.
Claim #254
Bell was taken, without warning, to the January 3, 2001 hearing, and literally as he walked through the door he was first given a copy of the prosecutor's fraudulent assertions against his sanity. (Months later, the same prosecutor, London, begrudgingly admitted that Bell was and is quite sane: London has not quite yet admitted that his January 3, 2001 hearing was intended as a sham, as he knew it was at the time.)
Claim #255
Bell, having been given less than 3 minutes to read a complex, multi-page document, recognized the nature of the fraud and its motivation, since he was already aware that the Prosecutor and the Defendants wished to obtain an illegitimate delay (Due to the speedy trial extortion by Leen). Bell responded in court by saying that he could easily respond to and demolish all of the false assertions present in the Prosecutor's abusive and false document. However, as might have been expected, Defendant London and Leen had pre-arranged this sham with the assistance of Defendant Judge Tanner, who denied Bell the opportunity to even address and challenge the prosecutor's false claims. They did this to accomplish the goals of the defendants’ conspiracy.
Claim #256
In another fraudulent hearing on January 5, 2001, Plaintiff Bell requested but was improperly and maliciously denied by Defendant Tanner the opportunity to read a list of over 25 separate improper, illegal, or unethical acts or failures to act committed by Defendant Attorney Robert Leen until that point: Bell was being (and has always been, since then) denied the opportunity to actually state what was wrong with Leen and his "representation" of Bell. Bell's numerous pretrial motions in that criminal case from January-April 2001 document many but not all of the problems with Leen's fraudulent, collusive, and malevolent "representation." These filings were filed with the Court, and thus Defendant Judge Tanner, and were also sent to Defendant Prosecutor London and to Leen himself.
Claim #257
On or before the February 16, 2001 "competency hearing", unknown-named Defendants, but including Defendant Prosecutor Rob London, tampered with the psychologist witness who had been assigned to testify, informing him that he should not show up for the hearing. By February 16, Defendants including Prosecutor London had already achieved the illegal delay in proceedings that they desired and had improperly worked for, so they had no further use for the psychologist or his testimony. The purpose of warning the psychologist away from the hearing was to prevent Plaintiff Bell from questioning the psychologist about the adequacy of the original justification for the evaluation, which Defendants including London knew would expose his and their procedural fraud.
Thus, the psychologist did not show up for Bell's questioning. This witness-tampering is a RICO predicate act (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512), as well as a conspiracy against the "speedy trial" procedural rights of Plaintiff Bell and is thus a violation of 42 USC § 1985. It is also a Bivens constitutional right violation of Plaintiff Bell's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him and to call witnesses in his favor. Defendant London contacted the psychologist by telephone, fax, email, or US Mail, which is either Wire Fraud or Mail Fraud, both RICO predicate acts. London was interfering in an investigation and the presentation of the results of that investigation in court. This was unethical.
Further, instructing a witness to not appear is, even when appropriate, an administrative task which is not immunized. The psychologist was not the prosecutor's witness, and no prosecutorial immunity applies.
Claim #258
Defendants including Defendant Prosecutor Rob London interfered with the reassignment of a different (and honest) attorney to Bell on January 3/5 and February 16, 2001. London falsely stated that Plaintiff Bell had been represented by "six" Defense attorneys, which was false, and falsely implied that this was based on the current charge, which was also false. Defendant London also was fully aware of the fraud and misbehavior of prior attorneys Avenia and Mandel against Plaintiff Bell's rights in their collusion with the Defendants including London (particularly as stated in this Complaint), and he was fully aware that Bell had every legitimate reason to want to replace Leen.
Claim #259
Defendant London also improperly and wrongfully responded in written opposition to Bell's written requests for attorney reassignment into which he (London) had no proper procedural input. Defendant London attempted and succeeded in denying Plaintiff Bell an honest attorney. Interfering with the opposition's representation is not a proper prosecutorial function: No immunity applies to this.
This constitutes Obstruction of Justice, which is a RICO predicate act. It is also a conspiracy against Plaintiff Bell's due process and Sixth Amendment representation rights, and is thus a violation of 42 USC § 1985, and is actionable under Bivens.
Claim #260
During December, 2000 through April, 2001 while he was at Seatac FDC, Plaintiff Bell repeatedly telephoned to the Tacoma and Seattle Federal Public Defenders offices, informing them that Defendant Lawyer Leen (whom they had assigned to be Bell's attorney) was intentionally acting against Bell's interests, failing to take ordinary and necessary actions concerning Bell's representation, sabotaging Bell's case in numerous ways, acting unethically, failing to act effectively to be replaced, and failing to act against the improper actions and abuses of Jack Tanner. Representatives from these Public Defender organizations falsely claimed that they could not replace Leen, appoint a different attorney, or do anything else to assist or protect Bell. They refused and failed to do anything to help. They also failed and refused to inquire further into the facts and circumstances related by Bell, nor act to confirm or deny anything Bell had stated, or report these violations.
Claim #261
Plaintiffs including Bell allege that these Public Defender Organizations knew or should have known that Leen and Tanner were acting to force Leen on Bell with improper and illegal intent, and they were aware by their intimate association with the local legal community the nature of the misbehavior and fraud that was occurring. Plaintiffs further allege that they could have acted to either stop the wrongful actions of Leen and Tanner but did not, or they could have assigned a second attorney to monitor, document, and report the incidents of which Bell had complained but did not, and this (if done) would have indirectly led to a prevention or amelioration of the harms that were occurring. Plaintiffs allege, therefore, that the Tacoma and Seattle Public Defender organizations violated 42 USC § 1986, since they were aware of actionable wrongs conspired to be done that had been and were about to be committed, and they had the power to prevent these wrongs. They neglected or refused to act to prevent the wrongs, and wrongful acts were then committed. This was malpractice.
Claim #262
Plaintiff Bell, in order to protect his own rights, filed an Interlocutory Appeal notice with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on March 27, 2001, one week before the scheduled trial, in order to get repaired numerous procedural errors, some of which are mentioned in this suit. One of the numerous issues to be resolved was the denial of Bell's access to un-conflicted, ethical legal representation due to the serious misbehavior of Defendant/Attorney Leen and his co-conspirators/Defendants. The defendants colluded to deny Bell access to the courts on this matter.
Claim #263
The defendants, particularly Tanner, Leen, and London, and others recognized or should have recognized that jurisdiction to proceed with a trial had been lost due to Bell's pro-se filed Interlocutory Appeal notice. They believed and agreed, however, that Judge Tanner had the immunity and the apparent (though illegal) "power" to “try” and "sentence" Bell despite the lack of jurisdiction to have a legal trial, or for that matter any trial at all. They understood and agreed that such a process would be a fraud and illegal, but they convinced themselves that they would be able to get away with it for an indefinite time in the future if the sham was sufficiently concealed, and with the ever increasing manipulations of the legal system that they were prepared to and planned to do, and later did.
Claim #264
The defendants agreed amongst themselves to put on a "sham trial" whose outcome would be legally moot (although they hoped it would appear to comport with what was to follow), followed by an illegal “sentencing” regardless of the outcome of the "trial." The defendants agreed that Plaintiff Bell would not be released even if the result of the "trial" was "not guilty". They agreed that he would be wrongfully re-arrested on a specious charge in that event, or the outcome of the trial would be declared somehow illegal and Bell would continue to be held indefinitely. Further, they agreed that they would subvert the Appeals process in whatever way was necessary to maintain their fraud and achieve their desired illegal goals, which they later did.
Claim #265
Defendants especially Tanner, Leen, London, and others colluded before, during, and after the scheduled start date of the "trial" in order to thwart and attempt to ignore and extinguish Plaintiff Bell's due process and other rights. Individually, and collectively, they acted to pretend that Bell's appeal notice did not divest the trial court of trial jurisdiction in of Supreme Court case Abney v. US, 431 US 651, 52 L.Ed.2d 651, 97 S.Ct 2034 (1978). They acted in clear violation of statutes and law expressly depriving them of jurisdiction. Leen colluded by failing to exercise ordinary and necessary means (such as mandamus) to keep the district court from acting outside its jurisdiction.
Claim #266
The co-conspirator defendants, in order to deny Plaintiff Bell's statutory right to have an interlocutory appeal, decided and agreed to interfere with this right and to extinguish the appeal unjustly and in violation of Due Process and case law. These Defendants colluded to recruit an essential new conspirator, Peter L. Shaw, who was by official title the "Commissioner" of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals headquartered in San Francisco, engaging in unethical ex parte communication with Shaw, and asked him to illegally deny the appeal in violation of law, precedent, and rule. He agreed to do so, in his administrative or other capacities.
Claim #267
Defendants including Peter Shaw agreed that Plaintiff (then Appellant) Bell must and would be illegally denied the statutory right to file and have adjudicated an interlocutory appeal, and they agreed and acted to have false, misleading, forged, and illegal orders issued from the Ninth Circuit Court Clerk's office in order to accomplish this illegal denial. Defendant Shaw began his overt interference by wrongfully assigning Defendant Robert Leen to "represent" Bell in the Interlocutory Appeal, when Shaw knew or should have known (due to the prior collusion and agreement among the Defendants including himself) that attorney Leen had no intention of assisting Bell on any appeal. Shaw knew and agreed that Leen was secretly instructed to help thwart Bell and deny Bell all legal assistance including appeal assistance. Shaw also knew about Leen’s extreme conflict of interest with Bell, yet acted wrongfully in its face in violation of proper procedure. Shaw and the other defendants agreed to obstruct Bell’s access to the courts, and they acted illegally to accomplish this outcome.
Claim #268
No later than March 30, 2001, Defendant Jack Tanner was officially informed of the existence of the Interlocutory Appeal notice, and he was or should have been aware (as were all of the other Defendants) that under Supreme Court case of Abney v. United States (1978) jurisdiction was lost. See also Moore v. Brewster, 96 F. 3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1996) at 1246. See also Taylor v. Wood, 458 F.2d 15, 16 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Davis v. United States, 667 F.2d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 1982). Tanner knew he did not have any subject matter jurisdiction at all at that point to proceed with trial. Nevertheless, and intending to violate Plaintiff (then defendant) Bell's rights, Tanner ignored his legal and administrative obligations and acted illegally in collusion with the other Defendants including those present and participating including Leen, London, Jeff Gordon, and others. Tanner acted in the face of statutes and precedents clearly depriving him of jurisdiction. See Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d at 849 (9th Cir. 1980).
Claim #269
On April 6, 2001, in his administrative or investigative capacities, Defendant Shaw issued an improper and fraudulent order directing Defendant Leen to "justify" the appeal based on "jurisdiction," when he was or should have been aware that Leen would not and in fact could not comply with this order due to the extreme conflict of interest present in the case at that time: Leen himself and his misbehavior was one of the main issues of the case, making the interlocutory appeal necessary, so Leen could not ethically or legally put himself (or allow himself to be put) in a position controlling the appeals case or defending its propriety. Defendant Shaw intended to ignore these problems, and obstruct Bell’s access to the courts, and he and the other defendants were aware that such collusion was illegal and unethical. Shaw was also aware that Tanner was already illegally proceeding with the non-jurisdictional “trial”, but he failed to act in his ministerial and administrative capacities to inform Tanner he could not proceed. Defendant/Attorney Leen, in a pre-arranged move designed to provide him a small amount of "ethical cover", responded to this ORDER on April 9, 2001, with a misleading and inadequate answer which did not fulfill his obligations to his client (Bell) and was intended to violate Bell’s rights. The ORDER and Leen’s letter constituted mail fraud.
Claim #270
By prior illegal arrangement, Defendant/Co-conspirator Peter L. Shaw was instructed and agreed to ignore Defendant Leen's letter in which Leen refused to be assigned to Bell's Appeal's case for good cause, and also ignore Leen’s failure to justify the appeal based on "jurisdiction." It was the intent and goal of Defendant Shaw, in secret agreement with all other Defendants, that Shaw would simply pretend to ignore Leen's answer and improper refusal to act on the appeal in violation of procedural rules, laws, and court precedent. This was intended to harm Bell and violate his constitutional and statutory rights. Then Shaw caused to be fraudulently issued a false order on May 22, 2001, dismissing the appeal for false reasons and with improper or no justification. Defendant Shaw caused this to be done, assisted by other personnel, acting wrongfully in administrative or ministerial capacity.
Claim #271
Defendant Shaw (and other defendants) were or should have been aware that Leen should not be assigned as Bell's counsel, yet they agreed it would be done. They were also aware (or should have been aware) that given Leen's contrived refusal (taking it at face-value) Leen would have to be replaced as appeals counsel (in order to comply with rules and law), but they secretly agreed among themselves ahead of time that he would not be, in order to continue to violate Bell's rights. The Defendants including Shaw also knew or should have known that it was illegal, unethical, and otherwise improper to make rulings on the appeal case (or the underlying court case) as it was done when Plaintiff (then Appellant) Bell was not effectively represented, but they proceeded to do so anyway in their continuing agreement to violate Bell’s rights. Not only was Bell not represented effectively, he was not even allowed to act on his own behalf, violating his rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment: His own filings were ignored, in violation of Ninth Circuit precedent and local rule 4-1(d).
Claim #272
Defendants, especially unknown-named administrative and ministerial personnel also maliciously and wrongfully conspired against Plaintiff Bell's future rights to bring actions in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. For example, the Docket entry for the improper May 22, 2001 dismissal of the March 27, 2001 filed Interlocutory Appeal (01-30143) includes the notation "Dismissed/Frivolous," when in fact these personnel knew that the claimed reason for the dismissal ("lack of jurisdiction") was in no way describable as "frivolous." ("Frivolous," in legal terms, is an entirely different concept than "lack of jurisdiction." And, a dismissal on the lack of jurisdiction prohibits the court from rendering merits issues such as frivolousness. See Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d at 1234 (9th Cir. 1990)) The wrongful purpose of this improper notation was to improperly cause or hasten the wrongful application of statute 28 USC § 1915 (g) which allows the dismissal of actions if there are three prior cases dismissed for being "frivolous, malicious," These personnel were acting to harm Bell's current and future cases by beginning to contaminate the record with false "facts." Bell’s written and filed challenge to this false entry was ignored by clerks colluding in their administrative or ministerial capacities.
Claim #273
Critically, however, these co-conspirators, including Defendants Peter L. Shaw, Appellate Commissioner for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Jack Tanner of the Tacoma Federal Court, Robert Leen, and prosecutor Rob London, were aware of the fact that even if the May 22, 2001 ORDER dismissing Bell's interlocutory appeal were ASSUMED to have been validly issued (which it was not), that dismissal order did not retroactively return trial jurisdiction to the Tacoma Federal Court and Judge Jack Tanner, and these defendants were fully aware of this legal and procedural fact no later than the beginning of the non-jurisdictional "trial," April 3, 2001. The co-conspirator Defendants who participated in the trial, including Tanner, Leen, London, Gordon, and others, were intentionally violating Bell's constitutional and statutory rights in a way that even future legal decisions (including at the Ninth Circuit Court level) would not rectify or repair.
Claim #274
During the fraudulent and non-jurisdictional "trial", Defendant/Attorney Leen extensively and willfully violated Bell's rights, for example by sabotaging Bell's right to call a list of defense witnesses that Bell himself had been forced to prepare and file with the court: Leen had failed and refused to discuss the matter with Bell, before or after Bell's witness list was filed. Defendant Leen colluded and agreed with Defendant Jack Tanner to provide further ethical "cover" to betraying attorney Leen, by the mechanism of Leen intentionally filing known-defective witness subpoena forms that Defendant Jack Tanner would reject. It was intended by the defendants that this "trick" would convert a blatantly-unethical and obvious refusal to request ANY defense witnesses, an act so thoroughly unethical and illegal that even crooked attorney Leen balked, into a supposedly-immunized act by Defendant Judge Tanner to deny those witnesses due to a “failure” of Leen to fill out the forms properly: In effect, an intentional fraud had been converted, as if by magic into a simple “mistake” that each side (Leen and Tanner) could blame on the other. Bell was made a victim of this ruse, by the defendants’ collusion.
(This was highly reminiscent of the actions of Defendants Judge Burgess and Attorney Judith Mandel, where Mandel failed to ask for defense witnesses in Bell's hearing, yet offering her resignation instead, and by pre-arrangement then she was "forced" onto Bell: Thus, in a remarkably similar event, Bell for a second time was effectively and intentionally denied any defense witnesses despite the fact that the US Constitution clearly indicates that all defendants have the right to "compulsory process" to obtain witnesses on their behalf).
Due to the court’s lack of jurisdiction the result of the “trial” was a legal nullity.
These examples of courtroom collusion were in violation of Bell's Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. These improper and illegal actions represent a conspiracy against rights in violation of 42 USC §§ 1985, 1988 and Bivens. These wrongful actions also constitute Obstruction of Justice, tampering with witnesses, and other RICO predicate violations in violation of 18 USC §§ 1961, 1962, and 1964, et seq. It was extrinsic fraud.
Claim # 275
As a consequence of the trial court’s loss of jurisdiction, and the fact that no subsequent trial has been held to date, Plaintiff Bell’s Speedy Trial rights under both the United States Constitution and the Federal Speedy Trial statute (18 USC 3161 et seq.) have been irretrievably violated. Violating 18 USC 3162(a)(2), Plaintiff Bell has not been brought to a jurisdictional trial within the time limit required by 18 USC 3161© as extended by 18 USC 3161(h). Plaintiff Bell filed a pro-se “Notice and Alert of Violation of Speedy-Trial Act”, docketed 2/15/01 in the district court. The district court was obligated to construe this pro-se motion broadly as a motion to dismiss, as per Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519, 520, 30 L.Ed.2d 652, 92 S.Ct. 594 (1972). This requires dismissal of all prior and contemplated charges “with prejudice”, including any which could have been brought during the period of November 2000 to date.
Claim #276
In violation of 18 USC 3162(b), both government attorney Rob London and attorney Robert Leen knowingly allowed the case #00-5731JET to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that Robert Leen would be unavailable for trial. Government attorney London filed a motion on or about December 29, 2000, solely for the purpose of delay which he knew to be false and which was material to the granting of a continuance. Both attorneys London and Leen willfully failed to proceed to a jurisdictional trial without justification consistent with 18 USC 3161.
These attorneys engaged in these acts for the purpose of the promotion of the conspiracy of the defendants, in an un-immunized capacity.
Claim #277
Defendant Jack Tanner refused to follow the recusal rules in Supreme Court case Liteky v. United States, 510 US 540, 127 L.Ed. 2d 474, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994) after Plaintiff Bell had filed a motion calling for the recusal of Jack Tanner for his serious misbehavior in the Dec 2000/February, 2001 time frame. Tanner's intent was to impose himself on Plaintiff Bell, and to keep himself in an administrative position to impose betraying attorney Robert Leen on Plaintiff (then defendant) Bell.
Claim #278
Colluding attorney Leen refused and failed, intentionally to the detriment of his client Bell, to take normal and necessary measures to cause Jack Tanner's illegal and improper actions to be identified and stopped or merely adequately documented. Leen did this to harm his client Bell, but he also did this (and failed to take necessary action) because of a serious conflict of interest he had. His prior collusion with prosecutors such as Anne Marie Levins and Rob London, as well as Judges such as Tanner and Burgess, made him susceptible to blackmail and threats, and he was dependant for his future income on money that he might not and likely would not make if he had stopped being willing to betray his clients such as Bell. Leen severely violated his ethical obligations by valuing his future relationship with the local court system over the rights of Bell, his client. This was malpractice.
Claim #279
Defendant Leen never inquired to Bell about the numerous legal motions Bell wrote and filed pro-se, the need for them, or offered to assist in their writing or filing. He ignored them. Defendant Leen continued to assist Defendants Rob London, Jeff Gordon, and Jack Tanner's desire and efforts to defraud Plaintiff Bell concerning access to essential discovery materials. This material was totally and illegally withheld from Bell up to and including March 27, 2001, when Bell filed the Interlocutory Appeal Notice with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, divesting jurisdiction from the district court to proceed.
Claim #280
On March 28, 2001, personnel of the Bureau of Prisons knowingly and intentionally began to engage in a sham discovery “disclosure” which was merely intended to generate the illusion of disclosure, but was intended and had the effect of denying Plaintiff Bell any real access or benefit. This "disclosure" occurred so late, according to the illegitimate desires and wrongful efforts of each of the Defendants, that only a tiny fraction of the provided-documents could be studied, but as importantly this "disclosure" was carefully delayed so that the ABSENCE of documents, in fact missing or withheld documents, would not be discovered by Bell until there was no time to even ask for more material, let alone receive it and study it. Leen refused and failed to resist this sham, and actually assisted it. Bell was denied the ability to use any of this discovery material to his own benefit.
Claim #281
Co-conspirator/Defendant Attorney Leen colluded by failing and refusing to be present at the fraudulent "disclosure" of the documents, and in fact to refuse to accept any complaints by Bell that the material was inadequate, incomplete, and Leen intentionally avoided disclosing any material actually generated by government agents (as opposed to merely being copied by them.)
Claim #282
Colluding Bureau of Prisons employees including Jill Sjodin engaged in a fraudulent effort to falsely portray the "disclosure" as proper by falsely and fraudulently preparing documents which "certified" that the materials had been shown to Bell. However, this disclosure was misrepresented, incomplete, maliciously done, and done without any legal representation being present. Bell was denied the ability to challenge these false claims.
Claim #283
Defendant Sjodin intentionally engaged in fraud, also, because she planned and acted as an intentionally biased "witness" to the proceedings. Plaintiff Bell, even before the March 28 date, approached Sjodin and explained to her that the disclosure was fraudulent and inadequate and was likely going to be incomplete, with little or no possibility of correcting this matter, and with virtually no likelihood of getting the "trial" delayed to complete the discovery properly. Bell also explained to Sjodin the fraudulent activity of Attorney Leen.
Claim #284
At this point, Plaintiff Bell presented to Defendant/Counselor Sjodin a document which stated these numerous objections for the record to Sjodin, and Bell asked Sjodin to sign this document, also for the record, simply to record the fact that she had been alerted to the objections and problems that existed, and to ensure that it was established for the record that the Bureau of Prisons through its personnel were aware of the problems at the time.
Dishonestly and collusively, however, Sjodin refused to sign that document, despite the fact that it clearly was labeled "read and understood." Sjodin was fully willing to and did, later, sign a fraudulent document for the benefit of the prosecution, making false and misleading claims about the disclosure, but acting in a thoroughly biased fashion she was not equally willing to acknowledge the existence of disclosed objections where the fact of those objections might later have been used by Plaintiff Bell for his own benefit and protection. This sham constituted a serious violation of Bell's constitutional right to have witnesses in his favor, and also his right to confront witnesses against him. Counselor Sjodin colluded to misrepresent the discovery disclosure, and to deny Bell the right to confront her false claims. Other unknown-named government agents, including other personnel of the Seatac FDC, assisted Sjodin in this fraud, a violation of 42 USC §§ 1985 and 1986. Colluding defendants denied Bell the right to confront witness Sjodin in violation of his constitutional and procedural rights.
Claim #285
Defendant/attorney Leen, in collusion with Defendants Tanner, London and Gordon, also violated Bell's right to testify wholly and completely by falling and refusing to allow Bell to testify in areas and subjects embarrassing and incriminating to government and its employees. Plaintiff (then defendant) Bell stated during his testimony that there was at least six more hours of material that he saw as essential to provide, Leen cut Bell off. Bell's right to testify was violated because despite the public image of courtroom protocol being that the defense attorney asks questions of the defendant who answers them, the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution neither requires nor allows an attorney to limit a defendant's testimony by simply refusing to ask questions. Betraying attorney Leen refused to ask essential questions, and by prior arrangement and collusion with defendant Tanner, Bell was cut off from further testimony simply because Leen maliciously claimed he had run out of questions. The Defendants were well aware that they were violating Bell's right to testify and they planned this trial sabotage. Bell objected at the time during the non-jurisdictional “trial”, preserving this, but defendants including Juergens further colluded to deny Bell the opportunity to appeal this matter.
During and before the non-jurisdictional “trial”, Leen and Tanner secretly colluded to deny Bell his constitutional right to witnesses in his favor, as well as his right to confront and challenge witnesses against him.
Claim #286
During various times of Bell's incarcerations, including and in particular his times at FDC Seatac, recordings of his telephone conversations were illegally disclosed to prosecution, probation, and other personnel in violation of 18 USC § 2515 with the intent of using his freedom of speech in order to punish Bell.
Claim #287
By law and regulation, 28 CFR § 540.101, inmates at Bureau of Prisons facilities such as FDC Seatac must be informed if their telephone conversations are being monitored, and if it is happening, that they are recorded as well. Moreover, these facilities are also legally required to disclose the REASON for this monitoring and recording.
FDC Seatac personnel engaged in numerous violations of these legal requirements, and these violations were willful and malicious. FDC Seatac specifically disclosed (in documents that were signed by inmates) that the reasons for the monitoring were only two: For "the safety of the institution" and "the protection of the public." Quite to the contrary, Seatac FDC staff had a fraudulent policy to not merely “monitor”, but also to record and disclose these recordings for reasons having nothing at all to do with these two disclosed reasons. Further, Seatac FDC fraudulently claimed that these phone conversations were merely "monitored"; It failed to disclose that they were RECORDED. It also failed to disclose that these recorded conversations were going to be used for basically whatever some government agent with a good story wanted them for.
Claim #288
In Bell's case, Defendant Agents Jeff Gordon, Rob London, and other unknown-named defendants, engaged in collusion with Seatac FDC staff to obtain copies of Bell's phone calls, to be used for the detriment of Bell, without prior disclosure of the fact of the recording, and in particular the fact of Gordon's (and other government agents including Defendants Leslie Spier and Michael Markham) wrongful intention to use them to cause harm to Bell and the people he was speaking to, as well as to harm third parties not participating in the phone calls. These people were harmed by the disclosures, as was intended by all the Defendants. Bell was also illegally prevented from using the contents of these recordings for his own benefit.
These Defendants also violated Bell's rights by preventing him from using these recordings (and the fact of these recordings and their improper and illegal disclosures) against his accusers including dishonest and colluding government agents such as Jeff Gordon, Leslie Spier, Rob London, and others. This constitutes obstruction of justice, a RICO predicate violation under 18 USC § 1961. It was also Wire Fraud. It was also intentional interference in the contractual relations of Bell, in order to fraudulently deny him the benefits of the plea agreement.
Claim #289
In various illegal uses of these wrongfully-made and wrongfully-disclosed recordings, probation department employee Michael Markham repeatedly attempted to violate Bell's rights as was self-documented in Markham's prepared initial PSI report: Markham intended these harms to occur and he colluded and assisted in these disclosures. Plaintiffs allege that Tanner did not request the probation department to prepare the PSI report, and that Tanner had lost the jurisdiction to have done so, and that all defendants were aware of these facts. Markham had no duty to prepare a PSI report in the absence of a valid trial and conviction and further he had an obligation to refuse to prepare such a report since he was aware of the defects in any order he would claim to have followed. His requests and the information were delivered by mail or telephone, which is Mail or Wire Fraud. Various paragraphs violated Bell's rights. Among these are a few selected examples:
144: Violated Bell's 1st Amendment right, was a violation of 18 USC § 241 and 42 USC § 1985142: Violated 1st Amendment rights; 18 USC § 241 and 42 USC § 1985
135: 1st Amendment, 18 USC § 241, 42 USC § 1985
136: 1st Amendment, 18 USC § 241, 42 USC § 1985
137: 1st Amendment, 18 USC § 241, 42 USC § 1985
138: 1st Amendment, 18 USC § 241, 42 USC § 1985
139: 1st Amendment, freedom of association, 18 USC § 241, 42 USC § 1985
140: 1st Amendment, freedom of association, as well as violating Bell's right to defend himself by lawful means, and violating Bell's rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.
Claim #290
All of these paragraphs illegally urged, in blatant violation of Bell's constitutional rights and 18 USC § 241 and 42 USC § 1985, punishment for Bell for his prior exercise of his constitutional rights (including First Amendment) and to deter him from their future exercise. These wrongful actions were done by these certain Defendants at the request of other unknown-named Defendants in order to cause harm to Plaintiff Bell. Bell was harmed as a consequence of these wrongful recordings and disclosures.
Claim #291
The actions of each defendant since as early as January 1997 have been designed not merely to violate the rights of Plaintiffs including class plaintiffs and Bell in particular, but also to help conceal and disguise all prior offenses against Plaintiffs and Bell, and to prevent them and him from investigating, uncovering, verifying, detailing, exposing, and publicizing these severe violations of the Plaintiffs' First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. These illegitimate and illegal actions by the defendants continue unabated to this date, and constitute fraudulent concealment.
LAW LIBRARY ACCESS DENIAL
Claim #292
During a time unknown, but continuing through the period of Plaintiff Bell's 2000/2001 incarceration at FDC Seatac, Defendants Warden Jusino, Administrator S. Young, and Administrator N. Cunningham and J. Sjodin as well as Defendant Counselor Ortiz and unknown-named others have illegally colluded amongst themselves to deny Plaintiffs and plaintiff class members their right to meaningful and adequate tools to prepare their legal cases, study case law and legal procedure, and to learn the law in general. This practice of denial includes denial of adequate and sufficient access to the inadequate FDC Seatac law-library, intentional under-use of this facility in order to deny inmates' rights, and in particular, the rights of Plaintiffs James Bell, Michael Hunter, and other plaintiff-class members to prepare this and other legal documents and actions. This violates their right of access to the courts, and is intended to assist the non-Seatac defendants in obstructing the plaintiffs efforts to protect their rights, and it has done so.
Claim #293
This denial includes the arbitrary and capricious limitations on the number of inmates allowed to attend an intentionally-minimal and inadequate weekly law-library session, and the intentional failure to schedule alternate sessions when the primary session is full.
Claim #294
According to Defendant Robert Leen, on June 30, 2001, in retaliation for a complaint send by Plaintiff Bell to the Washington State Bar Association in June, 2001, naming Defendant Jack E. Tanner, Tanner issue an illegal order to prohibit Bell from making further pro-se generated filings in District Court in order to further violate Bell's First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteen Amendment rights and to prevent Bell from documenting past, present, and future violations of Bell's rights. Also this was intended to keep Bell from attempting to fire Defendant/co-conspirator Leen, despite Leen's continuing unethical conduct and behavior, and his repeatedly and continuously demonstrated unwillingness to act on Bell's behalf. It remains unclear whether Leen’s statement was a lie. Regardless of whether or not it was a lie, it was intended by Leen and the other defendants to cause fear and trepidation in Bell’s mind, and to discourage Bell from further pro-se filings to protect his rights.
Claim #295
On June 26, 2001, Plaintiff Bell was intimidated and threatened by Administrator Mesler for doing legal work and giving assistance to inmate Thomas Merrit at the Law Library, in violation of their rights defined by Supreme Court case Johnson v. Avery. Later that day, an unknown-named Lieutenant assisted in this intimidation process by approving that complaint, in violation of the Constitutional rights (including free speech) of both Bell and Merrit. At approximately 5:30 PM on June 29, Defendants J. Gustin and A. Wolfe further intimidated and punished Plaintiff Bell by denying him commissary for 60 days for his exercise of his and Merrit's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution. These are violations of 18 USC § 241, as well as being conspiracies against rights under 42 USC § 1985 and Bivens. They worked to obstruct Bell’s access to the courts, and his right to assist other victimized inmates.
Claim #296
On June 8, 2001, Plaintiff Bell re-filed his Interlocutory Appeal notice with the Court Clerk, where it was intentionally ignored by Court personnel in their administrative or ministerial capacities who did not want Bell to obtain his statutory right to access an Interlocutory appeal. They acted (and failed to act) to obstruct Bell’s access to the courts.
Claim #297
The defendants continued to conspire to violate Plaintiff Bell's Constitutional right to a fair trial. Each Defendant knew that the April 3-10, 2001, "trial" did not, in fact, have jurisdiction, but the Defendants and especially Leen violated his ethical responsibilities to client Bell to defend Bell's case honestly and without conflict of interest. Betraying attorney Leen's actual interest at that point was to cause further and extensive harm to Bell, and he did this by failing and refusing to help obtain an Interlocutory Appeal for Bell. Leen further specifically failed and refused to allow or assist Bell in filing a petition for a "writ of Certiorari" which was made necessary due to the false dismissal of the first (March 27, 2001) interlocutory appeal (01-30143) which was done illegally on May 22, 2001.
Claim #298
Attorney Leen's legal responsibilities included advocating effectively for Bell, but at this point Leen was thoroughly incriminated by his prior illegal and unethical actions, and any action he might have taken on Bell's behalf would have revealed his criminal and civil liability, as well as ethical punishment. Leen, therefore, did nothing except those actions which were calculated to either harm Plaintiff Bell or to allow other people including each Defendant to harm Bell. Serious harm occurred to Plaintiff Bell by Leens actions and failures to act, in violation of 42 USC §§ 1985, 1986. Leen continued to commit legal malpractice.
Claim #299
On June 30, 2001, Defendant Robert Leen threatened Plaintiff/unwilling "client" Bell with the disclosure of confidentially-shared information should Bell file a lawsuit against Leen, a threat which was delivered at about 10:00 AM. Leen's threat, alone, would have made it impossible for Leen to ethically “continue” to represent Bell, although Bell had been unable to treat Leen as if he were Bell's attorney since late November, 2000 due to Leen's unethical activities and statements. Bell told Leen he had already written a lawsuit against Leen, and would shortly file it. Leen did not immediately resign, in violation of Bell’s rights to “meaningful and effective” assistance of counsel.
Claim #300
Minutes or hours after this meeting on June 30, Leen colluded with and disclosed confidential information obtained from Bell to unknown-named government agents including Defendants, who themselves directly or indirectly contacted Seatac FDC guard "McNeill" who that day worked the 6:00 AM to 2:00 PM shift, and McNeill was instructed to search for, read, and tamper with legal paperwork these agents believed would be found within the cells of Plaintiffs James Bell and Michael Hunter. Guard “McNeill” attempted to do this between 1:00 PM and 2:00 PM as requested by these Defendants, in violation of Bell and Hunter's First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. This was also a conspiracy against rights under 42 USC § 1985, and Bivens, and was a violation of 18 USC § 241. It was also an obstruction of justice, which is a RICO predicate act under 18 USC § 1961, et seq.
Claim #301
Guard McNeill attempted to threaten and intimidate Plaintiff Michael Hunter for doing legal work for fellow inmate Jose Cardenas, contrary to the right to do so expressed in Supreme Court case Johnson v. Avery, 393 US 483, 21 L.Ed.2d 718, 89 S.Ct 747(1969). Guard McNeill "wrote up" (filed an incident report on) Plaintiff Hunter to deter the future exercise not merely of Hunter's rights, but also to violate the rights of fellow inmates who might want and need legal assistance in the future, and to intimidate any other inmates including Plaintiff Bell intent on giving or receiving legal assistance in the further, in violation of their First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. This was a conspiracy against rights under 42 USC § 1985, and Bivens, and an attempt to obstruct justice which is a RICO predicate offense under 18 USC § 1961, et seq.
Claim #302
During meetings in July and August with Plaintiff Bell, Defendant Leen repeatedly and falsely claimed that "you [Bell] are a stalker", a false assertion attempting to intimidate and chill Bell from filing a lawsuit against Leen and London, et al. Leen knows that Plaintiff Bell was investigating criminal activities of Federal and State officials and agents in their violations of 18 USC § 241, 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1985, as well as RICO predicate and substantive violations, and False Claims against the Federal government.
Claim #303
Further, on June 30, 2001, Defendant Leen again threatened to claim that Plaintiff Bell is "delusional" thereby fabricating a defense to the lawsuit that he knew that Bell was going to file against Leen and other Defendants.
Claim #304
During April through June 2001 and beyond, Defendant Leen continued to sabotage Plaintiff Bell's legal position, for example by refusing to take legally defensible positions such as the conclusion that the District Court had no jurisdiction due to its abject failure to follow the dictates of U.S. v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980) which was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in US v. Lamere, 951 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1991). Leen’s actions were done as instructed by his co-defendants in this lawsuit.
Claim #305
Leen thus refused a position that was not merely arguable, but in fact was the only legally defensible one, and he intentionally assisted the prosecution as they wanted, by continuing to "hijack" Bell's case to Plaintiff Bell's extreme detriment. This was in violation of Bell's First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but particularly those of the Sixth: The Sixth says that a defendant has a right to "assistance" of counsel; it does not say that such a defendant must relinquish virtually total control of his case to such a counsel, particularly a counsel he has repeatedly attempted to "fire" for good cause. (Plaintiff Bell has never been offered the opportunity for pro-se representation under circumstances that actually allow for such effectively, making such a "choice" legally meaningless.)
Claim #306
Plaintiffs allege that defendant Leen acted wrongly, both in action and inaction, to further sabotage Bell's rights. Leen refused to work to halt the "sentencing" whose jurisdiction was separately removed by the second interlocutory appeal filing (first June 8, 2001, later about August 11, 2001) that became case #01-30296. At all times defendant lawyer Leen acted in ways, and only in ways, which were calculated and intended to assist the government and each of the defendants in wrongfully harming Plaintiff Bell, and they did so. Defendant Leen failed and refused to act in any way that might have helped Plaintiff Bell, for example to obtain defendant Tanner's replacement, a writ of Mandamus to stop the illegal “trial” and illegal “sentencing”, or to obtain a writ of certiorari which Bell stated he wanted. Prosecutor London participated in the non-jurisdictional “sentencing” after having been served, on or about August 24, 2001, with a summons in case # 01-1085KI. London thus became possessed of a conflict of interest which violated 28 USC § 528 and supporting regulations.
FRAUDULENT DISMISSAL
Claim #307
On or about July 11, 2001, Plaintiff mailed a copy of the original civil complaint to Portland, Oregon Federal Court, where it was apparently received within the week and assigned civil case #01-1085.
The civil complaint was served on numerous defendants, including Tanner, Leen, London, Spier, Markham, Avenia, Mandel, and others, as well as Tacoma Federal Court and Seattle Federal Court, Federal Public Defenders offices of Tacoma and Seattle, US Probation offices of Tacoma and Seattle, and the Prosecutors' office of Tacoma and Seattle, which were also defendants. Service was also performed on the US Attorney General, and the US Attorney's office in Portland, Oregon. This service was primarily accomplished on August 20 and 21, 2001 by certified mail according to Rule 4 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which allows certified mail service to government employees. (Attorneys Leen, Mandel, Avenia are contract employees of the Federal government.) The defendants conspired to ignore this lawful service.
Claim #308
At an unknown time, the Defendants including those listed above contacted the Portland Federal Court and officers of that Court, and they improperly sought to tamper with the proper functioning of that court according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These Defendants sought, attempted, and achieved the wrongful dismissal of that civil Complaint for premature, improper and illegal reasons, with the participation, help, and knowledge of unknown-named officers of the Portland Federal Court. This included unknown-named Court Clerks actions in their administrative or ministerial capacity, and personnel of the US Attorney in Portland, Oregon.
These contacts of the Defendants with Portland Federal Court (and US Attorney's office in Portland, Oregon) personnel were not done openly and according to documented, legitimate, and legal processes, but in fact they were done illegally, secretly and unethically and these Defendants were at all times aware and intended that their efforts be improper and not according to procedural rules. All these Defendants conspired to fail to respond with an answer to the lawsuit by means of improper communications with each other and Portland court personnel, and they did so. They sought secret, improper, and illegal “permission” to ignore the lawful service without complying with their legal obligations; they then received such wrongful “permission”, and then they failed to comply with the legally issued and valid summonses.
The civil complaint was also dismissed in violation of the circuit precedent established by Franklin v. State of Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, which held that the court must issue summonses and allow them to be served (and answered) unless the court clearly lacks subject-matter jurisdiction or if the court clearly lacks jurisdiction because the claim is “wholly insubstantial.” No reasonable judge could have believed such conditions were met in the instant case.
Claim #309
The Defendants secretly requested that the civil Complaint be dismissed wrongfully, illegally, and prematurely, in order to benefit themselves and to harm Plaintiffs including plaintiff Bell, and through their efforts and efforts of other unknown-named government personnel and Defendants they illegally obtained that improper result on September 12, 2001. These requests were communicated by mail and telephone, constituting Mail and Wire Fraud, as well as being obstruction of justice, all RICO predicate acts.
Claim #310
The law is clear that it is not necessary to state in the complaint any basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. See Stirling Homex Corp v. Homasote Co., 437 F.2d 89 (CA2 1971); Millwee v. Peachtree Cypress Inv. Co., 510 F.Supp. at 283 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); Burger King Corp. v. Holder, 844 F.Supp. 1531 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Joint Stock Soc. v. Heublein, Inc., 936 F.Supp. 177, at 192 (D.Del. 1996); Hansen v. Neumueller, 163 F.R.D. 471, 474 (D. Del 1995). See also 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 81: § 1206. In #01-1085, the defendants had not filed a motion to dismiss under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(2), and thus they waived a challenge to personal jurisdiction. See Chambers v. Blickle, 312 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1963). See also Form 2 (Appendix of Forms, F.R.Civ.P.). See also Rule 84, F.R.Civ.P.
Nevertheless, these Defendants secretly and wrongfully requested that the civil Complaint be ostensibly dismissed based on an intentionally-false claim that the Court had no "personal jurisdiction" over some of them, and it was so dismissed. These Defendants (and unknown-named Court personnel they illegally influenced, controlled, and worked with secretly and unethically) were aware at all times that this claim was false, because they were or should have been aware that statute 28 USC § 1391 specifically provides for personal jurisdiction in civil cases over Federal government employees. These Defendants (and the court personnel) were or should have been aware that this statute applied in civil case #01-1085, because they were aware 28 USC § 1391(e) applied, and (1) a defendant in this case resided in Portland, Oregon and (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Portland, Oregon and (3) at least one Plaintiff, Charles Stewart, and other class Plaintiffs reside in the District of Oregon. (See supra “Oregon Agents supporting personal jurisdiction in Oregon”) The dismissal was particularly improper because it was done before the Defendants were even obligated to answer, and their answers would have established the personal jurisdiction that the dismissal claimed did not exist. See Dodd v. Spokane County, 393 F.2d at 333-4 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d at 1234 (9th Cir. 1990).
Claim #311
These Defendants (and the unknown-named Court personnel they wrongfully influenced and controlled) were also aware of statute 18 USC § 1965, which provides for jurisdiction and venue on RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) claims under 18 USC § 1964. 18 USC §1965 provides that in a RICO civil complaint, of which 01-1085 is one, if only a single defendant has proper venue in a particular district, all other defendants can be served and brought into that particular venue. (Portland, Oregon). These Defendants were aware that numerous Defendants had proper venue in Oregon, and that 01-1085 was and is a RICO case claiming jurisdiction and venue under 18 USC §1965. They were thus aware, or should have been aware, that all other Defendants with sufficient contacts to the United States (which they knew or should have known) includes all Defendants) could be served. Yet these defendants conspired to have the court ignore this law, and as a wrongful result it did so.
Claim #312
These Defendants (and the Portland Court) also were or should have been aware of the "Effects Doctrine" of personal jurisdiction, promulgated in Supreme Court case Calder v. Jones, 79 L.Ed.2d 804, 104 S.Ct 1482 (1984). The actions of the Defendants within districts other than Oregon, including the Western District of Washington, were calculated and intended to influence and control the outcome of causes of action begun in Oregon in 1997, and these actions were intended to conceal and protect the illegal and improper actions of defendants who had proper venue within the District of Oregon. The Washington Defendants also made contact by a facility of interstate commerce (telephone, fax, email, US Mail) with the Defendants within the District of Oregon. The Defendants with residences outside of Oregon also owned property within the District of Oregon, sent agents to (and received agents from) the District of Oregon. Yet these defendants conspired to have the court ignore these facts, and as a result it did so.
Claim #313
The Defendants (and the Court personnel they contacted and controlled) also planned and requested (and achieved) that the civil Complaint be dismissed for yet another false reason, improperly justifying it based on an intentionally false and fraudulent reading of Supreme Court case Heck v. Humphrey. These Defendants were or should have been aware that Heck v. Humphrey:
1. Did not apply to any Plaintiff that was not a prisoner, including the vast majority of Plaintiffs in case 01-1085.2. Did not apply to any claims that would not NECESSARILY require the invalidation of a prior criminal conviction, and there were none of these in case 01-1085. (The dismissal merely referred to “defendants’ conduct LEADING TO plaintiff Bell’s arrest and conviction in 1977...” [Emphasis supplied] a matter of opinion which is utterly and blatantly improper to the extent it purports to be statement of the application of Heck.)
3. Required that a specific analysis be done to determine this, when no such analysis had been done or would be done.
See also supra “Jurisdiction in light of Heck v. Humphrey”, re-pleaded here by reference.
Claim #314
The complaint was not claimed to be frivolous or malicious, or failed to state a claim, or there was no subject-matter jurisdiction; it was a non-IFP complaint; yet it was dismissed without following the procedures described in Potter v. McCall, 433 F.2d 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1970) and further referenced in Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d at 1226 (9th Cir. 1984). See also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991)(“...complaint could properly be dismissed sua sponte and before the filing of responsive pleadings only if it were frivolous. See 28 USC 1915(d). See also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 US 319, 104 L.Ed.2d 338, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989)[...] A complaint is frivolous only if it contains ‘inarguable legal conclusion[s] or ‘fanciful factual allegations’. Neitzke, 109 S.Ct. at 1833".
According to Potter, Plaintiffs in a civil rights suit are entitled to have: (1) process issued and served; (2) notice of any motion thereafter made by defendant or the court to dismiss the complaint and the grounds therefore; (3) an opportunity to at least submit a written memorandum in opposition to such motion; (4) in the event of dismissal, a statement of the grounds therefor; and (5) an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome the deficiency unless it clearly appears from the complaint that the deficiency cannot be overcome by amendment.
In case #01-1085KI, however, there was an early dismissal (before the 120 day service limit), without any notice to Bell (until January 2002, and only after three filings by Bell), and without an opportunity to written opposition, and without an opportunity to amend. >ALL< of the procedural rights listed above were violated: none were respected.
Worse, plaintiffs allege that the September 12, 2001 dismissal of case #01-1085KI was known by its actual author, and was intended to be and was known by all defendants as an incomplete and intentionally-erroneous dismissal: Even accepting its (wrong) arguments and claims as valid, its terms did not dismiss all claims, nor all defendants in all their capacities, nor all plaintiffs. It was still, on paper at least, a valid Complaint.
Claim #315
Nevertheless, it was agreed by unknown-named Court personnel and defendants that despite the improper, inadequate, and incomplete dismissal, all the defendants would fail to respond to the suit with any Answer, and they did so. Yet, they all agreed that each defendant would be improperly "protected" from any sought default judgment as if the entire complaint had been validly dismissed, when it had not.
This wrongful agreement was necessary because it was recognized among the defendants as well as the Court personnel (many of whom are lawyers) that it would not be possible to write a dismissal which claimed to be "complete": The "lack of personal jurisdiction" argument the Dismissal claimed obviously couldn't apply to the numerous Oregon-resident defendants or government agencies, for example. The "Heck v. Humphrey" claims in the Dismissal, likewise, were obviously inapplicable to any plaintiff other than Bell.
Claim #316
This wrongful agreement was tested (and was "honored") in early November 2001 when the Portland Court received a motion for Default Judgment written by Plaintiff Bell (who had mysteriously not received a copy of the Dismissal). Bell's motion was rejected and claimed to be "moot," as if all of the complaint had been dismissed, when it had not. Bell did not receive any notice of this rejection until late January 2003 by wrongful actions and negligence of the defendants. The Defendants’ wrongful purpose of this concealment was to prevent Plaintiff from appealing that wrongful dismissal in a timely fashion, and it did so. This was intended by the defendants, who had control of Bell’s access to the U.S. Mail in both directions, and had the effect of obstructing plaintiffs’ access to the courts.
Plaintiffs allege, therefore, that the defendants' chosen tactic was to have the Dismissal loudly claim "defects" (though they weren't really defects at all) and to ignore the fact that they (even if true) wouldn't sink the entire complaint. This was intended by the defendants to obstruct justice, and it did so. This is a RICO predicate act. This was also a 42 USC § 1985 conspiracy to violate Bell’s access to the courts, also actionable under Bivens. This was fraudulent concealment, and “extrinsic fraud” because it prevented plaintiffs from bringing their true case before the courts.
Claim #317
The Defendants (and the unknown-named Court personnel they contacted and influenced) also illegally and improperly influenced the Court to violate its obligations under the Supreme Court case Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519(1972), to interpret pro-se complaints liberally. These requirements include an obligation to refuse to dismiss a case (even on motion of a Defendant) if there is any way to interpret the complaint as implying a legitimate cause of action. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 US 241 (1957). The Defendants and Court personnel were or should have been aware that pro-se complaint #01-1085 stated and implied numerous valid causes of action against each of the Defendants, in a manner which was legally sufficient to survive had it been properly considered under Haines v. Kerner and its progeny. Haines require the Court to recognize the existence of and applicability of 28 USC § 1391, 18 USC § 1965, also relevant decisions such as the “Effects Doctrine” of Calder v. Jones, supra, even if not pleaded by the pro-se complainant. If Haines had been followed, this would have precluded dismissal of civil complaint 01-1085 on September 12, 2001.
Claim #318
Similarly, the Complaint should not have been dismissed before an opportunity was given to amend it, and generally a pro-se complaint must be given even more freedom to be amended, even after the complaint is answered. Generally, dismissal of any case before answers are filed is improper unless there is no way that there could possibly be a legitimate cause of action. See Conley v. Gibson, supra.
The Dismissal also wrongfully and misleadingly stated: “This court takes judicial notice of the fact that plaintiff Bell’s convictions have not been reversed or otherwise invalidated.” However, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, (Seventh edition) “judicial notice” is intended to refer to “a well-known and indisputable fact.” Had the writer of the September 12, 2001 Dismissal bothered to compare the dockets of District Court case #00-5731 with the dockets for Appeals Court cases #01-30143 and #01-30296 (and checked cases, United States v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980)(adopted in the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Lamere, 951 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1991), he would have noticed that the claimed “conviction” in case #00-5731 was done in a court which had lost (due to #01-30143) jurisdiction (March 27, 2001, Houston v. Lack) to hold a trial, and the court separately lost (due to #01-30296) jurisdiction (about August 13, 2001) to hold a “sentencing” for which it still lacked a jurisdictional conviction.
Perhaps one of the reasons the 2001 “conviction” “has never been reversed or invalidated” is that no valid conviction ever existed to “reverse” or “invalidate”. Another is the collusion of co-conspirator attorney Peggy Sue Juergens as well as numerous other defendants to deny Bell a legal, jurisdictional appeal on cases #01-30143, #01-30296 and #01-30303. See “Sham Appeal”, infra, pleaded here by reference.
Claim #319
The September 12, 2001 dismissal was also done wrongly for yet another procedural reason: Summary judgment in favor of the defendant requires, first, that all issues of alleged fact be accepted in favor of the plaintiff. But that was not done: On page 32 of 01-1085, it clearly states that Bell filed an interlocutory appeal notice, and yet defendants proceeded with a non-jurisdictional “trial." The court must accept the non-moving party’s proffered evidence as true and it must resolve all disputed facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. See Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992). Had these allegations been accepted as factual (as they were), the “trial” would have been seen to be without jurisdiction, and thus any "conviction" obtained was invalid, and in fact legally non-existent. Heck v. Humphrey could not have applied, therefore, to claims based on case CR00-5731. But this allegation of fact was wrongly ignored.
This very premature and improper dismissal constituted "obstruction of justice," which is a RICO predicate act. The actions of the Defendants and those Court officer personnel they improperly influenced and controlled constitute a "conspiracy against rights" under 42 USC § 1985. The dismissal was made and eventually delivered to Plaintiff Bell to lull him into inaction, intending to fraudulently make him believe that he had no case. This was mail fraud. See United States v. Bratzman, 731 F.2d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1984).
Claim #320
The actual unknown-named author of the dismissal was and is a witness to the improper actions of the Defendants. Judge Garr King is a witness to the identity and the actions of the actual author of the dismissal order. Plaintiffs allege this dismissal constituted “extrinsic fraud” with the intent and effect of preventing the plaintiffs from bringing their true case before the Portland Federal Court within the meaning of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 60(b)(3). Plaintiffs allege that it would be improper to interpret these numerous substantive and due-process errors individually and in isolation from each other: they did not occur individually or in isolation within the dismissal itself, and in fact they occurred in close procedural proximity with numerous frauds alleged in the complaint. Combinations of errors may act cumulatively (see Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1333), and the vast improbability of such combinations can help prove that they weren’t accidents. Plaintiffs further allege that defendants conspired with a person or persons who may have possessed absolute immunity, and under Dennis v. Sparks, 449 US 24, 66 L.Ed.2d 185, 101 S.Ct. 183 (1980) they are liable for his (their) actions as well as their own.
Claim #321
Plaintiff Bell did not receive timely notice of the September 12, 2001 dismissal order, and in fact for many months he was unaware that it had occurred. During late October and early November 2001, Bell made two filings with the Portland Federal Court: One was a request for a docket, and the second was a filing for a default judgment against the served defendants, none of whom had answered the complaint and summons. Bell received no reply to either of these two filings.
Plaintiffs allege defendants and their co-conspirators wrongfully and intentionally caused this lack of received response to occur, either by intentionally failing to send the docket and dismissal order (the latter, twice) or by intercepting them and intentionally failing to deliver or forward them to Bell as was their ministerial obligation. This lack of notice obstructed Plaintiffs’ access to the court, and it also obstructed plaintiff’s access to the appellate court: Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B) allows only 60 days to file a notice of appeal “when the United States or its officer or agency is a party”. This would have been 60 days after September 13, or about November 12, 2001. Plaintiffs had no reason to suspect that the dismissal could have occurred, since that would have (and did) violate proper civil procedure.
Claim #322
In response to a second request for a docket and then a request for a copy of the dismissal, Plaintiff Bell finally received notice of the improper dismissal in late January 2001. Bell promptly responded to the Portland Court with a filing that being pro-se, under the Supreme Court case of Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519, 30 L.Ed.2d 652, 92 S.Ct. 594 (1972), should have been liberally construed as a motion for clarification and reconsideration. Bell never received any response to that, either, and in fact he was transferred February 28, 2002 to USP Atwater and was kept in “SHU” (the hole) and separated from all his legal materials in violation of his right of access to the courts. Bell was released into general population on or about March 18, 2002, about a week AFTER the 180-day deadline ostensibly offered in F.R.A.P. Rule 4(a)(6) for purposes of extending the filing of a notice of appeal. Plaintiffs allege that the combination of these events was a carefully-coordinated sham designed to wrongfully achieve precisely this improper outcome in violation of proper procedure. Plaintiffs’ access to the courts was egregiously violated.
Claim #323
Plaintiff Bell had filed for a default judgment, and received no response from the court; Bell twice requested a copy of the docket on case #01-1085KI, and only on the second attempt did a docket finally arrive. Bell finally received a copy of the dismissal order in late January 2002. On February 12, 2002, Bell filed a “Response to Partial Dismissal” with that court, a document pointing out numerous errors of fact, jurisdiction, and law, and inadequacies in the dismissal, many of which are described supra, and Bell’s filing could and should have been construed both as a motion for clarification and a motion for reconsideration. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). Bell was transferred on February 28, 2002 from Lompoc USP to Atwater USP, but he never received any answer to this document.
Claim #324
John Copp has been stalked by defendants by aircraft during the period 1997-present without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, with the assistance of a transmitter secretly and illegally placed in his car in violation of his possessory rights.
Claim #325
Beginning at an unknown date but continuing to the current date Defendants under the organization name ________________ have operated aircraft which have stalked Plaintiffs especially Bell and John Copp. These aircraft have been operated out of a building in the southeast corner of the Troutdale Oregon airport, and they had been run in long-term violation of Federal Aviation Administration regulations which require prompt repair of safety equipment, inter alia, one non-functional wing light that was later repaired after a delay of more than 2 years, in an egregious violation of 14 CFR § 91.209.
Claim #326
During the period of 1997-present, defendants and agents of the conspiracy engaged in a number of intimidating, threatening, and harassing approaches to various people known to plaintiff Bell. These approaches were intended to put fear into the minds of these people, and to scare them into not claiming their rights or not continuing to associate with Plaintiff Bell, in violation of their First Amendment rights of free speech and association. They were victimized because of their prior association with Bell.
These people include Bell's friend John Copp, who was threateningly approached at his residence in Portland, Oregon, and in front of his elderly mother he was falsely accused by defendants including Jeff Gordon of "illegally switching license plates on vehicles" for some improper purpose, when he had not done so. Copp was also approached at his boat slip in Kalama, Washington, and intimidated into consenting to a search of his boat despite the fact that the searchers had no probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to justify any sort of search.
Claim #327
These people also included Bell's friend Gary Peressini, who was approached
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, as a consequence of the improper
and illegal disclosure of the fact that Bell had telephoned Mr. Peressini
from Seatac FDC. The purpose of this approach was harassment and
intimidation.
Claim #328
These people include Bell's friend Robert East, whose house was searched, with the result of the theft of $1,000 cash by government agents acting under color of law or in their individual capacities, and permanent damage to his expensive 8-mm camcorder caused by ham-handed government agents who couldn't figure out how to eject a cassette from a modern piece of electronic equipment, so they decided to apply damaging force to the device. They did this without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and the warrant did not justify or require this damaging act.
Claim #329
Plaintiffs, including Bell, allege that there are many other such contacts and approaches, to people who were identified from material that had been illegally taken from Bell in violation of the terms of the April 1, 1997 and November 6, 2000 search warrants, as well as the illegally warrantless searches including June 23, 1998, and the illegal searches of Bell's car on or about November 10-11, 2000 and November 17, 2000. Such contacts were also improperly identified by a vastly over broad and thus illegal (abuse of process) search of Bell's computer files which the searchers weren't entitled to do.
Plaintiffs allege that these government agents including Jeff Gordon made no contacts that WEREN'T intended to be intimidating and harassing, and that many of these contacts have not yet been disclosed to plaintiffs for fear of retaliation from the defendants and/or government.
Plaintiffs allege that these people have been harmed due to the illegal disclosure of plaintiff Bell's telephone calls to them, and moreover they have been harmed due to improper government/defendant actions (wiretaps, bugs, tracking devices, following) against them derived from illegally-obtained information.
Claim #330
During various periods within 1996 to the present, unknown-named defendants and government agents (but including Jeff Gordon) have wrongfully sought and improperly and illegally obtained without legal warrant confidential information from private individuals as well as corporations and companies using intimidation, threats, bribes, and other improper contacts, for use in variously harming Plaintiffs including Bell. Such sources include banks, telephone companies, Internet Service Providers (ISP's), investment companies, electric power companies, and mortgage and loan companies, law enforcement agencies, and unknown others. This information was wrongly used to harm Bell and Plaintiffs. This information was delivered and requested by mail, constituting mail fraud.
Claim #331
Further, defendants including Jeff Gordon have illegally disclosed this and other information to persons and companies and organizations that were not entitled to (and were legally prohibited from) receiving it. This illegal disclosure includes tax-return information disclosed by Jeff Gordon and other defendants in violation of Internal Revenue laws. This illegal disclosure was intended, and had the effect, of promoting the interests of the defendants’ conspiracy.
SHAM APPEAL
Claim #332
In late August, 2001, Defendants colluded to continue to deny Plaintiff Bell the benefit of not only the Interlocutory Appeal that Bell should have been able to get, but also to shepherd through a sham "appeal" of a non-jurisdictional and fraudulent "final conviction" that had been illegally obtained by these defendants in August 2001. In doing so, they obstructed Bell’s constitutional and statutory rights, and obstructed Bell’s access to the courts.
Claim #333
To accomplish this fraud, Defendants including the Federal Public Defenders offices of Tacoma and Seattle illegally and unethically conspired to impose a new unethical attorney, Peggy Sue Juergens, on Plaintiff Bell. Attorney Juergens was selected by the Defendants to be willing to take control and "hijack" a phony non-jurisdictional appeal under case # 01-30303, and moreover to specifically ignore and abandon the interlocutory appeal under case #01-30296 that Bell himself had applied for and ostensibly had been granted, and she did these things on their behalf and for their wrongful benefit, as well as to harm Bell.
Claim #334
Defendant Attorney Juergens illegally and unethically agreed with the Defendants, and all of them, to generate a fraudulent "appeal" under case # 01-30303, carefully protecting the interests of the other Defendants to save them the embarrassment, incrimination, and ethical "exposure" that a proper appeal would have necessarily caused. In doing so, Juergens highly seriously and absolutely deliberately violated her ethical duties, and she knew and agreed to do this for the benefit of numerous of her colleagues that she knew or should have known had been engaging in fraud, and she did so. This document was prepared to waste, dissipate, and extinguish plaintiff Bell’s constitutional and statutory rights, including the right of appeal.
She also knew and intended that she would be necessarily and explicitly harming Plaintiff Bell, both by her actions, choices, and her failures to act, and she intended and accomplished this. Defendants, and all of them, including Juergens were fully and at all times aware that Juergens was and would selectively and specifically serve the improper and unethical and illegal interests of those Defendants, and also she and they would conceal this fact as best they knew how from Bell. They were also all aware and intended and agreed that she would seek and obtain (if and when it was needed) illegal and unethical assistance from colluding Defendants such as Appellate Commissioner Peter L. Shaw of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as well as other unknown-named court personnel. She did request and receive this assistance which includes court acts and failures of the court personnel to act including in administrative capacity, in combination to continue to impose and inflict Attorney Juergens on unwilling Appellant/Plaintiff Bell, and to protect and continue to protect Defendant Juergens' ability to harm Bell and direct and sabotage "his" appeal in the direction that the Defendants desired.
Claim #335
During the September-December, 2001 time frame, attorney Juergens acted and failed to act, in order to conceal her intentions from Bell. Bell made numerous efforts, in writing, to contact and direct Juergens, efforts which Juergens failed and refused to acknowledge or deal with. Juergens intentionally and maliciously refused to respond to direct and specific communications from Bell, over 100 pages long, stating:
(1) Bell insisted that Juergens obey Local Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a), which required Juergens to agree with Bell's objectives of representation.(2) Bell insisted, correctly, that he was entitled to the preparation and completion of Interlocutory Appeal 01-30296, a task which Juergens utterly failed to acknowledge or accomplish.
Juergens acted according to her agreement with the other Defendants to defraud Plaintiff Bell of his statutory right to interlocutory Appeal. Juergens refused and failed to discuss the legal basis for that Interlocutory appeal. This was consistent with and promoted her acts to hijack Bell's case.
Juergens failed and refused to discuss with Bell numerous appeal issues Bell had uncovered and delivered to Juergens by mail. Attorney Juergens engineered an effort to "burn up" the time available to do any appeal, by continuing to refuse to communicate effectively until and including the original date the appeal was due (December 4, 2001). Juergens unethically acted to “waive” and thus sabotage Bell’s rights, in every way she could think to do.
Claim #336
On or about December 10, 2001, about a week after the appeal had been originally due to be filed, Juergens finally mailed to Plaintiff Bell a sham letter listing a few inadequate appeal issues. These issues were carefully selected by Juergens and the other Defendants to avoid the serious incriminations, accusations of unethical conduct, and embarrassments to them that they wished to avoid. They and she agreed and intended to (and did) thwart Plaintiff Bell's right not merely to have an interlocutory appeal, but in fact Plaintiff Bell's right to not proceed with an "appeal" that was procedurally unnecessary, fraudulent, and legally inappropriate given the lack of jurisdiction of Defendant Tanner and the Tacoma Federal Court during the non-jurisdictional April 3-10 "trial" and August “sentencing.” This mailing constituted mail fraud.
Claim #337
Plaintiff Bell received Defendant Juergens' sham letter about December 16, 2001. Juergens lied, claiming that she "trust[ed]" that she had addressed the issued in Bell's numerous long letters. This was an entirely fraudulent claim: Her letter addressed absolutely NONE of Bell's questions, concerns, and issues. Juergens' comment was intended to defraud Plaintiff Bell of the adequate consultation Bell was entitled to. She was also attempting to manufacture evidence for later use to "explain" her continued failure to respond to Bell's numerous and detailed letters: Defendant Juergens wished that, considered only in isolation and without reference to Bell's letters, her December letter would sound like a "reasonable" response to whatever Bell had previously asked to about, and had asked her to do. It was a fraud.
Claim #338
Plaintiff Bell responded with a series of urgent letters (approximately one per day) for many days thereafter. Bell explained to Juergens why her short list of appeal issues was wrong and highly inadequate, that she had not merely utterly failed to respond to his prior letters but she also lied about this fact. Bell also repeatedly pointed out that it was only the interlocutory appeal (01-30296) which was procedurally appropriate given the prior events in the case, not case #01-30303. Plaintiff Bell repeatedly noted that he had never received a jurisdictional and legal trial, nor a jurisdictional and legal sentencing, and that this intentional illegality should have been the centerpiece of any realistic "appeal" that Juergens should prepare. These were not merely arguable position, they were essentially unchallengeable ones, and Juergens was unethically abandoning them in order to violate Bell’s rights.
Claim #339
Juergens' actions, however, were entirely consistent with her complete and intentional betrayal of Plaintiff Bell's interests and rights, and her desire and efforts to cover up this fact as best she could. Juergens continued to ignore Bell's numerous letters in late December, 2001 and through most of January, 2002, wherein Bell repeatedly noted and complained that Juergens' sole "substantive" letter (about December 10, 2001) was in no way a satisfactory and appropriate and adequate position, and pointing out that Juergens' had long before (by failing to communicate with Bell, ignoring Bell's letters) deviated from anything which could be thought of as appropriate and ethical behavior. Unethically, Juergens ignored the conflict and its implications: she could not ethically continue to act as if she represented Bell, but she wrongfully did so.
Claim #340
Finally, Juergens sent a letter to Bell on January 23, 2002, containing yet another lie: Juergens claimed she was "sorry that she and Bell had a disagreement." However, she had carefully concealed and disguised the fact and nature of this "disagreement", and intentionally delayed the exposure of this "disagreement" (by refusing and failing to respond to Bell's numerous letters) until that point, and particularly so that Bell would only learn of the facts of the problem after it was too late to fix the matter. (She has never stated what this “disagreement” actually consisted of, for example.) Her letter constituted mail fraud.
Plaintiff Bell had seen enough of the betrayals of "his" previous attorneys including Defendants Leen, Mandel, and Avenia to recognize the difference between well-intentioned, ethical behavior (or at least the pretense of same, before the illusion was eventually dropped as circumstances required) and Juergens' then-current malicious actions. Lacking any mechanism to force Juergens to behave ethically, Bell began to file complaints with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal to alert it to current events and to obtain Juergens' replacement if this was possible.
Claim #341
With Juergens’ fraudulent letter dated January 23, 2002 Bell received a wholly inadequate, fraudulent, and betraying "appeal" draft from Defendant Juergens. Bell had previously refused to waive any of his rights including a right to an interlocutory appeal, and he prohibited Juergens from filing any appeal that represented a waiver of this or any other right. Juergens' appeal was intended by her to be and was a wrongful, complete and total waiver of Bell's rights to the proper interlocutory appeal, a fair and jurisdictional trial, a fair and jurisdictional sentencing, and numerous (many dozen) other seriously-violated rights. The appeal draft was a sham, and done this way on orders of the other defendants.
Claim #342
Moreover, and most critically, the draft "appeal" was intended and written by Juergens to fully and completely "sanitize" the astonishing events pre-, during, and post "trial" for the benefit of Juergens’ co-conspirators, including the defendants. Reading that egregious document, no-one unfamiliar with the trial would have any reason to know that any of the official participants (officers of the court, such as defendants Leen, London, Tanner, Gordon, and others) had behaved in any way illegally, unethically, or maliciously, and this was the way Juergens and the other Defendants agreed it should be written. This was thoroughly unethical.
Claim #343
Juergens' betrayal, however, could not prevent Plaintiff Bell from complaining in writing. Bell utterly rejected Juergens' sabotaged draft appeal, and despite Juergens' being careful to delay the mail the draft too late for any substantial edits, Bell managed to send word to her utterly rejecting it, and prohibiting her from filing it. Acting on orders of the defendants, Juergens disobeyed these explicit orders, to harm Bell. Bell wrote numerous complaints, including to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but Defendant Peter L. Shaw, acting on behalf of the conspiracy rejected and apparently ignored Bell's strident objections and outraged complaints. Shaw also helped collude by rejecting Bell's request to file a “supplemental brief” along with the appeal brief a type of addendum approval of which is normally considered routine in most cases where it is requested. This supplemental brief would have alerted anyone considering the appeal to the extremely fraudulent nature of not merely Bell's original "trial" and "sentencing," but also the appeal-sabotage by his appointed appeal attorney Juergens. This right (which was actually allowed by Ninth Circuit Court rules and Circuit precedent: See Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d at 677 (9th Cir. 1981)) was wrongly and maliciously refused, by Defendant Shaw, acting in an administrative capacity and on behalf of and as a participant in the conspiracy. This refusal was intended to and had the effect of promoting the interests of the conspiracy by obstructing Bell’s access to the courts.
Claim #344
Plaintiff Bell further pointed out in that Ninth Circuit Court filing (docket 2/6/02) that Defendant Juergens was acting in furtherance of a conflict of interest in violation of her ethical obligations, in favor of not merely Defendants Judge Tanner, Prosecutor Rob London, Attorney Leen, and numerous others (because she would presumably be working with them for years) but also she was helping to cover up Peter L. Shaw's improper and illegal dismissal of the first interlocutory appeal in an improper order on May 22, 2001. In addition, Juergens was attempting to cover up the fact that even if that May 22 dismissal was assumed to be valid, it would not have returned jurisdiction retroactively (and thus, legality) to Defendant Judge Jack Tanner as of April 3-10, 2001. The fact demonstrated that the “trial” was a legal nullity.
Claim #345
Bell repeated his demand that Juergens be replaced in a Ninth Circuit filing, docketed 3/4/02. Despite Plaintiff Bell's specific requests, filed into the case record, Defendant Peter L. Shaw failed and refused to stop interfering with Bell's rights including his right to unbiased and unconflicted representation, and in particular Bell's right to not have betraying attorney Juergens forced on him while she was acting to protect Peter L. Shaw and others (including all defendants) from the legal and ethical consequences of their numerous and extraordinarily serious misbehaviors.
Claim #346
In his 2/6/02 filing, Plaintiff Bell had defended his need for a supplemental appeal brief by filing a list of ninety-two (92) appeal issues both with the Ninth Circuit Court, but also mailed to betraying attorney Juergens. Juergens did not respond to this filing, just as she had not responded to Bell's prior letters. (Nothing within Juergens' two letters of December 2001 and January 2002 actually RESPONDED to anything Bell had said in his numerous letters.) This was a conspiracy against Bell’s constitutional rights, and his right to appeal. Violating her legal and ethical obligations, Juergens did not attempt to resign or even address Bell’s complaints.
Claim #347
In furtherance of the sham involving Bell's sabotaged and manipulated "appeal" document and the imposition of betraying attorney Juergens onto Bell, Defendant Peter L. Shaw fraudulently cited a Supreme Court case Barnes v. Jones,444 US 853, 100 S.Ct. 109, 62 L.Ed.2d 71 (1979) apparently as justification for (on solely the grounds that Juergens refused to argue additional issues on appeal) denying Bell a replacement attorney. Shaw's cite of Barnes v. Jones was knowingly wrong, but it was also malicious and fraudulent. Shaw wrongfully ignored the existence of a far greater dispute between Bell and Juergens than Barnes covered.
In the instant case United States v. Bell, however, Defendant Shaw and the other defendants knew or should have known that Bell was making numerous, extensive, and serious accusations of malicious, fraudulent, and sabotaging behavior on the part of attorney Leen and Juergens. These Defendants knew, also, that none of Bell's prior accusations had ever been given any hearing, and in fact the silence was deafening on the treatment Bell's accusations against Leen and his attempts to have Leen replaced received. There was no inquiry because the defendants knew or should have known Bell’s accusations were true.
Claim #348
Leen had wrongfully continued to "represent" Bell while Bell had already sued Leen, London, Tanner, and numerous other government agents. Had there ever been any genuine belief that Bell's accusations were wrong, presumably there would have been an attempt to address the matter using procedurally-appropriate hearings and investigations. There were none.
In short, United States v. Bell was so dramatically different than Barnes v. Jones that it would have been utterly impossible to justify ANY treatment of BELL based on Barnes.
Claim #349
But citing Barnes was not merely wrong, it was actually FRAUDULENT: Each of the defendants, and now including Peter L. Shaw, had and has a serious conflict of interest in this matter, because each and all of them would (and did) want Bell's appeal to be written in such a way as to protect THEM from criminal, civil, and ethical "exposure." Legal ethics requires that an attorney not sacrifice a client's case because of the existence of a conflict of interest of a third party. But Juergens did precisely that, on orders of the defendants.
For this specific example, Defendant Peggy Sue Juergens knows that Defendant Peter L. Shaw is in serious ethical, legal, and civil trouble for his improper treatment and obtaining the dismissal of Bell's interlocutory appeal case 01-30143 which was improperly dismissed on May 22, 2001. Juergens knows that Bell was harmed by this improper dismissal, and she knows that Bell is entitled to cite and argue this matter in his appeal, particularly in a way which would embarrass, expose, and even incriminate Shaw. Juergens knows that Bell has a right to do this, but she also knows that her main interests lie with keeping her professional buddies happy and safe. Were Juergens an ethical attorney she would have resigned, or perhaps she would never have taken the case. Juergens, however, is taking this opportunity to help the other Defendants, and to harm Plaintiff Bell, in an extraordinary and coordinated violation of Bell's rights.
Attorney Juergens continued, intentionally and at the instructions of the other Defendants and for their benefit, to act with total disregard for Bell's rights and her ethical responsibilities. Defendants especially Peter L. Shaw continued to violate Bell's right to have a real appeal process, rather than the sham that was proceeding.
Claim #350
Plaintiff Bell informed the personnel of the Ninth Circuit Court at various times during February and March 2002 that the appeals court did not possess subject-matter jurisdiction on case #01-30303 due to the fact that the underlying “conviction” and “sentence” were without jurisdiction and thus were null and void and without legal effect. These pro-se filings were improperly ignored and refused by the personnel of the Ninth Circuit Court, acting in administrative, ministerial, and other capacities. Having been informed of their loss of jurisdiction, they also lost civil judicial immunity.See Breaches of Judicial Immunities, supra, incorporated and re-pleaded by reference. Peter L. Shaw and unknown-named Ninth Circuit Court personnel engaged in obstruction of justice, mail fraud, and retaliating against a witness or victim, all RICO predicate acts. Thus, they conducted the affairs of the enterprise “Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals” through a pattern of racketeering activity, a violation of 18 USC 1962(c).
Claim #351
Plaintiff Bell, during this February/March 2002 time frame, informed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that he had included Peggy Sue Juergens on the list of defendants of his lawsuit (this one) in Portland Federal Court. Court personnel neglected in their administrative, ministerial, and official capacities to remove Juergens as Bell’s attorney, and to replace her. Bell repeatedly and in detail informed that court of Juergens’ serious misconduct and his insistence that Juergens be replaced, but these filings were ignored in violation of proper court practice, and for purposes of allowing Juergens to continue to harm Bell.
Claim #352
At an unknown time, but no later than April 1, 2002, Steven L. Lane of Washington D.C. as well as John McKay, United States Attorney and Helen Brunner, Assistant United States Attorney for the Western District of Washington, began to participate in the conspiracy in the guise of being attorneys. They prepared a fraudulent “Response Brief” based on a case he knew was without jurisdiction, 01-30303, and as such they lacked any immunity. They made intentionally false assertions of the appeals and the district court’s jurisdiction in that brief, as well as fraudulently concealing prior related cases #01-30143 and #01-30296 which they were obligated to disclose. However, Lane was not licensed to practice law in Washington State, and he committed fraud upon the appeals court along with McKay and Brunner. They also failed to report fraud committed on that court by attorney Peggy Sue Juergens, who had herself made fraudulent assertions of jurisdiction in order to wrongfully and in error invoke the power of that court. Plaintiff (then appellant) Bell was harmed as a consequence of Lane’s unlicensed nature and unfamiliarity with Ninth Circuit law and precedent, and their fraud further rendered the “judgment” in case 01-30303 void and non-jurisdictional. Lane, McKay, and Brunner made fraudulent assertions in the government’s Response brief falsely claiming that the government was not aware of related cases, yet in fact they were aware of #01-30143, #01-30296 and civil case #01-1085KI in Portland Federal Court.
Claim #353
An earlier version of this lawsuit was filed August 5, 2002, as case #02-1052BR,
and a copy of the summons was served on Attorney Peggy Sue Juergens on that
date at her normal place of business. However, she failed to immediately
resign, and the next day (August 6) she wrongfully participated in oral argument
of the non-jurisdictional appeal #01-30303 without informing the other officers
of that appeals court of this serious conflict of interest. She also failed
to inform that court that she had filed the original appeal draft with a
fraudulent jurisdiction statement or that the government’s fraudulent
Response brief contained a similarly-false jurisdiction statement, as well
as a fraudulent statement of related cases. The former statement improperly
claimed that both the appeals court and the court below (case #00-5731JET)
possessed jurisdiction, when attorney Juergens knew that they did not possess
jurisdiction. Both Juergens’ brief and the governments brief contained
a fraudulent “statement of related cases” statement, and likewise
Juergens concealed this fact from the appeals court before, during, and after
oral argument, while the latter concealed the related cases #01-30143 and
#01-30296. This was “fraud on the court”, a broad category which
can, and in this case does, include fraud done with the knowledge and assistance
of the court.
Claim #354
Since a time unknown to plaintiffs, personnel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, acting in their administrative and ministerial and other capacities, have developed a wrongful pattern and practice of falsely mis-stating matters of fact and jurisdiction within legal opinions in order to support improper and intentionally erroneous decisions. These personnel are actively assisted by colluding attorney personnel practicing before the court, who learn, understand and agree that such factual mis-statements will be made, and who learn, understand and agree to fail to raise and object to those errors in legal filings at appropriate times. These practices constitute “extrinsic fraud” because they prevent a party from presenting his true case. The defendants participated in an incident of such fraud in case #01-30303, and plaintiff Bell was harmed.
Claim #355
On or about September 19, 2002, a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, acting knowingly without subject matter jurisdiction, issued such a fraudulent decision in non-jurisdictional case #01-30303. That decision made numerous serious false statements of “fact” that were wrong, and were known by the court personnel to be wrong at the time they were made. The contents of this “Opinion”, containing false claims labeled as “Facts”, were placed at the direction of the defendants in the West Publishing “F.3d” register, between the pages of 303 F.3d 1187 and 303 F.3d 1193. This was libel. Their decision also intentionally violated circuit precedantial case, United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2001), despite the fact that Bell explicitly raised this issue, pro-se, in his February-March 2002 filings and had informed that court by mail in February 2002 of its applicability and controlling authority.
This decision was delivered to attorney Juergens (by mail, which is mail fraud), who despite being aware of the numerous factual, precedential, and jurisdictional errors involved, wrongfully failed and refused to raise these matters to the court panel. Juergens also wrongfully failed and refused to inform ostensible client Bell, within the required time period, of Bell’s right to file for a writ of Certiorari, intentionally obstructing Bell’s access to the courts on instructions of the other defendants. Juergens maliciously delayed her request for withdrawal from the case for over two (2) months after she had been served with the lawsuit, with the intent and effect of subjecting client Bell to the negative effects of a conflict of interest between her and Bell, and to the absence of “meaningful and effective” assistance of counsel.
Claim #356
Attorney Juergens maliciously delayed an attempt to resign until October 7, 2002, despite having been sued and served by Bell August 5, 2002, and fraudulently gave intentionally-conflicted and knowingly erroneous legal advice to Bell (and wrongfully disclosed this advice to that court in an intentional violation of attorney/client privilege calculated to harm Bell) that there were no non-frivolous issues to appeal. Juergens did this with the intent and effect of denying Bell further representation, and to mislead and confuse Bell about his rights and the proper future of that case, and according to the desires and instructions of the other defendants, further violating Bell’s right to “meaningful and effective” and unconflicted assistance of counsel.
Claim #357
In late September and early October 2002, Plaintiff (then appellant) filed pro-se with the Ninth Circuit two legal motions, “Motion for Stay or Recall of Mandate”, and “Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc”, in which he again informed that court of its lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in case #01-30303, that Bell was improperly unrepresented by an unconflicted attorney. These filings were improperly and wrongfully ignored and denied, and Bell’s lack of representation was allowed to continue by Circuit Court personnel acting or failing to act in their administrative or ministerial capacities, including to the present date. These details were delivered to Bell by mail, which constitutes mail fraud.
Claim #358
At unknown times defendants and their agents belatedly returned unknown property to Bell, intending to and having the effect of “spoliating” the device: Making it less usable or unusable against the defendants, preventing Bell from exposing their crimes and unethical behavior. This was obstruction of justice, tampering with evidence, and extrinsic fraud.
Claim #359
Along with a copy of the Opinion, Plaintiff Bell was sent a copy of a form explaining that two of the reasons for having a rehearing on an appealed issue included errors of fact and conflict with prior decisions in the Ninth Circuit. Both of these problems were present in that Opinion, the former quite extensively. In these filings, Plaintiff (then appellant) Bell informed the Ninth Circuit Court that there were numerous false allegations of “fact” and jurisdiction embedded with the September 19, 2002 Opinion, and he individually listed and addressed those errors in a lengthily Petition for Rehearing. Plaintiffs allege that, following a wrongful pattern and practice to intentionally made false allegations of “fact” within opinions to support and defend false decisions, that court wrongfully failed and refused to cognize, admit, or correct these numerous erroneous “factual” allegations, including known-wrongful allegations of jurisdiction fraudulently made by defendants Juergens and Lane.
TELEPHONE RECORDING VIOLATIONS
Claim #360
In a violation actionable under 18 USC§ 2520, Seatac FDC staff, acting officially and individually, illegally recorded without notice and improperly disclosed the contents of telephone communications by inmates (including Michael Hunter and James Bell, and other inmates transferred from and held pursuant to charges and convictions including from the District of Oregon). The actual practice of such recording was not required by or informed by:
1. The relevant Bureau of Prisons polices (PS 5264.06) on inmate telephones;2. The local Institution Supplement policy statement;
3. Any form signed by all inmates on admission to Seatac FDC; and/or
4. The Seatac FDC Inmate’s Manual given to all inmates on arrival.
Thus, such recordings were not done in the normal course of these officers’ duties as defined by applicable published policy. In addition, there were no printed notices on or near the telephones referring to “recording” or “taping” or any subsequent disclosure, when Circuit precedent has specifically cited the presence of this kind of notification when recording is allowed. Nor was there a displayed notice that by using the telephone inmates were imputed to have “consented” to that recording and subsequent disclosure. Plaintiffs allege, therefore, that there was a constructive and actual lack of notice, and that therefore they had a reasonable expectation that such recording and disclosure was not being done in the circumstances.
Claim #361
In a violation actionable under 18 USC§ 2520, Phoenix FCI staff, acting officially and individually, illegally recorded without notice and improperly disclosed the contents of telephone communications by inmates (including James Bell, and other inmates transferred from and held pursuant to charges and convictions including from the District of Oregon). The actual practice of such recording was not required by or informed by:
1. The relevant Bureau of Prisons polices (PS 5264.06) on inmate telephones;2. The local Institution Supplement policy statement;
3. Any form signed by all inmates on admission to Phoenix FCI; and/or
4. The Phoenix FCI Inmate’s Manual given to all inmates on arrival.
Thus, such recordings were not done in the normal course of these officers’ duties as defined by applicable published policy. In addition, there were no printed notices on or near the telephones referring to “recording” or “taping” or any subsequent disclosure, when Circuit precedent has specifically cited the presence of this kind of notification when recording is allowed. Nor was there a displayed notice that by using the telephone inmates were imputed to have “consented” to that recording and subsequent disclosure. Plaintiffs allege, therefore, that there was a constructive and actual lack of notice, and that therefore they had a reasonable expectation that such recording and disclosure was not being done in the circumstances.
Claim #362
In a violation actionable under 18 USC§ 2520, Lompoc USP staff, acting officially and individually, illegally recorded without notice and improperly disclosed the contents of telephone communications by inmates (including Michael Hunter and James Bell, and other inmates transferred from and held pursuant to charges and convictions including from the District of Oregon). The actual practice of such recording was not required by or informed by:
1. The relevant Bureau of Prisons polices (PS 5264.06) on inmate telephones;2. The local Institution Supplement policy statement;
3. Any form signed by all inmates on admission to Lompoc USP; and/or
4. The Lompoc USP Inmate’s Manual given to all inmates on arrival.
Thus, such recordings were not done in the normal course of these officers’ duties as defined by applicable published policy. In addition, there were no printed notices on or near the telephones referring to “recording” or “taping” or any subsequent disclosure, when Circuit precedent has specifically cited the presence of this kind of notification when recording is allowed. Nor was there a displayed notice that by using the telephone inmates were imputed to have “consented” to that recording and subsequent disclosure. Plaintiffs allege, therefore, that there was a constructive and actual lack of notice, and that therefore they had a reasonable expectation that such recording and disclosure was not being done in the circumstances.
Claim #363
In a violation actionable under 18 USC§ 2520, Atwater USP staff, acting officially and individually, illegally recorded without notice and improperly disclosed the contents of telephone communications by inmates (including Michael Hunter and James Bell, and other inmates transferred from and held pursuant to charges and convictions including from the District of Oregon). The actual practice of such recording was not required by or informed by:
1. The relevant Bureau of Prisons polices (PS 5264.06) on inmate telephones;2. The local Institution Supplement policy statement;
3. Any form signed by all inmates on admission to Atwater USP; and/or
4. The Atwater USP Inmate’s Manual given to all inmates on arrival.
Thus, such recordings were not done in the normal course of these officers’ duties as defined by applicable published policy. In addition, there were no printed notices on or near the telephones referring to “recording” or “taping” or any subsequent disclosure, when Circuit precedent has specifically cited the presence of this kind of notification when recording is allowed. Nor was there a displayed notice that by using the telephone inmates were imputed to have “consented” to that recording and subsequent disclosure. Plaintiffs allege, therefore, that there was a constructive and actual lack of notice, and that therefore they had a reasonable expectation that such recording and disclosure was not being done in the circumstances.
Claim #364
On May 25, 2003, Plaintiff Bell (in writing) requested from the Atwater USP “Unit Team” including Counselor Christine Milligan, copies of the BP-8, BP-9, BP-10, and BP-11 form. The response to that written request failed to include any such forms which are necessary to initiate the “Administrative Remedy Program”. In the subsequent weeks, and despite numerous further requests by Bell, Milligan and Atwater USP repeatedly failed to furnish Bell copies of these essential administrative remedy forms. Plaintiffs allege that this failure is in furtherance of a wrongful pattern and practice of denying access to the administrative remedy program by means of denying access to the necessary forms. As he has denied all such forms, Bell has been denied participancy in the administrative remedy process, and he has thus exhausted the administrative remedies system for all claims that could have been pending at the time of this request.
VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
(Examples in claims are not intended to be exclusive.)
Claim #365
Defendants have violated Amendment 1 of the U.S. Constitution, clause "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." They did this by, for examples, targeting and punishing plaintiffs for their exercise of this right; obstructing their access to communications media; illegally taking materials they knew were intended to be published; spying on people communicating intending to use this exercise of free speech to harm the communicants, and doing so; etc.
Claim #366
Defendants have violated Amendment 1 of the U.S. Constitution, clause "the right of the people peaceable to assemble". They did this by, for examples, on numerous occasions sending spies to meetings of politically and socially-oriented groups; attempting to take control and obstruct the normal operations of those groups; threatening citizens for participating in those groups, and intimidating participants who had nevertheless attended those meetings. They also spied on communications media without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, but in fact because of known or believed political opposition that was being treated as if it were illegal; etc.
Claim #367
Defendants have violated Amendment 1 of the U.S. Constitution, clause "and to petition the Government for redress of grievances." They did this, for examples, by obstructing the formation of the Multnomah County Common Law Court and attempting to control and destroy it; by misrepresenting the work-product of the MCCLC as the phony product of a different court; by obstructing citizens from attending and using that court by means of harassment of attendees/plaintiffs; by obstructing access of plaintiffs to law libraries and other tools to engage in law; by corrupting and corruptly using various courts in order to obstruct, ignore, and defeat citizens including plaintiffs; etc.
Claim #368
Defendants have violated Amendment 2 of the U.S. Constitution, "...the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." They did this, for examples, by taking such firearms without probable cause nor reasonable suspicion, in fact based on a virtually automatic, pervasive, and illegal practice; by wrongfully threatening people against continuing to possess such protected arms based on false and illegal "convictions" obtained in corrupt courts; by wrongfully and without reason or justification using citizens’ exercise of this right in order to besmirch reputations, and to encourage juries within such corrupt courts to punish citizens exercise of that right.
Claim #369
Defendants have violated Amendment 4 of the U.S. Constitution, clause "The right people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...". They did this, for examples, by engaging in a series of illegal, sham and pretextual searches including without warrants; and taking numerous items unspecified in warrant; repeatedly intimidating citizens into consenting to warrantless searches without probable cause or reasonable suspicion; damaging and robbing people of property during such searches; illegally continuing to possess and refusing to return such property for years after any claims justification had elapsed; taking items intending to deprive citizens of evidence incriminating to the government and government employees; stopping people on the road using illegally-planted means, for purposes entirely different than the claimed reason for doing so.
Claim #370
Defendants have violated Amendment 4 of the U.S. Constitution, clause "...and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." They did this, for examples, by failing to obtain such warrants when legally required; or by lying to magistrates (or pretending to do so) about probable cause or reasonable suspicion; concealing the lack of an actual crime, and concealing their actual motive to retaliate against citizens for their political and social beliefs and their exercise of their constitutional rights; concealing their guilt of engaging in crimes against such citizens, and concealing the fact that their actual motive was to "protect" themselves from criminal charges or civil litigation instigated by their victims.
Claim #371
Defendants have violated Amendment 5 of the United States Constitution, clause "...nor shall he be compelled in any criminal cause to be a witness against himself..." by means of engaging in fraud by colluding with betraying "defense" attorneys, who prevent their clients/victims from exercising their rights to testify.
Claim #372
Defendants have violated Amendment 5 of the United States Constitution, clause "...nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...", for examples by means of countless ruses, frauds, and shams, described in great detail in this civil complaint.
Claim #373
Defendants have violated Amendment 5 of the United States Constitution, clause "...nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation", for examples by means of theft from victims; taking property without legal warrant and illegally keeping it; defrauding people using "plea agreements" that the government personnel have no intention of honoring and do not do so; etc.
Claim #374
Defendants have violated Amendment 6 of the United States Constitution, clause "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial...", for examples by using extortions and frauds to cause such accused to forgo trial; causing fraudulent and unjustified delays; holding illegal and non jurisdictional "trials" in place of the trials law requires.
Claim #375
Defendants have violated Amendment 6 of the United States Constitution, clause "...by an impartial jury of the State and district the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law", by for examples, illegally holding trials in different states and districts than in which the "crime" was supposed to have occurred.
Claim #376
Defendants have violated Amendment 6 of the United States Constitution, clause "...and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him", for examples, by engaging in fraudulent denial of evidence and access to prosecution witnesses; by sham communications with "witnesses" and "victims" intended to manufacture "crimes" that had not occurred; by denying such accused right to defend himself.
Claim #377
Defendants have violated Amendment 6 of the United States Constitution, clause "...to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor", for examples by engaging in repeated shams with corrupt "defense" counsel to deny such compulsory process to accused; by denying access to all evidence.
Claim #378
Defendants have violated Amendment 6 of the United States Constitution, clause "...and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense", for examples by victimizing accused repeatedly with corrupt "defense attorneys" who follow the secret instructions of government to harm and further victimize the accused; by denial of accused's right to defend himself.
Claim #379
Defendants have violated Amendment 7 of the United States Constitution, clause "In Suits at common law ... no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law", by for examples, misrepresenting the fact and nature of a Multnomah County Common Law Court judgment as if it were the judgment of a different court; and by attempting to punish citizens for seeking and obtaining and employing, as well as issuing, such a judgment.
Claim #380
Defendants have violated Amendment 8 of the United States Constitution, clause "...Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted", by for examples denying bail hearings; fining for non-existent crimes; engaging in "sentencings" without a jurisdictional trial or conviction.
Claim #381
Defendants have violated Amendment 9 of the United States Constitution, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Claim #382
Defendants have violated Amendment 10 of the United States Constitution, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
Claim #383
Defendants have violated Amendment 13 of the United States Constitution, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
Claim #384
Defendants have violated Amendment 14 of the United States Constitution, "...No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws..."
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
(For each claim, Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege all previous allegations, and all defendants have acted jointly and severally; and by engagement in a common enterprise.)
Claim #385
Defendants have engaged in legal malpractice, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against all Plaintiffs.
Claim #386
Defendants have engaged in abuse of process and/or malicious prosecution, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #387
Defendants have engaged in extortion and/or blackmail and/or coercion and/or duress and/or menacing, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #388
Defendants have engaged in false arrest and/or false imprisonment and/or kidnap, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #389
Defendants have engaged in conversion and/or unjust enrichment, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #390
Defendants have engaged in simulation of legal process and/or obstruction of governmental or judicial administration and/or obstruction of access to the courts and/or hindering prosecution and/or criminal impersonation, and/or sought and caused them to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #391
Defendants have engaged in perjury and/or bribing witnesses and/or tampering with witnesses and/or tampering with physical evidence and/or jury tampering, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #392
Defendants have engaged in fraud and/or wire fraud and/or mail fraud and/or contract fraud, and/or sought and caused them to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #393
Defendants have engaged in official misconduct and/or misuse of confidential information and/or initiating a false report, and/or sought and caused them to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #394
Defendants have engaged in reckless endangerment and/or assault and battery and/or torturing (intentional infliction of emotional distress), and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #395
Defendants have engaged in trespass and/or breaking and entering and/or wiretapping and/or intrusive surveillance, and/or sought and caused them to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #396
Defendants have engaged in theft and/or robbery, and/or burglary, and/or conversion, and/or property damage, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #397
Defendants have engaged in libel and slander and/or damage to reputation, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #398
Defendants have engaged in interference with personal rights and/or social and family relationships and/or interference with right to services, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #399
Defendants have engaged in the intentional procurement of a breach of contract and/or tortious interference with a contractual relationship and/or interference with property rights, fraudulent inducement of wrongful termination, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #400
Defendants have engaged in misfeasance in the performance of their contractural obligations and duties, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #401
Defendants have engaged in malicious publication of defamatory and non-defamatory falsehoods under circumstances calculated to produce actual damages, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #402
Defendants have engaged in obstruction of access to evidence and/or destruction of evidence and/or spoliation of evidence and/or concealment of evidence and/or planting of false evidence and/or forgery and/or illegal seizure of objects under false pretenses and/or illegal retention of seized evidence, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #403
Defendants have engaged in intentional interference with the exercise of Constitutional (both Federal and State) and legal rights and privileges, and/or sought and caused it to occur. against Plaintiffs.
Claim #404
Defendants have engaged in negligence and/or failure to prevent harms and protect and/or failure to report crimes and ethical transgressions to victims and/or competent authority, and/or sought and caused it to occur, against Plaintiffs.
Claim #405
Defendants have engaged in violation of ethical rules, regulations, duties, procedures, and practices, which have led to harm, and/or sought and caused it to happen, against Plaintiffs.
OREGON CONSTITUTION VIOLATION CLAIMS
Claim #406
Defendants have violated Article I, sections 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 33, and 34 of the Oregon State Constitution.
WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION VIOLATION CLAIMS
Claim #407
Defendants have violated Article I, sections l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29, and 30 of the Washington State Constitution.
CLAIMS FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Claim #408
Defendants individually and collectively committed an assault which resulted in serious bodily injury, and assaulted with a dangerous weapon Plaintiff Bell within the United States. As per 18 USC 2332b, these actions were accomplished by the use of the mail or a facility of interstate or foreign commerce. Those actions obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate an foreign commerce, or would have so obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate or foreign commerce if the offense(s) had been consummated.
Claim #409
As per 18 USC 3071-72, Plaintiff Bell has provided information leading to the prevention, frustration, or favorable resolution of acts of terrorism (judicial, prosecutorial, investigational, and representational terrorism) by the Defendants acting in their various capacities, against United States persons or property. Plaintiff Bell is entitled to a reward of $500,000 under 18 USC 3072, per terrorist defendant.
Claim #410
In late 2002, plaintiff Bell was being held based on false classification information in BOP’s file on him, which led to BOP’s Atwater USP facility keeping him at a far higher security level than would have been correct. This led to greater danger and risk of harm for Bell. Bell made numerous requests to Atwater USP staff to correct this false information, but the staff refused to do so. Then, Bell made a request to BOP under statute 5 USC § 552a, the Privacy Act, which contained an administrative remedy procedure described at 5 USC § 552a(d). Bell followed this specific administrative remedy procedure, but was finally refused by BOP personnel who sent it back (wrongfully and against Bell’s explicit instructions) to Atwater USP whose staff (again) wrongfully refused it. Plaintiff Bell has thus exhausted this specific administrative procedure as required to sue under 5 USC § 552a(g)(1). Atwater personnel Christine Milligan and case manager Brown are responsible for this intentionally improper misclassification and its maintenance. In May 2003 Milligan denied Bell access to the BP-8, BP-9, BP-10 and BP-11 forms required to access the administrative remedy program, and as such Bell has exhausted administrative remedies.
ANTITRUST CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
(VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 [SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT])
Plaintiffs re-allege all prior paragraphs, inclusive.
THE MARKET
Plaintiffs allege that there is a Dispute Resolution Market within the Fifty American States, consisting of courts, arbitrators, negotiators and other intermediaries and accessories (Police, jailers, lawyers, prosecutors, judges, etc.). Plaintiffs allege that this in excess of a $200 Billion market, in terms of its current direct and indirect costs and harms to the American society and those who foot its bills. American citizens do and should have a right to competition and alternatives in this market, but these rights are being violated.
THE DEFENDANTS
Any or all of the list of defendants in this civil Complaint who may be subject to liability under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 et seq. This includes all individuals, most of whom happen to be government employed, either overtly or covertly, and thus are dependent on the continued existence and success of the government, acting in their individual, color of law, co-conspiratorial and as agent of the conspiracy capacities. This also includes any governmental agencies which are subject to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 liability, including municipal corporations and their employees and agents, private citizens, and any government agency that can “sue or be sued.” This also includes private corporations and companies, most of which are financially dependent on any government at any level. This includes government agencies whose employees and agents have acted in violation of anti-trust laws in any one of their capacities and are derivatively liable under theories of respondent superior. The actions of these employees and agents include non-constitutional (including anti-trust) torts, within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act (28 USC § 2671 et seq). These agents, employees, and agencies have engineered these non-constitutional torts by means of engaging in a series of constitutional torts actionable under 42 USC §§ 1983/1985 and Bivens.
Claim #AT-1
Plaintiffs allege that since an unknown date, the defendants and numerous unknown-named others have been acting in their various capacities in a concerted and joint action in form of contract, combination, or conspiracy intent on the restraint of interstate and other trade in the Dispute Resolution Market in the fifty American states, and that this unreasonable restraint of trade has occurred, with resulting serious financial and other injury to actual and attempted competition in that market in, for example, the Plaintiffs’ operation of the MCCLC (The Multnomah County Common Law Court). Those with which the defendants act and are allied process at least a 97% market share, and act illegally and in concert to restrict and eliminate competition.
Claim #AT-2
The illegitimate and illegal goals of the defendants were to keep “prices” and thus costs high, in part and primarily because they, as government employees, were the direct and/or indirect beneficiaries of maintaining a wasteful, profligate, abusive and corrupt inefficient system. Their tactics included forcing the public to pay for Dispute Resolution Services indirectly, so the customers could not take their business elsewhere, particularly to lower-cost suppliers. This illicit system automatically allows the monopolistic suppliers to recoup their “investment” in those lower prices, and so overt prices will never need to be raised. Thus, there is not merely a “danger” of such recoupment, in fact it is a certainty. Their tactics also included causing disputes in the form of victimless crimes, in order to “make work” for themselves and their colleagues, all of which would be involuntarily paid-for by people who became the real victims. Plaintiffs allege that defendants and their allies maintain a system of predatory pricing, allowed by their wrongful monopoly power which forces citizens to pay indirectly, to further prevent competition from entering and operating in the American Dispute Resolution Marketplace. They and their allies also erect substantial and onerous “entry barriers” to prevent new rivals from timely responding to increases in price above competitive levels. They also employ the threat of physical violence, and actually have used such violence, and have done so extensively in the instant case.
Claim #AT-3
Another wrongful goal and effect was to keep the quality, uniformity, reliability and effectiveness of the system at a low level and to ensure that the system could not be used against their own people: They needed and wished to limit their own respective liabilities in the past, present and future, both civil and criminal. To do this, they needed and acted to maintain unfair and maliciously designed immunities, both de jure and de facto, on which they and their colleagues has traditionally depended on and benefitted from. This is illegal market monopolization, intended to erect an absolute market entry barrier to alternatives. This was extremely exclusionary conduct. They also needed and acted to maintain wrongful prejudices and biases built into the system, either by law or by custom and practice, both to help themselves and their colleagues and people with the same interests and positions, but also to hurt and victimize others on which the whole system depended as unwilling “customers.”
Such biases (in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution) include so-called “judicial immunity”, “prosecutorial immunity”, and “qualified immunity” which are not products of the US Constitution nor statutory law, and in fact are purely products of judicial interpretation. Another example of bias includes Federal Sentencing Guideline 3A1.2, “Official Victim”, which blatantly grants a person extra protection from a crime simply on the basis of employment by government or relationship with such a person. (Bell was a victim of this improper sentencing factor, and was illegally denied the opportunity to challenge it and all other factors.)
Yet another example of bias includes statute 28 USC § 1442, which authorizes removal of civil and criminal cases to Federal court simply based on the fact that he is a federal government employee. (Plaintiffs allege that conditions and limits put on these biases are essentially meaningless, particularly if the opposing party is seen to be an “enemy” of government.)
Plaintiffs allege that each of these goals would be difficult or impossible to achieve and/or maintain if there was true competition present in the American Dispute Resolution market. Plaintiffs allege that if the American public would not willingly choose to incarcerate over two million people, most for victimless crimes: thus there was no genuine dispute. This is done with huge and inflated costs, which the public would forbid if it wasn’t lied to (paid for by tax dollars), and propagandized, and if it actually had a genuine say in the matter, as is the public’s right. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants, as well as those with which they are allied, possess “monopoly power” over the Market as a consequence of their positions and wrongful actions, and they wrongfully employ that power in anti-competitive and exclusionary ways. Consumers have been seriously harmed.
Claim #AT-4
Plaintiffs allege that the level of corruption in the treatment of Bell’s legal cases is typical, usual, and representative of the existing monopolized “justice system.” Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege all prior contents of this Civil Complaint as being examples of such pervasive corruption. Plaintiffs allege, however, that the American public is kept almost totally unaware of this egregious situation, and they would not accept nor tolerate it if they knew and had an alternative.
Plaintiffs allege that such a system couldn’t long exist in a fully competitive Dispute Resolution market. Anyone attempting to impose such an impossibly wasteful and inefficient system on the public would, himself, thus be the cause of a dispute between he and whomever he’s trying to force to pay for this fiasco. This is a dispute he would surely lose. He would likely be adjudged guilty by his prior victims “the taxpayers” and lose most or all of his assets to compensate for this past damage. This is one of the outcomes the current system wrongfully prevents.
Plaintiffs allege that, obviously, the existing Equity Court system would not accomplish this important task: Those who run that system are, themselves, the prime beneficiaries of and dependents on the current wasteful and biased system, and they are the ones who would have the most to lose from a transition to a fully competitive Dispute Resolution market.
Plaintiffs allege that a different form of court, one that is rather new and yet quite old, has the ability to fix the current hegemonic stalemate: the Common law Court. Such courts pre-dated the writing of the United States Constitution by over two hundred years, were not extinguished by it, nor were depended on or limited by it, and could still be formed today by citizens using similar principles and procedures.
Claim #AT-5
Plaintiffs cite the existence of statute 28 USC § 1442, which purports to allow Federal officers and agencies to “remove” (transfer) cases from State courts to what would presumably be a more sympathetic Federal Court. Plaintiffs allege that this is a clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, giving extra protection to such officers and denying that protection to the public. (Being beneficiaries of biased treatment, Federal officers themselves would likely disagree.) Plaintiffs allege that a state’s selectively allowing removal of Federal government-employed defendants denies protection to the public and plaintiffs.
Even so, Plaintiffs note and allege that whether by oversight, design, or unavoidability, there exists no equivalent version of “28 USC § 1442” that is directed to accomplish removal from Common-Law court proceedings, and indeed there is no indication that Common-law courts would be obligated to accept and tolerate such removal. See Becenti v. Vigil, 902 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1990), at 779. Also Guam v. Landgraf, 594 F.2d 201, 202 (9th Cir. 1979).
Plaintiffs allege, therefore, that in the clear absence of such “removal” procedures, Federal government employees (including defendants) have had a powerful motivation to wrongfully suppress and eliminate all budding examples of Common-Law courts, to the point of acting illegally in order to accomplish this, and they did so. Their motivation was personal benefit: they wanted to prevent the emergence of an alternative court system that they believed would not be so solicitous to their interests, and would not be as manipulable as they desired. They knew and agreed that common-law courts were under no obligation to employ “absolute immunities”, “qualified immunities”, or other principles of biased treatment in their operations.
Claim #AT-6
Plaintiffs allege that the Multnomah County Common Law Court, formed in Multnomah County, Oregon in late 1996, represented a budding example of such a court. Plaintiffs further allege that news of the formation of such a court reached the defendants and others, all of whom were utterly dependent on the continued existence of and success of government at various levels, including the monopolized dispute-resolution market, and they recognized and agreed that their futures, including salaries, pensions, and their various assets, were similarly dependent on the non-emergence of this and other Common Law Courts as successful and effective alternative dispute resolution systems. Plaintiffs allege the defendants agreed to combine to obstruct and manipulate the formation and operation of the MCCLC, and they did so.
Plaintiffs allege that the ratification of the United States Constitution did not and does not restrict or end the right of the individual citizens to form and operate common law courts, or allow the Federal government to do so by statute, and in fact these and other rights are among those the Ninth and Tenth Amendments sought to protect.
Claim #AT-7
Plaintiffs allege that American governments, at all levels, do not openly and officially claim that common law courts cannot legally exist, although their personnel may occasionally “slip” and make this claim. Thus, this is not “clearly articulated” policy. See Lafayette v. Louisana Power, 435 US 389, 410, 55 L.Ed.2d 364, 98 S.Ct. 1123 (1978).
However, plaintiffs allege that on an informal and de facto basis, amongst themselves and when not “on the record,” defendants, government employees and officials and employees did and do take, express and encourage in others (including their colleagues and subordinates) positions which are highly hostile and negative both toward the existence of common law courts and the people’s right to form them. These government employees, which include most defendants, also express hostile and malevolent opinions and intents against any person who advocates-or worse-participates in common law courts. Plaintiffs allege that defendants, particularly government employees, wish to harm, and cause harm (including wrongful harm), plan harm against such common law court participants, and to accomplish this they will and do go so far as to improperly take time from their proper responsibilities. They do for their own benefit. See Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 US 34, 47, 85 L.Ed.2d 24, 105 S.Ct. 1713 (1985). They will even use their private times to carry out actions, whether they be overtly and ostensibly “legal” or actually illegal, which they plan and intend will, and do, cause those common law court participants fear, alarm and harm. The defendants did so. This activity was not “actively supervised” by government at any level. It was concealed and included illegal acts. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 US at 105, 63 L.Ed.2d 233, 100 S.Ct. 937 (1980), quoting Lafayette, supra, 435 US at 410.
Claim #AT-8
Plaintiffs allege that the United States Constitution did and does not grant exclusivity-nor joint exclusivity-to certain entities called “governments,” nor certain classes of governments, in the Dispute Resolution market. Plaintiffs allege that there are a limited number of “competitors” in the Dispute Resolution market, such as federal courts, state courts, county and city courts, Arbitration societies and companies and other such negotiators, suggesting a lack of de jure absolute monopoly. However, Plaintiffs allege that minor (and particularly non-governmental) competitors in this market are carefully yet improperly controlled and restricted by unwritten and improperly written rules and formal and informal limitations, and in fact are tolerated only to the extent that they do not operate in ways, subjects and areas unwelcome to the major players. Plaintiffs allege that if such minor players begin to act in unrestrained competition, or new players do so against the wishes of the major players, they have been and will be attacked in wrongful and various ways by the other players in an attempt to drive them away as was done to the MCCLC in 1997.
Claim #AT-9
Plaintiffs allege that these attacks have been and are carried out and assisted by defendants, including unknown-named government employees, overtly and covertly, in their various capacities, including wrongfully using and misusing real or apparent authority or real or apparent power obtained by them as a consequence of their government employee position. Plaintiffs allege, therefore, that none of the actions complained of were valid government actions even when they used (misused) government power to achieve these ends. Plaintiffs further allege that any governmental policies that the defendants might claim to have been following were neither clearly articulated nor affirmatively expressed as governmental policy. Plaintiffs further allege that such policies, were they claimed to exist, were not actively supervised by the government itself. Plaintiffs further allege that the actions complained of were not taken pursuant to constitutional or statutory authority, and in fact were corrupt, unconstitutional and illegal.
Claim #AT-10
Plaintiffs allege that all defendants engaged in numerous acts which were intended to be, and which became, unreasonably and illegally anti-competitive in violation of anti-trust laws, in the American Dispute Resolution Market, and that plaintiffs and the public were harmed.
Claim #AT-11
Defendants, in particular Steven Walsh and Jeff Gordon and unknown-named others infiltrated the MCCLC with the intent and purpose and effect of taking control of that organization, intentionally running it in self-destructive, wrongful and abusive ways that its Dispute Resolution competitors wanted, to ensure its destruction and failures, including engaging in what would be claimed to be illegal activities that they planned and agreed would be wrongly and maliciously charged to innocent participants in sham litigation (including unjustified criminal charges), a per se violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1. They then intended and sought and acted to discredit, sabotage, and destroy the MCCLC as an organization in a public and publicized way and under false, misleading, and misrepresented circumstances, so as to send a wrongful and extortionate anti-competitive message to anyone who might consider setting up and operating another such organization. Walsh illegally participated in jury actions and other proceedings under a false name, which is obstruction of justice. This illegally deterred potential competition in the American Dispute Resolution marketplace.
Claim #AT-12
They intended and acted to inhibit and frighten further potential competition in the Dispute Resolution market. They engaged in sham litigation, especially against Plaintiff Bell, including numerous fraudulent simulations of legal processes. They sent spies and saboteurs against the Multnomah County Common Law Court (MCCLC) in order to control, restrict, misuse, and destroy it. They threatened those who participated in and employed the work product of the MCCLC. The defendants intended to remove the MCCLC wrongfully from the market and to deter and prevent any further entry into that closely controlled and illegally monopolized market, in a per se violation of 15 U.S.C. §1 and §2. This was a concerted conspiracy and attempt to deprive the public of the good service products of the MCCLC, and to deter other potential competitors, in the Dispute Resolution marketplace.
Claim #AT-13
These defendants also secretly used the Portland Police Bureau to extort, deter, and harass the various innocent attendees and participants of the MCCLC, by virtue of pretextual traffic stops, sham litigation, including but not limited to tickets and fines, and vehicle seizures, and other deterrents, including to dissuade and discourage their continued and future participation in the MCCLC. This was extortion, and also an attempt to enforce an illegal secondary boycott in a further violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1.
Claim #AT-14
These defendants also utilized extortion against unknown-named plaintiffs, including class plaintiffs, but including Dick and Thor Lancial, who were threatened for engaging in commerce with the MCCLC and were further threatened with baseless and sham litigation and criminal prosecution and were told that to avoid this wrongful action they must agree to not use the services of the MCCLC again. This was a use of extortion to enforce an illegal secondary boycott under 15 USC §1.
Claim #AT-15
Similarly, the defendants, and particularly Anne Marie Levins, Leslie Spier, Jeff Gordon, Peter Avenia, Rob London and unknown-named others prepared and proposed a wrongful set of “conditions of release” in mid-1997 for Plaintiff Bell stating that he could not participate in any “illegal organizations” such as the “common law courts” and the MCCLC. This was extortion and an attempt to force an illegal secondary boycott under 15 U.S.C. § 1. It was also an attempt to ensure that Bell’s ideas would, themselves, be boycotted by the public, or unavailable to the public, in violation of Bell’s and the public’s First Amendment rights. Defendants began a series of corrupt “criminal cases” against Bell, using illegal and unethical assistance of numerous corrupt judges, prosecutors, probation officers, and attorneys. Defendants violated numerous laws, procedural rules, and rights in a massive attempt to violate Bell’s rights.
Claim #AT-16
Plaintiffs allege that defendants, as well as other government employees acting in their individual, administrative, governmental, and ministerial capacities helping to achieve the wrongful goals of the defendants, are part of a joint venture including Federal, state, and local government, and they have come to possess an “essential facility”, county recorders. Access to such facilities is essential to free and fair competition in the American Dispute Resolution workplace. They have promoted an illegal group boycott (concerted refusal to deal) of the work product of the common law courts in general, and in particular, the MCCLC among state and county officials, including county recorders and personnel ministerially responsible for accepting and recording judgments, liens and other court decisions. This constitutes an illegal secondary boycott under 15 U.S.C. § 1. It is also a denial of access to an essential facility under 15 U.S.C. § 2, to produce and register a monopoly, as well as preventing and deterring competition. The ability of these personnel to illegally and unconstitutionally assist in this restraint of trade is maintained and improved by the passage of statutes such as 15 USC §§ 35, 36. Removing the possibility of a civil damage remedy means that for those defendants, enforcement of anti-trust laws is left entirely to criminal (initiated by government) penalties, by the very people who benefit from the monopoly. Plaintiffs allege that this recording restriction is not required or authorized by statute, and is conduct designed to harass, deter, and preclude competitors from fair and unlimited access to the courts or other government branches, and is thus a sham designed to impede competition. Plaintiffs allege that recording of judgments and decisions is a commercial or quasi-commercial activity to which government immunity cannot apply and such records are ministerially or administratively obliged to deal with all customers (and courts) on an equal and non-discriminatory basis. Plaintiffs allege discrimination in this area is inherently, and is intended to be, anti-competitive and is intended to ensure the production and maintenance of a monopoly.
Claim #AT-17
Plaintiffs further allege that defendants and other unknown-named government personnel colluded to knowingly and falsely, privately and publicly call the work product of the MCCLC, including and for example a specific judgment document awarded the Lancials’, a “forged” product of a different court, rather than what it actually was, a genuine product of the MCCLC. This is a threatened use of illegal boycott power, is also extortion, is a threat of sham litigation, and is an attempt to threaten anyone considering seeking or obtaining a MCCLC judgment, and is, accordingly, an illegal secondary boycott under 15 U.S.C. § 1. The foregoing are all per se violations of American anti-trust laws. See e.g. MCI Comm. v. ATT, 462 F.Supp. 1072 (N.D.Ill. 1978); Power Replacements Corp. v. Air Preheater, 356 F.Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Claim #AT-18
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have promoted and forced a per-se tying anti-trust violation in the American Dispute Resolution Marketplace: (a) They have tied investigatorial services with specific court services; (b) They have tied specific court services with specific appellate services; © They have tied specific court services to specific enforcement mechanisms; and (d) They have tied specific people (“Customers”, but generally called “defendants”) to each of these services.
(1) These tied services are fundamentally separate products; (2) The instant case’s defendants including their allies have market power (indeed, monopoly power) in the tying product market; (3) The defendants including their allies afford customers no choice but to purchase the tied product from it; and (4) The tying arrangement forecloses a substantial volume of commerce. This constitutes a per-se anti-trust tying violation.
Claim #AT-19
Plaintiffs allege that these defendants combined and conspired to act in ways intended to and having the effect of producing adverse anti-competitive effects, to prevent current and potential competitors from remaining in or entering the market, and they knew or should have known that their actions and goals were illegal under the Sherman Anti-Trust law and other laws. Plaintiffs allege that these defendants acted in concerted ways and produced these illegal and damaging adversely anti-competitive effects of limiting, restricting, controlling, expelling and eliminating competition in the American Dispute Resolution market. Plaintiffs further allege that defendants engaged in these wrongful activities based upon motives of self-benefit from the resulting restraint of trade, and these individuals and organizations were thus benefited in a common purpose as they foresaw, worked for in a joint and concerted action, intended and achieved. Plaintiffs allege that they, and the public-at-large, was harmed by these wrongful and anti-competitive actions, which constitute horizontal monopolization and price-fixing.
Claim #AT-20
Plaintiffs allege numerous unlawful acts of defendants as well as countless ordinarily-lawful acts that became and have become unlawful due to their performance in an illegitimate attempt to restrain markets in violation of anti-trust laws.
PRAYER
DAMAGES
All damages are joint and several against all defendants. All damages are calculated prior to RICO and Sherman Act trebling. All damages are further awarded on a tax free/tax-paid basis.
All items of damages requested in case number 01-1085, whether or not placed in the request for default judgment: $260 million.
Avoidance, delay, or denial of the above damages using RICO methods: $260 million.
RICO tampering in cases 97-5270, 00-5731, 01-30296, and 01-30303, with or denying Plaintiff Bell’s access to proper appellate review at various times: $250 million.
Plaintiff Bell claims a $500,000.00 award under 18 U.S.C. § 3072 for reporting terrorism, (including but not limited to judicial, prosecutorial, representational and investigational), against each defendant acting in his capacities including conspiratorial. (Their acts were intended to intimidate the civilian populations of America, in violation of 18 USC § 3077(1)(B)(I))
Maximum damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 for any use of electronic surveillance against any plaintiff, including body wires, wiretaps, recorded phone calls, or denial of access of telephones in which records were not disclosed, “bugs,” Van Eck computer monitoring, “keyboard bugs,” third party recorded data disclosure, “Carnivore,” microwave motion detection, amplified audio recording, satellite electronic photography, synthetic aperture radar, land and aircraft based “bug” monitoring, radio acquisition of stored data surveillance. Damages to be calculated on a daily basis, per form of surveillance, from the first day a particular form of surveillance is used until the last day it is used, including all intermediate days without exception. Such damages to be awarded in any case where a warrant was not actually and physically served on the victim prior to the collection of the evidence or communication recorded.
Damages of $10,000 for each recorded telephone conversation recorded or used, in favor of victim.
Damages of $100 per day of such recording, or days on which such recording would have been done.
$2500 per day compensation to Bell for each day of confinement, or probationary period, per each defendant.
RICO damages and return of all property taken from Bell, and compensation for all Bell’s costs and expenditures 1997-present, including particularly those involved with the fraudulent 1997 “plea agreement”, $500,000 for breach of contract.
RICO damages of $10,000 for fraudulent fine imposed on Bell 8/24/01 without justification or jurisdiction.
RICO compensation for Bell for defrauding him of his PGP password, to be equal to a professional cryptographer’s fair estimate of the cost of “brute force” decryption of a 1024-bit PGP key using 1997 hardware, software and algorithmic technology.
RICO damages in favor of Controltek, Inc., and its owners based on lost profits and business opportunities of $250,000.00 per year, 1997 to present, intentional interference with contractual relationships.
RICO damages and back wages based on jobs lost jobs due to actions of defendants, including $450,000.00 to Plaintiff Bell.
RICO damages based on loss of future earning potential of $100,000 per year for 25 years, to Bell.
$100,000 to Plaintiff Mike Hunter, based on intimidation, interference with Constitutional rights.
RICO damages in favor of Gregory P. Daly in an amount of his back pay for the years of 1997 to the present, including interest, including $250,000 in punitive damages, as well as $250,000 intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful termination, intimidation, and retaliation.
RICO damages in favor of Robert East of $250,000.00, for on-the-road stalking, intimidating interrogation and theft and damages to property.
RICO damages of $2 Billion dollars per calendar year, January 1, 1997 to date, based on interference with commerce and lost profits, to the benefit of MCCLC participants and operators.
RICO damages of $500,000.00 for harassment and intimidation of, libel against, intentional interference with family and social relationships, stalking of, and physical and electronic surveillance of John Copp.
RICO damages of $1,000,000 in favor of Charles Stewart, as director of MCCLC.
RICO damages of $2,000,000 each to Richard Leroy Lancial and Thor Storm Lancial.
Damages to Bell’s family of $10,000,000 due to stalking, intimidation, interference with family relationships, intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Damages to Lou H. Bell of $4,000,000 for permanent injury, pain and suffering, medical costs, loss of enjoyment of life.
RICO damages of $4 million for Milo Wadlin and Louise Wadlin based on interference with business relationships, intimidation, loss of profits and all other damages consistent with this civil complaint, including those discovered later.
RICO damages of $100,000 to Mike Beketic for extortion, intimidation and interference with business relationships.
Punitive damages against all defendants of $500 million.
All attorney fees, costs and expenses incurred by Plaintiffs herein.
Pre-judgment interest on all damages.
Plaintiffs further seek the civil forfeiture to plaintiffs under RICO laws (18 USC 1963(a), (c)) from all defendants of the following:
1. All tools, instrumentalities and assets used for, or assisting in, the commission of RICO and civil rights violations against the plaintiffs, including vehicles, (land, air, and satellites), uplink and downlink equipment, real property and structures thereon built, from which or in which such violations were planned, designed, carried out, or aided, whether or not publicly owned.
2. The total value of salaries , wages, bonuses, per diems, awards, overtime pay, pensions, or any other compensations or remunerations of whatever kind paid to RICO persons, or by RICO organizations during the period 1996 to the present, associated, whether directly or indirectly, with the RICO violations herein described or later discovered.
3. The value of all tickets, fares, passes, rentals, tolls, tariffs, fees or other costs expended by RICO defendants or paid by RICO organizations directly or indirectly in furtherance of these RICO violations herein named or later discovered.
SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST DAMAGES
To the benefit of the MCCLC attendees and participants, based upon the denial of access to a fair share of the American Dispute Resolution market: $2 billion per calendar year, January 1, 1997 to the present date.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Additional injunctive relief to be determined, against all defendants.
That all RICO organizations permanently terminate all RICO persons/defendants from further employment, benefits of whatever kind including retirement, and that they be enjoined against future government employment at all levels and branches, including Federal, State, and local.
That all government employees and agencies be enjoined from enforcing any aspect of case # 97-5270, # 00-5731, #01-30303, #01-30296, or #01-30143, or maintaining any records labeled as a criminal record derived from such cases against any plaintiff in this case.
The Defendants Jack E. Tanner and Franklin Burgess be prohibited from adjudicating any future criminal or civil cases of whatever kind.
That the court declare that the MCCLC and other common law courts should be and are entitled to form and operate free of interference, and that their actions and verdicts must be accorded the same respect as other courts, by other courts, with full faith and credit according to 28 USC 1738.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs prays for a judgment against the Defendants as follows:
1. For their his First, Second and Third Claims (here list all Claims for relief where money damages are sought) For Relief, money damages from the Defendants commensurate with his economic and non-economic damages;
2. For declaratory relief holding the debt on the Account invalid against Plaintiff;
3. For the attorney’s fees, costs and disbursements incurred by the Plaintiff;
4. All awards on a tax-free basis.
5. For such other and further relief that the Court deems equitable and proper.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff moves the court to grant the relief sought. The plaintiff further respectfully requests the court, if and to the extent it exercises its discretion in denying any part or aspect of the foregoing requests, to indicate in terms that appear on the record, the basis and the reason or reasons for exercising its discretion in so denying said requests. See U.S. v. Wells, 387 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1967).
Submitted,
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James Dalton Bell, Pro Se
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Michael Hunter, Pro Se
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Charles Bruce Stewart, Pro Se
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Richard Leroy Lancial, Pro Se