



# **(U//FOUO) 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration**

## **Joint Threat Assessment**

*7 January 2009*



**Homeland  
Security**



**Washington Regional  
Threat & Analysis Center**



**United States  
Capitol Police**



**Maryland Coordination  
and Analysis Center**



**Federal Bureau  
of Investigation**



**National  
Counterterrorism Center**



**Virginia  
Fusion Center**



**National Geospatial  
Intelligence Agency**



**United States  
Northern Command**



Joint Threat Assessment—Special Events Working Group

## (U) 56th Presidential Inauguration

7 January 2009

*(U) Prepared by the DHS/Critical Infrastructure Threat Analysis Division, the FBI Washington Field Office, the FBI/Threat Review Unit, the National Counterterrorism Center, the United States Capitol Police, the Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center, the Virginia Fusion Center, the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and the United States Northern Command. The Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group reviewed this product from the perspectives of our non-federal partners.*

### (U) Scope

(U//FOUO) DHS and the FBI Washington Field Office prepared this Joint Threat Assessment to provide the perspectives of DHS, the FBI, and other members of the Intelligence Community and law enforcement communities at the federal, state, and local levels regarding potential threats to the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration, which will occur on 20 January 2009. This assessment will assist law enforcement personnel and security planners in monitoring threat information and ensuring a safe and secure event environment. DHS has designated this event as a National Special Security Event.

(U) DHS, the FBI Washington Field Office, and local fusion centers will be updating the threat information through Intelligence Information Reports, Situational Intelligence Reports, and Operational Situation Reports because of the time between the publication of this document and the inauguration.

(U//FOUO) This assessment supplements the Joint Forces Headquarters—National Capital Region—Operations and Intelligence Division, Foreign Intelligence Threat Assessment, dated 19 December 2008 and USNORTHCOM's 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration Special Event Assessment, dated 20 November 2008. Both documents provide a general threat overview and assess risks and vulnerabilities relative to the inauguration and should be read in conjunction with this joint threat assessment.

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## (U) Key Findings

- (U//FOUO) *The President-elect has been the focus of voluminous threat-related reporting since announcing his candidacy, and the number of threat reports has increased since his election.*
- (U//FOUO) *Lone offenders—individuals who are unaffiliated with a group, but act in furtherance of an ideology or group members who act on their own without direction from their group—pose the greatest potential threat.*
- (U//FOUO) *Because of the highly visible security present at the U.S. Capitol, soft targets close to the site, such as hotels, public gatherings, restaurants, and transportation modes, also are possible targets.*
- (U//FOUO) *Among the potential threats are explosive devices placed in heavily trafficked areas in and around the event site and individuals impersonating law enforcement and other security or emergency service personnel to facilitate attacks.*
- (U//FOUO) *It may be difficult to detect impersonators with the substantial increase in numbers of military members, law enforcement officers, and emergency service personnel present for this event. Law enforcement officers must remain vigilant about checking credentials of those seeking to pass through security.*

## (U) Event Overview

(U) On 20 January 2009, the 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration will take place in Washington, D.C. swearing in the 44<sup>th</sup> President of the United States. The event involves the swearing-in of both the new President and the Vice-President on the steps of the U.S. Capitol followed by an inaugural address.

- (U) Attendees will include high-ranking U.S. Government and military officials, Supreme Court Justices, former U.S. Presidents, and numerous foreign dignitaries.
- (U) The U.S. Secret Service, responsible for overall event security, expects between 1.5 and 2 million attendees. Regional hotels are booked to capacity, and the District of Columbia Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency confirmed at least 10,000 buses will transport as many as 500,000 visitors to the District. Passenger trains into Washington, D.C. also are completely sold out during the inauguration period.

(U//FOUO) The U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) has primary responsibility for protecting the U.S. Capitol complex. The Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), the lead local law enforcement agency with the role and responsibility of coordinating and augmenting law enforcement support from other local law enforcement agencies nationwide, will be augmented by approximately 5,000 military personnel and more than 4,000 officers from 94 law enforcement agencies.

(U) The inauguration is a potential target for a terrorist attack for a number of reasons to include the presence of VIPs, the symbolism and high-visibility of the event, and the historic significance of the Nation's first minority President.

## **(U) International Terrorism Threat**

(U//FOUO) DHS, the FBI Washington Field Office, and other members of the Intelligence Community (IC) have no credible reports indicating a threat to the inauguration from international terrorists. Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, however, remain a persistent threat to the United States and its interests worldwide. International terrorists view presidential transitions as periods of increased vulnerability, potentially increasing the threat level during the event.

(U) Al-Qa'ida's central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni Muslim communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. Any potential high-impact plots are likely to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershock, and fear among the U.S. population.

(U) In a mid-November 2008 audio statement, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa'ida's second-in-command, reaffirmed the group's intent to target the United States despite the election of a new President, remarking that, although America has a new face, its policies will remain the same.

## **(U) Domestic Terrorism Threat**

(U//FOUO) DHS, the FBI Washington Field Office, and other members of the IC have no credible reports indicating a threat to the inauguration from domestic terrorists. The historic significance of the President-elect, as the Nation's first minority President, however, increases the potential threat, particularly stemming from individuals on the extremist fringe of the white supremacist movement. To date, no organized domestic terrorist group, to include white supremacist and anarchist extremist groups, is known to have expressed a direct threat to the President-elect or the inauguration.

(U//FOUO) Lone offenders, individuals who are unaffiliated with a group but who act in furtherance of an ideology or a group whose members act on their own without direction from their group, pose the greatest potential threat.

- (U//FOUO) Some reporting of possible lone offender threats to the President-elect has been received, although nothing indicates that any of the potential threats linked to these individuals have progressed past rhetoric to operational planning.



- (U//FOUO) The intentions and activities of lone offenders are difficult to detect, monitor, and disrupt because of the typical independence of operation and limited trusted associations characteristic of them.

(U//FOUO) The inauguration serves as a symbol of organized government and the capitalist system; therefore, anarchist extremists could use the occasion to undertake criminal activity, possibly under the guise of a larger demonstration. Past criminal activities of anarchist extremists have resulted in injuries to law enforcement, injuries to the general public, and large-scale property damage. To date, no reporting exists of anarchist extremists planning events around the inauguration.

## **(U) Criminal Threat Environment**

(U//FOUO) DHS, the FBI Washington Field Office, and local fusion centers have no credible information indicating a criminal threat to the inauguration.

(U//FOUO) Many individuals or groups could find the inauguration an attractive occasion to mount criminal endeavors or to exploit the many targets of opportunity that will be present because of its high profile.

(U//FOUO) The USCP tracks individuals who have made threats to its protectees, including the President-elect. These individuals are listed on Law Enforcement Online on the USCP's 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration Virtual Command Center (VCC).\*

## **(U) Foreign Intelligence Threat Environment**

(U//FOUO) The FBI Washington Field Office has no credible information indicating a foreign intelligence threat to the inauguration.

(U//FOUO) Foreign intelligence networks most likely will increase their intelligence collection, seeking to obtain information on the policies of the President-elect. Collectors may conduct assessments to identify impending changes in both government leadership and policy.

## **(U) Cyber Threat Environment**

(U//FOUO) DHS and the FBI have no credible information indicating a cyber threat to the inauguration.

(U) Government information networks increasingly have come under cyber attack. On 7 November 2008, open-source reporting indicated foreign cyber attackers downloaded large quantities of information from the Presidential campaign networks, which intelligence analysts believe was an attempt to learn more about the candidates' policy positions.

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\* (U//FOUO) To access this Virtual Command Center (VCC), users first must request access to the USCP/Office of Intelligence Analysis (OIA) Special Interest Group on Law Enforcement Online. Once granted access, users must request access to the 2009 Inauguration VCC.

## **(U) Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Environment**

(U//FOUO) DHS, the FBI Washington Field Office, and other members of the IC have no credible intelligence indicating that international or domestic terrorists are planning to use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to attack or disrupt the inauguration. The symbolic significance of the event and the projection of approximately 2 million attendees, however, make it a high-value target. Densely packed crowds confined to specific areas, particularly at the ceremony and on the Metrorail system, would maximize the effectiveness of a WMD attack.

(U//FOUO) Lone offenders are more likely to use WMD in an attack than are domestic terrorist groups. Lone offenders were responsible for the six known attempts by domestic terrorists since January 2002 to acquire, produce, or use chemical or biological materials.

(U//FOUO) Domestic terrorists who intend to use chemical or biological weapons will continue to prefer those that are easily produced or that use material that is easy to obtain, such as ricin or cyanides.

## **(U) Threats to Facilities**

(U//FOUO) DHS and the FBI have no credible intelligence indicating that terrorists will attempt to gain access to the U.S. Capitol's restricted areas by impersonating government or military officials or emergency personnel in an attempt to carry out an attack at the inauguration. Recent reporting on overseas events indicates terrorists have used military, law enforcement, or emergency personnel uniforms and fraudulent identification to gain access to restricted sites or transport weapons to conduct attacks.

- (U//FOUO) On 17 September 2008 in Sanaa, Yemen, attackers wearing Yemeni security uniforms used vehicle bombs, rocket-propelled grenades, and automatic weapons to mount a coordinated attack against the U.S. Embassy. The attackers exchanged gunfire with the security guards in an attempt to breach security during the attack.
- (U//FOUO) On 14 January 2008, eyewitnesses say that four persons wearing military uniforms forcibly entered the Serena Hotel in Kabul, Afghanistan by opening fire on the guards.
- (U//FOUO) During the 2006 summer war with Israel, members of the Shia Amal Movement, who were providing logistical support to Hizballah fighters, dressed as firefighters and ambulance drivers, which enabled them to enter restricted areas to gather intelligence and provide assistance to their wounded fighters.

(U//FOUO) FBI Guardian reporting from January to September 2008 indicated an increase in uniform thefts in the United States. Of the 37 reported incidents, 5 occurred in the Baltimore area. DHS and the FBI have no specific threat reporting indicating an organized effort by terrorists or extremists attempting to obtain uniforms in furtherance of terrorist activities.

## (U) Transportation Threat Environment

(U//FOUO) DHS, the FBI Washington Field Office, other members of the IC, and local fusion centers have no specific or credible intelligence indicating a threat to transportation systems in the National Capital Region during the inauguration.

(U//FOUO) For a comprehensive assessment of event-related transportation threats conducted by the DHS/Transportation Security Administration, refer to Appendix F: TSA-OI Transportation Threat Assessment: 56<sup>th</sup> Presidential Inauguration.

## (U) Scenarios of Concern

(U//FOUO) DHS and the FBI Washington Field Office, other members of the IC, and local fusion centers have no information indicating attacks are being planned against the U.S. Capitol complex during the inauguration; however, the USCP/Office of Intelligence and Analysis identified the following scenarios that could disrupt the event directly or indirectly:

- (U//FOUO) ***Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)***: An individual IED would cause less destruction than a vehicle borne IED (VBIED), but several IEDs placed throughout the U.S. Capitol complex or along the parade route would cause significant casualties and panic. IEDs can be concealed in a backpack, bag, briefcase, or box and are transported easily.
- (U//FOUO) ***Armed assault and hostage taking***: A group of well-armed terrorists, likely equipped with automatic weapons and explosives, could assault their target forcibly with the intention of taking hostages.
- (U//FOUO) ***Suicide bomber***: This attack method uses at least one suicide bomber to detonate an explosive device while the bomber is carrying or wearing the device. The explosive power may not be as great as a VBIED or even an emplaced IED, but the bomber's mobility increases the chances the device will reach its target. This method is most successful when several suicide bombers are used in conjunction with other attack methods.

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
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
(U) **Tracked by:** HSEC-022000-01-05, HSEC-022100-01-05, HSEC-030000-01-05, TERR-020600-01-05



## (U) Appendix A: Capitol Hill Area



## (U) Appendix B: U.S. Capitol and Capitol Visitor Center






## (U) Appendix C: White House






# (U) Appendix D: Inaugural Parade Route



## (U) Appendix E: Transportation Overview





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## APPENDIX F: Transportation Security Administration Office of Intelligence

18 November 2008



(U) TSA-OI Transportation Threat Assessment:

56<sup>th</sup>

# Presidential Inauguration

20 January 2009



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**(U) Scope and Executive Summary**

(U) This transportation threat assessment focuses on the threat to transportation modes operating in and around the Washington, D.C. area during the 56th presidential inauguration being held 20 January 2009. The presidential inauguration has been designated as a National Special Security Event (NSSE). The Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Homeland Security Council (HSC), is responsible for designating NSSEs.

(U//FOUO) At this time, the Transportation Security Administration's Office of Intelligence (TSA-OI) is not aware of any threats or reporting indicating terrorists or extremists may be targeting transportation or related infrastructures located in or around the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area during the inauguration or subsequent celebratory events. Al-Qa'ida, its affiliates, and like-minded terrorist organizations pose the most significant threat to the U.S. transportation system and its supporting infrastructure. Because this may be an especially historic and high-profile inauguration, TSA-OI is concerned the inauguration could draw special attention from terrorists and domestic extremist groups, which may affect transportation assets.

(U//FOUO) TSA receives a steady stream of suspicious incidents targeting transportation infrastructure in and around the National Capital Region. To date, none of these incidents have been linked to terrorism.

**(U) 2009 Presidential Inauguration Threat Assessment****(U) Overview**

(U//FOUO) The 56th U.S. presidential inauguration will take place Tuesday, 20 January 2009, on the steps of the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. Inaugural events will include the swearing in ceremony of the 44th president of the United States, followed immediately by the inaugural address and a parade. A number of receptions, dinners, and inaugural balls will begin later that evening.



(U) United States Capitol

(U//FOUO) Presidential Inauguration Day is a federal holiday observed by federal employees who work in the metropolitan areas of Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Virginia. This historic event will receive widespread media coverage and will be attended by senior government officials, their family members, dignitaries, and distinguished guests such as members of Congress, Supreme Court justices, state and local politicians, celebrities and socialites, and the general public.

(U//FOUO) The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has designated the 2009 presidential inauguration as a National Special Security Event (NSSE). The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) is the federal coordinator for this event and has the lead responsibility for planning, directing, and executing security procedures. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the lead jurisdiction regarding law enforcement and criminal investigations should an assault on the president or a terrorist attack occur during this event. Aside from the USSS and FBI, all five branches of the Armed Forces, the Capitol Hill Police, and Washington, D.C.'s Metropolitan Police Department will also play a vital role in providing security for the event.

**(U) Al-Qa'ida Threat**

(U//FOUO) Al-Qa'ida, its affiliates, and like-minded terrorist organizations pose the most significant threat to the U.S. transportation system and its supporting infrastructure. Al-Qa'ida has a history of carrying out attacks overseas to influence political events such as elections and transfers of power, for example, the attacks on transportation targets in Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and Glasgow in 2007, all of which occurred during general election periods. However, at this time, the Transportation Security Administration's Office of Intelligence (TSA-OI) is not aware of any specific al-Qa'ida threats or reporting.

**(U) Domestic Terrorist Threat**

(U//FOUO) TSA-OI is not aware of any reporting to indicate demonstrations are being planned during the inauguration. As with previous presidential inaugurations, however, there are likely to be protest rallies and demonstrations throughout Washington, D.C., by domestic extremist groups and activists protesting against the new president or who wish to be heard in regard to current issues such as the U.S. economic and financial crisis, and the war in Iraq.

- (U) During the 2005 inauguration of President George W. Bush<sup>USPER</sup>, tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets around the country. More than 10,000 demonstrators converged in Washington, D.C., at John Marshall Park, located at 4th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue. Thousands more lined the parade route on both sides of Pennsylvania Avenue from 3rd to 7th streets. Many others who were stopped at security checkpoints, held spontaneous demonstrations there.<sup>1</sup>

(U//FOUO) There is also the possibility of demonstration activity and violent acts from Neo-Nazis, skinheads, and segregationist groups. According to hate group leaders and organizations that monitor hate groups, President-elect Barack Obama's<sup>USPER</sup> campaign sparked an increase in racist and white supremacist chatter on the Internet. These groups have reported an increase in website visitors and membership since President-elect Obama secured the Democratic presidential nomination in June 2008.<sup>2</sup>

- (U) In October 2008, federal prosecutors in Tennessee charged two men with plotting a "killing spree" against African-Americans that would have ended with an attempt to kill President-elect Obama. According to reporting, Daniel Cowart<sup>USPER</sup>, 20, and Paul Schlesselman<sup>USPER</sup>, 18, both self-proclaimed white supremacists, have been charged with illegal possession of a sawed-off shotgun, conspiracy to rob a federally licensed gun dealer, and making threats against a presidential candidate. The two men were arrested after an aborted robbery attempt the week before.<sup>3</sup> In early November 2008, a Tennessee court returned a seven-count indictment against Cowart and Schlesselman on the above charges.<sup>4</sup>

## **(U) Transportation Threat and Vulnerabilities**

(U//FOUO) TSA-OI receives numerous reports of suspicious incidents involving critical transportation infrastructure in and around the National Capital Region (NCR). These incidents encompass a wide variety of activities including surveillance, photography, and the possible testing of security. To date, none of these incidents have been linked to terrorism.

(U//FOUO) TSA-OI is concerned that terrorists have continued to demonstrate persistent intent and adaptability, and that they view transportation nodes as desirable targets for attack.

## **(U) Aviation Threats**

(U//FOUO) Three major airports serve the NCR: Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD), and Thurgood Marshall Baltimore-Washington International Airport (BWI). Because of its location inside the Washington, D.C. area, DCA has extra security precautions in place as required by the D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone. Its immediate proximity to the city also makes it an attractive venue for terrorists wishing to conduct attacks in the NCR. There are also three general aviation airports inside the Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ)—Potomac, Hyde Field, and College Park airports—located in Maryland. TSA-OI is not aware of any threats to target these airports or plots to use them as a base of operations.<sup>5</sup>

(U//FOUO) Terrorists continue to view commercial aircraft both as attractive targets and as potential weapons to inflict mass casualties, cause economic disruption, and demonstrate their continuing operational capabilities. Al-Qa'ida, its associates, and inspired groups pose the greatest threat to the U.S. civil aviation industry. The disrupted August 2006 plot by al-Qa'ida to target seven aircraft departing Heathrow International Airport bound for the United States and Canada, illustrates terrorist groups and particularly al-Qa'ida's continuing efforts to thwart aviation security by exploiting known gaps in the protocols for screening airline passengers, and by recruiting and infiltrating, or bribing insiders to support an attack.

## **(U) Maritime Threats**

(U//FOUO) TSA-OI is not aware of any current or credible incidents of suspicious activity/threats targeting the maritime sector in the nation's capital. Maritime traffic in the NCR primarily consists of recreational boating, dinner cruise vessels, and private charters. There is little commercial maritime activity (other than commercial fishing) in the immediate vicinity. The Port of Baltimore is the closest commercial shipping port to the event.<sup>6</sup>



**(U//FOUO)** In the past, al-Qa'ida and its affiliates have attacked U.S. and Western maritime interests overseas (i.e., the USS Cole in 2000 and the MV Limburg in 2002). According to a January 2008 joint U.S. Coast Guard-DHS National Maritime Terrorism Threat Assessment, al-Qa'ida inspired extremists have a strong intent to attack additional Western maritime targets. This assessment further states that the most probable attack scenario against maritime interests would be carried out by al-Qa'ida-inspired operatives and will likely consist of near simultaneous attacks involving boat, car, and truck bombs—possibly combined with small arms assaults to overcome the targets' physical security. According to the assessment, smaller boats, possibly dispatched by suicide operatives, would likely be used by al-Qa'ida operatives seeking to maximize casualties on vessels such as ferries and cruise ships.

Source: (U) Coast Guard Intelligence Estimate, National Maritime Terrorism Threat Assessment, 7 January 2008, CG-HSEC-006-08, U//FOUO

## **(U) Mass Transit Threats**

**(U)** The inaugural ceremony and parade are expected to draw large crowds of possibly millions of people. It is possible that transportation assets, such as Metro subway trains and stations (e.g., Capitol South Metro Station on the Blue and Orange lines), and Amtrak commuter trains (Union Station) that service locations close to inaugural events could become the target of criminal activity or violent acts.

- (U) Metrorail Subway System:** Washington, D.C.'s Metrorail system is one of the nation's busiest subway systems, with its vast underground network of tunnels crossing from Virginia and Maryland into the District. Thirty-five Metrorail stations serve federal facilities and during the normal work week nearly half of Metro's peak period commuters are federal employees. *In October 2008, Metro officials announced the initiation of random inspection of riders' backpacks, gym bags, or other containers in an effort to deter possible terrorist attacks. The Metrorail system already has automated electronic fire protection systems in stations and tunnels and chemical detection systems in underground stations.*
- (U) Commuter Trains:** In addition to Washington D.C.'s extensive passenger rail system, Union Station serves as a major hub for passenger and short-haul commuter trains such as the southern terminus of Amtrak's Northeast Corridor and Acela Express service, the Maryland Rail Commuter (MARC) service, and the Virginia Railway Express (VRE). Metrorail's Red Line also provides service into Union Station. Union Station is the second busiest train station in the United States, after Penn Station in New York. *In addition to Metrorail's October 2008 random inspection program, Amtrak unveiled new security measures in February 2008. Amtrak passengers will undergo random screenings of carry-on bags in a major new security push that will include officers with automatic weapons and bomb-sniffing dogs patrolling platforms and trains.*



**(U)** AMTRAK police officers display equipment to be used in security

### (U) Metrobus Threats

(U) There will likely be an increase in bus ridership to and from the inaugural site and parade routes by the general public. Metrobuses will probably be operating on a holiday schedule, which will result in fewer buses and longer waiting periods for riders. Also, buses that service routes along the Capitol Hill, and Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenue areas of the inaugural ceremony and parade, will likely be detoured due to street closures.



(U) WMATA Metro Bus

(U) **Metrobus:** The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) operates the fifth largest bus network in the United States. Metrobuses transport many federal government employees to work and millions of tourists to landmarks in the nation's capital. Metrobus transit zones consist of the District of Columbia and numerous counties in suburban Maryland and Northern Virginia. ***Metrobuses are equipped with two-way radio links to operations control centers, emergency radio silent alarms, and over 700 buses have cameras installed in them.***

(U//FOUO) Physical and verbal assaults have been on the rise against public transit bus operators in major metropolitan areas in the United States. Operators have been punched and assaulted with sticks, bricks, knives, and guns. According to the WMATA, reported assaults on bus operators have risen steadily from 36 in 2002 to 84 in 2007. Of the 84 reported assaults last year, 56 were in the District of Columbia, 21 were in Maryland, and 7 occurred in Virginia. These attacks typically stemmed from personal vendettas.<sup>7</sup>

(U//FOUO) In addition to public buses, an increase in long haul motor carriers, such as Greyhound and chartered commuter buses, can be expected in the nation's capital transporting participants to inaugural events.

(U//FOUO) There has recently been an increase in terrorist attacks on buses overseas. The attacks have been small-scale and carried out mainly by separatist groups motivated by local or regional differences. Buses targeted by terrorists have included public commuter buses, school buses carrying children, commercial tour and double-decker buses, as well as buses transporting military personnel.

- **(U//FOUO) Freight Trains:** CSX<sup>USPER</sup> freight trains carrying hazardous materials (HAZMAT) transit through the city in the vicinity of the Capitol Hill Complex and pass through Union Station. It is possible that these trains will be rerouted during the inauguration just as they are during other high-profile functions.<sup>8</sup> Although terrorists and extremists have successfully carried out attacks using chemicals as weapons in improvised explosive device and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks, and could potentially target container cars transporting HAZMAT in the future, there is no current, credible intelligence to indicate that al-Qa'ida or other terrorist groups are contemplating attacking a freight train carrying hazardous chemical materials during the inauguration.

### **(U) Bridges and Tunnels**

The District of Columbia, given its extensive highway system and its location on the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers, has many bridges and tunnels, which are critical transportation infrastructure that connect the NCR with Virginia and Maryland.

**(U//FOUO)** Bridge and tunnel design, size, age, purpose, capacity, and proximity to other infrastructure influence their vulnerability and the significance of the consequences of various attacks. Al-Qa'ida has repeatedly shown an interest in targeting U.S. bridges and tunnels. In 2007, the group demonstrated its capability to attacks bridges when al-Qa'ida in Iraq conducted numerous bridge bombings throughout Iraq. The majority of overseas attacks against bridges resulted in numerous deaths, destruction of key critical infrastructure, and economic hardship to various regions of the country. An attack against either of these critical structures in the Homeland has the potential to cause multiple casualties and severe economic and emotional devastation.

### **(U) Conclusion**

**(U//FOUO)** Currently, TSA-OI is unaware of any specific, credible threats directed at the presidential inauguration ceremony or celebratory events in the NCR. Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates/sympathizers continue to carry out attacks overseas, including attempts to target transportation infrastructure (e.g., airports, train stations, bridges, and buses), as well as events with symbolic significance. Al-Qa'ida may consider conducting similar attacks against public transportation targets in the Homeland.

**(U//FOUO)** Demonstration rallies can be expected by activists and organizations protesting President-elect Barack Obama's inauguration, as well as a variety of global and political issues. These rallies could impede traffic along highways, roadways, and bridges, and result in major congestion and possible street closures. TSA receives a steady stream of suspicious incidents targeting transportation infrastructure in and around the NCR. To date, none of these incidents have been linked to terrorism.

**(U) SOURCES**

<sup>1</sup> (U) [www.socialismandliberation.org](http://www.socialismandliberation.org); S&L Magazine; March 2005; “(U) Setting the stage for a revived anti-war movement Tens of Thousands protest Bush’s inauguration;” (U)

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