15 October 2000
Source:
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html
Jump to "official secrets act" provision, Section 304.
Comments on Section 304:
Representative Porter Goss, Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on IntelligenceRepresentative Nancy Pelosi: "official secrets law"
Representative John Conyers: "see, the reason that we are doing it this sneaky way is because it will scare the bejesus out of whistle blowers"
Representative Bob Barr: "official secrets act"
[Congressional Record: October 12, 2000 (House)]
[Page H9852-H9861]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr12oc00-108]
CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 4392, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2001
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call
up House Resolution 626, and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 626
Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be
in order to consider the conference report to accompany the
bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the United States Government, the Community Management
Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System, and for other purposes. All points of
order against the conference report and against its
consideration are waived. The conference report shall be
considered as read.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is
recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Frost), pending
which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration
of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, this rules provides for the consideration of the
conference report on H.R. 4392, the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001. The rule waives all points of order against the
conference report and against its consideration.
Further, the rule provides that the conference report shall be
considered as read. This is the standard approach for conference
reports, and this is a noncontroversial rule.
I urge all of my colleagues to support it. In addition, I strongly
encourage my colleagues to support the conference report itself. While
we will discuss the substance of the conference report during the
general debate, this bill is extremely critical in terms of making sure
our intelligence agencies have the capabilities needed to protect the
United States and the lives of American citizens at home and abroad.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, this rule allows for the consideration of the fiscal
year 2001 intelligence conference report. This conference agreement is,
in the main, not controversial. There is, however, concern about title
VII of the conference agreement, which creates a new Public Interest
Disclosure Act.
Mr. Speaker, as Members know, detailed information about the
provisions contained in authorizations for the intelligence activities
are for the most part classified. It is my understanding that there is
little disagreement on the part of the House managers on the provisions
of the conference agreement contained either in the statement of
managers or in the classified annex. However, title VII, the new Public
Interest Declassification Act, sets forth standards governing access to
and protection of national security information and creates a new set
of penalties relating to disclosure of classified information.
Both the gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde) and the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the ranking member of the Committee on the
Judiciary, have expressed their grave reservations about these
provisions and their implications on first amendment rights. Both the
gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde) and the gentleman from Michigan
(Mr. Conyers) have said that they should not
[[Page H9853]]
become law without full public hearings. However, since the Senate has
already acted on this conference agreement, a motion to recommit the
agreement to the conference has been precluded.
I would hope in the next Congress, the Committee on the Judiciary, in
cooperation with the Select Committee on Intelligence will thoroughly
examine these issues and, if necessary, make remedial changes to the
provisions now found in title VII of the conference agreement.
Mr. Speaker, in the meantime, I urge Members to support this rule so
that the House may proceed to the consideration of the conference
report.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I
move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider is laid on the table.
{time} 1545
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 626, I call up
the conference report on the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). Pursuant to House
Resolution 626, the conference report is considered as having been
read.
(For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of
October 11, 2000 at page H9709.)
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and
the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to present the conference report on the
Fiscal Year 2001 Intelligence Authorization bill. I believe that hard
work and careful deliberation has produced a first-rate bill that funds
the critically important work of our intelligence community, and we are
all reminded today just how critical that work is.
As has been the long-standing custom of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, this conference report is a bipartisan
product which reflects credit on our committee's members and its very
highly professional staff, and I want to thank all involved.
This conference report authorizes funds for fiscal year 2001
intelligence-related activities, the Community Management Account, and
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. I
just wanted to take a moment to highlight several provisions of the
conference report for the consideration of Members.
First, this conference report, I am happy to announce, includes
Senator Moynihan's ``Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000.''
This legislation is an important first step in regaining control and
putting some order to the government's declassification process, a
subject of great interest to many Members. I want to commend Senator
Moynihan for his tireless work to encourage the appropriate and timely
declassification of appropriate U.S. Government records.
Another initiative of note is language addressing the serious problem
of leaks of classified information by U.S. Government officials. Mr.
Speaker, leaking classified government information is not a right or a
privilege of U.S. officials or employees who have access to that
information. Too often over the past few years, we have significantly
risked, and sometimes lost, fragile intelligence resources because
those employed by the government and who have access to classified
information have chosen to leak that information and, thus, have
ignored their commitments to national security. Damage has been done.
The provision in this conference report simply states that, if one is
a current or former government employee who had access to classified
material that one has promised to protect, that one must live up to
those obligations. If one does not, then one is going to be held
accountable.
The provision is narrowly crafted to protect the rights that all
Americans hold dear. It is not, as some will say, an affront to the
first amendment. In fact, the Justice Department has reviewed the
provision and finds no constitutional infirmity. They even support the
provision. The committee has looked carefully at this provision. As
George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, has stated, ``the
administration leaks like a sieve.'' This must stop.
Mr. Speaker, although I expect some discussion about the provision I
just mentioned, I do not want Members to lose sight of a key and
important fact. Today's activities in the Middle East speak volumes,
sad volumes, I am afraid to say, to the type of world that we now live
in. The apparent attack on the U.S.S. Cole and the violence in Israel
and Palestine are terrible reminders of how fragile our national
security can be.
The only way to be ready to face the threats to our security, and
that is the security of all Americans at home and abroad, is by having
a vibrant first line of defense that provides indications and warning,
and that is our intelligence community. This conference report directly
helps to rebuild resources that were cut after the Cold War and ensures
the protection of our rights and liberties now and in the future. It is
carefully crafted.
Before I close, I want to mention one other important point. With the
conclusion of this Congress, the committee will lose the talents of
several valued Members who have either served out their terms on the
committee or who have chosen to seek other opportunities.
The gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), our esteemed vice
chairman, who also serves this body as the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on appropriations will rotate off the
committee.
The gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis) has been a tireless
supporter of the committee and of the intelligence community. His
insights and his opinions have been invaluable to me and to the
committee. He has also been instrumental in ensuring that his
subcommittee and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence work
very closely together, which has benefitted this House in many ways. I
thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), and all Americans
thank him for the work he has done.
In addition, I would like to recognize two other Members who will not
be with the committee next year: the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
McCollum) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi). They have
each contributed in an important way to the committee's work, and we on
the committee shall certainly miss them.
Also, I would be remiss if I did not mention the excellent work by
staff on both sides of the aisle, and I say that from my heart. Their
efforts have allowed for us to be here today with a good bipartisan
product on a critical subject.
Mr. Speaker, this is a good and important piece of legislation. I
urge my colleagues to support its adoption.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this conference report,
and because of a scheduling problem, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman
from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), a very valuable Member of our committee.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time. I want to thank the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Dixon), the
ranking member, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the
chairman, for the outstanding work that they have done and also the
work of the staff which is so invaluable in helping us to come up with
this work product.
Mr. Speaker, months ago, during the debate on the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence's reported authorization bill, I
highlighted several very positive features of the bill and applauded
the bipartisanship and the excellent cooperation in the work of the
committee under the leadership of the chairman and the ranking member.
I am pleased to note that this conference report sustains the
important initiatives and actions recommended in the House bill. This
outcome, too, is
[[Page H9854]]
testament to the sound judgment and hard work of the committee
leadership and, indeed, of all my colleagues on the committee.
During our meetings with the Senate, and our discussions with the
administration, concern arose over a House proposal to require the
National Reconnaissance Office to contract separately from the Air
Force for the large rockets that carry our reconnaissance satellites
into orbit.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence adopted this
proposal after substantial investigations and hearings following the
disturbing and costly string of launch failures and after several years
of unjustified volatility in the NRO's launch budget.
The Subcommittee on Tactical and Technical Intelligence, on which I
serve as ranking member, concluded that there would be greater
accountability and sounder fiscal management if the NRO were assigned
clearer responsibility for this aspect of its overall mission.
At the same time, I appreciate the concerns that this step could
contribute to deterioration of the partnership between the Air Force
and the NRO in managing U.S. national security space launch programs.
In this regard, I would cite the clear guidance in the statement of
managers that we expect the NRO and the Air Force to continue working
closely together, including negotiating contracts with industry
together to ensure favorable prices.
I would add also that I expect the NRO's contract awards to provide
appropriate support to DoD's policy of maintaining a competitive space
launch industrial base. The NRO and the Air Force are of course subject
to higher management authority, and the NRO director himself an
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. I would expect that DoD
management could check any harmful centrifugal forces in the NRO-Air
Force relationship.
Mr. Speaker, I will conclude by applauding the vigorous steps
contained in the conference report to overcome serious management and
resource problems at the National Security Agency and to improve the
ability of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to exploit and
distribute imagery collected by satellites and aircraft. These agencies
and their respective missions remain absolutely critical to diplomacy
and military preparedness.
I think it is a great conference report. I think we are moving
forward. I urge my colleagues and the House to adopt it. I think the
committee has done a good job, and we have served our colleagues and
the country well.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Let me begin by complimenting the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss),
our chairman, for his hard work and his dedication, as reflected in
this conference report, to meeting the needs of the men and women who
produce the intelligence on which policy makers and military commanders
rely.
As adopted by the House, the intelligence authorization was one-tenth
of one percent above the President's request. This conference report is
below the House bill and two-tenths of one percent below the request.
The primary reason for the reduction is that some of the items
authorized in the House bill were funded several months ago in a
supplemental appropriations measure.
The conference report, as did the supplemental appropriation bill,
supports the transformation initiative that the Director of the
National Security Agency, General Michael Hayden, has begun to
implement. It is critical to the security of the United States that NSA
be modernized.
General Hayden has developed a plan, which the committee generally
supports. The modernization of NSA will not succeed, however, without
the sustained, visible support of the most senior leaders of the
Department of Defense and the intelligence community. To date, in terms
of resource allocation, I have not seen evidence that the rebuilding of
NSA is a top priority of the executive branch. I hope that this changes
next year.
One of the shortcomings in the intelligence community, in my view, is
that there is too much emphasis on collection and not enough on making
sure that which is collected can be used. If it were possible to
collect only important information, this imbalance would be
inconsequential.
Our national technical means, however, collect volumes of information
that must be analyzed to identify what is important, put in a usable
form, and sent to those who need it.
Last year, Congress made clear its expectation that the new Future
Imagery Architecture (FIA) would be an adequate balance between
collection activities and TPED or tasking, processing, exploitation and
dissemination activities. Congress was clear in the description of the
consequences that would flow from an executive branch decision not to
make TPED investments sufficient to utilize fully the collection
capabilities of FIA. As the classified annex to this conference report
makes clear, the resolve of Congress on this issue has not changed.
The conference agreement amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) and the criminal code in ways that deserve some comment.
{time} 1600
Among other things, the FISA amendments make clear that, in making a
probable cause determination that a target was an agent of a foreign
power, the court may consider past activities of the target. I am
advised that the target's past activities have regularly been part of a
probable cause determination. In this respect, the amendment represents
a codification of current practice.
There have been suggestions that the amendment is needed to ensure
that information once excluded from the probable cause determination
merely because it was dated will now be considered. I believe that this
is an incorrect interpretation of both the current practice and the
effect of the amendment. Those facts which are relevant to determining
the probability that a target is currently an agent of a foreign power
should be considered. Those facts that are irrelevant, regardless of
whether they are fresh or stale, should not be considered.
Section 304 makes the unauthorized disclosure of properly classified
information acquired by a person who has, or had, authorized access to
the information a felony, subject to 3 years imprisonment, when the
disclosure is made willingly and knowingly to a person known not to
have authorized access. I disapprove of the practice by which some
individuals entrusted with access to classified information leak that
information to unauthorized recipients, including members of the media.
I share the frustration of those who open their daily newspapers only
to see in print some of the most sensitive information in our
government's possession. I have, however, grave concerns about the
reach and the scope of section 304.
There are currently a variety of statutory and administrative
prohibitions on the authorized disclosure of classified information.
The fact that more leakers are not punished is not, and I stress is
not, the result of too few prohibitions, it is the result of the great
difficulty inherent in identifying the leakers. Section 304 adds
another prohibition, unwisely in my judgment. It will not make it
easier to identify the source of a leak.
Before our conference began, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss)
and I received a letter from the chairman and ranking member of the
Committee on the Judiciary urging the rejection of this provision. In
their letter the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) noted that by making all leaks subject to
criminal penalties the provision ``has profound First Amendment
implications and goes to the very heart of the ability of the public to
remain informed about matters of critical public interest which often
relate to governmental misdeeds.''
In conference, I offered an amendment to narrow the definition of
classified information under section 304 to make sure that only leaks
of information of substantial sensitivity would be punished under this
provision. Other leaks would continue to be punishable under other
statutes or administrative procedures. Although my amendment was
approved by the House conferees, the Senate rejected it. I hope that in
the next Congress the Committee on the Judiciary, in whose jurisdiction
the issues raised by section 304 properly reside, will carefully
examine the provision.
[[Page H9855]]
Last year's intelligence authorization act established a commission
to examine the judicial review questions raised by the Foreign
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. The commission was given one year
from the date of enactment to review the current judicial, regulatory,
and administrative authorities under which the United States blocks
assets of foreign persons, and to provide a detailed constitutional
examination and evaluation of remedies available to United States
persons affected by the blocking of assets of foreign persons.
I had hoped that the commission might have completed its work in less
than a year because of the great importance I attach to the resolution
of the due process concerns raised by the drug kingpin legislation.
Although it now appears the commission will need all of the time
allocated, I look forward to its report and hope that it is dispositive
of these concerns.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I want to advise the House that two of our
very constructive and important Members have served their eight year
terms on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Lewis), conclude their terms of service this year. I
want to thank them for their many contributions to the committee's work
over the past eight years. Their enthusiasm, insight, and perspective
will be sorely missed.
I urge the adoption of the conference report.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Delaware (Mr. Castle), the chairman of our Subcommittee on Technical
and Tactical Intelligence.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time, and I rise in strong support of the conference report for the
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001.
Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking
member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), are to be commended
for the outstanding leadership they have provided to the intelligence
community during these difficult times.
I would also like to recognize the efforts of our distinguished vice
chairman, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), who will be
rotating off our committee under our rules. His insights into the
technical and distinctly military programs within the intelligence
community have been very helpful for me in understanding our future
needs. Likewise, as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations, his explanations of the resource
challenges facing the community are invaluable. I thank him for his
service to our Nation's security.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical
Intelligence, I understand the critical need to invest in and modernize
our technical intelligence systems. Although the investment in our
intelligence community's infrastructure had declined over the years,
and the strains were clearly showing through, we have responded in the
past 6 years by making some very difficult but sound choices to ensure
there are adequate future technical resources. This year's conference
report continues to address some very substantial problems, but this is
still only a beginning. We understand that providing the country with
the capabilities it deserves and needs will take years and will require
continued support from Congress.
Mr. Speaker, this conference report also provides our senior
policymakers with sufficient capabilities and tools to advance our
foreign policy, to enable strong leadership and proactive diplomacy,
and to improve our military's advantage over its adversaries, if and
when needed.
I am also pleased that we have incorporated a provision into this
year's conference report to address a concern related to the National
Reconnaissance Office and its launch program. This was the outcome of a
series of meetings, briefings, and hearings for which I personally
devoted a great deal of time. This provision has many benefits. One, it
will improve the NROs and our ability to have insight and perform
oversight into contracting launch services; two, it will allow us to
hold the NROs more accountable for their activities; and, three, it
could lead to significant savings for the government and American
people.
I want to address an issue that has been raised regarding this
important provision, and I want to make something very clear. There is
nothing in this provision that precludes the Air Force and the NRO from
continuing to work in a very close partnership. This includes
continuing cooperation on the wide range of launch service activities
and facilities that they share, as well as continuing potential block
purchases for launch vehicles if the NRO believes this is in the best
interest of the government.
Now, however, with this provision, the NRO will have insight into and
better control of launch contracts that have not been there before. We
expect that this added responsibility will ultimately result in a
stronger partnership between these two organizations. It will certainly
provide better budgeting of scarce intelligence resources.
Mr. Speaker, the conference report for the Intelligence Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2001 is a responsible, reasonable, and appropriate
request to fund our Nation's national security needs. The President,
our policymakers, our military, and the people of the United States
deserve nothing less. I ask the Members of the House to give it their
full support.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Pelosi).
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise as a member of the committee whose 8-year term is
coming to an end there. At this time I would like to commend our
distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), for his
leadership, his fairness, and his willingness to listen to another
point of view on the committee over these years. I thank him.
And to our ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon),
we are also very proud of his service. As a Californian, I am
particularly proud of his service as ranking member on the committee,
and I hope to see him serve as chair in a very short time on this very
important committee.
I would also like to commend the staff, I would say on both sides,
but I really view it as a unified staff of the committee, who have
served the Members so well and, in doing so, the community that we have
oversight over.
Mr. Speaker, I have been impressed with the dedication and hard work
of the men and women who work in the Nation's intelligence agencies and
the amazing feats they can accomplish. They often provide our
policymakers a decisive advantage in accomplishing our Nation's policy
goals and national defense goals.
While I have been a member of the committee, I have been especially
concerned about the issue of proliferation and how well the United
States tracks and then prevents weapons proliferation, particularly
weapons of mass destruction. I have often been dismayed how clear our
evidence on proliferation can be and how slow our diplomatic response
has been. We need to maintain a robust intelligence effort on
proliferation, and the issue needs continued attention and oversight in
the future.
I have also been deeply concerned over how counterintelligence
investigations have been handled. I reject the notion that one American
citizen is more likely to engage in espionage than another because of
his or her particular ethnic background. We are a proud Nation
strengthened by our immigration, and the rights of all our citizens
must be respected.
Mr. Speaker, secrecy is, of course, one necessary element in the
conduct of intelligence. Information that is necessary for us to
counter proliferation, terrorism, and espionage often must be obtained
secretly; and thus our sensitive sources and methods must be protected.
Let us stipulate to that. We all want to protect our sources and
methods. Yet I am concerned that the public interest is too often
thwarted by too much classification of information and by maintaining
classification for too long.
Last year, there were over 8 million classification actions; 10
percent more than the year before. Clearly, the system is not perfect;
but even so, we were all troubled by leaks and by the damage they can
cause. Nevertheless, I am
[[Page H9856]]
strongly opposed to the section of this legislation that would for the
first time in our history enact an official secrets law.
We have to remember that those who violate the rules on handling
classified information should be and are punished administratively. It
is already a felony to disclose national defense information to foreign
nations or their agents in order to injure the United States. Other
felony laws protect specifically defined, especially sensitive
categories of information. The Intelligence Authorization Act, on the
other hand, the bill before us today, would make it a felony for
officers or employees of the government to knowingly disclose
classified information broadly defined without the government even
having to prove any damage to national security.
In our briefing, I was convinced by the presentation that this
``officers or employees of the government'' includes Members of
Congress. By the actions taken in this bill, Members of Congress will
be subject to criminal charges if this category of properly classified
information is revealed by them. Make no mistake, this provision marks
the first time that Congress has placed the full force of criminal law
behind the executive branch's classification system. The current
Executive Order on classification of information at least has the
virtue of specifically prohibiting classification of information in
order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency or administrative
error, or to prevent embarrassment to the government.
{time} 1615
But the next President of the United States could change this
prohibition and this leaks law would still be on the books. The
Congress is foolish in my view, and that is a word I have never used
here on the floor, to give a blank check to the executive branch for
prosecutions in this important area.
I understand that the authors of the provision intend for it not to
be used to target the President, but I see nothing to prevent reporters
from being hauled in before grand juries and being forced to reveal
their sources.
Furthermore, we do not each know how this leaks law would interact
with criminal laws on conspiracy aiding and abetting solicitation and
the like.
The Committee on the Judiciary should examine issues such as these
and the impact on the first amendment issues before the Congress adopts
such important legislation. We should remember how difficult it has
been in our Nation's history to challenge official versions of the
facts when it comes to national security matters, even for Members of
Congress.
We all know that those outside powers are running a greater risk of
prosecution under this statute than those on the inside. I do not think
that this provision in the bill is in our national interest, and that
is why I was not able to sign the conference report on this important
legislation.
Again, I commend the distinguished chairman of the committee, the
distinguished ranking member, and the marvelous staff for their service
to the committee.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), a senior member of the
committee.
(Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Speaker, the conference report builds on the substantial work
done in last year's authorization bill to institutionalize the use of
competitive alternative analytical techniques by the Central
Intelligence Agency. This action is intended to further guard against
intelligence surprises and analytic complacency or ``group think,''
while better preparing policy-making intelligence consumers to deal
with the complexities of the post-Cold War international security
environment.
Furthermore, the conference report provides the means to modernize
the production mechanisms used by the CIA's Director of Intelligence to
produce and disseminate its invaluable finished intelligence products
in a more timely and secure manner. By promoting greater analytical
interaction and timeliness, the conference report helps to ensure that
intelligence consumers have the full range of tools necessary to make
informed policy before the swiftest of events force them into a
defensive crisis management posture, as too often has occurred in
recent years.
I would like to mention that the committee has worked through this
conference report, as we did in last year's report, to address the
problem of the chronic shortage of trained expert linguists available
to the intelligence community to exploit what is being clandestinely
corrected.
Moreover, we have taken steps to promote greater interoperability
between intelligence analysts of different agencies to further create
synergies that will improve the quality of intelligence reporting.
Finally, I am pleased to note that this conference report will help
the intelligence community to standardize and automate self-evaluative
tools for promoting greater interaction between those who collect
intelligence and those who determine its meaning and significance. In
this way, collectors will be able to determine the value of what they
are acquiring, and in instances where it is not so valuable, they can
adjust their collection focus accordingly.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and
the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), the ranking member, for
their leadership.
I urge adoption of this conference report.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Roemer), a distinguished member of our committee.
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from the State of
California (Mr. Dixon), the ranking member, for yielding me the time.
Mr. Speaker, I want to associate myself with the gentleman from
Florida (Chairman Goss) and again our ranking member for the hard work
they put in on this bill all year long, not just on the conference
report.
I also want to say that they really strive hard to create an
atmosphere of bipartisanship on that committee, and I salute them for
their hard work with that, and also for the excellent professionalism
we have on our staff.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Fiscal Year 2001 Intelligence
Authorization Act. Although this conference report represents a funding
level slightly below the President's request, I believe that it
nevertheless sets about the right level of overall funding for
intelligence activities next year.
I am pleased that the conferees have adopted language that urges the
administration to submit requests to Congress for reallocation of funds
to important initiatives, including language training and
counterterrorism efforts.
During my travels in various Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence hearings, administration officials have expressed concern
about the state of language capabilities of intelligence community
personnel. I have found that all too often there are not enough people
speaking the language native to the country in which they serve and too
many of those who are not sufficiently proficient in that language.
I firmly believe that language proficiency is critical to the core
mission of the intelligence community. Collectors, processors, and
analyzers must have sufficient linguistic skills to meet the challenges
posed by global targets.
I have, therefore, advocated relentlessly for the sufficient funding
of language related initiatives. I am pleased that our actions will
allow those men and women on the intelligence front line to have the
language training and related resources needed to effectively do their
jobs. We must continue on this mission.
Finally, the conference report sends a message that defeating
terrorism is important to this Congress. Earlier this year, I met with
the deputy director of Central Intelligence and discussed the
challenges posed by international terrorists. One thing was clear from
that meeting, as well as from oversight and legislative hearings. The
United States must have a robust counterterrorism program.
I am pleased that the conferees have chosen to fully fund the
President's request for counterterrorism activities. We would welcome
proposals for the reallocation of funds to efforts in this critical
area.
[[Page H9857]]
I again thank the chairman and the ranking member.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Bass), a man who keeps
our budget check working carefully for the committee.
Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for
yielding me the time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference report for the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.
There are many important aspects of this report, but I thought I
would use my time to address a concern to all of us, especially today,
the scourge of terrorism.
The bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania brought the Usama
Bin Laden organization to the forefront of terrorist threats to U.S.
interests, although numerous other terrorist groups continue to plague
us and put American citizens at risk.
Now, just this morning, we learned of what appears to have been a
very tragic attack on an American destroyer, the U.S.S. Cole, off Yemen
that has resulted in the loss of American lives. The committee,
together with its counterpart in the other body, understands the
critical need to be able to fight back. The Cole incident yet again,
Mr. Speaker, reminds us of the importance of good intelligence in
preventing these kinds of crises and, as in the case of this one,
bringing the perpetrators to justice.
The Intelligence Oversight committees are charged, among other
things, with overseeing the budgets, programs, and activities of the
various counterterrorism elements of the intelligence committee. And I
submit, Mr. Speaker, that our ability to fight back and, more
importantly, to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring at all is
robust and growing. But these capabilities, especially those involving
the prevention mission, need constant attention, as the Cole incident
reminds us.
The millennium celebrations around the world, which are a time of
great risk for us all, proved that our counterterrorism professionals
were ready and able to protect and defend. I am proud to say, Mr.
Speaker, that the intelligence community has time and time again saved
lives and secured the interests of Americans and their allies. This
arduous task consumes a significant amount of limited resources, but I
would find it hard to believe that any responsible person could deny
that this is money well spent.
We on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are dedicated to
ensuring that the intelligence community has adequate resources and is
well prepared to phase down the Usama Bin Ladens of this world.
While we are satisfied that the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence has generally performed well against the terrorist target,
we have learned through the course of our normal oversight work that
much more can and needs to be done, especially as terrorists attempt to
acquire chemical and biological weapons to pursue their shameful war
against society. This conference report will enhance our ability to
defend ourselves against terrorists through a variety of means.
I just want to say that our chairman and ranking minority member have
done a wonderful job leading this committee in a bipartisan fashion and
I want to thank them for their efforts. I urge adoption of this
conference committee report.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), our connection to
the Committee on Armed Services.
(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this conference
report.
I would first like to commend the gentleman from Florida (Chairman
Goss) for his stewardship through the process. I would also like to
recognize the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), the ranking
member, for his contributions to the committee's efforts as well.
Mr. Speaker, this conference report provides very important
investments for the intelligence community, including enhancements in
many areas that are of specific interest to the military. I wish we
could do more, especially given the ever-increasing requirements that
are being placed on intelligence to protect our troops who have been
sent all over the world for every sort of mission.
One of the most important issues facing the intelligence community is
the modernization of the National Security Agency. This agency, which
supplies signal intelligence to all levels of government, from the most
senior policymaker to the pilot in the cockpit, is in many ways the
linchpin of our warning capability. But today, this agency is about to
be overtaken by technology and by potential adversaries who are
increasingly sophisticated.
The NSA, in response, is undergoing a unique transition, the success
of which will affect the overall capabilities of the intelligence
community for the next several decades. The Director of Central
Intelligence has made the modernization of NSA his number one priority.
The good news is that the NSA director, Lieutenant General Mike
Hayden, is committed to leading his agency to overcome the
modernization challenge. Those challenges are great. They involve
overhauling every aspect of the NSA, from technical collection
capabilities, to acquisition programs and personnel structure.
General Hayden must be successful. But in order to make the needed
changes, he needs certain tools. Perhaps the most critical tool is the
ability to move the right people into key positions in the Agency to
affect change. Because of the unique and serious situation at NSA, I am
pleased that this conference report gives the NSA director that ability
through the NSA Voluntary Separation Act. This provision permits the
establishment of an early retirement and voluntary separation program
for all NSA employees, including the most senior levels of management.
With this authority, it is anticipated that the director will be able
to accomplish the personnel changes and management changes necessary to
see the process of NSA modernization through to completion. General
Hayden has our support in these efforts.
I urge all my colleagues to support this conference report.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the distinguished ranking member of the House
Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member of the committee
(Mr. Dixon) for yielding me the time.
Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to be here to find out if anybody ever
got the letter that me and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) sent
to the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) about the fact that
criminal matters fall under title 18 of the U.S. Code and is within the
total jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary. Did anybody ever
find out about that letter?
Well, we were trying to get some jurisdiction for this part of the
bill that deals with making it a felony for a Government employee to
disclose any and all information that the Government says is
classified.
The history of this provision, I say to members of the committee, is
that it was dropped quietly into a Senate version and has never had
hearings in the House or the Senate, no hearings on a provision that
has the exclusive jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary. And
we did not even get a response from the letter that the chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary sent the gentleman from Florida (Chairman
Goss).
And so, why are we doing this?
{time} 1630
There are a number of theories about this. Members may find out by
examining what would have happened had this been the law for the last
30 years:
One, the scope of the government's activities in Vietnam through the
Pentagon papers would have resulted in prosecutions.
Two, the CIA's complicity in the overthrow of Salvador Allende in
Chile.
Three, the Nixon administration's support of Pakistan in its 1971 war
with India.
Four, the revelations about spying at U.S. laboratories.
Five, China's alleged military involvement with Pakistan and North
Korea.
[[Page H9858]]
Six, basic information regarding the size of the CIA's annual budget.
See, the reason that we are doing it this sneaky way is because it
will scare the bejesus out of whistle blowers and they will be able to
be criminally punished by not sending this through the Committee on the
Judiciary. I am not saying that Judiciary might not have passed this
out. We do our share of things that I do not agree with, either. But
this super sneaky way of trying to do it does not reflect any credit on
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
I resent this very much the way you have dismissed the Committee on
the Judiciary. I think this is a travesty. And, by the way, The New
York Times, The Washington Times, the Los Angeles Times, the San
Francisco Chronicle, The Austin American Statesman and other papers
have all exposed this for what it is. I am shocked that this radical
departure of the way we legislate would be applauded on the floor,
tremendous congratulations for a bipartisan effort. Well, everything
bipartisan is not always right, and here is a perfect example of it.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. LaHood).
(Mr. LaHOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Speaker, notwithstanding what the gentleman from
Michigan just said, I am standing on this side of the well so I can say
to all the Members of the House, this is one of the most bipartisan
committees I have ever served on, and I serve on the Committee on
Agriculture which is a bipartisan committee. This is one of the best,
thanks to the leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and
the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon). The staff people work
together, and we work closely with the people from the CIA and the
defense intelligence community and all the intelligence community
because we care about the people who are out there around the world
putting their lives on the line, in dark corners of the world.
This is a bipartisan effort. People should be supporting this bill,
notwithstanding what the gentleman from Michigan said. And I have a
great deal of respect for him. This is a bipartisan bill. Every Member
should support it. I know we are going to hear opposition to it.
I want to dedicate just a couple of minutes to the human side, the
human program of intelligence. It is often portrayed in books and
movies. It is the spy versus spy story, the world's second oldest
profession. I am glad to say that America has some excellent spies, and
I am proud of what the conference report does to make them more
productive and effective. And I am sorry, this is not a laughing
matter, this is an important matter. After what has happened in the
world today, I hope Members will think twice about supporting this
bill. This is not a humorous matter. We are talking about people around
the world who are offering up their lives in public service for all of
us so that we can have a safe world.
Anyone who reads the newspapers and watches the television, if
anybody flips over to CNN right now will see reports on there about
what happened. Five Americans were killed today and some people believe
it was a terrorist attack. So this is important legislation. Criminal
organizations use ever more sophistication to infiltrate our financial
institutions and expand markets for illegal narcotics. The
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons remains a
top-priority concern of all civilized countries. The cyberthreat
becomes more and more real and ominous to Americans as our economy and
our well-being become ever more dependent on computers and
communication networks.
What these threats have in common is the human factor. What this
conference report does for our spies, the anonymous defenders of the
United States, for one it will provide more funding for their overseas
operations. And it does so in two ways. It provides continued but
overdue increases in the budget for human operations; and, number two,
it ensures that the funds that we allocate for these operations arrive
in tact to those operating overseas.
I encourage and advise all Members to vote for this bill today to
send a strong message to the intelligence community all over the world
and to public servants who offer up their lives on behalf of all of us
that we stand behind them and with them on their important work.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman
from New York (Mrs. Maloney).
Mrs. MALONEY of New York. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to commend the conferees, especially the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman from California
(Mr. Dixon), for working together to include in this conference report
the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act
which I authored along with the gentleman from California (Mr. Horn)
and Senator DeWine. This provision will extend the original Nazi War
Crimes Disclosure Act for 3 additional years while also adding
responsibilities to the Interagency Working Group's work as it pertains
to war crimes committed by the Japanese Imperial Government during
World War II.
In 1998, President Clinton signed into law the original Nazi War
Crimes Disclosure Act that established a process for the
declassification of documents maintained by government agencies about
Nazi war criminals and its allies. To date, the Interagency Working
Group has reviewed more than 6 million pages of material and has
released over 1.5 million pages of previously classified documents to
the public regarding World War II. Already, significant new information
about World War II war crimes has been revealed in the more than
400,000 Office of Strategic Services records released this past June by
the Interagency Working Group at the National Archives. However, even
with the diligent work the Interagency Working Group has accomplished,
there is an overwhelming amount of material that still needs to be
reviewed and declassified.
This success has also been achieved even though the Congress has not
appropriated funds for the support of the Interagency Working Group or
for the activities carried out by the various agencies that hold the
records. Without the resources to review the materials being released,
it will be years before we truly understand the significance of what is
contained in the declassified materials.
This conference report is a step forward in providing the Interagency
Working Group the authority and support it needs to complete the
tremendous tasks before them. I still have some concerns regarding the
language concerning the cooperation of U.S. Government agencies with
the Interagency Working Group and the ability of the Interagency
Working Group to review the more than 18 million pages of Japanese
Imperial Government information that the U.S. returned to Japan after
World War II. However, I support this conference report before us and
hope that the chairman and ranking member will work with me next year
to clarify this language and intent of this legislation so as to
further the success of the Interagency Working Group.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to clarify one point concerning title 8 of
this bill. Is it the gentleman's understanding that this section in no
way affects the authority of the Interagency Working Group established
under Public Law 105-246, the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998,
with regard to the ability of the Interagency Working Group to retrieve
documents from U.S. Government agencies?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?
Mrs. MALONEY of New York. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. Yes, it is.
Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Further, is it the gentleman's
understanding that the exceptions enumerated in that act are in no way
affected by the bill before us today?
Mr. GOSS. That is correct.
Mrs. MALONEY of New York. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson), a very valued
member of our committee, given all the events in that part of the
world.
Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the chairman and the
ranking
[[Page H9859]]
member for their work on this bill. I am the junior member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I have found it to be a
pleasure to work there because of the workmanlike and bipartisan and
professional approach to oversight in the intelligence community. We
have a wonderful staff and a focus on what this country needs in a
quiet way.
Intelligence is the eyes and ears of our national security. Events
like those we have seen today bring that home more closely than we
usually see in the day-to-day events of intelligence. It is an
important part of keeping our Nation strong and free. And it is more
and more difficult because of the diversity of threats that we face as
a Nation. We have more data from which to derive information and that
creates a tremendous challenge for our intelligence agencies.
I wanted to particularly thank the chairman and the ranking member
for what this bill does for counterintelligence. It strengthens
counterintelligence in a number of ways, particularly giving more tools
to the agencies that need them in order to counter threats from other
intelligence agencies.
I also want to commend them on their oversight of our
counterintelligence program in this country. The committee played a
quiet role in the creation of the NNSA which John Gordon is now the
capable head of. And this committee, I think, brought some common sense
and some balance to what we needed to do to protect our Nation's
secrets while not damaging that which we were trying to protect. I
appreciate the committee's point of view, its common sense approach,
its balance and its competence in this area.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr)
Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman and the
ranking member and all members of the committee for their service.
It pains me greatly as a former member of the CIA, as a former United
States attorney, as a Member of this body, though, to rise today in
opposition to this bill. It pains me greatly not only on the substance
of what is contained in this bill, which is by and large very good,
solid legislation, properly reflecting the tremendous work that our
intelligence officials in this country and all over the world perform,
giving them additional tools with which to perform those duties, but it
also pains me because of the process whereby I feel compelled to come
before this body and oppose this important piece of legislation.
This legislation contains a provision that will create, make no
mistake about it, with not one day of hearings, without one moment of
public debate, without one witness, an official secrets act. For those
who do not know what an official secrets act is, it is something that
we have never had in this country. It has been broached many times,
particularly in the Cold War era. But our regard for constitutional
civil liberties, our regard for the first amendment, and our belief
that before the government can put somebody in jail for following their
conscience and disclosing information showing government wrongdoing,
the government must shoulder a heavy burden, has in every case in which
an effort has been made to enact an official secrets act beaten back
those efforts.
Yet today we stand here with such a provision amending title 18, the
criminal code, that would create an official secrets act. That would
mean that any individual who discloses information that is classified
by the executive branch can be thrown in jail for up to 3 years for
every disclosure.
Currently, if an individual discloses certain categories of important
national security information, he can and should be prosecuted. It is
not as if these people who harm our Nation's security are not going
unprosecuted. They are.
{time} 1645
This provision, though, would silence whistleblowers in a way that
has never before come before this body and which has never before been
enacted. This is about to be done without the Committee on the
Judiciary even having been given the courtesy to look at this
legislation, to assess its first amendment problems; without one
hearing, without one witness, without one moment of debate.
This is very similar, Mr. Speaker, to what happened 2 years ago on
this same bill. The government was granted extensive expansion of
wiretapping authority without one witness, without one debate, without
one day of hearing. It was slipped into this bill 2 years ago.
I urge my colleagues to vote against this bill so that it can go back
to the drawing board and these particular provisions that have no
business being in this bill without having gone through the Committee
on the Judiciary can be properly assessed and their full constitutional
ramifications properly studied.
One can only pick up the paper almost every day and see examples,
whether it is Bill Gertz or Gary Aldrich or others, of people who have
let the public know important information who would be thrown in jail
under a provision that is about to pass without one day of hearing,
without one witness, without even the Committee on the Judiciary having
been given the courtesy to assess it.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), a member of the Committee
on Armed Services.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I serve on the Subcommittee on Defense
of the Committee on Appropriations, and it is one of the most
bipartisan committees that I serve on. I appreciate the bipartisanship
of the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) and the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss) as well. I think the Members on both sides of the
aisle will agree that I think we have a long way to go and a lot of
work to do. I think this is a good bill. I think hard work has been
done on it, but I think there is also agreement in areas that make up
intelligence and the agencies, a strong military.
While we may have the strongest military in the world, our national
readiness rates are very, very low in many cases. That hurts our
intelligence capability. Where our military is strung out for nation-
building quite often, according to George Tenet, those assets were
spread so very thin that it made it almost impossible to track Osama
bin Laden because we were engaged in those events. Our State
Department, both under Republicans and Democrats, I think all that
needs to be done is take a look at what happened to Enrique Camarena in
the drug wars and the lack of support for our agents under the State
Department, to Rambouillet, to hitting the Chinese Embassy. I also
think it is wrong that we had technology that we were developing to
defeat a Soviet missile. I cannot say what that missile is; but when we
gained access to that particular missile, we found out our defensive
system would not work.
We spent nearly a billion dollars to build that defensive system that
would not work. And the reengineering of that, we now have a system at
very low cost that will defeat that Soviet system, and that is why I
think many of us got so concerned when Loral with Bernie Schwartz gave
up second and tertiary missile boots to China, they gave up MRVing
capability which we, Intelligence, knew that the W-88 warhead had
already been stolen by the Chinese, and then the targeting device. The
CIA briefed many of us that North Korea was many years away from
striking the United States with a nuclear weapon. They can now hit the
United States with a Taepo Dong-2 missile. That should concern all of
us, and I think we have a long way to go to secure the national
security and intelligence forces of our country.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hutchinson).
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Goss) for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference report, and I wanted
to respond to my good friend, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr),
and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) as well, on a couple of
issues.
First of all, this provision simply says that we are going to take
some action to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information by government officials. Now, a complaint has been made
that, well, it should
[[Page H9860]]
have gone through the Committee on the Judiciary. I am a member of the
Committee on the Judiciary, and I guard our jurisdiction very
carefully; but, in fact, this was attached by the Senate, who held
hearings on this, who heard witnesses and who debated this, and this is
a normal process. Whenever they attach a provision, we in the House
have to consider it. We have to look at this, and from the standpoint
of the Committee on the Judiciary, I believe that this is carefully
crafted.
Now, the argument is made that this is going to silence whistle-
blowers. Well, I do not think that is true at all. First of all,
whistle-blowers are protected under the current law. Secondly, whistle-
blowers who have a concern about whether information is properly
classified or there is a concern about the agency that they are working
for, can come to Congress. That is our job. The oversig
t committee
would hold hearings on it, would deal with that issue, would protect
the whistle-blower. They are protected under law and under the
interests of Congress, and so I do not think that should be a concern.
The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr) raised the question that we are
going to criminalize conduct that historically has not been
criminalized and, in fact, what we are doing is to say that if an
employee of the United States, this does not pertain to the news media,
but if an employee of the United States has possession of classified
material and then discloses it to someone who is not authorized to
receive that material, then they can be prosecuted.
But there is something more in there that was left out of the
presentation of the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr), and that is they
must have done it knowingly and willfully, and that is the intent
portion of the burden of proof that will be on the government. So it
does not prosecute mistakes, someone who accidentally or inadvert
ntly
discloses information. They have to intentionally have done that,
knowingly have done that.
So I think it is well drafted, and I urge my colleagues to support
this well-drafted protection of classified information.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished friend,
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I am glad that the bill contains my
amendment to investigate the effects of espionage on American business
and industry and jobs. I am also glad at least we got some report
language on China. It should have been in the bill.
There is not enough anatomy in either of these bodies. Mr. Speaker,
we have had independent counsels on Henry Cisneros and Monica Lewinsky.
Now, look, Monica may be a threat to fidelity. She is not a threat to
liberty.
We had a Chinese Red Army general who funneled cash to the Democrat
National Committee, and we will not even include the Traficant language
as binding that says what is the extent on the national security. A
Chinese missile, as we laugh, will not have exemption for one party or
the other. A Chinese missile will hit all America. God Almighty. Last
month's 1-month trade deficit was $31 billion. At 1,000 jobs per
billion, we lost 31,000 high-paying manufacturing jobs. If that were
just put into highways, we would have created over a million jobs for 2
years.
What is wrong with us? Are we afraid of the politics of China? The
American people are watching. The greatest threat to our national
security is China, and they bought and spied and posed that great
threat.
I am disappointed. The intelligence committee is our number one
charge to secure America, secure that American peace. We are not doing
that. I think we are gutless, and I yield back the fact that that
should not have been in the report language as a wish; that should have
been a commitment and a mandate by Congress to investigate this Chinese
business.
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, on balance this is a good conference report that has
been brought together in a bipartisan way. I understand the ranking
member of the Committee on the Judiciary. I raised in the conference
his letter. I attempted to modify the language to make it more narrow.
The fact is that the Senate would not yield on this issue. I disagree
with that part of the bill because, one, it is the identification of
leakers before they can ever be penalized. Increasing the penalty, to
me, does not work. I certainly think that the House Committee on the
Judiciary should look at this, and I will pledge my support to support
legislation that in some way may either modify or mitigate the damage,
if any, that has been done.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to again publicly thank the gentleman from
California (Mr. Dixon) for being an extraordinary ranking member,
reaching across so many times on complicated and sensitive matters and
carrying a huge proportion of the load of the committee. I have a plan
that would like to keep him there as ranking member. I realize that may
not go entirely across the aisle.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), the vice chairman and critical
link to the Committee on Appropriations.
(Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I very much appreciate my
colleague, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, I have a magnificent speech that has been prepared
carefully for this discussion today. I am not going to refer to the
speech, but rather submit it.
In the meantime, Mr. Speaker, I want to express my deep appreciation
to my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), with whom
it has been my privilege to work for many, many years in the State
legislature as well as here. He has done a fantastic job, in my view,
providing the kind of balance that we need that makes the work of this
committee such a nonpartisan piece of work.
In turn, before coming to the committee, it had not been my privilege
to know well the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). The gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss) is a person of fabulous background, but very unique
experience in this subject area. He comes to our committee at a most
important time in our history. The leadership he has provided for us is
very important to the security interests of this country, at home and
abroad, but especially of significance to those who care about freedom
in the world.
The men and women who make up the personnel base of our intelligence
community overall are fabulous people. They do wonderful work on our
behalf. Most of it gets very, very little attention. From time to time,
we have a problem where someone crosses the line, usually stupidly,
sometimes overtly, and the work of the agency does come to public view.
It ofttimes is of great disservice to this country. It is important,
very important, that we secure those personnel who want to make sure
that the work of the agencies take place as reflected in the direction
of the law passed by the Congress.
I very much wanted to focus upon the comments of my colleague, the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr). Let me say that whistle-blowers are
protected within this bill and within the law. So long as they come
forward with matters that are security matters about which they are
concerned and they disclose them to people who are cleared to receive
such information, they can carry forward their conscience and their
responsibility as they would see fit.
{time} 1700
There is no restriction there, and the law is very careful about
that. I understand that lawyers, about presuming that only lawyers have
these answers, but the committee has worked very carefully with the
work done by the Senate, and I am comfortable with that work, as of
that moment.
The work of this bill is very, very critical work. Because of some of
these questions that are being raised, the votes today may be very
important. I urge the Members of the body to realize how significant
the work of this committee is and how important it is that they give it
their full support, as well as their attention.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to testify that this is a very fine piece
of work
[[Page H9861]]
done by both bodies, carried forward in a most positive way by the
leadership of both the ranking member and the chairman.
Mr. Speaker, this is my last year on the committee, and I want to
express to our Chairman and to Mr. Dixon my sincerest thanks for their
dedication in ensuring this nation has the intelligence capabilities
critical to protecting our freedoms. It's not often thought of in these
terms, but intelligence truly is our first line of defense, and the
close, personal, working relationship Chairman Goss and Mr. Dixon have,
has made our jobs all the easier. I want to thank you both, and I
believe this entire body owes you a great deal of gratitude.
Mr. Speaker, every year those of us who serve on the Intelligence
Committee stand before this body to discuss the Intelligence
Authorization bill. Because of very real national security issues, we
cannot discuss the sensitive details of the bill. We simply have to ask
our colleagues to ``trust us'' as we vote on the classified aspects of
our intelligence agencies and activities. Mr. Speaker, let me assure
you, and, most importantly, the American people, that each member of
the committee takes that responsibility very seriously. The issues and
debates we take up in committee about our intelligence programs are
based solely on national security interests.
Partisian politics is not a function in the conduct of committee
business. This has earned the Intelligence Committee the trust that is
required. Mr. Speaker, while the Members deserve much for their efforts
to oversee our Nation's intelligence organizations, I would be remiss
in not making mention of the superb committee staff. The staff deals
with some of the most difficult issues facing our country. They do
tough work, in a tough environment, and we ask much of them. I thank
each member of the Intelligence Committee staff for the support they
provide, and more importantly, for what they do for America.
Mr. Speaker, a quick word about our magnificent intelligence
community. It is a community of professionals who work in the
background and who don't get much credit, if any, for successfully
accomplishing the difficult tasks they are asked to carry out. The men
and women of the intelligence community often bear the full brunt of
public criticism for the rare, but inevitable intelligence shortfall--
after all ``perfect knowledge'' is a noble, but usually unobtainable,
goal. So it is important that we, who know the details of the good work
of this community, take every opportunity to thank them for their
heroism publically.
We can't, for example, publically acknowledge the Central
Intelligence Agency for an operation that might stop a planned
terrorist attack, or the National Security Agency for providing the
piece of information that might allow military commanders to locate
critical targets, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency for providing
the proof that a foreign nation is developing weapons of mass
destruction, or the FBI for locating and removing a Russian listening
device in the State Department conference room. These and the other
intelligence organizations and the analysts who make sense of the
myriad information stand watch for all Americans day in and day out. I
thank them for the jobs they do, for the professionals that they are,
and for the sacrifices they make every single day.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I urge support for this conference report.
Indeed it provides the intelligence community with the resources it
needs to carry out its mission, and it ensures that the American
military forces deployed around the world have the best information
resources we can provide them.
That is not to say that I think we have done enough. The world is not
a safe place. There are truly bad actors in the world and, in fact, we
may be living in a more dangerous and unstable world today than we
faced during the cold war: This past week's events in the former
Yugoslavia are example; the increase in terrorism--as, tragically, we
saw again this morning in the Persian Gulf; the proliferation of
inexpensive weapons of mass destruction that puts unbelievable
destructive power in the hands of small nations and non-nation groups;
the number of countries with nuclear weapons and the means to deliver
them is increasing. These threats present tough information challenges
for our intelligence community; challenges that must be met. We have to
make sure our intelligence organizations are given the proper resources
to successful operate in this dangerous world.
This conference report provides adequate resources that should be
seen as a down payment on keeping our intelligence community capable
and viable in this dangerous world. But to protect our national
security, we must resolve to invest more in our ``intelligence first
line of defense.'' I urge my colleagues to vote with me in support of
this conference report.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to say I support subtitle B of
this conference report regarding the Diplomatic Telecommunications
Service. Along with the ranking democratic member of the International
Relations Committee I wanted to clarify that section 322(a)(6)(C) does
not include personnel requirements. It is our understanding that this
provision does not require State Department personnel detailed or
assigned to the DTS or DTSPO to be polygraphed.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). All time has
expired.
Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the conference
report.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). The question is on
the conference report.
The question was taken; the Speaker pro tempore announced that the
ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will count. An insufficient number
of Members have risen, a recorded vote is not ordered.
A recorded vote was refused.
So, the conference report was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
[Congressional Record: October 12, 2000 (Senate)]
[Page S10333-S10334]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr12oc00-159]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001--CONFERENCE REPORT
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate
now proceed to the consideration of the conference report to accompany
H.R. 4392, the intelligence authorization.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Committee of Conference on the disagreeing votes of the
two Houses on the amendment of the Senate on the bill H.R.
4392, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States Government, the Community Management Account,
and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System, and for other purposes, having met, have agreed that
the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of
the Senate, and agreed to the same with an amendment, and the
Senate agree to the same, signed by a majority of the
conferees on the part of the Houses.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will proceed to the consideration
of the conference report.
(The report was printed in the House proceedings of the Record of
October 11, 2000.)
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, the Senate has before it the conference
report to H.R. 4392, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001. The conference report reflects the legislation, S. 2507, that was
approved unanimously by the Select Committee on Intelligence on April
27, 2000, and amended and approved by the Senate on Monday, October 2.
I thank Senator Bryan, the vice chairman of the committee for his
assistance in expediting this conference report. This is Senator
Bryan's first year as vice chairman. It has been a pleasure to work
cooperatively with him on a wide range of issues, and I regret that
this also will be his last year on the committee and in the Senate.
The committee has been increasingly troubled by the NSA's growing
inability to meet technological challenges and to provide America's
leaders with vital signals intelligence, SIGINT. Success in NSA's
mission is critical to our national security. Therefore, the conference
report reflects the start of our investment in resources and support
aimed at restoring the NSA's' capabilities.
I am proud to report that the conference report addresses the growing
problem of leaks of classified information. The conferees endorsed the
Senate provision that will close a gap in U.S. law to ensure the
prosecution of all unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
Successive directors of Central Intelligence have decried the growing
problem of leaks of classified information and the damage it causes to
our national security. DCI Tenet has publically stated that the U.S.
Government ``leaks like a sieve.''
Arguments that section 304 will stifle the freedom of the press
simply don't pass muster. This provision has nothing to do with
restraining publication. It simply criminalizes knowing and willful
disclosure of properly classified information by those charged with
protecting it. The Senate Intelligence Committee unanimously approved
this provision and worked closely with the Attorney General and the
intelligence community to incorporate changes requested by the
Department of Justice. The Departments of Justice and State and the CIA
all support the provision as approved by the conference committee.
Another provision of the bill is designed to ensure that the State
Department corrects the serious, systemic security weaknesses that have
repeatedly placed at risk sensitive classified intelligence information
collected at considerable risk and expense. This provision would
require that the Director of Central Intelligence certify that the
retention and storage of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) by
any element of the State is in full compliance with all applicable DCI
directives relating to the handling, retention, or storage of such
information.
The bill requires the Director of Central Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to create an analytic
capability for intelligence relating to prisoners of war and missing
persons. The analytic capability will extend to activities with respect
to prisoners of war and missing persons after December 31, 1990.
Also, the bill strengthens the IG's requirements to be fully engaged
in investigating and responding to possible wrongdoing by senior CIA
officials. In the wake of the investigation of former Director of
Central Intelligence John Deutch this provision will ensure that the
CIA policies its senior officials.
The conference report also contains the Counterintelligence Reform
Act of 2000. S. 2089 was introduced by Senators Specter, Torricelli,
Thurmond, Biden, Grassley, Feingold, Helms, Schumer, Sessions, and
Leahy in April in the wake of Congressional and other investigations
into PRC espionage against the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons
laboratories and other U.S. government facilities, and the U.S.
government's response. Those investigations focused attention on the
application of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and
highlighted coordination, information-sharing, and other problems
within and among the Department of Energy, FBI, and Department of
Justice. The amendment will correct some of the problems in
coordinating and sharing information between federal agencies, and will
[[Page S10334]]
clarify procedures and the statutory roles of various agencies in the
investigation and prosecution of espionage and other cases affecting
national security.
I thank all Senators for their cooperation in this conference report,
particularly the members of the committee. I also thank the staff of
the Select Committee on Intelligence for their hard work in developing
this legislation.
Section 304
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I would like to ask a question of the Vice
Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Bryan, for purposes of
clarification with respect to one definition in the Intelligence
Authorization bill. And that's the definition of ``classified
information'' in Section 304 of the bill which amends Section 798A of
Title 18. Section 304 establishes as a crime the willful disclosure of
classified information to an unauthorized person. In paragraph (c)(2)
it defines ``classified information'' as ``information that the person
knows or has reason to believe has been properly classified by
appropriate authorities, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or
Executive Order. . .''
Mr. President, I would like to ask the Vice Chairman's assurance that
this bill is not intended to alter in any way the existing definitions
of classified information contained in other statutes relevant to the
protection of classified information and whistleblower rights. Is that
correct?
Mr. BRYAN. The Senator is correct, and I thank him for bringing this
to the attention of the Senate.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the conference
report be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table,
and any statements be printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The conference report was agreed to.
____________________
[Congressional Record: October 11, 2000 (House)]
[Page H9709-H9723]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr11oc00-47]
CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 4392, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2001
Mr. Goss submitted the following conference report and statement on
the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes:
Conference Report (H. Rept. 106-969)
The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the
two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R.
4392), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States Government, the community Management Account
and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and disability
System, and for other purposes having met, after full and
free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to
their respective Houses as follows:
That the House recede from its disagreement to the
amendment of the Senate and agree to the same with an
amendment as follows:
In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate
amendment, insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community management account.
Sec. 105. Transfer authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--Intelligence Community
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of the Congress on intelligence community contracting.
Sec. 304. Prohibition on unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.
Sec. 305. Authorization for travel on any common carrier for certain
intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 306. Update of report on effects of foreign espionage on United
States trade secrets.
Sec. 307. POW/MIA analytic capability within the intelligence
community.
Sec. 308. Applicability to lawful United States intelligence activities
of Federal laws implementing international treaties and
agreements.
Sec. 309. Limitation on handling, retention, and storage of certain
classified materials by the Department of State.
Sec. 310. Designation of Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place.
Sec. 311. National Security Agency voluntary separation.
Subtitle B--Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTS-
PO)
Sec. 321. Reorganization of Diplomatic Telecommunications Service
Program Office.
Sec. 322. Personnel.
Sec. 323. Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Oversight Board.
Sec. 324. General provisions.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's central
services program.
Sec. 402. Technical corrections.
Sec. 403. Expansion of Inspector General actions requiring a report to
Congress.
Sec. 404. Detail of employees to the National Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 405. Transfers of funds to other agencies for acquisition of land.
Sec. 406. Eligibility of additional employees for reimbursement for
professional liability insurance.
[[Page H9710]]
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. Contracting authority for the National Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 502. Role of Director of Central Intelligence in experimental
personnel program for certain scientific and technical
personnel.
Sec. 503. Measurement and signature intelligence.
TITLE VI--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Sec. 601. Short title.
Sec. 602. Orders for electronic surveillance under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 603. Orders for physical searches under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 604. Disclosure of information acquired under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for law enforcement
purposes.
Sec. 605. Coordination of counterintelligence with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
Sec. 606. Enhancing protection of national security at the Department
of Justice.
Sec. 607. Coordination requirements relating to the prosecution of
cases involving classified information.
Sec. 608. Severability.
TITLE VII--DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION
Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Findings.
Sec. 703. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 704. Identification, collection, and review for declassification
of information of archival value or extraordinary public
interest.
Sec. 705. Protection of national security information and other
information.
Sec. 706. Standards and procedures.
Sec. 707. Judicial review.
Sec. 708. Funding.
Sec. 709. Definitions.
Sec. 710. Sunset.
TITLE VIII--DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON JAPANESE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT
Sec. 801. Short title.
Sec. 802. Designation.
Sec. 803. Requirement of disclosure of records.
Sec. 804. Expedited processing of requests for Japanese Imperial
Government records.
Sec. 805. Effective date.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2001 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2001,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R.
4392 of the One Hundred Sixth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2001 under section 102 when the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that
the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such section for such
element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of
the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2001 the
sum of $163,231,000. Within such amount, funds identified in
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development
Committee shall remain available until September 30, 2002.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized 313 full-time personnel as of
September 30, 2001. Personnel serving in such elements may be
permanent employees of the Community Management Account or
personnel detailed from other elements of the United States
Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are also
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2001 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall
remain available until September 30, 2002.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2001, there
are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such
elements as of that date as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
fiscal year 2001, any officer or employee of the United
States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the
staff of the Community Management Account from another
element of the United States Government shall be detailed on
a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee,
or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a
period of less than 1 year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated in subsection (a), $34,100,000 shall be
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within
such amount, funds provided for research, development, test,
and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2002, and funds provided for procurement
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under
paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so
transferred for the activities of the National Drug
Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
SEC. 105. TRANSFER AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Limitation on Delegation of Authority of Departments To
Object to Transfers.--Section 104(d)(2) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4(d)(2)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)'';
(2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), and
(E) as clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v), respectively;
(3) in clause (v), as so redesignated, by striking ``the
Secretary or head'' and inserting ``subject to subparagraph
(B), the Secretary or head''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), the authority
to object to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) may not be
delegated by the Secretary or head of the department
involved.
``(ii) With respect to the Department of Defense, the
authority to object to such a transfer may be delegated by
the Secretary of Defense, but only to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense.
``(iii) An objection to a transfer under subparagraph
(A)(v) shall have no effect unless submitted to the Director
of Central Intelligence in writing.''.
(b) Limitation on Delegation of Duties of Director of
Central Intelligence.--Section 104(d)(1) of such Act (50
U.S.C. 403-4(d)(1)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(1)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) The Director may only delegate any duty or authority
given the Director under this subsection to the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management.''.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2001 the sum of $216,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--Intelligence Community
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
[[Page H9711]]
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Director of
Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements
of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the
national security interests of the United States and
consistent with operational and security concerns related to
the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally
sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner
that maximizes the procurement of products properly
designated as having been made in the United States.
SEC. 304. PROHIBITION ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Chapter 37 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 798A as section 798B; and
(2) by inserting after section 798 the following new
section 798A:
``Sec. 798A. Unauthorized disclosure of classified
information
``(a) Prohibition.--Whoever, being an officer or employee
of the United States, a former or retired officer or employee
of the United States, any other person with authorized access
to classified information, or any other person formerly with
authorized access to classified information, knowingly and
willfully discloses, or attempts to disclose, any classified
information acquired as a result of such person's authorized
access to classified information to a person (other than an
officer or employee of the United States) who is not
authorized access to such classified information, knowing
that the person is not authorized access to such classified
information, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than 3 years, or both.
``(b) Construction of Prohibition.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to establish criminal liability for
disclosure of classified information in accordance with
applicable law to the following:
``(1) Any justice or judge of a court of the United States
established pursuant to article III of the Constitution of
the United States.
``(2) The Senate or House of Representatives, or any
committee or subcommittee thereof, or joint committee
thereof, or any Member of Congress.
``(3) A person or persons acting on behalf of a foreign
power (including an international organization) if the
disclosure--
``(A) is made by an officer or employee of the United
States who has been authorized to make the disclosure; and
``(B) is within the scope of such officer's or employee's
duties.
``(4) Any other person authorized to receive the classified
information.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `authorized', in the case of access to
classified information, means having authority or permission
to have access to the classified information pursuant to the
provisions of a statute, Executive order, regulation, or
directive of the head of any department or agency who is
empowered to classify information, an order of any United
States court, or a provision of any Resolution of the Senate
or Rule of the House of Representatives which governs release
of classified information by such House of Congress.
``(2) The term `classified information' means information
or material properly classified and clearly marked or
represented, or that the person knows or has reason to
believe has been properly classified by appropriate
authorities, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or
Executive order, as requiring protection against unauthorized
disclosure for reasons of national security.
``(3) The term `officer or employee of the United States'
means the following:
``(A) An officer or employee (as those terms are defined in
sections 2104 and 2105 of title 5).
``(B) An officer or enlisted member of the Armed Forces (as
those terms are defined in section 101(b) of title 10).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of that chapter is amended by striking the item
relating to section 798A and inserting the following new
items:
``798A. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
``798B. Temporary extension of section 794.''.
SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION FOR TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR
CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence collection
personnel
``Sec. 116. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Director of Central Intelligence may
authorize travel on any common carrier when such travel, in
the discretion of the Director--
``(1) is consistent with intelligence community mission
requirements, or
``(2) is required for cover purposes, operational needs, or
other exceptional circumstances necessary for the successful
performance of an intelligence community mission.
``(b) Authorized Delegation of Duty.--The Director may only
delegate the authority granted by this section to the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, or with respect to
employees of the Central Intelligence Agency the Director may
delegate such authority to the Deputy Director for
Operations.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the
National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 115 the following new item:
``Sec. 116. Travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence
collection personnel.''.
SEC. 306. UPDATE OF REPORT ON EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE ON
UNITED STATES TRADE SECRETS.
Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit
to Congress a report that updates and revises, as necessary,
the report prepared by the Director pursuant to section 310
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
(Public Law 106-120; 113 Stat. 1606).
SEC. 307. POW/MIA ANALYTIC CAPABILITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 305(a),
is further amended by adding at the end the following:
``pow/mia analytic capability
``Sec. 117. (a) Requirement.--(1) The Director of Central
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, establish and maintain in the intelligence community
an analytic capability with responsibility for intelligence
in support of the activities of the United States relating to
individuals who, after December 31, 1990, are unaccounted for
United States personnel.
``(2) The analytic capability maintained under paragraph
(1) shall be known as the `POW/MIA analytic capability of the
intelligence community'.
``(b) Unaccounted for United States personnel.--In this
section, the term `unaccounted for United States personnel'
means the following:
``(1) Any missing person (as that term is defined in
section 1513(1) of title 10, United States Code).
``(2) Any United States national who was killed while
engaged in activities on behalf of the United States and
whose remains have not been repatriated to the United
States.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the
National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 305(b),
is further amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 116 the following new item:
``Sec. 117. POW/MIA analytic capability.''.
SEC. 308. APPLICABILITY TO LAWFUL UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL LAWS IMPLEMENTING
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS.
(a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new title:
``TITLE X--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
``applicability to united states intelligence activities of federal
laws implementing international treaties and agreements
``Sec. 1001. (a) In General.--No Federal law enacted on or
after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 that implements a
treaty or other international agreement shall be construed as
making unlawful an otherwise lawful and authorized
intelligence activity of the United States Government or its
employees, or any other person to the extent such other
person is carrying out such activity on behalf of, and at the
direction of, the United States, unless such Federal law
specifically addresses such intelligence activity.
``(b) Authorized Intelligence Activities.--An intelligence
activity shall be treated as authorized for purposes of
subsection (a) if the intelligence activity is authorized by
an appropriate official of the United States Government,
acting within the scope of the official duties of that
official and in compliance with Federal law and any
applicable Presidential directive.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the
National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting at the
end the following new items:
``TITLE X--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
``Sec. 1001. Applicability to United States intelligence activities of
Federal laws implementing international treaties and
agreements.''.
SEC. 309. LIMITATION ON HANDLING, RETENTION, AND STORAGE OF
CERTAIN CLASSIFIED MATERIALS BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE.
(a) Certification Regarding Full Compliance With
Requirements.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
certify to the appropriate committees of Congress whether or
not each covered element of the Department of State is in
full compliance with all applicable directives of the
Director of Central Intelligence relating to the handling,
retention, or storage of covered classified material.
(b) Limitation on Certification.--The Director of Central
Intelligence may not certify a covered element of the
Department of State as being in full compliance with the
directives referred to in subsection (a) if the covered
element is currently subject to a waiver of compliance with
respect to any such directive.
(c) Report on Noncompliance.--Whenever the Director of
Central Intelligence determines that a covered element of the
Department of State is not in full compliance with any
directive referred to in subsection (a), the Director shall
promptly notify the appropriate committees of Congress of
such determination.
[[Page H9712]]
(d) Effects of Certification of Non-Full Compliance.--(1)
Subject to subsection (e), effective as of January 1, 2001, a
covered element of the Department of State may not retain or
store covered classified material unless the Director has
certified under subsection (a) as of such date that the
covered element is in full compliance with the directives
referred to in subsection (a).
(2) If the prohibition in paragraph (1) takes effect in
accordance with that paragraph, the prohibition shall remain
in effect until the date on which the Director certifies
under subsection (a) that the covered element involved is in
full compliance with the directives referred to in that
subsection.
(e) Waiver by Director of Central Intelligence.--(1) The
Director of Central Intelligence may waive the applicability
of the prohibition in subsection (d) to an element of the
Department of State otherwise covered by such prohibition if
the Director determines that the waiver is in the national
security interests of the United States.
(2) The Director shall submit to appropriate committees of
Congress a report on each exercise of the waiver authority in
paragraph (1).
(3) Each report under paragraph (2) with respect to the
exercise of authority under paragraph (1) shall set forth the
following:
(A) The covered element of the Department of State
addressed by the waiver.
(B) The reasons for the waiver.
(C) The actions that will be taken to bring such element
into full compliance with the directives referred to in
subsection (a), including a schedule for completion of such
actions.
(D) The actions taken by the Director to protect any
covered classified material to be handled, retained, or
stored by such element pending achievement of full compliance
of such element with such directives.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means
the following:
(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) The term ``covered classified material'' means any
material classified at the Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) level.
(3) The term ``covered element of the Department of State''
means each element of the Department of State that handles,
retains, or stores covered classified material.
(4) The term ``material'' means any data, regardless of
physical form or characteristic, including written or printed
matter, automated information systems storage media, maps,
charts, paintings, drawings, films, photographs, engravings,
sketches, working notes, papers, reproductions of any such
things by any means or process, and sound, voice, magnetic,
or electronic recordings.
(5) The term ``Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
level'', in the case of classified material, means a level of
classification for information in such material concerning or
derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical
processes that requires such information to be handled within
formal access control systems established by the Director of
Central Intelligence.
SEC. 310. DESIGNATION OF DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN PLACE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) during the second half of the twentieth century,
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan promoted the importance of
architecture and urban planning in the Nation's Capital,
particularly with respect to the portion of Pennsylvania
Avenue between the White House and the United States Capitol
(referred to in this subsection as the ``Avenue'');
(2) Senator Moynihan has stressed the unique significance
of the Avenue as conceived by Pierre Charles L'Enfant to be
the ``grand axis'' of the Nation's Capital as well as a
symbolic representation of the separate yet unified branches
of the United States Government;
(3) through his service to the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal
Office Space (1961-1962), as a member of the President's
Council on Pennsylvania Avenue (1962-1964), and as vice-
chairman of the President's Temporary Commission on
Pennsylvania Avenue (1965-1969), and in his various
capacities in the executive and legislative branches, Senator
Moynihan has consistently and creatively sought to fulfill
President Kennedy's recommendation of June 1, 1962, that the
Avenue not become a ``solid phalanx of public and private
office buildings which close down completely at night and
on weekends,'' but that it be ``lively, friendly, and
inviting, as well as dignified and impressive'';
(4)(A) Senator Moynihan helped draft a Federal
architectural policy, known as the ``Guiding Principles for
Federal Architecture,'' that recommends a choice of designs
that are ``efficient and economical'' and that provide
``visual testimony to the dignity, enterprise, vigor, and
stability'' of the United States Government; and
(B) the Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture further
state that the ``development of an official style must be
avoided. Design must flow from the architectural profession
to the Government, and not vice versa.'';
(5) Senator Moynihan has encouraged--
(A) the construction of new buildings along the Avenue,
such as the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade
Center; and
(B) the establishment of an academic institution along the
Avenue, namely the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, a living memorial to President Wilson; and
(6) as Senator Moynihan's service in the Senate concludes,
it is appropriate to commemorate his legacy of public service
and his commitment to thoughtful urban design in the Nation's
Capital.
(b) Designation.--The parcel of land located in the
northwest quadrant of Washington, District of Columbia, and
described in subsection (c) shall be known and designated as
``Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place''.
(c) Boundaries.--The parcel of land described in this
subsection is the portion of Woodrow Wilson Plaza (as
designated by Public Law 103-284 (108 Stat. 1448)) that is
bounded--
(1) on the west by the eastern facade of the Ronald Reagan
Building and International Trade Center;
(2) on the east by the western facade of the Ariel Rios
Building;
(3) on the north by the southern edge of the sidewalk
abutting Pennsylvania Avenue; and
(4) on the south by the line that extends west to the
facade of the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade
Center, from the point where the west facade of the Ariel
Rios Building intersects the north end of the west hemicycle
of that building.
(d) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation,
document, paper, or other record of the United States to the
parcel of land described in subsection (c) shall be deemed to
be a reference to Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place.
(e) Markers.--The Administrator of General Services shall
erect appropriate gateways or other markers in Daniel Patrick
Moynihan Place so denoting that place.
SEC. 311. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY VOLUNTARY SEPARATION ACT.
(a) In General.--Title III of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 405 et seq.) is amended by inserting at the
beginning the following new section 301:
``national security agency voluntary separation
``Sec. 301. (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as
the `National Security Agency Voluntary Separation Act'.
``(b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
``(1) the term `Director' means the Director of the
National Security Agency; and
``(2) the term `employee' means an employee of the National
Security Agency, serving under an appointment without time
limitation, who has been currently employed by the National
Security Agency for a continuous period of at least 12 months
prior to the effective date of the program established under
subsection (c), except that such term does not include--
``(A) a reemployed annuitant under subchapter III of
chapter 83 or chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, or
another retirement system for employees of the Government; or
``(B) an employee having a disability on the basis of which
such employee is or would be eligible for disability
retirement under any of the retirement systems referred to in
subparagraph (A).
``(c) Establishment of Program.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Director, in his sole discretion, may
establish a program under which employees may, after October
1, 2000, be eligible for early retirement, offered separation
pay to separate from service voluntarily, or both.
``(d) Early Retirement.--An employee who--
``(1) is at least 50 years of age and has completed 20
years of service; or
``(2) has at least 25 years of service,
may, pursuant to regulations promulgated under this section,
apply and be retired from the National Security Agency and
receive benefits in accordance with chapter 83 or 84 of title
5, United States Code, if the employee has not less than 10
years of service with the National Security Agency.
``(e) Amount of Separation Pay and Treatment for Other
Purposes.--
``(1) Amount.--Separation pay shall be paid in a lump sum
and shall be equal to the lesser of--
``(A) an amount equal to the amount the employee would be
entitled to receive under section 5595(c) of title 5, United
States Code, if the employee were entitled to payment under
such section; or
``(B) $25,000.
``(2) Treatment.--Separation pay shall not--
``(A) be a basis for payment, and shall not be included in
the computation, of any other type of Government benefit; and
``(B) be taken into account for the purpose of determining
the amount of any severance pay to which an individual may be
entitled under section 5595 of title 5, United States Code,
based on any other separation.
``(f) Reemployment Restrictions.--An employee who receives
separation pay under such program may not be reemployed by
the National Security Agency for the 12-month period
beginning on the effective date of the employee's separation.
An employee who receives separation pay under this section on
the basis of a separation occurring on or after the date of
the enactment of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of
1994 (Public Law 103-236; 108 Stat. 111) and accepts
employment with the Government of the United States within 5
years after the date of the separation on which payment of
the separation pay is based shall be required to repay the
entire amount of the separation pay to the National Security
Agency. If the employment is with an Executive agency (as
defined by section 105 of title 5, United States Code), the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management may, at the
request of the head of the agency, waive the repayment if the
individual involved possesses unique abilities and is the
only qualified applicant available for the position. If the
employment is with an entity in the legislative branch, the
head of the entity or the appointing official may waive the
repayment if the individual involved possesses unique
abilities and is the only qualified applicant available for
the position. If the employment is with the judicial branch,
the Director of the Administrative Office of the
[[Page H9713]]
United States Courts may waive the repayment if the
individual involved possesses unique abilities and is the
only qualified applicant available for the position.
``(g) Bar on Certain Employment.--
``(1) Bar.--An employee may not be separated from service
under this section unless the employee agrees that the
employee will not--
``(A) act as agent or attorney for, or otherwise represent,
any other person (except the United States) in any formal or
informal appearance before, or, with the intent to influence,
make any oral or written communication on behalf of any other
person (except the United States) to the National Security
Agency; or
``(B) participate in any manner in the award, modification,
or extension of any contract for property or services with
the National Security Agency,
during the 12-month period beginning on the effective date of
the employee's separation from service.
``(2) Penalty.--An employee who violates an agreement under
this subsection shall be liable to the United States in the
amount of the separation pay paid to the employee pursuant to
this section multiplied by the proportion of the 12-month
period during which the employee was in violation of the
agreement.
``(h) Limitations.--Under this program, early retirement
and separation pay may be offered only--
``(1) with the prior approval of the Director;
``(2) for the period specified by the Director; and
``(3) to employees within such occupational groups or
geographic locations, or subject to such other similar
limitations or conditions, as the Director may require.
``(i) Regulations.--Before an employee may be eligible for
early retirement, separation pay, or both, under this
section, the Director shall prescribe such regulations as may
be necessary to carry out this section.
``(j) Reporting Requirements.--
``(1) Notification.--The Director may not make an offer of
early retirement, separation pay, or both, pursuant to this
section until 15 days after submitting to the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate a report describing the occupational groups or
geographic locations, or other similar limitations or
conditions, required by the Director under subsection (h),
and includes the proposed regulations issued pursuant to
subsection (i).
``(2) Annual report.--The Director shall submit to the
President and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate an annual report on the
effectiveness and costs of carrying out this section.
``(k) Remittance of Funds.--In addition to any other
payment that is required to be made under subchapter III of
chapter 83 or chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, the
National Security Agency shall remit to the Office of
Personnel Management for deposit in the Treasury of the
United States to the credit of the Civil Service Retirement
and Disability Fund, an amount equal to 15 percent of the
final basic pay of each employee to whom a voluntary
separation payment has been or is to be paid under this
section. The remittance required by this subsection shall be
in lieu of any remittance required by section 4(a) of the
Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331
note).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for title
III of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by
inserting at the beginning the following new item:
``Sec. 301. National Security Agency voluntary separation.''.
Subtitle B--Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTS-
PO)
SEC. 321. REORGANIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SERVICE PROGRAM OFFICE.
(a) Reorganization.--Effective 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Diplomatic Telecommunications
Service Program Office (DTS-PO) established pursuant to title
V of Public Law 102-140 shall be reorganized in accordance
with this subtitle.
(b) Purpose and Duties of DTS-PO.--The purpose and duties
of DTS-PO shall be to carry out a program for the
establishment and maintenance of a diplomatic
telecommunications system and communications network
(hereinafter in this subtitle referred to as ``DTS'') capable
of providing multiple levels of service to meet the wide
ranging needs of all United States Government agencies and
departments at diplomatic facilities abroad, including
national security needs for secure, reliable, and robust
communications capabilities.
SEC. 322. PERSONNEL.
(a) Establishment of Position of Chief Executive Officer.--
(1) In general.--Effective 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, there is established the position of
Chief Executive Officer of the Diplomatic Telecommunications
Service Program Office (hereinafter in this subtitle referred
to as the ``CEO'').
(2) Qualifications.--
(A) In general.--The CEO shall be an individual who--
(i) is a communications professional;
(ii) has served in the commercial telecommunications
industry for at least 7 years;
(iii) has an extensive background in communications system
design, maintenance, and support and a background in
organizational management; and
(iv) submits to a background investigation and possesses
the necessary qualifications to obtain a security clearance
required to meet the highest United States Government
security standards.
(B) Limitations.--The CEO may not be an individual who was
an officer or employee of DTS-PO prior to the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(3) Appointment authority.--The CEO of DTS-PO shall be
appointed by the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget.
(4) First appointment.--
(i) Deadline.--The first appointment under this subsection
shall be made not later than May 1, 2001.
(ii) Limitation on use of funds.--Of the funds available
for DTS-PO on the date of the enactment of this Act, not more
than 75 percent of such funds may be obligated or expended
until a CEO is appointed under this subsection and assumes
such position.
(iii) May not be an officer or employee of federal
government.--The individual first appointed as CEO under this
subtitle may not have been an officer or employee of the
Federal government during the 1 year period immediately
preceding such appointment.
(5) Vacancy.--In the event of a vacancy in the position of
CEO or during the absence or disability of the CEO, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget may designate
an officer or employee of DTS-PO to perform the duties of the
position as the acting CEO.
(6) Authorities and duties.--
(A) In general.--The CEO shall have responsibility for day-
to-day management and operations of DTS, subject to the
supervision of the Diplomatic Telecommunication Service
Oversight Board established under this subtitle.
(B) Specific authorities.--In carrying out the
responsibility for day-to-day management and operations of
DTS, the CEO shall, at a minimum, have--
(i) final decision-making authority for implementing DTS
policy; and
(ii) final decision-making authority for managing all
communications technology and security upgrades to satisfy
DTS user requirements.
(C) Certification regarding security.--The CEO shall
certify to the appropriate congressional committees that the
operational and communications security requirements and
practices of DTS conform to the highest security requirements
and practices required by any agency utilizing the DTS.
(D) Reports to congress.--
(i) Semiannual reports.--Beginning on August 1, 2001, and
every 6 months thereafter, the CEO shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees of jurisdiction a report
regarding the activities of DTS-PO during the preceding 6
months, the current capabilities of DTS-PO, and the
priorities of DTS-PO for the subsequent 6 month period. Each
report shall include a discussion about any administrative,
budgetary, or management issues that hinder the ability of
DTS-PO to fulfill its mandate.
(ii) Other reports.--In addition to the report required by
clause (i), the CEO shall keep the appropriate congressional
committees of jurisdiction fully and currently informed with
regard to DTS-PO activities, particularly with regard to any
significant security infractions or major outages in the DTS.
(b) Establishment of Positions of Deputy Executive
Officer.--
(1) In general.--There shall be 2 Deputy Executive Officers
of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office,
each to be appointed by the President.
(2) Duties.--The Deputy Executive Officers shall perform
such duties as the CEO may require.
(c) Termination of Positions of Director and Deputy
Director.--Effective upon the first appointment of a CEO
pursuant to subsection (a), the positions of Director and
Deputy Director of DTS-PO shall terminate.
(d) Employees of DTS-PO.--
(1) In general.--DTS-PO is authorized to have the following
employees: a CEO established under subsection (a), 2 Deputy
Executive Officers established under subsection (b), and not
more than 4 other employees.
(2) Applicability of certain civil service laws.--The CEO
and other officers and employees of DTS-PO may be appointed
without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States
Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and
may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51
and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to
classification and General Schedule pay rates.
(3) Authority of director of omb to prescribe pay of
employees.--The Director of the Office of Management and
Budget shall prescribe the rates of basic pay for positions
to which employees are appointed under this section on the
basis of their unique qualifications.
(e) Staff of Federal Agencies.--
(1) In general.--Upon request of the CEO, the head of any
Federal department or agency may detail, on a reimbursable
basis, any of the personnel of that department or agency to
DTS-PO to assist it in carrying out its duties under this
subtitle.
(2) Continuation of service.--An employee of a Federal
department or agency who was performing services on behalf of
DTS-PO prior to the effective date of the reorganization
under this subtitle shall continue to be detailed to DTS-PO
after that date, upon request.
SEC. 323. DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE OVERSIGHT
BOARD.
(a) Oversight Board Established.--
(1) In general.--There is hereby established the Diplomatic
Telecommunications Service Oversight Board (hereinafter in
this subtitle referred to as the ``Board'') as an
instrumentality of the United States with the powers and
authorities herein provided.
(2) Status.--The Board shall oversee and monitor the
operations of DTS-PO and shall be
[[Page H9714]]
accountable for the duties assigned to DTS-PO under this
subtitle.
(3) Membership.--
(A) In general.--The Board shall consist of 3 members as
follows:
(i) The Deputy Director of the Office of Management and
Budget.
(ii) 2 members to be appointed by the President.
(B) Chairperson.--The chairperson of the Board shall be the
Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
(C) Terms.--Members of the Board appointed by the President
shall serve at the pleasure of the President.
(D) Quorum required.--A quorum shall consist of all members
of the Board and all decisions of the Board shall require a
majority vote.
(4) Prohibition on compensation.--Members of the Board may
not receive additional pay, allowances, or benefits by reason
of their service on the Board.
(5) Duties and Authorities.--The Board shall have the
following duties and authorities with respect to DTS-PO:
(A) To review and approve overall strategies, policies, and
goals established by DTS-PO for its activities.
(B) To review and approve financial plans, budgets, and
periodic financing requests developed by DTS-PO.
(C) To review the overall performance of DTS-PO on a
periodic basis, including its work, management activities,
and internal controls, and the performance of DTS-PO relative
to approved budget plans.
(D) To require from DTS-PO any reports, documents, and
records the Board considers necessary to carry out its
oversight responsibilities.
(E) To evaluate audits of DTS-PO.
(6) Limitation on authority.--The CEO shall have the
authority, without any prior review or approval by the Board,
to make such determinations as the CEO considers appropriate
and take such actions as the CEO considers appropriate with
respect to the day-to-day management and operation of DTS-PO
and to carry out the reforms of DTS-PO authorized by section
305 of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001
(section 305 of appendix G of Public Law 106-113).
SEC. 324. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
(a) Report to Congress.--Not later than March 1, 2001, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees of jurisdiction a
report which includes the following elements with respect to
DTS-PO:
(1) Clarification of the process for the CEO to report to
the Board.
(2) Details of the CEO's duties and responsibilities.
(3) Details of the compensation package for the CEO and
other employees of DTS-PO.
(4) Recommendations to the Overseas Security Policy Board
(OSPB) for updates.
(5) Security standards for information technology.
(6) The upgrade precedence plan for overseas posts with
national security interests.
(7) A spending plan for the additional funds provided for
the operation and improvement of DTS for fiscal year 2001.
(b) Notification Requirements.--The notification
requirements of sections 502 and 505 of the National Security
Act of 1947 shall apply to DTS-PO and the Board.
(c) Procurement Authority of DTS-PO.--The procurement
authorities of any of the users of DTS shall be available to
the DTS-PO.
(d) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees of
Jurisdiction.--As used in this subtitle, the term
``appropriate congressional committees of jurisdiction''
means the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations, the
Committee on International Relations, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(e) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this subtitle shall
be construed to negate or to reduce the statutory obligations
of any United States department or agency head.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations for DTS-PO.--For each
of the fiscal years 2002 through 2006, there are authorized
to be appropriated directly to DTS-PO such sums as may be
necessary to carry out the management, oversight, and
security requirements of this subtitle.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. MODIFICATIONS TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S
CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.
(a) Deposits in Central Services Working Capital Fund.--
Subsection (c)(2) of section 21 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u(c)(2)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (H);
and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new
subparagraphs:
``(F) Receipts from individuals in reimbursement for
utility services and meals provided under the program.
``(G) Receipts from individuals for the rental of property
and equipment under the program.''.
(b) Clarification of Costs Recoverable Under Program.--
Subsection (e)(1) of that section is amended in the second
sentence by inserting ``other than structures owned by the
Agency'' after ``depreciation of plant and equipment''.
(c) Financial Statements of Program.--Subsection (g)(2) of
that section is amended in the first sentence by striking
``annual audits under paragraph (1)'' and inserting the
following: ``financial statements to be prepared with respect
to the program. Office of Management and Budget guidance
shall also determine the procedures for conducting annual
audits under paragraph (1).''.
SEC. 402. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
(a) Clarification Regarding Reports on Exercise of
Authority.--Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended--
(1) in subsection (d)(1), by striking subparagraph (E) and
inserting the following new subparagraph (E):
``(E) a description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (e)(5) by the Inspector General
during the reporting period; and''; and
(2) in subsection (e)(5), by striking subparagraph (E).
(b) Terminology With Respect to Government Agencies.--
Section 17(e)(8) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(8)) is
amended by striking ``Federal'' each place it appears and
inserting ``Government''.
SEC. 403. EXPANSION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIONS REQUIRING A
REPORT TO CONGRESS.
Section 17(d)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)) is amended by striking all that
follows after subparagraph (A) and inserting the
following:
``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by
the Inspector General should focus on any current or former
Agency official who--
``(i) holds or held a position in the Agency that is
subject to appointment by the President, by and with the
advise and consent of the Senate, including such a position
held on an acting basis; or
``(ii) holds or held the position in the Agency, including
such a position held on an acting basis, of--
``(I) Executive Director;
``(II) Deputy Director for Operations;
``(III) Deputy Director for Intelligence;
``(IV) Deputy Director for Administration; or
``(V) Deputy Director for Science and Technology;
``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General
to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by
a current or former Agency official described or referred to
in subparagraph (B);
``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of
possible criminal conduct of any of the officials described
in subparagraph (B); or
``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible
alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary
information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or
audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a
report on such matter to the intelligence committees.''.
SEC. 404. DETAIL OF EMPLOYEES TO THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``detail of employees
``Sec. 22. The Director may--
``(1) detail any personnel of the Agency on a reimbursable
basis indefinitely to the National Reconnaissance Office
without regard to any limitation under law on the duration of
details of Federal Government personnel; and
``(2) hire personnel for the purpose of any detail under
paragraph (1).''.
SEC. 405. TRANSFERS OF FUNDS TO OTHER AGENCIES FOR
ACQUISITION OF LAND.
(a) In General.--Section 5 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f) is amended by adding at
the end the following new subsection:
``(c) Transfers for Acquisition of Land.--(1) Sums
appropriated or otherwise made available to the Agency for
the acquisition of land that are transferred to another
department or agency for that purpose shall remain available
for 3 years.
``(2) The Director shall submit to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives an annual
report on the transfers of sums described in paragraph
(1).''.
(b) Conforming Stylistic Amendments.--That section is
further amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``In General.--'' after
``(a)''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``Scope of Authority
for Expenditure.--'' after ``(b)''.
(c) Applicability.--Subsection (c) of section 5 of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as added by
subsection (a) of this section, shall apply with respect to
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the
Central Intelligence Agency for fiscal years after fiscal
year 2000.
SEC. 406. ELIGIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES FOR
REIMBURSEMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of title VI,
section 636 of the Treasury, Postal Service, and General
Government Appropriations Act, 1997 (5 U.S.C. prec. 5941
note), the Director of Central Intelligence may--
(1) designate as qualified employees within the meaning of
subsection (b) of that section appropriate categories of
employees not otherwise covered by that subsection; and
(2) use appropriated funds available to the Director to
reimburse employees within categories so designated for one-
half of the costs incurred by such employees for professional
liability insurance in accordance with subsection (a) of that
section.
(b) Reports.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent
[[Page H9715]]
Select Committee of Intelligence of the House of
Representatives a report on each designation of a category of
employees under paragraph (1) of subsection (a), including
the approximate number of employees covered by such
designation and an estimate of the amount to be expended on
reimbursement of such employees under paragraph (2) of
that subsection.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. CONTRACTING AUTHORITY FOR THE NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) In General.--The National Reconnaissance Office
(``NRO'') shall negotiate, write, execute, and manage
contracts for launch vehicle acquisition or launch that
affect or bind the NRO and to which the United States is a
party.
(b) Effective Date.--This section shall apply to any
contract described in subsection (a) that is entered into
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Retroactivity.--This section shall not apply to any
contract described in subsection (a) in effect as of the date
of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 502. ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN
EXPERIMENTAL PERSONNEL PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL.
If the Director of Central Intelligence requests that the
Secretary of Defense exercise any authority available to the
Secretary under section 1101(b) of the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
(Public Law 105-261; 5 U.S.C. 3104 note) to carry out a
program of special personnel management authority at the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the National Security
Agency in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent experts
in science and engineering at such agencies, the Secretary
shall respond to such request not later than 30 days after
the date of such request.
SEC. 503. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Study of Options.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, conduct
a study of the utility and feasibility of various options for
improving the management and organization of measurement and
signature intelligence, including--
(1) the option of establishing a centralized tasking,
processing, exploitation, and dissemination facility for
measurement and signature intelligence;
(2) options for recapitalizing and reconfiguring the
current systems for measurement and signature intelligence;
and
(3) the operation and maintenance costs of the various
options.
(b) Report.--Not later than April 1, 2001, the Director and
the Secretary shall jointly submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report on their findings as a result
of the study required by subsection (a). The report shall set
forth any recommendations that the Director and the Secretary
consider appropriate.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means the following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
TITLE VI--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS
SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Counterintelligence Reform
Act of 2000''.
SEC. 602. ORDERS FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNDER THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) Requirements Regarding Certain Applications.--Section
104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1804) is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
``(e)(1)(A) Upon written request of the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, or the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Attorney General shall personally review
under subsection (a) an application under that subsection for
a target described in section 101(b)(2).
``(B) Except when disabled or otherwise unavailable to make
a request referred to in subparagraph (A), an official
referred to in that subparagraph may not delegate the
authority to make a request referred to in that subparagraph.
``(C) Each official referred to in subparagraph (A) with
authority to make a request under that subparagraph shall
take appropriate actions in advance to ensure that delegation
of such authority is clearly established in the event such
official is disabled or otherwise unavailable to make such
request.
``(2)(A) If as a result of a request under paragraph (1)
the Attorney General determines not to approve an application
under the second sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of
making the application under this section, the Attorney
General shall provide written notice of the determination to
the official making the request for the review of the
application under that paragraph. Except when disabled or
otherwise unavailable to make a determination under the
preceding sentence, the Attorney General may not delegate the
responsibility to make a determination under that sentence.
The Attorney General shall take appropriate actions in
advance to ensure that delegation of such responsibility
is clearly established in the event the Attorney General
is disabled or otherwise unavailable to make such
determination.
``(B) Notice with respect to an application under
subparagraph (A) shall set forth the modifications, if any,
of the application that are necessary in order for the
Attorney General to approve the application under the second
sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of making the
application under this section.
``(C) Upon review of any modifications of an application
set forth under subparagraph (B), the official notified of
the modifications under this paragraph shall modify the
application if such official determines that such
modification is warranted. Such official shall supervise the
making of any modification under this subparagraph. Except
when disabled or otherwise unavailable to supervise the
making of any modification under the preceding sentence, such
official may not delegate the responsibility to supervise the
making of any modification under that preceding sentence.
Each such official shall take appropriate actions in advance
to ensure that delegation of such responsibility is clearly
established in the event such official is disabled or
otherwise unavailable to supervise the making of such
modification.''.
(b) Probable Cause.--Section 105 of that Act (50 U.S.C.
1805) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), (f),
and (g) as subsections (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h),
respectively;
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) In determining whether or not probable cause exists
for purposes of an order under subsection (a)(3), a judge may
consider past activities of the target, as well as facts and
circumstances relating to current or future activities of the
target.''; and
(3) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by
striking ``subsection (b)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection
(c)(1)''.
SEC. 603. ORDERS FOR PHYSICAL SEARCHES UNDER THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) Requirements Regarding Certain Applications.--Section
303 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1823) is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
``(d)(1)(A) Upon written request of the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, or the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Attorney General shall personally review
under subsection (a) an application under that subsection for
a target described in section 101(b)(2).
``(B) Except when disabled or otherwise unavailable to make
a request referred to in subparagraph (A), an official
referred to in that subparagraph may not delegate the
authority to make a request referred to in that subparagraph.
``(C) Each official referred to in subparagraph (A) with
authority to make a request under that subparagraph shall
take appropriate actions in advance to ensure that delegation
of such authority is clearly established in the event such
official is disabled or otherwise unavailable to make such
request.
``(2)(A) If as a result of a request under paragraph (1)
the Attorney General determines not to approve an application
under the second sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of
making the application under this section, the Attorney
General shall provide written notice of the determination to
the official making the request for the review of the
application under that paragraph. Except when disabled or
otherwise unavailable to make a determination under the
preceding sentence, the Attorney General may not delegate the
responsibility to make a determination under that sentence.
The Attorney General shall take appropriate actions in
advance to ensure that delegation of such responsibility is
clearly established in the event the Attorney General is
disabled or otherwise unavailable to make such determination.
``(B) Notice with respect to an application under
subparagraph (A) shall set forth the modifications, if any,
of the application that are necessary in order for the
Attorney General to approve the application under the second
sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of making the
application under this section.
``(C) Upon review of any modifications of an application
set forth under subparagraph (B), the official notified of
the modifications under this paragraph shall modify the
application if such official determines that such
modification is warranted. Such official shall supervise the
making of any modification under this subparagraph. Except
when disabled or otherwise unavailable to supervise the
making of any modification under the preceding sentence, such
official may not delegate the responsibility to supervise the
making of any modification under that preceding sentence.
Each such official shall take appropriate actions in advance
to ensure that delegation of such responsibility is clearly
established in the event such official is disabled or
otherwise unavailable to supervise the making of such
modification.''.
(b) Probable Cause.--Section 304 of that Act (50 U.S.C.
1824) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) as
subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) In determining whether or not probable cause exists
for purposes of an order under subsection (a)(3), a judge may
consider past activities of the target, as well as facts and
circumstances relating to current or future activities of the
target.''.
SEC. 604. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED UNDER THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES.
(a) Inclusion of Information on Disclosure in Semiannual
Oversight Report.--Section 108(a) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1808(a)) is amended--
[[Page H9716]]
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Each report under the first sentence of paragraph (1)
shall include a description of--
``(A) each criminal case in which information acquired
under this Act has been passed for law enforcement purposes
during the period covered by such report; and
``(B) each criminal case in which information acquired
under this Act has been authorized for use at trial during
such reporting period.''.
(b) Report on Mechanisms for Determinations of Disclosure
of Information for Law Enforcement Purposes.--(1) The
Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report on the authorities and procedures
utilized by the Department of Justice for determining whether
or not to disclose information acquired under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.) for law enforcement purposes.
(2) In this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees
of Congress'' means the following:
(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 605. COORDINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WITH THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
(a) Treatment of Certain Subjects of Investigation.--
Subsection (c) of section 811 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 402a) is
amended--
(1) in paragraphs (1) and (2), by striking ``paragraph
(3)'' and inserting ``paragraph (5)'';
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6) as
paragraphs (5), (6), (7), and (8), respectively;
(3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new
paragraph (3):
``(3)(A) The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall submit to the head of the department or
agency concerned a written assessment of the potential impact
of the actions of the department or agency on a
counterintelligence investigation.
``(B) The head of the department or agency concerned
shall--
``(i) use an assessment under subparagraph (A) as an aid in
determining whether, and under what circumstances, the
subject of an investigation under paragraph (1) should be
left in place for investigative purposes; and
``(ii) notify in writing the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation of such determination.
``(C) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the head of the department or agency concerned shall
continue to consult, as appropriate, to review the status of
an investigation covered by this paragraph, and to reassess,
as appropriate, a determination of the head of the department
or agency concerned to leave a subject in place for
investigative purposes.''; and
(4) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by striking
``paragraph (1) or (2)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1), (2),
or (3)''.
(b) Timely Provision of Information and Consultation on
Espionage Investigations.--Paragraph (2) of that subsection
is further amended--
(1) by inserting ``in a timely manner'' after ``through
appropriate channels''; and
(2) by inserting ``in a timely manner'' after ``are
consulted''.
(c) Interference With Full Field Espionage
Investigations.--That subsection is further amended by
inserting after paragraph (3), as amended by subsection (a)
of this section, the following new paragraph (4):
``(4)(A) The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify
appropriate officials within the executive branch, including
the head of the department or agency concerned, of the
commencement of a full field espionage investigation with
respect to an employee within the executive branch.
``(B) A department or agency may not conduct a polygraph
examination, interrogate, or otherwise take any action that
is likely to alert an employee covered by a notice under
subparagraph (A) of an investigation described in that
subparagraph without prior coordination and consultation with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''.
SEC. 606. ENHANCING PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
(a) Authorization for Increased Resources To Fulfill
National Security Mission of the Department of Justice.--
There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of
Justice for the activities of the Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review to help meet the increased personnel
demands to combat terrorism, process applications to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, participate
effectively in counter-espionage investigations, provide
policy analysis on national security issues, and enhance
secure computer and telecommunications facilities--
(1) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2001;
(2) $7,500,000 for fiscal year 2002; and
(3) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 2003.
(b) Availability of Funds.--(1) No funds authorized to be
appropriated by subsection (a) for the Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 may be
obligated or expended until the date on which the Attorney
General submits the report required by paragraph (2) for the
year involved.
(2)(A) The Attorney General shall submit to the committees
of Congress specified in subparagraph (B) an annual report on
the manner in which the funds authorized to be appropriated
by subsection (a) for the Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review will be used by that Office--
(i) to improve and strengthen its oversight of Federal
Bureau of Investigation field offices in the implementation
of orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.); and
(ii) to streamline and increase the efficiency of the
application process under that Act.
(B) The committees of Congress referred to in this
subparagraph are the following:
(i) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(ii) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(3) In addition to the report required by paragraph (2),
the Attorney General shall also submit to the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives a report that addresses the issues identified
in the semiannual report of the Attorney General to such
committees under section 108(a) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1808(a)) that was
submitted in April 2000, including any corrective actions
with regard to such issues. The report under this paragraph
shall be submitted in classified form.
(4) Funds made available pursuant to subsection (a), in any
fiscal year, shall remain available until expended.
(c) Report on Coordinating National Security and
Intelligence Functions Within the Department of Justice.--The
Attorney General shall report to the committees of Congress
specified in subsection (b)(2)(B) within 120 days on actions
that have been or will be taken by the Department to--
(1) promote quick and efficient responses to national
security issues;
(2) centralize a point-of-contact within the Department on
national security matters for external entities and agencies;
and
(3) coordinate the dissemination of intelligence
information within the appropriate components of the
Department and the formulation of policy on national security
issues.
SEC. 607. COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION OF CASES INVOLVING CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
The Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.)
is amended by inserting after section 9 the following new
section:
``coordination requirements relating to the prosecution of cases
involving classified information
``Sec. 9A. (a) Briefings Required.--The Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division and the appropriate United
States attorney, or the designees of such officials, shall
provide briefings to the senior agency official, or the
designee of such official, with respect to any case involving
classified information that originated in the agency of such
senior agency official.
``(b) Timing of Briefings.--Briefings under subsection (a)
with respect to a case shall occur--
``(1) as soon as practicable after the Department of
Justice and the United States attorney concerned determine
that a prosecution or potential prosecution could result; and
``(2) at such other times thereafter as are necessary to
keep the senior agency official concerned fully and currently
informed of the status of the prosecution.
``(c) Senior Agency Official Defined.--In this section, the
term `senior agency official' has the meaning given that term
in section 1.1 of Executive Order No. 12958.''.
SEC. 608. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this title (including an amendment made
by this title), or the application thereof, to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this title
(including the amendments made by this title), and the
application thereof, to other persons or circumstances shall
not be affected thereby.
TITLE VII--DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION
SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Public Interest
Declassification Act of 2000''.
SEC. 702. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) It is in the national interest to establish an
effective, coordinated, and cost-effective means by which
records on specific subjects of extraordinary public interest
that do not undermine the national security interests of
the United States may be collected, retained, reviewed,
and disseminated to Congress, policymakers in the
executive branch, and the public.
(2) Ensuring, through such measures, public access to
information that does not require continued protection to
maintain the national security interests of the United States
is a key to striking the balance between secrecy essential to
national security and the openness that is central to the
proper functioning of the political institutions of the
United States.
SEC. 703. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.
(a) Establishment.--There is established within the
executive branch of the United States a board to be known as
the ``Public Interest Declassification Board'' (in this title
referred to as the ``Board'').
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of the Board are as follows:
(1) To advise the President, the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and such other executive branch
officials as the Board considers appropriate on the
systematic, thorough, coordinated, and comprehensive
identification, collection, review for declassification, and
release to Congress, interested agencies, and the public of
declassified records and materials (including donated
historical materials) that are of archival value, including
records and materials of extraordinary public interest.
[[Page H9717]]
(2) To promote the fullest possible public access to a
thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of
significant United States national security decisions and
significant United States national security activities in
order to--
(A) support the oversight and legislative functions of
Congress;
(B) support the policymaking role of the executive branch;
(C) respond to the interest of the public in national
security matters; and
(D) promote reliable historical analysis and new avenues of
historical study in national security matters.
(3) To provide recommendations to the President for the
identification, collection, and review for declassification
of information of extraordinary public interest that does not
undermine the national security of the United States, to be
undertaken in accordance with a declassification program that
has been established or may be established by the President
by Executive order.
(4) To advise the President, the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and such other executive branch
officials as the Board considers appropriate on policies
deriving from the issuance by the President of Executive
orders regarding the classification and declassification of
national security information.
(c) Membership.--(1) The Board shall be composed of nine
individuals appointed from among citizens of the United
States who are preeminent in the fields of history, national
security, foreign policy, intelligence policy, social
science, law, or archives, including individuals who have
served in Congress or otherwise in the Federal Government or
have otherwise engaged in research, scholarship, or
publication in such fields on matters relating to the
national security of the United States, of whom--
(A) five shall be appointed by the President;
(B) one shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives;
(C) one shall be appointed by the majority leader of the
Senate;
(D) one shall be appointed by the minority leader of the
Senate; and
(E) one shall be appointed by the minority leader of the
House of Representatives.
(2)(A) Of the members initially appointed to the Board by
the President--
(i) three shall be appointed for a term of four years;
(ii) one shall be appointed for a term of three years; and
(iii) one shall be appointed for a term of two years.
(B) The members initially appointed to the Board by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives or by the majority
leader of the Senate shall be appointed for a term of three
years.
(C) The members initially appointed to the Board by the
minority leader of the House of Representatives or the Senate
shall be appointed for a term of two years.
(D) Any subsequent appointment to the Board shall be for a
term of three years.
(3) A vacancy in the Board shall be filled in the same
manner as the original appointment. A member of the Board
appointed to fill a vacancy before the expiration of a term
shall serve for the remainder of the term.
(4) A member of the Board may be appointed to a new term on
the Board upon the expiration of the member's term on the
Board, except that no member may serve more than three full
terms on the Board.
(d) Chairperson; Executive Secretary.--(1)(A) The President
shall designate one of the members of the Board as the
Chairperson of the Board.
(B) The term of service as Chairperson of the Board shall
be two years.
(C) A member serving as Chairperson of the Board may be
redesignated as Chairperson of the Board upon the expiration
of the member's term as Chairperson of the Board, except that
no member shall serve as Chairperson of the Board for more
than six years.
(2) The Director of the Information Security Oversight
Office shall serve as the Executive Secretary of the Board.
(e) Meetings.--The Board shall meet as needed to accomplish
its mission, consistent with the availability of funds. A
majority of the members of the Board shall constitute a
quorum.
(f) Staff.--Any employee of the Federal Government may be
detailed to the Board, with the agreement of and without
reimbursement to the detailing agency, and such detail shall
be without interruption or loss of civil, military, or
foreign service status or privilege.
(g) Security.--(1) The members and staff of the Board
shall, as a condition of appointment to or employment with
the Board, hold appropriate security clearances for access to
the classified records and materials to be reviewed by the
Board or its staff, and shall follow the guidance and
practices on security under applicable Executive orders and
Presidential or agency directives.
(2) The head of an agency shall, as a condition of granting
access to a member of the Board, the Executive Secretary of
the Board, or a member of the staff of the Board to
classified records or materials of the agency under this
title, require the member, the Executive Secretary, or the
member of the staff, as the case may be, to--
(A) execute an agreement regarding the security of such
records or materials that is approved by the head of the
agency; and
(B) hold an appropriate security clearance granted or
recognized under the standard procedures and eligibility
criteria of the agency, including any special access approval
required for access to such records or materials.
(3) The members of the Board, the Executive Secretary of
the Board, and the members of the staff of the Board may not
use any information acquired in the course of their official
activities on the Board for nonofficial purposes.
(4) For purposes of any law or regulation governing access
to classified information that pertains to the national
security of the United States, and subject to any limitations
on access arising under section 706(b), and to facilitate the
advisory functions of the Board under this title, a member of
the Board seeking access to a record or material under this
title shall be deemed for purposes of this subsection to have
a need to know the contents of the record or material.
(h) Compensation.--(1) Each member of the Board shall
receive compensation at a rate not to exceed the daily
equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay payable for
positions at ES-1 of the Senior Executive Service under
section 5382 of title 5, United States Code, for each day
such member is engaged in the actual performance of duties of
the Board.
(2) Members of the Board shall be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence at rates authorized
for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of
title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or
regular places of business in the performance of the duties
of the Board.
(i) Guidance; Annual Budget.--(1) On behalf of the
President, the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs shall provide guidance on policy to the
Board.
(2) The Executive Secretary of the Board, under the
direction of the Chairperson of the Board and the Board, and
acting in consultation with the Archivist of the United
States, the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, shall prepare the annual budget of the Board.
(j) Support.--The Information Security Oversight Office may
support the activities of the Board under this title. Such
support shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.
(k) Public Availability of Records and Reports.--(1) The
Board shall make available for public inspection records of
its proceedings and reports prepared in the course of its
activities under this title to the extent such records and
reports are not classified and would not be exempt from
release under the provisions of section 552 of title 5,
United States Code.
(2) In making records and reports available under paragraph
(1), the Board shall coordinate the release of such records
and reports with appropriate officials from agencies with
expertise in classified information in order to ensure that
such records and reports do not inadvertently contain
classified information.
(l) Applicability of Certain Administrative Laws.--The
provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C.
App.) shall not apply to the activities of the Board under
this title. However, the records of the Board shall be
governed by the provisions of the Federal Records Act of
1950.
SEC. 704. IDENTIFICATION, COLLECTION, AND REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION OF ARCHIVAL
VALUE OR EXTRAORDINARY PUBLIC INTEREST.
(a) Briefings on Agency Declassification Programs.--(1) As
requested by the Board, or by the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the head of
any agency with the authority under an Executive order to
classify information shall provide to the Board, the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, or the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives, on an annual basis, a summary briefing and
report on such agency's progress and plans in the
declassification of national security information. Such
briefing shall cover the declassification goals set by
statute, regulation, or policy, the agency's progress with
respect to such goals, and the agency's planned goals and
priorities for its declassification activities over the next
two fiscal years. Agency briefings and reports shall give
particular attention to progress on the declassification of
records and materials that are of archival value or
extraordinary public interest to the people of the United
States.
(2)(A) The annual briefing and report under paragraph (1)
for agencies within the Department of Defense, including the
military departments and the elements of the intelligence
community, shall be provided on a consolidated basis.
(B) In this paragraph, the term ``elements of the
intelligence community'' means the elements of the
intelligence community specified or designated under section
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a(4)).
(b) Recommendations on Agency Declassification Programs.--
(1) Upon reviewing and discussing declassification plans and
progress with an agency, the Board shall provide to the head
of the agency the written recommendations of the Board as to
how the agency's declassification program could be improved.
A copy of each recommendation shall also be submitted to the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
(2) Consistent with the provisions of section 703(k), the
Board's recommendations to the head of an agency under
paragraph (1) shall become public 60 days after such
recommendations are sent to the head of the agency under that
paragraph.
(c) Recommendations on Special Searches for Records of
Extraordinary Public Interest.--(1) The Board shall also make
recommendations to the President regarding proposed
initiatives to identify, collect, and review for
declassification classified records and materials of
extraordinary public interest.
(2) In making recommendations under paragraph (1), the
Board shall consider the following:
[[Page H9718]]
(A) The opinions and requests of Members of Congress,
including opinions and requests expressed or embodied in
letters or legislative proposals.
(B) The opinions and requests of the National Security
Council, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads
of other agencies.
(C) The opinions of United States citizens.
(D) The opinions of members of the Board.
(E) The impact of special searches on systematic and all
other on-going declassification programs.
(F) The costs (including budgetary costs) and the impact
that complying with the recommendations would have on agency
budgets, programs, and operations.
(G) The benefits of the recommendations.
(H) The impact of compliance with the recommendations on
the national security of the United States.
(d) President's Declassification Priorities.--(1)
Concurrent with the submission to Congress of the budget of
the President each fiscal year under section 1105 of title
31, United States Code, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall publish a description of the
President's declassification program and priorities, together
with a listing of the funds requested to implement that
program.
(2) Nothing in this title shall be construed to substitute
or supersede, or establish a funding process for, any
declassification program that has been established or may be
established by the President by Executive order.
SEC. 705. PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND
OTHER INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Nothing in this title shall be construed
to limit the authority of the head of an agency to classify
information or to continue the classification of information
previously classified by that agency.
(b) Special Access Programs.--Nothing in this title shall
be construed to limit the authority of the head of an agency
to grant or deny access to a special access program.
(c) Authorities of Director of Central Intelligence.--
Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the
authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence as the
head of the intelligence community, including the Director's
responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure as required by section 103(c)(6)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6)).
(d) Exemptions to Release of Information.--Nothing in this
title shall be construed to limit any exemption or exception
to the release to the public under this title of information
that is protected under subsection (b) of section 552 of
title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the
``Freedom of Information Act''), or section 552a of title 5,
United States Code (commonly referred to as the ``Privacy
Act'').
(e) Withholding Information From Congress.--Nothing in this
title shall be construed to authorize the withholding of
information from Congress.
SEC. 706. STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES.
(a) Liaison.--(1) The head of each agency with the
authority under an Executive order to classify information
and the head of each Federal Presidential library shall
designate an employee of such agency or library to act as
liaison to the Board for purposes of this title.
(2) The Board may establish liaison and otherwise consult
with such other historical and advisory committees as the
Board considers appropriate for purposes of this title.
(b) Limitations on Access.--(1)(A) Except as provided in
paragraph (2), if the head of an agency or the head of a
Federal Presidential library determines it necessary to deny
or restrict access of the Board, or of the agency or library
liaison to the Board, to information contained in a record or
material, in whole or in part, the head of the agency or the
head of the library shall promptly notify the Board in
writing of such determination.
(B) Each notice to the Board under subparagraph (A) shall
include a description of the nature of the records or
materials, and a justification for the determination, covered
by such notice.
(2) In the case of a determination referred to in paragraph
(1) with respect to a special access program created by the
Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence,
or the head of any other agency, the notification of denial
of access under paragraph (1), including a description of the
nature of the Board's request for access, shall be submitted
to the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs rather than to the Board.
(c) Discretion To Disclose.--At the conclusion of a
declassification review, the head of an agency may, in the
discretion of the head of the agency, determine that the
public's interest in the disclosure of records or materials
of the agency covered by such review, and still properly
classified, outweighs the Government's need to protect such
records or materials, and may release such records or
materials in accordance with the provisions of Executive
Order 12958 or any successor order to such Executive Order.
(d) Discretion To Protect.--At the conclusion of a
declassification review, the head of an agency may, in the
discretion of the head of the agency, determine that the
interest of the agency in the protection of records or
materials of the agency covered by such review, and still
properly classified, outweighs the public's need for access
to such records or materials, and may deny release of such
records or materials in accordance with the provisions of
Executive Order 12958 or any successor order to such
Executive Order.
(e) Reports.--(1)(A) Except as provided in paragraph (2),
the Board shall annually submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the activities of the
Board under this title, including summary information
regarding any denials to the Board by the head of an agency
or the head of a Federal Presidential library of access to
records or materials under this title.
(B) In this paragraph, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means the Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on Government Reform of the House of Representatives.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), notice that the Board
has been denied access to records and materials, and a
justification for the determination in support of the denial,
shall be submitted by the agency denying the access as
follows:
(A) In the case of the denial of access to a special access
program created by the Secretary of Defense, to the
Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate
and to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of
the House of Representatives.
(B) In the case of the denial of access to a special access
program created by the Director of Central Intelligence, or
by the head of any other agency (including the Department of
Defense) if the special access program pertains to
intelligence activities, or of access to any information and
materials relating to intelligence sources and methods, to
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(C) In the case of the denial of access to a special access
program created by the Secretary of Energy or the
Administrator for Nuclear Security, to the Committees on
Armed Services and Appropriations and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and to the Committees on Armed
Services and Appropriations and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 707. JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Nothing in this title limits the protection afforded to any
information under any other provision of law. This title is
not intended and may not be construed to create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable against the
United States, its agencies, its officers, or its employees.
This title does not modify in any way the substantive
criteria or procedures for the classification of information,
nor does this title create any right or benefit subject to
judicial review.
SEC. 708. FUNDING.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is hereby
authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of
this title amounts as follows:
(1) For fiscal year 2001, $650,000.
(2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2001, such sums
as may be necessary for such fiscal year.
(b) Funding Requests.--The President shall include in the
budget submitted to Congress for each fiscal year under
section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, a request for
amounts for the activities of the Board under this title
during such fiscal year.
SEC. 709. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Agency.--(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
the term ``agency'' means the following:
(i) An Executive agency, as that term is defined in section
105 of title 5, United States Code.
(ii) A military department, as that term is defined in
section 102 of such title.
(iii) Any other entity in the executive branch that comes
into the possession of classified information.
(B) The term does not include the Board.
(2) Classified material or record.--The terms ``classified
material'' and ``classified record'' include any
correspondence, memorandum, book, plan, map, drawing,
diagram, pictorial or graphic work, photograph, film,
microfilm, sound recording, videotape, machine readable
records, and other documentary material, regardless of
physical form or characteristics, that has been determined
pursuant to Executive order to require protection against
unauthorized disclosure in the interests of the national
security of the United States.
(3) Declassification.--The term ``declassification'' means
the process by which records or materials that have been
classified are determined no longer to require protection
from unauthorized disclosure to protect the national security
of the United States.
(4) Donated historical material.--The term ``donated
historical material'' means collections of personal papers
donated or given to a Federal Presidential library or other
archival repository under a deed of gift or otherwise.
(5) Federal presidential library.--The term ``Federal
Presidential library'' means a library operated and
maintained by the United States Government through the
National Archives and Records Administration under the
applicable provisions of the Federal Records Act of 1950.
(6) National security.--The term ``national security''
means the national defense or foreign relations of the United
States.
(7) Records or materials of extraordinary public
interest.--The term ``records or materials of extraordinary
public interest'' means records or materials that--
(A) demonstrate and record the national security policies,
actions, and decisions of the United States, including--
(i) policies, events, actions, and decisions which led to
significant national security outcomes; and
(ii) the development and evolution of significant United
States national security policies, actions, and decisions;
[[Page H9719]]
(B) will provide a significantly different perspective in
general from records and materials publicly available in
other historical sources; and
(C) would need to be addressed through ad hoc record
searches outside any systematic declassification program
established under Executive order.
(8) Records of archival value.--The term ``records of
archival value'' means records that have been determined by
the Archivist of the United States to have sufficient
historical or other value to warrant their continued
preservation by the Federal Government.
SEC. 710. EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET.
(a) Effective Date.--This title shall take effect on the
date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(b) Sunset.--The provisions of this title shall expire four
years after the date of the enactment of this Act, unless
reauthorized by statute.
TITLE VIII--DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON JAPANESE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT
SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Japanese Imperial
Government Disclosure Act of 2000''.
SEC. 802. DESIGNATION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given such
term under section 551 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) Interagency group.--The term ``Interagency Group''
means the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government
Records Interagency Working Group established under
subsection (b).
(3) Japanese imperial government records.--The term
``Japanese Imperial Government records'' means classified
records or portions of records that pertain to any person
with respect to whom the United States Government, in its
sole discretion, has grounds to believe ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the experimentation
on, and persecution of, any person because of race, religion,
national origin, or political opinion, during the period
beginning September 18, 1931, and ending on December 31,
1948, under the direction of, or in association with--
(A) the Japanese Imperial Government;
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military
forces of the Japanese Imperial Government;
(C) any government established with the assistance or
cooperation of the Japanese Imperial Government; or
(D) any government which was an ally of the Japanese
Imperial Government.
(4) Record.--The term ``record'' means a Japanese Imperial
Government record.
(b) Establishment of Interagency Group.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall designate the
Working Group established under the Nazi War Crimes
Disclosure Act (Public Law 105-246; 5 U.S.C. 552 note) to
also carry out the purposes of this title with respect to
Japanese Imperial Government records, and that Working Group
shall remain in existence for 3 years after the date on which
this title takes effect. Such Working Group is redesignated
as the ``Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government
Records Interagency Working Group''.
(2) Membership.--Section 2(b)(2) of such Act is amended by
striking ``3 other persons'' and inserting ``4 other persons
who shall be members of the public, of whom 3 shall be
persons appointed under the provisions of this Act in effect
on October 8, 1998.''.
(c) Functions.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Interagency Group shall, to the
greatest extent possible consistent with section 803--
(1) locate, identify, inventory, recommend for
declassification, and make available to the public at the
National Archives and Records Administration, all classified
Japanese Imperial Government records of the United States;
(2) coordinate with agencies and take such actions as
necessary to expedite the release of such records to the
public; and
(3) submit a report to Congress, including the Committee on
Government Reform and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate, describing all such records, the
disposition of such records, and the activities of the
Interagency Group and agencies under this section.
(d) Funding.--There is authorized to be appropriated such
sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
title.
SEC. 803. REQUIREMENT OF DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS.
(a) Release of Records.--Subject to subsections (b), (c),
and (d), the Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency
Working Group shall release in their entirety Japanese
Imperial Government records.
(b) Exemptions.--An agency head may exempt from release
under subsection (a) specific information, that would--
(1) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(2) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or
reveal information about an intelligence source or method
when the unauthorized disclosure of that source or method
would damage the national security interests of the United
States;
(3) reveal information that would assist in the development
or use of weapons of mass destruction;
(4) reveal information that would impair United States
cryptologic systems or activities;
(5) reveal information that would impair the application of
state-of-the-art technology within a United States weapon
system;
(6) reveal United States military war plans that remain in
effect;
(7) reveal information that would impair relations between
the United States and a foreign government, or undermine
ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
(8) reveal information that would impair the current
ability of United States Government officials to protect the
President, Vice President, and other officials for whom
protection services are authorized in the interest of
national security;
(9) reveal information that would impair current national
security emergency preparedness plans; or
(10) violate a treaty or other international agreement.
(c) Applications of Exemptions.--
(1) In general.--In applying the exemptions provided in
paragraphs (2) through (10) of subsection (b), there shall be
a presumption that the public interest will be served by
disclosure and release of the records of the Japanese
Imperial Government. The exemption may be asserted only when
the head of the agency that maintains the records determines
that disclosure and release would be harmful to a specific
interest identified in the exemption. An agency head who
makes such a determination shall promptly report it to the
committees of Congress with appropriate jurisdiction,
including the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on
Government Reform and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Application of title 5.--A determination by an agency
head to apply an exemption provided in paragraphs (2) through
(9) of subsection (b) shall be subject to the same standard
of review that applies in the case of records withheld under
section 552(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code.
(d) Records Related to Investigations or Prosecutions.--
This section shall not apply to records--
(1) related to or supporting any active or inactive
investigation, inquiry, or prosecution by the Office of
Special Investigations of the Department of Justice; or
(2) solely in the possession, custody, or control of the
Office of Special Investigations.
SEC. 804. EXPEDITED PROCESSING OF REQUESTS FOR JAPANESE
IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS.
For purposes of expedited processing under section
552(a)(6)(E) of title 5, United States Code, any person who
was persecuted in the manner described in section 802(a)(3)
and who requests a Japanese Imperial Government record shall
be deemed to have a compelling need for such record.
SEC. 805. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The provisions of this title shall take effect on the date
that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
And the Senate agree to the same.
From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for
consideration of the House bill and the Senate amendment, and
modifications committed to conference:
Porter J. Goss,
Jerry Lewis,
Bill McCollum,
Michael N. Castle,
Sherwood L. Boehlert,
C.F. Bass,
Jim Gibbons,
Ray LaHood,
Heather Wilson,
Julian C. Dixon,
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr.,
Norman Sisisky,
Gary A. Condit,
Tim Roemer,
Alcee L. Hastings,
From the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of
defense tactical intelligence and related activities:
Floyd Spence,
Bob Stump,
Ike Skelton,
Managers on the Part of the House.
Richard C. Shelby,
Richard G. Lugar,
Jon Kyl,
James Inhofe,
Orrin G. Hatch,
Pat Roberts,
Connie Mack,
From the Committee on Armed Services:
John Warner,
Richard H. Bryan,
Bob Graham,
John F. Kerry,
Max Baucus,
Chuck Robb,
Frank R. Lautenberg,
Managers on the Part of the Senate.
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE
The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the
conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the
amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and the
intelligence-related activities of the United States
government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for
other purposes, submit the following joint statement to the
House and the Senate in explanation of the effect of the
action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the
accompanying conference report:
The managers agree that the congressionally directed
actions described in the House
[[Page H9720]]
bill, the Senate amendment, the respective committee reports,
and classified annexes accompanying H.R. 4392 and S. 2507,
should be undertaken to the extent that such congressionally
directed actions are not amended, altered, or otherwise
specifically addressed in either this Joint Explanatory
Statement or in the classified annex to the conference report
on the bill H.R. 4392.
Report of the National Commission on Terrorism
Pursuant to Public Law 105-277, the National Commission on
Terrorism, chaired by former Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III,
submitted its report to Congress in June 2000. The managers
commend the Commission for its effort and contribution on
this critical issue.
Many of the Commission's findings strongly support
positions Congress has taken. The Commission report
reinforces the assessment by Congress of the scope and
evolving nature of the international terrorist threat. The
Commission further highlights the managers' view that good
intelligence is one of the best tools against international
terrorism, and that there is an urgent need to rebuild the
NSA.
The Commission determined that some policies and other
restrictions are hindering efforts to counter terrorism. For
example, the Commission highlighted--with concern--the
complex manner in which the Justice Department implements the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). It noted,
however, that the Attorney General managed to streamline the
Department's processes for considering FISA warrants-still in
a manner fully consistent with the law-in order to address
the myriad terrorist threats during the millennium period.
The Commission noted that the United States government was
much more effective in pursuing terrorists during that
period. The managers appreciate the Commission's support for
the efforts of all involved in countering the millennium
threats.
The Commission recommended the elimination of the 1995 DCI
guidelines requiring approvals from CIA headquarters before
terrorist informants who have human rights violations in
their background can be recruited. The rationale stated by
the Commissioners was that it should be understood by all in
the Intelligence Community that aggressive recruitment of
human intelligence sources is one of the highest priorities.
The managers share this priority, and will continue to
examine the implementation of these important guidelines. The
managers are concerned, however, that there may be intangible
impediments to recruitment of such terrorist informants. For
instance, there may be some in CIA headquarters who
believe that Congress and the American public will not
support a CIA relationship with a ``terrorist organization
insider,'' or close associates of terrorists, even though
such persons may often be in the best or only position to
provide valuable counterterrorism intelligence. The
managers applaud the determined effort of the CIA to
ensure that all case officers understand the commitment of
the Agency to the recruitment of persons with access to
information on terrorist organizations or access to the
organizations themselves. The managers also insist that
appropriate recruitment of such sources receives the
continued and necessary support from CIA management at all
levels.
Unquestionably, a robust and effective intelligence effort
will, from time to time, require U.S. interaction with
extremely dangerous and truly unsavory characters. After all,
it is an unfortunate matter of fact that individuals with
reputable backgrounds rarely yield the key intelligence leads
that are critical to the counterterrorist efforts of the
United States.
The managers strongly support an aggressive
counterterrorism program, and urge all intelligence officers
to continue their heroic efforts to deter terrorist
activities against U.S. citizens and interests at home and
around the world.
Title I--Intelligence Activities
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS
Section 101 of the conference report lists the departments,
agencies, and other elements of the United States government
for whose intelligence and intelligence-related activities
the Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2001.
Section 101 is identical to section 101 of the House bill and
section 101 of the Senate amendment.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS
Section 102 of the conference report makes clear that the
details of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities and
applicable personnel ceilings covered under this title for
fiscal year 2001 are contained in a classified Schedule of
Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is
incorporated into the Act by this section. The Schedule of
Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and
to the President. The classified annex provides the details
of the Schedule. Section 102 is identical to section 102 of
the House bill and section 102 of the Senate amendment.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS
Section 103 of the conference report authorizes the
Director of Central Intelligence, with the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in fiscal
year 2001 to authorize employment of civilian personnel in
excess of the personnel ceilings applicable to the components
of the Intelligence Community under section 102 by an amount
not to exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings
applicable under section 102. The Director of Central
Intelligence may exercise this authority only if necessary to
the performance of important intelligence functions. Any
exercise of this authority must be reported to the
intelligence committees of the Congress.
The managers emphasize that the authority conferred by
section 103 is not intended to permit wholesale increases in
personnel strength in any intelligence component. Rather, the
section provides the Director of Central Intelligence with
flexibility to adjust personnel levels temporarily for
contingencies and for overages caused by an imbalance between
hiring of new employees and attrition of current employees.
The managers do not expect the Director of Central
Intelligence to allow heads of intelligence components to
plan to exceed levels set in the Schedule of Authorizations
except for the satisfaction of clearly identified hiring
needs that are consistent with the authorization of personnel
strengths in this bill. In no case is this authority to be
used to provide for positions denied by this bill. Section
103 is identical to section 103 of the House bill and section
103 of the Senate amendment.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT
Section 104 of the conference report authorizes
appropriations for the Community Management Account (CMA) of
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and sets the
personnel end-strength for the Intelligence Community
management staff for fiscal year 2001.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $163, 231,000
for fiscal year 2001 for the activities of the CMA of the
DCI. This amount includes funds identified for the Advanced
Research and Development Committee and the Advanced
Technology Group, which shall remain available until
September 30, 2002.
Subsection (b) authorizes 313 full-time personnel for the
Community Management Staff for fiscal year 2001 and provides
that such personnel may be permanent employees of the Staff
or detailed from various elements of the United States
government.
Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and
personnel for the CMA as specified in the classified Schedule
of Authorizations and permits these additional amounts to
remain available through September 30, 2002.
Subsection (d) requires that, except as provided in Section
113 of the National Security Act of 1947, or for temporary
situations of less than one year, personnel from another
element of the United States government be detailed to an
element of the CMA on a reimbursable basis.
Subsection (e) authorizes $34,100,000 of the amount
authorized in subsection (a) to be made available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Subsection (e)
requires the DCI to transfer these funds to the Department of
Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the authority of
the Attorney General and subject to section 103(d)(1) of the
National Security Act. Subsection (e) is similar to
subsection (e) of the House bill and subsection (e) of the
Senate amendment.
The managers note that since Fiscal Year 1997 the Community
Management Account has included authorization for
appropriations for the National Drug Intelligence Center
(NDIC). Over that time, the funding level for the NDIC has
remained unchanged. The committees periodically have
expressed concern about the effectiveness of NDIC and its
ability to fulfill the role for which it was created. The
managers are encouraged, however, by the NDIC's recent
improved performance and by the refocused role for the
organization, which was outlined in the Administration's
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan earlier this year. The
managers agree to provide $7.1 million over the requested
amount for the NDIC and instruct the Director of the NDIC to
provide a spending plan to the intelligence committees and to
the appropriations committees within 90 days of enactment of
this Act.
SEC. 105. TRANSFER AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Section 105 is identical to Section 105 of the House bill.
The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate
recedes.
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
Section 201 is identical to Section 201 of the Senate
amendment and section 201 of the House bill.
Title III--General Provisions
Subtitle A--Intelligence Community
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW
Section 301 is identical to section 301 of the Senate
amendment and section 301 of the House bill.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 302 is identical to section 302 of the Senate
amendment and section 302 of the House bill.
SEC. 303. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING
Section 303 is identical to section 303 of the House bill.
The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate
recedes to the House provision.
[[Page H9721]]
SEC. 304. PROHIBITION ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION
Section 304 is identical to section 303 of the Senate
amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House
recedes.
Unauthorized disclosures of sensitive intelligence
information are of great concern. Such disclosures,
regardless of whether they involve an intelligence
``success'' or ``failure,'' can compromise irreplaceable
sources and methods, and in some cases, can directly endanger
lives.
The managers note that the current Executive Order
governing classified national security information (E.O.
12958) requires that, in order to classify information, the
original classifying authority must determine that
unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could
be expected to result in damage to the national security and
the original classification authority must be able to
identify or describe the damage. The managers further note
that the current Executive Order specifically prohibits the
classification of information in order to conceal violations
of law, inefficiency, or administrative error or to prevent
embarrassment to the government.
It is the intent of the managers that the government may
meet its burden of proof under this statute by proving that
the information was classified under the applicable statute
or Executive Order. The government should not be required to
prove that damage to the national security actually has or
will result from the unauthorized disclosure. Subsection
(c)(2) is not intended by the managers to create a defense
based on a technical error in the classification markings, or
the lack thereof, or to create a right of the defendant to
dispute the propriety of the President's classification
decision. The managers believe that requiring the government
to prove that the classified information is or has been
properly classified under an applicable statute or Executive
Order strikes the appropriate balance between protecting only
that information that would damage the national security if
disclosed and not creating a burden of proof that is so great
that the government could never meet its burden without
having to disclose unnecessarily additional classified
information.
SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION FOR TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER
Section 305 is similar to Section 304 of the House bill.
The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate
recedes, with amendment.
Section 4(b)(3) of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended,
provides the DCI with authority to promulgate regulations
governing travel requirements for CIA officers and other
federal government employees or members of the Armed Services
detailed to the CIA.
Subject to regulation, CIA employees and detailees to the
CIA may be permitted to use non-American-flag airlines when
it is determined to be essential to satisfy mission
requirements. The managers believe that this type of
flexibility is necessary for other personnel of the
Intelligence Community carrying out intelligence community
mission requirements, given the nature of the work of the
Intelligence Community. This provision is not intended to
supersede the CIA's current regulation relating to this
matter. Rather, it is a complementary provision meant to
ensure an appropriate level of latitude to the Intelligence
Community to carry out the critically important activities in
pursuit and defense of the national security.
SEC. 306. UPDATE OF REPORT ON EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE ON U.S.
Section 306 is similar to Section 306 of the House bill.
The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate
recedes, with technical amendment.
SEC. 307 POW/MIA ANALYTIC CAPABILITY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Section 307 is similar to Section 304 of the Senate
amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House
recedes, with technical modifications.
SEC. 308. APPLICABILITY TO LAWFUL UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF FEDERAL LAWS IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS
Section 308 is identical to Sec. 305 of the Senate
amendment. The House had no similar provision. The House
recedes.
The managers note that section 308 applies only to
intelligence activities of the United States. By its clear
terms, this provision deals solely with the application of
U.S. law to U.S. intelligence activities. Unquestionably, it
does not address the issue of the lawfulness of such
activities under the laws of foreign countries. It is also
not meant to suggest that a person violating the laws of the
United States may claim any authorization from a foreign
government as justification for a violation of a U.S. law, or
as a defense in a prosecution for such violation.
SEC. 309. LIMITS ON HANDLING, RETENTION, AND STORAGE OF CERTAIN
CLASSIFIED MATERIALS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Section 309 is identical to Section 306 of the Senate
amendment. The House addressed this issue in the classified
annex to the report accompanying the bill H.R. 4392, but had
no similar statutory proposal. The House recedes.
SEC. 310. DESIGNATION OF DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN PLACE
Section 310 is nearly identical to Section 309 of the
Senate amendment. The House had no similar provision. The
House recedes, with technical amendments. The managers agreed
to technical modifications pertaining to the exact
description and location of the parcel of land in Washington,
D.C., to be designated in honor of the retiring senior
Senator from the State of New York.
SEC. 311. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT
Neither the House bill nor the Senate amendment contained
similar provisions.
Section 311 establishes the ``National Security Agency
Voluntary Separation Act.'' This provision grants to the
Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) the authority
to establish a program for early retirement and voluntary
separation pay for NSA employees. The provision allows the
Director to either offer early retirement for employees who
are at least 50 years of age and have 20 years of service, or
who have at least 25 years of service, regardless of age. The
Director is also permitted to offer $25,000 in separation pay
to eligible applicants. The Director is empowered to deny an
employee's application for benefit under this section.
The NSA is in a unique period of transition, the success of
which will affect the overall capabilities of the
Intelligence Community for the next several decades. The
Director of Central Intelligence has claimed that the
modernization of NSA is his number one priority. There are
several aspects to the NSA modernization effort that range
from overhauling technical collection, to restructuring
acquisition, to new personnel programs, including major
outsourcing initiatives. The Director needs the flexibility
to institute whatever personnel changes he deems necessary if
NSA modernization is to be successful. This provision will
give him that needed flexibility. This section is modeled
after the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public Law 103-
36).
The managers understand that such authority could be seen
as setting a precedent, and that other agencies may wish to
have such authorities as well. In the managers' view, the
situation at NSA is unique, not only in the enormity of the
task of modernization, but also in the direct impact on
national security should NSA modernization fail. Therefore,
the managers believe that this is a necessary step to take
for the specific circumstance confronting the NSA.
Subtitle B--Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTS-
PO)
SEC. 321. REORGANIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
PROGRAM OFFICE
Section 321 reorganizes the Diplomatic Telecommunications
Service Program Office (DTS-PO). The managers agree that the
current DTS-PO management and Diplomatic Telecommunication
Service (DTS) operations structure is fundamentally flawed
and believe that a new construct for managing the DTS is
necessary. They further agree that retaining the current DTS-
PO organization, but with a new management approach, is the
best means for improving DTS support to all U.S. government
users. Funding has been authorized in this legislation for
the purposes of overhauling the DTS-PO management and
correcting communications and security deficiencies within
the DTS.
The current organizational structure requires that both the
DTS-PO Director and Deputy Director concur on technical,
funding, and operational issues before actions can be taken.
This management-by-consensus approach abrogates the authority
of the Director to make final decisions. It is clear to the
managers that this management approach is not working, and
that the parent organizations inherently lack the ability,
and the will, to work together to resolve their mutual DTS
issues of concern. Further, it is clear to the managers that
the Office of Management and Budget has been frustrated in
its obligations to ensure that executive branch organizations
work together. Of significant concern is that, as currently
operated, DTS-PO has exhibited substantial interruptions in
service and presents serious security concerns for the
protection of sensitive government communications. Because of
these concerns, the managers, and the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the other committees of jurisdiction,
believe that a new management structure for DTS-PO is
required and decidedly overdue. Similarly, they are of the
view that a transition to a more modern and effective
telecommunications system, based on commercial best-business
practices, is warranted.
SEC. 322. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND OTHER DTS-PO PERSONNEL
Section 322 establishes the position of Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) and a DTS board of directors. The CEO is to be
ultimately responsible for the management of the DTS-PO and
operation of the DTS. The managers direct the OMB to recruit
and hire a communications professional from outside the DTS-
PO and the U.S. government for appointment as the CEO. This
appointment is to be made no later than May 1, 2001. The CEO
is granted the authorities necessary for managing, ensuring
funding for, and operating the DTS, the DTS-PO, and their
personnel. It is the managers' intent that the CEO will be
the final decision authority for implementing necessary
changes to the DTS, and for managing all communications,
technology, and security upgrades to satisfy DTS United
States user requirements. The managers further direct the CEO
to certify that the operational and security requirements and
practices of DTS conform to the highest security requirements
and practices required
[[Page H9722]]
by any U.S. government agency utilizing the DTS.
Consistent with Section 305 of the ``Admiral James W. Nance
and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 2000 and 2001'' (section 305 of appendix G of Public
Law 106-113), the CEO shall: (1) ensure that those
enhancements of, and the provision of service for,
telecommunications capabilities that involve the national
security interests of the United States receive the highest
prioritization; (2) confirm the termination of all leases for
satellite systems located at posts in criteria countries,
unless all maintenance and servicing of the satellite system
is undertaken by United States citizens who have received
appropriate security clearances; and (3) implement a system
of charges for utilization of bandwidth by all participating
agencies, and institute a comprehensive charge-back system to
recover all, or substantially all, of the other costs of
telecommunications services provided through the DTS to each
agency.
Beginning August 1, 2001, and every six months thereafter,
the CEO shall submit a report to the oversight committees
regarding the activities of DTS-PO during the preceding six
months, the current capabilities of DTS-PO, and the
priorities of DTS-PO for the subsequent six month period. The
semi-annual report shall include a discussion of any
administrative, budgetary, legislative, or management issues
that hinder the ability of DTS-PO to fulfill its mandate.
Upon the appointment of a CEO on May 1, 2001, the current
positions of Director and Deputy Director of DTS-PO shall be
eliminated. To assist the CEO, and to perform such duties as
the CEO may require, there shall be two Deputy Executive
Officers. The DTS-PO management staff will consist of not
more than four other employees. The Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) shall prescribe the rates of
basic pay for the CEO, the two Deputy Executive Officers, and
any other DTS-PO employees.
SEC. 323. DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE OVERSIGHT BOARD
Section 323 establishes a Diplomatic Telecommunications
Service Oversight Board (``the Board''). The Board shall
perform an oversight function with respect to DTS, DTS-PO,
and the CEO. Specifically, the Board shall be empowered to
review and approve: overall strategies, policies and goals
established by DTS-PO; financial plans, budgets and periodic
financing requests developed by DTS-PO; overall performance
relative to approved budget plans; any DTS-PO reports,
documents, and records; and audits of DTS-PO. The CEO will be
responsible to this three-member board, which will be chaired
by the Deputy Director of OMB. The two other board members
shall be appointed by the President, as indicated in the
classified annex to this bill. Decisions and directives of
the Board shall require a majority vote of the Board.
Although the Board will exercise oversight of, and provide
management direction to, the CEO, the managers have
authorized the CEO to control the day-to-day management and
operations of DTS-PO and the DTS.
SEC. 324. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 324 requires that the Director of the OMB submit a
report to the oversight committees not later than March 1,
2001. This report shall provide details on steps taken by the
executive branch to restructure DTS-PO's management, to
enhance the security practices of agencies participating in
the DTS, and to develop a spending plan for the additional
funds provided for the operation and improvement of DTS for
fiscal year 2001.
The managers have determined that the most flexible
procurement authority available to DTS-PO users shall be
available to the DTS-PO. The notification requirements of
sections 502, 504, and 505 of the National Security Act of
1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 413a, 414, and 415, respectively)
shall apply to DTS-PO, the CEO, and the Board.
It is the intent of Congress that the CEO shall have total
and immediate insight into the complete operations of current
and future DTS-PO and DTS operations. The managers expect the
Secretary of State and the head of the other agency users to
ensure this access. Likewise, Congress intends that the CEO
can request the assistance of the Inspectors General of any
agency user of the DTS and DTS-PO. The CEO should receive all
reports from the IGs that relate to security of applicable
overseas facilities and the DTS.
It is the intent of Congress that the Secretary of State,
and the head of any other agency user of DTS, shall support
the decisions and recommendations of the CEO in keeping with
the current operation and transition of the DTS system. The
CEO is expected to report any difficulties or obstacles
presented by the agency users of the DTS in the
implementation of these provisions.
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 401. MODIFICATIONS TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S CENTRAL
SERVICE PROGRAM
Section 401 is similar to Section 401 of the House bill and
Section 403 of the Senate Amendment. The Senate recedes, with
a technical modification.
There is concern among the managers relating to the costs
levied by the Central Services Program upon the Langley
Children's Center. These costs, for various and miscellaneous
items or services provided by the Central Services Program to
the non-profit Center, seem overly burdensome. The Center is
of great utility to the dedicated and hard-working parents
employed by the CIA. It is the expectation of the managers
that the Central Services Program, in an effort to recoup
costs, would not impose costs that would have an adverse
impact on the continuity of the services provided by the
Langley Children's Center.
SEC. 402. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS
The House bill and the Senate amendment contained similar
provisions. The Senate recedes to the House, with technical
modifications.
SEC. 403. EXPANSION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIONS REQUIRING A REPORT TO
CONGRESS
Section 403 is similar to Section 401 of the Senate
amendment. The House had no similar provision. The House
recedes, with technical modifications.
The conferees intend that this additional reporting
requirement identified in the new Section 17(d)(3)(B) will
arise when an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out
by the Inspector General focuses upon the official identified
in (i) or (ii), specifically, as opposed to an investigation,
inspection, or audit of the office that the official heads,
with only incidental references to the official.
SEC. 404. DETAIL OF EMPLOYEES TO THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Section 404 is identical to Section 404 of the Senate
amendment. The House had no similar provision. The House
recedes. The managers request that the DCI supply the
intelligence committees with a report to be submitted
annually, beginning October 1, 2001, that includes the number
of detailees assigned pursuant to this provision and a
description of the positions filled by the detailees.
SEC. 405. TRANSFERS OF FUNDS TO OTHER AGENCIES FOR ACQUISITION OF LAND
Section 405 is similar to Section 405 of the Senate
amendment. The House had no similar provision. The House
recedes, with a technical amendment.
SEC. 406. ELIGIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
Section 406 is identical to Section 406 of the Senate
amendment. The House had no similar provision. The House
recedes.
Title V--Department of Defense Intelligence Activities
SEC. 501. CONTRACTING AUTHORITY FOR THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Section 501 is similar to Section 502 of the House bill.
The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate
recedes, with a technical amendment.
SEC. 502. ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN EXPERIMENTAL
PERSONNEL PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL
Section 502 is identical to Section 502 of the Senate
amendment. The House had no similar provision. The House
recedes.
SEC. 503. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE
Section 503 is identical to Section 506 of the Senate
amendment. The House had no similar provision. The House
recedes.
Title VI--Counterintelligence Matters
The ``Counterintelligence Reform Act of 2000''
Title VI includes Title VI of the Senate amendment. This
language is similar to S. 2089, introduced on February 24,
2000. The bill was reported by the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence on July 20, 2000 (S. Report No. 106-352). The
Senate Judiciary Committee had previously acted favorably
upon the bill. The House had no similar provision. The House
recedes, with minor modifications.
Title VI, as passed by the Senate on October 2, 2000,
included a limitation on the obligation and expenditure of
funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2001 for
the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) within
the Department of Justice until two reports were submitted to
the appropriate committees. These reports were to describe
the use to which the funds would be put in order to improve
the efficiency of the FBI and the OIPR in the application and
implementation process under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. In anticipation of passage of the Senate
amendment, the Department of Justice submitted a draft
version of the required reports to the congressional
committees. Given the prompt response, the limitation for the
obligation and expenditure of fiscal year 2001 funds is
removed. The managers have left in place, however, the
similar limitation on funds for fiscal years 2002 and 2003,
pending the receipt of the recurring annual report required
by section 606(b)(2).
Title VII--Declassification of Information
``The Public Interest Declassification Act''
Title VII includes Title VIII of the Senate amendment. This
title was based on the bills H.R. 3152 and S. 1801,
introduced in the House and Senate in the 106th Congress,
respectively. The House had no similar provision. The House
recedes, with technical amendments.
Section 701 states that the title may be cited as the
``Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000.'' Section 702
makes findings concerning the importance of public access to
information that does not require continued
[[Page H9723]]
protection to maintain the national security interests of the
United States. Section 703 establishes a nine-person board to
advise the President and other senior executive branch
officials on classification and declassification policies,
particularly on policies concerning the systematic, thorough,
coordinated, and comprehensive review for declassification of
records and materials that are of archival value, including
records and materials of extraordinary public interest. The
Board is also charged with promoting the fullest possible
public access to a thorough, accurate, and reliable
documentary record of significant US national security
decisions and significant US national security activities.
Section 704 sets forth the requirement that heads of
agencies with the authority to classify information must
brief the Board on an annual basis, at the request of the
Board or the intelligence oversight committees, on such
agency's declassification policies and practices. The Board
is to provide the agency with its recommendations on how the
agency's declassification program could be improved. The
Board is also responsible for making recommendations to the
President on initiatives to identify, collect, and review for
declassification classified records and materials of
extraordinary public interest. The section also requires the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget to publish a
description of the President's declassification program and
priorities, together with a listing of funds requested to
implement that program, concurrent with the submission to
Congress of the President's budget each fiscal year.
Sections 705, 706, and 707 set forth the standards
governing access to and protection of national security
information and other information covered under this title.
Section 708 provides an authorization of appropriations for
the Board. Section 709 sets forth definitions of the terms
used in Title VII. The effective date of Title VII is 120
days after the date of enactment of the Act. The provisions
of the title expire four years after the date of enactment of
the Act.
Title VIII--Disclosure of Information on Japanese Imperial Government
The ``Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act
of 2000''
Title VIII is similar to title VII of the Senate amendment,
which was identical to the language of H.R. 3561 and S. 1902.
The House had no similar provision. The House recedes, with
modifications.
The modifications require that the interagency working
group established pursuant to the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure
Act of 1999 (P.L. 105-246) be expanded and assigned the
responsibility of also carrying out the requirements of this
title. The managers decided this was the most cost-effective
approach, rather than establishing a new interagency working
group.
From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for
consideration of the House bill and the Senate amendment, and
modifications committed to conference:
Porter J. Goss,
Jerry Lewis,
Bill McCollum,
Michael N. Castle,
Sherwood L. Boehlert,
C.F. Bass,
Jim Gibbons,
Ray LaHood,
Heather Wilson,
Julian C. Dixon,
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr.,
Norman Sisisky,
Gary A. Condit,
Tim Roemer,
Alcee L. Hastings,
From the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of
defense tactical intelligence and related activities:
Floyd Spence,
Bob Stump,
Ike Skelton,
Managers on the Part of the House.
Richard C. Shelby,
Richard G. Lugar,
Jon Kyl,
James Inhofe,
Orrin G. Hatch,
Pat Roberts,
Connie Mack,
From the Committee on Armed Services:
John Warner,
Richard H. Bryan,
Bob Graham,
John F. Kerry,
Max Baucus,
Chuck Robb,
Frank R. Lautenberg,
Managers on the Part of the Senate.
____________________