14 December 2001. Thanks to DM. Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html ----------------------------------------------------------------------- [Congressional Record: December 13, 2001 (Digest)] [Page D1249-D1253] From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:cr13de01-1] Thursday, December 13, 2001 Daily Digest HIGHLIGHTS Senate agreed to the Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2883, Intelligence Authorization Act. [Excerpt] Intelligence Authorization Act Conference Report: By unanimous consent, Senate agreed to the conference report on H.R. 2883, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence- related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, clearing the measure for the President. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Congressional Record: December 12, 2001 (House)] [Page H9246-H9254] From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:cr12de01-74] CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 2883, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 312 and ask for its immediate consideration. The Clerk read the resolution, as follows: H. Res. 312 Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 2883) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. All points of order against the conference report and against its consideration are waived. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is recognized for 1 hour. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only. Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 312 is a standard rule that allows the House to consider the conference report to accompany H.R. 2883, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. The rule waives all points of order against the consideration of the conference report. The rule is the normal rule we have for conference reports. The intelligence authorization bill is a critical piece of legislation in any average year, but this year, given the recent September 11 tragedies and the war we are waging against terrorism as we speak, it is absolutely essential that we get this bill to the President's desk without any further delay. As Members are aware, the National Security Act requires that Congress authorize each dollar the U.S. spends on intelligence and intelligence-related activities. We are unique in that respect. The war on terrorism means that there has [[Page H9247]] been a fundamental shift in intelligence and defense priorities, as the President has stated, and these authorities must be reflected in law. While we will discuss the conference report in greater detail during the general debate, I would like to highlight a few of the ways that the legislation will tackle both critical counterterrorism challenges as well as the long-term problems facing America's intelligence community. The conference report increases funding for foreign language capability. Obviously this is a critical requirement in the fight against terrorism because it is all over the world and we need the language capability. It certainly is also a basic, core competency for our intelligence community. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has pushed this issue for several years and we are going to continue to push it in the future until we get better results. Another core intelligence capability this conference report bolsters is human intelligence. In addition to providing the necessary resources for this, the conference report includes a version of the House language directing the Director of Central Intelligence to repeal the so-called Deutch 1995 guidelines on the recruitment of human sources. These guidelines may have been issued with the best of intentions, and no doubt were, but in practice, they have had a chilling effect on our ability to gain vital intelligence from sources with access to unsavory characters, particularly such as terrorists. Finally, this conference report includes a House provision requiring an accounting from the Director of Central Intelligence concerning whether and to what extent the intelligence community has implemented the recommendations of the Bremer, the Hart-Rudman and the Gilmore commissions. All of those were reports on terrorism and the vulnerabilities and threats to our security and the security of Americans at home and abroad. As Members are aware, these independent commissions examined the United States' measures for prevention of and preparedness for terrorist attacks. All of the provisions are essentially components to the health of the intelligence community and our country. I urge the House to adopt the rule and embrace the conference report. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my good friend and colleague from Florida for yielding me the time. It is a pleasure for me to serve with Chairman Goss on both the Committee on Rules and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule, providing for the consideration of H.R. 2883, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. H. Res. 252 is a modified open rule requiring that amendments be preprinted in the Congressional Record. However, Mr. Speaker, the preprinting requirement has been the accepted practice for a number of years because of the sensitive nature of much of the bill and the need to protect its classified documents. The bill is not controversial and was reported from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by a unanimous vote. Members who wish to do so, and I urge Members to pay attention to this, can go to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Office to examine the classified schedule of authorizations for the programs and activities of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the national intelligence program, which includes the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence programs within, among others, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the Departments of State, Treasury and Energy and the FBI. {time} 1115 Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities and Joint Military Intelligence Program of the Department of Defense. Members can go to the committee and review those matters. Mr. Speaker, last week the House considered and passed the authorization for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2002. The intelligence bill we consider today is another critical component in our national defense. Today, more than ever, we need to be vigilant about the myriad threats to our national security. Mr. Speaker, while there will be debate on some worthy amendments, this is a noncontroversial bill providing authorizations for important national security programs. I urge my colleagues to support this rule and to support the underlying bill. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution. The previous question was ordered. The resolution was agreed to. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 312 just passed, I call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 2883) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence- related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Pursuant to rule XXII, the conference report is considered having been read. (For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of December 6, 2001, at page H9057). The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) each will control 30 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support today of the conference report before us. Before I begin the main part of my statement, let me first acknowledge and thank the Members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, each and every one of them, but especially our ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for hard work, dedication, showing up and doing the business that needed to be done, and doing it intelligently and with a good deal of thoughtfulness. I also want to specifically thank the committee staff on both sides of the aisle for their untiring efforts that have gotten us to this point. I very much appreciate the way they work in a nonpartisan way. Obviously, I need to thank the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Members and their staffs as well, especially under the steady hand of the chairman, my good friend, Senator Graham, and the vice chairman, my good friend, Senator Shelby. We appreciate the efforts they have put in. Mr. Speaker, by definition a conference is a time when the two bodies come together to settle whatever differences there may be between the bills, often including resolution of differences of opinion and viewpoints on how money is needed, how it should be spent, what laws should be changed, what direction the administration should go, those kinds of things. But in this case, we are talking about protecting our Nation's security at a time when this is very much in the forefront of everybody's attention. Ironically, Mr. Speaker, this conference found very, very few differences of opinion between the two bodies, and, frankly, between the points of view on either side of the aisle, on these and other areas. When it comes to national security, we seem to be pulling together very strongly in the area of intelligence. Let me briefly review some of the areas of agreement. First, intelligence is our first line of defense; and it must be treated as such, especially on our war on terrorism, one of the new transnational threats we are, regrettably, beginning to understand a lot better. Although it may get lost in the continuous CNN optic of the coverage going on in Afghanistan and the Pentagon releases of bombs exploding and troops on the move, none of the activity that is actually happening would be possible without good intelligence. Second, there are four key areas where the administration and Congress must immediately address themselves [[Page H9248]] if we are to properly protect the country's rights and freedoms. They are revitalizing the National Security Agency and the signals intelligence system, upon which we have had such wonderful production and service over the years and now needs upgrading; correcting deficiencies in conducting and collecting human intelligence, a matter which we all understand very well, something we cannot do without; providing a more appropriate balance between intelligence collection and analysis to better achieve a global awareness capability, something we have been talking about for years; and rebuilding a robust research and development program across the intelligence communities. We have been so lucky and so well helped by the innovation and creativity that our country produces and the applications we have been able to use in the intelligence community over the last 50 years, and we need to have more of that in the days ahead. There are other areas of concern besides these four, but these are the most critical for the types of threats that we face now and that we are going to face, we think, over the next few years; and they are certainly the areas that we are in full agreement with the other body on. Thirdly, the intelligence community has got to be better focused on strategic intelligence and better positioned to be able to get access to so-called plans and intentions, that is, what is going on in the minds of the evil-doers, the mischief makers, in order to prevent the crisis. We do not want to be just great at sweeping up after the tragedy; we want to stop the tragedy before it happens. In short, we must have an intelligence community culture that is less risk averse. My last example is that the conferees believe that any effort to invest in and expand intelligence capabilities, and such efforts clearly must be made, will only be marginally successful if it does not also include provision for a more appropriate management structure for the intelligence community. We are talking here basic architecture and the appropriate management overlay to make the system work. Today's intelligence structure is insufficient for today's and tomorrow's challenges. We know it, and we have to get about the job of dealing with that; and I am pleased that the administration is taking up that challenge. We look forward to working with the President and his administration on these issues. They simply cannot wait. Mr. Speaker, this does not mean that there were not differences between the bodies during our conference. There were. I am happy to report that there were few and that they were worked out successfully and the result is a conference report that was approved by a vast bipartisan majority of the conferees. There are a couple of areas where I would have liked things to have turned out differently personally, but that did not happen; and in the spirit of compromise, I am happy to support what I think is a very good conference report which will serve this country well. Again, I commend my colleagues for working in that spirit. Mr. Speaker, on Monday we paused to remember the 3-month anniversary of the horrible and tragic attacks on America by the terrorists, those the President has referred to as the ``evil-doers.'' Also on Monday we laid to rest the first combat casualty of our war on terrorism, Mike Spann. The fact that the first casualty was a CIA officer speaks to the fact that intelligence is in fact in the lead in this war. There is no argument about that. But some have questioned how our Nation got into this position, how these attacks could have occurred in the first place; and frankly, there is no easy answer to that question, as there are many facets. For one thing, terrorists took advantage of the basic rights and freedoms that we so openly and charitably give to our citizens and visitors alike in this country. They abused those privileges. Another point is that communications between the entities and agencies assigned the responsibility for protecting our borders was simply not adequate. We know that. But there is also certainly an intelligence story here. Put simply, we do not have an intelligence community that is properly structured to collect the types of intelligence that would have prevented such attacks had the information been available. In part, this is of our own doing as a country and a Congress. After the Cold War, a decision was made to ``build down'' intelligence. Many thought that we were at peace, perhaps this would be part of the peace dividend. We did not have a single major threat that people really could identify, and we could afford to spend intelligence monies elsewhere. Congress acted. Money was shifted, indeed. Beginning in the 104th Congress, the Intelligence Committees of Congress on both sides, both Houses and both sides of the aisle, recognized the risks of the looming threats of transnational issues and year after year attempted to put more investment into intelligence. However, the administration's efforts were more focused on domestic issues and had little interest in that kind of investment at that time. Consequently, we ended up with a much-reduced intelligence capability, less access around the world, and a risk-averse environment, and, frankly, a growing threat. This is not to say that those brave men and women in the rank and file of the intelligence community were not doing their jobs. They were playing the hand they were dealt, and they were doing very well under the circumstances. This is also not to say that Congress was not aware of the risks. We certainly were, and we talked about them a lot. Recently, I had occasion to review the intelligence bills and conference reports since the 104th Congress. In the 104th Congress, we noted that there was a growing threat and a growing vulnerability to terrorism. We sent that message. We talked about the need to share information better between intelligence and law enforcement. Remember, this is back in the 104th Congress. We talked about the need to invest more robustly in intelligence resources. Then in the 105th Congress we noted that the intelligence community must ``keep a watchful eye on the areas that are likely to be tomorrow's crises.'' I would point out that we mentioned the transnational threats. We also mentioned that our national security was being affected by a broader set of issues that have not been identified with our global interests. We needed to rebuild our intelligence capabilities, and we expressed concern over the growing apathy toward national security and intelligence. Again these issues were raised in the 106th Congress, where we stated that there was a growing possibility that a rogue nation or group would acquire the ability to attack U.S. interests with nuclear, biological, chemical, or some other weapon of mass destruction. Mr. Speaker, I am not pointing these facts out to say ``we told you so.'' Far from it. The point is that we must engage with this administration now, and we must put significant effort into quickly rebuilding our intelligence capabilities. We cannot wait. The events of September 11, sadly, stand as a reminder of what happens when we let our intelligence guard down. Mr. Speaker, this conference report is a good start toward rebuilding what the Nation needs. But it is only a start. It is a snapshot in time. Many of us refer to it as the first year of a 5-year plan. We look forward to working with the administration to secure our national freedom. We look forward to working in a nonpartisan way to do this with the passage of this conference report. I am fully supportive of the report. I encourage its passage. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Our chairman has very well explained how we got to the point we are at today. I want to commend him for the leadership he has provided to the committee, not only at the conference meeting but throughout what has turned out to be a very challenging year. I thank the chairman. The House version of the intelligence authorization bill came to the floor a little over 3 weeks after the terrorist attacks on New York City, Washington, and Pennsylvania. Active and retired intelligence community personnel were killed in the World Trade Center and at the Pentagon. In the weeks since, the United States has begun to strike back at those who [[Page H9249]] were involved in the September attacks, and at those who support them. On Monday, the first combat fatality of the struggle against terrorism in Afghanistan was buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Mike Spann was a CIA officer. We eulogized him yesterday on this floor with the suspension vote in the presence of his family: his wife, Shannon; his parents, and his children. Timely and reliable intelligence, as we know, is crucial to the successful conclusion of this campaign, and it is already clear that intelligence officers will be deeply involved, at home and in the field, in the difficult and dangerous job of ensuring that our policymakers and military commanders have the information on which they will increasingly depend. The emergency supplemental appropriations bill passed in the wake of the September attacks provided a large amount of additional resources for intelligence programs and activities. This conference report provides more; substantially more, than was provided last year, and significantly more than was requested by the President. Our chairman has gone over some of the priorities in the bill, and I want to associate myself with those. That would be human intelligence capabilities that he talked about and TPED, the tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination of intelligence. It is very important for us to put more resources there. Another priority for us in the bill was the investment in advanced research and development projects necessary to keep pace with changes in technology, and, of course, the technology necessary to improve the process of collecting and processing intelligence. Some of these funds that are in this bill will continue improvements as the chairman emphasized, in our human intelligence capabilities, to ensure that case officers receive the kind of training they need, particularly in foreign languages, to enable them to do their jobs effectively. {time} 1130 Some of these funds will make investments in the kinds of systems required if agencies like the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office are to keep pace with rapid technological change. The modernization of NSA remains a top priority of the committee and measurable progress is expected in the coming year. As steadfast as the committee has been in advocating more spending on intelligence, it must now be equally engaged in conducting the kind of oversight necessary to make certain that these additional funds are spent efficiently on programs that will really make a difference, not only in the current effort against terrorism, but on the demands of an uncertain future as well. Although I am satisfied with the disposition made by the conferees on most of the items which separated the two bodies, I was disappointed with the resolution of the provision in the House bill which would have established an independent commission to review the Nation's security posture immediately preceding September 11. Our colleagues in the other body insisted that the two intelligence committees could undertake an inquiry into the readiness of the intelligence community, and other committees of jurisdiction could examine the other elements of the executive branch. The issue was never whether the committees had the resources to do this job, it was whether it made sense for them to do it. I am concerned that an independent review would have had credibility with the American people that a congressional review, no matter how professionally done, will not. The House version of the bill, when it left our committee stated, Mr. Speaker, ``The committee believes that the Commission will only be successful if it is seen to be truly independent of any preconceived notions about the effectiveness of the activities of the departments and agencies it will review. Appointing members with a reputation for challenging conventional wisdom, wide perspective, bold and innovative thought, and broad experience in dealing with complex problems will contribute directly to instilling the Commission with an independence of spirit which will enhance the credibility of its work.'' It goes on further. I want to put these words on the record. This body chose to modify the Commission and change its nature, but when we got to the conference, the Commission was eliminated all together. I want to put on the record the spirit of independence that I hoped the review would have. This is not about fingerpointing or assigning blame; it really is more about understanding whatever government shortcomings may have contributed to the events of September 11. An independent inquiry will one day be commissioned, I am certain, although perhaps without the congressional input that we tried to do in our committee. We need to know if there were gaps and where they were, again, not to assess blame, but to be sure that they are addressed. Our constituents must have confidence that an assessment of future needs is based on solid judgments about past performance. This will be especially important if we are to consider changing the structure of the intelligence community, and that is the challenge our chairman and our committee will have in the next year. Some of these reforms may be called for by President Bush, as is his right. On another important issue the conference report more faithfully reflects the position of the House, and that was a compromise that the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) took the lead in shaping and I was pleased to support. It was necessary because in 1995, in response to concerns that there was insufficient CIA headquarters involvement in decisions to recruit as assets individuals with poor records of respecting human rights or the law, guidelines were issued to ensure that senior officials were aware of and approved, certain recruitments. The intent of these guidelines was to protect relatively junior officers in the field from later charges that they acted unilaterally, and unwisely, in entering into relationships with certain individuals. Despite repeated assurances to the committee from high-level intelligence officials of two administrations that the guidelines had not prevented the recruitment of a single, identifiable, worthwhile asset, concerns were raised that the bureaucratic process through which the guidelines were administered was so time consuming that it provided a disincentive to case officers. This controversy has obscured the fact that encouraging a potential asset on a hard target, like a terrorist cell, to betray his or her country or cause is tremendously time consuming, difficult and dangerous. That we have had uneven success against these targets is more a reflection of those facts than it is the fault, in my view, of any guidelines. Nevertheless, to make clear that Congress wants the recruitment process to be as aggressive as possible given the totality of the circumstances involved, the House approved a provision in the committee's bill which would have required a rescission of the existing guidelines and their replacement with new guidelines which achieve balance that ``recognized concerns about egregious human rights behavior, but provides the much needed flexibility to seize upon opportunities as they present themselves.'' The House made clear that in striking this balance, ``clearly there is a certain class of individuals who, because of their unreliability, instability, or nature of past misconduct, should be avoided.'' Again, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) led the way on this compromise that was in the House bill. Although the DCI chose to rescind and reissue the guidelines before the legislative process was complete, the heart of the language which I was pleased to work with the gentleman from Nebraska on was retained in conference. The conferees want the current, more streamlined guidelines reviewed again to make certain that they provide appropriate encouragement to case officers to do their jobs well. As the statement of managers makes clear, however, whatever the results of that review, any guidelines issued ``must balance concerns about human rights behavior and law-breaking'' with the efforts to provide flexibility to take advantage of opportunities to gather information. That balance is the proper interpretation of the phrase ``more appropriately weigh and incentivize risk'' which appears in [[Page H9250]] clause (2) of section 403 of the conference report. Mr. Speaker, our President, when he came to the House on September 14, three days after the tragedy, said that we will bring the perpetrators of that tragedy to justice, or we will bring justice to them, but justice will be done. We want to be sure that our intelligence capabilities help the President reach that goal, a goal that we all share. Hopefully, this bill will take us closer to that. I believe the conference agreement will contribute significantly to meeting the intelligence needs of the Nation, and I urge its adoption. I again associate myself with many of the remarks made by my chairman, particularly those about sharing of information by the FBI. Once again, I want to extend the sympathies of my constituents and I know all of our colleagues, to the family of Mike Spann and the Special Forces soldiers, the Green Berets who lost their lives. If I may, I would like to put their names in the Record also: Master Sergeant Jefferson Davis; Staff Sergeant Brian Cody Prosser; and Sergeant First Class Daniel Petithory. God bless them. God bless America. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the vice chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy and National Security. (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, this Member congratulates and commends the exemplary bipartisan effort of the chairman, the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), and his counterpart in the other body, the distinguished senior Senator from Florida, Senator Graham. I also want to extend my congratulations and appreciation to the distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for continuing to give us the leadership for a bipartisan conference report. I rise, of course, in strong support of the conference report. Under the leadership of the people I have just mentioned, the legislative branch continues to move rapidly to address a number of long-standing deficiencies in our intelligence collection and analysis programs. The chairman's comments about the high quality work and dedication of the committee's first-rate staff are exactly on the mark, and I express my personal appreciation for their expertise, dedication, and hard work throughout the year. Mr. Speaker, it is important to note that the Select Permanent Committee on Intelligence has not suddenly awakened to the very real funding deficiencies and program matter inadequacies of the intelligence agencies. For years, the intelligence committee has worked to reorient and enhance the effectiveness of the intelligence community and, of course, that has not received much public attention. But now, more than ever before, the American people understand through tragedy that our intelligence and counterterrorism programs are extremely important. As the distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has frequently noted, ``The message is not new; the audience for the message is now new.'' I want to express my appreciation for the fact that he has gone back a few minutes ago to previous Congresses, back at least to the 104th Congress, to give some indication that the committee for some period of time has recognized and tried to address these transnational problems that are relatively new in the national focus. Responsibly addressing the Nation's intelligence requirements now clearly has become a recognized national priority across the country in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack. One result is a natural tendency to seek a simple solution, a quick fix. Certainly the conference report provides much-needed additional funds to improve our intelligence capabilities and to wage the war against terrorism, but at a more fundamental level, H.R. 2883 continues to aim even more aggressively to respond to serious underlying policy inadequacies and structural problems. I know all members of the committee would agree our work is not done, that we are looking forward to taking on this task during the next year. In some cases, these are problems that have been years in the making and will take a number of years to reverse. For example, the conference report continues support for additional capacity in human intelligence collection. Human intelligence, or HUMINT, is the placement of highly- trained, language-capable officers in positions where they can acquire information vital to our national interests. Our HUMINT capacity was substantially downgraded in the years following the end of the Cold War. Also, our human intelligence collection efforts was understandably directed during the Cold War period at collection of the Soviet Union and its client states. Not in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, and especially not in the problems of transnational terrorism and narcotics trafficking. The conference report continues this body's efforts at addressing these deficiencies and the new priorities. Addressing another reason for the HUMINT inadequacies, this Member is particularly gratified that the conferees agreed to reverse the 1995 limitations on asset recruitment, and I especially appreciate the cooperation and assistance of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) for the committee in working with me, and the chairman. These restrictions, called ``the Deutsch guidelines,'' were promulgated as a means to limit our association with unsavory individuals, with human rights or other criminal problems. While the concerns underlying these guidelines were understandable, resulting from revelations about the problems of the 1970s and early 1980s, the reality is that the Deutsch guidelines have had a chilling effect on the recruitment of people who can actually and efficiently penetrate the inner circles of terrorist networks and narcotics rings. The recruitment of assets with unique knowledge or access to these terrorists and drug cartels is the key to successful HUMINT against these targets. The regrettable, real-world reality is that especially in the crucial battle against terrorism, we must allow our foreign officers to recruit assets that sometimes are rather unsavory characters. To win the war on terrorism, we have to end the cycle of risk aversion by our intelligence operatives and their superiors in headquarters. Recruiting Boy Scouts will not give us the penetration and intelligence we need. In many cases, there will be difficult decisions to make, but the U.S. has professionals in the intelligence and law enforcement fields who can and must make those decisions. This conference report makes clear that our foreign intelligence personnel must recruit as agents those who possess the detailed and timely information which the United States needs to defend its people and its interests. Admittedly, there are risks with such recruited agents, but if the risks are realistically weighed against the benefits, the enhanced chances of operational success, this body must not rashly second-guess those decisions or fail to replace the Deutsch guidelines where they are detrimental to effective intelligence-gathering. Mr. Speaker, this Member urges adoption of the conference report on the intelligence authorization for fiscal year 2002. Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), who is the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time. As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, I rise in support of this conference report. It is a good work product. I want to thank and to congratulate the chairman and the ranking member, and especially our staff, who worked so hard and who did an extraordinary job to make sure that this package will serve to improve our country's ability to provide the best real-time information possible to our war-fighters and our policymakers, so as to protect Americans wherever they may be situated in the world. [[Page H9251]] The intelligence systems and activities that are funded by this conference report are a prominent and indispensable element of the war on terrorism. In the short time between September 11 and the time when the committee marked up the authorization bill, this committee worked extremely hard in a completely nonpartisan manner to develop proposals to correct shortfalls and to establish a basis for continued reform and innovation. {time} 1145 Most of these proposals are reflected in this conference report. The human element in this war on terrorism is fundamental, and it is an appropriate focus of our attention. But American technological prowess will greatly determine how effective our soldiers and intelligence officers will be, how many casualties our forces suffer, and how many innocent lives will be lost or protected. The precision of our air campaign in Afghanistan is wondrous, and we must always remember that it depends as much on precise intelligence as on the guidance system of the missiles or the bombs. Developing these technical intelligence capabilities is expensive, and it is often difficult. Sometimes we make mistakes; but usually we, the government, and American industry get it right in the end. I am gratified to be part of this process. Mr. Speaker, this bill is a good start on correcting the problems in the intelligence community, but there is clearly much more that must be done. I speak, I believe, for all of my colleagues on the committee in again commending the chairman and our ranking member for their dedication, and also the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), my own counterpart, in assuring that our intelligence organizations can protect Americans against the new menace. Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of this report. Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), a distinguished member of our committee and the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding time to me, and I join in saluting American heroes who have given their lives in the fight against terrorism in the aftermath of September 11. Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for their leadership in bringing this conference report to the House. I also commend the hard work of our committee colleagues and staff, whose bipartisan approach attempts to ensure that this Nation has the best intelligence capabilities. I love serving on this committee and as ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. It is a high honor, and it honors the constituents of California's 36th Congressional District, who design and build most of our Nation's intelligence satellites. Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, President Bush spoke to 1,900 cadets at the Citadel and laid out three priorities for national defense: first, speeding the transformation of the military to face 21st century threats; second, protecting against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and third, strengthening our intelligence capability. All these goals are important, and I strongly support them. This bill goes a long way toward accomplishing the third: this bill provides increased funding for human, technical, and tactical counterterrorist activities; it rescinds the CIA guidelines that may have restricted recruitment of some people with critical information on terrorist groups; and it requires the issuance of new guidelines to rebalance the recruitment process. Also, it requires the administration to explain why it has not implemented the recommendations of three national commissions that studied terrorism and homeland security. I served on one of those commissions, the congressionally mandated Commission on Terrorism. All three produced good ideas that are still good today. Our committee has served notice that it will do even more to push restructuring of the intelligence community next year; but meanwhile, this restructuring cannot happen in a vacuum. I believe the lesson learned from 9-11 is that good people had poor tools, and that our homeland security effort needs a leader with adequate power to conduct a unified threat assessment, develop a national plan, and compel agencies at all levels to share information and coordinate seamlessly to prevent or respond to acts of terrorism. Governor Tom Ridge has this top job. Ridge is charged with coordinating all Federal efforts related to homeland security with those of State and local governments. The President's executive order also makes Ridge the chief communicator of homeland security policy. Two months have passed since Tom Ridge started as director of the Office of Homeland Security; but in my view, he is losing power every day. He is a capable man with the skills and resume needed; but without the authority to influence Federal budgets, Ridge cannot enforce the changes that this committee has required and that this country needs. A bipartisan bill, H.R. 3026, would give him that authority. Finally, Mr. Speaker, as I stated in a letter to the President on Monday, I continue to be concerned that the release of the new bin Laden videotape could prove damaging to American security. Those who do not believe bin Laden is guilty will not be persuaded by this tape. To me, the benefit of showing the tape is outweighed by the risks that secret messages, signals, or facial expressions of bin Laden or in the background are embedded in the tape. I would have preferred that its distribution be limited to those with a need to know, possibly including foreign leaders. But Mr. Speaker, returning to this conference report, it gives the right tools to good people in our intelligence community. I thank them for working 24-7 before and after September 11 to protect this country from terrorist attacks. Mr. Speaker, I urge strong bipartisan support for this bill. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), who is also the chairman of our Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence. Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the conference report to accompany H.R. 2883, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Before I get to my statement, I wish to acknowledge the superb leadership, and I mean this very sincerely, of our chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), and our ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), and the Senate Intelligence Committee's chairman, Senator Graham, and the vice chairman, Senator Shelby. Their support and guidance brought the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence through a very difficult year, culminating in this fine piece of legislation. I think it is fitting to thank them for all of their efforts in support of our Nation. Mr. Speaker, today we are voting on a bill that authorizes spending for the Nation's intelligence organizations, operations, and the brave men and women, such as our fallen CIA officer Mike Spann, who are stationed all around the globe collecting and analyzing information to provide our true first line of defense. Tragically, the events of September 11 have made crystal clear what many of us in the Congress have been saying for sometime, that we need to significantly improve our intelligence-gathering, analysis, and dissemination capabilities. I do not for one moment blame the attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania on an intelligence failure. Indeed, that blame can only be assigned to radical fanatics who would see America fall. But I do assign some blame on our collective lack of attention for maintaining a robust, properly resourced, and forward-leaning intelligence community that is not unduly restricted from collecting information on foreign threats to our country. The authorization levels in this bill were determined by the conference committee as appropriate for beginning to rebuild our Nation's intelligence defenses. In the wake of 9-11, our intelligence organizations and [[Page H9252]] their professionals have been asked to do more than ever before, to provide more detailed information on an elusive but omnipresent enemy that directly threatens our country and our citizens. Indeed, President Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Director of Homeland Security Governor Ridge have all made statements about the increased need for and reliance upon our intelligence service in the wake of terrorist attacks. There is no question in my mind that intelligence is now, more than ever, a critical function of national security worthy of this body's full funding support. It is in that spirit, Mr. Speaker, that I urge my House colleagues to support this conference report. We elected Members of Congress have no greater duty to the people of the United States of America than to protect their safety, their freedoms, and their way of life. To do that in a world populated with any number of terrorists who have no remorse for loss of American lives and property we must go on the offensive. We must discover and take action against the people who would do us harm. That requires knowledge. Before the FBI can arrest a single al Qaeda member, the Bureau must know who and where that person is. Before a B- 52 bomber can effectively drop a single bomb, its crew must be given the information on what target to attack. Before we can better defend against an intended terrorist attack, we need forewarning of the attack location and timing. All of these require intelligence, intelligence for national defense. There is no higher priority. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure. Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Condit), the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy and National Security. (Mr. Condit asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the conference committee today. This is a very powerful tool in arming our intelligence agency in a campaign against terrorism. Though I am disappointed the conference report does not include an outside commission to assess our national security readiness since September 11, it is still a very good conference report. It does increase human intelligence, and it improves foreign language skills and translation capabilities. We face an extraordinary challenge now to collect information and preserve our national security, and we must focus now on the security of our homeland. We cannot sit back and think about the future in the out years; we must address security needs now. This conference report does just that. Yesterday, we passed a resolution honoring Johnny Spann, the first American to die in combat in Afghanistan. We pledged to continue to support our men and women, to ensure the safety to all of our citizens. This conference report makes good on that pledge. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend and congratulate the chairman of the committee, as well as the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for this product, because I think it is a product that helps build a better and safer Nation. I congratulate them and thank them for their leadership. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), the chairman of our Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence, our subcommittee on hacking. I will let him explain what that stands for. Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. I thank the chairman of the full committee and the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for bringing before this House what I feel is probably one of the best intelligence authorization conference report bills we have had in a long time. As a result, I do stand here in strong support of the conference report. Mr. Speaker, since September 11, all Americans have witnessed, I believe, our intelligence community working at its best. America, unfortunately, did witness its first loss, our first combat loss of an American hero in our war on terrorism, CIA agent Johnny Mike Spann. Now we must provide the resources needed to combat terrorism at the most basic level for intelligence. This, Mr. Speaker, is a good bill. It provides significant resources to the intelligence community which, during the last decade, went underfunded, understaffed, and underappreciated. The 1990s were a risk-averse period during which the bullies of the world began to get the idea that the United States had gone soft and no longer had the will to defend American lives and American interests. The intelligence community often was not performing aggressively enough, though this was by no means the fault of the dedicated men and women who constitute the intelligence agencies' rank and file. They are now doing a terrific job, a wonderful job of catch-up, and they deserve the best support that we can give them. Regarding today's needs, we are providing logistical and technical resources for a worldwide campaign to root out terrorism. Our intelligence officers are working on the ground in Afghanistan, as the American public is now very much aware, sadly aware, with the news of our fallen CIA hero. What the American public will probably never know is that American intelligence officers are working around the clock worldwide to neutralize terrorist cells and otherwise diminish the possibility of future attacks on innocent American citizens. As for the needs and future needs, this bill provides resources for greater foreign language expertise, increased specialized training, increased analytical expertise, to include measures to restore the intelligence community's ability to provide worldwide analytical coverage. This administration and this Congress are acutely aware of the need for a strong intelligence capability. We on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have done our utmost to give the intelligence agencies what they need to do their job. Mr. Speaker, I want to ask all my colleagues to support this bill, and I urge an ``aye'' vote. {time} 1200 Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the very distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. (Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I join in the accolades and the compliments to our chairman and to our ranking member, who have brought the committee together in a bipartisan way. When we do have differences in the committee, they are settled in an inclusive way and in an intelligent manner that I think benefits the bipartisan nature of the final product. They both do this institution well by their working together. I also want to thank the staff. The staff has been through an exceedingly difficult year, working in an environment in the United States Capitol that has often been target or a suspected target, has been evacuated a number of times. It is a very difficult environment; and they do an excellent job creating an excellent product, and we are grateful for their hard work. The intelligence budget and the reforms that are needed are now confronted with three different challenges. Certainly, we have the September 11 challenge, the attack on our country. We have the challenge of changing the culture in the intelligence community over the last 10 years from one that is targeted in an old-fashioned way, guards, guns and gates, to now trying to go after transnational targets, tents, technology, terrorism; and that is a slow and sometimes difficult push into the future. We also have the difficult challenge of latching up the intelligence with the military capability as we are doing now in Afghanistan. Our intelligence personnel, our intelligence equipment become more and more important in the future. How do we address that in this bill? We could do it with a quick fix, we could do it with bold reform, or we could construct the platform for [[Page H9253]] change into the future. We have mostly settled on the latter, platform for change, constructive change; and I think that has been a good, healthy approach. I do, however, wish that we would have taken steps for bold change in two or three areas, like, as our ranking member mentioned, an independent commission to look at what happened on September 11. We have the same people always looking at the same problems, and we do not have enough new eyes on old problems, giving us new solutions. We need to work more on the information and collaboration in our intelligence community, and we need to look at the cultural changes. Moving to transnational targets, rather that than being comfortable going at just other countries' intelligence capability, we need to look at going after biological and chemical weapons and nuclear weapon capabilities of terrorist groups. We have accomplished a lot, Mr. Speaker. We not only have more money for language and fluency capabilities; we have specifically said that there is congressional interest in this area and the intelligence communities cannot move this money away from language and fluency requirements. We have improved human intelligence in this bill; and as I said before, we are improving the latching up of the military and the intelligence capabilities. Finally, our hearts and our prayers go out to Johnny Mike Spann and to Shannon Spann for the sacrifices that they and their family have made and the three children who Shannon now raises with the help of that family. Support this bipartisan conference report, and we look forward to bolder changes next year. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), who is the chairman of our effort on counter terrorist efforts. Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for yielding me the time, and I particularly thank him for his strong leadership, along with the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) for bringing this bill to the floor in such great fashion and to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member of my committee, for all who have worked in a very bipartisan way to ensure that we are improving our intelligence community. And to the staff, they have been under such great pressure. The staff on both sides of the aisle have worked close together to ensure that we are going to win this battle against terrorism. Mr. Speaker, I do rise in support of the conference report for H.R. 2883. Yesterday, America paused to remember the terrorist acts that shook our Nation and the many acts of heroism and courage that followed. In the intervening 3 months, America has been fighting back and we are winning. As the President has said on numerous occasions, this is a war that will extend far beyond the conventional battlefield in Afghanistan; and it is a war that will take years, not days, weeks or months. It is a war that will be fought on American soil and on the soil of our friends and enemies alike. It will be fought in the electronic air waves and the bazaars of the Mideast and north Africa, on the streets of London, Paris, Rome and Bangkok, right across the globe. Conventional weapons will not be enough to safeguard our public from the long-term threat from terrorism. Smart bombs and Special Forces can only be used against targets that have first been identified as posing a threat. Intelligence is the weapon most capable of identifying terrorists, their plans and intentions, operating methods, whereabouts and targets of terrorist attack. When 9-11 happened, the world changed but the threat from the terrorists stayed the same. What changed most of all was the recognition that intelligence is critical to our Nation's defense against terror. In fact, a whole new constituency for intelligence has arisen from the ashes of 9-11, and this constituency was far too long in coming. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, I am here to tell the American people that the Intelligence Authorization Act lays the groundwork for fixing many of the problems that have plagued our intelligence professionals. We have sought to address systemic problems within the intelligence community and to begin to correct some of the funding deficiencies of years past that have crippled our ability to achieve true global coverage in intelligence collection and analysis. This conference report provides the resources and direction necessary to overhaul the intelligence community language training programs and to begin to build a workforce that can operate effectively in the languages and environments used by terrorists. In addition, the report addresses in a more decisive fashion than ever before the chronic shortfall in language exploitation capabilities across the community. The 9-11 attacks also highlighted shortcomings in the way in which information is shared and analyzed. This conference report provides significant new funding to establish additional joint terrorism task forces across the country, and it enables accelerated construction of analytic capability in the law enforcement, military and intelligence spheres that will aid in untangling the complex of webs of terrorist financing, support, movement, training, and operations, both through enhanced resources and cooperation. This analytic capability, as a result of the report under consideration, will be applied more rigorously and in a more focused manner to raw threat reporting on terrorism matters. Such analysis, coupled with direction that the intelligence community establish a reasonable threshold for disseminating raw threat reporting, should vastly improve our ability to make sense of the many scraps of intelligence, real and fabricated, that are collected on a daily basis on terrorist threat activities. Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of this conference report and ask that it proceed. Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I believe that we have completed our roster of Members who wish to speak on the Democratic side, and I would like to just say in a few closing remarks how appreciative we are to our distinguished chairman for the bipartisan nature of our proceedings, to extend to my Republican colleagues, again, thanks for their cooperation. I want to acknowledge the good work of the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the gentleman from California (Mr. Condit), the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), the Democratic members of the committee for their attention to the important work of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is like signing up when you join the committee. It is very demanding and Members on both sides have made a strong commitment of time, enthusiasm, and dedication to these important issues so that we can have the force protection that is one of the main goals of intelligence and that we can have mission success on whatever we set out to do. We talked about human intelligence at the beginning. The chairman mentioned it as a priority in his remarks and I did in mine. We want to commend all of the people who work in the intelligence community, in the human intelligence side, and otherwise, for their courage and their dedication. I also want to note the commitment that our committee has to bringing diversity to our human intelligence. There are people in our country who understand the language, the cultures, the opportunities in other countries and in other cultures that would serve us well in achieving our mission success and we must draw upon them. Our HUMINT has to look different as we go into the future. So we recognize and express gratitude to all of them, particularly Mike Spann and the others who lost their lives. We also recognize those who risk their lives every day for freedom in America and to root out terrorism wherever it exists. I want to commend especially, though, the staff of Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence led by Tim Sample on the Republican side. We do [[Page H9254]] not really call it the Republican side. We really have a bipartisan approach to this. But he is the chief of staff for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I want to acknowledge the Democratic side staff: Mike Sheehy, Wyndee Parker, Beth Larson, Carolyn Bartholomew, Chris Healey for her good work on our issues, Kirk McConnell, Bob Emmett, and Ilene Romack, who work so hard for us. I want to commend our chairman for his leadership. It was interesting to work with the Senate on this bill. So I commend the chairman, the new Democratic chairman, Senator Graham, and Senator Shelby for their cooperation as well. With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge our colleagues to support the bill. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers and I just wanted to finish this with some thoughts about how grateful I am and how privileged I am, indeed honored, to serve with such wonderful members. That is a select committee. And I mean it. We have heard today from the chairman and the ranking members of the four subcommittee we now have because we have so much business on the committee. But the others who did not speak, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood), the gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Burr), the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings), have all contributed mightily to this. It is obviously a wonderful select committee to have and be able to work with and we are backed up with the kind of staff that we have as the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) has said, with Mike Sheehy and Tim Sample and Chris Barton, our top staff keeping us on the track. I think we are able to do our job well. And, of course, a big part of that is the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), who has been outstanding with her time, her energy, her attention and her leadership when she has one or two other things to do, I understand, in her portfolio of responsibilities as well. It is a very good situation for us. I think the people of the United States of America sometimes wonder what the job of Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is and need to be reassured that today we are talking about advocacy for sure. That is part of our job. We need to make sure that our folks out there have the tools they need to do the job, to do national security. But the other side of our job is oversight. We do it very diligently and dutifully. And that is to make sure that all of these awesome capabilities are used in a way that is entirely lawful and within keeping of character of the goals and wishes and the standards of the people of the United States of America. We do not have a 1-800 number to flash across the bottom of the screen to say if you have a problem. But we are there as your oversight committee, and if there are problems, we are responsible for dealing with them. And I think we take that seriously, very seriously indeed. Having said all of that, I think that we have with all of this wonderful good will, and responding to the tasks before us, come up with a good piece of legislation which is urgently needed. I see my friend, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), sitting over there. A lot of us have taken credit and heaped praise back and forth on the work that has been done. A lot of the success we are enjoying today that you are seeing on CNN is coming from the hard work of the people who went before us on the oversight committees. And I take my hat off to those people because they too understood the need. I am very sorry this year my friend Julian Dixon is not with us to be able to see some of the results of some of his hard work, and I know I am joined on that from my colleagues on the other side. Fortunately, there are always people to come along to fill shoes, and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) has done that so well. Having said that, I urge adoption of this particular conference report. Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this conference report and commend the conferees and the professional staff for their hard work. Specifically, I wanted to express my appreciation for the inclusion of the language I offered as an amendment that requires that the Central Intelligence Agency assume 100 percent of the cost of personal liability insurance for certain CIA employees involved in counter- terrorism activities. Mr. Speaker, for 10 years I served with the Central Intelligence Agency. I spent five years overseas engaged in intelligence collection, counter-intelligence and, in some cases, counter-terrorism. The work was difficult and dangerous. This fact has been reaffirmed by the terrible death of CIA operations officer, Johnny Micheal Spann, who was the first American to die in combat in Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism last week. But at no time did I doubt that my government would protect me from any personal liability if I encountered a lawsuit as a consequence of my professional duties. Today, I understand that CIA officers engaged in counter-terrorism activities are virtually required to have personal liability insurance; but the CIA pays only half of the premium. What incentive does a CIA Case Officer have to do the job if he or she is subject to liability lawsuits? Why would they take any risks if the government were unwilling to cover the cost of liability? I understand that I served in a different time. But I did have the backing of my government--100 percent. It is time to give this assurance back to our Case Officers, many of whom are on the front lines of the war on terrorism. This is not an original idea. In fact, it was a recommendation of the Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, titled ``Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism'' submitted to Congress in June of 2000. The report states, ``The risk of personal liability arising from actions taken in an official capacity discourages law enforcement and intelligence personnel from taking bold actions to combat terrorism.'' Following the tragic events of September 11th, it is apparent that we must do better in our counter-terrorism effort. The least that we can do is guarantee that any CIA officer participating in the war on terrorism will have the full backing of the federal government. They deserve no less. Passage of this conference report will provide this full backing. It also maintains the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to designate those CIA employees who qualify for this benefit. Again, I thank the Members and staff of the House and Senate Intelligence committees for their hard work on this legislation, and I urge my colleagues to support the conference report. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time. The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the conference report. There was no objection. The conference report was agreed to. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. ____________________ _________________________________________________________________________ [DOCID: f:hr328.107] From the House Reports Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] 107th Congress Report HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 107-328 ====================================================================== INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 _______ December 6, 2001.--Ordered to be printed _______ Mr. Goss, from the committee of conference, submitted the following CONFERENCE REPORT [To accompany H.R. 2883] The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2883), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amendment, insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations. Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations. Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments. Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account. Sec. 105. Codification of the Coast Guard as an element of the intelligence community. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law. Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities. Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting. Sec. 304. Requirements for lodging allowances in intelligence community assignment program benefits. Sec. 305. Modification of reporting requirements for significant anticipated intelligence activities and significant intelligence failures. Sec. 306. Report on implementation of recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorism and other entities. Sec. 307. Judicial review under Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. Sec. 308. Modification of positions requiring consultation with Director of Central Intelligence in appointments. Sec. 309. Modification of authorities for protection of intelligence community employees who report urgent concerns to Congress. Sec. 310. Review of protections against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Sec. 311. One-year suspension of reorganization of Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office. Sec. 312. Presidential approval and submission to Congress of National Counterintelligence Strategy and National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessments. Sec. 313. Report on alien terrorist removal proceedings. Sec. 314. Technical amendments. TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Sec. 401. Modifications of central services program. Sec. 402. One-year extension of Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act. Sec. 403. Guidelines for recruitment of certain foreign assets. Sec. 404. Full reimbursement for professional liability insurance of counterterrorism employees. TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Sec. 501. Authority to purchase items of nominal value for recruitment purposes. Sec. 502. Funding for infrastructure and quality-of-life improvements at Menwith Hill and Bad Aibling stations. Sec. 503. Modification of authorities relating to official immunity in interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking. Sec. 504. Undergraduate training program for employees of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Sec. 505. Preparation and submittal of reports, reviews, studies, and plans relating to Department of Defense intelligence activities. Sec. 506. Enhancement of security authorities of National Security Agency. TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2002 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence- related activities of the following elements of the United States Government: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (4) The National Security Agency. (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (6) The Department of State. (7) The Department of the Treasury. (8) The Department of Energy. (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. (10) The National Reconnaissance Office. (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (12) The Coast Guard. SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS. (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2002, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 2883 of the One Hundred Seventh Congress. (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch. SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS. (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2002 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element. (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2002 the sum of $200,276,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the advanced research and development committee shall remain available until September 30, 2003. (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized 343 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2002. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. (c) Classified Authorizations.-- (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2002 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until September 30, 2003. (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2002, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2002 any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.-- (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection (a), $44,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2004. (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center. (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403- 3(d)(1)). (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center. SEC. 105. CODIFICATION OF THE COAST GUARD AS AN ELEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(H) is amended-- (1) by striking ``and'' before ``the Department of Energy''; and (2) by inserting ``, and the Coast Guard'' before the semicolon. TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2002 the sum of $212,000,000. TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING. It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the United States. SEC. 304. REQUIREMENTS FOR LODGING ALLOWANCES IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSIGNMENT PROGRAM BENEFITS. Section 113(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h(b) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``An employee''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(2) The head of an agency of an employee detailed under subsection (a) may pay a lodging allowance for the employee subject to the following conditions: ``(A) The allowance shall be the lesser of the cost of the lodging or a maximum amount payable for the lodging as established jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and-- ``(i) with respect to detailed employees of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense; and ``(ii) with respect to detailed employees of other agencies and departments, the head of such agency or department. ``(B) The detailed employee maintains a primary residence for the employee's immediate family in the local commuting area of the parent agency duty station from which the employee regularly commuted to such duty station before the detail. ``(C) The lodging is within a reasonable proximity of the host agency duty station. ``(D) The distance between the detailed employee's parent agency duty station and the host agency duty station is greater than 20 miles. ``(E) The distance between the detailed employee's primary residence and the host agency duty station is 10 miles greater than the distance between such primary residence and the employees parent duty station. ``(F) The rate of pay applicable to the detailed employee does not exceed the rate of basic pay for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule.''. SEC. 305. MODIFICATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR SIGNIFICANT ANTICIPATED INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE FAILURES. Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(a) In General.--'' before ``To the extent''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsections: ``(b) Form and Contents of Certain Reports.--Any report relating to a significant anticipated intelligence activity or a significant intelligence failure that is submitted to the intelligence committees for purposes of subsection (a)(1) shall be in writing, and shall contain the following: ``(1) A concise statement of any facts pertinent to such report. ``(2) An explanation of the significance of the intelligence activity or intelligence failure covered by such report. ``(c) Standards and Procedures for Certain Reports.--The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the departments, agencies, and entities referred to in subsection (a), shall establish standards and procedures applicable to reports covered by subsection (b).''. SEC. 306. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM AND OTHER ENTITIES. (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report concerning whether, and to what extent, the Intelligence Community has implemented recommendations relevant to the Intelligence Community as set forth in the following: (1) The report prepared by the National Commission on Terrorism established by section 591 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277). (2) The report prepared by the United States Commission on National Security for the 21st Century, Phase III, dated February 15, 2001. (3) The second annual report of the advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction established pursuant to section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105- 261; 50 U.S.C. 2301 note). (b) Recommendations Determined Not To Be Adopted.--In a case in which the Director determines that a recommendation described in subsection (a) has not been implemented, the report under that subsection shall include a detailed explanation of the reasons for not implementing that recommendation. SEC. 307. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER FOREIGN NARCOTICS KINGPIN DESIGNATION ACT. Section 805 of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (title VIII of Public Law 106-120; 113 Stat. 1629; 21 U.S.C. 1904) is amended by striking subsection (f). SEC. 308. MODIFICATION OF POSITIONS REQUIRING CONSULTATION WITH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN APPOINTMENTS. Section 106(b)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is amended by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the following new subparagraphs: ``(C) The Director of the Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy. ``(D) The Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.''. SEC. 309. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES FOR PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES WHO REPORT URGENT CONCERNS TO CONGRESS. (a) Authority of Inspector General of Central Intelligence Agency.--Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(5)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking the second sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``Upon making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the Director notice of that determination, together with the complaint or information.''; and (2) in subparagraph (D)(i), by striking ``does not transmit,'' and all that follows through ``subparagraph (B),'' and inserting ``does not find credible under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B),''. (b) Authorities of Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community.--Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended-- (1) in subsection (b), by striking the second sentence and inserting the following new sentence: ``Upon making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the head of the establishment notice of that determination, together with the complaint or information.''; and (2) in subsection (d)(1), by striking ``does not transmit,'' and all that follows through ``subsection (b),'' and inserting ``does not find credible under subsection (b) a complaint or information submitted to the Inspector General under subsection (a), or does not transmit the complaint or information to the head of the establishment in accurate form under subsection (b),''. SEC. 310. REVIEW OF PROTECTIONS AGAINST THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. (a) Requirement.--The Attorney General shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of Energy, Director of Central Intelligence, and heads of such other departments, agencies, and entities of the United States Government as the Attorney General considers appropriate, carry out a comprehensive review of current protections against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including-- (1) any mechanisms available under civil or criminal law, or under regulation, to detect the unauthorized disclosure of such information; and (2) any sanctions available under civil or criminal law, or under regulation, to deter and punish the unauthorized disclosure of such information. (b) Particular Considerations.--In carrying out the review required by subsection (a), the Attorney General shall consider, in particular-- (1) whether the administrative regulations and practices of the intelligence community are adequate, in light of the particular requirements of the intelligence community, to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information; and (2) whether recent developments in technology, and anticipated developments in technology, necessitate particular modifications of current protections against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information in order to further protect against the unauthorized disclosure of such information. (c) Report.--(1) Not later than May 1, 2002, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report on the review carried out under subsection (a). The report shall include the following: (A) A comprehensive description of the review, including the findings of the Attorney General as a result of the review. (B) An assessment of the efficacy and adequacy of current laws and regulations against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including whether or not modifications of such laws or regulations, or additional laws or regulations, are advisable in order to further protect against the unauthorized disclosure of such information. (C) Any recommendations for legislative or administrative action that the Attorney General considers appropriate, including a proposed draft for any such action, and a comprehensive analysis of the Constitutional and legal ramifications of any such action. (2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 311. ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROGRAM OFFICE. Notwithstanding any provision of subtitle B of title III of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-567; 114 Stat. 2843; 22 U.S.C. 7301 et seq.), relating to the reorganization of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office, no provision of that subtitle shall be effective during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on October 1, 2002. SEC. 312. PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STRATEGY AND NATIONAL THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND PRIORITIZATION ASSESSMENTS. The National Counterintelligence Strategy, and each National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment, produced under Presidential Decision Directive 75, dated December 28, 2000, entitled ``U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness--Counterintelligence for the 21st Century'', including any modification of that Strategy or any such Assessment, may only take effect if approved by the President. The Strategy, each Assessment, and any modification thereof, shall be submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. SEC. 313. REPORT ON ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS. Section 504 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1534) is amended by adding after subsection (k) the following new subsection: ``(l) Not later than 3 months from the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report concerning the effect and efficacy of alien terrorist removal proceedings, including the reasons why proceedings pursuant to this section have not been used by the Attorney General in the past and the effect on the use of these proceedings after the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56).''. SEC. 314. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS. (a) FISA.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is amended as follows: (1) Section 101(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 1801(h)(4)) is amended by striking ``twenty-four hours'' and inserting ``72 hours''. (2) Section 105 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended-- (A) by inserting ``, if known'' in subsection (c)(1)(B) before the semicolon at the end; (B) by striking ``twenty-four hours'' in subsection (f) each place it appears and inserting ``72 hours''; (C) by transferring the subsection (h) added by section 225 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56; 115 Stat. 295) so as to appear after (rather than before) the subsection (h) redesignated by section 602(b)(2) of the Counterintelligence Reform Act of 2000 (title VI of Public Law 106-567; 114 Stat. 2851) and redesignating that subsection as so transferred as subsection (i); and (D) in the subsection transferred and redesignated by subparagraph (C), by inserting ``for electronic surveillance or physical search'' before the period at the end. (3) Section 301(4)(D) (50 U.S.C. 1821(4)(D)) is amended by striking ``24 hours'' and inserting ``72 hours''. (4) Section 304(e) (50 U.S.C. 1824(e)) is amended by striking ``24 hours'' each place it appears and inserting ``72 hours''. (5) Section 402 (50 U.S.C. 1842) is amended-- (A) in subsection (c), as amended by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 214(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act (115 Stat. 286), by inserting ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1); and (B) in subsection (f), by striking ``of a court'' and inserting ``of an order issued''. (6) Subsection (a) of section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861), as inserted by section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (115 Stat. 287), is amended by inserting ``to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or'' in paragraph (1) after ``an investigation''. (7) Section 502 (50 U.S.C. 1862), as inserted by section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (115 Stat. 288), is amended by striking ``section 402'' both places it appears and inserting ``section 501''. (8) The table of contents in the first section is amended-- (A) by inserting ``Sec.'' at the beginning of the items relating to sections 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, and 601; and (B) by striking the items relating to sections 501, 502, and 503 and inserting the following: ``Sec. 501. Access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations. ``Sec. 502. Congressional oversight.''. (b) Title 18, United States Code.--Paragraph (19) of section 2510 of title 18, United States Code, as added by section 203(b)(2)(C) of the USA PATRIOT Act (115 Stat. 280), is amended by inserting ``, for purposes of section 2517(6) of this title,'' before ``means''. (c) USA Patriot Act.--Effective as of the enactment of such Act and as if included therein as originally enacted, the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56) is amended-- (1) in section 207(b)(1) (115 Stat. 282), by striking ``105(d)(2)'' and ``1805(d)(2)'' and inserting ``105(e)(2)'' and ``1805(e)(2)'', respectively; and (2) in section 1003 (115 Stat. 392), by inserting ``of 1978'' after ``Act''. TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SEC. 401. MODIFICATIONS OF CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM. (a) Annual Audits.--Subsection (g)(1) of section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended-- (1) by striking ``December 31'' and inserting ``January 31''; and (2) by striking ``conduct'' and inserting ``complete''. (b) Permanent Authority.--Subsection (h) of that section is amended-- (1) by striking paragraph (1); (2) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (1) and (2), respectively; (3) in paragraph (1), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (3)'' and inserting ``paragraph (2)''; and (4) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1)''. SEC. 402. ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT. Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended-- (1) in subsection (f), by striking ``September 30, 2002'' and inserting ``September 30, 2003''; and (2) in subsection (i), by striking ``or 2002'' and inserting ``2002, or 2003''. SEC. 403. GUIDELINES FOR RECRUITMENT OF CERTAIN FOREIGN ASSETS. Recognizing dissatisfaction with the provisions of the guidelines of the Central Intelligence Agency (promulgated in 1995) for handling cases involving foreign assets or sources with human rights concerns and recognizing that, although there have been recent modifications to those guidelines, they do not fully address the challenges of both existing and long-term threats to United States security, the Director of Central Intelligence shall-- (1) rescind the existing guidelines for handling such cases; (2) issue new guidelines that more appropriately weigh and incentivize risks to ensure that qualified field intelligence officers can, and should, swiftly and directly gather intelligence from human sources in such a fashion as to ensure the ability to provide timely information that would allow for indications and warnings of plans and intentions of hostile actions or events; and (3) ensure that such information is shared in a broad and expeditious fashion so that, to the extent possible, actions to protect American lives and interests can be taken. SEC. 404. FULL REIMBURSEMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE OF COUNTERTERRORISM EMPLOYEES. Section 406(a)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-567; 114 Stat. 2849; 5 U.S.C. prec. 5941 note) is amended by striking ``one-half'' and inserting ``100 percent''. TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SEC. 501. AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE ITEMS OF NOMINAL VALUE FOR RECRUITMENT PURPOSES. (a) Authority.--Section 422 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``(b) Promotional Items for Recruitment Purposes.--The Secretary of Defense may use funds available for an intelligence element of the Department of Defense to purchase promotional items of nominal value for use in the recruitment of individuals for employment by that element.''. (b) Clerical Amendments.--(1) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows: ``Sec. 422. Use of funds for certain incidental purposes''. (2) Such section is further amended by inserting at the beginning of the text of the section the following: ``(a) Counterintelligence Official Reception and Representation Expenses.--''. (3) The item relating to such section in the table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I of chapter 21 of such title is amended to read as follows: ``422. Use of funds for certain incidental purposes.''. SEC. 502. FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND QUALITY-OF-LIFE IMPROVEMENTS AT MENWITH HILL AND BAD AIBLING STATIONS. (a) Authority.-- (1) In addition to funds otherwise available for such purpose, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force may each transfer or reprogram such funds as are necessary-- (A) for the enhancement of the capabilities of the Menwith Hill Station and Bad Aibling Station, including improvements of facility infrastructure and quality of life programs at those installations; and (B) at the appropriate time, for costs associated with the closure of the Bad Aibling Station. (2) The authority provided in paragraph (1) may be exercised notwithstanding any other provision of law. (b) Source of Funds.--Funds available for any of the military departments for operation and maintenance shall be available to carry out subsection (a). (c) Budget Report.--The Secretary of each military department shall ensure-- (1) that the annual budget request of that military department reflects any funds transferred or reprogrammed under this section for the preceding fiscal year; and (2) that a copy of the portion of the budget request showing each such transfer or reprogramming is transmitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (d) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section may be construed to modify or obviate existing law or practice with regard to the transfer or reprogramming of funds from the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force to the Menwith Hill Station at the Bad Aibling Station. SEC. 503. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO OFFICIAL IMMUNITY IN INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING. (a) Certification Required for Immunity.--Subsection (a)(2) of section 1012 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 22 U.S.C. 2291-4) is amended by striking ``, before the interdiction occurs, has determined'' in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting ``has, during the 12-month period ending on the date of the interdiction, certified to Congress''. (b) Annual Reports.--That section is further amended-- (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection (c): ``(c) Annual Report.--(1) Not later than February 1 each year, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the assistance provided under subsection (b) during the preceding calendar year. Each report shall include for the calendar year covered by such report the following: ``(A) A list specifying each country for which a certification referred to in subsection (a)(2) was in effect for purposes of that subsection during any portion of such calendar year, including the nature of the illicit drug trafficking threat to each such country. ``(B) A detailed explanation of the procedures referred to in subsection (a)(2)(B) in effect for each country listed under subparagraph (A), including any training and other mechanisms in place to ensure adherence to such procedures. ``(C) A complete description of any assistance provided under subsection (b). ``(D) A summary description of the aircraft interception activity for which the United States Government provided any form of assistance under subsection (b). ``(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''. SEC. 504. UNDERGRADUATE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY. (a) Authority To Carry Out Training Program.--Subchapter III of chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: ``Sec. 462. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition of critical skills ``The Secretary of Defense may establish an undergraduate training program with respect to civilian employees of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency that is similar in purpose, conditions, content, and administration to the program established by the Secretary of Defense under section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) for civilian employees of the National Security Agency.''. (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of such subchapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item: ``462. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition of critical skills.''. SEC. 505. PREPARATION AND SUBMITTAL OF REPORTS, REVIEWS, STUDIES, AND PLANS RELATING TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. (a) Consultation in Preparation.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure that any report, review, study, or plan required to be prepared or conducted by a provision of this Act, including a provision of the classified Schedule of Authorizations or a classified annex to this Act, that involves the intelligence or intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense shall be prepared or conducted in consultation with the Secretary of Defense or an appropriate official of the Department designated by the Secretary for that purpose. (b) Submittal.--Any report, review, study, or plan referred to in subsection (a) shall be submitted, in addition to any other committee of Congress specified for submittal in the provision concerned, to the following committees of Congress: (1) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. SEC. 506. ENHANCEMENT OF SECURITY AUTHORITIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended to read as follows: ``Sec. 11. (a)(1) The Director of the National Security Agency may authorize agency personnel within the United States to perform the same functions as special policemen of the General Services Administration perform under the first section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special policemen for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318) with the powers set forth in that section, except that such personnel shall perform such functions and exercise such powers-- ``(A) at the National Security Agency Headquarters complex and at any facilities and protected property which are solely under the administration and control of, or are used exclusively by, the National Security Agency; and ``(B) in the streets, sidewalks, and the open areas within the zone beginning at the outside boundary of such facilities or protected property and extending outward 500 feet. ``(2) The performance of functions and exercise of powers under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) shall be limited to those circumstances where such personnel can identify specific and articulable facts giving such personnel reason to believe that the performance of such functions and exercise of such powers is reasonable to protect against physical damage or injury, or threats of physical damage or injury, to agency installations, property, or employees. ``(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude, or limit in any way, the authority of any Federal,State, or local law enforcement agency, or any other Federal police or Federal protective service. ``(4) The rules and regulations enforced by such personnel shall be the rules and regulations prescribed by the Director and shall only be applicable to the areas referred to in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1). ``(5) Not later than July 1 each year, the Director shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report that describes in detail the exercise of the authority granted by this subsection and the underlying facts supporting the exercise of such authority, during the preceding fiscal year. The Director shall make each such report available to the Inspector General of the National Security Agency. ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency is authorized to establish penalties for violations of the rules or regulations prescribed by the Director under subsection (a). Such penalties shall not exceed those specified in the fourth section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) (40 U.S.C. 318c). ``(c) Agency personnel designated by the Director of the National Security Agency under subsection (a) shall be clearly identifiable as United States Government security personnel while engaged in the performance of the functions to which subsection (a) refers.''. And the Senate agree to the same. From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for consideration of the House bill and the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Porter J. Goss, Douglas Bereuter, Michael N. Castle, Sherwood Boehlert, Jim Gibbons, Ray LaHood, Duke Cunningham, Pete Hoekstra, Richard Burr, Saxby Chambliss, Nancy Pelosi, Sanford Bishop, Jane Harman, Gary Condit, Tim Roemer, Alcee L. Hastings (except for an item listed in the classified schedule of authorizations), Leonard L. Boswell, Collin C. Peterson, Managers on the Part of the House. Bob Graham, John D. Rockefeller IV, Dianne Feinstein, Ron Wyden, Richard Durbin, Evan Bayh, John Edwards, Barbara Mikulski, Richard Shelby, Jon Kyl, James Inhofe, Orrin G. Hatch, Pat Roberts, Mike DeWine, Fred Thompson, Richard G. Lugar, Managers on the Part of the Senate. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2883), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, submit the following joint statement to the House and the Senate in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying conference report: The Senate amendment struck all of the House bill after the enacting clause and inserted a substitute text. The House recedes from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate with an amendment that is a substitute for the House bill and the Senate amendment. The differences between the House bill, the Senate amendment, and the substitute agreed to in conference are noted below, except for clerical corrections, conforming changes made necessary by agreements reached by the conferees, and minor drafting and clerical changes. The managers agree that the congressionally directed actions described in the House bill, the Senate amendment, the respective committee reports, and classified annexes accompanying H.R. 2883, should be undertaken to the extent that such congressionally directed actions are not amended, altered, or otherwise specifically addressed in either this Joint Explanatory Statement or in the classified annex to the conference report on the bill H.R. 2883. Rebuilding the Nation's Intelligence Capabilities The conferees note that the fiscal year 2002 budget request submitted by the President includes a substantial increase for programs funded in the National Foreign Intelligence Program. This authorization bill further enhances that investment. The conferees believe this funding increase should represent the first installment of at least a five-year effort to correct serious deficiencies that have developed over the past decade in the Intelligence Community. The conferees recognize that these deficiencies existed prior to the events of September 11th and, indeed, they have been consistently highlighting these shortfalls for the past seven years. Put simply, although the end of the Cold War warranted a reordering of national priorities, the steady decline in intelligence funding since the mid-1990s left the nation with a diminished ability to address the emerging threats and technological challenges of the 21st Century. In this budget, the conferees seek to highlight four priority areas that must receive significant attention in the near term if intelligence is to fulfill its role in our national security strategy. Those are: (1) revitalizing the National Security Agency (NSA); (2) correcting deficiencies in human intelligence; (3) addressing the imbalance between intelligence collection and analysis; and (4) rebuilding a robust research and development program. The conferees' top priority last year was the revitalization of the National Security Agency. This continues to be the conferees' number one concern. Within the next five years, the NSA must have the ability to collect and exploit electronic signals in a vastly differenct communications environment. Along with significant investment in technology, this means closer collaboration with clandestine human collectors. The computer and telecommunications systems that NSA employees use to accomplish their work must be state-of- the-art technology. Analysts must have sophisticated software tools to allow them to exploit fully the amount of data available in the future. Correcting deficiencies in the area of human intelligence is critical for the Intelligence Community if it is to meet the increasingly complex and growing set of collection requirements within the next five years. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will need to hire case officers capable of dealing with the explosion of technology, both as collection tools and as potential threats. These individuals must be able to operate effectively in the many places around the world. To do that, the CIA must place even greater emphasis on the diversity of the new recruits. As importantly, the emphasis of our human collection must change in such a way that places a priority on being able to access the types of information that reveal the plans and intentions of those who would harm U.S. interests. The human intelligence system also must be integrated more closely with our other collection capabilities. As we do a better job of collecting intelligence, we also must enhance our ability to understand this information. The percentage of the intelligence budget devoted to processing and analysis has been declining steadily since 1990. Although collection systems are becoming more and more capable, our investment in analysis continues to decline. The disparity threatens to overwhelm our ability to effectively use the information collected. To address this problem, the conferees have added funds to finance promising all-source analysis initiatives across the Community. Over the next five years, the Intelligence Community must rebuild its all-source analytical capability, creating a force that can truly present a global coverage capability. The conferees' fourth priority, a strong research and development program, supports all of the other initiatives and more. Over the past decade, agencies have allowed research and development accounts to be the ``bill payer'' for funding shortfalls, and have sacrificed modernization and innovation in the process. The conferees believe that over the next five years, there must be a review of several emerging technologies to determine what will provide the best long-term return on investment, while ensuring that sufficient incentives for ``risk'' are promoted in order to bring R&D to the ``cutting edge.'' As part of such an effort, the conferees continue to support and encourage a symbiotic relationship between the Intelligence Community and the private sector using innovative approaches such as the Central Intelligence Agency's In-Q-Tel. Although the conferees believe that this authorization represents a ``down payment'' for a five-year effort to rebuild our intelligence capabilities, they also believe that, in light of the horrible and tragic terrorist attacks, this year's authorization represents only a snapshot in time, and does not necessarily represent the critically needed long-term investments sufficient to bolster national security objectives. In fact, the conferees believe that this authorization is only the beginning of what must be a substantial investment if the nation is to have the intelligence capabilities required to protect national security and to provide the first line of defense against terrorism and other transnational issues. Beyond the four priority areas mentioned above, significant attention is needed elsewhere as well. For example, designing and procuring the appropriate capabilities for technical collection to replace our aging systems must also be addressed. Additionally,there are areas that the Administration must address that are beyond financial investment, and go to instilling, within the Intelligence Community, a focus on ensuring anticipatory access, so as to be able to obtain information on plans and intentions in order to prevent crises. The Intelligence Community must create a ``culture'' that is less risk averse. Finally, the conferees believe that any effort to invest in and expand intelligence capabilities will only be marginally successful, at best, if there is not a parallel effort to change the structure of the Community where appropriate. Today's intelligence structure is not suitable to address current and future challenges, and the conferees look forward to working with the Administration on this issue as well. Title I--Intelligence Activities SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS Section 101 of the conference report lists the departments, agencies, and other elements of the United States Government for whose intelligence and intelligence-related activities the Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2001. Section 101 is identical to section 101 of the House bill and section 101 of the Senate amendment, except for the addition of the Coast Guard, see section 105, infra. SEC. 102 CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS Section 102 of the conference report makes clear that the details of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities and applicable personnel ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 2002 are contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the Act by this section. The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The classified annex provides the details of the Schedule. Section 102 is identical to section 102 of the House bill and section 102 of the Senate amendment. SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS Section 103 of the conference report authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in fiscal year 2002 to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the Intelligence Community under section 102 by an amount not too exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under section 102. The Director of Central Intelligence may exercise this authority only if necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions. Any exercise of this authority must be reported to the intelligence committees of the Congress. The managers emphasize that the authority conferred by section 103 is not intended to permit wholesale increases in personnel strength in any intelligence component. Rather, the section provides the Director of Central Intelligence with flexibility to adjust personnel levels temporarily for contingencies and for overages caused by an imbalance between hiring of new employees and attrition of current employees. The managers do not expect the Director of Central Intelligence to allow heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed levels set in the Schedule of Authorizations except for the satisfaction of clearly identified hiring needs that are consistent with the authorization of personnel strengths in this bill. In no case is this authority to be used to provide for positions denied by this bill. Section 103 is identical to section 103 of the House bill and section 103 of the Senate amendment. sec. 104. intelligence community management account Section 104 of the conference report authorizes appropriations for the Community Management Account (CMA) of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and sets the personnel end-strength for the Intelligence Community management staff for fiscal year 2002. Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $200,276,000 for fiscal year 2002 for the activities of the CMA of the DCI. Subsection (b) authorizes 343 full-time personnel for the Community Management Staff for fiscal year 2002 and provides that such personnel may be permanent employees of the Staff or detailed from various elements of the United States Government. Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and personnel for the CMA as specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and permits these additional amounts to remain available through September 30, 2003. Subsection (d) requires that, except as provided in Section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947, personnel from another element of the United States Government be detailed to an element of the CMA on a reimbursable basis, or for temporary situations of less than one year on a non- reimbursable basis. Subsection (e) authorizes $44,000,000 of the amount authorized in subsection (a) to be made available for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Subsection (e) requires the DCI to transfer these funds to the Department of Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the authority of the Attorney General and subject to section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act. Subsection (e) is similar to subsection (e) of the House bill and subsection (e) of the Senate amendment. The managers note that since Fiscal Year 1997 the Community Management Account has included authorization for appropriations for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). The committees periodically have expressed concern about the effectiveness of NDIC and its ability to fulfill the role for which it was created. The managers are encouraged by the NDIC's recent performance and by the refocused role for the organization. The conferees request that the Director of the NDIC provide a spending plan for fiscal year 2002 to the intelligence committees and to the appropriations committees within 90 days of enactment of this Act. SEC. 105. CODIFICATION OF THE COAST GUARD AS AN ELEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Section 105 is identical to Section 105 of the House bill. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate recedes. Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS Section 201 is identical to Section 201 of the Senate amendment and section 201 of the House bill. Title III--General Provisions Subtitle A--Intelligence Community SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW Section 301 is identical to Section 301 of the Senate amendment and section 301 of the House bill. sec. 302 restriction on conduct of intelligence activities Section 302 is identical to Section 302 of the Senate amendment and section 302 of the House bill. SEC. 303 SENSE OF THE CONGRESS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING Section 303 is identical to Section 303 of the House bill. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate recedes. sec. 304. REQUIREMENTS FOR LODGING ALLOWANCES IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSIGNMENT PROGRAM BENEFITS Section 304 is identical to Section 304 of the House amendment. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate recedes. SEC. 305. MODIFICATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR SIGNIFICANT ANTICIPATED INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE FAILURES Section 305 is identical to Section 305 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. SEC. 306. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM AND OTHER ENTITIES Section 306 is similar to Section 307 of the House bill, which requires a report from the Director of Central Intelligence concerning whether and to what extent, the Intelligence Community has implemented the applicable recommendations set forth by the National Commission on Terrorism (Bremer Commission). The DCI report, which shall be due 120 days after enactment of this legislation, shall include a detailed explanation from the DCI as to the reasons for not implementing Intelligence Community-related recommendations contained within the three commission reports. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The conferees agree to expand the DCI's reporting requirement to include applicable provisions of the US commission on National Security for the 21st Century and the second annual report of the so-called Gilmore Commission. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate recedes. SEC. 307. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER FOREIGN NARCOTICS KINGPIN DESIGNATION ACT Section 307 is identical to Section 303 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. SEC. 308. MODIFICATION OF POSITIONS REQUIRING CONSULTATION WITH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN APPOINTMENTS Section 308 is identical to Section 304 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. SEC. 309. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES FOR PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES WHO REPORT URGENT CONCERNS TO CONGRESS Section 309 is identical to Section 306 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. SEC. 310. REVIEW OF PROTECTIONS AGAINST THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION Section 310 is identical to Section 307 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. The conferees expect a report no later than May 1, 2002, from the Attorney General providing a comprehensive review of current protections against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. SEC. 311. ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROGRAM OFFICE Section 311 is identical to Section 309 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. sec. 312. presidential approval and submission to congress of national counterintelligence strategy and national threat identification and prioritization assessments Section 312 is identical to Section 310 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. sec. 313. report on alien terrorist removal proceedings Section 313 is identical to section 312 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. sec. 314. technical amendments Extension of Time to Seek FISA Ratification of Attorney General- authorized Electronic Surveillance and Physical Searches Under current law, the Attorney General may authorize electronic surveillance or a search without a court order when he concludes, first, that the factual basis for granting such an order exists and, second, that an emergency exists requiring action before a court order may be obtained. 50 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1805(f), 1824(e). Current law requires the Government to prepare a complete FISA application and present it to the FISA court for approval within 24 hours ``after the Attorney General authorizes'' the surveillance or search. Failure to do so results in the suppression of information from the surveillance or search. Given the length and complexity of many FISA applications, the need to verify the accuracy of each FISA declaration by review in the field, the requirement that the Government obtain both a written certification from the director of the FBI (or a similar official) and the written approval of the Attorney General, it often is extremely difficult to meet the 24-hour deadline. This is especially true where--as often will be the case--the emergency authorization comes in the midst of a larger emergency requiring the personal attention of the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI. The emergency authorization provision of title III wiretaps, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(7), sets a deadline of 48-hours, and starts the 48-hour clock not at the time of authorization, but only once the interception ``has occurred, or begins to occur.'' The conferees agreed to a provision to extend the time for judicial ratification of an emergency FISA surveillance or search from 24 to 72 hours. That would give the Government adequate time to assemble an application without requiring extraordinary effort by officials responsible for the preparation of those applications. The additional 48 hours for FISA applications is appropriate given their complexity and the need for higher-level approval for FISA applications than for applications under title III. The additional time is also appropriate given that the deadline for submission of applications under FISA begins when the Attorney General authorizes the surveillance or search, rather than when the surveillance or search actually occurs, as is the case under title III. Multipoint Wiretaps The multipoint wiretap amendment to FISA in the USA PATRIOT Act (section 206) allows the FISA court to issue generic orders of assistance to any communications provider or similar person, instead of to a particular communications provider. This change permits the Government to implement new surveillance immediately if the FISA target changes providers in an effort to thwart surveillance. The amendment was directed at persons who, for example, attempt to defeat surveillance by changing wireless telephone providers or using pay phones. Currently, FISA requires the court to ``specify'' the ``nature and location of each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance will be directed.'' 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1805(c)(1)(B). Obviously, in certain situations under current law, such a specification is limited. For example, a wireless phone has no fixed location and electronic mail may be accessed from any number of locations. To avoid any ambiguity and clarify Congress' intent, the conferees agreed to a provision which adds the phrase, ``if known,'' to the end of 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1805(c)(1)(B). The ``if known'' language, which follows the model of 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1805(c)(1)(A), is designed to avoid any uncertainty about the kind of specification required in a multipoint wiretap case, where the facility to be monitored is typically not known in advance. Non-conformity of FISA Subsections 501(a)(1) and 501(b)(2) Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 amended title V of the FISA, adding a new section 501. Section 501(a)(1) now authorizes the director of the FBI to apply for a court order to produce certain records ``for an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.'' Section 501(b)(2) directs that the application for such records specify that the purpose of the investigation is to ``obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person.'' However, section 501(a)(1), which generally authorizes the applications, does not contain equivalent language. Thus, subsections (a)(1) and (b)(2) now appear inconsistent. The conferees agreed to a provision which adds the phrase ``to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or'' to section 501(a)(1). This would make the language of section 501(a)(1) consistent with the legislative history of section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (see 147 Cong. Res. S11006 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (sectional analysis)) and with the language of section 214 of the USA PATRIOT Act (authorizing an application for an order to use pen registers and trap and trace devices to ``obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person''). Clarification of Intelligence Exception Section 203(b)(2) of the USA PATRIOT Act added a definition of ``foreign intelligence information'' to chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code. The existingintelligence exception from certain chapters of title 18--i.e., chapters 119, 121, and 206--is contained in chapter 119 (at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2511(2)(f)) and uses the term ``foreign intelligence information'' to define the scope of the exception. As a result, the new definition of ``foreign intelligence information'' added by section 203(b)(2) could potentially be read to limit the intelligence exception--particularly when compared to the National Security Act definition of ``foreign intelligence'' (50 U.S.C. Sec. 401(a)). Other Technical Amendments The conferees agreed to provisions correcting several drafting problems in the text of the USA PATRIOT Act. First, section 207(b)(1) of the PATRIOT ACT refers to section 105(d)(2) instead of section 105(e)(2) and to 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1805(d)(2) instead of 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1805(e)(2). Second, section 215 (creating new section 502 of FISA) refers to ``section 402'' instead of ``section 501'' in the last line of new section 502(a) and in the last line of new section 502(b)(1). Third, section 225 adds a new subsection (h) immediately following 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1805(g), but it should add a new subsection (i) immediately following 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1805(h). Fourth, the title of section 225 is ``Immunity for Compliance with FISA Wiretap'' and it is an amendment to 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1805, both of which suggest that it applies only to electronic surveillance and not to physical searches or other activity authorized by FISA. However, the text of section 225 refers to court orders and requests for emergency assistance ``under this Act,'' which makes clear that it applies to physical searches (and pen-trap requests--for which there already exists an immunity provision, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1842(f)-- and subpoenas) as well as to electronic surveillance. Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency sec. 401. modifications to central intelligence agency's central service program Section 401 is identical to Section 401 of the House bill and Section 402 of the Senate amendment. sec. 402. one-year extension of central intelligence agency voluntary separation pay act Section 402 is identical to Section 402 of the House bill and section 401 of the Senate amendment. sec. 403. guidelines for recruitment of certain foreign assets Section 403 addresses the CIA's 1995 guidelines on recruitment of foreign assets and sources. The House bill noted the concern that excessive caution and a burdensome vetting process resulting from the 1995 guidelines have undermined the CIA's ability andwillingness to recruit assets, especially those who would provide insights into terrorist organizations and other hard targets. The conferees believe that the concerns expressed in the House bill are justified and that, despite the changes to the 1995 guidelines that the Director of Central Intelligence made in September, the current guidelines must be rescinded and replaced with new guidelines. The conferees intend that a new balance be struck between potential gain and risk, a balance that recognizes concerns about egregious human rights behavior and law breaking, while providing much needed flexibility to take advantage of opportunities to gather important information as those opportunities present themselves. Moreover, the conferees believe that the goals and priorities for human collection must be weighted toward collecting the type of information that will provide plans and intentions of those who would threaten American national security, in a timeframe that will allow maximum opportunity to prevent actions against American interests. The conferees acknowledge that it may not always be possible to collect such information in every case, but this must be a focus for planning future HUMINT collection efforts if such collection is going to be preventative in nature rather than reactive. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate recedes. SEC. 404. FULL REIMBURSEMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE OF COUNTERTERRORISM EMPLOYEES Section 404 is identical to Section 404 of the House bill. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate recedes. Title V--Department of Defense Intelligence Activities SEC. 501. AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE ITEMS OF NOMINAL VALUE FOR RECRUITMENT PURPOSES Section 501 is identical to Section 501 of the House bill. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate recedes. SEC. 502. FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND QUALITY-OF-LIFE IMPROVEMENTS AT MENWITH HILL AND BAD AIBLING STATIONS Section 502 is similar to Section 502 of the House bill. The provision is intended to facilitate the transfer or reprogramming of funds from the Departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy as necessary to support the enhancement of the infrastructure of Menwith Hill and Bad Aibling stations. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate recedes. SEC. 503. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO OFFICIAL IMMUNITY IN INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING Section 503 is identical to Section 503 of the House bill and Section 308 of the Senate amendment. sec. 504. undergraduate training program for employees of the national imagery and mapping agency Section 504 is identical to Section 504 of the House bill. The Senate amendment had no similar provision. The Senate recedes. sec. 505. preparation and submittal of reports, reviews, studies, and plans relating to department of defense intelligence activities Section 505 is identical to Section 311 of the Senate amendment. The House bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. sec. 506. enhancement of security authorities of national security agency Section 506 authorizes the National Security Agency (NSA) security protective officers to exercise their law enforcement functions 500 feet beyond the confines of NSA facilities. At present, NSA's protective jurisdiction does not extend beyond the territorial bounds of its perimeter fences. Additionally, NSA has to rely on several federal, state, and local jurisdictions to respond to threats that occur just outside its fence line. With so many jurisdictions involved, there is a chance that a necessary response could be slowed and thus ineffective. In addition, under current law (Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959) the Administrator of General Services, upon the application of the Director of NSA, may provide for the protection of those facilities that are under the control of or use by the National Security Agency. The General Services Administration has delegated this authority to NSA. This amendment to the National Security Agency Act would provide NSA with the organic authority needed to protect its facilities and personnel without having to obtain a delegation of authority from the General Services Administration. This section parallels authority the Central Intelligence Agency currently has in section 15 of the CIA Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o). The attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the growing threat of terrorism in the United States. The conferees believe the NSA's authority to have a protective detail should be clarified and enhanced 500 feet beyond the confines of NSA's facilities, but were sensitive to the public's reaction to an unlimited grant of law enforcement jurisdiction outside NSA's borders. Therefore, the exercise of this new authority is expressly limited to only those circumstances where NSA security protective officers can identify specific and articulable facts giving them reason to believe that the exercise of this authority is necessary to protect against physical damage or injury to NSA installations, property, or employees. This provision also expressly states that the rules and regulations prescribed by the Director of the NSA for agency property and installations do not extend into the 500 foot area established by this provision. Thus, there will be no restrictions, for example, on the taking of photographs within the 500 foot zone. The conferees do not envision a general grant of police authority in the 500 foot zone, but do envision NSA security protective officers functioning as federal police, for limited purposes, within the 500 foot zone with all attendant authorities, capabilities, immunities, and liabilities. The conferees expect the Director of NSA to coordinate and establish Memoranda of Understanding with all federal, state, or local law enforcementagencies with which NSA will exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the 500 foot zones. The Director of NSA shall submit such Memoranda of Understanding to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives. The Director of NSA is also expected to develop a training plan to familiarize the Agency's security protective officers with their new authorities and responsibilities. The Director of NSA shall submit such plan to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives not later than 30 days after the enactment of this provision. Section 506 also includes a reporting requirement so that the intelligence committees may closely scrutinize the exercise of this new authority. Items Not Included Section 306 of the House bill contained a provision establishing, with respect to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a federal commission on the national security readiness of the United States. The Senate bill had no similar provision. The House recedes. From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for consideration of the House bill and the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Porter J. Goss, Douglas Bereuter, Michael N. Castle, Sherwood Boehlert, Jim Gibbons, Ray LaHood, Duke Cunningham, Pete Hoekstra, Richard Burr, Saxby Chambliss, Nancy Pelosi, Sanford Bishop, Jane Harman, Gary Condit, Tim Roemer, Alcee L. Hastings (except for an item listed in the classified schedule of authorizations), Leonard L. Boswell, Collin C. Peterson, Managers on the Part of the House. Bob Graham, John D. Rockefeller IV, Dianne Feinstein, Ron Wyden, Richard Durbin, Evan Bayh, John Edwards, Barbara Mikulski, Richard Shelby, Jon Kyl, James Inhofe, Orrin G. Hatch, Pat Roberts, Mike DeWine, Fred Thompson, Richard G. Lugar, Managers on the Part of the Senate. -----------------------------------------------------------------------