The Honorable Wayne T. Gilchrest

Joint Hearing Testimony

Committee on Government Reform, Transportation and Infrastructure

April 24^th, 2001

Thank you Chairman LaTourette and Chairman Shays for the invitation to speak to you today on a topic of critical importance.  I commend the efforts of members of your committees and my colleagues as you discuss ways to remedy problems as they have been identified.  This forum provides the ability to discuss the issue of domestic terrorism, build on the research that has been done in this area, and explore legislative proposals that are designed to address the situation.

Each of the members on the panel comes at the issue with a unique perspective.  Each bill has taken a lot of time and thought and represents a true commitment to the issue and dedication to the American public.  I appreciate the opportunity to share my views with you this afternoon on why I introduced H.R. 525 and feel that is bill is the most appropriate approach to dealing with the threat posed by domestic terrorists using weapons of mass destruction.

Six years after the domestic terrorist bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal Office building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, America still does not have a coordinated strategy to deal with the consequences of a large scale terrorist incident on American soil, especially if that explosion involves biological, chemical or radiological agents.

If anyone in this institution believes that no such event is possible, or even probable, they are deluding themselves and those they represent.  They are ignoring the predictions of many experts.  Unfortunately, like those experts, I believe it is only a matter to time.

The Oklahoma City bombing was perhaps the most devastating event on American soil in the 1990s.  We had a situation where a young man, for reasons still not quite understood, detonated a bomb constructed with fertilizer and subsequently killed 168 men, women and children.  It was not the first example of domestic terrorism, but it was certainly the largest.  Although this was a terrible episode, it could have been more catastrophic.  If the explosion had included germs or poisonous gas, or produced massive doses of radiation, we might still be trying to contain its effects six years later. 

Those families who just commemorated the anniversary of the deaths of their loved ones deserve to know that the nation takes this threat seriously.  The Federal Government and many state and local agencies quickly moved to set up programs and teams designed to handle the domestic terrorism crisis and manage the consequences of such a disaster.  Unfortunately, in our zeal to address the threat, we have created many duplicative and overlapping federal assets.  Often, these programs are designed in the absence of an end-state of preparedness.  No one knows or can tell if their response team is ready, nor have they adequately defined what they need to be ready for. 

Our duplicative, uncoordinated efforts are also costly.  Funding for counter-terrorism has doubled from $6.5 billion in fiscal year 1998 to about $11.1 billion in fiscal year 2001.  Funding levels have increased so quickly that we do not know exactly how many or what programs have been created to respond to domestic terrorism.

America has always had to face the possibility of domestic terrorists using some tactic or device to cause mass casualties to somehow further their goal, or to get publicity.  Fortunately, however, we have seen these criminals as lone individuals attacking small targets in a relatively small area.  Oklahoma City and the bombing of the World Trade Center in Manhattan changed all of that.  Both attacks represented a coordinated effort to make a public political statement.  It is inevitable that these types of dangers will continue and increase in frequency and severity. 

In this age of mass media saturation, a criminal (or network of criminals) know that there is a an immediate worldwide audience, especially if he/she is inside the United States and can destroy some symbol of American government, culture or influence.

International terrorism is indeed an important issue.  As the United States exercises its considerable economic, military, cultural, social, and legal power around the globe, it is inevitable that terrorists will seek to make “an example” of the United States, its citizens, and its interests.  It is an emerging and growing problem that must be dealt with in a forthright way, where we as a nation dedicate the appropriate attention and resources to the problem. 

Domestically, however, it is important to keep in mind that in the event of a massive natural or man-made disaster, the first call that will be made is to 911.  At the other end of that call is not the White House, not the Federal Emergency Management Agency, not the Federal Bureau of Investigation – it is the local firefighter, the police, and the emergency medical technician who will be first on the scene.  They, in turn, will contact a hazardous material unit and inform the area hospitals to expect casualties and injuries.  In a likely domestic terrorism scenario, we would face the real threat of not only weapons of mass destruction, but the mass confusion that would result as the first responders, and follow-on federal assets, try to figure out “who is in charge” during the inevitable onslaught of the mass media sending inaccurate or misinformed material that will scare the population and make matters worse.  Currently, we have an “alphabet soup” of  more than 40 federal agencies, teams and organizations – each responsible for some aspect of responding to the consequences of a disaster involving a weapon of mass destruction. 

A lot of groups, a lot of money, but no strategy.

There have been many comprehensive and exhaustive reports commissioned over the last few years to explore this emerging threat.  Each has come to a similar conclusion: 

The United States is likely to face the specter of a domestic terrorist attack sometime in the near future.   The fact that we, as a nation, have not been able to develop and implement a clear, comprehensive, and truly integrated national domestic preparedness strategy means that we remain incapable of responding effectively to a major attack on American soil.

Several research groups have issued reports regarding the organization of the federal counter-terrorism effort.  Many of these groups propose drastic changes to the existing Executive Branch structure.  I fully support the efforts of these groups. 

Unfortunately, some groups do not focus on the urgency of making sure the federal dollars we spend to prepare our nation’s first responders are spent in the most effective and efficient manner.  This is just as important, if not more so, than creating a super anti-terrorism entity.

While my bill addresses this important aspect of our total terrorism budget, it does not propose ways to organize the entire federal counter-terrorism structure.  It is not designed to do that – I defer that mission to the expertise of those more familiar with the US intelligence community. 

Whether Congress can pass sweeping reforms to the overall federal, we need to make sure that the fire service, the police and the emergency medical personnel in your community and in communities across the country can respond adequately to the first few hours after a catastrophic domestic terrorist attack.  As of today, they cannot.   And in the current, unorganized system, we will be no better prepared a year from now.

I believe this issue demands leadership.

The Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001 (H.R. 525) establishes a President’s Council within the Executive Office of the President to coordinate government-wide efforts for improving preparedness against domestic terrorist attacks.  The Council will participate in agency budget processes making recommendations to accomplish the goals of a defined national strategy.  The Council will be responsible for creating a national strategy for preparedness, which will eliminate duplication of efforts through the budget process, and define an end-state for preparedness.

H.R. 525 amends the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to include acts of terrorism or other catastrophic events within its definition of "major disaster" for purposes of authorized disaster relief.  In doing so, it requires the President to ensure that federal response plans and programs are adequate to respond to the consequences of terrorism directed against a target in the United States.

My bill establishes the President's Council on Domestic Preparedness and requires the Council to (1) publish a Domestic Terrorism Preparedness Plan and an annual implementation strategy based on an evaluation of the risks and threats; (2) designate an entity to assess the risk of terrorist attacks against transportation, energy, and other infrastructure facilities; and (3) establish voluntary minimum guidelines for state and local preparedness programs.  In addition to responding to a domestic terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction, H.R. 525 will help to better coordinate the federal response to other major disasters, not just terrorist actions, where the same consequence management skills and expertise may be necessary.

There obviously have been other measures introduced to address the issue of what to do if a terrorist detonates a bomb that contains chemical, biological of radiological agents.  I think my bill is the right approach because it raises the profile of domestic preparedness by placing the formulation of a national strategy into the Executive Office of the President, it creates a council that includes representation by each federal department that has an important role to play in development of that strategy, and improves accountability by directing the Council to provide clear budget recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget where those recommendations would be required to follow the national strategy.  It is important to do each of these simultaneously because, with such an important responsibility as creating a national domestic preparedness plan, no single agency should be put in the tenuous position of having to formulate and manage key parts of other agencies’ domestic preparedness budget. 

We do not want a situation where any new agency (or an enhanced existing agency) is responsible for another agency’s budget recommendations to the President.  That type of situation has not worked in the past and is not likely to work in future.  It merely creates the same type of jurisdictional battles, dissent, confusion, and bureaucratic bickering that has plagued the federal response effort so far.  The proper place for the formulation of a national domestic preparedness strategy is in the White House.  It belongs with the President and his appointed council.

H.R. 525 puts all of those agencies in the same room working on the strategy, with the various domestic preparedness programs on the table to be discussed.

My legislation does not seek to increase the federal bureaucracy by creating a new agency.  It does not realign existing agencies, nor does it dictate to the President what type of strategy needs to be developed.  It expands the current authority of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to specifically include a domestic terrorist incident using weapons of mass destruction in the definition of “disaster” for which FEMA already has jurisdiction.  It also allows the President the flexibility to design the national strategy to include, exclude, realign, or enhance any agency as he (or she) sees fit.   It specifically avoids mandating agency realignment until a national strategy is actually crafted.  There should be no shifting of roles, responsibilities, or funding until a clear, coordinated national policy of how we plan to prepare ourselves for domestic terrorism is created.

There is no doubt that the federal agencies have created world-class training and exercise programs.  We are improving the capabilities of responders more and more each day; however, I am certain that we can put taxpayers dollars to better use by coordinating our federal efforts, not merely creating new ones.

I applaud the Presidential Decision Directives of the Clinton Administration that were designed to address this issue.  They were in response to the Oklahoma City bombing and sought to help coordinate federal efforts.  While helping to define the role of various federal agencies in dealing with domestic responses to catastrophic natural or man-made disasters, these directives and subsequent laws have helped create new offices and programs but have failed to address the overarching issues of coordinating federal efforts into a single integrated plan, streamlining the budgeting process, or responding effectively to state and local needs and concerns. 

Furthermore, the patchwork of directives, budget summaries, independent agency plans, and related public laws have provided no mechanism for accountability, no enforceable requirement for agency coordination, and no entity with responsibility to review agency funding, all of which are necessary for an effective organizational structure.  Even if given more time to try to force the existing measures to work more efficiently, a single statutory mechanism to address the coordination and budget issues does not exist. 

In addition, existing measures, including the recent National Security Presidential Directive issued by President Bush, and other proposed legislation, do not adequately address the need (nor provide a mechanism) to eliminate duplicative programs that lead to fragmentation between federal disaster response programs and confusion amongst state and local first responders.

To date, more than 40 federal departments and agencies have established programs to assist emergency responders in dealing with the consequences of terrorism. These programs primarily help train state and local officials to recognize and respond to a terrorist attack or create federal response teams that can assist state and local officials should an attack occur.  Currently, the Federal Government offers almost 100 separate federal terrorism preparedness training courses and has created over 100 federal terrorism response teams.

These federal programs are viewed by most as being fragmented, uncoordinated, inefficient, and confusing.  For instance, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has concluded, “Federal training programs on weapons of mass destruction are not well coordinated, resulting in inefficiencies in the federal effort and concerns the first responder communities.” 

Agencies have created programs to address domestic preparedness against terrorism, but in most cases their efforts are uncoordinated and do not address the needs of state and local responders. 

Unfortunately, many of the programs designed to enhance the capabilities of state and local responders duplicate existing federal programs and are created independently of each other.  The bottom line is that we have spent a good deal of money recreating the wheel when we should be trying to make it turn faster and more efficiently. 

The problem is that there is no single entity in charge of federal terrorism efforts.  In the absence of clear leadership, agencies have created training programs without knowing what is already out there and what the requirements should be for these various programs.    Furthermore, the government has not clearly defined an end-state to identify when we, as a nation, will consider ourselves adequately prepared to handle a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction.  

Without a national strategy and end-state we do not have a standard to measure the effectiveness of existing federal programs or any new ones. H.R. 525 provides voluntary guidelines for the state and local groups to follow.  From non-federally mandated guidelines, state and local groups can determine whether their programs meet requirements so they can allocate resources where they are currently lacking.  According to the International Association of Fire Chiefs, “It will be exceedingly difficult to reach an acceptable state of preparedness throughout the country if there is no defined level to which we should work.”

Preparing state and local responders for domestic terrorist attacks requires an orderly, focused national effort.  The federal focus should be on enhancing existing response efforts from an “all hazards” approach, not replacing them.  Our federal efforts must focus on the immediacy of assistance to state and local responders.  The fire community says that if we are going to save the community hit by an attack, it will be in the first hour after the incident.

Many local fire chiefs and state emergency responders tell us that federal assistance does not arrive on the scene of an event until it is too late – at the earliest three to four hours.  Chicago’s Fire Chief John Eversole stated during a Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee hearing in June 1999 that “if I have to wait three to four hours, then send me a lot of body bags, because that’s what is going to be left.”

Our responders need to be prepared as they are the first on the scene after an incident – but their resources may become quickly overwhelmed.  They need to get the training, equipment, and information to better deal with the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.  Our first responders need to know how to hand off the emergency once federal assets arrive.  The public needs to know there is a strategy to do these things.

H.R. 525 does not prescribe a “one size fits all” approach.  I welcome input from all interested members to craft legislation that will offer the best opportunity for passage in the House that will lead to reforms at the federal level. 

This bill is designed to be afford the President the latitude and flexibility to be able to work with his staff to create a domestic preparedness plan that can incorporate the recommendations of the entire Federal Government (not just a few select agencies), streamline the budget process, incorporate needs of state and local first responders, and define a level of preparedness to guide our national efforts in order to deal with the existing, emerging, and evolving nature of domestic terrorism.  As aspects of domestic terrorism such as cyber-terrorism and agricultural terrorism increase in likelihood, it is vital that a structure be in place that can quickly and appropriately respond by adapting the President’s Council to address the new threats.

This is a critical situation that requires our immediate attention.  America cannot afford to wait for another “Oklahoma City” before we start to seriously address the problem.  Hopefully, by this time next year, we will be discussing how the strategy is working.

Thank you Chairman LaTourette and Chairman Shays for the opportunity is discuss this important issue with the Committee.

Testimony of
Congressman Mac Thornberry
Joint Hearing
Government Reform Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations
Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Economic Development,
Pubic Buildings, and Emergency Management

April 24, 2001

Messrs. Chairmen,

I appreciate the invitation to testify today, but I am even more grateful for your decision to have this hearing in the first place.  If you believe, as I do, that defending the country and its citizens is one of the primary reasons we have a federal government, then the issues surrounding homeland security must get more of our attention.

Partly because we have begun a new century and a new millennium, partly because there is a new Administration, and partly because more of us are realizing that the pace of change in the world around us is accelerating at an almost frightening pace, there have been a number of studies and reports in the last couple of years on the world security environment. 

One overwhelming, common conclusion in them is that America and Americans are increasingly vulnerable to a broadening array of threats from a variety of actors around the world.  The development of technology and the rapid spread of technology makes us more vulnerable here at home.  We may also find it more difficult to pin down exactly who is responsible for some kind of attack.

The world learned in Desert Storm that it is foolhardy to hit us where we are strong.  So there is intensive search to find and to exploit our weak spots.  We will have a tough time knowing exactly who will try something, as well as when and how.  So we must prepare for uncertainty.

This past January, the bipartisan Commission on National Security/21st Century issued a report in which it found that:

“The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack.  A direct attack on American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century.  The risk is not only death and destruction but also demoralization that could undermine U.S. global leadership.”

We have often heard about the dangers associated with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons being smuggled into this country.  But we could also be devastated by computer attacks against our critical infrastructure or by livestock and plant diseases being introduced into our food supply.

Let me give you one fact that caught my attention.  Every day $8.8 billion of goods, 1.3 million people, 58,000 shipments, and 340,000 vehicles enter our country.  But the Customs Service is only able to inspect 1 to 2% of them.  The volume of U.S. trade has doubled since 1995, and some expect it to double again in the next five years.

And yet, by every account, we are not doing enough to protect our citizens.  The Commission on National Security/21st Century found, “[i]n the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated governmental structures.”

A July 1999 report by the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction concluded that “a cardinal truth of government is that policy without proper organization is effectively no policy at all.  If the Federal Government’s policy is to combat the threat posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction, then the government must be organized to do so.”

A June 2000 study by the National Commission on Terrorism echoed this conclusion when it found that “[t]his country’s seeming inability to develop and implement a clear, comprehensive, and truly integrated national domestic preparedness strategy means that we may still remain fundamentally incapable of responding effectively to a serious terrorist attack.”  The Commission also found that “the complex nature of current Federal organizations and programs makes it very difficult for state and local authorities to obtain Federal information, assistance, funding, and support.”

The General Accounting Office recently questioned whether having terrorism response teams associated with the National Guard and with the FBI and with FEMA makes sense.  Not only may there be duplication, but there may be confusion about who is responsible for dealing with an incident.

Homeland security is a big, complex problem.  No one bill and no one branch of government can address the need.  We need a strategy to reduce our vulnerabilities; we need appropriate funding of the efforts we make; and we need effective organizational structures.

President Eisenhower put it pretty well.  He said, “the right system does not guarantee success, but the wrong system guarantees failure.  A defective system will suck the leadership into its cracks and fissures, wasting their time as they seek to manage dysfunction rather than making critical decisions.”

My bill, H.R. 1158, tries to deal with part of the organizational deficiencies created by having literally dozens of agencies with some responsibility for homeland defense.  The bill does not try to fix all of the problems.  It does not deal with the military’s role in homeland security, for example.  It does not try to legislate a particular strategy.  But it does try to force more integration, coordination, and planning so that we can “prepare for uncertainty.”

My bill would implement one of the recommendations of the Commission on National Security/21st Century.  I think that it is important to say a word about that Commission.  We are all used to commission after commission producing report after report, which simply set on a shelf somewhere.  If we allow the reports of this Commission to simply set on a shelf, history will not be kind to us.

This Commission was unique in the exceptional background, experience  – and I would say gravitas – of its members.  Their political philosophies ranged from the left to the right.  But they unanimously agreed on the nature of the threats we face and on our lack of adequate preparation, and most amazingly, they agreed on what we should do.   

Following their recommendations, H.R. 1158 would essentially do 3 things:

1. It would transform FEMA into a National Homeland Security Agency, utilizing its existing regional structure.  The Agency would provide one central focal point and contact point for other federal agencies and for state and local entities.  Its Director would answer directly to the President and would give priority to operational planning and coordination.

2. H.R. 1158 would bring the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol under the umbrella of this Homeland Security Agency as distinct entities.  Each of these agencies are in Departments where their mission is very different from the mission of the Department.  Each of them play an integral part in protecting our borders, yet there is not the coordination we need. 

3. As part of this new agency, my bill would also consolidate a variety of programs to protect critical information infrastructure that are now scattered in a variety of places.

I would like to add one final point.  As we try to do a better job in preventing and preparing for the homeland attacks which are sure to come, the lines between foreign and domestic terrorism, between law enforcement and military functions, will become fuzzier and fuzzier.  The constitutional and civil libertarian concerns about where all this will lead are real.  Some of you may remember the outcry when a military serviceman shot an unarmed civilian along the Texas border a few years ago.

My bill tries to be sensitive to those concerns by utilizing civilian agencies while also making sure we are more effective in fulfilling that first function of the federal government -- to provide for the common defense.

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE IKE SKELTON

BEFORE THE TRANSPORTATION AND GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEES

ON HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES

APRIL 24, 2001 

Thank you, Chairman Shays and Chairman LaTourette, and members of the Government Reform and Transportation Committees.  I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.

I think all of us here today would agree that the United States needs to improve its ability to provide security for our citizens, our territory and our infrastructure against terrorist attacks.  Unfortunately, domestic terrorism is an increasing national problem, and the sad truth is that the federal, state and local governmental structures now in place do not operate in an efficient, coordinated and coherent way to provide adequate homeland security for our citizens.

Part of the reason for the lack of coherence in our domestic terrorism prevention and response capability is that terrorist attacks can come in many forms.  They may involve sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, crude home made bombs in suitcases, or computer intrusions that could disable our power grid or our air traffic control system.  Conventional, chemical, radiological or biological weapons may be involved.  An attack could come at our borders, at our places of government, on our military installations, or at a place where people congregate for a brief event.  The process of identifying, acquiring and planning the use of resources needed to prevent or respond to a potential or actual terrorist incident is complex and necessarily involves several executive departments and agencies at federal, state and local levels.

I do not believe we presently have an adequate comprehensive, government-wide national strategy concerning the role of the United States Government in the many facets of homeland security.  The bill I've introduced, H.R. 1292, recognizes this deficiency and directs the president to develop and implement a national homeland security strategy.

In my view, it doesn't make sense to prescribe which governmental organizations are going to do what in terms of preparing for and responding to domestic terrorism until we have studied the threats, inventoried our capabilities and resources, and devised an overarching strategy for how to best address this problem.  It is premature to specify the organizational structure and shape of the federal homeland security operations until that strategy is in place.

At the same time, we know that any national security strategy must include certain components.  For instance, a strategy only makes sense if you identify the threats against which you must be prepared to respond.  We know that any strategy will involve roles for existing governmental agencies, and we must make those roles explicit.  My bill tries to outline the broad parameters and components of a national homeland security strategy without being overly prescriptive about what the specific strategy should say.

That's because, in my view, we in Congress are not in the best position to know what should go into a national homeland security strategy that will have to be carried out by the executive branch-the president, as chief executive, is in a better position to make those determinations.

As ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, I know that any homeland security strategy will have to make use of our military assets and capabilities.  But I can't tell you specifically how to make the best use of our military because those bureaucratic decisions are best left to the military and the executive branch.  The president and his departmental secretaries are in the best position to know the answers to issues concerning use of the military in homeland security.  As a result, H.R. 1292 directs the president to devise and implement this strategy.

However, I also recognize that Congress has obligations to the country for homeland security, and we do, after all, authorize and appropriate the funds that will make execution of this strategy possible.  Therefore, my bill requires the president to report to Congress on the process and time table for development of the homeland security strategy so that Congress will have an adequate opportunity to intervene legislatively should that become necessary.

Mr. Chairmen, we all recognize that domestic terrorism is a growing problem, and we all want our government's resources to be used in the most effective way in addressing homeland security issues.  My bill simply reflects my effort to keep the horse in front of the cart and to require the development of a comprehensive national homeland security strategy before we start implementing operational solutions to the problem.

Thank you, and I will be happy to try to answer your questions.

United States General Accounting Office 

Testimony
Before the

Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives 

Combating Terrorism
Observations on
Options to Improve the Federal Response

Statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:

We are pleased to be here to discuss three bills—H.R. 525, H.R. 1158, and H.R. 1292—to change the overall leadership and management of programs to combat terrorism.  Federal efforts to combat terrorism are inherently difficult to lead and manage because the policy, strategy, programs, and activities cut across many agencies.  Given that $11 billion will be spent during fiscal year 2001 and that more than 40 federal agencies are involved in this matter, we view this hearing as a positive step in the ongoing debate about the overall leadership and management of programs to combat terrorism.

We will also discuss additional related proposals from other congressional sources, such as Committee reports and commissions.  One of these, the Hart-Rudman Commission, had a scope beyond terrorism, including the broader issue of homeland security.

Our testimony is based upon our extensive evaluations—many of them for your Subcommittees—of federal programs to combat terrorism.[1]  Most of our experience is in evaluating programs to combat terrorism, and not the broader topic of homeland security.  First, we will discuss the three bills and related proposals and how they are similar and different.  Second, we will discuss key problems we have noted in federal programs to combat terrorism and how each of the bills might provide a solution to these problems.  In the course of this discussion, we will highlight specific provisions of each bill that could enhance the others.

SUMMARY

The three bills and related proposals vary in scope.  H.R. 525 focuses on federal programs to prepare state and local governments for dealing with domestic terrorist attacks.  Both H.R. 1158 and H.R. 1292 focus on the larger issue of homeland security which includes terrorism and additional threats such as military attacks.  Other proposals include both domestic and international terrorism and/or both crisis and consequence management.[2]  The bills and related proposals are similar in that they all advocate a single focal point for programs to combat terrorism.  However, the bills and proposals vary in where they place the focal point.  Some of them place the focal point in the Executive Office of the President and others place it with a Lead Executive Agency.  Both locations have potential advantages and disadvantages.

Based upon the problems we have identified during five years of evaluations, we believe the following actions need to be taken: (1) create a single high-level federal focal point for policy and coordination, (2) develop a comprehensive threat and risk assessment, (3) develop a national strategy with a defined end state to measure progress against, (4) analyze and prioritize governmentwide programs and budgets to identify gaps and reduce duplication of effort, and (5) coordinate implementation among the different federal agencies.  To the extent that these three bills—or some hybrid of them all—address these five actions, we believe that federal programs to combat terrorism will be improved.

BACKGROUND

Three recent bills have been introduced to change the overall leadership and management of programs to combat terrorism and homeland security.   On February 8, 2001 Representative Gilchrest introduced H.R. 525, the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001, which proposes establishing a President’s Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness within the Executive Office of the President to address preparedness and consequence management issues.  On March 21, 2001, Representative Thornberry introduced H.R. 1158, the National Homeland Security Act, which advocates the creation of a cabinet-level head within the proposed National Homeland Security Agency to lead homeland security activities.  On March 29, 2001 Representative Skelton introduced H.R. 1292, the Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001, which calls for the development of a homeland security strategy developed by a single official designated by the President.

Related proposals from congressional committee reports and congressionally chartered commissions provide additional, often complementary, options for structuring and managing federal efforts to combat terrorism.  These include Senate Report 106-404 to Accompany H.R. 4690 on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill 2001, submitted by Senator Gregg on September 8, 2000; the report by the Gilmore Panel (the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by Governor James S. Gilmore III) dated December 15, 2000; and the report of the Hart-Rudman Commission (the U.S. Commission on National Security/21^st Century, chaired by Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman) dated January 31, 2001.[3]  H.R. 1158 is based upon the report of the Hart-Rudman Commission.

BILLS AND RELATED PROPOSALS VARY IN SCOPE
AND THE LOCATION OF OVERALL LEADERSHIP

The bills and related proposals vary in the scope of their coverage.  H.R. 525 focuses on federal programs to prepare state and local governments for dealing with domestic terrorist attacks.  Both H.R. 1158 and H.R. 1292 focus on the larger issue of homeland security that includes threats other than terrorism, such as military attacks.  However, only H.R. 1292 includes a specific definition of homeland security.  The Senate Report 106-404 proposal is limited to domestic terrorism preparedness, including programs for both crisis and consequence management.  The Gilmore Panel report includes both international and domestic terrorism programs.  The Hart-Rudman Commission report (like H.R. 1158) focuses on the larger issue of homeland security. 

The bills and related proposals also vary in where they locate the focal point for overall leadership.  Federal efforts to combat terrorism are inherently difficult to lead and manage because the policy, strategies, programs, and activities to combat terrorism cut across more than 40 agencies.  The bills and related proposals would create a single focal point for programs to combat terrorism, and some would have the focal point perform many of the same functions.  For example, some of the proposals would have the focal point lead efforts to develop a national strategy.  The proposals (with one exception) would have the focal point appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.  The various bills and proposals differ in where they would locate the focal point for overall leadership and management.  The two proposed locations for the focal point are in the Executive Office of the President or in a Lead Executive Agency.

Table 1 summarizes the various bills and proposals regarding the focal point for overall leadership, the scope of its activities, and its location.

Table 1.  Proposals to Create a Focal Point for Overall Leadership and Management of Programs to Combat Terrorism

 

Source of proposal	Focal point for overall leadership	Scope of responsibilities	Location of focal point
H.R. 525	President’s Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness	Domestic terrorism preparedness	Executive Office of the President
H.R. 1158	Cabinet-level head of proposed National Homeland Security Agency	Homeland security (including domestic terrorism, maritime and  border security, disaster relief and critical infrastructure activities)	Lead Executive Agency (National Homeland Security Agency)
H.R. 1292	Single official to be designated by the President	Homeland security (including antiterrorism and protection of territory and critical infrastructures from unconventional and conventional threats by military or other means)	To be determined based upon the President’s designation
Senate Report 106-404	Deputy Attorney General for Combating Counterterrorism	Domestic terrorism preparedness (crisis and consequence management)	Lead Executive Agency (Department of Justice)
Gilmore Panel	National Office for Combating Terrorism	Domestic and international terrorism (crisis and consequence management)	Executive Office of the President
Hart-Rudman Commission	Cabinet-level head of proposed National Homeland Security Agency	Homeland security (including domestic terrorism, maritime and  border security, disaster relief, and critical infrastructure activities)	Lead Executive Agency (National Homeland Security Agency)

Source: GAO analysis of various proposals.

Based upon our analysis of legislative proposals, various commission reports, and our ongoing discussions with agency officials, each of the two locations for the focal point—the Executive Office of the President or a Lead Executive Agency—has its potential advantages and disadvantages.  An important advantage of placing the position with the Executive Office of the President is that the focal point would be positioned to rise above the particular interests of any one federal agency.  Another advantage is that the focal point would be located close to the President to resolve cross agency disagreements.  A disadvantage of such a focal point would be the potential to interfere with operations conducted by the respective executive agencies.  Another potential disadvantage is that the focal point might hinder direct communications between the President and the cabinet officers in charge of the respective executive agencies.

Alternately, a focal point with a Lead Executive Agency could have the advantage of providing a clear and streamlined chain of command within an agency in matters of policy and operations.  Under this arrangement, we believe that the Lead Executive Agency would have to be one with a dominant role in both policy and operations related to combating terrorism.  Specific proposals have suggested that this agency could be either the Department of Justice (per Senate Report 106-404) or an enhanced Federal Emergency Management Agency (per H.R. 1158 and its proposed National Homeland Security Agency).  Another potential advantage is that the cabinet officer of the Lead Executive Agency might have better access to the President than a mid-level focal point with the Executive Office of the President.  A disadvantage of the Lead Executive Agency approach is that the focal point—which would report to the cabinet head of the Lead Executive Agency—would lack autonomy.  Further, a Lead Executive Agency would have other major missions and duties that might distract the focal point from combating terrorism.  Also, other agencies may view the focal point’s decisions and actions as parochial rather than in the collective best interest.

THE THREE BILLS WOULD ADDRESS SOME KEY
ACTIONS NEEDED TO COMBAT TERRORISM 

Based upon the problems we have identified during five years of GAO evaluations, we believe the following actions need to be taken: (1) create a single high-level federal focal point for policy and coordination, (2) develop a comprehensive threat and risk assessment, (3) develop a national strategy with a defined end state to measure progress against, (4) analyze and prioritize governmentwide programs and budgets to identify gaps and reduce duplication of effort, and (5) coordinate implementation among the different federal agencies.  The three bills would collectively address many of these actions.  We will now discuss each of these needed actions, executive branch attempts to complete them, and how the three bills would address them.

Need for a Single Focal Point

In our testimony last May, we reported that overall federal efforts to combat terrorism were fragmented.[4]  To provide a focal point, the President appointed a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism at the National Security Council.[5]  This position, however, has significant duties indirectly related to terrorism, including infrastructure protection and continuity of government operations.  Notwithstanding the creation of this National Coordinator, it was the Attorney General who led interagency efforts to develop a national strategy.  Thus, at least two top officials are responsible for combating terrorism, and both of them have other significant duties. 

·        H.R. 525 would set up a single, high-level focal point in the President’s Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness.  In addition, H.R. 525 would require that the new Council’s executive chairman—who would represent the President as chairman—be appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.  This last requirement would provide Congress with greater influence and raise the visibility of the office.

·        H.R. 1158 would designate the Director of the proposed National Homeland Security Agency as the focal point for policy and coordination.  As with H.R. 525, the appointment of the Director by the President and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provides Congress with greater influence and raises the visibility of the office.

·        H.R. 1292 would require the President to designate a single official within the U.S. government to be responsible and accountable to the President concerning homeland security.

Need for a Threat and Risk Assessment

We testified in July 2000 that one step in developing sound programs to combat terrorism is to conduct a threat and risk assessment that can be used to develop a strategy and guide resource investments.[6]  Based upon our recommendation, the executive branch has made progress in implementing our recommendations that threat and risk assessments be done to improve federal efforts to combat terrorism.  However, we remain concerned that such assessments are not being coordinated across the federal government. 

·        H.R. 525 would require a threat, risk, and capability assessment that examines critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, evaluates federal and applicable state laws used to combat terrorist attacks, and evaluates available technology and practices for protecting critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks.  This assessment would form the basis for the domestic terrorism preparedness plan and annual implementation strategy.

·        Although H.R. 1158 would not require the National Homeland Security Agency Director to conduct a threat and risk assessment, it directs this individual to establish and maintain strong mechanisms for sharing information and intelligence with U.S. and international intelligence entities.   Information and intelligence sharing may help identify potential threats and risks against which the United States could direct resources and efforts.

·        H.R. 1292 would require the President to conduct a comprehensive homeland security threat and risk assessment.  This assessment is the basis for a comprehensive national strategy.

Need for a National Strategy

In our testimony last July, we noted that the United States has no comprehensive national strategy that could be used to measure progress.[7]  The Attorney General’s Five Year Plan[8] represents a substantial interagency effort to develop a federal strategy, but it lacks defined outcomes.  The Department of Justice believes that their current plan has measurable outcomes about specific agency actions.  However, in our view, the plan needs to go beyond this to define an end state.  As we have previously testified, the national strategy should incorporate the chief tenets of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P.L. 130-62).  The Results Act holds federal agencies accountable for achieving program results and requires federal agencies to clarify their missions, set program goals, and measure performance toward achieving these goals.[9] 

·        H.R. 525 would require the new council to publish a domestic terrorism preparedness plan with objectives and priorities; an implementation plan; a description of roles of federal, state, and local activities; and a defined end state with measurable standards for preparedness.

·        H.R. 1158 would require the annual development of a federal response plan for homeland security and emergency preparedness and would require the Director to provide overall planning and guidance to federal agencies concerning homeland security.  The bill would require the Director to work with state and local governments, but it would not explicitly require that the plan include the roles of state and local governments.

·        H.R. 1292 would require the President to develop a strategy and multiyear phased implementation plan and budget for antiterrorism and consequence management.  The bill requires the inclusion of specific, measurable objectives based on findings identified in a threat and risk assessment.  Furthermore, it requires the strategy to (1) define federal agencies’ responsibilities, (2) permit the selective use of military personnel and assets without infringing on civil liberties, (3) provide for the use of intelligence assets and capabilities, and (4) augment existing medical response capabilities and equipment stockpiles at the federal, state, and local levels.

Need to Analyze and Prioritize Governmentwide Programs and Budgets

In our December 1997 report, we reported that there was no mechanism to centrally manage funding requirements and requests to ensure an efficient, focused governmentwide approach to combat terrorism.[10]  Our work led to legislation that required the Office of Management and Budget to provide annual reports on governmentwide spending to combat terrorism.[11]  These reports represent a significant step toward improved management by providing strategic oversight of the magnitude and direction of spending for these programs.  Yet we have not seen evidence that these reports have established priorities or identified duplication of effort. 

·        H.R. 525 would require the new council to develop and make budget recommendations for federal agencies and the Office of Management and Budget.  The Office of Management and Budget would have to provide an explanation in cases where the new council’s recommendations were not followed.  The new council would also identify and eliminate duplication, fragmentation, and overlap in federal preparedness programs.

·        H.R. 1158 would not explicitly require an analysis and prioritization of governmentwide budgets to identify gaps and reduce duplication of effort.  Rather, it would require the Director to establish procedures to ensure that the planning, programming, budgeting, and financial activities of the National Homeland Security Agency use funds that are available for obligation for a limited number of years.

·        H.R. 1292 would provide for the development of a comprehensive budget based on the homeland security strategy and would allow for the restructuring of appropriation accounts by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as necessary to fulfill the organizational and operational changes needed to implement the national strategy.

Need to Coordinate Implementation

In our April 2000 testimony, we observed that federal programs addressing terrorism appear in many cases to be overlapping and uncoordinated.[12]   To improve coordination, the executive branch created organizations like the National Domestic Preparedness Office and various interagency working groups.  In addition, the annual updates to the Attorney General’s Five Year Plan now tracks individual agencies’ accomplishments.  Nevertheless, we have noted that the multitude of similar federal programs have led to confusion among the state and local first responders they are meant to serve. 

·        H.R. 525 would require the new council to coordinate and oversee the implementation of related programs by federal agencies in accordance with the proposed domestic terrorism preparedness plan.  The new council would also make recommendations to the heads of federal agencies regarding their programs.  Furthermore, the new council would provide notification to any department that it believes has not complied with its responsibilities under the plan.

·        H.R. 1158 would require extensive coordination among federal Agencies — especially those under the National Homeland Defense Agency — concerning their activities relating to homeland security.  For instance, the bill would require the agency’s Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection to coordinate efforts to address vulnerabilities in the U.S. critical infrastructure by working with other federal agencies to establish security policies, standards, and mechanisms and to share intelligence.  Additionally, H.R. 1158 would instruct the Directorate for Emergency Preparedness and Response to coordinate activities among private sector entities and federal agencies and the bill would delegate the coordination of all U.S. border security activities to the Directorate of Prevention.

·        H.R. 1292 would require a national strategy to provide for the coordination of federal programs.  For example the strategy would identify federal agencies and their respective roles and responsibilities for homeland security.

CONCLUSION

In our ongoing work, we have found that there is no consensus — in Congress, the Executive Branch, the various panels and commissions, and among organizations representing first responders — on the matters discussed in our testimony.  Specifically, there is no consensus on the required scope of duties or the location for a single focal point.  In addition, the three bills provide the focal point with different, but often similar, duties to improve the management of federal programs.  To the extent that these three bills — or some hybrid of them all — address the problem areas we have identified above, we believe that federal programs to combat terrorism will be improved.  Developing a consensus on these matters and providing the focal point with legitimacy and authority through legislation, is an important task that lies ahead.  We believe that this hearing and the debate that it engenders, will help to reach that consensus.

This concludes our testimony.  We would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgement

For future questions about this testimony, please contact Raymond J. Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-6020.  Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Stephen L. Caldwell and Krislin Nalwalk.

ATTACHMENT I

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Combating Terrorism:  Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy (GAO-01-556T, Mar. 27, 2001)

Combating Terrorism:  FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating Preparedness and Response (GAO-01-15, Mar. 20, 2001).

Combating Terrorism:  Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO-01-14, Nov. 30, 2000).

Combating Terrorism:  Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, July 26, 2000).

Combating Terrorism:  Comments on Bill H.R. 4210 to Manage Selected Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-172, May 4, 2000).

Combating Terrorism:  How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism (GAO/NSIAD-00-85, Apr. 7, 2000).

Combating Terrorism:  Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145, Apr. 6, 2000).

Combating Terrorism:  Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, Mar. 21, 2000).

Critical Infrastructure Protection:  Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on Year 2000 Experiences  (GAO/AIMD-00-1, Oct. 1, 1999).

Combating Terrorism:  Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Sept. 7, 1999).

Combating Terrorism:  Observations on Growth in Federal Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999).

Combating Terrorism:  Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).

Combating Terrorism:  Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999).

Combating Terrorism:  Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Combating Terrorism:  Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

Combating Terrorism:  Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism:  Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

Combating Terrorism:  Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

(350070)

House of Representatives

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *   

Joint Hearing of the

 Committee on Government Reform

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

 And the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Testimony of 

JAMES CLAPPER, JR.
(Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Retired)

Vice Chairman,
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities
for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

24 April 2000

TESTIMONY OF JAMES CLAPPER, JR. 

Mr. Chairmen, Members of the Subcommittees, I am honored to be here today.  I come before you as the Vice Chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, also known as the “Gilmore Commission” (after its Chairman, Governor James S. Gilmore, III, of Virginia).  Thank you for the opportunity to present the views of the Advisory Panel.  Governor Gilmore was invited to appear today, and would liked to have been here personally, but was already scheduled to be out of the country on a Commonwealth of Virginia trade mission.  He asked that I appear in his stead.

The Advisory Panel was established by Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105­­–261 (H.R. 3616, 105^th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998).  That Act directed the Advisory Panel to accomplish several specific tasks.  It said:

The panel shall--

1. 1. assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
   2. assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
   3. assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, including a review of unfunded communications, equipment, and planning requirements, and the needs of maritime regions;
   4. recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to Federal agency weapons of mass destruction response efforts, and for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for weapons of mass destruction incidents; and
   5. assess the appropriate roles of State and local government in funding effective local response capabilities.

The Act requires the Advisory Panel to report its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction to the President and the Congress at three times during the course of the Advisory Panel’s deliberations—on December 15 in 1999, 2000, and 2001.

            Mr. Chairmen, you have asked that we provide testimony today on three specific issues:

• The current organization of the federal government for counter terrorism and the reasons improvement is necessary

• How each bill (H.R. 525, Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001; H.R. 1292, Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001; and H.R. 1158, National Homeland Security Agency Act) might produce a more effective and efficient organization of the federal government to counter terrorism

• Which specific provisions of each bill could be used to enhance the others

            Let me start by commending the sponsors of the bills—Congressmen Wayne Gilchrest, Mac Thornberry, and Ike Skelton—and their cosponsors, for their initiative and dedication in keeping these issues before the Congress.  Each of these bills contributes significantly to the public debate, and all will help in eventually finding the best possible solutions to some very difficult issues.

Current Structure and Need for Improvement 

         To many at the State and local levels, the structure and process at the Federal level for combating terrorism appear uncoordinated, complex, and confusing.  Our first report included a graphical depiction of the numerous Federal agencies and offices within those agencies that have responsibilities for combating terrorism. 

         Attempts to create a Federal focal point for coordination with State and local officials—such as the National Domestic Preparedness Office—have been only partially successful.  Moreover, many State and local officials believe that Federal programs intended to assist at their levels are often created and implemented without consulting them.  Confusion often exists even within the Federal bureaucracy.  The current coordination structure does not possess the requisite authority or accountability to make policy changes and to impose the discipline necessary among the numerous Federal agencies involved.

            Mr. Chairmen, we discussed extensively to what extent simply maintaining the status quo would contribute to a resolution of these issues.  We acknowledge the improvements that have been made in Federal Interagency coordination in the past few years, but we adjudged the current structure and processes inadequate, for the following reasons.

¨    Lack of Political Accountability—The senior person with day-to-day responsibility for Federal programs for combating terrorism—the National Coordinator for Security, Counter-terrorism, and Infrastructure Protection—is not Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed.  A career employee of the Executive Branch holds the position.   It is essential that the person responsible for these processes must be a senior-level Presidential appointee, confirmed by the Senate.

¨    Insufficient Program and Budget Authority—The current structure relies on a very involved process of interagency “coordinating groups” which depends heavily on meetings to get things done.  While there is opportunity for discussion and for suggestions to improve programs, there is no real authority to enforce program or budget changes.  Moreover, that the current format for budget submissions is insufficient in detail to prove useful in the budget deliberative process.

¨    Lack of Adequate Resources—The current NSC structure lacks sufficient staff even to oversee the Federal coordination structure—there is no inherent directive authority to require Federal agencies to detail support personnel—much less to engage State and local entities in the process of developing national strategies and implementation plans.

¨    Lack of State and Local Expertise—The current structure lacks the resources to accommodate the resident State and local staff expertise that is required to build strategies and plans with a true “bottom up” approach.

         For those and other reasons, we recommended the establishment of a senior level coordination entity in the Executive Office of the President, entitled the “National Office for Combating Terrorism,” with the responsibility for developing domestic and international policy and for coordinating the program and budget of the Federal government’s activities for combating terrorism.  The title of the entity is not as important as its responsibilities, the functions that it will be called upon to perform, and the structure and authorities that we believe, at a minimum, such an entity must have.

The National Office for Combating Terrorism

Responsibilities and Functions

1.  National Strategy.  Foremost will be the responsibility to develop the comprehensive national strategy described above.  That strategy must be approved by the President and updated annually.   I will address the key components of such a strategy later in this testimony.

2.  Program and Budget.  A concurrent responsibility of the National Office for Combating Terrorism will be to work within the Executive Branch and with the Congress to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to support the execution of the national strategy.  The U.S. strategy for deterrence, prevention, preparedness, and response for terrorists acts outside the United States, developed under the leadership of the Department of State, is comprehensive and, for the most part, appropriately resourced.  It is on the domestic front that much additional effort and coordination will be required.

The Executive should provide comprehensive information to the Congress to consider in the deliberative authorization and appropriations processes.  In addition to a comprehensive strategy document, supporting budget information should include a complete description and justification for each program, coupled with current and proposed out-year expenditures.

3.  Intelligence Coordination and Analysis.  We recommended that the National Office for Combating Terrorism provide coordination and advocacy for both foreign and domestic terrorism-related intelligence activities, including the development of national net assessments of terrorist threats.  A critical task will be to develop, in concert with the Intelligence Community—including its Federal law enforcement components—policies and plans for the dissemination of intelligence and other pertinent information on terrorist threats to designated entities at all levels of government—local, State, and Federal.

To oversee that activity, we recommended that an Assistant Director for Intelligence in the National Office direct the intelligence function for Combating Terrorism, who should be “dual-hatted” as the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Combating Terrorism at the National Intelligence Council.  That Assistant Director/NIO and staff would be responsible for compiling terrorism intelligence products from the various agencies, for providing national-level threat assessments for inclusion in the national strategy, and for producing composite or “fused” products for dissemination to designated Federal, State, and local entities, as appropriate.  That person will serve as focal point for developing policy for combating terrorism intelligence matters, keeping the policymaking and operational aspects of intelligence collection and analysis separate.  The Assistant Director will also be the logical interface with the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress.  It is, in our view, important to have a senior-level position created for this purpose.  To assist in this intelligence function, we also recommended the establishment of a “Council to Coordinate Intelligence for Combating Terrorism,” to provide strategic direction for intelligence collection and analysis, as well as a clearance mechanism for product dissemination and other related activities.  It should consist of the heads of the various Intelligence Community entities and State and local representatives who have been granted appropriate security clearance. 

4.  Plans Review.  We recommended that the National Office for Combating Terrorism be given authority to review State and geographical area strategic plans, and at the request of State entities, review local plans or programs for combating terrorism, for consistency with the national strategy.  That review will allow the National Office to identify gaps and deficiencies in Federal programs. 

5.  Proposals for Change.  We recommended that the National Office for Combating Terrorism have authority to propose new Federal programs or changes to existing programs, including Federal statutory or regulatory authority.

6.  Domestic Preparedness Programs.  The National Office should direct the coordination of Federal programs designed to assist response entities at the local and State levels, especially in the areas of “crisis” and “consequence” planning, training, exercises, and equipment programs for combating terrorism.  The national strategy that the National Office should develop—in coordination with State and local stakeholders—must provide strategic direction and priorities for programs and activities in each of these areas.     

7.  Health and Medical Programs.  Much remains to be done in the coordination and enhancement of Federal health and medical programs for combating terrorism and for coordination among public health officials, public and private hospitals, pre-hospital emergency medical service (EMS) entities, and the emergency management communities.  The National Office should provide direction for the establishment of national education programs for the health and medical disciplines, for the development of national standards for health and medical response to terrorism, and for clarifying various legal and regulatory authority for health and medical response.

8.  Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), and National Standards.  The National Office should have the responsibility for coordinating programs in these two areas.  The national strategy should provide direction and priorities for RDT&E for combating terrorism.  We believe that the Federal government has primary responsibility for combating terrorism RDT&E.  Moreover, we have essentially no nationally recognized standards in such areas as personal protective equipment, detection equipment, and laboratory protocols and techniques.

9.  Clearinghouse Function.  We recommended that the National Office for Combating Terrorism serve as the information clearinghouse and central Federal point of contact for State and local entities.  It is difficult for local jurisdictions and State agencies, even those with experience in complex Federal programs, to navigate the maze of the Federal structure.  The National Office for Combating Terrorism should assume that role and serve as the “one-stop shop” for providing advice and assistance on Federal programs for training, planning, exercises, equipment, reporting, and other information of value to local and State entities.

Structure and Authority

1.  Political Accountability and Responsibility.  The person designated as the focal point for developing a national strategy and for coordinating Federal programs for combating terrorism must have political accountability and responsibility.  That person should be vested with sufficient authority to accomplish the purposes for which the office is created and should be the senior point of contact of the Executive Branch with the Congress.  For these reasons, we recommended that the President appoint and the Senate confirm the Director of the National Office for Combating Terrorism, who should serve in a “cabinet-level” position.

2.  Program and Budget Authority.  The National Office for Combating Terrorism should have sufficient budget authority and programmatic oversight to influence the resource allocation process and ensure program compatibility.  That authority should include the responsibility to conduct a full review of Federal agency programs and budgets, to ensure compliance with the programmatic and funding priorities established in the approved national strategy, and to eliminate conflicts and unnecessary duplication among agencies.  That authority should also include a structured certification/decertification process to formally “decertify” all or part of an agency’s budget as noncompliant with the national strategy.  A decertification would require the agency to revise its budget to make it compliant or, alternatively, to allow the agency head to appeal the decertification decision to the President.  This limited authority would not give the Director of the National Office the power to “veto” all or part of any agency’s budget, or the authority to redirect funds within an agency or among agencies

3.  Multidisciplinary Staffing.  The National Office for Combating Terrorism should have full-time multidisciplinary expertise, with representation from each of the Federal agencies with responsibilities for combating terrorism, and with resident State and local expertise.  For programs with a domestic focus, the National Office for Combating Terrorism must have sufficient resources to employ persons with State and local expertise and from each of the response disciplines. 

4.  No Operational Control.  While the National Office for Combating Terrorism should be vested with specific program coordination and budget authority, it is not our intention that it have “operational” control over various Federal agency activities.  We recommended that the National Office for Combating Terrorism not be “in charge” of response operations in the event of a terrorist attack.  The National Office should provide a coordinating function and disseminate intelligence and other critical information.  Mr. Chairman, I should note at this point that the word “czar” is inappropriate to describe this office.  The Director of this office should not be empowered to order any Federal agency to undertake any specific activity.  With few exceptions, we recommended that existing programs remain in the agencies in which they currently reside.  One notable exception will be the functions of the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), currently housed in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  The new office should subsume all of the intended functions of the NDPO—coordination, information clearinghouse, advice and assistance to State and local entities.  The National Office for Combating Terrorism should also assume many of the interagency coordination functions currently managed by the National Security Council office of the National Coordinator for Security, Counter-terrorism, and Infrastructure Protection.  For example, the responsibility for coordination of certain functions related to combating terrorism—Assistance to State and Local Authorities, Research and Development, Contingency Planning and Exercises, and Legislative and Legal Issues, among others—will devolve to the National Office for Combating Terrorism.  We also recommended that the National Office for Combating Terrorism absorb certain entities as adjuncts to its office, such as the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and InterOperability.

5.  Advisory Board for Domestic Programs.  To assist in providing broad strategic guidance and to serve as part of the approval process for the domestic portion of strategy, plans, and programs of the National Office for Combating Terrorism, we recommended the establishment of a national “Advisory Board for Domestic Programs.”  That Board should include one or more sitting State governors, mayors of several U.S. cities, the heads of several major professional organizations, and a few nationally recognized terrorism subject matter experts, as well as senior officials from relevant Federal agencies.  The President and the Congress should each appoint members to this board.

A National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 

         Mr. Chairman and Members, the Advisory Panel believes that a truly comprehensive national strategy will contain a high-level statement of national objectives coupled logically to a statement of the means to be used to achieve these objectives.  Currently, there is no overarching statement of what the United States is trying to achieve with its program to combat terrorism.  Goals must be expressed in terms of results, not process.  Government officials have, in the past, spoken of terrorism preparedness goals in terms of program execution.  A comprehensive national strategy will answer the more fundamental and important question:  To what end are these programs being implemented?

         Instead of a national strategy, the nation has had a loosely coupled set of plans and specific programs that aim, individually, to achieve certain particular preparedness objectives. Senior U.S. officials have previously stated that several official broad policy and planning documents that were published in the prior administration—Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, the Attorney General’s 1999 Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan, and the most recent Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism[1]—taken as a whole, constitute a national strategy. These documents describe plans, the compilation of various programs already under way, and some objectives; but they do not either individually or collectively constitute a national strategy. 

         Although Executive Branch agencies are administering programs assigned to them in the various pieces of legislation, the Executive Branch, under the former administration, did not articulate a broad national strategy that would synchronize the existing programs or identify future program priorities needed to achieve national objectives for domestic preparedness for terrorism.  Moreover, it is our view that, given the structure of our national government, only the Executive Branch can produce such a national strategy.

         As a result, we recommended that the incoming Administration begin the process of developing a national strategy by a thoughtful articulation of national goals for combating terrorism, focusing on results rather than process.  The structure and specifics of the national program should derive logically and transparently from the goals, not the other way around.

Basic Assumptions

The Advisory Panel agreed on several basic assumptions to guide its approach to strategy development.  First, “local” response entities—law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical technicians, hospital emergency personnel, public health officials, and emergency managers—will always be the “first” and conceivably only response. 

Second, in the event of a major terrorist attack, however defined—number of fatalities or total casualties, the point at which local and State capabilities are overwhelmed, or some other measure—no single jurisdiction is likely to be capable of responding to such an attack without outside assistance.  That assumption is critical to understanding the need for mutual aid agreements and coordinated operations.

Third—and perhaps most important—there are existing emergency response and management capabilities, developed over many years, for responses to natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and accidents.  Those capabilities can and should be used as a base for enhancing our domestic capability for response to a terrorist attack.  We can strengthen existing capabilities without buying duplicative, cost-prohibitive new capabilities exclusively dedicated to terrorism. 

Major Elements of the National Strategy

The national strategy should be geographically and functionally comprehensive.  It should address both international and domestic terrorism. The distinction between terrorism outside the borders of the United States and terrorist threats domestically is eroding.  International terrorism crosses borders easily and may directly affect the American homeland.  That was evident in the New York World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and more recently in the activities around the turn of the century.  The terrorist bombings of the U.S. garrison at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, the two U.S. embassies in East Africa, and the recent USS Cole incident, also illustrate the reach of terrorists against U.S. interests and the profound domestic implications they pose.

To be functionally comprehensive, the national strategy should address the full spectrum of the nation’s efforts against terrorism: intelligence, deterrence, prevention, investigation, prosecution, preemption, crisis management, and consequence management.  Our nation’s highest goal must be the deterrence and prevention of terrorism.  The United States cannot, however, prevent all terrorist attacks.  When deterrence and prevention fail, the nation must respond effectively to terrorism, whether to resolve an ongoing incident, mitigate its consequences, identify the perpetrators, and prosecute or retaliate as appropriate.  The national strategy should deal with all aspects of combating terrorism and must carefully weigh their relative importance for the purpose of allocating resources among them. 

The national strategy should apply to the nation as a whole, not just the Federal Executive Branch.  The Federal government should lead a strategic planning process that involves States and communities as essential and equal partners.

The national strategy must be appropriately resourced, by all levels of government, to provide a reasonable opportunity to achieve its successful implementation.  At the Federal level, that will require a closer relationship between the Executive and Legislative Branches.  Nationally, that will require better coordination with State and local governments.

Articulating the End State: National Goals

         The first step in developing a coherent national strategy is for the Executive Branch to define some meaningful, measurable expression of what it is trying to achieve in combating terrorism.  The Federal government’s goals have previously been expressed primarily in terms of program execution.  Administrative measurements alone do not foster effective management of a national program. 

         The national strategy must express preparedness goals in terms of an “end state” toward which the program strives.  Since there exists no ready-made measurement of a country’s preparedness for terrorism, especially domestically, the Executive Branch must develop objective measurements for its program to combat terrorism, to track its progress, to determine priorities and appropriate funding levels, and to know when the desired “end state” has been achieved.  

         The nation’s strategy for combating terrorism requires results-based goals for three reasons.  First, the programs need an end-state goal.  Elected and appointed officials from Federal, State, and local governments must be able to allocate resources to specific geographic regions according to requirements of that region.  Resources should be allocated to achieve that broadest application for all emergency and disaster needs, consistent with preparedness goals.  That approach is fundamental to the principles of building on existing systems and to achieving the maximum possible multipurpose capability.

         Second, programs for combating terrorism need accountability.  Legislators and public officials, especially elected ones, must have some reliable, systematic way of assessing the extent to which their efforts and taxpayers’ money are producing effective results.  The performance and results of programs for combating terrorism are currently assessed almost solely according to anecdote.  The only concrete measure available at the moment is the dispersal of Federal funds—a process measurement that does not achieve effective strategic management. 

         Third, programs for combating terrorism need clear priorities.  It is impossible to set priorities without first defining results-based objectives.  The essence of any coherent strategy is a clear statement of priorities that can be translated into specific policy and programmatic initiatives.  Priorities are the transmission mechanism that connects ends to means.

Fostering the Means of Strategy: Program Structure and Priorities

         Setting priorities is essential in any strategy, but priorities require clear, results-based objectives.  With some meaningful sense of objectives, it will be possible to develop coherent priorities and an appropriate set of policy prescriptions.  For instance, should the nation seek a different level of preparedness for large urban centers than for rural areas?  What should be the relative importance of preparing for conventional terrorism, radiological incidents, chemical weapons, biological weapons, or cyber attacks?  Should the nation seek to improve its preparedness more against the types of attacks that are most likely to occur, such as conventional terrorist bombings or the use of industrial chemicals, or for those that are most damaging but less likely to occur, such as nuclear weapons or military-grade chemical or biological weapons?  With respect to biological weapons, which pathogens deserve priority?  Should the emphasis be on small-scale contamination attacks as opposed to large-scale aerosol releases of the worst pathogen types, such as anthrax, plague, and smallpox?  What is the relative priority for allocating resources to protect critical infrastructure, especially from cyber attacks?

The answers to these and other questions have important implications for the allocation of resources for training, equipment acquisition, exercises, research and development, pharmaceutical stockpiles, vaccination programs, and response plans.  A coherent national strategy would provide clarity to the allocation of resources across the full range of possible activities to combat terrorism.  To date, these critical resource allocation decisions have been made in an ad hoc manner and without reference to meaningful national goals. 

We cannot stress strongly enough that the strategy must be truly national in character—not just Federal.  The approach to the domestic part of the national strategy should, therefore, be “bottom up,” developed in close coordination with local, State, and other Federal entities.

            Mr. Chairman, for those and other reasons, we believe that it is time to craft a national strategy for combating terrorism to guide our efforts—one that will give our citizens a level of assurance that we have a good plan for dealing with the issue; one that will provide State and local governments with some direction that will help them make decisions that will contribute to the overall national effort; one that will let our potential adversaries know, in no uncertain terms, how serious we are.

Analysis of the Three Bills

         Mr. Chairmen, I will now attempt to answer collectively your second and third issues, as the apply to each of the measures under consideration:

How each bill might produce a more effective and efficient organization

 of the federal government to counter terrorism; and which specific provisions of each bill could be used to enhance the others. 

If I may, let me address them in a little different order than the sequence in which each was introduced.  In order to provide some structure to this analysis, I will direct my critique of each measure to those specific elements that the Advisory Panel determined were essential for any structure and process at the federal level.  At the end of my statement, I have appended a matrix that synopsizes this analysis.

H.R. 1292, Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001 (Congressman Ike Skelton)

Responsibilities

1.       National Strategy.  The heart of Mr. Skelton’s bill is clearly, of course, the development of a national strategy.  Therefore, we certainly commend that measure as being a major step forward.  The bill correctly notes the absence of such a strategy, and the need for a fully-integrated approach—Federal, State, and local—in developing one.  We likewise applaud the recognition in the bill of the need for the “comprehensive threat and risk assessment with respect to homeland security” (Sec. 3(c).  The Advisory Panel has stated emphatically and from the beginning of its deliberations that comprehensive, articulate, continuing assessments of the threats are essential prerequisites to everything else that is done.  The bill does, however, differ in two significant ways from our recommendations.  First, it addresses all issues of “homeland security” including both terrorism and threats from foreign nation military forces.  The second way that it differs from our approach to combating terrorism is that it would only deal with domestic attacks—i.e., those inside the United States.  We believe that any strategy dealing with terrorism must include domestic and international aspects. 

2.       Program and Budget.  It is not clear to what extent this bill addresses the responsibilities for program and budget oversight, at least not within a single coordination entity.  Although it requires the appointment by the President of a single official “responsible for. . . homeland security” (Sec. 4(b)), it appears to leave all budget functions in OMB (Sec. 4(d)).

3.       Intelligence Coordination and Analysis.  We applaud the emphasis in the sponsor’s bill on intelligence collection and dissemination, including improvements in procedures for information sharing to State and local governments.  We believe that improvements in those processes are critical.

4.       Plans Review.  Not specifically addressed.

5.       Proposals for Change.  Not specifically addressed.

6.       Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation and National Standards.  While there appears to be no direct reference to the RDT&E function or to the development of national standards, it is reasonable to assume that the bill’s sponsor intends those issues to be addressed in the strategy itself (Sec. 3(b)), and in connection with the various agency responsibilities for implementing the strategy (Sec. 4).  Nevertheless, we felt that the issues involving RDT&E and standards are so important, that those areas should be addressed directly.

7.       Clearinghouse Functions.  Not specifically addressed.

Structure

1.      Political Accountability and Responsibility.    Although it requires the appointment by the President of a single official “responsible for. . . homeland security (Sec. 4(b)), it does not appear that the position requires Senate confirmation.  The Advisory Panel believes that it is important that person with responsibilities of this magnitude should serve at the “cabinet level.”  Moreover, since this person will inevitably become the focal point for dealing with the Congress on the issues, he or she should be subject to the ordinary confirmation process.

2.      Program and Budget Authority.  We have articulated in our report the reasons we believe it essential that the Executive Branch senior person have some limited but direct program and budget authority.  This bill apparently envisions the normal OMB process.  That may work, but it will, in our view, make it more difficult for the “Responsible Official” to carry out the assigned duties.

3.      Multidisciplinary Staffing.  Not specifically addressed.

4.      No Operational Control.  It is unclear the extent to which the bill anticipates the “Responsible Official” having operational responsibilities before, during, or after an attack.  It is our view that sufficient operational authorities and experience already exist for the various agencies of government, at all levels, to execute activities to deter, protect, and respond.  What is needed is a comprehensive national strategy and better coordination.  Our proposal does not include operational responsibilities in the National Office for Combating Terrorism.

5.      Advisory Boards.  This bill does not specifically address advisory boards.  We believe that, in certain functions—especially intelligence, domestic programs (such as training and exercises), and health and medical issues—that advisory panels can add significant value to the development of strategies, including especially those composed of State, local, and private sector representatives.

H.R. 525, Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001 (Congressman Wayne Gilchrest)

Responsibilities

1.      National Strategy.  The bill fully recognizes—as it should—the need for the development of a national strategy.  We likewise applaud the recognition in the bill of the need for the strategic plan to be based on comprehensive assessments of terrorist threats (new 42 U.S.C. Sec 653 (bill Sec. 9).  Unlike our proposal, however, this bill  would only address “domestic” elements and functions for combating terrorism.  We strongly believe that the domestic and international aspects of terrorism are so interdependent that any strategy should focus on the full range of deterrence, prevention, preparedness, and response, both foreign and domestic.

2.      Program and Budget.  This bill has very clear provisions for the oversight by the Council and other mechanism for program and budget oversight and coordination.

3.      Intelligence Coordination and Analysis.  We applaud the emphasis in the sponsor’s bill on intelligence collection and dissemination, including improvements in procedures for information sharing to State and local governments.  We believe that improvements in those processes are critical.

4.      Plans Review.  Although not specifically addressed, we assume that the review of state and local plans could be accomplished through the coordination mechanisms established under new Sec. 653.

5.      Proposals for Change.  Not specifically addressed.

6.      Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation and National Standards.  While there appears to be no direct reference to the RDT&E function or to the development of national standards, it is reasonable to assume that the bill’s sponsor intends those issues to be addressed in the responsibilities of the Council outlined in new Sec. 652.  Nevertheless, we felt that the issues involving RDT&E and standards are so important, that those areas should be addressed directly.

7.       Clearinghouse Functions.  Clearly covered in the functions under new Sec. 652.

Structure

1.      Political Accountability and Responsibility.    The bill requires the appointment of an “Executive Chairman” of the Council, subject to Senate confirmation.  As previously noted, the Advisory Panel believes that it is important that person with responsibilities of this magnitude should serve at the “cabinet level.”  Moreover, since this person will inevitably become the focal point for dealing with the Congress on the issues, he or she should be subject to the ordinary confirmation process.  This bill appears to accomplish that essential purpose. 

2.      Program and Budget Authority.  We have articulated in our report the reasons we believe it essential that the Executive Branch senior person have some limited but direct program and budget authority.  This bill requires agencies to submit budget information to the Council; for Council to make comment on those recommendations to the Director of OMB; and for OMB to “consider” the Council’s comments.  That may work, but without some specific budget authority it will, in our view, make it more difficult for the Council to carry out the assigned duties.

3.      Multidisciplinary Staffing.  The bill envisions staffing from other Federal agencies and provides authority to hire state and local expertise. 

4.      No Operational Control. The bill apparently does not anticipates the Council having operational responsibilities before, during, or after an attack.

5.      Advisory Boards. We note with approval that this bill specifically addresses the use of advisory boards.  As noted earlier, we believe that, in certain functions that advisory panels can add significant value to the development of strategies, including especially those composed of State, local, and private sector representatives.

H.R. 1158, National Homeland Security Agency Act (Congressman Mac Thornberry)

Responsibilities

1.      National Strategy.  The bill fully recognizes that a “comprehensive strategy” is needed, but does not articulate the essential elements of that strategy, nor who or what agency or entity has the responsibility for developing the strategy. 

2.      Program and Budget.  Other than the planning, programming and budgeting responsibilities for the new Agency (Sec. 8), and the requirement to provide “overall planning guidance to executive agencies regarding. . . homeland security (Sec. 3(c)(3)), there is no indication that there is any program or budget oversight or coordination with other Federal agencies.

3.      Intelligence Coordination and Analysis.  We applaud the emphasis in the sponsor’s bill on intelligence and information sharing but note that it only applies to U.S. and international intelligence agencies (Sec. 7).  As noted in our report, we believe it is essential to share such information with designated, and appropriately cleared, State and local officials.

4.      Plans Review.  There is only passing reference to working with State and local entities (Sec. 3(c)(2)).  We are convinced, for reasons stated in our recommendations above, that very close and direct relationships must be established with state and local governments.

5.      Proposals for Change.  Covered in detail in Sec. 6.

6.      Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation and National Standards.  Apparently the bill only addresses the Agency’s own RDT&E  (Sec 6(b)).  Standards are addressed only in the context of cyber security (Sec. 5(a)(2)(E)), and “international standards for enhanced security in transportation nodes” (Sec. 5(a)(1)(C).

7.       Clearinghouse Functions.  Not specifically addressed.

Structure

1.      Political Accountability and Responsibility.    Mr. Chairmen, this bill requires that the head of the new Agency serve at the “cabinet level”— appointed by the President with Senate confirmation.  While on the surface, that meets one of the specific attributes that our Advisory Panel has identified, it does not, in our view, address the requirement to develop a national strategy (Federal, State, and local) and to have the requisite authority to provide coordination of programs and budget throughout the Federal government, in close coordination with State and local entities.  As discussed in the following section, this proposal is, in our view, essentially only a “Federal”-level solution, and indeed not the entire solution at the Federal level.

2.      Program and Budget Authority.  We have articulated in our report the reasons we believe it essential that the Executive Branch senior person have some limited but direct program and budget authority over all affected executive agencies.  The Gilmore Panel looked hard at several models, one of which was an embellished FEMA (in fact, we considered recommending FEMA as an 11^th Cabinet Department), which, at the end of the day, we rejected.  

      We came to the conclusion that, given the wide-range of capabilities that must be included in the totality of thwarting and responding to terrrorism---“horizontally” across all the Federal departments and agencies, as well as “vertically”

with the state and local levels— we did not think it either necessary or appropriate for any organization to abrogate its responsibilities.  Furthermore, even if a “Homeland Security Agency” were established, it would still be in the awkward position of policing those other cabinet-rank departments which have responsibilities for combating terrorism.  The approach in the Thornberry bill (HR 1158) is limited to certain “planning guidance” for other entities outside the new Agency, and essentially no budget input beyond its own Agency requirements.  If this approach is designed to bring coherence and structure to the entire Federal government, we suggest that it falls significantly short of that goal.  The bill would:

·        Transfer the U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Border Patrol to the new “Homeland Security Agency,” using the existing Federal Emergency Management Agency as the foundation.   As a preliminary matter, each of the agencies to be transferred have significant missions—which they conduct effectively every day—which have little or nothing to do with the apparent intent of the instant legislation.   

·        Transfer certain other subagency entities—such as the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), and the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)—to the new agency.

Mr. Chairmen, even if that approach were sound, it would leave out of this new Agency several of the most important players in homeland security, most notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  More important, such drastic measures are, in our view, not necessary.  We firmly believe that existing agencies and entities—Federal, State, and local—possess essential authority and expertise to conduct the operations and activities required to defend our homeland.  What are missing are the vision, the strategy, the leadership, and the coordination, to bring all of those disparate pieces together when the situation requires.  Fortunately, that requirement does not occur on a regular basis.   There is, in our view, no requirement, therefore, to restructure our government in such an extreme fashion, with potentially far-reaching and unintended consequences.

3.      Multidisciplinary Staffing.  The new Agency would not, apparently, have the authority for staffing from all of the agencies potentially affected by the activities contemplated in this bill.

4.      No Operational Control.  While it appears that the new Agency would have significant operational assets of its own, there is little if any provision for the incorporation of other operational assets.  The strategy and plan for the incorporation of all affected entities—Federal, State, and local—is missing from this approach.

5.      Advisory Boards.  Not addressed.

Summary

            Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, the members of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction are convinced that essence of two recommendations are essential to the national effort to combat terrorism: the promulgation of a truly national strategy, and the appointment of a senior person at the Federal level who has the responsibility—importantly, who can be seen as having the responsibility—for coordinating, not controlling our national efforts—Federal, State, and local.

            We believe that can be accomplished without major upheavals in our governmental structures or in our uniquely American way of life.  Although the Advisory Panel on which I serve has its own views about how that should be done, each of the proposals before you, and perhaps others yet to be introduced, contributes immeasurably to the public debate, and should be seriously considered in the search for the best solution.

            This is not a partisan political issue.  It is one that goes to the very heart of public safety and the American way of life.  We have members on our panel who identify with each of the major national political parties, and represent views across the entire political spectrum.  We urge Members on both sides of the aisle, in both Houses of the Congress, to work with the Executive Branch to bring some order to this process and to provide some national leadership and direction to address this critical issue.

            Thank you again for this opportunity.

COMPARISON OF HR 1292, HR 525, AND HR 1158 WITH RECOMMENDATIONS OF

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TERRORISM

INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (“Gilmore Commission)

 

	HR 1292	HR525	HR1158	Gilmore	Comments/Issues
National Strategy	X-1	X-2	X-3	X+4	1.                Covers terrorism and nation-state.  Domestic Only. 2.                Domestic terrorism only; not international 3.                Recognizes need, but does not place responsibility/identify essential elements 4.                Comprehensive; domestic and international; full range of threats
Program Oversight	X5	X	X-6	X+	5.                Single person “responsible;” no definition of duties 6.                Only internal.  “Planning guidance” to other agencies.  Unnecessarily moves some (USCS, USCG, USBP) but not all related agencies (e.g., FBI) to new structure.
Budget Authority		X-		X+7	7.                Full budget certification/decertification authority
Political Accountability	X-	X	X(-)8	X	8.                Cabinet-level but only for limited agency assets
Intelligence Functions	X+	X+	X	X+
Plans Review				X	Entity must have authority and process for reviewing State and local plans for integrated response
RDT&E/Standards				X	Direct oversight of RDT&E and standards are required
Clearinghouse		X+		X+	“One-stop shop” is need for all Federal, State, and local agencies
Multidisciplinary Staffing		X		X	All Federal agencies, plus State and local disciplines, must be represented
Advisory Boards		X		X+	Advisory boards for State and local input and for intelligence coordination are essential
Senior Official Location	Unknown	Executive Office of the President	Homeland Security Agency (Enhanced  FEMA)	Executive Office of the President	Senior official needs to be independent of single agency “turf” and parochialism, and have broad, unbiased view of all related programs.  Official seen as having too much law enforcement focus may impede cooperation and coordination
Operational Control (Y/N)	Unknown	No	Yes-9	No	9.  Only direct control of those subagencies within its structure.  Does not have broad operational control over other agencies.

Before the House Committee on Government Reform,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations
and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management 

24 April 2001

Amy E. Smithson, Ph.D.
Director, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project
Henry L. Stimson Center

            Few would dispute that Washington’s halls are filled with very bright people, many with impressive degrees and policy making experience to their credit.   The soundest policies are based not on book learning and hypothetical thinking, but rather on real life experience.   As is well-known, real life is what is found outside of Washington’s beltway.   Comparatively few of those who have been setting the US policies on how best to prepare this nation to confront the specter of unconventional terrorism have ever fought a raging wildfire; unearthed victims from the rubble left behind by hurricanes, tornadoes, or bombs; encountered the ravages of a microscopic killer like Ebola and steered the implementation of measures to contain an infectious disease outbreak; or rescued and administered medical care to those involved in a major industrial or transportation accident.

Another major factor influencing the difference in perspectives that one hears inside versus outside of the beltway involves the relative disparity of resources.   In Washington, policy makers debate whether to spend mega-millions on this or that, while in US cities, fire chiefs scrimp to replace worn out respirators and public hospital administrators cannot even buy new gurneys.   No wonder, the “first responders” among your constituents would say, so much has been spent on unconventional terrorism preparedness, yet so much more could have been accomplished.

            Since an unconventional terrorist attack would create a disaster that has much in common with the calamities that this nation’s hazmat captains, emergency department nurses and physicians, public health officials, police, and city emergency planners and managers already deal with on a routine basis, arguably their experience and pragmatism should be driving the federal government’s approach to terrorism preparedness programs.   If Washington’s policy makers would listen to what these front-line rescuers and healthcare givers have to say, federal programs would be streamlined and would cost less, but the nation’s preparedness would increase manifold.

My remarks today amplify the voices of front-line public safety and health officials from 33 cities in 25 states that I interviewed from February 1999 to September 2000.   Since the publication of the report that resulted from these interviews, titled Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response, my co-author Leslie-Anne Levy and I continue to interact with front-line officials from these and other cities on an almost daily basis.  The executive summary of this report contains all manner of practical recommendations about how federal preparedness programs can be improved.   In all candor¾and these rescuers rarely mince words¾front-line responders are dismayed at the disarray of the federal government’s preparedness programs.  Any time the subject of federal leadership of terrorism preparedness programs was broached, the local officials gave eerily similar replies, which can be paraphrased as:  “They’ve been at this for five years and they still can’t figure out who is in charge,” I was told time and time again.  “All the federal agencies constantly preach at us about everybody working together at the local level, but it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to see they are fighting with each other tooth and nail over the money and missions.”

The good news is that local and state officials would be immensely relieved if somebody was definitively put in charge.   They find the current situation confusing¾over ninety different training courses and multiple equipment and planning grant programs, each with different guidelines,  hoops, deadlines, and areas of emphasis.    Local officials long ago lost track of the legion of federal rescue teams that have been beefed up or simply built from scratch.   Ask local responders and they will matter-of-factly say that every one of these rescue teams, unless pre-deployed, are of no life-saving utility in a chemical disaster.   Contemplate for a moment the odds that such teams would be pre-deployed where terrorists choose to strike and one can tap into local frustrations about how Washington has been spending taxpayers’ preparedness dollars.   Hordes of federal rescuers that arrive hours after a chemical disaster would just be another burden to exhausted local officials who have just gone all-out to contain damage and get survivors to the hospitals.   Anyone who studies case histories of emergency response to chemical disasters, including what happened in Tokyo in the immediate aftermath of Aum Shinrikyo’s 20 March 1995 sarin gas attack on subway commuters, understands this.   One has to wonder why Washington does not.  Quite frankly, so many federal rescue squads have been revved up that local officials are genuinely worried that if their city had the misfortune to suffer a chemical terrorist attack, they would be overwhelmed after the fact by wannabe rescuers.   Of this situation, one city emergency manager half-jokingly quipped that after getting the victims to the hospitals, his first order of business would be to station police at the city’s borders, guns pointed outward, to keep these would-be federal helpers at bay.

Conversely, ask local responders and they will readily convey their serious doubts that the federal  government could deliver sufficient medical manpower quickly enough during a biological disaster to stave off the collapse of the local healthcare system.   Similar doubts surfaced in the aftermath of the federal government’s TOPOFF exercise in mid-May 2000, where public health officials decided in the aftermath of a simulated release of plague in Denver that unless the federal government delivered 2,000 healthcare personnel within a 24-hour period, the local healthcare system would go under and citizens would begin to flee, taking the plague with them wherever they went.   This exercise also graphically demonstrated the shortcomings of the federal government’s organizational structure.   During TOPOFF, telephone conference calls linked roughly 100 different government officials for the purpose of making decisions.  The current structure puts the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in charge of crisis management, while the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has the lead on consequence management, which meant that public health officials had to funnel their recommendations through two different command centers back to a high-level interagency command center in Washington.  Federal officials and their contractors may characterize TOPOFF as a success, but talk to the locals and they will describe how the exercise underscored the foibles of the federal structure.  If the committee will pardon the reference, the road to Hades is paved with decisions by committee.  A major public health disaster is no time to have FBI and FEMA personnel second-guessing or tweaking the decisions of the real experts who should be calling the shots in such circumstances, public health officials.    In other words, in a real pandemic the existing crisis-consequence management structure would be a disaster in and of itself.

While some gains have undoubtedly been made over the last few years¾indeed Ataxia documents those gains¾it is fair to say that the current federal structure has steered the nation’s preparedness programs seriously off track.   The magnitude of the detour can be seen by checking where the dollars have gone.   The intent of this program’s original architects, Senators Sam Nunn (D-Georgia, ret.), Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), and Pete Domenici (R-New Mexico), was to help the nation’s first responders get better prepared to grapple with the aftereffects of an unconventional terrorist attack.   In 2000, the counter terrorism budget was $8.4 billion, of which, according to the Office of Management and Budget, some $1.4 billion was spent on defense against weapons of mass destruction terrorism.  Of that $1.4 billion, as Figure 1 shows, only $315 million went to assist the first responders.   Clearly, an absurdly small slice of the funding pie has made it beyond the beltway.

Figure 1: US Fiscal Year 2000 Counterterrorism Spending

Given this topsy-turvy state of affairs, local officials and I applaud your efforts to wrest order from the spaghetti-like maze that now constitutes the federal organizational chart.  The sooner a definitive federal structure is put in place, the sooner the agencies involved would hopefully concentrate on the real task at hand, namely preparedness.   On the other hand, locals did not have any clear-cut favorites as to which federal agency should lead the pack.  Their preferences were influenced by their relationships and experiences with the local branches of various federal agencies.  Some favored leaving the FBI in charge, and others thought this should be FEMA’s bailiwick.  Still others made compelling arguments for why the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the Health and Human Services Department should run the show or described how they had carved out very cooperative relationships with the commander of a nearby military base.   In one city, officials said hands-down their first call would be to the local Environmental Protection Agency office, which always got to a hazardous materials accident scene quickly and pitched in positively.   In a way, the disparity of local opinions about federal leadership reflects the dilemma for those in Congress who must cast a vote on how to structure the federal government¾almost all of the agencies involved seem to be able to state a case for being crowned terrorism preparedness czar.

            Of the three bills being considered, by far H.R. 525, the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001, sponsored by Congressman Wayne Gilchrest (R-Maryland) and others holds the most promise.   H.R. 1291, Representative Ike Skelton’s (D-Missouri)  bill rightly asks for strategy and emphasizes the importance of good intelligence and improving medical response capabilities, but it has little in the way of specifics about government structure.    Congressman Mac Thornberry’s (R-Texas) legislation, H.R. 1158, leaves the federal government in charge of training programs, which is not cost-effective, and would create a new composite government agency, an unattractive option when streamlining is what is really in order.   What sets the Gilchrest bill apart are its proposals to consolidate coordination and oversight, to avoid recreating the wheel, and to shut down superfluous programs.

The language in the Gilchrest bill stops short of giving the proposed Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness czar-like budgetary authority, such as that conveyed to the Office of National Drug Control and Policy in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690).   By doing so, H.R. 525 endeavors to establish a stronger coordinating mechanism while skirting Congress’ limitations in dictating how a president organizes the Executive Office of the President.   The alternative is to create a czar-like structure outside of the White House, but as the General Accounting Office concluded in its 4 May 2000 assessment of previous proposals to manage counterterrorist programs, federal agencies are reluctant to cede influence even to a czar, so almost a decade can pass before a czar really begins to function as such.   The less-than-czar approach clearly has its downsides, lack of budgetary authority being the principal disadvantage.   The other drawback is that the fortunes of a council or coordinator located in the White House can wax or wane with the interest shown by the president, Congress, or the general public in the domain at issue, in this case terrorism preparedness.

Therefore, although far and away the best of the three proposed laws, H.R. 525 would not be a perfect solution, if such a thing existed, even if the following improvements were made.   Anyone around when the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created can attest to the difficulty of creating a “purple-suite” office, where officials with different institutional loyalties are supposed to forge a policy making and operational team.  The Gilchrest bill verges on an interagency equivalent of the Joint Chiefs, something that the FBI’s National Domestic Preparedness Office attempted in the last couple of years with mixed success.   While federal coordination is very important, it is also pivotal that the proposed Council, which would orchestrate government policy, be grounded in reality.   Arguably, that reality check should come from outside the beltway, which is why the language in section 658 (a) of the bill should be amended to specify that the Executive Chairman of this Council have extensive local disaster and emergency management experience.   This stipulation would help ensure that the state and local advisory group proposed in section 652(6) does not get drowned out by the federal players.  Moreover, given this Council’s important duties, such a stipulation would avert the possibility that political appointees with no background whatsoever in disaster management would be parked in this job.

In addition, various subparagraphs of sections 652 and 653 of the bill require a determination of the sufficiency of existing federal response teams, programs, and activities and their compliance with an overall preparedness plan, including the identification of “duplication, fragmentation, and overlap” of these efforts.   The Council is also given the authority to weed out redundant programs and consolidate fragmented ones.   The elimination authority in section 653 (13) specifically applies to “preparedness programs,” but it should also apply to federal response teams and federally-funded state teams for the sole purpose of terrorism response.   This recommendation is made in view not only of the plethora of federal response assets that pre-dated Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 attack but of the marginal, if not negative utility many of the more recently created response teams would have in an actual chemical or biological disaster.   A prime case in point is the National Guard’s RAID or WMD Civil Support Teams.  Local officials, including many in the Guard, were scathing in their criticism of these teams, which they described as inept and essentially a waste of tax dollars. 

The Council should also be empowered in section 652 (13) to eliminate spurious programs because all manner of programs have been launched under the rubric of terrorism preparedness, some with dubious, if any, utility.   Moreover, until the initial assessment is made, the language in section 653 should be strengthened to institute a government-wide moratorium on any new rescue teams, programs, or bureaucracies.   Such a provision would complement the authority that the Council is given in section 659(b)(1), where federal agencies are required to notify the Council in writing prior to creating any new programs.  This provision is particularly commendable and should help to stem the spending frenzy of the last few years.

            Additionally, those in the public safety and health fields across the country would recommend adding a few items to the list of the Council’s duties in section 652.   First, the Council should be required to direct the federal government’s efforts in concert with the relevant nongovernmental organizations and state governors to see that preparedness training is institutionalized in local police and fire academies, as well as in medical and nursing schools nationwide.   As the General Accounting Office rightly pointed out in November 1998, the current 120 cities approach reaches responders that serve just over 20 percent of the nation’s population.  The time-tested and cost-effective alternative that would spread training to every part of the country, not just to the largest metropolitan areas, is to set standards and to train and regularly test personnel against them.   Such a strategy would help sustain preparedness and it would also get the federal government and its stable of expensive contractors out of the training business.

Second, the Gilchrest legislation could reinforce the findings in section 2 (a) about the importance of early detection and warning and also address concerns expressed in every city surveyed for Ataxia that public health and medical preparedness is lagging far behind the readiness of other segments of the response community.    Even brief consultation with public health experts will reveal worries that disease surveillance capabilities are probably not up to the task of  detecting an outbreak in sufficient time for life-saving medical intervention.   Hospital staffers rightly point out that heroic rescues at the scene would have little value if hospital personnel are ill prepared to treat chemical casualties and to decontaminate the swarms of possibly injured people likely to arrive at their doorsteps by other means.  Therefore, as a priority duty, the Council should be required to articulate a plan for jump-starting federal efforts devoted to public health and medical community preparedness with such programming as regional hospital planning grants and additional tests of disease syndrome surveillance systems followed by plans to establish such capabilities nationwide.

A final duty that should be added to section 652 is the development of a plan to sustain local preparedness over the long term.   The current concept for preparedness programs has US cities receiving federal training and equipment grant aid for a limited time period, which begs the issue of how preparedness is to be sustained indefinitely.  Cities surveyed for Ataxia were already beginning to backslide on some preparedness gains, so a formula that shares the fiscal burden among local, state, and federal levels must be found.  Otherwise, preparedness will gradually erode in the recipient cities as equipment is not replaced and repaired, refresher training does not materialize, and much-needed field exercises fall by the wayside.

On behalf of the local public health and safety officials who have shared their experience and common sense views with me, I urge you and your colleagues to waste no time in passing legislation that brings the burgeoning federal terrorism preparedness programs to heel and points them in a more constructive, cost-effective direction.   Such legislation would be for naught, however, if Congress does not more rigorously coordinate its oversight activities across committees of jurisdiction and exercise more discipline in the programs it authorizes.   The countryside is now peppered with various terrorism research and training centers that benefit the constituents back home but all too often duplicate existing capabilities.   Ideally, the Council proposed in the H.R. 525 would quickly give redundant training and exercise centers the ax and redirect the bulk of federal spending to enhancing local response disaster response capabilities that will prove their utility in all manner of emergencies, whether or not terrorists ever wield chemical or biological agents on US soil.