



Foreign Relations of the  
United States, 1950–1955

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# The Intelligence Community 1950–1955

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stress the care with which the necessity for the proposed increases has been scrutinized. This is in part borne out by the fact that if all the proposed increases are granted, the intelligence organization of the Department of State will still be substantially smaller than in FY 1953.

I strongly recommend that the Bureau of the Budget give its support to the proposed intelligence program of the Department of State for FY 1957.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

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## 229. Editorial Note

The U.S. Air Force had been developing the concept of plastic balloon reconnaissance since 1946. After studying the use of plastic balloons as carriers of photographic and electronic reconnaissance equipment since 1948, the Air Force by 1953 was experimenting and testing the balloons directed at the Soviet bloc. By the middle of 1954 the Air Force had test-launched over 500 reconnaissance balloons in Project Moby Dick and had by fall 1954 drawn up a basic operational concept for all future important reconnaissance programs. On March 23, 1955, Air Force headquarters assigned the Strategic Air Command to undertake a pioneer reconnaissance of Soviet territory. (Memorandum of conversation by Robert F. Packard, July 22; National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 61 D 67, Genetrix; John T. Bohn, "History of the First Air Division," unpublished history done in SAC History Division, Office of Information, Headquarters, SAC, November, 1956, vol. 1, pp. 2–3)

Project Genetrix, the codename ultimately adopted for the first U.S. Air Force large-scale, unmanned, high altitude balloon intelligence operation, was conceived and designed by the RAND Corporation for the Air Force as a means of overcoming the lack of photographic and meteorological intelligence on the Soviet bloc land mass. SAC was charged with operational responsibility for Genetrix. The plans for Genetrix initially called for free flight of balloons from west to east across the Soviet land mass from launching sites in either England, northern Europe, or the eastern Mediterranean. On June 28, the Air Force requested concurrence of the Department of State for conducting negotiations with German, Norwegian, and Turkish authorities to obtain cooperation on Genetrix activities on their territories.

*Implementation:* The Department of Defense will use its best efforts to carry out this Recommendation.

*Recommendation No. 9*

“That a comprehensive, coordinated program be developed to expand linguistic training among American citizens serving the Intelligence effort; and

“That the Department of Defense expand and promote language training by offering credit toward reserve commissions to ROTC students and drill credit to Reserve personnel for completion of selected language courses.”

*Concur in principle*

*Comment*

The Department of Defense endorses the importance of a comprehensive program of foreign language and area specialist training for persons serving the national intelligence effort and allied activities. It and its elements have taken various measures during the past years to further such a program. But in the case of ROTC and reserves, the Department of Defense is reluctant to provide for additional language training if such training must be at the expense of training in primary military subjects. Specifically, the Task Force’s recommendation would make for wider participation but would, not by itself, produce well-trained linguists.

*Implementation:* The various existing programs are being studied in the light of this recommendation with a view to achieving an optimum balance between qualitative and quantitative standards.

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## **240. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 22, 1955, 3:39 p.m.

The Sec. referred to Grayback.<sup>2</sup> Radford has written Wilson,<sup>3</sup> who took it up with the Pres., requesting that he be authorized to proceed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Conversations, General. No classification marking. Drafted by Phyllis D. Bernau. Secretary Dulles placed the call.

<sup>2</sup> Formerly known as Project Genetrix. See Document 229.

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, November 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5261/11–1655)

The Sec. has reservations about it—this is a dangerous and cumbersome way of going about it. AWD said there are two feelings in Defense. AWD talked with Quarles the other day. AWD thinks it will get them so alerted it will spoil other things he thinks have more potential.<sup>4</sup> The Sec. has to make a decision. AWD suggested they, Radford, Wilson and Quarles get together—AWD does not feel he knows enough about the potential to pass good judgment. The Sec. said they want authority here before December 1. The Sec. may call Wilson to see if it can wait until next week, or maybe Hoover can handle it. The Sec. said the Pres. is dubious about it on general principles. The Sec. said a lot of money was spent on it. The Sec. will find out how fast it has to move.

AWD said Strauss will use “megaton” instead of “large” in the release for Thursday’s papers. The Sec. said o.k.

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<sup>4</sup> Dulles is alluding to the U-2 which would fly over Eastern Europe in June 1956.

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#### **241. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 25, 1955.

Dear Park:

This is with reference to your letter of 5 October 1955<sup>2</sup> concerning the statements made in the report of the Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Clark Committee)<sup>3</sup> regarding the attitude of the Department of State toward intelligence collection activities.

As you point out, there is no substantiating data or argumentation for the implied charges made against the Department of State in the Top Secret Task Force Report, dated May 1955—at least not in that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5200/11–2555. Top Secret. The letter is attached to a November 29 memorandum from Armstrong indicating that Dulles’ letter was being forwarded to Hoover, Murphy, and MacArthur.

<sup>2</sup> Document 236.

<sup>3</sup> Documents 220 and 221.

portion of the report, which excludes pages 76–204,<sup>4</sup> made available to this Agency.

We have once again carefully reviewed Appendix II which deals with certain aspects of CIA's work.<sup>5</sup> The pertinent portions of this report appear to be:

"The allocation of funds for all projects of psychological warfare to specific areas, more particularly for propaganda, has been consistently influenced and too frequently interfered with by low-level State Department representatives since the beginning of the cold-war program. This intervention in the program by such representatives, whose interests are narrow and restricted to their assigned country areas, has at times in the past resulted not only in misdirected efforts on the part of the Clandestine Services, but in serious financial losses to the Government also, without a fair measure of gainful return. These might have been avoided had the DCI been given long-range national policy guidance at higher State Department level and had been permitted then to act on his own judgment, or, better still, had NSC more clearly defined the prerogatives of the DCI in carrying out his cold-war mission. To the surveying officer it is significant that NSC gave to the DCI the sole responsibility for carrying out cold-war operations aimed at the Communist bloc. Nowhere in NSC directives pertaining to this mission is it indicated that the DCI's responsibility therefor may be delegated to, or shared with, any other Government agency. . . . While there is no evidence revealed in this survey concerning any serious disagreement between CIA officials and these same representatives with respect to psychological warfare, it is clearly indicated that, as far as the Office of the Secretary of State is concerned, such policy advice has come on a piece-meal basis and too often not from specifically designated representatives of that agency."

[1 paragraph (3½ lines) not declassified]

I consider that there is no real basis of fact for the above allegations regarding the State Department's attitude. As regards policy guidance, the Department has been wholly cooperative and I do not consider that there has been any improper "intervention" or "interference" in the carrying out by CIA of cold war programs. [3 lines not declassified]

Sincerely,

**Allen W. Dulles**

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<sup>4</sup> Pages 76–88 concerned the Department of State and pages 89–205 examined the intelligence role of the Department of Defense. (Memorandum from Dillon Anderson to Goodpaster, February 14, 1956; Eisenhower Library, Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activities, May 1955–October 1956)

<sup>5</sup> Appendix II, which discussed the clandestine service of the Central Intelligence Agency, is not printed.

## 242. Memorandum From Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 1, 1955.

SUBJECT

“Operation Grayback”<sup>2</sup>

I have been fully briefed by the Air Force on “Operation Grayback”.<sup>3</sup> It is my view that while I would not today start the operation in view of possible newer techniques, nevertheless the operation is already mounted at a cost of approximately \$70,000,000, with personnel all over the world. The operation will probably produce intelligence data of considerable significance. Also, reasonable cover has been devised in that similar operations have, in fact, been conducted from a good many points in the United States and elsewhere, designed to obtain meteorological data. This cover will probably not fool the Soviets, but it will create a situation such that they cannot take any very great offense publicly.<sup>4</sup>

On balance, I would be inclined to go ahead with it if Sir Anthony Eden is also prepared to do so. While some operations will be started from Norway, Germany and Turkey, there is, I believe, primary dependence upon the British Isles.

I would suggest your authorizing me to advise Eden of the foregoing attitude on our part and see what his reaction is.<sup>5</sup>

JFD

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5261/12–1555. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Formerly known as Project Genetrix. See Document 229.

<sup>3</sup> The Secretary of State received an Air Force briefing on Grayback on November 29. (Memorandum of conversation by Armstrong; National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 766, Genetrix)

<sup>4</sup> According to the memorandum of the November 29 briefing, the Air Force proposed to say that the balloons were part of a worldwide meteorological research survey that the U.S. Government had been conducting for years. (Ibid.)

<sup>5</sup> A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “I concur C.E. Wilson O.K.” Below this note President Eisenhower wrote: “Original query to be of a *non*-pressure type. D.” Secretary Dulles wrote a December 1 letter to British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins in which he noted that he had discussed “Grayback” with the President who had asked him to notify Prime Minister Eden, through Makins, that he, the President, was disposed to let the operation proceed. He would, however, not take final action until he had Eden’s response. (Ibid., Central Files 1955–60, 711.5261/12–155) On December 3, Secretary Dulles informed Secretary of Defense Wilson that he had solicited Eden’s views and would let Wilson know of Eden’s response. He added: “I showed the President my memorandum with your concurrence with respect to ‘Grayback’. The President said that he was disposed to go along, provided Eden concurred. However, the President asked me, in putting it up to Eden, to make clear that the President was not trying to pressure him. I gathered that the President has not much enthusiasm for the project.” (Ibid., INR Files: Lot 61 D 67, Genetrix)

**248. Editorial Note**

Under a December 27, 1955, covering memorandum to the National Security Council, Executive Secretary Lay transmitted an undated report prepared by Nelson Rockefeller, "Coordination of Foreign Political, Military, Economic, Informational, and Cover Operations," which recommended farreaching changes in military theater and command organization and in the Operations Coordinating Board. (Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, William H. Jackson, Records, President's Papers) Rockefeller was scheduled to defend his views before the NSC Planning Board on February 20, 1956. Documentation on the Department of State's opposition to Rockefeller's recommendations is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 430.

Subsequently, Eisenhower's Assistant, Sherman Adams, asked the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, William H. Jackson, to examine Rockefeller's proposal. Jackson prepared a critical memorandum on April 2, 1956. (Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Records, OCB Organization) Finally, on March 26, 1957, following the issuance of Executive Order 10700 of February 25, 1957 (22 *Federal Register* 1111), which amended E.O. 10483 of September 2, 1953, by placing the Operations Coordinating Board within the National Security Council structure, Eisenhower agreed that Rockefeller's report could be removed from the NSC's agenda. At the same time, however, he referred the relevant recommendations for wartime responsibility for foreign information and psychological operations to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization to prepare plans. (National Archives, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, 1935-62, Box 115)

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**249. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 27, 1955.

## OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles  
Assistant Secretary Gardner (Air Force)  
General Twining

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of White House Staff Secretary, Intelligence Matters. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 28.

General Cabell  
Colonel Randall  
Colonel Goodpaster

The President said that the background regarding project “Gray-back”<sup>2</sup> was very hazy in his mind. He did not know how it had gotten started, although he did recall that it had been mentioned by Dr. Land in his office at the time of the Killian Report.<sup>3</sup> He now understood that it represents about a \$75 million investment, and that it is ready for initiation very soon. General Twining said that Admiral Radford had stated that he had presented the matter to the President for consideration, and he also said that Mr. Quarles had also stated that the matter had been presented to the President. He said that there is nothing in the records about this. Secretary Dulles recalled that just prior to the Geneva meeting he had raised with the President the question whether it should be held in abeyance.<sup>4</sup>

The President then said that regardless of how the matter progressed, it is timely to consider what should be done now. He understood that a plane that is being developed is coming along very well.<sup>5</sup> It also appeared that if the balloons were discovered, as they will be, certain questions become important—such as what will public reaction be in the UK and Japan, how many of them are likely to be shot down, whether their release will spur the development of higher altitude radar, etc. General Twining said it is practically impossible to pick these up by radar. It is also practically impossible to intercept them—our Air Force has made extensive attempts to do so and has never succeeded.

Replying to a question by the President, Mr. Gardner said there are approximately 2500 of these balloons. It is expected that 500 to 600 would pass through to the Western coast of the Pacific. One-half would travel at about 40,000 feet and the other half could be sent much higher. The project is manned with 4400 people in the United States and 1400 overseas. The President asked whether the project should not be presented as meteorological, with pictures taken to show ground speed, etc. Secretary Dulles said a further question is whether to do it at all. Mr. Gardner said that by late April or May four alternative items, with trained crews, should be available and capable of operating at

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<sup>2</sup> Previously known as Project Genetrix. See Documents 229, 240, and 242.

<sup>3</sup> Headed by James R. Killian, President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee prepared a study, issued on February 14, requested by the President on U.S. technological capability to reduce the threat of surprise attack. See Document 223.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 229.

<sup>5</sup> The U-2, a joint CIA-U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft.



approximately 80,000 feet.<sup>6</sup> General Cabell viewed the present project as a supplement, and thought if the balloons were kept below 50,000 feet they would not stimulate a “crash” radar program. There was discussion whether possible political reaction might tend to prevent use of the alternative when it is ready—in that case it might be well to consider delaying the whole project a year. The President said that there is a natural tendency toward reluctance for a bold program. If the results seem necessary, he would do it, but that is the question. He thought that an effort involving 2500 in a few months might cause alarm, where a dozen or so a week would not have a “crash” significance (Secretary Dulles asked what would be lost if the action were delayed for a year—Mr. Gardner said that the force will have to be largely disbanded and material would crack and disintegrate).

Mr. Gardner said that low altitude winds are satisfactory throughout the year except in July and August, and that if the lower altitudes were used—which seem desirable—the release could be phased out. The President thought they should be released at a number of points throughout the world. Mr. Dulles felt an agreed news release will be extremely important, and the President said it must tell a good story. General Cabell suggested that other countries be approached to ask them to return the equipment gondolas when they come down. Mr. Dulles agreed that it made a great difference if they were released a few at a time and in many places all over the world. The President thought that the announcement should be on the basis that when the winds are right, we will get off a number from all stations. He thought that if this is presented as a meteorological operation, it would be all right; he did not feel it could be done just in January and February, i.e., it should not be a “crash” program. Mr. Dulles suggested the following as points on which to agree: Launchings should be spread over time; medium altitudes should be used—50 to 55 thousand feet; some should be released from Japan, Honolulu and Alaska; notice should be given to other countries and to the world at large. The President indicated agreement and suggested that this notice bring out that we would like to have the items returned; that if any country wanted to develop the prints, they should take care not to destroy the negatives; that all languages should be used on the request for return, including Russian; that State Department should review the cover plan (Secretary Dulles to get a little group together to look at this); that the long-term aspect of the thing should be emphasized, bringing out that efforts in the past have been too intermittent and relating it to the “jet stream” shift responsible for the recent floods in California. To a question by Secretary Dulles as to how the photographing operation is to be

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<sup>6</sup> Gardner apparently is alluding to the U-2.

explained, it was indicated that operations are well advanced to inform the authorities of the International Geophysical Year<sup>7</sup> of this activity as a means of mapping cloud formations (which is, in fact, all that most photographs will show.)<sup>8</sup>

AJG

*Colonel, CE, US Army*

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<sup>7</sup> The International Geophysical Year was scheduled to begin July 1, 1957, with worldwide scientific observations of earth and astronomical phenomena. It would continue for one and a half years.

<sup>8</sup> President Eisenhower was given a technical briefing on December 27. On the next day Secretary Dulles told Fisher Howe that those attending the briefing included Secretary Dulles, General Twining, Trevor Gardner, and an aide to Secretary of Defense Wilson. The Secretary indicated at the briefing that the British had given their go ahead on December 25, and the President approved the operation subject to “certain modifications,” which included slowing down the rate of launching, extending the time period of the operation, and resubmission of the program to Secretary Dulles to whom the President “delegated authority for the final decision and triggering of the operation.” (Memorandum by Fisher Howe, December 28; National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 61 D 67, Genetrix) Another account of this December 27 briefing is in a telegram from Bergquist to General LeMay, December 28. (Ibid.)

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## 250. National Security Council Directive<sup>1</sup>

NSC 5412/2

Washington, undated.

### COVERT OPERATIONS

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the USSR and Communist China and the governments, parties and groups dominated by them (hereinafter collectively referred to as “International Communism”) to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other powers of the free world, determined, as set forth in NSC directives 10/2<sup>2</sup> and 10/5,<sup>3</sup> that, in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the overt

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to President for National Security Affairs Records, President’s Papers. Top Secret. This directive was transmitted to the NSC under cover of a December 28 note from NSC Executive Secretary Lay. Lay stated that the President had approved the directive on the same date.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, Document 292.

<sup>3</sup> Document 90.