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12 September 2007
[Federal Register: September 11, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 175)]
[Notices]
[Page 51898-51901]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr11se07-131]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2007-03
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory; Railroad Bridge Safety--Explanation
and Amplification of FRA's ``Statement of Agency Policy on the Safety
of Railroad Bridges.''
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2007-03 recommending that
owners of track carried on one or more railroad bridges adopt safety
practices to prevent the deterioration of railroad bridges and reduce
the risk of casualties from train derailments caused by structural
failures of such bridges.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gordon A. Davids, P.E., Bridge
Engineer, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 1120 Vermont
Ave., NW., RRS-15, Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-
493-6320); or Sarah Grimmer, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel,
FRA, 1120 Vermont Ave., NW., RCC-12, Mail Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590
(telephone 202-493-6390).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FRA published its ``Statement of Agency
Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges'' (``Policy'') on August 30,
2000 (65 FR 52667). The Policy Statement, included in the Federal Track
Safety Standards (Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 213) as
Appendix C, includes non-regulatory guidelines based on good practices
which were prevalent in the railroad industry at the time the Policy
was issued.
FRA has examined reports from January 1, 1982 through December 31,
2006 of 52 train accidents caused by the catastrophic structural
failure of railroad bridges, an average of two per year. During that
twenty-five year period, two people were injured and no fatalities were
attributed to structural bridge failure. In addition, since the
examination of those reports in April of 2006, FRA has learned of four
instances where lack of adherence to the guidelines in the Bridge
Safety Policy resulted in trains operating over structural deficiencies
in steel bridges that could very easily have resulted in serious train
accidents. It should be noted that FRA uses the term ``catastrophic
failure'' to describe an incident in which a bridge collapses or
directly causes a train accident. A simple ``bridge failure'' is a
situation in which a bridge is no longer capable of safely performing
its intended function.
During the past sixteen months, three train accidents occurred due
to catastrophic structural failures of bridges, all of which were
timber trestles. The most recent bridge-related train accident occurred
on the M&B Railroad near Myrtlewood, Alabama, where a train of solid-
fuel rocket motors derailed when a timber trestle railroad bridge
collapsed under the train. Several cars, including one car carrying a
rocket motor, rolled onto their sides and six persons were injured. FRA
has also recently evaluated the bridge management practices of several
small railroads, and found that some had no bridge management or
inspection programs whatsoever.
FRA therefore issues this non-regulatory Safety Advisory to
supplement and re-emphasize the
[[Page 51899]]
provisions of the Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges. FRA
recognizes the potential impact of regulations related to structural
integrity of railroad bridges. However, should these serious incidents
and failures continue and FRA determines that the responsible track
owners are not conforming to accepted engineering principles and
procedures, including those outlined herein and in the Bridge Safety
Policy, FRA might have to change course and develop a regulatory
approach.
FRA Bridge Safety Evaluations
FRA has been evaluating bridge management practices on a
representative sampling of the Nation's railroads, including class I,
II and III freight railroads, and passenger carriers. The evaluations
generally compare a railroad's program with the guidelines in the FRA
Bridge Safety Policy, and include observations of individual bridges to
determine their general condition, as well as the accuracy of the
railroad's inspection reports.
Most large railroads generally conform to the FRA guidelines, but
FRA has discovered instances where management had not adequately
evaluated or addressed critical items delineated in railroad bridge
inspection reports before they developed into critical failures or
near-failures. Many of the smaller railroads evaluated also conformed
generally to the guidelines, but a considerable number either fell
short by a large degree, or showed absolutely no evidence of bridge
inspection, management or maintenance.
This Safety Advisory
As serious gaps exist between the FRA Bridge Safety Guidelines and
the actual practices on many railroads, and because FRA has discovered
some extremely serious hazards as a result, FRA is issuing this Safety
Advisory. Its purpose is to explain and amplify the provisions of the
Bridge Safety Guidelines, and to discuss and make recommendations
concerning some points in addition to the guidelines that FRA has
determined are critical to bridge safety.
Conformance with the FRA Bridge Safety Guidelines
Certain provisions of the FRA Bridge Safety Guidelines are critical
from the standpoint of immediate safety to the development and
implementation of a railroad's bridge management program. These points
are reiterated and expanded below.
Responsibility for the Safety of Railroad Bridges
FRA has specified that the owner of the track carried by a bridge
is responsible for the safety of trains that operate over that track,
and therefore the track owner must know that the track is being
adequately supported by the bridge. Even though the Guidelines are
published as an appendix in the Federal Track Safety Standards for
convenience, that does not imply that the track owner need only assure
compliance with the minimum requirements of the Track Standards. Track
conditions that are well within the limits of the Track Standards might
also be valid indications of imminent bridge failure.
The owner of the track supported by a bridge is fully responsible
for the safety of trains that operate over that bridge, regardless of
any agreements, or division of ownership or maintenance expense, to the
contrary. The track owner must be able to control, and restrict if
necessary, the movement of trains on any segment of its track,
including the track on a bridge.
Capacity of Railroad Bridges, and Bridge Loads
The capacity of a bridge, and the actual loads that it carries, are
so interrelated that they must be considered together.
The load a bridge carries directly affects its serviceable life and
safety. These loads, and various external influences, impose forces on
the various components of the bridge. These components, in turn, are
each capable of carrying a certain level of forces without failing or
rapidly deteriorating.
Every properly designed railroad bridge is configured and
proportioned so that it will safely handle the forces developed by a
certain train load, together with effects associated with that load.
That load, termed the ``design load,'' is the general basis for
determining the safe capacity of a bridge. The design load is, most
typically, a series of wheel loads of defined weight, with spacings
between every pair of wheels of a defined distance. The bridge must
also be capable of carrying its own weight, the weight of other objects
permanently attached to the bridge, such as signals and pipes, and
other external forces, such as wind and stream flow.
An engineer determining the capacity of a bridge, a process termed
``rating,'' is fortunate if the original design documents of the bridge
are available, together with documentation of repairs, modifications
and inspections. In that case, the design load can be compared with the
original dimensions of the bridge and its components, including
inspection records that indicate the actual condition of the
components, and the bridge can be given a rating in terms of a common
standard series of train loads. Absent the design documents for a
bridge, an engineer should make a detailed inspection of every member
of the bridge to record its actual dimensions, material, and condition.
Every train moving over a bridge causes forces to be developed in
the components of the bridge. The magnitude of those forces in each
component are determined by the weight carried on each wheel, the
spacing of the wheels within the train, and associated effects, such as
impact, rocking, and lateral forces. The effect of the actual load on a
bridge can be associated with the effect of the rated load, and an
engineer can determine if the proposed or actual loads are within the
limits of the rated load, given any operating conditions placed on an
actual load.
Several critical points are associated with making a proper
determination of bridge capacities and loads. At a minimum, each track
owner should take the following actions:
1. Ensure that a professional engineer competent in the field of
railroad bridge engineering, or someone under his or her supervision,
determines bridge capacity;
2. Maintain a record of the safe capacity of every bridge which
carries its track;
3. Enforce a procedure that will ensure that its bridges are not
loaded beyond their capacities; and
4. Ensure that regular comprehensive inspections are conducted.
Bridge ratings will change with time, and will seldom improve.
Regular comprehensive inspections are vital to maintaining valid bridge
ratings and to performing timely bridge maintenance and repairs.
The rating of timber trestles is a less exact process than the
rating of steel and concrete bridges. Timber bridge components can vary
widely in their composition, quality and condition. The inherent
redundancy in timber trestles will partly compensate for a single sub-
standard component, but the good parts which pick up more than their
share of load from the weak member will degrade at a more rapid rate.
It is essential that a weak timber member be repaired or replaced in a
reasonable time; however, while it is still in place in the bridge, it
and its surrounding members should be given extra attention with more
frequent, detailed inspections.
[[Page 51900]]
Bridge Inspection
Railroad bridges are subjected to train loads and associated
effects, as noted above. In addition, they are subjected to both
natural and non-natural effects. Natural effects include decay,
corrosion, deterioration of concrete and masonry, thermal expansion and
contraction, freezing and thawing of water, floods, and growth of
vegetation. Non-natural effects include impacts from vehicles and
vessels, train derailments, vandalism and fires. All of these effects
can severely and rapidly degrade the capacity of a bridge to safely
carry its railroad traffic.
Railroad bridges also support much heavier loads in relation to
their own weight (ratio of live load to dead load) than do highway
bridges. All of these factors have led to a standard practice in the
railroad industry to inspect each bridge carrying railroad tracks at a
frequency of not less than once per year.
Bridge inspection, unlike the inspection of track, equipment and
other railroad property, is a multi-level process. The inspector is a
technician who should be able to reach all parts of the bridge to be
inspected, detect indications of deterioration or other problems on the
bridge, and accurately record and report them. Most railroad bridge
inspection programs employ inspectors with these qualifications, but
those inspectors are not expected to be able to perform the engineering
calculations necessary to determine the safe capacity of a bridge. That
function is performed by a competent engineer, working from basic
design and historical records of the bridge and the reports of the
inspector-technicians.
While the engineer needs complete and accurate information on the
condition of the bridge from the inspector, the inspector can provide a
much more comprehensive inspection if the engineer provides information
back regarding any critical points or components on the bridge that
might call for more intensive investigation or specialized inspection
techniques. These items might be discovered in the bridge design
documents, especially the so-called ``stress sheets,'' or by review of
certain types of connections that have been prone to trouble on other
bridges. This type of two-way communication can prove invaluable.
Protection of Train Operations
FRA did not address the issue of protection of train operations
from potentially hazardous bridge conditions in the guidelines because
FRA did not find it to be a problem at the time. Since then, however,
FRA has discovered several instances where a person who was not fully
qualified to determine the safety of a bridge was dispatched to resolve
a report of trouble, and that person approved the bridge for continued
service based on the criteria in the Federal Track Safety Standards,
rather than a structural evaluation of the bridge. In a typical case, a
track owner would have a railroad track inspector investigate a report
from a train crew of rough track on a bridge. It is possible that
during such an investigation, even a diligent track inspector would
fail to find a deviation from the requirements of the Track Safety
Standards for the class of track on the bridge, or, in the alternative,
would find that the track could be brought into compliance with a
temporary speed restriction. In this situation, it is likely that,
after possibly placing a speed restriction, he would have returned the
bridge to service while the structural condition that caused the track
anomaly still existed. Without further attention, the anomaly would
continue to deteriorate, until the bridge actually failed under load.
Recommended Action: FRA makes the following specific
recommendations to owners of railroad track carried on one or more
bridges, in order to prevent the deterioration of railroad bridges and
reduce the risk of human casualties, environmental damage and
disruption to the Nation's transportation system that would result from
a catastrophic bridge failure.
(1) Inventory of Railroad Bridges. Every owner of track carried on
one or more bridges should maintain an accurate inventory of those
bridges. The inventory, or ``bridge list,'' should identify the
location of the bridge, its configuration, type of construction, number
of spans, span lengths, and all other information necessary to provide
for management of the bridges.
(2) Regular Comprehensive Inspections. Every owner of track carried
on a bridge should ensure that regular comprehensive inspections are
conducted, as these are vital to maintaining valid bridge ratings and
to performing timely bridge maintenance and repairs.
(3) Determination of Railroad Bridge Capacities and Loads. Several
critical points are associated with making a proper determination of
bridge capacities and loads. At a minimum, each track owner should take
the following actions:
(a) Ensure that a professional engineer competent in the field of
railroad bridge engineering, or someone under his or her supervision,
determines bridge capacity;
(b) Maintain a record of the safe capacity of every bridge which
carries its track; and
(c) Enforce a procedure that will ensure that its bridges are not
loaded beyond their capacities.
(4) Railroad Bridge Inspection Procedures and Recordkeeping.
(a) Inspection frequency. Every bridge which carries railroad
traffic should be inspected at least once per year. The level of detail
and the inspection procedure should be appropriate to the configuration
of the bridge, conditions found during previous inspections, and the
nature of the railroad traffic moved over the bridge (car weights,
train frequency and length, levels of passenger and hazardous materials
traffic, and vulnerability of the bridge to damage).
(b) Inspection records. Every bridge inspection should be recorded,
and the record of the inspection be available to the engineer who is
responsible for the integrity of the bridge. The inspection record
should show the date on which the inspection was actually performed,
the precise identification of the bridge inspected, the items inspected
and the condition of those items. Any inspection item that is found by
the inspector to be a potential problem should be described in a
narrative.
Many different systems are used to ascribe condition values to
bridges and their components, but care should be taken that the
inspection reports do not simply generate a number but, instead, an
accurate description of the condition of the bridge components. It is
appropriate to use a valuation system that serves to identify
individual inspection reports that should be reviewed by the engineer
or other engineering managers.
(c) Prescribing inspection procedures. The engineer responsible for
the safety of a group of railroad bridges should prescribe the
inspection procedures for those bridges. Bridges of a common
configuration and no exceptional conditions may be considered as a
group for a common procedure, but uncommon bridges, those with critical
components and bridges which indicate possible deterioration that could
affect their continued safety should be noted to the inspector. The
inspector should be advised of any particular items of concern on the
bridge, and any specific inspection procedure (frequency, detail and
method) that is necessary to maintain the safety of the bridge.
(d) Review of inspection reports by a competent engineer. Bridge
inspection reports should be reviewed by an engineer who is competent
in the field of railroad bridge engineering. The
[[Page 51901]]
engineer should determine whether the bridges are being inspected
according to the applicable procedure and frequency, and will review
any items noted by the inspector as exceptions. Often, the individual
exceptions would not indicate a serious problem with a bridge, but when
considered together by an engineer, they would show a more serious
problem developing on the bridge.
(5) Protection of Train Operations. A bridge owner should designate
qualified bridge inspectors or maintenance personnel to authorize the
operation of trains on bridges following repairs, damage or indications
of potential structural problems. Only a qualified person should be
permitted to authorize train operation after such an occurrence.
Implementation of the FRA Bridge Safety Program
FRA has been conducting evaluations of railroad bridge management
programs since the 1980's, before the Bridge Safety Policy was first
issued. The Policy indicates that its guidelines will be the basis for
FRA's evaluation of bridge management. This Safety Advisory essentially
amplifies and clarifies the criteria included in the Policy guidelines.
The recommendations included in this Safety Advisory will be reviewed
by FRA personnel when conducting evaluations of railroad bridge
management. The same criteria, together with other risk factors, will
be considered by FRA when selecting small railroads for further
evaluation. FRA will maintain on-going evaluations on the larger
railroads and passenger carriers.
FRA has been able to adhere to its policy of not issuing specific
regulations governing bridge management, bridge conditions and bridge
capacities. If the continuing evaluations show that the railroad
industry is essentially adhering to the principles of good engineering
and the provisions of this Safety Advisory, and also provided that no
significant train accidents are caused by the structural failure of a
railroad bridge, FRA intends to continue with this non-regulatory
policy.
Owners of track carried on one or more railroad bridges are
encouraged to voluntarily take action in accordance with these
recommendations. If circumstances so warrant, FRA reserves the
authority to take other corrective action, including: issuing an
emergency order to restrict operations over a railroad bridge if
necessary to protect public safety, modifying this Safety Advisory
2007-03, issuing additional safety advisories, taking regulatory
action, or taking other appropriate action necessary to ensure the
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.
Issued in Washington, DC, on September 4, 2007.
Jo Strang,
Associate Administrator for Safety.
[FR Doc. E7-17811 Filed 9-10-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P