28 January 2003. Thanks to J.
Source:
http://adserver.libertaddigital.com/libertadvigilada/english.htm
According to disclosures in the book "Libertad vigilada" (Watching over freedom), whose author is Nacho García Mostazo, the "Fresnedillas-Navalagamella Satellite Monitoring Station" has ten large parabolic antennae that are allegedly being used to "tap" the satellite communications of the countries around us. The base belongs to the Ministry of Defence, but official sources affirm that its activities there are "a mystery".
In 1965, the United States built a space monitoring station in the town of Robledo de Chavela, in the Sierra of Madrid, to be used by the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA). Today, that base continues being one of the its strategic posts for space research. However, although NASA also built two other stations to support Robledo, the first in Fresnedillas de la Oliva (Madrid)and the second in Cebreros (Ávila). On June 1969, a parabolic antennae of 26 metres in diameter located at Fresnedillas achieved a historic goal in capturing the images of the arrival of the first man on the Moon.
However, Cebreros and Fresnedillas stopped being useful for NASA in the middle of the eighties, and the United States returned them to the Spanish state. The Ministry of Defence, which took over running them, closed the first in 1983. But it kept the second open, where the Army has recently has installed five parabolic antennae of over 18 metres in diameter and another five of some 14 metres, in addition to six smaller ones. Apart from two that seem to be disconnected, the other sketch a span that ranges from the south-west to the south-east, with a 45 degree tilt. This would mean that presumably they are orientated towards the geo-stationary telecommunications satellites that orbit at an altitude of some 36,000 kilometres above the Equator.
In 1986, the Government approved the setting up of a military project that was classified as secret, and that will fully operational in 2008. This is "Santiago Programme", whose main objective according to Defence sources is "the capturing of electro-magnetic broadcasts and images in zones defined as of strategic interest for national security". For this reason, the same sources confirm, the army is deploying a "network of sensors" with "communications, electrical and optical intelligence". Saying this in other word, Spain has a military espionage network composed of surveillance planes (the Air Intelligence Centre at Torrejón de Ardoz), observation satellites (Helios and others that will soon be launched) and land bases, although the system has not yet been finished.
Reportedly, the Fresnedillas-Navalagamella Satellite Monitoring Station, as it is officially called, would be one of the key strategic points of the "Santiago Programme". Since this is obviously a classified programme, the Defence Ministry cannot officially acknowledge it. But it does not even confirm that it owns the station and Ministry sources, headed up by Federico Trillo-Figueroa, assure us that the activities being carried on there are "a mystery". Nevertheless, the latest records of the Property Estate Tax (IBI in Spanish) of the Council of Navalagamella, the municipal district in which the station is located, states that the property belongs to the Ministry of Defence, that pays 11.713.52 euros each year as the tax for it.
A Spanish "Echelon"
The United States and the United Kingdom, along with other allied countries, have a series of bases from where it "taps" the satellite communications of the whole world. In the middle of 2001, the European Parliament denounced the existence of this espionage network, whose code name is "Echelon". As the Euro-chamber showed, there are at least twenty similar bases all over the world and each one of these are fitted out with large parabolic antennae that capture all the communications (telephone conversations, fax, telex, etc.) and those deriving from large filtering computers. These extract only those communications that could allegedly affect the national security interests of the USA, the United Kingdom and the other component members of the network.
According to reported data, Spain does not form part of this global espionage set, although the United States is collaborating with the Spanish authorities in order to provide sensitive information, obtained by this other methods, that would presumably be aimed at improving the anti-terrorist struggle. However, even though Spain is not officially involved in this network, this has not stopped it having developed its own systems in order to hugely spy on communications. It was not in vain that the new law concerning the National Intelligence Centre (NIC), the institution replacing the CESID, was passed into law at the start of 2002 and authorises Spanish spies to "obtain, evaluate and interpret signal traffic of a strategic nature".
The countries involved in "Echelon" have officially acknowledged its existence but, although it seems incredible, this activity is not illegal. The Spanish constitution, like those passed into law in all the other democratic countries, declares that the communications are invulnerable. In fact, both Spain and any other country in our sphere, have laws that stop the intelligence services from spying on their own citizens, unless with judicial authorisation, But the same degree of protection for residents of neighbouring countries is not considered. As such, the Spanish intelligence service cannot spy on a Spaniard without permission from a High Court judge, but it can do this if the individual is a Moroccan, Frenchman or Portuguese, for instance. The same happens with the other intelligence services of any democratic country. British spies have a very odd formula for justifying these activities: "What is up in the air belongs to everyone", they say.
In addition, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the wave of solidarity with the United States has prevented many other countries from denouncing the existence of the "Echelon" espionage network. In the middle of the war on terrorism, declared by George W. Bush after those traffic attacks, it seems clear that no Government will dare to break with the global coalition by protecting its citizens against this invasion of their privacy. In the same way, most of the countries allied to the USA, Spain included, but also France or Germany for example, have many reasons for not condemning the existence of "Echelon" and other similar programmes because, amongst other reasons, they would lose their own capacity to spy on the communications.
The Fresnedillas-Navalagamella Spanish Satellite Monitoring Station is not a radio-telescope, as several astronomists who have been consulted confirm, because the antennae would be placed in the form of a "Y" or a "V" in order to synchronise them, when this is not the case. Neither is this a "tele-port" of the Spanish telecommunications companies (Telefónica, Retevisión, etc.), nor a base associated with NASA, who re-integrated it into Spain in the eighties. Nor does it belong to the European Space Agency (ESA), whose monitoring centre is a few kilometres away in the town of Villafranca del Castillo, also in Madrid. Besides, access to the Fresnedillas base is prohibited and one of the civil caretakers working there says that this is a "national security" post and threatens to call the Civil Guard if the visitor takes photographs.
If these arguments were not enough to demonstrate what the presumed activities that are carried out there are, the definitive report from the European Parliamentary Commission that investigated the "Echelon" case conforms that "if two or more satellite reception antennae of over 18 metres (in diameter) can be found at a (military) station, it is certain that civil communications are listened to there". Following this definition, there is no doubt that the Spanish army could be using the Fresnedillas-Navalagamella base to spy on the communications that are transmitted by the satellites within the reach of their huge parabolic antennae, from America to the Middle East, or maybe beyond that, to the Indian Ocean.
Conil de la Frontera and "Operation Delikatesse"
But this station is not the only one associated with espionage of communications in Spain. In the province of Cadiz, the town of Conil de la Frontera is well-known for its whitewashed houses and its wonderful beaches. But very few people know that a concealed military operation has been carried out there since 1975. there is an important telecommunications station in Conil, run by Telefónica, that is linked through several undersea cables that connect Spain with the Canary Islands but also with Africa, America and several coastal countries of the Mediterranean. The traffic of the signals that passes through these cables is very valuable for any espionage agency. This is because not only do the calls between Spain and a good part of the world pass through Conil, but communications whose origin and destination is not Spanish territory are also linked up.
According to Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, author of several books about the German intelligence services, an espionage base was installed in Conil in 1975. This was orientated towards finding out the content of the communications that pass through the undersea cables. That operation was jointly carried out by German and Spanish spies and was called "Operation Delikatesse". CESID, the Spanish intelligence service, built a house very close to the Teléfonica station. This has been used since then as a front for this operation, as Spanish espionage sources confirm. The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), which is the German intelligence service, abandoned the installations in 1992 following German reunification, but the Spanish have carried on working there up to this time, presumably maintaining a listening post on the undersea cables.
This is a chalet that is known among the locals as "the house of the military" and curiously, it is located in a street called "Camino de los Militares", (Military Road). This is in spite of the fact that there is apparently no army installation there. Nevertheless, local sources confirm that uniformed men worked in the chalet until at least 1978, and that the name of the street, which corresponds to the name that the locals gave to that road situated on the outskirts of Conil derives from that chalet. Moreover, many residents recall that on February 23, 1981, when the coup d'état of the Lieutenant Colonel of the Civil Guard, Antonio Tejero, took place, both the chalet and the Teléfonica station were surrounded by military vehicles and uniformed men for hours. This would confirm that both posts are of strategic use for national security, albeit for different reasons.
The house is in perfect condition and apparently awaiting the arrival of its tenants. But it has never been inhabited by a family, but rather by employees of CESID, now the NIC. The most notable thing about the dwelling is a tower that has false balconies and whose windows are covered over. This confirms the thesis that this is presumably a front for espionage. There are presently only civil personnel in the "house of the military". The chalet is always closed, but a guard, several gardeners and other people carrying out unknown tasks work at the same place. The current employees, and even those who worked there years ago, are not authorised to talk about the operations that are carried out at the "house of the military". This is the "law of silence" that binds the spies to keep the secret until they die, like the "omerta" of the mafia.
Why military personnel and not civilian?
The huge espionage systems, like that allegedly installed at Fresnedillas or those that could remain concealed at the Conil "house of the military", "sweep" communications and it is very likely that they also intercept the conversations of Spanish citizens, although this may only be by accident. This matter is completely regulated in countries like the United States. The National Security Agency (NSA), which reports to the Secretary of the Defence, and is responsible for foreign espionage through "Echelon" and other similar programmes, requires authorisation from the State Attorney General (the Ministry of Justice) to spy on American citizens. But this legislation does not protect the citizens of another country in the same way. So, the NSA is authorised to spy, to a massive extent, on communications all over the world, provided that this is outside North American territory.
Although it seems surprising, telephone taps in Spain were not regulated until roughly a year ago, when the National Intelligence Centre laws were passed. With this new legislation Spanish spies -wary since such scandalous cases as that of the CESID tapping- have to obtain authorisation to interfere in the communications of a Spanish citizen from a High Court judge. But they also have the obligation the spy on and analyse the so-called "signal traffic" of a strategic nature, as has already been mentioned. This means that they can spy on international communications, provided that the taps do not affect Spanish citizens.
Nevertheless, it is surprising to observe how, coinciding with the approval of the NIC laws, the Ministry of Defence created the Armed Forces Intelligence Centre (AFIC - CIFAS in Spanish). Oddly, the AFIC is not regulated by any law, nor will it be in the future. Official defence sources confirm that a ministerial order will be published that will simply be limited to specifying the internal organisation of the Centre, but nothing else. Last December, the minister Federico Trillo made a pact regarding the Strategic Defence Review with the PSOE, the Spanish Socialist Party, that envisaged enabling "the process of rationalising the intelligence capabilities of the Defence, Army and Navy Staff, initiated with the creation of the Armed Forces Intelligence Centre".
The same document also mentions that "in order to face up to terrorism coming from beyond our borders, it will be necessary to make use of the capabilities of the Armed Force". Trillo emphasised, before the Congress Defence Committee, that military intelligence will only be orientated towards the cases of "a military threat abroad" and the "theatre of intelligence". However, he also acknowledged that the AFIC will not operate separately from the NIC, since its director Jorge Dezcallar will coordinate its activities. This aspect had already been established in the NIC Act, where it states that one of the missions of its directors is to "maintain and develop (...) the collaboration with the information services of the State Security Forces and Bodies and the organs of the civil and military administration that are relevant for intelligence objectives".
But while the NIC is authorised by law to spy on so-called "signal traffic", it is very possible that this institution has delegated the presumed espionage activities that are carried on at the Fresnedillas-Navalagamella base and the Conil chalet to the Army. This is because if a Spanish citizen falls through the "cracks" in the system, albeit by accident, the NIC would be breaking the law that obliges it to obtain prior authorisation to make taps from the High Court. Nevertheless, intelligence sources confirm that the concealed Conil de la Frontera operation continues in the hands of the NIC, that inherited it from the CESID. So, the Spanish intelligence agency could be acting against the the law if it also spies on Spanish citizens from there.
With respect to the alleged tapping carried out at Fresnedillas, the same sources assures us that the installation was never under the control of CESID, but rather was run by the army. This detail would confirm the thesis that CIFAS is currently coordating the activities that are carried on there. It seems clear that this would be the case because, if military officials are spying on a Spanish citizen, although they may not have intentionally intercepted his communications, nobody would have to give explanations before the courts or before Parliament as a result of this infringement of the fundamental rights to the inviolability of communications.
Years before, CESID had carte blanche to do what it wanted and it did so. It is now very possible that the NIC activities are more controlled thanks to the laws that regulate its functioning. But there is also the AFIC that can be entrusted with doing the "dirty work". Thus, we are in the same position as before, with the sole difference that the intelligence services have changed their name.
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*Sierra: A group of mountains.