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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

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SUBJECT: Proposed Control of the Italo-Swiss Frontier.

TO : A. C. of S., G-2(CI), AFHQ. (Through Channels).

Introduction. This frontier is 1167 kilometers in length and will be controlled by approximately 60 men of C.I.C., in conjunction with the Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, and SIM/CS.

1. Personnel. The frontier will be divided into five sections for administrative purposes with main headquarters in COMO. (See attached map) (Exhibit A).

a. Utilization and allocation of C.I.C. personnel is discussed in attached report. (Exhibit B)

b. Transportation and communication, as it directly affects the functioning of this section, is also discussed under Exhibit B.

2. Guard System.

a. Guardia di Finanza will be employed on the actual frontier as a permanent guard. The location of these different frontier points can be found on the attached map. (Exhibit C). The actual strength, as calculated by pre-war standards is shown on the attached report. (Exhibit D).

(1) The activities and control methods employed by the Guardia di Finanza will be under direct observation and supervision of selected C.I.C. personnel.

b. The Carabinieri will be utilized as an auxiliary force to supplement the Guardia di Finanza, in addition assisting C.I.C. in checking passengers and controlling traffic at the two security controls, DOMODOSSALLA and CHIASSO. If there is available personnel, utilization of roadblocks leading to the frontier will be employed. (See Exhibit E).

c. The Pubblica Sicurezza will be utilized in setting up defense in depth, i.e. Restricted Zone. This zone will not be an arbitrary line, but will be a series of roadblocks in the densely populated areas. In addition, Pubblica Sicurezza will be utilized in interrogation of suspects, and doing general police work in the rear areas.

Ltr to G-2(CI), AFHQ, re Control of Italo-Swiss Frontier - Continued.

d. SIM/CS will work in close conjunction with the C.I.C., having men at the recognized crossing points, as well as assisting C.I.C. in interrogation and related duties at the various branch offices. Close liaison between SIM/CS and C.I.C. will be necessary in order to apprehend clandestine crossers, and more so to determine the intent of violators of this control.

3. Topography.

a. The western half of the frontier is in high mountains, and road traffic is blocked by snow from October to May. In this area there are no lateral roads, therefore mobility in control will be difficult to maintain.

(1) The only year round route, and one of the most important is the railroad that passes through the SIMPLON tunnel.

b. The central section of this frontier is in the lake region, surrounded by low lying hills. The MONT CENERE pass is open the year round, and this road leads into CHIASSO, the actual frontier crossing point.

(1) Due to the number of lakes, and the dense populations of the section around COMO, this will be the most difficult area to control.

c. The eastern section of this frontier is also mountainous and the main crossing points into Swiss territory are SPLUGEN PASS, MALOJA PASS, and the STELVIO PASS.

(1) The MALOJA PASS (road traffic) is kept open the year round by snow plow.

(2) This section of the frontier does not lead into any populated area of Switzerland, therefore the control phase will be on a more limited basis.

d. See Exhibit F for detailed information.

4. Police.

a. In general, this control will follow the same procedure utilized by other frontier control agencies during military occupation.

(1) The frontier will be closed completely with the exception of the two recognized security control points.

(a) All passengers crossing at these points will be properly documented, and in addition to a valid

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Ltr to G-2(CI), AFHQ, re Control of Italo-Swiss Frontier - Continued.

passport and necessary visas, will possess an AFP if entering, or an MTA if departing.

(b) Stop lists will be employed as a further security check.

(2) A frontier control operates as a convenience for the military establishment, and its main function is taking appropriate steps to safeguard the security of military information and lines of communication.

(3) The frontier (or frontier permit system) will be put into effect immediately, and the permission for persons on either side of the frontier to cross back and forth will be the sole responsibility of this travel control section.

(4) The final decision as to permission of travellers who are an exception to the established rules to cross will rest with G-2(CI-iii), AFHQ. However, as much responsibility as can be delegated, should be delegated to the subordinate commander.

5. Operational procedure.

a. This frontier should be sealed as soon as possible.

(1) This travel control detachment will have to be among the first to arrive at the frontier.

b. Security controls at DOMODOSSALLA and CHIASSO should be set up, following a pre-arranged plan.

c. Travel control headquarters and branch offices should be set up, and personnel assigned to the border points for surveillance of the Italian guard system.

d. A survey of the complete frontier should be effected as soon as possible.

(1) This will enable establishment and dispersal of guard units so as to effect an efficient control of the frontier.

e. The frontier system to be set up.

(1) Those people wishing frontiers should be checked, and the final decision, based on objective investigation, will determine the feasibility of granting frontiers.

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Ltr to G-2(CI), AFHQ, re Control of Italo-Swiss Frontier - Continued.

6. Overall picture.

a. Topographically this will be a frontier difficult to control, and great reliance will have to be placed in the Italians. This in turn will necessitate close surveillance of the fixed guard posts.

b. The need for qualified linguists, and independent self-reliant Agents is self-evident, since this section in many locations will be the only representatives of AFHQ in the area, and will have to act accordingly.

c. Transportation, communication and supply properly arranged, will be prime requisites. The poor functioning of the above will be magnified naturally in an area covering 1200 kilometers, and could cause a complete breakdown of this section.

d. The necessity for close liaison with the local authorities, and thus understanding of the necessity of strict control is paramount and self-evident. Liaison agents should be chosen with great care, and they should be capable of insisting on adherence to the master plan without causing friction.

JAMES T. O. BRAAFIADT
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