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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
MILAN DETACHMENT, ZONE 3
APO 512

16 May 1948

SUBJECT: Communist Party Plan.
RE : Political and Military Preparations for Over-throwing
the Existing Government.
TO : GSI(b), 3 Dist., Northern, c/o 427 FSS, CMF.

The attached is a translation from the Yugoslav which was brought to this office by an informant who is considered reliable and who stated that it was stolen from a Communist headquarters in the Venezia-Giulia region. It is forwarded for your information.

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SUBJECT: Technical and Military Preparations for the Revolution and Particulars Pertaining to the Development of the Industries

I. GENERAL

A. It is necessary to divide the preparations for the revolution into two periods because the work differs and is significant in itself as well as necessary for the success of the movement. The two periods are:

1. Period of Political Preparation.
2. Period of Technical Preparation within the Organization.

The work of the former (1) is to concentrate all attention of the Communist Party (along general lines) on labor in general to win them over to Communism. In this period organization of the masses is desired, new members recruited, and the conquest of disbelief in communism of the worker and the working class.

The work of the latter (2), that is, the technical preparations of the organization can only be instituted when the Communist Party has won over to its ranks the masses of working peoples and when most working people are inscribed in the Party. When this is accomplished then only can the technical preparations be commenced to insure the overthrow of the existing government. Technical preparations should be instituted at a psychological time, such as:

1. During a grave economic crisis.
2. When the Communist Party has won over a majority of the working class.
3. When the workers and farmers are willing to take an active part in the battle.
4. When the ministers and heads of the armed forces suffer from indecision.

Principal orders during the above period are:

1. Organization and the arming of the revolutionary forces.
2. Demoralization and neutralization of the opposing forces.
3. Disorganization of the armed forces.
4. Choosing leaders to govern cities and towns as soon as the revolution commences.

Military activity during the political and technical periods of preparation will be confined to propagaanda and agitation, designed to confuse and disorganize the opposing forces. At the same time our own military forces should be organized. In this manner, the shortest possible time will be needed to develop our own forces and disorganize the opposition. The principal work therefore will be to disorganize the opposing forces.

B. The party activity should pass from the clandestine stage to a revolutionary stage without loss of time. During the period of transition calm should be maintained. Political and

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technical preparations should be conducted without compromising the objective of the party. Actually the goal can only be reached through a secret armed revolt. To insure the success of the revolution the work must be done efficiently. The objectives of these preparations are:

1. To assure with the advent of the revolution armed force which is adequately organized, prepared, and united.
2. To prepare and have in readiness all means and materials necessary for the struggle.
3. To work against the enemy and to weaken him without loss of time.

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

A. During the Period of Political Preparation

1. The Party will establish one organ for the direction and employment of all military organs. This organ will also be responsible for the organization and technical supervision of the armed forces.

2. The responsibility for the technical organization of the armed forces will therefore be placed in the hands of a triumvirate commission who are militarily capable to assume this responsibility. These men must be Party members.

3. One of the three members must be a member of the general committee of the Party and will function as secretary general of the military organization.

4. The other two members will be elected by the general committee of the Party from amongst the comrades and must meet the requirements under Article 2.

5. The work of the triumvirate will be divided as follows:

- a. One member will direct the organization of the Party's armed forces.
- b. One member will direct the offensive against the opposition.
- c. One member will be responsible for the coordination of the work of the triumvirate as well as the direction of the political work of the armed forces. He will be responsible to the general committee for the organization of the Party's armed forces and the destruction of the opposition.

6. Apart from the triumvirate a special organ will be created for the technical direction of labor. Its members will be trusted comrades, well qualified for the task who will be elected to their positions by the general committee.

7. The triumvirate system will be used in every district, city and province and will be directly responsible to the general committee and will be placed under the committees orders.

8. The directives governing the provincial committees will be the same as those governing the central committee.

9. The local triumvirate will be governed by the same directives as the provincial and central triumvirates.

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10. The secretary of the provincial triumvirate will report, and is responsible to the provincial central committee. All instructions issued by the general committee triumvirate to the provincial triumvirate will be thru the channels of the provincial central committee.

11. The provincial central committee will provide all assistants and collaborators needed by the provincial triumvirate.

12. Organization of the military is done by the above under the direction of one of the members of the triumvirate. This member is the only one known to them and they receive and follow his instructions and are familiar only with their immediate work and not of the complete military organization.

13. If conferences are required during this period all possible precautions must be undertaken to safeguard the material discussed and utmost secrecy is necessary.

B. During the Period of Technical Preparation

1. When the Party is mobilizing for the revolt, it is necessary to enroll as many workers as is possible prepared to assume an active role in the revolution. Organizations will be formed to govern the provinces after the success of the Military.

2. The direction of the work of the Party, both political and military should be concentrated in the hands of one single organ that represents the people. This organ, the People's Military Revolutionary Committee, should be separated from the territorial organization of the Party. It must employ men of action in preparing for the revolution.

3. Military centers and headquarters will be established to facilitate the preparative work and to coordinate the action of the armed forces. These headquarters will be indirectly responsible to the general committee. In creating these military centers both the military and political strategic factors must be kept in mind.

4. Competent authority will be in the hands of the Military Revolutionary Committee to insure that the plans for the unification of the armed forces and the revolution are completed and that sufficient men and commanding officers are on hand to be able to carry on independent military operations.

5. Military Revolutionary Committees are usually collective organs representing the principal organizations which participate in the revolt. It is of the utmost importance that the Communist Party should have the majority and play the leading role.

C. MILITARY CENTERS

1. Organs that will interest themselves solely with the technical preparations of the revolt were formed within the army of the revolution.

2. Apart from the Central Military Revolutionary Committee, a military headquarters under the direction of the a/m committee, with various sections will be organized and will deal with purely military organization and similar work under the direction of the central committee of the Party.

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3. The leaders of the military headquarters should be composed of men who are willing to cooperate with the political organization in case of revolt. They do not have to be from the working class, but faithful to the party.

4. A single head will direct the military headquarters. The authority of this person should be directed by the Central Revolutionary Committee. The coordination of the work of the military headquarters will be accomplished through conferences held with the heads of the interested offices under the direction of the military director of the Revolutionary Committee.

5. The military headquarters will be under the orders of the Central Military Revolutionary Committee's director. This director must be elected as being one of the most energetic of Party members, and must be popular with the workers.

6. The military headquarters of the Party will be composed of.

- a. Operations section
- b. Information or intelligence section
- c. Armament section
- d. Liaison section
- e. Communications section
- f. Sabotage section
- g. Quartermaster section
- h. Medical section

In emergencies one comrade can assume command of several sections. This is especially true in small provinces. The heads of the sections are nominated by the military director, and must be approved by the People's Military Revolutionary Committee.

7. The heads of the sections are responsible for their section and are subordinate to the military director. They should however, have sufficient movement of action, transportation and initiative to accomplish their mission.

8. Military headquarters will be established immediately when the revolution commences. Work must be done thoroughly. Technical advisors will be called when needed. All sections will be ready to assume their responsibilities in guiding the revolt as soon as the revolution commences, but their organization must be safeguarded against premature discovery.

9. The above orders must be flexible enough to meet the situation, but the principals should be kept intact.

10. In selecting candidates for the different sections of the military headquarters, their preparation and training, profession, past experience, and position in the party must be considered. In selecting these candidates one should be very careful to see that he, the comrade is fitted for the post, for one day one of these will be chief of the Red Army and should be elected with care.

D. PROVINCIAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION

1. The Party has agreed that the provincial Military Revolutionary Committee will be organized on the same basis as the General MRC and will have its own military headquarters.

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2. The provincial military organization are under the orders of the military headquarters in the various territories. Sub-sections depend upon the locality, but the functions of such offices are limited. Sub-sections will be watched because too much liberty and authority causes discord between the workers and the Party. All of these offices will be directed by the military headquarters.

III. ORGANIZATION OF COMBAT GROUPS
(Militia and other branches)

A. During Period of Political Preparation

1. The Military High Command will alert the provincial military headquarters of the worker's army to prepare and arm the masses so that potential combat units will be in readiness when the revolution commences.

2. The military head of the provincial headquarters should be in a position to contact all communists and sympathizers at the given moment.

3. All organizations are under the supervision of the triumvirate when military preparations are concerned.

4. The local triumvirate is under the leadership of the member of the central triumvirate responsible for administration.

5. The member of the local triumvirate responsible for the organization of our forces has at his disposition members of the party who are in contact with the different communist nuclei. These party members, with the aid of the organizer decide on military leaders to be appointed, keeping in mind long party standing and military experience.

6. The work of the organizer is to direct the formation or nuclei of Party members into combatant groups.

7. In order to assure good control, a combat group should not exceed ten men.

8. The leader of a combat group is to be one who is devoted to the revolutionary cause as the leader of the group is responsible for the military preparation of the group.

9. Each member of a group should be instructed in the following:

- a. Use of weapons
- b. Tactical use of weapons especially at close quarters.
- c. Liaison and traffic control.

10. The provincial triumvirate will decide on the number of combat groups, machine gunners, grenadiers, saboteurs, miners, chemical warfare men and other experienced to be used.

11. From a political and military point of view the group must understand the importance of the armed revolt to make the fight a decisive one for the creation of a proletarian dictatorship.

12. Fundamental principals in instruction to combat groups are street fighting and recognition of military objectives.

13. Practical instruction must be emphasized. Instruction should be established by the military triumvirate with emphasis

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placed on night attacks and surprise attacks.

14. Classes should not exceed the figure ten during military instruction periods.

15. Open training can be accomplished under the guise of athletic organizations, clubs, health associations etc.

B. During Period of Technical Preparation

1. The organization of proletarian combat groups seeks to:
a. Penetrate the revolutionary masses of workers and farmers and effect a solid and flexible organization.

b. Prepare the chain of command not only for initial successes, but also after the initial goal has been attained.

2. The organization of the armed forces should be accomplishing using as an example the armed forces of the country. The armed forces must have the following characteristics:

a. Simple and flexible.

b. In a position to permit the rapid formation of new units according to need.

c. The possibility of organizing minor combat units into major combat units.

d. All combat units to have freedom of movement.

e. Unity of purpose must exist both in industrial and farming regions, with the former being better organized.

3. Small military units in the provincial military zones must be organized in factories, industrial centers, farm regions, and villages.

4. During this period the combat groups in the major industrial centers must be in liaison with the proletarian masses to enable joint action and to assume the following:

a. Formation of units capable of handling large groups and coordinating military operations during combat.

b. Enable the choosing of able commanders for strategically located units.

5. Every effort must be made to form large units from smaller units located in the same factories and centers.

6. During the period of political preparation, a table of organization should be formed to aid in organizing units. Persons responsible for this must be familiar with the scheme of organization as well as immediate command. All lower commands should be familiar with the schemes of their higher commands.

7. One prerequisite is simplicity of the scheme. Uniformity must be attained to enable the preparations for the fight in cooperation with the proletarian forces. No large unit must have less than three nor more than six companies under its command.

8. Companies will be organized by drafting workers and farmers. The draft is a necessity of the military organization. Registration of recruits and assignment to combat units as supervised by a comrade appointed by the high command. The command and coordination of this work as well as the competence

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the person in charge is the responsibility of the local or provincial military commander as the case may be.

9. Before operations begin the recruits know only the immediate commander.

10. The commanding officers of the military organizations are morally under the command of the local military organization until the moment that their units are activated. They are under the authority of the local military organizations in the zone of action in which they are assigned for preparing the revolution. When the unit assumes the size of a regiment it no longer remains under the supervision of the local military command. This enables the unit to operate with the maximum freedom of movement in any number of zones.

11. When combat groups are formed, they must be cautious of independent groups formed by other parties. Partisans can be used when necessary, but must be kept under control during military operations. One of our commissaires must always be near the partisan leaders. They will only be supplied with arms and munitions if they place themselves under our command. Partisan organizations must always be kept under surveillance. We should take advantage of their personnel and arms and eliminate those hostile to our cause.

12. The authority to designate the commanders of combat groups rests with the local military commander upon confirmation by the Military Revolutionary Committee. Normally, commanders of companies and battalions are designated by the military commander of the zone and commanders of regiments by the provincial military commander.

13. Military zone commanders can nominate a person but have no right to promote him in rank. Nominees will be selected from among capable men true to the Party.

IV. ARMAMENTS

A. Acquisition of Arms

1. Every communist should always be prepared. He must be ready to prove his words and beliefs with deeds. He must procure his own arms.

2. In acquiring arms, a communist must exhaust all possibilities:

- a. Disarming fascists and confiscating their arm deposits.
- b. Confiscation of arms located in army barracks and dumps. Organizing communist dumps.
- c. Buying arms from sources outside the country.

3. According to the general plan it is not wise to disarm the police and the regular army or to conduct raids on their barracks during the period of political preparation.

4. Effective use of explosives employed in industry and mining is as follows:

a. Decide on the model of hand grenades, rifles, grenade launchers, mines and toxic gasses. This can be done in small machine shops and in homes, using explosives and materials employed in industry and mining.

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b. Machine shops should be capable of effecting mass production as well as experimenting for new weapons.

c. Prepare instructors to supervise the work in the machine shops and to teach the comrades the technical and tactical use of explosives.

5. During the period of political preparation for the revolution, the use of explosives is taught to the workers to enable them to use as well as manufacture munitions.

6. Arms distribution should be made in this manner:

a. Arming of combat groups first.

b. Arming of all faithful communists capable of bearing arms.

c. The remaining arms should be held in reserve in small hidden dumps. Dumps should include a dozen rifles and one or two machine guns and they should be located in the proximity of large factories where the workers are revolutionary minded. Arms should be kept in good condition and the deposits must have sufficient ammunition to effect maximum use of arms.

7. The distribution of arms is done according to strategic importance and political value, with the greater number going to the important zones.

V. SABOTAGE OF THE ARMED FORCES, POLICE AND GOVERNMENT

A. General

1. Destruction of the police agencies and the government armed forces is of the greatest importance. All Party members must participate in this work faithfully.

2. The Party cannot find its true place in society without the unquestioned assistance of all comrades.

3. The sabotage section is attached to the local triumvirate. One of "the three" is responsible for this important work.

4. The local triumvirate is held responsible for the appointment of penetration agents into the police organizations and the local units of the armed forces. Agents must locate communist sympathizers in the above named units and attempt to organize communist cells to help in disorganizing and destroying the police and the army. If no sympathizers can be contacted Party members must attempt to join police agencies and the army with the intent to disorganize and sabotage the forces.

5. Agents in this work receive orders from the triumvirate through their leader.

6. Agents disseminate propaganda material in the police forces which is supplied by the triumvirate.

7. Agents gather information on the strength, material and morale of the troop and police and communicate this to the triumvirate through their leaders.

8. Women will be used extensively for espionage purposes amongst troops and police.

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9. During draft periods for the regular army the military triumvirate will conduct extensive propaganda to place communist Party members among the draftees who will continue this propaganda among the recruits

10. The triumvirate must control all Party members sent among the recruits for the army and police. In this way Party members in the armed forces or police can be used to the greatest advantage.

11. One of the "three" who is responsible for sabotage, establishes liaison with the communist youth drafted into the army and encourages them to form cells.

12. All communist draftees must be instructed in agitation and sabotage methods. These agents should begin their work as soon as they receive a permanent assignment.

13. All communist party members eligible for the draft should contact other draftees who sympathize with the cause and form communist cells as soon as they reach their barracks.

VI. COMMUNIST CELLS IN THE ARMY

A. Mission

1. The mission of the communist cell in an army unit is to conduct daily propaganda and agitation with the object of transforming the political thought of the workers and farmers in the unit. The secret of the disorganization of the army lies in the success of this mission.

2. In this way, the workers and farmers in the army will be made to understand the ideals and objects of the proletarian revolution with the view of enlisting them in the fight.

3. Members of the communist party are obliged to abstain from causing armed disturbances during this period, but must always report any brutality or wrong doing of officers against the troops. Officers are the representatives of the government and are the tools of bourgeoisie domination.

4. In the case where officers issue orders to suppress demonstrations, strikes and riots, it is the duty of the communist members to intervene with the troops to sabotage the movement and to call attention to the fact that they are tools of the bourgeoisie with the object of provoking a refusal of the orders.

5. Members of the Party should attempt to become leaders among the troops. They should acquire popularity and later authority. The soldiers should see in these men leaders and defenders of their rights. They should acquire authority to be able to help other Party members and soldiers in case of trouble.

6. In the case of a declaration of war, it is the duty of the communist cells to refuse to fight and attempt to turn the war into civil strife.

7. These Party cells will also distribute pamphlets, proclamations, papers and other propaganda proclamations published by the central triumvirate section for sabotage and propaganda.

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8. The cells must at all times keep the Central Military Committee informed of the morale and status of their units.

9. They must turn in to the Central Committee the names of all sympathizers and enemies of the proletariat.

10. The military communist cells do not recognize any sabotage and propaganda agents other than those appointed by the central committee. These agents should not have a complete picture of the communist military organization nor of all the military leaders.

11. The military cells will be in contact with the responsible local military committee.

12. The agent ^{was} confided the task of the disorganization forwards information received from the Corps Command to the responsible member of the military triumvirate.

13. The member of the military triumvirate seeks information from non-commissioned officers (Communist literature regarding general politics or military revolts and transformation of external war into an internal struggle). With particular attention to NCO's who come from the farming and working class.

VII. PRE-REVOLT INSTRUCTIONS

A. During the Period of Technical Preparation

1. The technical and organizational superiority will be in favor of the enemy at the beginning of the revolt therefore it is necessary, if victory is to be assured, to take all measures to weaken the morale and render harmless all tactics of the enemy. The general situation during this period necessitates speeding the work of the party. In this manner we strengthen in him our faith and causes indecision in units of the regular army and divert hired subordinates of the lower class to our cause. If this is accomplished in time positive results will be had. The purposes of this operation are:

a. To bring to our side the soldiers who render simple services and neutralize the others.

b. Destroy the activity of governing bodies and military groups and all organs of military semblance.

c. Inflict material damages to weaken the resistance of the enemy.

2. These objectives will be realized with intellectual and physical means against the entire state organization. Thus denying the use by the enemy of punitive means and preventing him from continuing the war.

3. The sabotage of morale will be accomplished with all moral means and with propaganda pamphlets limited to the masses. Women's circles, clubs, etc. can be utilized for this.

4. The manner and scope of agitation is very different from propaganda for the working class. Small internal disorders in barracks and institutions to aid single operations can have excellent results especially if these acts can provoke a public disorder. If the Communist groups in the Army and police forces are enlarged by the union of new nuclei they must, at the moment of the revolt, either rebel or remain neutral

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depending on the situation.

5. Materialistic measures against the enemy consist of an operation reinforced by groups of terrorists and partisans as semi-military operations of the militia.

6. The purpose of these actions is to remove individuals harmful to the revolution, capture arms and material necessary for the revolt, suppress and destroy unauthorized offices and annihilate enemy organizations.

7. The active head of the partisans of the zone is obligated to come to an agreement with the military commander for disorganizing the enemy and giving advice to partisans and the militia. In instances where there is no leader, directives will be issued by the military commander. However, if these missions do not correspond to local situations the authority of superior headquarters is necessary.

8. In the pursuance of the operation, it is necessary to observe that the usable material which is gained be lawful and that not too much damage be inflicted.

9. All types of terrorism is permitted against those non-proletarian enemy organizations (fascists).

10. The activity of the partisans needs particular surveillance in order that they may not enrich themselves with personal property. Undesired and harmful elements should, without pity, be expelled from the organizations and if necessary liquidated. The provocateurs should also be removed to avoid them from infiltrating and harming the organizations.

11. The partisans should be included in the local organizations without the Party taking full responsibility. The press is to publish that these are the aspirations of the proletarian masses.

12. During this period all must seek to effect the revolt of the masses (street demonstrations, reunions) against the police and armed forces with the scope of gaining sympathy from neutral elements.

13. Single semi-uprisings which will take place before the revolt should serve as demonstrations to gain the attention of the enemy forces from the first real encounter at the moment of revolt.

VIII. PLAN OF THE ARMED REVOLT

A. Offensive Action

1. It is not possible to foresee the development of the armed conflict.

2. The armed revolt should proceed according to pre-established plans effected at the proper time exhausting at the same moment the greatest number of enemy forces and efforts.

3. The plan of the revolt is in large part surprise and at the opportune moment start the offensive of the armed proletarians.

4. The plan of the revolt consists:

a. A strategical plan

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- b. A plan for every locality of singular importance.
 - c. Eventual tactical activity in every center of revolt. (development of the strategical plan)
5. All the plans of the revolution are made by military sections on information received by intelligence agencies.
6. The military director is responsible for the supervision of the elaborated plans, the commanding of this operation and the coordination of individual plans. It is his task to establish the time and assigning of duties to military units who have already been indoctrinated on their assignments and issue particular directives that follow the general strategic plan.
7. The plan must meet the following exigencies:
- a. It must be clear and precise and must not give access to false interpretations in its goal.
 - b. It must be flexible enough to undamage the principle idea of the operation in the event of unforeseen changes.
 - c. It must be able to change totally from the real situation.
 - d. Individual orders which originate from the plan must be feasible in regard to personnel and time. It is recommended that in the elaboration of local individual plans where time is precious, nothing but a precise task should be given.
8. The flexibility in the plan is assured if the units, who receive orders coming from the general plan, are allowed complete independence in choosing their method in executing their tasks. Units assigned missions must be up-to-date and current with the plan to be able to operate by themselves in the event of any interruption.
9. Each military company that performs according to the plans of the revolt must be instructed as to the necessary limits of the planned revolt, of future developments and of the bordering zones.
10. In fulfilling the plans it is necessary to pay attention to the strength of the companies that must execute the plan. The smaller they are the more detailed the plan must be as the picked units have a smaller amount of liberty for movement. The detailed plan is used only for the first uprising. The subsequent operations are explained only in general terms.
11. The elaboration of the plan commences from a high level and takes into consideration the fact that if the operations in undetermined zones are favorable and our movement overcomes the enemy it is necessary to dispatch troops where others are in the minority.
12. Even the most complete plan cannot foresee all the various possibilities in the moment of the revolt and its development. It is not necessary to state that the revolutionary party must maintain the initiative and must not content itself to follow the actions of the enemy. The best way to correct the influx of unexpected circumstances is to maintain the greatest amount of activity.

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13. The best plan can fail if the revolt is begun too soon in certain zones. This can happen often by necessity or under the influx of enemy agent provocateurs.

14. The following notes complete the plan of the operations:

- a. Information bulletins with particular reference to the situation of the people's army and their position in the revolutionary picture, that is, the assignment of zones and where the initial blow will occur.
- b. Military and geographical notes with precise information as to future offensives or defenses, the significance of road junctions, means of communication, and mountain points which can be of great importance for the operations.
- c. Location of the main body of the regular army, police, arms depots, and eventually of Fascist squads. However, the location of the companies must be known as soon as changes are made in the first plans. The information system hence becomes of extraordinary importance and must communicate on time the consolidation of government troops.
- d. Main objectives for the headquarters of the operations
 1. Occupation and defense of centers of revolt
 2. Activity against the enemy that seeks to regroup itself.
 3. Enlarging of occupied territory and the capturing of this territory from the enemy.
 4. Then definite counter attacks against enemy moves and initiatives.
 5. Preparing for possible foreign intervention.

15. In making strategic plans definite zones which are of importance to us must be singled out, as well as the purposes and direction of re-inforcements, and where maximum attention must be concentrated. In particular;

- a. Arms must be distributed according to the political, and military and strategic importance of the zone.
- b. Concentrate organizing forces same as above.
- c. Roads of communications, crossroads, etc., must be known and prepare for their destruction according to the exigences of the general plan. Elaboration of the strategic points of the organization and effectuation of the armed revolt must render us the possibility of directing our organized forces and preparing to have the maximum amount of combat troops in uncertain decisive localities.

IX. TACTICAL AND STRATEGICAL ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES

In the elaboration and in executing the plan, tactical and strategical principles must be maintained;

1. The armed forces of the governing classes (army, police, citizen squads) are numerically strong, well-equipped, especially the army and police who have the most modern means. They are highly and technically prepared and therefore are very capable of being victorious.

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2. The forces in power in large part come from the working class, soldiers, and police and farmers. The command is formed of representatives from the middle and nobility classes.

3. Thusly, the army and the police at the moment of the revolt cannot avoid taking part in the general revolution, this will cause squabbles in their ranks during the revolt and will weaken their combat forces.

4. For this reason it is not advisable to conduct (for the army and police) the fight against the rebels in the city and in populated localities. The regular army forces prefer to fight in the open country because they are more adept in handling arms and the commanders can better maintain order in the field.

5. The proletariat will not be able to arm a necessary number of combatants that would naturally fight because they do not have enough arms. Therefore, at the moment of revolt the working class will not be in the majority in the country and the numerical superiority of the armed forces will be had by the counter-revolutionaries.

6. Ultimately the armed forces of the proletariat will be behind the combatant forces of the bourgeoisie depending on the amount of war material, organization, technical and tactical preparation and especially the command of the troops.

7. However, the armed forces of the proletariat possess valuable qualities that they place before the bourgeoisie forces. The conviction of the masses, (of vital interest for victory) is the enthusiasm to sacrifice themselves in uniting with the working classes.

8. In all operations, all possible strategical and tactical surprises must be employed.

9. Bear in mind the principle of half victory in each separate case and look forward to final victory which is more important. It must be remembered that one of the fundamental tasks at the first stages of the revolt is to capture arms and equip the masses who rebel.

10. Liquidate at sight the forces of the enemy, killing them, disarming them, and weakening them in order to prevent them from reorganizing their forces.

The means are:

- a. Decisive and unexpected attacks on the barracks and the zone occupied by the enemy with the intention of liquidating him completely. This method is more decisive and can give best results in the shortest possible time.
- b. The attack of the squads cannot be positive, therefore the enemy must be blocked with barricades and entrenchments. The enemy must be blocked in a manner interrupting all communications from the outside world (liaison and transport), cut his water supply, light, destroy his physical and moral forces with surprise attacks that are accomplished by small groups creating chaos favorable to us.
- c. If the attack is not met with success, partisan squads who have the task of molesting impeding the enemy in

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reorganizing in other zones will be used. Therefore combat groups (5 men) who are experienced and courageous must be organized in the city and elsewhere. Destroy all roads of communication, means of transport, set up wire barriers to impede the enemy. All these methods of combat must be coordinated.

11. The operations of the rebels must bring tumult in the offensive and must be active, decisive, courageous. No one is to remain idle but must seek the enemy and annihilate him. This is also the task of small squads (farmers). Victory will be achieved with maximum initiative and personal enthusiasm by each single combatant.

12. The start of the revolt must be decided and realized throughout the country contemporaneously and all physical and moral forces of the rebels must be employed solely for the revolt.

13. To maintain fighting spirit of the rebels it is necessary to supply them often with personal items.

14. To arrive at the disorganization of the enemy, mass terrorism against the commanders of the enemy forces must be organized until they are liquidated.

X. GENERAL STRATEGIC PLAN
for offensive action

A. 1. The general strategic plan which will be of value to the country when it is clearly elaborated, must correspond to the following principal questions:

- a. What are the principal zones of the country where the revolt can have absolute success and where the dictatorship of the proletariat can be enlarged in the country?
- b. What regions are considered least important?
- c. From what possible external direction can a counter revolution be started and what are the possible counter-measures?
- d. What political and military aid can be had from the proletariat of other countries for victory in the revolution?
- e. What missions are destined to the leaders of the revolt and against what objectives, above all, must attention be directed (combat forces, marines, depots, arms and munition factories, political and economical centers)?
- f. The date of the armed revolt in each district?
- g. Liquidation of anti-revolutionary personalities in authority and leaders of other parties.

SECRET