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HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

/mef

6 January 1945

SUBJECT: The C. I. C. Function in Travel Control.

TO : G-2(CI-111), AFHQ, APO 512, US Army.

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE WORK IN FRONTIER CONTROL.

Counter Intelligence work, by far, is one of the most important duties of the CIC Agent in frontier control. The prime requisite in this case is a well-developed informant system. Informants should be chosen from the inhabitants of the frontier zone. The CIC Agent, for best results, should attempt to form an informant system on a friendly basis rather than on a paying basis. Give an informant the impression that he is highly esteemed and that the information he gives is important to you personally. From time to time, offer him material gifts in the spirit of friendship. Never let on that he is an informant, but rather a valuable friend. With a well-developed informant system, the CIC Agent should be able to be well-informed on illegal crossings, attempted crossings, contraband activities, subversive activities in the zone of insecurity, parachutists dropped in the region, saboteurs entering the zone, enemy propaganda, information on enemy agents living on the other side of the frontier, the political situation on the other side, and all unusual occurrences or border incidents in the zone of insecurity. The informant system should include minor functionaries, small merchants, people with frontier passes (who have easy access back and forth from the neighboring country), innkeepers, and other middle-class people. Agents should pay weekly visits to check on their informant system. Valuable information can, many times, be procured from the various consular and diplomatic officials at the time of their entry or exit.

In performing his counter intelligence mission, the CIC Agent is conforming to all border control requisites. Arresting illegal traffic is the primary mission of the CIC in traffic control. The various expedients employed to accomplish the CIC mission are, therefore, conciliatory to the fulfillment of this mission. In border control work, the CIC Agent must be informed of all activity in his region. Jurisdictional lines cannot be drawn because this would defeat his mission. Good control is complete control. Thus the Agent must occupy himself with all the counter intelligence functions. In security problems his function is purely advisory and no attempt to exercise physical control should be made.

RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

CIC border control personnel, in order to insure good control must always be in close liaison with the local authorities. Therefore, one Agent is solely occupied with liaison between CIC and the local authorities.

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Ltr to G-2(CI-iii), AFHQ, re CIC Function in Travel Control - Continued.

All information pertinent to travel control, counter intelligence, enemy propaganda among the local population, contraband, political developments in the region, and security problems should be collected, evaluated and sent to the interested authorities. Liaison with all local bureaus is necessary for the reason that the function of one organization differs from that of another and the collection of information should, therefore, be as complete as possible. Local intelligence agencies should be given more consideration, but minor agencies should never be neglected, because as it usually transpires, minor agencies are able to impart valuable information. Information necessitating immediate action must be given priority, but all information must be acted upon according to importance.

Security problems should be discussed thoroughly and steps for changes and improvements of the system acted upon immediately. Close liaison with the military authorities in the region is another important mission that the liaison Agent is responsible for. In order to determine the different guard posts and the number of men needed to properly control the frontier, the liaison Agent should be in close contact with the military authorities at all times.

It is obvious that the liaison Agent must have a very good command of the language of the country, as well as an understanding of the character, customs and psychology of the people he is dealing with; otherwise his mission, which is of the utmost importance, will end in failure.

GUARD SYSTEM.

The success of border control work is largely dependent upon an intelligent guard system. We have found through experience that never can enough military personnel be assigned to guard the frontier so as to make clandestine crossing an impossibility. Therefore, the other alternative is to create a system of permanent guard posts and roving guard units, depending upon the topography of the region. Permanent guard posts established in the insecurity zone must be strategically placed so as to command road networks, all possible crossing points, natural weak points (because of the existing terrain features), and at the same time to act as departure and arrival points for the roving guard units. The roving guard units, operating in jeeps, or when topography makes this impossible, on horseback or even on foot, should be the linking elements between permanent guard posts. Permanent guard posts must be equipped with telephonic equipment to effect efficient liaison with each other. At all times there must be a mobile guard unit at every permanent guard post to cope with emergency situations as they arise. Permanent guard posts must be centralized and in constant liaison with several rear echelon headquarters posts.

Personnel detailed for guard duty at the frontier must be hand-picked. All personnel must be thoroughly briefed on their assignment. A knowledge of the existing regulations is highly important. Border

CONFIDENTIAL

Ltr to G-2 (CI-iii), AFHQ, re CIC Function in Travel Control - Continued.

incidents are avoidable only when the military personnel are familiar with the traffic control rules. Military personnel must be as permanent as possible; otherwise, the efficiency of the guard units will naturally tend to decrease.

CONTRABAND.

In the frontier zone, control over persons arrested for dealing in contraband becomes a CIC necessity. Experience has taught border control Agents that under the seemingly innocent pretext of carrying contraband across the frontier, enemy agents, couriers and enemy propaganda materiel infiltrate into the country. Persons caught carrying contraband into the country should be thoroughly searched, interrogated and investigated by CIC Agents. The simplest way to avoid suspicion when entering the zone for espionage purposes is to carry contraband. If caught, the enemy agent uses this as an excuse to divert suspicion from his real purpose. CIC Agents should, therefore, be very careful in dealing with persons arrested for contraband. Professional contraband artists are usually employed by the enemy as couriers for their agents. Professional contrabandists are experts in illegal crossings of the frontier. They are familiar with all the weak points in the guard system, as well as the topographically weak points. Usually these men are unscrupulous and dangerous, and for a price, work for anyone. Most enemy propaganda materiel finds its way into the country through these channels. When carrying mail or propaganda materiel, contrabandists employ convenient sized packages that can be easily disposed of in the event of capture. When a contrabandist is arrested while attempting to cross into the country, the area in which he was arrested should be thoroughly searched for any documents that were disposed of by him when capture became imminent. Professional contrabandists are highly organized. Their methods are many and varied. One well-known method is the contraband train: This method assumes the military diamond formation. There is a point, as well as flank scouts. The main body assumes a position in the center. The flank guards and the point men carry light contraband, and in the event of capture, the main body is duly warned and makes its escape, while the individual contrabandist gives himself up and claims to be all alone. This usually throws off the authorities and saves the train. To deal with this situation, it is best to allow an individual contrabandist to pass your fixed position, and if it is verified that he is alone, arrest him later on.

NECESSARY RECORDS.

1. Weekly lists of crossings: The weekly reports sent to headquarters must be inclusive, as well as precise. Individual lists must include:

- a. Date of crossing.
- b. Time of crossing.
- c. Authorizations for passage and the issuing officer or officers.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ltr to G-2(CI-iii), AFHQ, re CIC Function in Travel Control - Continued.

- d. Name of passenger or passengers, former address, address of destination, mode of travel (if by automobile, give number, make, etc.) Also the address of diplomatic baggage is very important.
 - e. Nationality, passport number, place and date of issue, expiration date, etc.
2. Stop lists.
 3. Emergency crossing authorization lists.

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cc: Col Nichols, Asst AC of S, G-2, AFHQ.
Chief, CIC, AFHQ
Major Hamblen.

NOTES ON DECISIONS TAKEN AT MEETING ON SUPPLIES TO
PARTISANS IN NORTH ITALY HELD AT HEADQUARTERS 6TH
ARMY GROUP, 1400 HOURS 17 JANUARY 1945.

Note: The decisions stated below are subject to review
by higher authorities at the various headquarters
represented at the meeting.

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3. Lt. Col. Baumer asked 6th Army Group's policy as to frontier control. At the present time it is a forward zone. He understood that First French Army controls part of the frontier and an AA Brigade the other portion. Gen. Jenkins explained that 6th Army Group controls the SWISS frontier and the FRANCO-ITALIAN border through the First French Army as far south as ST. ETIENNE. General de Lattre is Army Commander commanding that area. General Molle is in command of the Alps front from the SWISS frontier to ST. ETIENNE. Troops are under 6th Army Group through First French Army. It is a combat zone and not communications zone nor zone of the interior. Only General Devers is responsible for everything in the area. South of ST. ETIENNE the border is controlled by a task force set up under the headquarters of 44 AAA Brigade under General Tobin who is responsible directly to Gen. Devers. This is also a combat zone and not CZ nor ZI.

Lt. Col. O'Hanlon of SHAEF Mission (FRANCE) Stated that some time ago they had taken up with the French, at the request of 6th Army Group, the advisability of the French assuming responsibility for control of that frontier and a French general in charge responsible directly to 6th Army Group. He asked if this would still hold. Gen. Jenkins replied that the condition which existed at the time this request went to SHAEF no longer exists. 6th Army Group proposed as soon as other operations are completed to pass back to the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier an additional division; the frontier to be controlled by 6th Army Group. That division will be, it is hoped, a Rearmament Program French Division.

4. AFHQ asked if it was to 6th Army Group's interest to keep a quiet frontier on FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier to which Gen. Jenkins replied that it was very definitely so. AFHQ then asked if it would be to 6th Army Group's interest to have a strong Partisan movement on the other side of the border. Gen. Jenkins stated that he felt it would be dependent on the ability of the Partisans to accomplish any mission, which he felt was doubtful.
5. Col. King of AFHQ then discussed the present state of Italian Partisans in NW ITALY. He stated there were 53,000 potential Partisans in NW ITALY. There are 25,000 active Partisans in NW ITALY and 5,000 effective Partisans close to the border. He stated that AFHQ plans an offensive some time in the future. AFHQ desires to hold all possible enemy hostiles in the NW, up in PIEDMONT. There are now held there by Partisan effort the 5th Mountain and 34th Inf. German divisions, sizable elements of Italian regulars and some irregular

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Italian outfits. We feel then that it is necessary to keep the 5,000 effectives close to the border still engaging the enemy and to prepare them by propaganda, training and some supplies to strike even a heavier blow when we start our offensive. To do this we will have to build up a little stock pile. Bearing in mind that Gen. Jenkins has said we do not want to be mixed up with any new activities on the border now but we do want to keep what is going there going. As to the operational value of the partisans, AFHQ feels that the value of these effectives and these active, now passive, Partisans is equal to the number of divisions and irregulars that they now hold there and may attract in the future. In other words we feel that the Partisan activity in NW ITALY is the equivalent of at least 3½ hostile, perhaps not first class, enemy divisions. He then asked Col. Riepe with 15th Army Group to continue with more detailed information.

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6th Army Group
AG TRANSLATION
T-468 18 January 1945

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

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- 2 -

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