8 April 2002
Panels investigating the lack of preparedness against violent attacks on buildings and physical instructure have called for the public to better understand blast vulnerability of national and personal security; to generate sustained public support for blast countermeasures known and needing research; and to make publicly available "sensitive" information on blast protection heretofore restricted to the government and advisory professionals. A 1999 National Research Council report on blast-mitigation stated:
The committee believes that provisions for blast-resistant design are not likely to be incorporated into model building codes in the foreseeable fature. Although bombing attacks have serious consequences, the probability that a civilian building will be the target of a terrorist bombing is relatively low. Therefore, public support for blast-resistance requirements in all construction is also low, and building owners are reluctant to pay the additional costs of designing and maintaining blast-resistant features. ... In light of the lack of public awareness of the nature of the threat and the lack of a consensus on what to do about it, guidance on building collapse and building code requirements would be valuable.Universities could provide a significant contribution to technology transfer and closing the training gap by including aspects of blast-resistant design in their structures and structural dynamics curricula, similar to university programs in earthquake-resistant or wind-resistant design. Furthermore, training should be complemented by university involvement in active research related to the improved blast-resistance of structures.
A technology transfer program for mitigating blast effects must be tailored to handle potentially sensitive information. Although the design basis (underlying assumptions of design blast loads and the location and configuration of critical services) for a specific building would be valuable to terrorists, the process used to design the building would not. Plans for buildings, both public and private, which are often available from local building officials to anyone who requests them, could represent a more serious security issue than the widespread dissemination of design guidance. Nevertheless, the committee recognizes that the dissemination of test and analysis data for specific components from the Blast Mitigation for Structures Program (BMSP) coupled with detailed structural plans could be a serious security risk. However, realization of the benefits of a wide range of improved techniques, materials, and practices developed by the BMSP will require that the information not be restricted to a narrow group of users.
The BMSP should also consider sponsoring an annual or biennial conference on blast-mitigation design and engineering. Although these issues are discussed at existing engineering, construction, security, and emergency management conferences, a single, integrated forum could be of enormous benefit in the dissemination of the latest advances in the field and could stimulate the development of new and effective retrofitting concepts for existing structures.
Cryptome is compiling a list of online sources and offline bibliography on blast protection to assist wider public knowledge of protective means once restricted to specialists and in many instances classified. While many sources remain unavailable online and offline there are more available online than is commonly known and many more available in hardcopy. Selected online sources are being listed on Cryptome's daily contents and the open-ended compilation will be published in the near future. Online and offline sources welcome, particularly those restricted or classified; send-to info.
This blast protection compilation follows the model of Joel McNamara's exemplary collection of public information on TEMPEST technology which was once known only to specialists and keepers of secrets.
Cartome and Cryptome are operated by Deborah Natsios and John Young, respectively, architects in New York City: http://jya.com