



BLUE-RIBBON PANEL

MEMORANDUM

September 23, 2005

To: The Honorable Porter Goss, Director
Central Intelligence Agency

From: (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Subject: Response to request from Director for Assessment of EIT effectiveness

1. **Background Information and Tasking.** The CIA Office of the Inspector General filed a report on May 7, 2004 reviewing the Agency's counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities (2003-7123-IG). That report criticized certain aspects of the Agency's program for handling and interrogating high value detainees. One of the recommendations of that report directed that the agency "conduct a review of the effectiveness of each of the authorized EITs [enhanced interrogation techniques] and make a determination regarding the necessity for the continued use of each. . . ." The report further directed that this review "include in the group conducting the review non-Agency independent experts. . . ." The Director subsequently asked to undertake this review. This report contains my observations.
2. We met with the Director and with the leadership of the Special Missions Department of the Rendition, Detention and Interrogation program of the DCI Counterterrorism Center. Our tasking was specifically refined to help assess the efficacy of the EITs in developing intelligence information for operational use against Al-Qa'ida (AQ) operatives and operations. We were given extensive materials on the detainee program and were given access to everything that we requested. Our inquiry was restricted because of classification purposes to the materials presented to or otherwise made available by the RDI program office. We did meet with the Inspector General and his staff.
3. We were not asked to assess the legality of the program. We were given copies of the legal rulings from the Justice Department under which the program was authorized and is being conducted.

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13. As stated earlier, there is no objective way to answer the question of efficacy. Because of classification, it is not possible to compare this program with other programs (e.g. law enforcement procedures) which derive information through interrogations. As such, there are no external standards for comparison. And there is the epistemological problem of internal measure of effectiveness. It is possible, however, to make some general observations about the program based on "meta data" provided by the program office.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Memorandum

Date: September 2, 2005
To: Director Porter Goss
CIA
From: (b)(3) CIAAct
Subject: Assessment of EITs Effectiveness

Introduction

You have asked us to make judgments regarding the effectiveness of the range of enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) used by the Renditions and Detention Group of the Counterterrorism Center of the CIA (CTC/RDG) on high value detainees (HVDs). It is my understanding that this request evolved from a recommendation in a 2004 report of the CIA Inspector General that addressed the larger issue of agency-wide counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities that took place from September, 2001 – October, 2003¹. During the course of our review, we have interviewed senior staff of CTC, CTC/RDG, OMS, OIG, DI, contract employees of CTC, as well as agents of the FBI. We have been heavily reliant on the willingness of CTC staff to provide us with the factual material that forms the basis of our conclusions and I am grateful to them and to all others who so generously shared with us their time, knowledge and experience.

Neither my background nor field of expertise particularly lend themselves to judging the effectiveness of interrogation techniques, taken individually or collectively. However, I have spent considerable time and energy studying the important responsibilities of the RDG and the role this program plays in providing extraordinarily useful intelligence to both policymakers and those on the front lines defending America.

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¹ The report contains a recommendation that asks the DDO to “conduct a review of the effectiveness of each of the authorized EITs (Enhance Interrogation Techniques) and make a determination regarding the necessity for the continued use of each, including the required scope and duration of each technique. Include in the group conducting the review non-Agency, independent experts recommended by the Director of OMS and the Deputy Director for Science & Technology”.

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Overall Program Effectiveness

It is clear from our discussions with both DO and DI officers that the program is deemed by them to be a great success, and I would concur. The EITs, as part of the overall program, are credited with enabling the US to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of useful intelligence on al-Qai'da (AQ). The program accounts for *over half* of all HUMINT CIA collection against AQ and associated groups, and vast numbers of intelligence reports have been produced as a result. Source validation is another major benefit of the program. There are accounts of numerous plots against the US and the West that were revealed as a result of HVD interrogations. Detainee reporting from the RDG program has played a significant role in the capture of nearly all AQ operatives and associates in US custody, no doubt saving countless American lives.

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