Police Transition Team Training Support Package v4.0

POLICE TRANSITION TEAM

TRAINING SUPPORT PACKAGE

The United States Army Military Police School developed this Training Support Package primarily for Military Police Squad Leaders and Soldiers performing a Police Transition Team mission at a local Iraqi Police Station.

Police play a critical role in a counterinsurgency by creating a safe and secure environment, upholding the rule of law, and reinforcing the legitimacy of the government. This Training Support Package bridges new counterinsurgency doctrine found in FM 3-24 and emerging Military Police doctrine found in draft FM 3-19.10 for Police Transition Teams.

The new Iraqi government has no task more critical than developing a professional, modern, and responsive police force that enjoys the trust, confidence, and respect of the Iraqi people. Iraq has many internal challenges and systemic issues that will take a dedicated effort over a long period of time to overcome. Police Transition Team advisors have a historic opportunity to mentor their Iraqi counterparts in a way that leads to Iraqi solutions for the challenges they face. The strategic implications of this mission cannot be clearer. "When they (Iraqis) win, we win".

Version 4.0

22 Jun 2007

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FOREWORD

This training support package (TSP) will set the conditions for our Soldiers to train the Iraqi Police more effectively. The security situation in Iraq requires new tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to address the challenges associated with developing a fledgling police force. According to the U.S. Institute of Peace, the greatest security threat Iraqis face is pervasive criminal violence.

Over the past four years, significant progress has been made in training and equipping the Iraqi Police, but the job of developing the Iraqi Police is far from over. The challenge now is to improve the effectiveness of the Iraqi Police at all levels so they can assume the lead for domestic security, make the streets safe again, control crime, and help defeat the ongoing insurgency.

The Police Transition Team (PTT) is the tactical element that helps train and mentor the local, district, directorate and provincial Iraqi Police. These transition teams are performing their mission in the middle of an active insurgency, so this TSP recognizes the critical role that police play in counterinsurgency operations. The TSP is designed to provide PTTs with a fundamental understanding of the unique environment they will find in Iraq, the factors that affect Iraqi Police development, and practical advice on how to plan, prepare, and train for the mission.

An integral component of a PTT unit is the International Police Liaison Officer (IPLO). Further in this text you will be informed in further detail as to the benefits and utilization of the IPLO member of the PTT unit. Whereas the end state of the Iraqi Police Service is that it be a civilian led public service entity, it is critical that the civilian police officers, the IPLOs, be integrated and their collective knowledge base be exploited for the benefit of the PTT mission.

PTTs must first understand the Iraqi culture and environment. There are multiple sources of violence in Iraq: the Sunni Arab insurgency, al Qaeda and affiliated jihad groups, Shiite militias and death squads, and organized criminality. Sectarian violence has become the principal challenge to Iraqi Police who are on the front line of an active counterinsurgency. Attacks by insurgents against coalition forces and criminal violence remain a major security problem. Some insurgent groups have extended their terror campaign by targeting Iraqi civilians to undermine their support for the government. One of the ways a government demonstrates concern for its people is through a police force that is trusted, respected, and professional. Police play a key role in a counterinsurgency by helping the government to achieve greater legitimacy by protecting the populace from insurgent attacks and enforcing the rule of law. Consequently, developing an effective police force is one of the highest counterinsurgency priorities.

Unfortunately, many Iraqis have turned to sectarian solutions for protection by forming their own militias instead of relying on the police. Ethnic divisiveness, regional differences, and tribal and religious influences are just a few of the factors affecting the level of trust, respect, and support for the police. Under Saddam Hussein, the police were perceived to be the corrupt implementers of brutally oppressive policies. Iraqi Police must foster an atmosphere of trust, credibility, and authority to overcome this legacy. If the people of Iraq do not have trust and confidence in the ability of their police to provide a safe and secure environment, the criminals and insurgents will exploit this weakness for their own advantage.

The Army's new Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24, states that counterinsurgency "is an intelligence-driven endeavor", and intelligence in counterinsurgency is all about people. Local police who know the people and are familiar with the environment are in the best position to develop an

accurate intelligence picture due to their daily contact with the populace. Reporting of information increases when the police can protect the populace from criminals and insurgents and the people believe that the insurgency will be defeated.

To be effective trainers and advisors, PTTs must understand the complexities of the Iraqi environment, the unique role that police play in a counterinsurgency, the need to control crime and make the streets safe, and the historic mission that lies before them in preparing Iraqi Police to support self-governance and the rule of law in an emerging democracy. This TSP is designed to help U.S. Military Police Units prepare for that mission.

Jeffrey A. Butler
CSM, US Army
Regimental CM

David E. Quantock
Brigadier General, US Army
Commandant

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no tool is more important to a burgeoning [growing] democracy than a well-trained police service capable of establishing the rule of law in Iraq and of protecting the Iraqi people.

MG Kenneth Hunzeker
U.S. Commander of Civilian Police Assistance Training Team

This TSP provides information, training support materials, and references that will help Military Police battalion and company leaders and Soldiers plan, prepare for, train for, and execute a PTT mission. The TSP provides helpful tips based on lessons learned from Iraq and interim doctrine and from doctrine recently developed. It primarily focuses on the role of a squad leader performing duties as a PTT Team Chief and the PTT mission at the local level.

PTT is one of the most challenging missions facing our Soldiers today. It is a complex mission that requires extensive law enforcement experience, warrior skills, and a thorough understanding of the environment in Iraq.

This TSP begins with the role of the police in counterinsurgency operations. Lessons 1 through 7 provide information that will enable the PTT to understand the environment they will work in.

Lesson 1 provides practical advice on how police can win the support of the people and the necessity of policing using the rule of law as a fundamental principle. Lessons 2 and 3 provide an overview of coalition forces and the factors that affect police development, such as cultural considerations, politics and policing, and the Iraqi economy.

The role of the advisor and PTT guidelines are covered in Lesson 4. Lesson 5 identifies some of the major challenges PTTs will encounter and explains how the police can create a safe and secure environment to counter criminal and insurgent influence. Lesson 6 provides background information to inform the PTT about the Iraqi Police recruiting process; basic, advanced, and specialized police training programs; and the relationship among the Iraqi Army, the National Police, and the Iraqi Police Service. Lesson 7 will help PTTs understand what a local Iraqi Police Station should look like and includes a discussion about facilities, personnel, equipment, and capabilities.

Lessons 8 through 13 will help the PTT plan, prepare for, and train for their mission. Lesson 8 outlines the essential elements of the PTT program, including organizational structure, roles and responsibilities, the concept of the operation, and the Iraqi Police assessment process. Lesson 9 describes the five phases of the PTT training plan, specific tasks that must be accomplished prior to deployment, and the certification process. Lesson 10 will help the PTTs prepare for their mission by providing helpful advice about Iraqi Police training requirements, command relationships, and how to task-organize the PTT for success. Lesson 11 outlines force protection considerations that will enable PTTs to execute their mission securely. Lesson 12 discusses the Iraqi Police supply and maintenance system, how to account for authorized equipment, and how to compete for limited resources. Lesson 13 provides information about collective training, employment of Iraqi Police, and how to develop a self-sustaining police force.

Lesson 14 begins with a discussion of the Center for Army Lessons Learned "First 100 Days" Soldier's Handbook, which will help PTTs survive the first 100 days of their deployment. Lesson 14 concludes with a discussion of best practices from previous PTTs and training methods that work. Lesson 15 contains five practical exercises designed to reinforce learning objectives.

The proponent of this TSP is the U.S. Army Military Police School. Users are invited to send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms). Completed forms, or equivalent response, will be mailed or attached to email and transmitted to

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LETTERS FROM GENERAL PETRAEUS

15 Mar 2007

Members of MNF-I:

I've been on the ground for about a month now and wanted to share some early thoughts with you.

First, and foremost, I want to note how impressed I have been by your professionalism, skill, and determination. In my visits to units all over Iraq, I have repeatedly seen a true will to win and a sincere desire to help our Iraqi partners achieve success. These observations give me confidence that we and our Iraqi counterparts **will** be able to improve the level of security for the Iraqi people—though I recognize that it won't be easy or without frustration and setbacks. You know as well as I do how challenging an endeavor this is.

Improving security for Iraq's population is, of course, the overriding objective of our strategy. Accomplishing this mission requires carrying out complex military operations **and** convincing the Iraqi people that we will not just "clear" their neighborhoods of the enemy, we will also stay and help "hold" the neighborhoods so that the "build" phase that many of their communities need can go forward. Helping ensure enduring security in Iraqi neighborhoods not only helps Iraqi officials make the most of the opportunity that we and our Iraqi counterparts will create, it also helps ensure that our Iraqi counterparts are fully ready to accept the eventual hand-off of responsibilities to them.

Operation Fardh al Qanoon—the Iraqi name for the operation to improve security in Baghdad—is in its early stages. Success will take months, not days or weeks, and there undoubtedly are many tough days ahead. Nonetheless, because of your hard work with our Iraqi partners, some encouraging signs are already emerging: sectarian murders are down and sectarian displacement appears to have slowed or even stopped, with increasing numbers of families returning to their homes. It already appears that the Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts you are establishing are making their presence felt and helping restore a sense of hope to the Iraqi people, block-by-block.

Your efforts will provide Iraqi leaders an opportunity to resolve the serious political challenges they confront, reconcile their sectarian issues, and forge the way ahead for the new Iraq—thereby giving all Iraqi citizens a stake in their new country. From my vantage point, I believe the Iraqi political leadership is committed to moving in the right direction, despite being pulled in different directions by various political parties, sectarian influences, and ethnic pressures. They are realistic, however, and they recognize, as we do, that resolving the many challenges facing Iraq will not be easy.

Beyond that, although most Iraqis want a future of peace, opportunity, and increasing prosperity, there clearly are some individuals and groups with whom the Government of Iraq will not be able to reconcile—soulless thugs who violently reject the goals of the new Iraq. They will not be won over by Iraqi political action; rather, there appears to be no alternative to Iraqi and Coalition Forces bringing them to justice so that they cannot inflict further barbarism on the Iraqi people.

The environment in Iraq is the most challenging that I have seen in over 32 years of service. Indeed, few soldiers have ever had to contend with the reality of an enemy willing to blow himself up for his twisted cause. In view of that, as you conduct your daily operations, remember that you have every right to protect yourself, even as you attempt to prevent situations from escalating without good reason.

I also want you to be aware of my recognition that our focus on securing the population means that many of you will live in the neighborhoods you're securing. That is, in fact, the right way to secure the population—and it means that you will, in some cases, operate in more austere conditions than you did before we adjusted our mission and focus. Rest assured that we will do everything we can to support you as we implement the new plans. This approach is necessary, because we can't commute to the fight in counterinsurgency operations; rather, we have to live with the population we are securing. As you carry out the new approach, I also count on each of you to embrace the warrior-builder-diplomat spirit as we grapple with the demands that securing the population and helping it rebuild will require.

Tom Brokaw spent some time with the unit I was privileged to command in Iraq a few years ago and, after seeing all that our troopers were doing, he said to me: "You know, General, the World War II generation may have been 'the Greatest Generation,' but the soldiers I've seen today surely must be 'the new Greatest Generation'." I agreed with him then, and I agree with him even more now. You should, in short, be quietly proud not just of what you're doing and how you're doing it, but also of the individuals on your left and right with whom you're privileged to serve.

Thanks for the sacrifices that you and your families are making.

David H. Petraeus
General, United States Army
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

MNFI-CG   8 May 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR IRAQI SECURITY FORCE TRANSITION TEAM MEMBERS

SUBJECT: Commander's Guidance and Expectations

1. Congratulations on being assigned to a transition team. You will be embarking on what will undoubtedly be one of the most challenging – and most important – jobs of your professional career. By helping develop Iraqi Security Forces and assisting them in taking on an increasingly greater responsibility for the security of their country, you will be directly contributing to mission success. Capable Iraqi Security Forces are critical to our effort to secure the Iraqi people.

2. As a Transition Team advisor, your job is to teach, coach, and mentor your Iraqi unit. While your primary mission is to ensure that your Iraqi unit becomes a capable fighting force – one able to secure its people – you also need to build a fighting force that can ultimately be viable on its own, long after you depart. So, my guidance to you is this: whether your unit is in training or in operations, go the extra mile. Be relentless. Create a unit that is well-trained, well-led, and well-disciplined, and that will make a difference on the battlefield, in the police station, and along the border. But in doing so, also develop a unit that will thrive within Iraqi culture and that is commanded by Iraqi leaders.

3. To succeed, it will be critical for you to understand and work within the Iraqi culture. The Iraqi culture puts a premium on respect and personal relationships, frequently valuing such relationships over the professional qualities an individual might possess. Demonstrating respect and investing in personal relationships with your counterparts will yield valuable dividends. You will need to be sensitive to the fact that Iraqis are heavily influenced by ethnic, religious, tribal, and political allegiances.

4. In watching the development of Iraqi Security Forces over time, it has been very clear that unit leadership is the key element in achieving success in operations. Indeed, a leader in an Iraqi unit has an even greater impact on the success of his organization than does a leader in one of our formations. To accomplish your mission, therefore, you will need to invest heavily in leaders and leader development – as well as in the development of capable headquarters elements and staffs. Make Iraqi leaders strong; make them heroes in the eyes of their Soldiers. And as you do this, remember that your example, your values, your actions, and your warrior ethos will be critical. They will be emulated by your Iraqi partners.

5. As part of their training, your Iraqi counterparts need to develop a respect for the rule of law and an understanding of fundamental human rights. This includes compliance with the laws and standards governing the treatment of detainees and the Laws of Armed Conflict. You will receive detailed instruction on this subject during your training at the Phoenix Academy. Pay close attention to it, for in order to maintain popular support, Iraqi forces must distance themselves from the abusive practices of the former regime and adhere to accepted norms of human rights and standards

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governing the use of force. You must train and re-train in this area and be willing to make on-the-spot corrections. You must also be vigilant regarding evidence of abuses. Take all reasonable action in accordance with the ROE to stop and prevent suspected detainee abuse, and promptly report violations to your Iraqi counterpart and through your Transition Team chain of command. It is very important that we never turn a blind eye to abuses, thinking that what Iraqis do with their own detainees is "Iraqi business;" nor can we wink at suspected transgressions. The legitimacy of, and popular support, for Iraq's security forces would plummet were they to sink to the levels of Al Qaeda, the insurgents, or those of the prior regime.

6. Even though we have made enormous progress, we still have more work ahead of us. The way ahead will not be without frustrations, challenges, or setbacks. Few tasks are easy in Iraq, and you should be prepared for good days and bad days. I would ask, however, that you always strive to be a positive example for your Iraqi partners in dealing with adversity, as well as in carrying out all your other duties.

7, Thank you for your service and sacrifice. I am honored to serve with you again.

DAVID H. PETRAEUS
General, USA
Commanding

TRAINING THE IRAQI POLICE

Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, Multi–National Force–Iraq spokesman, and Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. Hunzeker, commanding general of the Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team, discussed training the Iraqi Police during a media roundtable, February 7, 2007.

"The Baghdad security plan remains an extended campaign," said Caldwell. "Perhaps no task is more critical than developing a modern, professional police force that enjoys the confidence of all Iraqi peoples. Iraq's problems are systemic and require long-term solutions developed by the Iraqis. Simply put, we win when they win," he said.

Hunzeker said that one of the challenges the Iraqi Police faced was a reputation of being "hopelessly corrupt," "ineffective and won't fight to protect the Iraqis," and "hopelessly sectarian and brutal.... Four months into my command, I've come to realize that these warnings were more of an overstatement than reality. There are still challenges to overcome in training and equipping the Iraqi Police, who are courageous, and well-trained and committed to defending Iraq's citizens."

"In 2004, we all looked in dismay as Iraqi police abandoned their posts as angry mobs [formed] in the cities throughout Iraq," he said. "Now Iraqi policemen frequently will work four-day shifts, sleeping in any corner of the station they can find." Hunzeker remarked on the heroism of the Iraqi Police during the conference: "Many of the officers have been lost while preventing suicide bombers from killing numbers of Iraqis in marketplaces or mosques. Despite being a consistent target of a terrorist attack, we typically see 10 volunteers for every job vacancy within the Iraqi Police."

Solutions to the problems of the Iraqi Police are under way. "To address these issues, 2007 will be the year that I call leadership and logistics," said Hunzeker. "We will bring training for mid-level managers within the Ministry of Interior helping to put in place an Iraqi logistics and sustainment system."

Hunzeker praised the Iraqi Police and expressed the importance of the police to Iraq. "No tool is more important to a burgeoning democracy than a well-trained police force capable of establishing the rule of law in Iraq and protecting the Iraqi people," he said. "Given how far the Iraqi Police force has come in the past four years, I believe that with time Iraq will be able to overcome the twin scourges of terrorism and sectarian violence."

LESSON 1
THE ROLE OF POLICE IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY

Few military units can match a good police unit in developing an accurate human intelligence picture of their AO [area of operation]. Because of their frequent contact with populace, police often are the best force for countering small insurgent bands supported by the local populace.

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, p. 6-19

OVERVIEW

This lesson discusses the role of the police in a counterinsurgency environment. The goal of policing in a counterinsurgency environment is to provide political power to the government through the power of the people. Since the police are best positioned to affect the population's perception of the government on a daily basis, they become the front line counterinsurgency force, providing support through a safe environment, the rule of law, and intelligence gathering.

MNF-I COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDANCE

The war in Iraq has reached a critical stage. During 2007, Coalition and Iraqi forces must work together to create security improvements and, in doing so, provide Iraqi leaders with the time and space to tackle the tough political issues that must be resolved in order to achieve national reconciliation and build a secure and stable Iraq.

To meet this challenge, we have revised our approach in order to focus on securing the Iraqi people. Initially, our main effort will be securing Baghdad; it will later expand to other areas. To effectively secure the Iraqi people – in Baghdad and throughout the rest of Iraq – we must coordinate our actions closely with each other and with our Iraqi leaders. For this reason, I am issuing specific counterinsurgency guidance for all forces operating in Iraq. The following ten points, in priority order, lay out the key requirements.

As you read, think through, talk about, and ultimately operationalize these points, always remember that in this environment, "business as usual" will not be good enough. Complacency will kill us; we must visibly improve security. A sense of urgency and good situational awareness will also be critical. Troopers on the spot, and their immediate instinctive reactions, will win or lose the perception battle at the local level. Everything we do supports and enables this battle of perceptions, locally here in Iraq and also in the global audience.

1. Secure the people where they sleep. Population security is our primary mission. And achieving population security promises to be an extremely long-term endeavor – a marathon, not a sprint – so focusing on this mission now is essential. Most extra-judicial killings occur at night and in people's homes, while most spectacular terrorist attacks occur during the day, where people shop, work and play – anywhere they gather publicly. These key areas must be secured. Once secured, an area cannot be abandoned; it must be permanently controlled and protected, 24 hours a day, or else the enemy will re-infiltrate and kill or intimidate those who have supported us. This protection must be kept up until the area can be effectively garrisoned and controlled by Iraqi police (ideally from the

1

area being secured) and other security services. *We can't be everywhere — therefore you must assess your AOR, identify priority areas, work to secure them first, and then expand into other areas.*

2. Give the people *justice* and *honor*. We think in terms of democracy and human rights. Iraqis think in terms of justice and honor. Whenever possible, help Iraqis to retain or regain their honor. Treat Iraqis with genuine, not patronizing, dignity and respect; that will win friends and discredit enemies. You must act quickly and publicly to deal with complaints and abuses. Never allow an injustice to stand unaddressed; never walk away from a local Iraqi who believes he or she has been unjustly treated. *Second only to security, bringing justice to the people and restoring their honor is the key task.*

3. Integrate civilian/military efforts — this is an inter-agency, combined arms fight. Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams now operate directly alongside military units, adding new capabilities, skills, and funds to our counterinsurgency effort. PRTs bring political and economic expertise to the brigade and regimental combat teams with whom they serve, operate under force protection rules that allow them to accompany our military forces on operations, and conduct extended engagement with local communities. In order to exploit military and civilian capabilities to their fullest potential, we must fully integrate our civilian partners into all aspects of our operations — from inception through execution. *Close working relationships, mutual respect, and personal interaction between BCT/RCT commanders and PRT Team Leaders are critical to achieving "interagency combined arms".*

4. Get out and walk — move mounted, work dismounted. Vehicles like the up-armored HMMWV insulate us from the Iraqi people we are securing, limit our situational awareness, and drastically reduce the number of Soldiers able to dismount. Furthermore, they make us predictable as they often force us to move slowly on set routes. Meanwhile, an underbelly attack by an IED or an EFP may still damage the vehicle heavily — so we gain little in safety, but sacrifice much in effectiveness. HMMWVs are necessary for traveling to a patrol area or for overwatch, heavy equipment transportation, and communications. But they are not squad cars. *Stop by, don't drive by. Patrol on foot to gain and maintain contact with the population and the enemy.*

5. We are in a fight for intelligence – all the time. Intelligence is not a "product" given to commanders by higher headquarters, but rather something we gather ourselves, through our own operations. Tactical reporting, from civilian and military agencies, is essential: there are thousands of eyes out in your area — all must act as scouts, know what to look for, and be trained and ready to report it. Also, units should deploy analytical capacity as far forward as possible, so that the analyst is close — in time and space — to the commander he supports. Our presence, living alongside the people, will turn on a "fire-hose" of unsolicited tips about the enemy. Units must be prepared to receive this flood of information. Intelligence staffs and commanders must learn how to sort through reports, separating the plausible from the fictitious, integrating the reports with other forms of intelligence, and finally recognizing and exploiting a "break" into the enemy network. Once you make a break, stay on it until it pays off. *Most actionable intelligence will come from locally produced HUMINT, tactical reporting, follow-up of IED and sniper attacks, detainee interrogations, and SIGINT. Work with what you have.*

6. Every unit must advise their ISF partners. Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts have put coalition and Iraqi forces shoulder-to-shoulder throughout the battlespace. Regular MiTTs can't be everywhere, so units must help the MiTTs enforce ISF standards, enable performance, and monitor for abuses and inefficiencies**.** Any coalition unit working with ISF will be studied, emulated

and copied – for better or worse**.** Therefore we must always set the example. *Regardless of mission, any coalition unit operating alongside ISF is performing a mentoring, training, and example-setting role.*

7. Include ISF in your operations at the lowest possible level. As foreigners, Coalition forces lack language capacity, situational and cultural awareness, and a "feel" for what is normal in the environment. ISF possess all these abilities, but lack the combat power of coalition forces. Working together, with the ISF and the local populace, we are an extremely powerful combination; working unilaterally, we can be defeated piecemeal. Therefore, units should operate with an ISF presence at the lowest feasible tactical level — ideally, at squad or platoon level. And when operating together, you must plan, sequence, and conduct operations together with local Iraqi commanders right from the outset. *Units should build a genuine, field-based partnership with local ISF units: move, live, work, and fight together.*

8. Look beyond the IED — get the network that placed it. Every IED provides a window into the network that placed it. If properly exploited, this window can be used to damage and roll back that network, thus ultimately defeating the threat. Of all key locations, the actual IED site is least important. Instead, units should look for early warning observation posts, firing and assembly points, and infiltration /exfiltration routes. Commanders should map IED patterns and use friendly convoy movement to trigger enemy action, having first pre-positioned SIGINT and reconnaissance assets to identify IED teams moving into position, and to listen for communications between OPs and firing teams. Lastly, use UAVs to trace enemy firing teams back to caches and assembly areas. *Over time, units that adopt a pro-active approach to IEDs will degrade enemy networks and push back the IED threat in their area. This will ultimately save more lives than a purely reactive approach.*

9. Be first with the truth. Public Affairs Officers and Information Operations organizations can help manage the message and set general themes. But what Soldiers say and do speaks louder than what PAOs say; the trooper on the spot has a thousand daily interactions with Iraqis and with the global audience via the news media. While encouraging spontaneity, commanders should also communicate key messages down to the individual level, so that soldiers know what message to convey in interactions with the population and the media. When communicating, speed is critical – minutes and hours matter – and we should remember to communicate to the local (Arabic/Iraqi) audience first – the U.S./global audience can follow. *Tell the truth, stay in your lane, and get the message out fast. Be forthright and never allow an enemy lie to stand unchallenged. Require accuracy, adequate context, and proper characterization from the media.*

10. Make the people choose. Some in the Iraqi civilian population want to "sit on the fence" and avoid having to choose between the insurgents and the government. They attempt to protect themselves by supporting the strongest local power; however, this makes them vulnerable to enemy intimidation. We must get the Iraqi populace off the fence – and on the side of the Iraqi government. To do this, we must first persuade the population to choose to support the government. Having done this, we must make this choice irrevocable by having the citizens publicly support government programs or otherwise declare their allegiance. Once the population has chosen to support the government, they will become vulnerable to the insurgents were we to leave. So, together with the ISF, we must protect the population, where they live. *People in Iraq exercise choice collectively, not just individually; win over local leaders to encourage the community to shift to the side of the new Iraq.*

1-1. PRIMARY FRONTLINE COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCE

The primary frontline counterinsurgency force is often the police—not the military. The primary counterinsurgency objective is to enable local institutions while decreasing the ability of the insurgency to execute operations. Because of their frequent contact with the populace, police often are the best force for countering small insurgent bands supported by the local populace. In counterinsurgency operations, special strike units, military or police, may move to different areas of operation, while patrol police remain in the local area every day and build a detailed intelligence picture of the insurgent strength, organization, and support. The police can accomplish this by providing a safe environment, policing by the rule of law, winning the support of the people, and conducting police intelligence operations. These actions become the base of the policeman's daily duties.

1-2. PROVIDING A SAFE COMMUNITY

The first step to gaining trust and confidence in the government is to provide a safe environment for the populace to work and conduct daily life. On the other hand, insurgents use terrorist tactics in urban areas to accomplish the following:

- Create disorder

- Incite sectarian violence

- Weaken the government

- Intimidate the population

- Kill government and opposition leaders

- Influence police and military forces, limiting their ability to respond to attacks

- Create government repression

- Promote their own organizational growth through recruiting, infiltration of civic and government organizations, and increased funding via criminal activities

- Otherwise exploit a chaotic environment to mask illicit activities and leverage negative media coverage

1-3. CREATING A SAFE ENVIRONMENT IN THE COMMUNITY

An effective police force can assist in creating a safe environment in the community. Being proactive and efficient in their actions, police display a position of strength to the insurgents and a sense of safety to the local population. Showing a genuine interest and concern in the safety and security of the local population, stopping to talk to the local populace during patrols, are investments in building trust between the police and the local population. Actions as simple as this provide the basis for establishing and promoting a safe and secure environment, which enables the police to accomplish the following:

- Collect information and intelligence

- Quell sectarian violence

4

- Strengthen the government

- Empower the population to take control of their life

- Improve the response of police and military forces to the needs of the populace

- Improve the government and the quality of life in the neighborhood

1-4. POLICING BY THE RULE OF LAW

Stability and security depend on establishment of, and respect for, the rule of law by government institutions that represent the state and by the citizens whom the rule of law seeks to protect. The rule of law is founded on clear, understandable legislation that is applied equally to all, respect for and adherence to such laws by the public and governmental officials, governmental authority to enforce adherence to the law and to bring violators to justice, and the means to hold government officials accountable for the misuse of power.

A safe and secure environment depends on an effective judiciary system, police force, and penal system as depicted in Figure 1-1. Under the rule of law, a society's governmental systems work hand in hand to provide a safe and secure environment for the population.

- The base of a safe environment is provided by the laws set forth by a government and the people, defining acceptable actions and behaviors.

- The judiciary system is responsible for interpreting and applying the laws to the population, while the police are charged with the execution and enforcement of the law.

- These three systems converge under the IPS charter as PTTs train police competencies of apprehension, processing, investigation, adjudication, and incarceration.

- The IPS initiates and supports the rule of law through crime and threat reduction.

- When called upon, they must be prepared to apprehend, investigate (starting at the point of capture), conduct pretrial confinement, and coordinate for IJ hearings and, upon receipt of an IJ commitment order, transfer detainees to MOJ pretrial to await their day in court.

- Consequently, the IPS provides the foundation for successful rule of law and through legitimate and transparent law enforcement build community confidence and trust.

- All three systems depend on one another in order to combat crime and insurgent activities. The area of focus for the police service is in enforcing the laws, without prejudice, throughout the local population. To do this, the police must understand the laws and legal system so as to actively apply the law day to day. *(For further information, see Appendix A — The Iraqi Criminal Justice System.)*

Civil Authority Triad

Setting conditions to achieve National Stability

Law Enforcement

L&O CS CID

Transition security operations to National Law Enforcement

Warrants

Transition detainee operations to National Penal System

I/R CS

Evidence   Records

Penal System

Judicial System

• Law Enforcement System
• Judicial System
• Penal System

Developed in Tandem

National Stability

The Law Enforcement System requires the ability to conduct Apprehensions, Processing, and support to Investigations, Adjudications, and Incarcerations in order to build Community Security and Community Trust

Figure 1-1. Civil Authority Triad.

1-5. THE IRAQI LEGAL SYSTEM

There is, unfortunately, a wide disparity between the way the Iraqi Criminal Justice System is designed to work and the way it currently operates. It is important that the student be familiar with both theory and practice because one of the main missions for PTTs is to teach their Iraqi counterparts how the system is supposed to work, while assisting them in overcoming current obstacles that prevent the system from operating as it should. What follows is a brief discussion of the various stages of the Iraqi process as it is supposed to, and as it actually does operate focusing on the role of the Iraqi Police in each.

- Unlike the United States, Iraq is a "Civil Law" jurisdiction. In the United States, judges decide cases based on written laws and precedents set by previous cases. However, in Iraq, judges decide cases based only on the written laws (the Penal Code, Criminal Procedures Law, and the Iraqi Constitution). Iraq has constitutional, civil, criminal and personal status law. The Iraqi constitution separates the legal system from the executive branch to form an independent system based on European civil law coupled with Islamic law with civil and criminal courts.

- Iraqi Judges use their own interpretations in applying the facts of a case to the written law. In short, an American working in the Iraqi Justice system will notice many significant differences from the system we have in the United States. Professional and thorough police work is as

critical in Iraq as it is in the United States, as the following discussion of the various stages of the Iraqi Judicial System reveals.

- Investigation Stage
  - Initial Investigation to Point of Arrest:
    - The role of the Iraqi Police early on in a case is very similar to that of Police in the United States. Upon notification that an offense has taken place, Iraqi Police must immediately respond to the scene, assess and react to any present threats, take statements from the victim and witnesses, and preserve all evidence.
    - In theory, Iraqi Police are required to get a warrant from a local judge before arresting a suspect. However, currently they arrest suspects without a warrant for witnessed offenses.
    - Either way, it is important that police follow procedures to ensure that the judiciary will have the necessary information to complete their job successfully.
  - Point of Arrest to Commitment Order:
    - Currently in Iraq, many suspects are brought to Detainee Collection Points to determine if detention should occur in an Iraqi Police facility, Iraqi Army facility, or a Coalition Forces (CF) facility. Frequently however, suspects are brought directly to an Iraqi Police facility.
    - Suspects are sometimes transferred from an Iraqi Police facility to a CF facility or vice versa. However, suspects arrested for purely criminal actions should be processed by Iraqi Police. In certain cases involving serious offences (Grand Crimes) the suspect will be transferred to a newly created detention facility at the Rusafa Legal Complex in Baghdad. There they will await trial by the Grand Crimes Chamber of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI).
    - Shortly after arrest the Iraqi system diverges dramatically from the American system. In Iraq, Investigative Judges (IJs) are at the center of gravity throughout the investigative stage of the case. They are equal parts judge, district attorney, and investigator. Civilian Judicial Investigators (JIs) assist IJs in preparing investigations.
    - Within 24 hours of arrest, Iraqi Police are required to present a case file to an IJ. This rarely happens due to a current shortage of IJs and JIs, and security concerns. Instead, suspects often spend weeks, months, and in some cases years, at Iraqi Police facilities waiting to be seen by an IJ before their cases can be moved through the system.
    - Due to critical shortages of IJs and JIs, the Iraqi Police become primarily responsible for keeping the process flowing for suspects in their facilities. Although the system is not designed to give much of an investigative role to the Iraqi Police after the point of arrest, the Iraqi Police find themselves in charge of initiating, investigating, and preparing cases for IJs. The fruit of this investigation go into the case file which is used throughout the rest of the process.
    - Without active investigations by the Iraqi Police, the flow of suspects through the Rule of Law grinds to a halt at the Iraqi Police station facilities. The criminal justice system often succeeds or fails based on the investigative work of Iraqi Police.

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- When a case is finally presented to an IJ, he takes control of the investigation, and makes one of three determinations: (1) set the case for trial (commitment orders); (2) dismiss the case (release orders); or (3) hold the case over for further investigation (continuance orders).

- If the case is held over for further investigation, the IJ directs the Iraqi Police and/or JIs to take further statements or gather additional evidence.

– Evidence at Investigative Hearing and Trial:

- Iraqi judges rely heavily on direct evidence of crimes during investigative hearings and trials. Thus, Iraqi Police must gather eyewitness statements, confessions, and photographs/diagrams that directly link the suspect to the alleged crime. PTTs should encourage Iraqi Police to quickly respond to crime scenes and investigate as long as security conditions permit.

- Forensic evidence, such as latent prints, DNA, and x-spray results, does not hold the same amount of weight as direct evidence in Iraq. While forensic evidence is admissible and can be helpful to secure a conviction, it cannot serve as the sole basis for a conviction. For example, a suspect's fingerprints found on a weapon will prevent the suspect from claiming he had never seen the weapon before, but eyewitness testimony would still be necessary to convict him of shooting that weapon at someone.

- Figure 1-2 depicts examples of evidence required by the IJs before a case can be set for trial: (1) a confession and/or two sworn statements from reliable observers who witnessed the illegal act, (2) pictures taken at the crime scene that graphically link the suspect to the illegal contraband and/or illegal act, (3) a diagram that summarizes the area and the suspect's relationship with the illegal activity, and (4) a Report of Findings, which is akin to an American arrest report. Also see appendix A.

- Once a case reaches a trial court, the eyewitnesses will be required to testify. Thus, it is vital for Iraqi Police to ensure eyewitnesses provide complete contact information so that they may testify at trial.

- <u>Iraqi Judges give more weight to confessions than any other type of evidence</u>. Written confessions taken by Iraqi Police or Coalition Forces (CF) can be used to aid an IJ, but are inadmissible at trial. Only written confessions taken by an IJ or a JI can be admitted at trial. Thus, Iraqi Police should collect enough evidence to "box in" a suspect, as well as a confession if possible to assist the IJ.

What Evidence Do Iraqi Courts Require?

Pictures	Diagrams	Sworn Statements	Report of Findings
• Suspects with illegal items at crime scene • Illegal items where found	• Crime scene layouts • Show distances • Signed by arresting officer	• Confessions • Eyewitness testimony • Must have two (2)	• Arrest report • Signed by arresting officer and suspect

Figure 1-2. Required evidence for courts.

- Trial Stage

  - When an IJ refers a case to trial, he signs a commitment order transferring the detainee to a dedicated pretrial confinement facility run by the Ministry of Justice. Unfortunately, shortages in pre-trial bed space often result in significant delays in transporting the detainees from the IP stations.

  - Depending on the type and severity of the offense, a case will be referred to the CCCI or a local criminal court. Trial judges often rely on the case file prepared by the IJ in determining a verdict. Thus, evidence and statements collected by the Iraqi Police will have a direct impact on the outcome of cases.

  - As discussed above, witnesses are required to testify at trial. However, if a witness testified in front of an IJ in the case, the trial judges can accept the IJ's written summary of the witness testimony.

- ISF Pretrial Detention System

  - Iraqi Police station detention cells were designed for temporary holding of suspects until seen by an IJ. Due to the current condition of the Iraqi criminal justice system, many Iraqi Police detention cells are being used as de facto pretrial confinement facilities for weeks, months, and in some cases, years.

  - This leads to overcrowding and in some cases, human rights violations and deprivation of standards. PTTs must monitor these conditions and report all human rights violation via SIR through operational channels to MNC-I PMO. PTTs must also take all reasonable action, in accordance with Rules of Engagement, to prevent any observed or suspected instances of physical or mental abuse likely to lead to serious injury or the death of detained person in Iraqi Police custody. After engaging with the ISF commanders on the scene and the discovering unit believes that the detainee is at risk of additional abuse if left in ISF custody, the unit will notify the ISF division commander who will make the determination of whether

or not CF can take custody of the detainee. Walking the thin line between the need to develop the trust of a Police Unit and the clear duty to report that unit, should they abuse their detainees, is as important as it is difficult. Abuse cannot be tolerated.

- To take a proactive step towards identifying and preventing abuse MNC-I PMO created the monthly ISF Detention Oversight Inspection Program. This program evaluates and reports conditions at ISF pretrial facilities and assists the Government of Iraq (GOI) in taking corrective actions to meet international standards for the care and custody of pretrial detainees and respect for human rights.

  - Police Transition Teams (PTT), Military Transition Teams (MTT), and National Police Transition Teams (NPTT) use the checklist to input their data into the CIDNE database on SIPRNET at http://22.30.3.59/cidne/ (see Chapter 8 and Appendix D for more information on the web based reporting system.

  - Physical abuse is an SIR reportable instance which should be recorded on the 'ISF Detention Oversight Assessment Checklist' provided in figure 8-7 ISF Detention Oversight Checklist. Physical abuse is defined as:

    - Resulting in bodily harm from the use of unlawful force or violence such as beatings that leave marks, welts, bruises, burn marks or indications of electrical shock.

    - Unlawful coercion such as threats to inflict bodily harm or harm to a family member or acquaintance.

    - Exposure to humiliating, degrading, or inhumane treatment to include sexual assault.

  - Instance(s) of unacceptable living conditions should also be recorded on the checklist. Unacceptable living conditions are defined as violation or deprivation of the following standards:

    - Crowded Conditions. Each detainee must have the space to stand, sit, and lie down in a prone position. Detainees must be provided with matting or bedding. The matting or bedding must be in good repair and generally clean.

    - Medical Care. Each detainee must be provided medical care necessary to treat injuries, wounds, and illness that are likely to threaten loss of life, limb or eyesight. Illness includes communicable and chronic diseases.

    - Food. Each detainee must be provided a minimum of two (2) meals of nutritional value per day.

    - Water. Each detainee must have potable water available at all times.

    - Hygiene. Each detainee must be provided with basic hygiene articles that are necessary to maintain general cleanliness. Each detainee must bathe or shower, at a temperature suitable for the climate, once a week. Each detainee must be provided ready access to a sanitary location to urinate and defecate when needed. They will also be provided clean clothing.

    - Living Area. Each living area must have enough natural or artificial light to read. All living areas will be ventilated by fresh air and heated or cooled to a reasonable temperature as appropriate for the climate.

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- Adjudication. Every detainee must see an investigative judge within twenty-one (21) days. No detainee should be held beyond ninety (90) days in a pre-trial confinement.

  - The results of these inspections are used to synchronize the efforts of various organizations (DoJ/ICITAP/BOC/MNDs, MNC-I SJA/PMO) to assist the Iraqi Rule of Law process. MNC-I PMO uses this information to prioritize requests for Judicial resources and pretrial bed space in support of maneuver operations, abuse prevention, and overcrowding of ISF detention facilities.

  - Currently the availability of bed space at these facilities is extremely limited. PTTs must work with their chain of command, through the Provost Marshal of MNC-I, to secure adequate bed space for suspects in MOJ pretrial confinement facilities to keep the system moving.

  - Concerns remain that the Iraqi Corrections Service is increasingly infiltrated by criminal organizations and militias. Detention facilities in Iraq do not meet incarceration capacity needs. Pre-trial detention facilities in Iraq, administered by the MOI, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the MOJ, are overcrowded, substandard facilities with poor detainee accountability practices. Post-trial prisons, administered by the MOJ, generally meet international standards, but are at maximum capacity. To address this problem, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice are demanding greater oversight of prison facilities, and U.S. advisors are encouraging the MOJ to increase the salaries of corrections officers to bring them more in line with those of police officers and thus to reduce the temptations of bribery. The Embassy and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) are also working with the GOI to increase detention capacity in the near term through additional compounds with adequate oversight in Baghdad and in the long term through hardened facilities to be administered by the MOJ.

- Figure 1-3 depicts the Iraqi Police Detainee Flow Chart from Point of Capture (Arrest) to Post Trial Confinement in the Iraqi Correctional System. (Note: This slide also reflects the fact that Iraqi Army and National Police Units also contribute to the flow of detainees through the same pipeline used by IP units).

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
Figure 1-3. Detainee Flow through Iraqi Legal System.

- (1) Actions and requirements for the Point of Capture (POC). Fill out and record capture tag serial #, prepare detainee packet which includes (2 witness statements, sketch of crime scene, photo of crime scene, photo of detainee w/ evidence, intel reports, written document of evidence inventory), segregate based on risk and conditions, safeguard detainees, conduct tactical questioning.

- (2) Actions and requirements for the Detainee Collection Point (DCP).

  - Decision Point 1: Retain or Release

  - Decision Point 2: Determine if offense is a Grand Crime or other

  - Decision Point 3: If offense is a Grand Crime, then ISF transports the detainee to Rusafa

  - Decision Point 4: If not a Grand Crime, then the detainee is transported to the respective ISF detention facility

  - Upon in-processing the ISF detention facility, validate detainee packet and evidence based on criteria in (1) above.

  - Confirm capture tag & serial number w/ detainee and evidence

  - Segregate based on risk and conditions and safeguard detainees

  - Conduct interrogations

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- Provide custodial care such as: medical, shelter, sustenance, comfort items
- Custodial care increases after 24 hours or based on conditions

  - (3) Rusafa Complex. In certain cases involving serious offences (Grand Crimes) the suspect will be transferred to this detention facility at the Rusafa Legal Complex in Baghdad. There they will await trial by the Grand Crimes Chamber of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI).

  - (4) While in the ISF pretrial facility, the Investigative Judge reviews the evidence and determines if they should retain or release. Notice that #3 and 4 are shaded the same color, this represents the Probable Cause hearing. Actions at the ISF pretrial facility include:
    - Establish ISF Transition Team contact at facility
    - Monitor daily in-processing rate and facility capacity
    - Segregate appropriately (e.g., male, female, juvenile)
    - Schedule detainee packet review by IJ
    - Decision Point: Release or retain for further investigation
    - Transfer to Rusafa as space is available

  - (5) The detainee then goes to court and a Trial Judge will either acquit or convict. If convicted, the detainee enters the Iraqi Penal System (6).

  - This seems like a fairly quick and clean system. In reality it is not. Sometimes detainees wait at the ISF detention facility for months due to the Rule of Law process not functioning properly as described below.

- Judicial Review Teams – Jumpstarting The Iraqi Rule of Law

  - Until suspects are seen by an IJ there is no mechanism for detainees to be released, for their cases to receive further investigation or for their cases to be forwarded to a Trial Court. The system simply stops, causing an overflow of detainees into cramped and often run-down ISF detention facilities. The purpose of the Judicial Review Team is to relieve a crisis situation that is beyond the capabilities of the ISF unit (e.g., Iraqi Army, National Police, and Iraqi Police System detention facilities) and the local judge to affect the Rule of Law. Every effort by the ISF unit or Transition Team should be taken to prevent the interruption of the Rule of Law. Judicial Review Teams (JRT) are to be used as a last resort to keep detention populations within capacity. JRTs are composed of at least one IJ and one Public Prosecutor, as well as several JIs. While Multi National Forces currently organize, transport, and protect JRTs, these responsibilities are in the process of being turned over to the Government of Iraq. JRTs spend less than a week at each location; thus, the Iraqi Police must meticulously prepare all case files by taking a proactive approach in investigating each case. PTTs must focus on helping their IP units lay all the necessary groundwork for the JRT to be a success. The ultimate goal of all JRTs is to restart the flow of detainees through the Rule of Law system, and at the same time lay the groundwork for resurrecting permanent Investigative Judges in each jurisdiction. Neither of these goals can be reached without case file preparation.

  - JRTs have proven successful in restarting detainee flow between the investigative and trial stages at Iraqi Army, National Police, and Iraqi Police detention facilities.

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- The following steps outline the process to request a JRT. The process is broken down into three stages the first being JRT request process and pre-deployment preparation.

  - Government of Iraq (GOI) or Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) unit identifies the need for a Judicial Review Team and sends the report up through its chain of command (simultaneously advises CF counterparts); or

  - Coalition Forces (CF) identify a need for a Judicial Review Team and advises their GOI/ISF counterpart of conditions requiring Judicial Review Team.

  - Once it is determined that a JRT is necessary, CF submit their request to MNC-I PMO.

  - Corps PMO and SJA in coordination with DoJ, MNF-I/TF 134, Iraqi Higher Juridical Council (HJC), and MSCs conduct a forum to organize, review, and establish priorities for employing JRTs to ISF detention facilities based on three factors: (1) overcrowding, (2) abuse/potential abuse based on monthly ISF Detainee Abuse Reporting, and (3) detainee throughput.

  - Transition teams must take the time to coach, teach and mentor their ISF counterparts to ensure case files are prepared for the JRT.

  - When the HJC receives the request for a JRT, they first identify a Judicial Inquiry Team (JIT) to prepare detainee packets and to ensure completeness of files prior to JRT arrival. A JIT is comprised of 3-4 Judicial Investigators and one Investigative Judge. This team helps the local judge to prepare case files.

  - To keep situational awareness and assist as necessary a CF Judge Advocate should be dedicated for the duration of the mission. This serves two purposes; it allows CF to gain a better understanding of the Iraqi legal system as well as gives CF material to build training packets for IP to further develop their investigative files.

- Deployment of Judicial Review Team and Detainee Processing. Requesting a JRT generates a few logistical requirements. MSCs need to ensure the following are available:

  - Identification of a facility capable of JRT requirements such as two rooms large enough for the IJ and JIs to conduct interviews and discuss the aspects of each case.

  - Logistical plans (lodging/travel/food for JRT members and movement of detainees between detention facility and JRT site).

  - Security and travel for JRT members (will the JRT stay the night at the facility or will they travel each day to and from the CCCI).

  - Systemic review and preparation of case files.

  - Once a facility is prepared to receive a JRT (e.g., review and prepare investigative case files; plan and prepare facilities, logistics, and security; etc.), the JRT will deploy to the facility and can provide one of three mandates: release detainee for lack of evidence (release order), set detainee for trial (commitment order), or hold case for further investigation (continuance order).

- JRT Post-Detainee Processing / Redeployment. Upon completion of case file review, the JRT provides an out-brief to the ISF/MTT/PTT/NPTT Commander or designee. They briefly recap the process and provide a by-name list identifying total detainees processed in

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each disposition category (release, transfer, continuance). They also give notification of any reports of human rights violations, abuse or torture cases.

– Transfer of Detainees from Pretrial Facility to Post Trail Facility. Once the JRT has completed its review, Corps staff (PMO/SJA) work with DoJ to request available bed space at a MoJ pretrial facility such as the Rusafa Detention Complex. The MSC works with the ISF to arrange the actual transfer of detainees with commitment orders. The transition team should remain engaged with the ISF leadership for appropriate release of detainees who receive release orders. The following are guidelines when transferring detainees to Rusafa:

  ▪ Detainees must have a commitment order and some form of photographic identification. There is no need to send the investigative file; just the commitment order signed and stamped by the IJ.

  ▪ An ICITAP (DoJ) representative will be present during the transfer of custody to the Rusafa guards/staff.

  ▪ Rusafa can only accept 100 detainees per day and they must be delivered prior to 1000hrs. Rusafa does not accept detainees on Friday, Saturday, or Iraqi holidays.

  ▪ Detainees can be transferred to Rusafa via ground or rotary wing.

  ▪ For ground transport, CF should send a representative to accompany the IA unit during the transfer to de-conflict issues in coordination with the ICITAP (DoJ) representative.

  ▪ For transport of detainees by rotary wing, the Rusafa Detention Complex staff will bring a bus to the LZ and review commitment orders and transport the detainees to Rusafa. At that point, transfer of custody is complete.

  ▪ Units must make every effort to ensure the commitment orders are in order or the detainees will not be accepted.

• Laying the Groundwork for a Better Iraqi Judicial System.

– As of May 2007, Iraq has approximately 870 investigative and trial judges and 100 criminal courts. The GOI recognizes the need to expand judicial capacity. To meet the growing demands of the judiciary, the number of judicial investigators is scheduled to reach 700 in 2007 and 1,000 in 2008. The MOJ now operates a Judicial Training Institute. The first class of 178 judges and prosecutors is scheduled to graduate in summer 2007. A second class of 60 trainees is scheduled to graduate in fall 2008. These are positive steps, but to meet the growing demand across the judicial sector, the MOJ needs to increase the system's capacity. Judges frequently face threats and attacks; thus, absenteeism and resignations undermine the workforce. Those who remain often fear handing down guilty verdicts against defendants with ties to insurgent groups or militias. In the provincial courts, judges often decline to investigate or try cases related to the insurgency and terrorism. The United States has obligated roughly $38 million since 2004 for judicial security. To counter judicial intimidation, secure criminal justice complexes are under development. A criminal justice complex may include a courthouse, pre and post trial detention facilities, forensic labs, and judicial housing—all located within the same secure perimeter. The Rusafa district of Baghdad has a criminal justice complex where the Grand Crimes Chamber of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq operates.

1-6. WINNING THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE

In June 2006 a Staff Sergeant would bring soccer balls and Beanie Babies out on patrol with the Iraqi Police. He would tell the Iraqi Police to hand out soccer balls and Beanie Babies to the kids in Saba al Bour. In September 06, the Sergeant was flagged down by 30 kids. He stopped his vehicles and the kids told him there was "a boom" down the road. The Soldiers got out of the vehicles and found a 155[mm] shell 30 meters in front of the vehicles. The round blew up before EOD arrived. The kids stopped the Sergeant's men from entering the kill zone. A couple of soccer balls saved our lives.

U.S. Army MP 1SG

Winning the support of the people is a fundamental counterinsurgency principle that police must understand. There is no doubt that the success of the Iraqi Police and perhaps the success of a democratic Iraq is tied to the police's ability to positively connect to the community they serve. The police are the first-line, face-to-face connection to the larger government. This concept is not easily realized due to many factors, including the actions of the police during Saddam Hussein's regime and the sectarian issues tied to the power of the police. Even since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, there have been documented cases of the police abusing their power for personal gain or for other issues such as tribe domination or helping the insurgent cause.

To win support of the people, the police must accomplish the following:

- Convince the community that the police will contribute to the community's return to normal life by protecting them from criminal violence.

- Continue to show that they are part of the solution for the average citizen and are working to put an end to the attack from violent extremists. Violent opposition to the Iraqi Government and Coalition forces comes from a variety of groups with political, religious, ethnic, or criminal objectives. Some groups receive support from outside Iraq. Although much of the violence is attributable to sectarian friction, each of the violent factions is driven by its own political power relationships, and the factions are often hostile to one another.

- The excerpt below from the U.S. Institute of Peace provides a historical context for the importance of protecting Iraqis from criminal violence:

Policing Iraq: Protecting Iraqis from Criminal Violence

Public opinion surveys show that Iraqis feel the greatest security threat they face is not the insurgency or sectarian conflict but pervasive criminal violence. For a people accustomed to a stifling regime security presence under Saddam Hussein—and the correspondingly safe streets—the post-intervention upsurge in murder, home invasion robbery, kidnapping, carjacking, and rape is fundamentally disturbing.

The inability ... in controlling criminal violence angered ordinary Iraqis and fueled initial support for the insurgency. The U.S. military's use of Iraqi police in counter-insurgency operations reinforced the impression among Iraqis that the United States was less concerned with their welfare than with implementing an exit strategy.

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This impression was re-enforced when the U.S. military created a new Iraqi National Police composed of counterinsurgency units made up of former soldiers. These units performed well in combat, but were infiltrated by Shiite militias and have carried out sectarian violence. Distrust of the police is widespread, particularly in Sunni areas.

Reducing criminal violence would advance stability in Iraq, increase popular support for Iraq's new government, and improve police-community relations. This would require focusing the Iraqi Police Service (the street cops) on fighting crime and protecting Iraqi citizens. It would involve improved training in conducting investigations and community-oriented policing, and new equipment to give the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) the ability to fight crime and to improve relations with Iraqi citizens. Doing this would pay dividends in the war against the insurgency, because citizens would be more likely to assist the police in tracking down insurgents.

Robert Perito, U.S. Institute of Peace, "Policing Iraq: Protecting Iraqis from Criminal Violence," June 2006;

http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0629_policing_iraq.html

Community leaders attend a local town council meeting in Qada to discuss security issues.

- To improve relations with the Iraqi people, the police will need to establish a bond of trust and cooperation. The police must take steps to establish a relationship with the community they serve. One hundred percent trust for the police by all people will never be realized. However, a level of trust enabling peace, security, and a sense of normality must be achieved. The police need the cooperation of the community to do their job. This cooperation is built on trust. One way the police can win this trust is to rise above the cultural, religious, ethnic, and political differences.

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- Police must separate themselves from negative factors such as sectarian and ethnic violence, corruption, and political influence. This effort will be very difficult because these influences are embedded in everything about this society. The Minister of Interior and police leadership must help the police work within these differences. The desired end state is for police to learn how to treat the people in the community they serve with an appropriate level of equality.

1-7. GAINING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

As the Iraqi Police gain the trust and confidence of the population being served, a symbiotic relationship (you scratch my back, I scratch your back) evolves. This relationship built on trust increases the dialogue between the police and the community, resulting in tips and information. Information collection is a critical piece of a policeman's daily job. Information from local sources provides the most time-sensitive information in a format that the collector can describe with all five senses. Since police duties require daily interaction with the local populace, the police are best suited to gather this information. Information can be gathered during these interactions in two primary ways: covertly or overtly. Information gathered covertly is obtained without posing direct questions. Some items considered covert:

- Daily conversation and neighborhood feelings and concerns

- Body language of individuals

- Changes in routine patterns

Information gathered overtly is normally obtained through the use of direct questioning or

- Informants

- Formal complaints and reports

- Deliberate reconnaissance (stakeouts)

  - The information gathered from the people in the community is invaluable and can often save the same people from harm and advance security and stability. The talk on the street in Iraq is extremely powerful; passing information by word of mouth is the most important part of communicating in this society.

  - The police must understand how to get this information while protecting from harm the person who is giving it to them. The criminals or insurgents will punish anyone giving up information that would stop one of their acts of violence. Protecting the people and families of those who choose to trust the police is very important. This is not a new idea, but it cannot be overemphasized, especially as this new relationship begins.

  - Information gathered from the local population must be analyzed and acted on by the police much as the U.S. Military Police conduct police intelligence operations.

    Police intelligence operations provide situational awareness and visualization across the operating environment and are essential to the success of Army protection programs. These operations help develop the intelligence needed to deter, detect, detain, or defeat threats against US or protected persons, materials, and information.

    For further information see [Appendix B, Police Intelligence Operations Guidebook](#).

1-8. POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Police intelligence operations are conducted by collecting, categorizing, organizing, and evaluating information and intelligence. The information and intelligence come from the information gathered by the police from the local populace, sharing of information and intelligence with other stations, other local or governmental organizations, and open sources (news, the Internet, etc.).

- The police intelligence operations process begins with the gathering of information and intelligence and ends with a planned or targeted operation.

- Intelligence gathered should be categorized and tracked on maps using colored push pins or overlays. These can be used to adjust patrol distributions and identify areas of dense crime or insurgency that require more presence.

- Proper tracking of and reacting to these trends will cause a break in the criminals' or insurgents' planning and operating cycle, keeping them off balance and giving the police services a chance to establish a safer environment.

- Usable intelligence can be established when more than one link provides a location and date that can be exploited by an offensive operation. Once the usable intelligence has been compiled into targeting packages, priorities can be set. The police unit that identifies a usable intelligence target can act on the objective target or pass the intelligence to elements better suited for the action. *(For further information see* _FM 3-19.10, "Law and Order Operations,"_ *Lesson 8, Managing Police Information.)*

> *We would collect information from an Iraqi Policeman at the station where we worked. The information he provided about the other Iraqi Police at the station was always right on target. We would collect information from this guy on the Iraqi Police Force and his information was always right on. He was so good that we talked him into moving from being an Iraqi Policeman to becoming an interpreter. His information was invaluable. You can't get this type of intelligence from daily Intelligence Summary briefs.*

> U.S. Army MP 1LT

LESSON 2
COALITION FORCES OVERVIEW

OVERVIEW

Every Soldier understands the importance of developing good situational awareness before performing any mission. Soldiers often find it difficult to accomplish the mission if they are not familiar with their operating environment. In Iraq, command and control relationships and the structure of the Iraqi government may not be familiar to most Soldiers performing the PTT mission. The following discussion will help PTT members know the terrain they are operating on. However, since the Iraqi government and coalition forces are in transition, PTTs should expect some changes and receive updates during the pre-deployment process. This lesson provides an overview of the coalition forces, the command relationships, the Iraqi government, and Iraqi Security Forces.

2-1. COALITION CHAIN OF COMMAND AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Multi-National Force–Iraq is the command responsible for the overall day-to-day operations in theater.

- The first major subordinate command under MNF-I is Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) which is the tactical unit responsible for command and control of operations in Iraq. Military Police Units conducting the PTT mission are OPCON to one of the six Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) under MNC-I: Multi-National Division–Baghdad, Multi-National Division–North, Multi-National Force–West, Multi-National Division–Center South, and the newly formed Multi-National Division–Center.

Several other commands that work with the above six major commands:

- **Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.** The Gulf Region Division is responsible for helping the Iraqi government rebuild the country's infrastructure.

- **Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I)** is an international command with subordinate commanders currently from Australia, Denmark, and the U.S. Navy and Army. It includes:

  - **Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT)**, which organizes, trains, and equips the Iraqi Armed Forces. During operations, it provides ongoing mentoring and advises Iraqi leaders at all levels of command.

  - CMATT supports the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Joint Headquarters (JHQ) as they recruit, train, equip, base, and sustain Army, Air Force and Navy units throughout Iraq until they achieve operational readiness.

  - This directorate is responsible for training Iraqi soldiers assigned to the Iraqi Army, Coastal Defense Forces and Intervention Forces. Key tasks include curriculum development, facility construction and development, life support issues, force protection and equipment distribution. CMATT coordinates with the Coalition Military Transition Teams (MiTT) who

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are assigned to MNC-I and are embedded with Iraqi military units to provide training oversight, leadership and mentoring assistance. Each MiTT consists of around 10 soldiers.

– **Ministry of Defense Transition Team (MoD TT)** MoD TT is partnered with Iraq's MoD to assist in the development of Iraq's military capacity and its ability to lead and resource the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF). The MoD works closely with the MoI to provide a secure environment for the people of Iraq and the Gulf Region.

– **Joint Headquarters Transition Team (JHQ TT)** is partnered with the JHQ to assist in the development of Iraq's Joint Headquarters inside the MoD to effectively command and control the Iraqi Joint Forces (IJF; Army, Navy, and Air Force) in accordance with Iraqi MoD direction.

– **Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT)** is partnered with the Iraqi Air Force to assist in the development of the Iraq's military air capability and the progressive transition of Counter Insurgency Operations for the Government of Iraq in accordance with Iraq's National Security Strategy and Defense Policy. Additionally, CAFTT is working with the Iraqi Air Force to improve current capabilities in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well mobility and airbase operations and to define the service's future roles and missions. This is accomplished by MiTTs embedded with Iraqi personnel at all four Iraqi Air Force locations.

– **Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT)** is responsible for organizing training, equipping, and mentoring the Iraqi Civilian Police services, the Department of Border Enforcement Forces, and the Facilities Protection Service Forces. The Professional Development Division of CPATT coordinates with the MOI on the training of Iraqi police in the institutional setting such as the Baghdad Police College. CPATT provides these services through a staff of civilian planners and trainers such as the International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) embedded with the PTTs.

– CPATT assists with the training, equipping, organizing, mentoring and developing the Ministry of Interior forces in order to contribute to defeat the insurgency and establish a safe, stable Iraq in which a democratic rule of law can be established. CPATT works closely with the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior and directs a menu of basic and specialized training curriculums for the various Iraqi police operations. Training is conducted by trained Iraqi police instructors who make up 80 percent of the instructors with contracted police instructors and Coalition Soldiers providing the remaining 20 percent of instructorship.

– Police Transition Teams were introduced at the provincial, directorate, district and station levels in nine key cities to enhance the scope and depth of the development of the Iraqi Police Services. The intent is to enhance the IPS capability to provide effective, legitimate policing services and public order within a counter-insurgency environment.

– CPATT compiles all the reports and data it receives through the Iraqi Police channels as well as the higher headquarters roll-ups. CPATT and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) then tabulate all the data and publish the rolled-up Training Readiness Assessment (TRA) levels for all the stations, districts, and provinces. These assessment levels then guide Multi-National Corps–Iraq and Multi-National Force–Iraq in determining timelines for transitioning provinces to Provincial Iraqi Control.

– **Ministry of the Interior Transition Team (MoI TT**) is partnered with Iraq's MoI to assist in the development of Iraq's law enforcement capacity and its ability to lead and resource the Iraqi Police. The MoI works closely with the MoD to provide a secure environment for the people of Iraq and the Gulf Region.

The MNC-I PMO is responsible for Policy Oversight and IPLO integration for the IPS Development Program

The Military Police Brigade is assigned ADCON of all MP units assigned to theater for PTT mission and responsible for PTT certification

PTTs are OPCON to the Multi-National Divisions

Figure 2–1. MNF–I Command Structure.

– **U.S. coalition partners.** There are 25 other countries providing forces in support of coalition operations in Iraq. While some troop contingents are small, all are valued members of the coalition. The countries currently contributing troops are Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Several NATO countries also have forces in Iraq that are not under Multi-National Force–Iraq: Hungary, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Turkey. Fiji has forces in support of the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq.

– **Security Transition Plan.** One of the primary ongoing missions of the coalition is to develop Iraqi Security Forces capable of assuming the lead for providing security. There are four overlapping phases for this transition:

  ▪ Implement Partnerships: Multi-National Force–Iraq establishes and maintains partnerships across the entire Iraqi Security Forces (this phase is complete).

- Iraqi Army Lead: Iraqi Army units develop progressively through stages from unit formation to conducting counterinsurgency ops (ongoing; nearly complete).

- Provincial Iraqi Control: Iraqi civil authorities ready to assume control and security in provinces (ongoing, with several provinces under Iraqi control).

- Iraqi Security Self-Reliance: the Iraqi Government achieves Provincial Iraqi Control (or a combination of Provincial Iraqi Control and Iraqi Army Lead) throughout Iraq, and the Government, through its security ministries, is capable of planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces (ongoing).

- The Coalition has met the overall force generation targets for Iraqi Security Forces but the actual number of present-for duty soldiers is only about one-half to two-thirds of the total end-strength due to scheduled leave, absence without leave, and attrition.

- The police have also experienced significant attrition of personnel who have been through Coalition training, but provincial and local governments have hired additional police outside the train-and-equip program. Both the MOD and the MOI have assumed control of most force generation tasks and have developed a plan to continue routine replenishment of the force.

2-2. OVERVIEW OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT

The Iraqi people have elected a representative democratic government in the political void created by the Ba'ath collapse. There are substantial obstacles to this political development, not the least of which are the current instability of Iraqi society and the historical factors defining the realities of Iraq's political environment. The variety of competing parties and interests, insecurities, and fears pose a serious threat to the representative government and political stability in general.

- **Background**. In the effort to develop a representative Iraqi democratic government, the coalition forces established the Coalition Provisional Authority under UN Security Council Resolution 1483, dated 22 May 2003. The Coalition Provisional Authority reported to DoD and appointed 25 Iraqis to the Iraqi Governing Council. The Coalition Provisional Authority transferred full governmental authority on June 28, 2004, to the Iraqi Interim Government, which governed under the Transitional Administrative Law for Iraq. Under the Transitional Administrative Law, a national conference was convened, and elections for a 275-member Transitional National Assembly were held in Iraq on Jan. 30, 2005.

- **Following these elections,** the Iraqi Transitional Government assumed office. The Transitional National Assembly was charged with drafting Iraq's permanent constitution, which was approved in an Oct. 15, 2005, constitutional referendum. An election under the constitution for a 275-member Council of Representatives was held on Dec. 15, 2005. About 77 percent of voters participated in the December 2005 election. On March 16, 2006, the Iraqi Council of Representatives was sworn in, and on June 8, 2006, the last two ministers of the Iraqi cabinet were sworn in.

- **A few key government officials** in the unity government are Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, President Jalal Talabani, Minister of the Interior Jawad al-Bolani, Minister of Defense Abdul Qadir Mohammed Jasim, and Minister of Justice Hashim al-Shibli. For further information on the Iraqi government and key officials, see the U.S. Embassy in Iraq website at http://iraq.usembassy.gov/.

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2-3. IRAQI SECURITY FORCES OVERVIEW

The Iraqi Security Forces are composed of different organizations working in cooperation to provide a safe and secure environment in Iraq. The two main Iraqi Government Ministries that the PTT must know about are the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI).

- **Ministry of Defense.** The Iraqi Armed Forces are under the Ministry of Defense, with operational control exercised through a Joint Force Headquarters. The ground force strength is approximately 152,200 personnel.

  - The Iraqi MOD forces consist of the Joint Headquarters (JHQ), the IGFC, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF), the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy (including Marines). The Iraqi military has an authorized strength of approximately 175,000 personnel and is centered on an Army with nine infantry divisions, one mechanized infantry division, and associated combat support/combat support units. Two additional infantry divisions are in development as part of Prime Minister Maliki's Expansion Plan. The Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters reached initial operating capability in July 2006 and will eventually command and control all Iraqi institutional training facilities. The Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, under the direct command of the JHQ, consists of the Tactical Training Command and the National Defense University. The Tactical Training Command will begin to assume control of the institutional tactical training facilities—six Regional Training Centers and three Iraqi Training Battalions—in 2007. The National Defense University has reached initial operating capability and has started to operate institutions of professional development.

  - Development and transition of the 10 divisions is still ongoing. By November, it is expected that the Iraqis will gain operational control of all divisions. Embedded Coalition advisors continue to assist in the development of JHQ and IGFC command-and-control capabilities.

  - Divisions will have three or four brigades averaging three battalions each. Each infantry division has a motorized transportation regiment and the mechanized division has a logistics battalion for each brigade. Additionally, there are three special operations battalions, numerous support units, and 17 strategic infrastructure battalions.

  - The Iraqi Air Force has six squadrons consisting of medium-lift planes, reconnaissance aircraft, and light utility helicopters. The Navy has a battalion of Marines and an assortment of coastal patrol boats and a newly formed Iraqi Special Operations Force.

  - Figure 2-2 below depicts the Iraqi Armed Forces rank and insignia.

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
Figure 2-2. The Iraqi Armed Forces rank and insignia.

- The Iraqi Army is rapidly becoming capable of leading counterinsurgency operations with coalition forces in support. Eight of ten divisions are currently under command and control of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC). Embedded Coalition advisors will continue to assist in the development of JHQ and IGFC command-and-control capabilities. The divisions are headquartered in a particular region, but some may be called upon to provide support in other regions. As of May 2007, headquarters location and composition were:

    - 1st Division   (Habbaniyah—4 brigades)
    - 2nd Division   (Mosul—4 brigades)
    - 3rd Division   (Al Kasik—3 brigades)
    - 4th Division   (K-1—4 brigades)
    - 5th Division   (KMTB—3 brigades)
    - 6th Division   (Old Muthanna—6 brigades)
    - 7th Division   (Ramadi—3 brigades)
    - 8th Division   (Diwaniyah—4 brigades)
    - 9th Mech Division   (Taji—4 brigades)
    - 10th Division   (Basrah—5 brigades)
    - 11th Division   (Baghdad)

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- **Ministry of Interior**. This ministry is responsible for several security organizations, including the National Police, the Iraqi Police Service, Emergency Response Unit, Department of Border Enforcement, and Dignitary Protection. The Facilities Protection Service falls under the authority of the MOI but is not fully under its control.

  - The Ministry of Interior (MOI) views its primary role as that of providing security. Considering the nature of the violence in Iraq, there has been less emphasis on training in the conduct of criminal investigations. To address this shortcoming, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) is strengthening the Iraqi Major Crimes Task Force and the Major Crimes Unit. Additionally, MNSTC-I and the MOI are working to improve Iraq's forensic investigative capabilities by adding several thousand forensic specialists to the police forces.

  - The MOI is being expanded to an end-strength of 194,800 and an automated personnel management system is being implemented to track the force. Annual attrition in the MOI is estimated at 20%.

  - **National Police.** The National Police is a bridging force between the local police and the Iraqi Army, allowing the Minister of Interior to project police capabilities across provinces. The National Police is also charged with maintaining law and order while an effective community police force is developed. Until October 2006, the National Police was trained and served primarily in a paramilitary role and had received little traditional police training. MNSTC-I is implementing a National Police Transformation and Retraining Program to reorient it toward police functions.

    - The National Police are formally known as the Commandos, the Mechanized Brigade, and the Public Order Battalions. While they are a part of the MOI, they do not answer to Police Affairs. They should not be called Iraqi Police. As of March 2007, five of the National Police Brigades were assigned to perform security duties in Baghdad. There are plans to expand this force to 26,900 personnel.

    - Several National Police brigades are conducting counter-insurgency operations to support the Baghdad Security Plan. Two National Police battalions have been assigned security lead for their areas of responsibility within Baghdad. One battalion has been designated as part of the prime minister's operational reserve, and an additional (10th) National Police brigade has been requested by the prime minister to provide security to the Samarra Shrine reconstruction project. Thirty-nine Coalition NPTTs now support the development of National Police units by mentoring, training, and facilitating communication with Coalition forces. NPTTs assess the readiness and operational capability of the National Police, similar to the tasks performed by MiTTs with Iraqi Army units and PTTs with the Iraqi Police.

  - **Iraqi Police Service**. The Iraqi Police Service is composed of patrol, traffic, station, and highway police as well as forensics specialists assigned throughout Iraq's 18 provinces. Its mission is to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level. The Iraqi Police Service constitutes the majority of MOI forces.

    - The term *Iraqi Police* refers only to the station, traffic, and patrol police who answer to MOI–Police Affairs.

- The different types of Iraqi Police stations include: Provincial Headquarters, Directorate Headquarters, District Headquarters, Patrol Stations, Traffic Stations, Central Maintenance Facility, Highway Traffic, Motorcycle Traffic, Checkpoint Headquarters, River Patrol Station, and Major Crime Unit (CID)

- It is important to note that each of these has a specific function and that they will generally "stay in their lanes" and not try to perform the duties of other stations. This can be a source of confusion for coalition forces who do not understand their roles.

- PTTs assist the development of the Iraqi Police Service. Each team has approximately 11 to 15 members; 3 or 4 members of each team are IPLOs hired as contractors by the U.S. State Department, and the rest are typically military personnel, many of whom are Military Police.

- As of 15 May 2007, there are 223 PTTs (10 Provincial, 64 District, and 159 Station) assisting the development of the Iraqi Police Service. PTTs travel to stations to coach the Iraqi police and to conduct joint patrols with them. These joint PTT/Iraqi Police Service patrols promote active community policing and work to improve the reputation of the police among the Iraqi people.

- Each month, MNC-I uses PTTs to assess the operational readiness of a portion of the police forces using the Transition Readiness Assessment process. This process evaluates the ability of the police to perform core functions required for effective law enforcement and community policing. Key assessment criteria include manning, leadership, training level, equipment, facilities status, force protection measures, and station ability to conduct independent operations.

- Cost and risk preclude deploying enough PTTs to cover all of Iraq's police stations; at any time, only 5 of Iraq's 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs to conduct the full range of activities described above. Continued PTT presence and participation at Iraqi Police Service stations are needed to improve police readiness and to sustain progress in reforming community policing.

- Figure 2-3 depicts the IPS rank structure and insignia. **NOTE: In some provinces and cities, Iraqi Police Rank and insignia may differ from the chart.** PTTs should find out what the rank structure and insignia is for their area so they can show proper respect and military courtesy.

- Coalition Forces and the MOI face the formidable challenge of constructing an effective police service to serve and protect the Iraqi people, uphold the rule of law, and defeat insurgents and criminals.

- The coalition and Iraqi government must construct this police service from the remnants of a poorly trained, poorly equipped, corrupt police service unaccustomed to proactive patrolling or serving the community in which they live and work.

- The difficulty of constructing this police service is compounded by powerful insurgent and criminal organizations that threaten officers and their families if the police take action against them. Police stations are often subject to attack, and in many places the police do not have the trust of the population.

Current IPS Police Career Progression

شرطي
"Shurti"
1st Policeman
constable

(No Insignia)
Policeman
constable

نائب عريف
"Naeb Arif"
Corporal

عريف
"Arif"
Sergeant

رئيس عرفاء
"Raees Arif"
Chief Sergeant

Promotion classes

3 years

3 years

3 years

Promotion classes

3 years

مفوض درجة ثامنة
"Mofawad
Daraqa Thamena"
8th Degree Warrant

مفوض درجة سابعة
"Mofawad
Daraqa Sabia"
7th Degree Warrant

مفوض درجة سادسه
"Mofawad
Daraqa Sadisa"
6th Degree Warrant

مفوض درجة خامسة
"Mofawad
Daraqa Kamisa"
5th Degree Warrant

Promotion classes

3 years

3 years

3 years

مفوض درجة رابعة
"Mofawad
Daraqa Rabia"
4th Degree Warrant

مفوض درجة ثالثة
Mofawad
Daraqa Thalitha
3rd Degree Warrant

مفوض درجة ثانية
Mofawad
Daraqa Thaniya
2nd Degree Warrant

مفوض درجة أولى
Mofawad
Daraqa Olla
1st Degree Warrant

Policeman ranks are worn on the lapel only. Warrant ranks are worn on the collar only.

IRAQI POLICE RANKS

INSPECTOR	POLICE ACADEMY CADETTE	MULAZIM	MULAZIM AWWAL	NAQIB	RAID
INSPECTOR	POLICE ACADEMY CADETTE	2ND LIEUTENANT	1ST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL	BRIGADIER GENERAL	MAJOR GENERAL	LIEUTENANT GENERAL	GENERAL
MAQADDAM	AQID	AMID	LIWA	FARIQ	FARIQ AWWAL

Figure 2-3. Iraqi Police Service rank and insignia.

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- CPATT has met the nationwide OCSF goal of training 135,000 Iraqi Police Service personnel. However, distribution of that 135,000 has not been according to original program goals, leaving some provinces with more than their programmed allocation and some with less. Basic training continues in those provinces still working to meet their individual requirements. CPATT is working with the MOI to build institutional capacity and to identify annual requirements for force sustainment, reconciling anticipated annual requirements with institutional capacity. To meet local needs and dynamic requirements, the MOI authorized provincial governors to hire additional Iraqi Police Service officers, but the MOI and the governors are responsible for the additional officers' equipment and training. Every province, except Anbar, has more personnel than agreed. However, many of these additional police are put on the job with minimal or no training. As the Coalition transfers the institutional training base to MOI control, training of these "extra" local police will continue.

- Iraqi Police Service development is managed by the Ministry of Interior with assistance from the coalition. Figure 2-4 depicts several key elements of this effort.

Figure 2-4. Iraqi Police Service (IPS) Development Model

- The MOI Transition Team is focusing on developing the minister's ability to delineate authority, responsibility, and accountability clearly throughout the MOI. The chain of command is relatively clear and effective for National Police and Border Forces. However, command and control for the provincial police is unclear. The decentralized nature of the Iraqi Police Service often results in conflicting guidance and directives coming simultaneously from the central ministry and the provincial government.

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
Figure 2-5. Relationship of MOI, Provincial Government, and Iraqi Police Service.

- **Facility Protection Service**. Over 150,000 Facility Protection Service personnel work for the MOI. At least half of them work in Baghdad for the other 26 ministries and 8 independent directorates, such as the Central Bank of Iraq. These forces act in two capacities: as security guards at government buildings and as personal security details to protect important government ministry officials. They dress similar to Iraqi Police, but their brassards have "FPS" on them. Their badges and their vehicles should have MOI markings on them. The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) is a decentralized group of security guards who protect GOI buildings and act as personal security details to protect government ministers and ministry officials. Each ministry controls its own force of FPS personnel. Although they share the same name, FPS personnel are not a coherent force. The MOI FPS continues to have better regulation, training, and discipline than the FPS staff at other ministries. There continues to be evidence that FPS personnel are unreliable and, in some cases, responsible for violent crimes and other illegal activity. On December 27, 2006, the prime minister signed a consolidation directive that provided instructions placing all FPS personnel under the Minister of Interior and ordered the transfer of money for salaries to the MOI budget. The directive maintained the separation of the Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Electricity, and the Higher Juridical Council forces. The MOI has a plan to assess the current state of these forces and implement the consolidation, including standardizing training, equipment, uniforms, and procedures.

- **Directorate of Border Enforcement and Directorate of Ports of Entry.** The Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) and the Directorate of Ports of Entry (POE) are

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charged collectively with controlling and protecting Iraq's borders. The DBE is organized into 5 regions, 12 brigades, and 38 battalions, and includes forces that man 420 border posts and forts, of which the Coalition has funded 258. There are 17 land border Ports of Entry, 4 sea Ports of Entry, and 4 air Ports of Entry. The DBE is supported by 28 Coalition Border Transition Teams (BTTs). The 11-man BTTs mentor and support the development of the border units. Additionally, four 3-man Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Border Support Teams (BSTs) mentor and monitor Border Enforcement personnel at critical POEs. The BTTs and the Border Support Teams are essential to the development of the DBE and POEs. The DBE is in the lead on Iraq's borders with the Iraqi Army in support.

- **Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC).** A key element of the security transition plan is to meet the conditions for Provincial Iraqi Control. PIC provinces (complete or very close) are Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar, An Najaf, Maysan, Al-Qadisiyyah, Wasit and Al Basra provinces. On 30 May 2007, the provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Dahuk transferred as a bloc to regional Iraqi control under the Kurdistan regional government.

  - One key condition for Provincial Iraqi Control is the readiness of the local police and governments to provide security and domestic order.

  - The governors and the provincial government must be capable of overseeing security operations with support from the Ministry of Defense and MOI. Figure 2-5 shows the relationship among MOI, the Provincial Government, and Iraqi Police. Figure 2-4 shows the IPS Development Model. Note where PIC falls on the spectrum of development.

  - The security forces, mainly police, must be trained, equipped, and capable of protecting the Iraqi people.

  - The coalition has Provincial Reconstruction Teams to work with local leaders and assist in this process. As security improves, economic reconstruction programs enabled by Iraqi and Coalition funding and expanded Provincial Reconstruction Teams are moving in to assist with basic services and improving economic opportunities for Iraqi citizens.

  - PTTs also play an important role by their work with the Iraqi Police.

  - A province reaching Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) does not mean that the coalition no longer supports it. On the contrary, depending on the threat and the situation, Multi-National Force–Iraq may still be heavily engaged in that province. The coalition can reinforce Iraqi Forces if needed in a particular situation, and reconstruction projects will continue under Provincial Iraqi Control.

LESSON 3
FACTORS AFFECTING POLICE DEVELOPMENT

It's no secret that sectarian violence has changed the dynamics of what Iraqis must face here on the ground.

General George W. Casey, Jr., Commanding General, MNF-I, February 2007

OVERVIEW

While the obvious factors of policing (availability and quality of equipment and personnel, systems, and training) are certainly the fundamentals that will determine mission success, other influences are equally important to daily police operations. Successful counterinsurgency operations depend on thoroughly understanding the society and culture in which they are being conducted. This lesson will help PTTs understand the Iraqi cultural, political, and economic factors that affect police development.

3-1. CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Culture and history affect how people view the roles, responsibilities, and actions of a police force, and they influence police development. Guiding principles in Arab culture are *inshaAllah* (if God wills it), *buqra* (tomorrow), and *Ma`lish* (it is nothing). PTTs should be aware that in Iraq, there may be no sense of urgency to do everything here and now. In Western culture, everything is viewed as a "window of opportunity"—an admired and attractive expression. Therefore, a middle ground must be found between these two competing cultures in order to maintain effective negotiations even at the lowest levels. PTTs must practice patience when dealing with their Iraqi counterparts.

Instead of asserting their separateness and privacy as independent individuals, Iraqi Arabs tend to interact as members of a group—family, clan, village, neighborhood, and tribe. Group norms guide individual behavior, and Iraqi Arabs display a high need for social approval.

- Pride is a valued commodity within the Arab society. As a result, shaming is the primary instrument with which Iraqi Arab society enforces conformity.

- The group often determines a person's identity, status, and prospects for success in life, resulting in Iraqi Arabs' being subject to immense family and community pressures that over-shadow, if not eliminate, the existence or development of individual thought, opinions, judgments, and initiatives.

- Arab culture favors centralization of authority at each level. Arabs are generally submissive and obedient to their superiors. Delegation of authority is rare, and decision making is reserved for senior leaders.

- Tribes value and expect members to display courage, gallantry, honor, and pride.

- Arabs consider hospitality an outward demonstration of honor and respect. This can result in agreements that they cannot necessarily meet.

- There is a basic lack of trust toward outsiders. This lack of trust is caused by a general skepticism of U.S. intentions in Iraq and the Middle East. Also, some Sunnis believe that Americans are biased towards the Shiites. PTTs should be aware of this lack of trust and continually reinforce U.S. intentions (a free, secure, democratic Iraq) while treating all people equally and fairly.

Iraqi Culture Hierarchy of Loyalties

Figure 3-1. Arab hierarchy of loyalties or societal framework.

- **Immediate family** (self-explanatory).

- **Extended family** (similar to our society; more inclusive to persons related by marriage).

- **Sub-tribe:** This traditionally constituted the main defense unit. It is historically composed of a number of extended families tracing themselves back to one father.

- **Tribe:** This consists of four to six sub-tribes tracing back to a real (or sometimes fictional) ancestor. The tribe's activities are mainly political, consisting of managing relations with other tribes and the government. At this level, the tribe is led by a sheik and advised by a council. The tribal system in most of the Shi'a Arab south is different from that of the Sunni Arab center-north in that the Shi'a sheiks often had to share power with the sadah (holy men) and the ulema (Muslim scholars trained in Islamic religion and law).

- **Tribal confederation**. Some tribes join to form confederations. Iraqi tribes are characterized by solidarity, hospitality, and independence. The tribe provides its members with an identity, a sense of security, and a blueprint for the resolution of conflicts, but everyday behavior is pragmatic and adaptive to specific situations.

- **Same-sect Muslims**: Loyalty to one's sect (Sunni or Shi'a) before another Muslim sect.

- **Other Muslims**: Loyalty to Muslims comes before loyalty to other religions.

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- **Nation**: Iraq is a multicultural society without a strong common national identity. As an example, a foreign fighter from another country who is a Shi'a will pragmatically claim stronger loyalty to a Shi'a sect in Iraq based on local conditions in order to gain acceptance, than he will to Iraq as a nation.

3-2. ETHNIC INFLUENCES

- **Arab** (75 to 80%). The term *Arab* is a cultural description, not a racial category. Typically, it means anyone who speaks Arabic as the primary language. Arabic is the language of the Quran, and there are over 200 million Arabs worldwide.

- **Kurds** (15 to 20%). Located primarily in the northern provinces of Iraq, Kurds are loyal and dedicated to an independent Kurdish state. Their primary language is *Kurdish*.

- **Turkmen, Assyrian, Bedouin**, others (2 to 3%). The Iraqi Turkmen are of Turkish ethnicity, descended from a federation of Turkic-speaking tribes called the Oghus that migrated from Mongolia to Central Asia in the 7th century AD. The Turkmen want a democratic state that maintains the territorial unity of Iraq, safeguards the human rights of all Iraqi citizens, and provides cultural rights for the Turkmen population.

3-3. RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES

Most Arab Muslims in the world are of the Sunni sect. (This is not the case in Iraq.)

- **Sunni** (20% to 35%) are mostly located in an urban environment. During Saddam's rule, the Sunni controlled Iraq via a few provinces in the northwest part of the country. They are independent power brokers and make up most of the professional class. They desire secular ownership of the government and prefer a mixture of religion and secular government.

- **Shi'a** (55% to 60%) are mainly located in cities in and around Basra and Baghdad. They were historically oppressed despite being the majority. Piety, not politics, is important to them. They look to Iran for leadership, as it is the nearest nation to their part of Iraq and mostly populated by Shi'a). To the Shi'a, religion must be the first priority in building the new government.

- **Christians** (3%) are very urbanized and live together in dense populations, mostly around Baghdad. They have no real tribal relationship.

3-4. TRIBAL RELATIONSHIPS

The importance of tribe, clan, and village affiliations has increased in Iraq despite urbanization and other changes, because of longstanding conflicts, economic sanctions, and Saddam Hussein's manipulation of tribal identity and tribal values.

PTTs should understand the strong influence tribal relationships have over all Iraqis, including the Iraqi Police.

- Over time, tribal customs have permeated the state's legal system, and thus all other state organizations.

- Because law enforcement agencies and courts continue to experience some degree of corruption, many Iraqis approach powerful and influential tribes to settle disputes or provide protection.

- Surnames (for example, al-Najafi, al-Samawi, al-Mashhadi, al-Zubaydi, and al-Jubori) typically reveal the area or tribe from which a person's family originated.

Meeting between Iraqi Police and local sheiks

When we first got to Al Zouhor, we were trying to get the District Commander to start work on some of the improvement programs to the station that involved getting out into the community. The District Commander was adamant that before he took action, he had to get approval from the local Sheikh.

Army MP 1LT

3-5. CULTURAL PRACTICES

The following cultural practices are important to understanding tribal dynamics:

- Loyalty to kinsmen—even those who are bad—is a given. Don't expect tribes to give up insurgents in their midst.

- Negotiations between the police and local tribal leaders may help broker surrenders.

- Tribes will seek revenge or compensation for perceived wrongs toward their kinsmen. Killing tribesmen will cause tribes to rally against the outsider.

- Banditry is a common practice. Raiding the outsider is a frequent occurrence unless a deal is brokered.

- Any action that occurs in the tribal area requires compensation to the tribe:
    - Construction (pipelines, power or sewage lines)
    - Land use (checkpoints)
    - Business practices (distributing goods and services)

- What's in it for me? Calculations of gains and losses, often gauged against rivals, are determinants of behavior.
    - Through this action, will I gain, maintain, or lose?
    - What are my rivals being offered?
    - Are they getting a better deal than I am?

- Will seek to use the coalition to undermine traditional enemies and rivals.
    - PTTs could get caught up in a tribal dispute
    - PTTs could be perceived as not being the honest broker

- Corruption remains a factor at both the unit and ministerial level. In the personnel system, the Ministers of Defense and Interior are aware of "ghost" soldiers and policemen who exist only on the rolls. By maintaining these soldiers and policeman on their roles, units are able to receive additional resources based on per capita planning factors. Additionally, corrupt leaders often collect pay and other compensation designated for these soldiers and policemen. The ministries have made significant strides in reducing corruption within the personnel and pay systems and are well along in the automation of these systems to reduce corruption further and to tackle the absenteeism resulting from soldiers leaving their units to deliver their pay in cash to their families in their home districts.

- Corruption, illegal activity, and sectarian influence constrain progress in developing MOI forces. Although the primary concern of the GOI remains the Sunni insurgency, tolerance of and influence exerted by Shi'a militia members within the MOI are troubling. Militia influence affects every component of the MOI, particularly in Baghdad and several other key cities. Recruits take an oath of office denouncing militia influence and pledging allegiance to Iraq's constitution. Whenever actionable evidence is found, it is acted on by the MOI Internal Affairs Directorate and the minister.

3-6. POLICING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY

All of the previously mentioned differences contribute to an ever-increasing strain on the ability of the Iraqi Police to conduct law-and-order operations. PTTs should understand the impact that these cultural practices have on policing in a divided society with limited national identity:

- Many Iraqis, even those in positions of authority, are slow to make decisions and implement changes until they have determined how their community will react.

- Leveraging pride can be a useful tool to effect change within your stations.

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- Shaming Iraqi Police should be avoided at all costs.

- It can be frustrating, when looking through an American lens, to not see a similar sense of national pride in the Iraqi people. It must be understood that most Iraqis identify themselves more with their family and tribes than with their broader nation. Therefore, when training and working with Iraqi police, emphasize what they are doing for their families and communities rather than what they are doing for their nation.

- The religious conflict between the Sunni and Shi'a Muslims is a permanent condition of the battlefield. It is possible that some stations will have a mix of the two major religious sects. This is something a PTT should be aware of in order to identify any potential points of internal strife. Religious differences can have an effect from the station level all the way through the provincial level, depending on the religious beliefs and affiliations of the chiefs. PTTs should make it very clear that allowing religious differences to get in the way of a functioning police force is not professional or acceptable. Confidence building, respect, and cooperation between groups are important.

- In terms of religious sects, the Iraqi Police Service is generally representative of the demographic makeup of its neighborhoods, although there are some neighborhoods in Baghdad and other cities where the percentage of Shi'a in the Iraqi Police Service is disproportionately high. Initial estimates, compiled during implementation of the National Police Transformation and Retraining program in late 2006, showed that the National Police were disproportionately Shi'a. The U.S. is in the process of helping the Iraqi Government create a MOI that reflects the diversity of the Iraqi people. The goal is to create ethnically integrated units at the national level, while still allowing local police to reflect the ethnic composition of the communities in which they serve. MNSTC-I continues to advocate recruiting initiatives targeting Sunnis to improve diversity and to provide a force that will impart even-handed law enforcement.

3-7. POLITICS AND POLICING

Besides the difficulties of policing in a divided society, *politics* plays an important role.

- PTT success demands a thorough, in-depth understanding of the operational area and its people, including the political factors that affect policing.

- PTTs can gain *limited awareness* of an area's culture, tribal relationships, politics, and accepted practices through pre-deployment area analysis and area studies.

  Detailed understanding is achieved only through intensive personal interaction with coalition counterparts. Here, knowledge of cultural and political subtleties is gained, and true partner-ships are formed. No grand strategy or technological advantage can be substituted for intensive personal awareness of a counterpart's politics and culture.

  FM 31-20-3, PTT, adapted

Battalion commander and sheik addressing local community concerns.

- **The role of the state vs. the role of the ethnic group.** PTTs must recognize that the government or *nationalism can be overridden by sectarian influences.*

  – The geographic shorthand used to describe Iraq—Shi'a south, Sunni center—masks more complex patterns of social and cultural identity.

  – An Iraqi could simultaneously profess a strong Shi'a or Sunni loyalty, identify with a particular tribe, and have a sense of being an Arab.

  – The existence of such overlapping loyalties has given the Iraqi ruling elites the opportunity to define and redefine the country's identity in accordance with their interests and the dictates of policy at any given time. PTTs should be aware that it is common for social identities to overlap and be manipulated as a strategic asset.

  – The Iraqi state has created institutions that have effectively mixed communities and diluted their sense of separateness. The net result has been an ethnic and sectarian mixing that has created some sense of Iraqiness, particularly among a segment of the middle and upper classes.

  – Since the late 1960s, moreover, voluntary and forced migration has altered the demographic balance. In urban areas, many Iraqis live in mixed communities, in which class and social status can have as much significance as ethnic and religious affiliation. However, the regime's tendency to rule along regional, tribal, and religious lines has caused tensions.

  – *The state has failed to offer diverse communities with divergent aspirations a single and unified focus of loyalty and allegiance. The two main groups that make up Iraq's Arab population are torn between affiliations as Iraqi and as members of a religious subgroup.*

  – Because the Iraqi state is a relatively recent creation, the Iraqi identity is the least rooted. The religious affiliation has deeper roots, greater historical weight, more passionate potential, and a transnational character.

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- The religious differences between Sunnis and Shi'a have impeded the emergence of an Iraqi nationalism, created dilemmas of self-identification, and made relations among the two groups problematic.

The major split: Sunni vs. Shi'a. PTTs must recognize that this split between the two major groups creates great challenges in developing a safe and secure community.

- **Sunni Arabs.** Sunni Arabs were the ruling elite in Iraq even though they are the minority, about 20% of the population. With the decline of the Arab nationalist parties, many Sunnis consider the military their only potential protector against Shi'a domination. For their part, many Sunnis fear and resent the loss of power and influence that has accompanied a more representative government. They also feel excluded from the primary government processes due to their lack of participation in the constitution-building process.

- **Shi'a Arabs.** Shi'a Arabs represent approximately 55% of the Iraqi population and are the majority ruling party.
  - The establishment of modern Iraq posed a dilemma for the Shi'a and emphasized the issue of their identity. Unlike Kurds, who constitute a distinct ethnic group, Shi'a are mainly Arabs.
  - In coping with their identity crisis, the Shi'a explicitly stress their Arab culture, unlike their Iranian co-religionists, who are Persian.
  - Some Shi'a Arabs have made attempts to accommodate their religious identity to the framework of the Iraqi state.
  - However, Shi'a have not been a major part of the governmental process because they
    - Lacked a unified Shi'a cause, goal, or direction
    - Lacked a strong, leading personality
    - Lacked a well-developed organization
    - Consciously chose to not participate in governing Iraq
    - Explicitly identify themselves as Shi'a (as opposed to Arab or Iraqi) and will articulate their demands only in Shi'a terms
    - Failed to attract the support of either the secular or religious Shi'a

Besides religious differences, PTTs must understand that the rift between Sunnis and Shi'a is rooted in a struggle for political and economic power and representation. PTTs should also understand that this Sunni-Shi'a rift is not all about religion. The sectarian violence is ultimately a fight for the balance of power and spheres of influence. Understanding this background will assist the PTTs in advising their Iraqi Police counterparts.

- **Accepted practices that affect policing.** These tribal customs have resulted in accepted norms within society as well as in the police and court systems. This norm is best illustrated by "you scratch my back and I will scratch yours." This is an important part of the Iraq culture and affects how the Iraqis conduct policing. PTTs should understand that Iraqi Police will sometimes
  - Accept bribes
  - Be reluctant to arrest personnel from the same or a neighboring tribe
  - Exert undue influence on citizens from a different sect

- While trying to steer the Iraqi Police away from these practices, PTTs must realize that the practices are part of the political culture, which is determined by the level of development and education of the people. PTTs should discourage Iraqi Police from engaging in this type of behavior because it is wrong and not professional. However, PTTs should also have realistic expectations about the pace of change. A change in the political culture will be a gradual transformation that will proceed with general acceptance of the rule of law, standards of accountability, and good governance.

- **Economics and essential services.** To understand a police station's area of responsibility and/or neighborhood (mahala), it is important to understand how the Iraqi Police are perceived.

Iraqi Police conducting community relations.

- The state of the economy (that is, unemployment rates) and availability/affordability of essential services (sewer, power, water, fuel, etc.) are important elements influencing the attitudes of the populace.

- If the local area economy is thriving and the essential services are at an acceptable level, then the attitude toward the Iraqi Police will be favorable. To the people, the Iraqi Police may represent the government.

- The GOI has taken significant steps to improve its economy, although security concerns continue to restrain Iraq's economic growth. In February 2007, the Iraqi Cabinet approved a framework hydrocarbon law that provides the structure and principles for foreign investment in Iraq's energy sector, decentralized management for the oil industry, and equitable distribution of oil revenues to provincial and regional governments.

- This legislation was important for promoting the economic development and political unity of the country. In 2006, the Council of Representatives passed the Foreign Investment Law and the Fuel Import Liberalization Law to facilitate the expansion of private sector activity. To become effective, these laws require promulgating regulations to provide a sufficient legal framework. The GOI is drafting these regulations, which should be implemented later

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this spring. An increase in foreign investment will be effective in stimulating growth, building trust, and strengthening the Iraqi dinar.

– From October-December 2006, there were, on average, 1.4 attacks per week on infrastructure providing essential services, such as electrical power, water, and fuel. This is down from the peak of 6.7 attacks per week in April-June 2004. However, the timing and location of more recent attacks resulted in greater disruption of service due to weak ministerial oversight, ineffectual rapid-repair teams, and criminal harvesting of infrastructure assets (e.g., copper from power lines). Collectively, these have impeded the delivery of essential services. This adversely affects the legitimacy of the government in the minds of the civilian population. Iraq's infrastructure will remain a high-value target for insurgents and criminal elements.

Figure 3-2 depicts the correlation between effective policing and the state of the neighborhood.

Figure 3-2. The correlation between effective policing and the state of the neighborhood.

Understanding the dynamics of the neighborhood plays a key role when assessing and analyzing a police station's effectiveness. PTTs should advise their counterparts to discuss projects that focus on an immediate, visible impact. These projects can decrease unemployment and increase basic essential services to the local leaders and people, and the projects will aid in the ultimate progress of a police station.

LESSON 4
ROLE OF THE ADVISOR

What will win the global war on terrorism will be people that can cross the cultural divide, reach out to those who want our help, and figure out how to make it happen so [those people] can help themselves. That is how we will win this thing.

Gen. John Abizaid
Former Commander, USCENTCOM

OVERVIEW

The PTT advisor coaches, teach, and mentor the Iraqi Police so that they can help themselves. *The PTTs goal is to enable the host nation police force to become self-sufficient.* The PTT advisor has a challenging mission and must have a thorough understanding of the role of an advisor. This lesson builds upon the information contained in Lesson 3 (Factors Affecting Police Development) by providing information about the PTTs advisory role. Tips for working with PTT enablers and some "do's and don'ts" are presented. This lesson also discusses five advisor imperatives that PTTs must focus on.

4-1. THE PTT ADVISOR'S ROLE

Great advisors are able to see solutions to seemingly unsolvable problems. They are able to work from commander's intent while orchestrating events to ensure success from behind the scenes. This is done not for personal credit but for the sake of the overall mission. They build and maintain excellent *rapport* and *credibility*.

- Building rapport is one of the most important things advisors do. Establishing rapport is the *desired* method of gaining influence with a counterpart; rapport is the lubricant that enables all other activities to occur more smoothly. Genuine rapport is developed slowly over time, but it can be ruined in an instant.

- Skills that contribute to credibility:
  - Leadership.
  - Courage.
  - Discipline.
  - Maturity.
  - Judgment.
  - Decision-making ability.
  - The ability to provide good advice. Demonstrating proficiency as a trainer will make a good first impression. This requires a combination of technical and tactical knowledge and experience of application.

- The ability to provide good planning advice. This requires more than a sound understanding of the planning process. It requires practice and analytical judgment to adjust and apply the process effectively during the normal confusion of actual operations.

- The ability to provide valuable tactical advice. This requires an intimate understanding of the threat, the environment, and how to apply tactics appropriately. PTTs will often have to analyze the situation and make decisions with little or no information.

4-2. FIVE ADVISOR IMPERATIVES

- **Provide effective leadership.**

  - Leadership, a critical aspect of any application of military combat power, is especially important in the dynamic and complex environments associated with PTTs, which place a high premium on effective leadership at all levels, from the most junior NCO to the most senior officer. Leadership on both sides—coalition and Iraqi Police—must fully comprehend the operational environment and be *prepared*, *engaged*, and *supportive* in order for the PTT effort to succeed. It is especially important that senior leadership empower PTT leaders to make appropriate, timely decisions. While senior leaders must maintain situational awareness, decentralized control usually provides greater success and credibility with the Iraqi Police in this environment.

  - Unlike other types of military operations, personal and professional rapport between coalition and Iraqi Police counterparts sets the stage for success or failure of PTT operations. While temperament is a facet of individual personality, certain training in negotiating, methods of influence, cultural understanding, and rapport-building skills can help coalition leaders and advisors build the necessary skills. *It is very important for advisors to be able to see things as they are, through the eyes of the local population—this is sometimes referred to as insight.*

  - Likewise, effective, dedicated leadership on the Iraqi Police side can make or break the PTT operation. It is important that the Iraqi Police leadership be appropriately engaged in sponsoring the PTT effort.

- **Ensure legitimacy**. The ultimate goal of the PTT is to develop an Iraqi Police Force that contributes to the legitimate governance of the population.

  - This is done by Iraqi Police who are competent, capable, committed, and confident, not only in the eyes of coalition forces and the Iraqi government but, more critically, in the eyes of the Iraqi people.

  - While it is important to assist the Iraqi Police in developing professionally, it is also important to realize that a mirror image of the U.S. police model may not be the optimum solution for Iraq. Like leadership, legitimacy is a multifaceted imperative that includes:

    - The legitimacy of the Iraqi government in the eyes of the people

    - The legitimacy of the Iraqi government in the eyes of the international community, including regional neighbors

    - The legitimacy of the Iraqi Police Service in the eyes of the government

    - The legitimacy of the security forces in the eyes of the people

- **Ensure unity of effort and unity of purpose**. The PTT effort will include PTT and Iraqi Police in *joint operations* with other security forces. PTT command relationships may range from very simple to very complex. Whatever the command relationship, it must be clearly delineated and understood. Supporting and supported relationships will change over time and are instrumental to full transition to Iraqi responsibility. PTTs may work with other coalition forces' transition teams; essential to unity of effort is the ability of leadership to effectively communicate and synchronize efforts throughout coalition and Iraqi Police operations.

  PTTs must constantly gauge and improve upon the relationships between the different Iraqi Security Forces operating in their area of responsibility. In many cases the relationship will be strained, and the Iraqi Security Forces may not be willing to work together. The reasons for this are many and varied. Politics, culture, tribal and religious affiliation, and personalities of the leaders of these security forces all shape the relationship with the Iraqi Security Forces and how they operate in the area of responsibility. The following are questions a PTT should ask upon arriving to conduct the mission:

    – How does the PTT communicate with higher headquarters, other police stations, and the Iraqi military in the area?

    – Is there a Joint Coordination Center (JCC) in your area of responsibility?

    – If so, are all elements of the Iraqi Security Forces represented in the JCC?

    – Does your station or district know how to contact the JCC?

    – Do the Iraqi Security Forces leaders at each level meet regularly?

    – Do they conduct joint operations?

    – Who are the MTTs and Special Police Transition Teams operating in your area of responsibility?

    – Where are the MTTs and Special Police Transition Teams located?

    – How do the Iraqi Security Forces share intelligence?

    – How do the Iraqi Security Forces coordinate their operations?

    – How are detainees transferred between Iraqi Security Forces?

- **Manage information**. Managing information encompasses the collection, analysis, management, application, and preparation of information both from an information operations perspective and in ways internal to the PTT operation, such as lessons learned integration.

    – Effective information operations must be synchronized with the PTT effort and the overall company mission.

    – Effective information operations may serve to mitigate the ability of the threat forces to use the PTT effort as a source of propaganda potentially damaging to the Iraqi government.

    – Media reports will directly affect how PTT operations are perceived by the Iraqi populace and our populations. Leaders should be proactive and detail how information will flow to the media to best ensure long-term support of PTT efforts.

- **Sustain the effort**. PTT operations will most likely last several years, and the environment will change. At a minimum, the Iraqi Police's expectation of the professional skills that advisors

should possess will increase over time. Changing tactics, techniques, procedures, and environmental factors and incorporating those changes into the training and preparation of each successive rotation is important to maintaining the continuity and momentum of the PTT effort.

– Sustainability possesses two major components: the ability of the coalition to sustain the PTT effort and the ability of the Iraqi Police Service to ultimately sustain its operations independently.

– Every PTT plan should take into account the magnitude of the preparatory effort as well as long-term fiscal and personnel resources, as all will affect the sustainability of the overall effort.

– The Iraqi Police and the supporting institutional structure must eventually be self-sustaining. They must be appropriately manned, trained, and equipped so that the Iraqi government is capable of economically sustaining the security capability.

4-3. HOW TO ADVISE YOUR IRAQI COUNTERPART

Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them sensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion. When you attain this point, hold him to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push them forward as firmly as possible, but secretly, so that to one but himself (and he not too clearly) is aware of your pressure.

T. E. Lawrence

MP Battalion Commander and Iraqi Sheik.

- If you can get people to make the decision you want them to make and have them think it was their idea, you have found success. Offer options, but be non-committal—they will want to do what you want and then blame you for negative results.

- The PTT Chief must help the Iraqi Police Station Chief take the initiative. There will be many excuses not to do something; get to the bottom of the real reason and push forward.

- The following vignette highlights the importance of unity of effort, keeping an open mind, and willingness to compromise.

> *It is critical that PTTs, National Police Transition Teams, and Military Transition Teams all work together and get along with their counterparts. Each part of the Iraqi Security Force plays an integral part in the overall security of Iraq. In East Baghdad, the 720th MP Battalion had the PTT mission (then called the Police Partnership Program). This was a very complex area with a population of 4 million people. Beyond the inherent danger of operating in East Baghdad, the coalition forces had to deal with the complex issues of growing an army, National Police, and Iraqi Police Service. In the Adhemiya District, the relationship between the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police was very strained, based on the personality of the leaders of these organizations. A friendly-fire incident led to the Iraqi Army's kidnapping a key leader from the Iraqi Police station in the vicinity of the Iraqi Army base. The company commander was called by the Iraqi Police District Commander for assistance in this matter. The PTT company commander, the Iraqi Police District Commander, asked to have a meeting with the Iraqi Army Commander and the Military Transition Team Chief to work out the Iraqi Police kidnapping as well as the overall animosity between these organizations. The meeting did not go well; the discussion got so heated that the PTT company commander and Iraqi Army Military Transition Team Chief also began to argue about how corrupt the other organization was. The typical response to this is that the Military Transition Team Chief and PTT went native. The advisors became so involved with the organizations they advise that they lost their objectivity.*

> US Army MP Major

4-4. UNDERSTANDING THE IRAQI ENVIRONMENT

Without a clear understanding of the organizational and environmental factors in your district, many changes that you wish you could effect will be lost. It is imperative that you begin now to understand the assets and resources that you and your station commander will have access to. Beginning to understand the socio-economic and political structure will also help you make informed decisions.

- **The operational and organizational environment.** An understanding of the working environment is critical to planning and conducting effective PTT operations. This primarily includes an awareness and analysis of

  – The availability of Iraqi Police and other security forces in your district

  – The reliability of available security forces

  – The human geography aspects of your district (ethnicities, religious ties, tribes, political tendencies)

  – The key actors in your district (politicians, tribal leaders, etc.)

  – The economic situation of your district

  – The information and communication infrastructure (is there a system in place for distributing information and intelligence among the police stations, both laterally and

horizontally?) between agencies (Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army, and the coalition) and to the public

- **Physical and geographic**. Geographic factors contribute largely to the number of the populace and overall strains on the environment and the economic situation generally.

    - The geography and environment will have obvious effects on the PTT and the Iraqi Police.

    - When assuming operations within a province, it is critical to understand the district breakdown for multiple reasons. The obvious reason is troop distribution. Besides the usual methods for troop task assignment, such as size of the physical area and number of mobility corridors, the key element in assigning troop distribution depends on the number of stations within each district and how they are arrayed.

    - Distinguishing between insurgent and criminal activity: Is your district a high-crime or high-insurgent activity area? The distinction is important, as it drives the intelligence that you will send higher, which will ultimately shape military operations.

    - Overall, Iraq is the 58th-largest country in the world. It is comparable in size to California. Large parts of Iraq are desert, but the area between the two major rivers, the Euphrates and Tigris, in the center of the country, is fertile and green, fostering the largest population areas.

    - The north of the country is largely mountainous with cooler weather. Iraq has a small coastline on the Persian Gulf.

    - The local climate is mostly desert with mild to cool winters and dry, hot, cloudless summers, when temperatures can reach upwards of 150 degrees Fahrenheit. The northern mountainous regions can experience cold winters with occasional heavy snows, sometimes causing extensive flooding.

    - Iraq is divided into 18 governorates (or provinces). The governorates are subdivided into districts. Figure 4-1 depicts the 18 provinces.

1. Baghdad	10. Babil
2. Salah ad Din	11. Karbala
3. Diyala	12. An Najaf
4. Wasit	13. Al Anbar
5. Maysan	14. Ninawa
6. Al Basrah	15. Dahuk
7. Dhi Qar	16. Arbil
8. Al Muthanna	17. At Ta'mim (Kirkuk)
9. Al-Qādisiyyah	18. As Sulaymaniyah

Figure 4-1. The provinces of Iraq.

Total Attacks by Province
November 11, 2006 – February 9, 2007

These four provinces have approximately 37% of the population but account for 80% of attacks.

Population weighted map

Source: MNC-I

Figure 4-2. Attacks per Day per Province.

- **The security situation.** Defining the security situation of each district is an obvious, and perhaps the most vital, piece in understanding your environment. However, this is often difficult to assess, as there is a variety of threatening activity.

  – **Insurgent activity.** This is typically characterized by methods normally recognized by the coalition, such as improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, person-borne improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenade attacks, small arms fire, and ambushes.

  – **Criminal activity.** The lines between insurgent activity (and therefore activity that should be dealt with more by the Iraqi Army) and criminal activity frequently blur because the Iraqi Police are routinely targeted by the insurgency. Some examples of these activities are kidnappings, thefts and robberies, auto chop shops, and weapon trafficking. Additionally, there are crimes peculiar to the Iraqi Legal System, such as adultery.

  – **Foreign actors**. One of the critical, but often difficult, activities to assess is the emergence and depth of non-Iraqi actors operating in your district. Typically, most Iraqis find it easy to identify a non-native living in their district. This information can be easily collected during routine joint operations and is often critical to intelligence operations.

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- **Armed Groups/Militias.** They are homogenous in ethnicity and sect but rarely in motivation. The key is to understand the nature of the threat and to deal with each component of it appropriately. Militias have been a critical issue in Iraq since the war that toppled Saddam Hussein left a security void. In June 2004, then-Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi announced a deal to disband the nine recognized militias -- those that pre-dated the Iraq invasion and who opposed Saddam Hussein. The nine militias, including two units of Kurdish Peshmerga and the Shiite Badr brigade, count around 100,000 fighters collectively. The militia leaders reportedly agreed to a timetable for disbanding their forces and joining the Iraqi army and police in separate units. About 60 percent were to remain in the military, and the rest were to retire or take other kinds of jobs. At least one of the most notorious militias in Iraq, Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) or the Mahdi Army loyal to Shiite Moqtada Sadr, was not included in the 2004 agreement and is considered illegal. Sadr`s army was responsible for two bloody uprisings against coalition forces in April and August of 2004. Sadr himself has been indicted for the murder of a Shiite cleric in Najaf in April 2003. In JAM there is an element of unemployed, young men who consider themselves simply a `neighborhood watch.` There is another element motivated by financial gain and who conduct kidnapping, car jacking, and even murder for profit. And, there is a third element that conducts crimes motivated by Shia religious extremism and sectarian hatred. The militia 'problem' -- that is, kidnappings, killings and challenges to Iraqi military and police supremacy, or the apparent infiltration of police -- is largely confined to Baghdad and Basra. Militias both fill a security void in Iraq -- one of the reasons the Iraqi government is not eager to dismantle them -- and add to the problem, depending on their location and leadership.

- **Recent developments.** The conflict in Iraq has changed from a predominantly Sunni-led insurgency against foreign occupation to a struggle for the division of political and economic influence among sectarian groups and organized criminal activity. As described in the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, the term "civil war" does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shi'a-on-Shi'a violence, al-Qaida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Some elements of the situation in Iraq are properly descriptive of a "civil war," including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities and mobilization, the changing character of the violence, and population displacements. Illegally armed groups are engaged in a self-sustaining cycle of sectarian and politically motivated violence, using tactics that include indiscriminate bombing, murder, and indirect fire to intimidate people and stoke sectarian conflict. Much of the present violence is focused on local issues, such as sectarian, political, and economic control of Baghdad; Kurdish, Arab, and Turkomen aspirations for Kirkuk; and the political and economic control of Shi'a regions in the south. Although most attacks continue to be directed against Coalition forces, Iraqi civilians suffer the vast majority of casualties. Given the concentration of political power and population in Baghdad and the city's ethnic and sectarian diversity, Baghdad security remains the key to stability in Iraq. An Iraqi-conceived and -led Baghdad Security Plan is the centerpiece for addressing the escalating violence.

- The level of violence in Iraq continues to be the major challenge in Iraq as ethnic, tribal, sectarian, and political factions seek power over political and economic resources. More than 80% of the violence in Iraq is limited to four provinces centered on Baghdad, although it also exists in other population centers, such as Kirkuk, Mosul, and Basrah. Sectarian violence and insurgent attacks still involve a very small portion of the population, but public

perception of violence is a significant factor in preventing reconciliation on key issues. The conflict in Iraq remains a mosaic and requires maximum flexibility on the part of the Coalition and the GOI to uproot the main drivers of violence in different areas of the country.

– The conflict in the north is characterized by sectarian tensions, insurgents and extremist attacks, and competition among ethnic groups (Kurd, Arab, and Turkomen) for political and economic dominance, including control of the oilfields around Kirkuk. Violence remained focused primarily in and around the northern cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, and Tal'Afar, where ethnic competition for power is exacerbated by violence from Sunni extremists.

– Violence in Anbar is characterized by Sunni insurgents and AQI attacks against Coalition forces. AQI and affiliated Sunni extremists are attempting to intimidate the local population into supporting the creation of an Islamic state. However, in a positive development, these efforts are provoking a backlash among some tribal figures and Sunni insurgent leaders, who are encouraging local opposition to AQI, particularly in ar-Ramadi. Local Sunni sheikhs are leading this opposition and have strengthened recruiting efforts for local police forces.

– Violence in Baghdad, Diyala, and Balad is characterized by sectarian competition for power and influence between AQI and JAM, principally through murders, executions, and high-profile bombings. AQI and JAM elements rarely clash directly; reciprocal violence is against Shi'a and Sunni civilians through high-profile bombings or campaigns of sectarian cleansing.

– The conflict in the southern provinces is characterized by tribal rivalry; factional violence among the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)/ Badr Organization, the Office of the Martyr Sadr/JAM, and smaller militias for political power; and attacks on Coalition forces.

– PTTs should learn everything they can about criminal and insurgent activity in their AO. Is kidnapping prevalent? Have there been extrajudicial killings? Where? When? Are there death squads? Are there extremist groups? Are there militias? Who funds them and supports them? How do they dress? Where do they attack? What methods do they use?

4.5. WORKING WITH PTT ENABLERS

The success of the PTT mission depends not only on how the PTT performs, but also on how well it employs enablers such as the IPLO and linguists. The IPLOs and linguists can spell success or failure for the PTT.

IPLO Mission Statement:

The mission of the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team's (CPATT) International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) is to assist the Iraq Ministry of Interior by providing expertise, in the form of mentoring, monitoring and advising, to the emerging Iraqi Police Service. This will be accomplished through the IPLOs teaching at structured academy settings, formal and informal settings in field situations and in the venue of overseeing field training. The International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) and International Police Trainers (IPTs) will focus on the principles of internationally recognized democratic policing standards, and work towards developing the Iraqi Police into a recognized democratic police entity.

- In the above Paragraph, you see the mission statement of the IPLO in the Iraq mission as a member of CPATT. How that mission is actually accomplished involves a wide variety of interwoven groups of military and civilian entities.

- At the forefront of this effort is the US Department of State. Its subordinate section, the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement funds and maintains oversight of the IPLO mission. The IPLOs are comprised of veteran Police officers from across the United States. The level of civilian law enforcement can be as low as 5 yrs active police duty to 35 years experience in all aspects of law enforcement including, but not limited to Criminal Investigations, Organized Crime, Gang Units, Property Crimes, Patrol Supervisors, Narcotics Investigators, Homicide Detectives, Patrol Officers, Police Instructors, SWAT officers and Hostage negotiators to name a few. Education levels vary from practical real life experience to JD and PhDs.

- The program has members who are Police officers/attorneys, retired Chiefs of Police and Sheriffs of counties across the US. Each IPLO brings a perspective unique to their experiences in the field. It is that very experience that the PTT mission draws its core strengths. When combined with the MPs operating in the field, they form a strong training force with a shared goal which to mentor the Iraqi Police Service and Iraqi Security Forces as they progress to becoming self sufficient and reliant and are capable of maintaining and sustaining a viable civilian police force in this new and growing system of government. CPATT has evolved and will continue to evolve to accomplish the mission.

- It is generally understood that the environment is not conducive to independent movement by the members of the IPLO community. The IPLO program suffered staggering losses in the last 18 months that predicated the need to reassess the approach being employed historically to accomplish the PTT mission. It was approximately January 2006 that the PTT format began to truly take hold. The mission was being accomplished, however in a different format as we expect it to progress from now on.

- By combining and embedding the IPLOs with their respective MP counterparts, an increased level of teamwork was created. As the program progressed, issues and problems would surface and over a period of time a somewhat stable system was developed which carries on to this day. The program has inherent deficiencies that require day to day adjustments. The senior level IPLO Command staff known as *Bureau Commanders* who coordinate with the CORPS level military PMO staff and assist in facilitating communication throughout the mission with regard to their respective MNDs.

- The IPLO command structure is as follows:
  - Contingent Commander (CPATT)
  - Bureau Commanders. (MND-B, MND-W, MND-N, MND-S)
  - Regional Commanders
  - Deputy Regional Commander
  - Chief of Operations
  - There are subordinate command positions that include Team leaders and Coordinators. All answer to the above command structure.

- The command staff members typically have a military counterpart with whom they interact on a daily basis. This constant interaction enables the mission to progress and grow in a manner that had, historically, been somewhat slower. As a result of this interaction, the IPLOs have been empowered and enabled to infuse the civilian law enforcement perspective on the PTT mission. The military PTT members have and must acknowledge that the police officers assigned to the particular PTT team bring a wealth of knowledge and credibility to the mission and is integral to its ultimate success. The IPLOs must acknowledge and accept that they are operating in a military combat environment.

- Communication between the IPLOs and their military counterparts is the fundamental component for mission success. There will always be basic differences in philosophies between military and civilian police which will require considerations while operating in a combat environment. This is why the PTT team members must recognize these basic and sometimes opposing perspectives and mutually work towards a productive compromise.

- IPLOs do not have the authority to arrest or detain a suspect. They can only use force in self-defense and are not supposed to engage in combat operations.

- **Working With International Police Liaison Officers.** As an advisor you will be involved in several relationships with people who are directly involved with the Iraqi Police. Below are some explanations of how you can best incorporate IPLOs into your team.

  - IPLO Command staff is responsible for assignment of individual IPLO's to maximize the potential of individual IPLO skill sets in accordance with PTT mission goals and objectives.

  - The team chief and the platoon leader should sit down with the IPLO and come up with a standardized training model for each station. IPLOs should be used liberally, allowing them to leverage their experience.

  - Once the left and right limits have been established on training guidance for the Iraqi Police, you must also seek out parameters to establish the role of the IPLO within the station itself. Many IPLOs are kept in the dark about the station's ongoing dynamics and issues. The IPLO has some form of knowledge of how a station should run and may be able to assist with defining problems and how to correct them.

  - Not using all your resources will severely impact the mission and may impact the working relationship among the IPLOs, the Team Chief, and the PTT itself. Integration and cooperation are the keys to success for the PTT mission.

  - Once you have integrated the IPLOs into the team and mission, it is recommended that you incorporate them into the functioning combat team. The IPLO will be carrying an M4 and M9 pistol with a full combat load and must be integrated into your team's fire plan. Having said this, it must be understood that the IPLO is NOT a force multiplier and should never be directed to take an offensive posture or participate in an offensive action during a mission. The IPLOs are mandated by policy to maintain a defensive posture and are to use their issued weapons in self defense and in the defense of their fellow team mates. This has, historically, been a point of contention in that as a soldier it is difficult to separate the defensive and offensive nature of the IPLOs presence within the PTT unit during AIF encounters. On many occasions, the IPLOs have fought alongside the MPs during AIF contacts. Many have been injured and some have died as a result of IED/VBIED/PBIED and sniper attacks. Many of the IPLOs have SWAT training and are mentally predisposed and

geared to act offensively in an AIF contact situation. It is generally understood that the IPLO has been informed and understands the nature of their defensive posture.

- Deviations from the dedicated nature of the PTT mission into arenas and environments that do not offer reasonable security and stability is counter-productive to the mission and detrimental to all mission assets. Although there is merit in well-conceived and purposeful tactical field overwatch of IPS performance, particularly in the areas of legitimate law enforcement and community policing activities, PTT elements should not deviate from their dedicated mission focus. PTT elements should deploy into environments where there is substantial, legitimate value with respect to IPS development, and should remain focused on their primary mission in order to achieve success.

- Ensure that the IPLO is familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the weapon systems within the team.

- IPLOs should be incorporated into the training and rehearsals of the PTT; this will also help build camaraderie within the team and squad.

- **Working With Linguists.** The successful use of Iraqi linguists is absolutely essential to executing the PTT mission. Keep in mind that the use of local national (LN) linguists are restricted due primarily to OPSEC concerns. As a general rule LN linguist are used for the direct communication with junior IP officials and IP patrols. They are also used for IP training on unclassified and non-sensitive information and systems. LN linguists are not usually briefed as to the location of that day's movement or routes, usually restricting the information to what time to be ready and any special requirement for the day (ie pen, paper etc…). On arrived at the location minimum information is provided, only enough to actively support the actions at the time. LN linguist are not allowed to possess or use cell phones on the FOB and should only use them while on mission under special circumstances and then only under strict supervision. The use of US contract linguist should be used periodically to verify and validate the effectiveness of their translating skills. If possible the addition of a 09L (soldier linguist) should be added to a mission to conduct this check. Yet due to the limited numbers of them in theater this may not be possible. The following are some simple guidelines to help facilitate the use of linguists:

- Linguists must not be overused. They are there to help you in all facets of translating, but you must remember to treat them with respect.

- Use simple phrases and short words. Be direct with your wording; avoid slang, idioms, and jargon. This will assist the linguist in understanding your meaning and will speed the translation. A lot of time is lost in translating.

- Speak *directly* to the person to whom you are trying to convey the message, not to the linguist. This helps you establish a stronger bond with the host nation individual.

- Incorporate your linguist into your rehearsals.

- Limit private conversations between your linguist and the local national you are addressing. You, not your linguist, must always be in control of the conversation.

- Operational security: linguists (Category I) are not a part the combat team. They will not be part of convoy briefs or rehearsals. Linguists will travel with the PTT but should not be given any mission-specific information (such as the exact time of departure, routes, places

you will visit, and your troop strength). Although these linguists are working for coalition forces, they are still local nationals, and you do not know their backgrounds. Operational security is imperative for the safety of the team.

– There have been instances where the host nation linguists were misleading coalition forces because of a personal agenda. A good test is to include a trusted experienced linguist to observe a newly assigned linguist on an actual mission. Have the trusted one make the call as to whether the new one can be trusted.

– Remember, linguists are there to assist the PTT. The PTTs responsibility is to safeguard and properly employ them.

4-6. PTT GUIDELINES—DO'S AND DON'TS

Some **a**dvisors have not performed as well because of their lack of background and training in advisory skills. The techniques outlined below apply to both the individual advisor and a PTT.

- **Advisors do**

  – Empower the station commander.

  – Provide the reason for suggestions.

  – Set the example by asking their counterpart for his opinion. The advisor must realize that the counterpart is the expert in his country.

  – Conduct important business in person to assure full understanding of difficult subjects.

  – Use the soft approach to request information. For example, instead of saying, "We need to conduct training today!" say, "When would be a good time to conduct this important training?"

  – Correct the most important deficiencies first. They avoid telling their counterpart that everything is all wrong. They look for the good systems and policies and praise successes. At this point, the counterpart will normally point out deficiencies that need correction as his idea, and joint problem solving can begin. In some cases it may take a month or more to sell one idea.

  – Phrase recommendations in a way that will not impose their will on the Iraqi Police station commander's decisions. They leave enough room for their counterpart to exercise his prerogative. One of your counterpart's greatest fears is that his police officers will see him as dependent on his advisor. Carefully choose a time and place to offer advice.

  – Advise the station commander but never usurp his authority. Offer advice and critiques in private. The amount of advising during an operation is limited. The advisor does most advising while preparing for the operation or task.

  – Advise against a bad decision tactfully. Act as a staff member who recommends a change of action similar to the way an American staff officer will advise a commander he works with daily.

  – Approach discussions from different directions and with a variety of words to make sure advice given is clearly understood. Don't accept a yes answer at its face value. A yes could

mean the person understands but does not necessarily accept the suggestion. It may also be used to cover a lack of understanding.

– *Exercise patience*; never expect a job to be done at the snap of a finger, and don't snap a finger.

– Allow the Iraqi Police to take credit and ownership for good ideas.

– Take time developing a healthy relationship; it pays large dividends later.

– Maintain high moral standards and be honest. Present a good military appearance, stay in good physical condition, and lead by example.

– Demonstrate sincerity.

– Know the organization, equipment, and tactics of the unit thoroughly. They demonstrate an awareness of the Iraqi Police's problems.

– Focus on the positive. If not sure of the subject matter, they say so and take the steps to obtain the correct information. They don't bluff their way through a problem.

– Demonstrate persistence. They continuously bring matters to their counterpart's attention until he takes steps to solve the problems.

– Spend maximum time at the police station so that the police officers get to know and trust them. Talk to and get to know the police officers, not just the station leaders. They will get excellent feedback in the police officer's candid comments. Such comments often reflect officer morale and operational effectiveness. Stay in close contact with the station commander and staff.

– Encourage frequent inspections by the station commander. Many station commanders are reluctant to inspect. They rely solely on correspondence and the reports they receive to evaluate the station's effectiveness.

– Constantly strive to raise the Iraqi Police station's standards to the level needed to complete the mission. Keep training standards high enough so that the police station is prepared at all times.

– Stress human rights and the consequences of mistreating suspects and prisoners.

– Constantly promote esprit de corps to sustain the police station in the face of difficulties.

– If *authorized*, become accustomed to the native food and drink. Advisors establish and maintain rapport more easily by drinking and eating with their counterparts in accordance with culturally acceptable rules. Refusal to accept their drink and food is often considered an insult.

– Study their counterpart to determine his personality and background. They make every effort to establish and maintain friendly relationships. They learn something about their counterpart's personal life and demonstrate an interest in his likes and dislikes. It is a compliment to ask an Iraqi Policeman about his children; it is rude to ask about his wife.

- **Advisors don't**

  – Take charge of the police station.

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- Use bribery or coercion.

- Accept information on blind faith. They check it discreetly and diplomatically.

- Give the counterpart the impression that status reports and administrative requirements are the most important items.

- Present too many subjects at one time or unnecessarily prolong the discussion of one subject. They schedule another conference at a later time if needed.

- Hesitate to make on-the-spot corrections, but don't make the person they are correcting lose face in front of peers or subordinates. Embarrassing the counterpart can cause a serious loss of rapport and possible mission failure. The advisors respect the almost universal custom and desire of saving face.

- Make promises they cannot or must not carry out. They never pledge coalition assets unless they have the authority and capability to deliver them.

- Become discouraged. Not all advice will be accepted. Some will be implemented at a later date.

- Forget that a careless word or action can cost the United States dearly in good will and cooperation that may have been established with great effort and at considerable cost.

- Criticize Iraqi Police policy in front of Iraqi Police personnel. It is the advisors' obligation to support the incumbent government just as they do their own.

- Get caught in personality clashes between Iraqi Police officers.

A U.S. Army PTT Chief advises an Iraqi Police Chief on station standard operating procedures.

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LESSON 5
POLICE CHALLENGES

Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, has acknowledged that U.S. troops will face opposition as they move into neighborhoods. "It's a fight. They're fighting to hold a grip on the population, and the Iraqis and coalition are working to break the grip," he said in an interview last month (April 07). Still, he said, the outposts are vital to his counterinsurgency strategy. "If you want to protect the population, you've got to live with it," he said. "There's no commuting to the fight."

OVERVIEW

Helping the Iraqi Police develop a *safe community* in the middle of an insurgency exacerbated by sectarian violence, uncontrolled criminal activity, and terrorism will be one of the toughest challenges PTTs face. The cultural, ethnic, and religious differences discussed in Lesson 3 make the task even more complex. At times, these differences may appear to be too difficult to overcome, but they can be minimized with patience, understanding, and determination. This lesson will explain how the PTT can assist the Iraqi Police in countering insurgent and criminal influence and break the cycle of fear that grips many Iraqi communities. The key to success is to win the hearts and minds of the people by establishing the conditions for a secure community. The Iraqi Police must connect to the community they serve and build trust, cooperative relationships, and proactive support.

5-1. WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

In December of 2006, the local Iraqi Police Station at Al Quds in Baghdad started receiving visits from Coalition Forces and IPLOs after a three month suspension of visits. The station had been declared "off limits" due to Coalition Forces finding an illegal arms cache in one of their storage rooms. The station was filled with local militia members who virtually controlled the area.

Upon resumption of visits, Coalition Forces and IPLOs found the station protected by non-uniformed police officers who gathered around the entrance of the station. They were talking with each other and not paying attention to anything else that was going on around them. All of the towers and front gate were devoid of sentries. The attitude of the police officers exuded apathy. Initial attempts at conversing and entering dialog with these police officers were met with silence and looks of distrust. A look of defeat and acquiescence was written on their faces.

Over the next three months relationships were built. Police Officers began attending and actively participating in training sessions. Their confidence gradually became evident. People from the community began coming to the station seeking resolution to their problems. By the end of February 2007 the experience of entering their compound took on an entirely different persona. Guards manned their towers. Sentries stood at the front gate, professionally meeting the public. Police Officers manning the entry point were stopping and inspecting vehicles prior to their entering the compound. It became obvious these police officers now controlled and protected their area of operations. The community responded in kind as a direct response to

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Community Policing efforts by the local police officers. The police officers of Al Quds Local Police Station are well along in the process of becoming a respected and effective police force. It is still a work in progress. This is just one example of a process that is sure to give hope to the people of Iraq.

Bureau Commander MND-CN/NW, CPATT 05-07

"Some of the best weapons do not shoot" is one of the counterinsurgency paradoxes that apply to this situation. According to [FM 3-24](#):

- Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and legitimacy for the host nation government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents.

- The decisive battle is for the people's minds.

- Popular support allows counterinsurgents to develop the intelligence necessary to identify and defeat insurgents. Designing and executing a comprehensive campaign to secure the populace and then gain its support requires carefully coordinating actions along several lines of operations over time to produce success.

- While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, and *restored hope*.

- It is also important to note that Muslims, like Christians, believe that all people should be treated humanely. Under Saddam Hussein, mistreatment of Iraqi citizens, to include by the Iraqi Police, was used to foster fear and maintain control. Current Iraqi Police training emphasizes basic human rights and humane treatment but it will take time to convince the Iraqi people to trust the Iraqi Police and overcome this legacy and negative perceptions.

5-2. BREAKING THE CRIMINAL AND INSURGENT GRIP

Figure 5-1 represents how criminals, insurgents, and terrorists attempt to accomplish their objectives. They use a *cycle of fear* to discredit the Iraqi Government, and demoralize the Iraqi people.

- **Cycle of fear:**

  - Currently, the criminals, insurgents, and terrorists have many communities in a cycle of fear that is characterized by a lack of security, violence, and chaos in the streets. Fear is the negative leverage used to get control over the people. Criminals and insurgents thrive on chaos. The lack of security makes this group stronger and more daring.

  - Criminals are also often connected to insurgents by funding insurgent activity or carrying out tasks directed by insurgent groups. The cycle of fear is strengthened by this connection, and, in some areas, less significant criminal acts are often overlooked because of the increased number of major crimes and insurgent acts.

  - Insurgents will use threats, violence, and any other means possible to maintain power over the people of the community. Insurgents are not bound by what is right or good. They will use any means to defeat a cooperative relationship of the people and the police. The police represent the government that reflects order and normalcy. Order and normalcy diminishes the power of this group.

– *About 60 joint U.S.-Iraqi security stations have been established in and around Baghdad as part of a strategy to deny insurgents the opportunity to embed themselves among the city's residents. Al Qaeda is a vicious enemy that employs bombings and mass murder of innocent people "to discredit the Iraqi government and demoralize its people. We see them use car bombs and suicide vests to try to dash hope and spark a cycle of violence." --- MG Caldwell, MNF-I spokesman*

Current Situation

Figure 5-1. The cycle of fear.

A result of anti-Iraqi forces instilling fear in the local populace (using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device and small arms ambush).

- According to a report from the U.S. Institute of Peace, the factors that contribute to crime in Iraq are interconnected, in the Iraqi citizen's mind, to the presence of Coalition Forces and the consequences of the failed regime.

  With the disappearance of regime authority, Iraqis were subjected to an uncontrolled wave of criminal violence. (Prior to the war, Saddam released 38,000 inmates from prison.) Home-invasion robberies, muggings, and murders increased dramatically following the war, affecting all levels of society. Abductions, rapes, carjackings, and kidnappings terrorized families.

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Ba'ath Party members and former regime informants were gunned down in a wave of revenge killings. Many crimes went unreported because people could find no one in authority to report them to. As a result, families armed themselves, barricading their homes to protect themselves from the "Ali Babas," gangs of thieves that roamed freely. According to even the most conservative estimates, 10,000 Iraqi civilians were killed in the year following the U.S. intervention. For people accustomed to an overbearing security presence and the near absence of street crime, the loss of personal safety was particularly traumatic. Crime—not terrorism or the insurgency—was the primary concern of most Iraqi citizens.

Robert Perito, "Policing Iraq: Protecting Iraqis from Criminal Violence," June 2006

- PTTs must understand that there is an increase in crime for the average Iraqi citizen. Where the average Iraqi citizen was able to go to the market, walk the streets, and take care of daily business in relative safety, now every person lives in fear, especially in Baghdad and other larger cities.

- Many insurgents are attempting to win the hearts and minds of the community for their own purpose. They may even hand out water, pay an electric bill, or protect someone's family to win over the people of the community. This is all about power and legitimacy and demonstrating that they can fill the needs of the people where the government cannot.

- Additionally, militia infiltration of local police remains a problem. Prime Minister Maliki has demonstrated a commitment to retraining and reforming police units that are shown to be serving sectarian or parochial interests. Though improving, the lack of a fully functional justice system has led to unreliable detention practices, and police have often disregarded release orders signed by Iraqi judges. Security forces also remain prone to intimidation by or collusion with militias and criminal gangs, thereby decreasing the confidence among ordinary Iraqis in their legitimate security force.

5-3. POLICE PRESENCE, INCREASED SECURITY, COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Figure 5-2 represents how the police can break the cycle of fear through police presence in the community, reducing crime, and gaining community support. This positive *cycle of hope,* leads to safe and secure communities.

- Cycle of hope:
  - The cornerstone of any counterinsurgency effort is to establish security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented, and disorder spreads.
  - "Security under the rule of law is essential" is a historical counterinsurgency principle. Transitioning security activities from combat operations to law enforcement as quickly as possible is key. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they will lose public support (for further information, see FM 3-24).

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End-State

Police
Presence

LEVERAGE

Community
Support

Reduced
Crime

Establish and build relationships,
trust, and support to end the cycle
of crime, violence, and fear

Figure 5-2. The cycle of hope.

- The rule of law we understand cannot be thrust on the Iraqi society. The strict rules and laws we abide by or are punished by do not have the same power in the Iraqi society.

- Establishing a rule of law that fits into the Iraqi society will eventually lead to a more normal life and safety on the streets.

- Iraqis must be part of figuring out the left and right limits of the rule of law that works in their community. More important than the exact letter of the law is the responsiveness to the needs of the community.

One recent afternoon, a rocket landed nearby, followed a short while later by gunfire and then two more explosions. "Okay, let's find out about this explosion. I need to know right away if that was a VBIED or an IED," Capt. Frank Fisher told the Iraqi police commander, using abbreviations for car bomb and roadside bomb, as they scanned a map in the operations center. "You need to call these checkpoints," Fisher said, prompting the commander to get on the radio. Fisher, 37, of Dryden, Mich., said that by living in Sadr City he can respond much faster to incidents than if he stayed on a large outlying military base, as U.S. forces did in the past. "We hear a boom somewhere in the city and within minutes or seconds I can get an indication of where that explosion happened," Fisher said. "Every time I step out of the base I'm in my own battle space. It pays big rewards when people see you in their neighborhood every day," he said.

– **Police presence in the community**. The Iraqi police must be involved in deciding how to best create a service-oriented police force. The dynamics may be different in every community or neighborhood; therefore, discussing how to accomplish this task must be part of the leadership training. Many of these topics are found in the Police Station Monthly Report (PSMR) discussed in Lesson 8 and include actions such as responding to a crime,

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conducting investigations, conducting public affairs activities, and family visitation of detainees.

MP Battalion Commander on walking patrol in the market in historic Salmon Pak in South East Baghdad.

- When positive relations exist between the police and the populace, the police are able to provide effective community policing, which continues to improve the relationship between the people and the police.

"Our mission is to investigate crimes and respond to emergencies," said Iraqi Police Captain, Majid, Deputy Commander of the Juaifer Police Station, which is responsible for the Salhiya neighborhood. Majid had pointed out that the Salhiya neighborhood is an area composed of Shia and Sunni residents, which borders the Tigris River and contains Haifa Street and attributes the change in the area's crime patterns, over the last few months, to several factors beginning with increased patrols. "Our police conduct many patrols in cars and on foot throughout the neighborhood," he said, "we have several vehicle checkpoints and a patrol in the market." The neighborhood is safer because of improved law enforcement measures. Also, the Iraqi Police in the area routinely work with the Iraqi Army. "The Iraqi Army will provide escort (security) for our police and work side-by-side at checkpoints," said Majid. "We used to have up to three to four murders a day, but since Dardh Al-Qanoon started, murders and attacks have decreased tremendously." While Security and crime investigation remain positive factors, building relationships with local residents during patrols has also helped the Iraqi Police gain a foothold in the neighborhood. "Children and adults come out to greet the police and seem happy they are in their neighborhoods," said, U.S. Army 1st Lt. Elisabeth Zerwick, a Police Transition Team advisor who is helping the Juaifer Police Station.

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Two Iraqi Policemen from the Juaifer Police Station, man a checkpoint in Baghdad's Salhiya neighborhood.

Photo and excerpt from
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Public Affairs, 17 April 2007

Iraqi Police running a positive information operations campaign on their capabilities and the support they can lend to the local community.

- The police must articulate through word and deed to the people that it will require the community to team with the police to bring back safety in the streets.

- When police establish positive relations, the community responds with usable intelligence that leads to positive results. Police must take advantage of the results of this information sharing by publicizing the success; this in turn will lead to greater co-operation with the community.

- Professional police talk to the people of their community, treat them impartially, and respond to their law enforcement needs. There is a personal touch needed to reach out to the people. This concept may be the overall key to the success of all the processes put in place to make the Iraqi Police legitimate.

- IPS has an information office that works for the MOI and answers to the Station Commander. Every household in a police district is expected to register certain events with the IPS such as moving into a new neighborhood, a marriage, birth, or death of a family member. The head of household also registers to obtain official identification for that household. This ID (registration) is needed for obtaining marriage, birth, and death certificates as well as citizenship documentation and passports.

Army MP interacting—"making friends"—with the local children of Sammarah.

- Just as the criminal and insurgent are trying to gain support in the community through either positive or negative influencers, the police must also work for that support.

- Responding to the average citizen in a professional manner and conducting police matters properly for every person in the community will pave the way for winning the hearts and minds of those people.

- Iraqi police must understand that this is the way to success. Coalition forces have tried to win the hearts and minds of the people, but it is more important for the people to have this relationship with their police service.

- Surveys of the Iraqi people consistently demonstrate a rejection of violence, particularly violence against civilians. More than 80% of the population rejects violence against the government under any circumstance, and more than 90% rejects

attacks against women and children. Those surveyed also rate tensions in the country to be much higher than tensions in their neighborhood.

- Shi'a militias and Sunni insurgent groups are engaged in sectarian cleansing in Baghdad neighborhoods and forcibly displacing residents. The new approach is designed to help the Iraqis end this trend. Iraqi government willingness to challenge the militias, especially JAM, and the announcement that the ISF would pursue all illegally armed groups, regardless of affiliation, is a positive development— though ultimate success will require sustained and consistent commitments to action and even-handed application of the rule of law by all Iraqi leaders.

- The insurgency is not a cohesive unitary entity. It is comprised multiple groups that are competing for power often against each other. Shi'a sectarian militias have differing objectives, which occasionally lead to violence among these militias. JAM, which is associated with Muqtada al-Sadr, conducts attacks and provides services in support of Sadr's efforts to dominate the Shi'a areas of Baghdad and the south. The Badr Organization often works against JAM and in support of SCIRI and its political agenda of autonomy in the south. AQI and associated foreign fighters attack Coalition and GOI targets and both Shiites and Sunnis to further AQI's goal of establishing an Islamic state in Iraq and to build a sanctuary to support operations against targets outside Iraq, while Sunni insurgents attack Coalition forces and the Shi'a-dominated GOI to promote a predominantly secular Sunni Arab agenda.

- As the following chart shows, sectarian murders and incidents per month have more than tripled since Feb 2006.

Figure 5-3. Sectarian murders and incidents from January 2006 to January 2007.

- The total number of attacks on and casualties suffered by Coalition forces, the ISF, and Iraqi civilians for the October-December 2006 period were the highest for any 3-month period since 2003. These attacks were concentrated in the provinces of Baghdad, Anbar, Salah ad Din, and Diyala, with Baghdad experiencing 45 attacks per day. The other 14 provinces of Iraq experience comparatively low levels of attacks.

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- The New Way Forward focuses on security where violence is highest—in Baghdad and Anbar. While the overarching strategic goals remain unchanged, securing the population is a top priority to help set conditions for political and economic progress. Forces in Baghdad are being increased by over 20,000 personnel to give commanders an enhanced ability to hold previously cleared neighborhoods. The ISF are also reinforcing the capital with three additional brigades. Prime Minister Maliki has established a Baghdad Security Command with 10 Security Framework Districts, with an Iraqi brigade, partnered with a U.S. battalion, permanently located in each. More than 40 Joint Security Stations are being established to facilitate cooperation between Coalition and Iraqi forces and to build trust and confidence with the local population. In Anbar, U.S. Marines will be added to provide more forces to consolidate recent gains against AQI networks. Throughout Iraq, embedded teams advising Iraq units are being substantially increased in size to improve ISF operational capabilities more rapidly.

- The number of actionable tips on the National Hotline has increased dramatically since last fall from around 1,500 per month to an average of over 2,500 per month. Likewise, there has been an increase in confidence in the Army and police with the highest support coming from the Shi'a south and Kurdish north. As the following two charts indicate, attacks on coalition forces have increased considerably and in recent months there has been an increase in overall casualties with the majority coming from an increase in civilian casualties.

- Operation Enforcing the Law was launched in mid-February to secure in Baghdad and western Iraq and tamp down violence in those areas. The operation is to provide the fledgling Iraqi government with breathing room to resolve pressing political issues such as Sunni-Shiite reconciliation, de-Baathification, constitutional reforms, and an oil-revenue-sharing program that includes all Iraqis.

- The plus-up buys time for further development of Iraq's armed forces and police, so that they can assume responsibility for protecting themselves. Iraqi-on-Iraqi sectarian violence has decreased since the operation began but continued terrorist attacks staged by al Qaeda and other insurgents make the security situation in Iraq complex and challenging. "Once security is improved, the Iraqi people will be able to move forward," MG Caldwell, MNF-I Spokesman

Group	Goals
Sunni Insurgents	• Expel U.S. and Coalition Forces from Iraq • Topple the Elected Government • Re-Establish Sunni Governance in Anbar and Diyala
AQI	• Force Coalition Forces Withdrawal • Gain Territory from Which to Export Conflict • Provoke Clash Between Islam and Others • Establish Caliphate with *Shari'a* Governance
JAM	• Force Coalition Forces Withdrawal • Consolidate Control over Baghdad and the GOI • Exert Control over Security Institutions • Implement *Shari'a* Governance

Figure 5-4. The goals of groups seeking to destabilize Iraq.

Average Weekly Attacks
April 1, 2004 – February 9, 2007

Legend:
- Attacks Targeting Iraqi Civilians
- Attacks Targeting Iraqi Security Forces
- Attacks Targeting Coalition Forces

X-axis categories:
- Pre-Sovereignty: 1Apr - 28 Jun 04
- Sovereignty: 29 Jun - 26 Nov 04
- Election: 27 Nov 04 - 11Feb 05
- Pre-Constitution: 12 Feb - 28 Aug 05
- Referend/Elect: 29 Aug 05 - 10 Feb 06
- Gov Transition: 11 Feb 06 - 19 May 06
- Gov Established: 20 May 06 - 31 Dec 06
- Trans to Self Reliance: 1 Jan - 9 Feb 07

Source: MNC-I

Average Daily Casualties*
April 1, 2004 – February 9, 2007

Legend:
- Civilians
- Iraqi Security Forces
- Coalition

X-axis categories:
- Pre-Sovereignty: 1Apr 04 - 28 Jun 04
- Sovereignty: 29 Jun 04 - 26 Nov 04
- Election: 27 Nov 04 - 11Feb 05
- Pre-Constitution: 12 Feb 05 - 28 Aug 05
- Referend/Elect: 29 Aug 05 - 10 Feb 06
- Gov Transition: 11Feb 06 - 19 May 06
- Gov Established: 20 May 06 - 31 Dec 06
- Trans to Self Reliance: 1 Jan - 9 Feb 07

* Casualty data reflect updated data for each period and are derived from unverified initial reports submitted by Coalition elements responding to an incident; the inconclusivity of these numbers constrains them to be used only for comparative purposes.

Source: MNC-I

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5-4. POLICE VALUES

Actions that can sabotage the creation of positive community relations include police corruption, ineptitude, and infiltration. Methods to combat this include minimum requirements for recruits, vetting (specifically background checks and sponsor programs), and probation periods. Even with these measures, more has to be done at the station and PTT levels.

- PTTs should remain aware of the environment and continually reinforce proper behavior through actions and mentorship. When necessary, PTTs should document evidence and provide it to their chain of command and other interested organizations (that is, Brigade Combat Teams, intelligence staff, and higher PTTs).

- To reinforce discipline, accountability, and responsibility, illegal actions by IP can not be tolerated. Likewise, police intimidation by militias can not be tolerated. IP suspected of corruption or illegal actions should be held accountable not moved to another station.

- The standards for leadership and ethics in Iraq and within the Iraqi Police are considerably different than the standards and culture of the U.S. military. This difference will be a challenge for the PTTs as they train and mentor the Iraqi Police leadership.

- The Iraqi Police concept of leadership and ethics may appear to be an impediment to building a cohesive team, but as long as the PTTs work within their counterpart's leadership and ethics culture, cohesiveness can be attained.

- Iraqi Police leadership authority is based on the power of the position. A station commander is not generally expected to lead by example. This usually means that the leader will sit in his office and dictate actions for subordinates to follow. Interaction between the PTT and the Iraqi Police leaders will seem as if the leader is inattentive or even preoccupied due to the traffic in and out of his office. This, however, is normal and does not mean that the Iraqi Police leader is ineffective or lazy. Station commanders make most of the decisions.

- PTTs should take this information into consideration when assessing the level of leadership and ethics practices at their stations.

- Once the PTT has fully assessed the situation, a plan to improve leadership and ethics can be formulated. PTTs should consider the following when planning improvements:
  - Formal leaders are not expected to lead from the front.
  - Sometimes informal leaders in the police force—an officer or higher enlisted policeman—seems to make things happen at the station.
  - Ethics training has been given to all police, either at the academy or during Transition Integration Program training; refresher training is a portion of the PSMR checklist discussed in Lesson 8.

Iraqi Police receiving leadership and ethics training from an IPLO and a U.S. Army MP.

- Before trust and positive relations can be established in the community, trust and positive relations must exist within the police organization. One of the greatest challenges a PTT can face is to build a cohesive team.

- In addition to the ethics training that the Iraqi Police receive, the Ministry of Interior is expanding their Inspector General (IG) office to improve their ability to root out corruption and report independently on the performance of MOI programs and operations to include the police.

- During the fourth quarter of 2006, the MOI IG focused on improving the MOI capacity to identify, deter, and prevent corruption. Recent funding approval by the Ministry of Finance for increased force structure enabled the IG to embark on planning efforts to increase the number of employees by 1,000 individuals during 2007. These resources will significantly improve the IGs ability to evaluate and report independently on the performance of MOI programs and operations throughout Iraq. For the first time, the IG has developed an Annual Inspection Plan aimed at formalizing the use of IG special inspection committees to conduct inspections of pre-selected MOI organizations throughout Iraq based on approved inspection checklists.

- The majority of the Iraqi Police are new recruits and inexperienced leaders. The PTTs challenge is to establish pride, unity of effort and purpose, and commitment to the

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organization before oneself. PTTs should consider the following factors when attempting to develop a cohesive team at an Iraqi Police station:

- Lead by example
- Establish respect up and down the chain of command
- Enforce consistent discipline
- Empower subordinate leaders
- Provide for specialty training or professional development
- Instill professional pride
- Express concern and interest
- Give positive reinforcement
- Give positive public recognition
- Foster officer safety on and off duty
- Employ a consistent promotion system
- Pay Iraqi policemen on time
- Enforce accountability for personnel and equipment
- Have sustainable logistics
- Maintain the facility

Army MP, Police Chief, and Police Chief's Assistant.

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LESSON 6
IRAQI POLICE

There were plenty of people that wanted jobs. They would step in front of the militias and insurgents because they wanted to protect their communities. There would be over a thousand Iraqi candidates lined up outside the Police station. By the time we went through the vetting process, we would end up with about 70 recruits who were qualified.

U.S. Army MP SFC

OVERVIEW

As a result of the conflict in 2003 and the ensuing state of chaos and looting, much of the Iraqi Police infrastructure was destroyed or badly damaged. Many of the Iraqi Police who served during the Saddam Hussein era either abandoned their positions or were casualties of war. To reestablish an Iraqi Police force, the coalition and Iraqi government began recruiting and training Iraqi Police. This lesson is designed to familiarize PTTs with the Iraqi Police recruiting standards and the training the police should receive.

6-1. RECRUITING STANDARDS

In the past the MOI has made IP assignments based on sectarian and tribal background of the individual IP. The methodology now being attempted by some stations to assign Iraqi Police is determined by where the IP's home is. Every attempt is being made to assign the IP to the area where they are familiar. This method has both an up and down side. Positive results of this method are: 1) the IP knows the neighborhood and does not need to learn a new geographical area; 2) the IP does not have to travel a long distance, placing him in additional danger of driving through neighborhoods that may have sectarian issues; 3) the IP has to go through fewer check points which may present a set of identification problems; and 4) the IP does not have to risk as large of threat to IEDs and ambushes. The down sides are: 1) the IP may be influenced by friends and/or local militia personnel; 2) the IP may be more reluctant to enforce the law with family or friends; and 3) the IP is more likely to let people through check points or into compounds due to familiarity with those seeking to do so.

Currently the MOI, through the local police districts, conducts recruiting for the Iraqi Police. It is important for PTTs to understand the minimum requirements for an Iraqi recruit to qualify for police service and track the placement, in-service training, utilization, and progress of the recruits within the Iraqi Police Service. The Iraqi Police Service has screened more than 280,000 MOI employees, checking fingerprints against Ba'ath Party and Saddam-era criminal records. Of these, 8,000 were reported as possible derogatory matches and thousands have been dismissed. More than 58,000 police candidates have been screened for literacy. The majority of those who passed were allowed to enter basic training.

- Several large-scale, successful attacks by insurgents have severely hampered the recruiting process. It is essential that PTTs mentor Iraqi Police to provide proper force protection and security measures for the recruiting sites the Iraqi Police are charged with protecting.

- Recruiting standards for Iraqi police recruits vary from province to province, but the minimum requirements established by the MOI are as follows:

  – Minimum age of 20

  – Completed secondary school with ability to read, write, and communicate in Arabic

  – No affiliation with the *Ba'th* party

  – No reported history of human rights violations or history of mistreatment or abuse of other persons

  – No criminal history involving violence, theft, or violating the public trust

  – Physically and psychologically fit to accept responsibilities

  – Uncorrected vision must not exceed 20/200 in either eye, with normal color vision

- The screening process is not perfect. The Iraqi Police Service is infiltrated by insurgents and many recruits have strong ties to militias. Weeding out these individuals is a significant challenge.

- The PTTs should monitor the recruiting process and ensure that the Iraqi Police have processes in place to identify qualified recruits.

- Once recruits have been screened at the police stations or recruiting center, the provincial government reviews the files and recommends who should be hired. The Police Recruit Testing Center does further screening of candidates in a one day event before the provincial government issues a hiring order. After the hiring order has been processed by MOI human resources, a hiring order is signed with instructions that the cadet will begin being paid in four weeks. Cadets spend one to three months before going to basic recruit training. After they complete basic training, the provincial government assigned them to a police station.

- Biometric systems in use in Iraq (see Appendix F for more information)

  – There are three primary biometric identification systems used in Iraq; STRATOPS' BISA, DCSINT's BAT, and CPATT's Iraqi AFIS. All three systems use national standards to support fingerprint comparisons. Their main difference is how they pass information to the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) in West Virginia where multiple databases reside.

  – The Biometric Identification System for Access (BISA) is a Force Protection system used to record data on Third Country Nationals (TCN) and Local Nationals (LN). BISA transmits at the unclassified level, and the data resides in West Virginia for matching and storage.

  – Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) is a SIPRNET identity management system used to record data and intelligence attachment linked to biometrics of detainees and non-US persons of interest. BAT information retained at 11 servers in Iraq, interconnected with other USCENTCOM and CONUS databases and travels back to BFC for consolidation.

  – Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (I-AFIS) is an unclassified identity management system used to record data on Iraqi citizens and persons of interest. Iraqi data remains in Baghdad and copies are sent electronically to CONUS under an agreement with FORMER Iraqi officials. Currently there are almost 640K records in the AFIS data base; 300K Saddam-era criminal cards with fingerprints; 270K Iraqi Police and 40K Iraqi Army.

This system has been given permission to be shared with Iraqi AFIS and other coalition partners.

- Currently, it is thought that the AFIS system will eventually be provided to the Iraqi's for their use. MSC's favor using AFIS to document Iraqi Security Forces members upon their initial hire as well as all detainees once they enter the system in the hopes of building a Iraqi managed countrywide database to enhance governance and rule of law.

- For more information see Appendix F.

Iraqi candidates awaiting the vetting process at a local Iraqi Police station.

6-2. BASIC AND ADVANCED TRAINING COURSES

As of December 31, 2006, the majority of Iraqi Police academies had transitioned to Iraqi control. The two exceptions are the BPC and the Jordan International Police Training Center. For all academies, the administration and instruction functions transferred with relative ease. Operational control of the BPC was turned over to the MOI in 2006. Life support for the BPC transitioned to the MOI in early 2007. Because sufficient training capacity exists inside Iraq, the Jordan International Police Training Center is scheduled to cease basic-level training in March 2007 but, if funding becomes available, it might be kept open to train limited numbers of Iraqi police officers in leadership and specialized courses after DoD funding ends.

- **Basic training.** The basic training course for the Iraqi Police Service is offered primarily at Baghdad Police College and the Jordan International Police Training Center. Additionally,

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basic training has been conducted at regional training academies at al-Hillah, al-Asad, Basrah, Mosul, and Sulaymaniyah. The courses generally have a standardized 8- to 10-week MOI-approved curriculum. Many of the recruits will be screened, hired, and already interning at a police station before being sent to basic training.

- Currently, IP candidates are assigned to the District HQ during the initial screening process and training. Upon graduation the IPs should be reassigned to stations that fall under their District HQ.

Iraqi Police recruits at Baghdad Police College.

- One of the most important roles the PTT will serve is in monitoring the selection, tracking, staging, and movement of the basic training recruits from their assigned station to the ultimate training site.

- PTTs will work closely with the Iraqi Police, Brigade Combat Team, and CPATT to coordinate the effort. Basic training is intended to serve as a starting point and not as the ultimate training solution.

- As the security situation deteriorated in Iraq, it became apparent that the Iraqi Police Service needed more training in counterinsurgency skills. This shift in the basic training curriculum towards officer survival skills reduced the amount of law enforcement training the recruits received.

- PTTs must ensure that the local stations and districts have a field training and mentoring program to supplement the rudimentary basic training course. Although PTTs no longer recruit Iraqi Police candidates, they are still responsible for ensuring that the police they are partnered with are professionally developed and properly scheduled for required courses. The field training program is intended to develop the ability of new Iraqi Police to perform their duties with close supervision and frequent evaluation.

- The Iraqi Police basic training experience is similar to that of U.S. soldiers. During the eight week course, cadets engage in physical training every morning, followed by drill and ceremony and weapons training the rest of the day. All the instructors are Iraqi police officers. It's a demanding schedule that leaves many cadets exhausted by the end of the day. "The training is hard, but it's also easy because we have a goal to reach," said a cadet at the Kirkuk Police

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Academy. "The vast majority (of cadets) came here for more than just a job. They came here because a lot of them got hurt by terrorists. They have had a cousin killed, a relative, or a brother. Everybody has a problem with the terrorists and the bad guys."

- The basic training graduate is clearly not at the level of proficiency of a standard Western police academy graduate. It is incumbent upon the PTT to supplement the training of the police recruit with well-planned, well-prepared in-service training.

Iraqi police cadets at the Kirkuk Police Academy practice drill and ceremony techniques during training. The academy, in Kirkuk, Iraq, offers basic physical training to cadets, as well as advanced training in criminal investigation, computer skills, first aid, and more.

- **In-service training**. Coupled with the PTT training, MOI and CPATT have developed in-service training programs to further develop the Iraqi Police. PTTs monitor the selection of police for these courses and track their follow-on utilization within the Iraqi Police. **Transition Integration Program.** One challenge of building a viable police service was to retrain the veteran policemen who served during the Saddam Hussein era. In this group must be instilled modern police techniques, respect for human rights, and democratic policing principles. To achieve this goal, CPATT implemented an in-service training program called the Transition Integration Program, which incorporates applicable Iraqi criminal law along with the procedures to be observed for arrest and detention. Additionally, the program was designed to accomplish several other key tasks:

  - Identify existing Iraqi Police Service personnel who were academically, intellectually, or morally unsuitable

  - Identify potential leaders within the Iraqi Police Service

  - Identify potential Iraqi Police Service instructors and field training officers

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- Transition Integration Program training takes place at coalition forward operating bases and at some of the regional academies. The course is three weeks long and covers 126 hours of instruction. Course subjects include

  - The philosophy and role of the Iraqi Police Service

  - Prohibitions against torture

  - Police ethics and values

  - The code of conduct

- About one-third of the course time is devoted to firearms instruction in 9mm and AK-47 weaponry. As with the Basic Training Course, PTTs must track and coordinate the selection, staging, movement, and placement of the Transition Integration Program graduates.

- In addition to the in-service training at the station level, the district, directorate or province level may have additional training programs. For example, there may be a Provincial Police Trainer that has oversight and provides guidance to Police Station Training Officers and Field Training Officers who mentor newly assigned policemen.

- **Iraqi Police Service Leadership Training**. The Iraqi Police Service has three 2-week leadership courses to improve the quality of its leaders. The First Line Supervisor Course is designed for company-grade officers; the Intermediate-Level Course is designed for field-grade officers; and the Senior-Level Course is designed for general officers. Courses cover topics ranging from management to ethics to field training. The MOI Intermediate Staff Officers Course, started in September 2006, teaches senior lieutenants and junior captains staff operational functions. The Advanced Staff Officers Course, which began in November 2006, teaches field-grade staff functions to senior captains and majors. The Senior Staff Officers Course and the Executive Officers Course—designed for colonels and generals—are scheduled to begin in early 2007.

An Iraqi K9 cop launches toward a suspected terrorist during a recent demonstration at the Baghdad Police College.

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6-3. SPECIALIZED POLICE TRAINING

Life support contracts for eight Iraqi Police Academies transitioned to the MOI on December 31, 2006. Efforts are under way to establish an MOI reporting mechanism to assess the quality of life support services at the academies following transition from the Coalition forces. The following courses provide the Iraqi Police with advanced training for specialized units and professional development for the police leadership. Students are selected by an MOI Board. PTTs assess the competencies of the police they partner with and may nominate them through CPATT or MOI for the following training.

- Specialized police training
  - Basic Criminal Investigation
  - Advanced Criminal Investigations
  - Collator Course
  - Post-Blast Investigation
  - Explosive Hazard Awareness Training
  - Counterterrorism
  - Kidnapping Investigation and Crisis Negotiations
  - Election Security
  - Organized Crime
  - Organized Crime—FBI
  - Criminal Intelligence
  - Drug Enforcement Investigation
  - Internal Controls
  - Violent Crimes Investigations
  - Basic Computer Skills
  - Intelligence Analyst Course
  - Intelligence Analyst Course (FBI)
  - Transition Integration Program for Officers
  - Department of Border Enforcement
  - Nine-Month College

- Specialized Advanced Training
  - Management-Leadership
  - First-Line Supervision
  - Mid-Level Management
  - Executive Leadership & Development
  - Critical Incident Management—Large-Scale Civil Disobedience
  - Civil Disorder Management
  - Sergeant-to-Commissioner Course

- – Basic Supervisor Training
- Instructor Development
  - – Train the Trainer (T-3) Basic
  - – Train the Trainer (T-3) Advanced
- Degree Programs
  - – Baghdad Police College (three-year course)

Iraqi policemen of the Thar-Thar Police Station perform mission drills in Samarra, Iraq, demonstrating how they will defend their station in case of attack.

6-4. IRAQI POLICE FIELD TRAINING PROGRAM

The objectives of the Iraqi Police Field Training Program are to:

- To ensure that structured and collective guidance is adopted which will meet the standardized needs of all police and security forces within each province and across Iraq.

- The program will produce training managers who, when properly supported, will ensure training needs are met for policemen leave the training academies in order to maintain and enhance their levels of professionalism.

- This will assure the excellence of Iraqi Security Forces at the police station level, in the community, across the provinces and for the nation of Iraq.

The program involves the development of training professionals within the IPS at several levels to include Provincial Police Trainers, Police Station Training Officers and Field Training Officers.

Provincial Police Trainers will be assigned by and work towards the objectives of the Provincial Director of Police, or organization leader such as a Police District Officer. The course will train Provincial Police Trainers for their new posts. It will prepare them as professional instructors as well as providing them with a solid understanding of how to produce a professional training plan, conduct

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assessment, evaluate, manage and develop training programs for delivery within the province. The Provincial Police Trainer will have oversight and give guidance and advice to Police Station Training Officers and Field Training Officers. The Provincial Police Trainer will feed back to the Chief of Police or Unit Head lessons learned from localized training which can be used to enlighten the training program.

Police Station Training Officer. The Police Station Training Officers will be posted to a police station and work under the guidance of the Provincial Training Officer. The training will prepare the Police Station Training Officers to be a professional instructor. It will give them skills to develop Field Training Officers in order to maintain training for the policemen at their respective stations. The Police Station Training Officer will ensure the needs of the policeman, the police station and the community are being met. The Police Station Training Officer will feed back to the Provincial Training Officer lessons learned from their individual stations to enlighten the training program.

Field Training Officer. The Field Training Officer will be an experienced serving policeman posted to a police station and work under the guidance of the Police Station Training Officers. The training will prepare the Field Training Officer to be a mentor and guide to new graduates from the academies. The Field Training Officer will assist in the assessment and evaluation of the new policemen. The Field Training Officer will ensure the needs of the policeman, the police station and the community are being met. The Field Training Officer will feed back to the Police Station Training Officers lessons learned from their individual experiences with the new policemen to enlighten the training program.

LESSON 7
IRAQI POLICE STATION

I remember the first time I arrived at an Iraqi Police station and saw the entire shift sleeping on the roof; as I walked through standing sewage to speak with the Iraqi Police Station Commander, I knew my Soldiers were in for a long deployment.

U.S. Army MP 1SG

OVERVIEW

This lesson will help the PTT understand what a typical Iraqi Police station might look like. Although the missions vary between the different types of police, the station and capabilities are relatively similar. This lesson provides information about the general design of an Iraqi Police station, organizational structure, authorized equipment, and Iraqi Police capabilities.

7-1. IRAQI POLICE STATION DESIGN

The PTT should not expect the typical Iraqi Police station to resemble anything close to what a Provost Marshal Office would look like in the United States.

- Many Iraqi Police stations were converted from previous government-owned buildings (such as schools). Most of these buildings are poorly constructed, and the PTTs should expect to encounter these conditions:

  - 2 to 4 hours of power available daily (if any)

  - Lack of heat and air conditioning

  - Generators that work poorly (if at all)

  - Latrines are almost all "Eastern style" and have plumbing problems

  - Limited water and an unworkable sewage system

  - Overcrowded detention cells

- Taking these conditions into consideration, the first impression of many PTTs is unfavorable. Under these circumstances, it is easy, but wrong, to conclude that there is no order in the station and that the previous PTT did not make any progress. In actuality, the station has probably made great improvement.

- Many stations in Iraq went through a renovation to improve the facility. PTTs may encounter a mix of refurbished and newer facilities. Different construction standards and practices resulted in widely varying quality and design of stations.

- Although these stations are in different types of buildings, they typically have similar layouts. Figure 7-1 depicts a typical station design.

  - At a minimum, there should be an entry control point to enter the compound, manned by Iraqi Police.

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- The building should have a detention cell that can hold an average of 30 persons. Often it is a large room with area for placing sleeping mats.

- There should be numerous offices to accommodate the leadership, administration, supply, storage, and arms room. Some stations have lockers and shower facilities.

- They will usually have some form of force protection plan implemented by coalition forces to protect the station from attack.

  - Force protection measures will vary. Some stations have temporary HESCO barriers that may be falling apart. These barriers were intended to be replaced by permanent concrete barriers that offer more protection.

  - Some stations have fighting positions on the roof or guard towers that offer more protection from attack.

  - The primary walls surrounding the station also vary. Some are very high and offer protection from direct fire, and some have only perimeter walls made of HESCO barriers.

  - Parking space may be severely limited at some station.

  - PTT should expect the Entry Control Point to be manned by IP as part of a Force Protection plan that has been coordinated with Coalition Forces in the area. A typical detention cell is large enough for 30 people but may be overcrowded.

## Sample Iraqi Police Station Layout – 1st Floor Plan

Figure 7-1. Sample Iraqi police station layout.

- The pictures below represent one of the better Iraqi Police stations that PTTs may encounter.

Clockwise from upper left: Typical Iraqi Police station, shift commander, arms room, and MP–Iraqi Police Joint Coordination Center for operations within the city.

- PTTs can upgrade the station where they work with the following means by requesting engineer assets from the Brigade Combat Team in their area of operations. The Brigade Combat Team commander has responsibility for force protection of all facilities within his area of responsibility. Therefore, PTTs should request force protection upgrades through the Brigade Combat Team. Listed below are additional resources that are available through the MP Company:
  - MOI (through the Iraqi Police chain of command)
  - Iraqi local community council
  - District PTT (Transition Team Iraqi Funds)
  - Force Protection Office at the Battalion/Task Force Headquarters
  - Brigade Provost Marshal–Iraqi Security Forces Cell
  - MP Battalion Supply channels
  - CPATT
  - Engineer Brigade (or Battalion) in sector
  - Civil Military Operations Center or Governance Center

7-2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE—PERSONNEL

Police station manning is determined by population size. A typical station will be responsible for a population of 50,000 to 100,000. The average Iraqi Police station is usually authorized approximately 150 police. Figure 7-2 represents a sample police station organizational structure. The station modified table of organization and equipment can be found on the PSMR.

- Station organization varies but most have some type of an Operations section for tracking activity and maintaining communication via cell phone, handheld radios, or other means.

The following chart gives an example of a typical makeup.

Sample Police Station Organizational Structure

Police Station Personnel

120 Police Officers + 30 Support Staff = 150 Total Personnel

Figure 7-2. Police station personnel.

7-3. WORK SCHEDULE

A typical station's work schedule is broken down into 24-hour shifts. Culturally, this has been an Iraqi decision, and efforts to change to 8- or 12-hr shifts have been disregarded. The vast majority of Iraqi Police, including the most senior officials, live at the station 5 to 7 days a week.

- In the event of a large-scale Iraqi Police operation (for example, elections, large cordon and search) the manning at the station on the following day may be very limited or nonexistent.

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- PTT involvement and planning assistance can help mitigate this problem. Many stations will be under strength, and the station commander will need help adjusting his troop-to-task ratio. Figure 7-3 depicts an Iraqi Police work schedule.

Iraqi Police Station-Level Routine Work Schedule
(As of 19 Nov 2006)

		Work Shift	
		Days	Nights
Iraqi Police Agency	Station (a.k.a. Local Police)	Full manning w/ Chief and Staff: 0800-1400 Staff, Force Protection, ERF present for duty	Patrol: Minimum manning. IPs will only respond to specific calls/complaints. ERF not on duty. Force Protection: 24 hour shifts/48 IPs per shift per station
	Patrol	Full manning w/ Chief and Staff: 0800-1400	Patrol: 24 hrs on/48 hrs off shift w/75 IPs per shift per station Force Protection/Administrative: 24 hrs on /48 hrs off shift w/25 IPs per shift per station
	Traffic	Full manning w/ Chief and Staff: 0900-1500	D: 0700-1400 w/ 28 IPs per station S: 1330-2100 w/ 48 IPs per station M: 2100-0700 w/ 8 IPs per station
	IHP	Full manning w/ Chief and Staff: 0900-1500	Patrol: 24 hour shifts w/100 IPs per shift per station Force Protection: Weekly shifts w/175 IPs per weekly shift (7 days on/ 7 days off)
	CID	Full manning w/ Chief and Staff: 0900-1500	Admin/Investigators: 24 hrs on /48 hrs off shift w/ 20 personnel Force Protection: 24 hrs on /48 hrs off shift w/ 65 CID IPs per shift per station

The vast majority of Iraqi Police (including the most senior officials) *live* at their workplace 5-7 days a week.

Figure 7-3. Police work schedule.

- **The station commander** is the most important person in this chain. Very few officers will make a decision in a station without the station commander. Having a strong leader in this position who works well with coalition forces is imperative to the success of the Iraqi Police station.

- **Getting a consistent work force at the station is a major challenge**. Corruption is commonplace at every level in the police force. The station may have 150 police on the payroll, but only 70 consistently showing up for work.

- **Shift commanders** are identified (usually a captain or lieutenant). Shift commanders are responsible for conducting guard mount, assigning responsibilities for that shift, and checking on the execution of tasks and are usually the on-scene commanders at incidents. They report directly to the station commander.

- **The station staff** typically works only during the daytime (approximately a 6-hour shift). The staff will comprise officers who are responsible for administration, investigations, logistics, and operations.

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- **Each station has shortages** and usually has officers covering multiple tasks. The PTT will be coordinating with the station staff to collect data at the station and to establish or improve systems within the Iraqi Police station.
  - Iraqi Police stations operate in the heart of the cities. There are nearly a thousand independent stations that are responsible for their own force protection.
  - Adding to the complexity of PTTs' training at hundreds of stations is the fact that the Iraqi Police are a civilian workforce.
    - As a civilian workforce, some considerations come into play for the Iraqi Police:
      - Personal and family issues
      - Sickness
      - Weather
      - Pay
      - Holidays
      - Shift-work limitations
      - Food and travel stipends
      - Risk, isolation, and vulnerabilities
      - Difficulty training: Trying to train civilian police while maintaining a daily mission on the street or in the station where they cannot just go to a training class

7-4. EQUIPMENT

Each Iraqi Police station is authorized equipment based on the modified table of organization and equipment found in the IPFSR database. The modified table of organization and equipment is based on the personnel authorized to that station. The equipment on hand is routinely inventoried by the PTT for accountability. The following is a sample equipment list that a local police station is authorized:

Equipment	Coalition Supported	On Hand	FMC
M89: Vehicles	16	5	2
M90: Patrol Boats	0	0	0
M91: Motorcycles	0	0	0
M101: Pistols	160	160	158
M102: Rifles	160	160	160
M103: PKC/PKM Light Machine Guns	12	5	5
M104: Pistol Ammunition (9 MM)	7,200	7,200	—
M105: Rifle Ammunition (7.62 x 39)	16,906	16,906	—
M106: Light Machine Gun Ammunition (7.62 x 54)	4,025	4,025	—
M95: Ballistic Vests	160	160	—
M96: SAPI Plates (Pairs)	160	160	—
M98: Winter Coats	160	50	—
M97: Uniforms and Accessories	480	375	—
M99 Iraqi Police ID Badges	—	50	—
M100: Temporary Police ID/Weapons Card	—	25	—
M88: Generators	2	1	1

Figure 7-4. Iraqi Police station authorized equipment.

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- The amount of equipment on hand at a station will vary for several reasons (priority, accountability, availability, etc.). Directorates transferred equipment to various stations, leaving some stations extremely short on resources. Some equipment on hand will not be fully mission capable.

- The Iraqi Police drive several types of vehicles. The majority patrol in Nissan 2400 pickups or Chevy Luv pickups. CPATT recently purchased Chevy 3500 pickups to fill needed shortages across Iraq. These vehicles will be in various states of repair at the different stations. PTTs must encourage their counterparts to perform maintenance, including preventative maintenance. Patrol boats and motorcycles are only in the inventory of River Patrol and Motorcycle Patrol stations.

- Iraqi Police carry several types of weapons. Each policeman is authorized a Glock 9mm pistol and an AK-47 rifle for his protection and the protection of others. The pistols are issued directly to the policeman, and the AK-47 (7.62 x 39) rifles are part of the station's inventory based on its authorized personnel. Each station will be authorized PKC/PKM (7.62 x 54) machine guns. The police usually use the machine guns for force protection at the station or mounted in the back of their trucks while patrolling. Iraqi Police who have graduated from the Police Academy are usually authorized to carry their Glock while off duty but should have their badge with them.


Iraqi Police arms room.

- Ammunition authorization is based on the number of weapons assigned. With the number of engagements daily in Iraq, keeping accountability of ammo is a challenge. PTTs should encourage station leadership to conduct frequent inventories to account for spent ammo.

- There are several types of ballistic vests and ballistic plates at the stations in Iraq. They are in various states of repair and are a challenge to keep in the inventory. Many of the policemen have taken them home in fear of being killed off duty.

- The availability of winter coats and uniform accessories has declined tremendously in Iraq. The initial set of uniforms and police equipment (holsters, flashlights, handcuffs, etc.) has been

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degraded or is missing from the station's inventories. These items should be supplied by the Iraqi government (MOI). PTTs should conduct a personnel asset inventory at the station to determine what that station has on hand.

- Badges (or police identification cards) may be used to identify government officials and police in Iraq. These ID cards have changed numerous times over the years, and the system to gather the data and to generate and distribute the cards is not working efficiently. Most of the Iraqi Police do not have a current Police ID. Their information (name, photo, badge number, blood type, date issued, and weapon authorization) is supposed to be collected in the academy and forwarded to Baghdad to make the ID. The ID is then forwarded to the respective station.

- The IP badge/ID Card is either yellow in color (old style) or white (new MOI issued badges). If the IP has been issued a white badge, the yellow one should be turned in. The badges are in English and Arabic. Different colors on the card indicate whether the individual is a civilian (blue), IPS up through NCO (green), Officer (red), or high ranking civilian (black).

7-5. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

The following chart offers a general comparison between Western Police and Iraqi Police.

 The capability of a typical Iraqi policeman is often misunderstood. Because the police operate in an insurgent environment, they are often used in combat operations. The Iraqi Police are not ideally trained or equipped as a combat force; however, they are often the only force available. The Iraqi Army was intended to clear out cities of major resistance, and the Iraqi Police were supposed to enforce the rule of law and conduct community policing after the cities were relatively safe.

Iraqi policeman in the back of a truck getting ready for patrol.

- Some police have advanced training. Investigators assigned to some stations are very helpful. They have enough knowledge to secure a crime scene, collect evidence, and conduct interviews and interrogations. The majority of the investigation is usually conducted by Investigative Judges.

- The typical police station can handle normal policing duties in their community: mounted and dismounted patrols, checkpoints, force protection, cordon and searches, and limited intelligence operations. Each station will be at different levels of proficiency depending on the leadership and the experience within the ranks. The PTT will assess each station's capabilities and adjust its training and mentorship accordingly.

- The Iraqi Police uniform is a light blue shirt, navy blue pants, and a black brassard with the Iraqi Flag and the letters IP or IPS. Traffic police wear a white shirt and navy blue pants. Emergency Response Unit forces often wear a dark blue shirt, navy pants and tan boots.

- Police vehicles have different colors and different colored stripes on the side panels to denote the type of IP. Patrol vehicles have yellow stripes; traffic police have a blue stripe on the sides; Highway Patrol vehicles have a black and white checker board pattern.

LESSON 8
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE PTT PROGRAM

U.S. Army MP Platoon Leader: "Listen up. We are going to be assigned the PTT mission."

U.S. Army MP Squad Leader: "Hooah, what the hell is a PTT mission?"

OVERVIEW

One of the problematic obstacles to Iraqi sovereignty and the drawdown of coalition forces is Iraq's security infrastructure. At the heart of this challenge are the readiness, training, manning, and overall effectiveness of the Iraqi Police.

The ability of the local police to maintain order and security throughout the country will ensure transition of the country to Provincial Iraqi Control. In January 2006, the Commander-in-Chief in his State of the Union Address provided the Military Police Corps and Multi-National Force–Iraq with their marching orders toward success in Iraq by designating that year the "Year of the Police."

This focus led the Multi-National Force–Iraq commander to develop the PTT program to assist the Iraqi Police in transitioning to full control. This lesson provides information on the essential elements of the PTT program to help units destined to perform the PTT mission begin planning and preparation. The composition of a PTT, roles and responsibilities, and the concept of operation are discussed.

8-1. PTT STRUCTURE

A Police Transitional Team (PTT) is the tactical element that helps train, advise and mentor the IPS at the local, district, directorate and provincial levels. The team is formed around a Military Police Squad capable of training advanced law enforcement skills, as well as station operations. At a minimum, the team consists of 1-3 International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO), and linguist support. These teams may further be augmented with medical, logistics, maintenance, communications, administrative, legal, and intelligence depending on the mission requirements, and partnered headquarters level. The minimum composition for the PTTs should be a follows:

- Station level PTT: 31B30(MP) Team Chief, 1 x IPLO, 2 x Civilian Linguists and 12 x MP squad – Minimum Total 15

- District HQ level PTT: O1-O3/31A (MP Officer) Team Chief, 2 x IPLOs, 3 x Civilian Linguists, and 12 x MP squad – Minimum Total 18

- Provincial HQ level PTT: O3-O4/31A (MP Officer) Team Chief, 3 x IPLOs, 4 x Civilian Linguists, and 12 x security element – Minimum Total 20
  - When available, the Provincial and District HQ PTTs should be expanded with additional IPLOs to assist in the development of the IPS Headquarters. Likewise the expansion of Linguists allows greater utilization of the PTT members.

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PTT Chief briefing the station and district commanders.

Figure 8-1 represents a local station personnel and equipment breakdown.

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Police Transition Team

The foundation for all PTTs is the 12x man Military Police Squad

PTT Partnership

Bde/Bn/Co	Provincial HQ
Bn/Co	Directorate HQ
Co/Plt	District HQ
Plt/Sqd	Station

PTT Composition

Military Police Squad
Bde/Bn/Co/Plt Leadership
International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO)
Interpreters

Subject Matter Experts as needed
- Medical
- Logistics/maintenance
- Communications
- Administration
- Intelligence

Maximum	
all UAH	max 20 pax
w/ASV	max 19 pax

| Safe	
all UAH	max 18 pax
w/ASV	max 17 pax

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
Figure 8-1. PTT structure examples.

Task organization of your PTT team is an important aspect of pre-deployment planning and training. (Note: squad size and types of vehicles/equipment varies)

I had no idea what a PTT team consisted of or the individual training needed for each member. During the first 6 weeks of the pre-deployment I had my team members training themselves on the aspects of the PTT; this time would have been better utilized conducting troop leading procedures and survivability training.

U.S. Army MP SSG PTT Team Chief

8-2. PTT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The unit should task-organize the PTT before deployment in order to meet the roles and responsibilities listed below. That way, once the PTT arrives in Iraq, they will have trained together as a team and know their proper function on the team. The PTT chief should select Soldiers or IPLOs who have expertise in detention, intelligence, and arms room operations. If possible, send these Soldiers to institutional training to receive formal instruction.

- **Team chief:** A Squad leader or platoon leader is usually designated a PTT team chief whose main responsibility lies with mentoring and training police chiefs at the station level.

  - A team chief may be assigned anywhere from one to five police stations at any time during deployment. The team chief assists the police chief with supervising or developing systems for his police in investigations, community policing, patrol plans, station structure, force protection, code of conduct, basic police training tactics, and all administrative systems. He also assists in planning and execution CF/Iraqi Police joint patrols and operations.

  - Team chiefs will also need to assist the station commander in interacting with multiple local or government agencies. Many of these local government agencies consist of provincial police chiefs, or religious leaders, tribal leaders, and social leaders within a community.

  - The team chief must maintain focus on teaching, coaching, training, and mentoring the Iraqi Police. He must enhance the readiness of the Iraqi Police station in accordance with the results of the previous month's **Police Status Monthly Report (PSMR).**

- The team chief will use the PSMR to identify areas needing improvement to develop and implement training. He must remember to identify problems in the infrastructure and work to correct these issues. From month to month, team chiefs will assess the station and refocus training as needed. This process will be repeated until all deficiencies have been improved upon or corrected.

- The other vital role that the team chief plays is in assisting the station commanders with all logistical requests, including weapons, ammunition, uniforms, vehicles, radios, supplies, and personnel, along with various other police equipment to assist the Iraqi Police in their jobs. The team chief needs to monitor the request to the station commander's next higher headquarters and track the request through the PTT chain.

- The PTT chief must maintain focus on the police systems and not become overly fixated on any one area (structure upgrades, joint patrols, cordon and search operations, checkpoints, etc.). The key to success is to build the Iraqi Police systems.

- **Deputy Chief (IPLO or team leader).** The deputy may assist the team chief in mentoring and training shift supervisors and section leaders. The deputy chief should be capable of performing the same functions as a team chief.

  - Deputy Chief maintains visibility of daily operations of the arms room, supply room, administration, detention facilities, evidence rooms, joint coordination centers, maintenance, and other areas.

  - The Deputy Chief may assist in collecting data for the PSMR during the shift and then supervises investigations, community policing, patrol plans, shift structure, code of ethics, police training tactics, and all administrative actions surrounding the shift.

  - The Deputy Chief, with the assistance of the IPLO, conducts training with Iraqi Police patrols and section leaders at the stations. The deputy chief supervises and assists in force protection of the station while the PTT is on station.

- **International Police Liaison Officers** (IPLO's) are police officers from the United States who are contracted by the State Department to assist in developing the Iraqi Police. They must be sworn officers in good standing and have been active in law enforcement within the past nine years. IPLOs work for the MP PTT, and the program is managed by the Multi-National Corps–Iraq Provost Marshal. Each PTT is assigned three to five IPLOs. IPLOs have one team chief who serves as the leader and liaison to the higher military headquarters.

  - IPLOs assist the PTT team chief in mentoring district commanders, station commanders, shift commanders, and policemen with training, decisions, and management. IPLOs use their law enforcement training and experience to continue IP education (using in-service-supported PowerPoint classes).

  - IPLOs provide continuity for the PTT mission. IPLOs can provide the PTT with a detailed history of the police station. Since IPLOs do not deploy or redeploy with a unit, they can provide invaluable insights into the PTT mission progress.

  - IPLOs function as a member of the team during the entire deployment. IPLOs carry an M4 and M9 pistol with a full combat load. Although IPLOs are not allowed to participate in combat missions, they must be fully integrated into all mission rehearsals and battle drills. The PTT is responsible for the IPLOs' force protection**.**

A PTT IPLO from the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department prepares Iraqi Police for a joint patrol.

- **Criminal intelligence.** The criminal intelligence specialist is responsible for mentoring Iraqi Police in investigative functions such as major crimes (murders, rape, extortion, kidnapping, etc.). The chain of command must identify the appropriate person for this duty position and ensure that he is trained before deployment. For further information, see FM 3.19-10 and the police intelligence operations guidebook. The criminal intelligence specialist helps the Iraqi Police improve their intelligence collection capability and the subsequent analysis, distribution, and targeting.

- **Linguist.** A good linguist is a force multiplier. *Not all linguists are equal.* It is vital that you get to know your linguists. You must develop trust and confidence with your linguist. There are three categories of linguists assigned to PTTs.

  - **Local national linguists (Category I)**: Primarily used at the company level, they are Iraqi citizens who live either on the economy or on the forward operating base. The PTTs will have varying degrees of responsibility for the linguists, depending on the PTT location in theater. Although the linguists are managed through a central contract, the PTT may have considerable administrative or logistical requirements for the linguist's well-being (such as transportation to a leave location, pay issues, and security). *Safeguarding and care of the linguist is ultimately the responsibility of the PTT.*

  - **U.S. contracted Linguists (Category II/III)**: These are U.S. citizens and/or Soldiers who serve as linguists in Iraq. They may have a security clearance and have access to classified or sensitive information.

    He was a very strict Shi'a Iraqi from the Basra area who fought against the regime in 91 (know your interpreter's background). I would notice a difference in how he spoke with Shi'a and Sunni police. Other interpreters told me that he was prejudiced towards the Sunni Iraqis (use of trusted interpreters or 09Ls) He also had a temper and became upset whenever I assigned him to work with a female Soldier. I questioned his loyalty. He got into fights with Soldiers and would often go to south camp and try to get Iraqi Army Soldiers to take him into Baghdad for women and drinking (monitor activities). The result was that contractor moved

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him to another unit without passing along the reason that I fired him (get to know your interpreter ... if he came to you from another unit, talk to unit leadership and find out why he was moved).

- **Medic.** When task organizing for the PTT mission, the company should consider including medics as part of the PTT. The medic's primary function is to provide medical care for the PTT mission; once on site at the Iraqi Police Service, the medic can perform health and welfare checks of the detention cell or facility and prisoners inside the facility. This is an asset that has historically proved valuable during Red Cross inspections, training the police in medical tasks, and helping with the information operations campaign.

- **Some typical PTT roles at IP Stations include:**
  - IP Training (classroom, hands-on, field training)
  - Perform joint IP/MP operations (mounted and dismounted patrols)
  - Improve IP Force Protection and building infrastructure
  - Monitor detainees
  - Police intelligence operations (eyes and ears)
  - Daily SITREP on station activity (eyes and ears)
  - Gather weekly station stats for PSMR/TRA
  - Air concerns of Station CDRs
  - Monitor arms room accountability

8-3. PTT CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

The MP's PTT mission is a key aspect of Multi-National Force–Iraq's main effort in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom's operational and strategic aims. With this understanding, MP units assigned to conduct PTT need to understand the significance of their task and thoroughly prepare for the mission. As the Iraqi Police improve, the complexity of the tasks in which they are to be trained will require knowledge of law enforcement skills that only Military Police and IPLOs possess. If the Iraqi Police are not ready to maintain security and enforce the laws, the Iraqi Government will be unable to assume full and autonomous control.

- In spite of the significance of the task to train Iraqi Police, the PTT concept remains one of the least understood missions inside and outside the Iraqi theater of operations. This may be due in part to the complexity of the system of training and evaluating police services as well as the fact that operations focused on building a security infrastructure of a society are not well understood.

- There is also confusion as to the responsibilities and organization of PTTs, compared to National Police Transition Teams (formally known as Special Police Transition Teams) and the Military Transition Teams. These are often confused, even though their tasks, compositions, and responsibilities are not the same.
  - The Military Transition Teams and National Police Transition Teams are 11-man teams built specifically to train and equip the Iraqi Military and National Police (National Police are in

essence light infantry units within the MOI and do not perform traditional law enforcement). These teams comprise individual augmentees based upon team skill set requirements, trained at Fort Riley, KS, and are embedded with their Iraqi division, brigade, or battalion. These units are not organic to any unit in theater.

- PTTs comprise organic MP squads that are augmented by additional support specialties. The MP component of the PTT is being trained at the U.S. Army Military Police School, at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, using a train-the-trainer program.

- In 2006, the PTTs' primary subset of the overall National Command Authority's plan was to train 135,000 Iraqi Police (Police, Patrol, Traffic, Highway Patrol, and the Criminal Investigation Division) throughout 18 provinces and build their capability to plan, execute, and sustain counterinsurgency and law enforcement operations with limited support of coalition forces.

  - PTTs serve in an advisory role to assist in the transition of responsibility for domestic security to the Iraqi Police in order to provide a safe and secure environment.

  - To focus the coalition efforts, Multi-National Corps–Iraq identified ten key cities in which to develop the Iraqi Police. These cities, largely chosen for their population size, were to receive priority in terms of training and equipping at the provincial, district, and station levels. The PTT program includes the following goals:

    - Build a base of Iraqi Police success in 9+ key cities

    - Train and equip 135,000 police throughout Iraq

    - Cycle all Iraqi Police officers through the Police Academy

    - Develop provincial and district headquarters sufficiently capable of independent operations

    - Police lead domestic order efforts throughout Iraq

    - Police coordinate and synchronize with the Iraqi Army

    - Military Police and IPLOs are mutually supportive in PTTs

    - Synchronize police operations with other Iraqi Security Forces

  - To execute the PTT mission, PTTs conduct a multi-tiered system of training and development for the complete Iraqi Police structure, from the individual Iraqi Police at the station through the Provincial Chief of Police and his staff within the 18 Iraqi province HQs.

  - PTTs follow certain principles for training the Iraqi Police and receive refined guidance from the MP Brigade. The PTT are OPCON to the Multinational Divisions and further TACON to the subordinate maneuver Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). The basic principles of PTT are these:

    - Train, coach, and mentor the Iraqi Police patrolman up through the provincial police chiefs and staffs (develop leadership)

    - Develop personnel accountability procedures (administration, pay, leave)

    - Develop security protection measures

    - Develop criminal intelligence direction, collection, and analysis

    - Plan and execute collective training programs: Iraqi criminal law, criminal investigation and evidentiary procedures, and community policing

- Ensure that all officers cycled through formal individual training (police academy)
- Plan and coordinate effective police operations
  - Establish procedures for suspect and detainee handling
  - Develop logistical support systems (maintenance, supply, accountability)

8-4. THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Although the assessment process (Figure 8-2) used to determine the effectiveness of the Iraqi Police seems complicated, it provides a systematic way to evaluate, plan, and train. It has several components:

- PSMR Assessment Checklists and Commander's Assessment (Appendix D of PTT TSP CD)

- Police Station Monthly Report

- Transition Readiness Assessment

- Police Essential Task List

- Training Plan

NOTE: "PSMR" is the monthly assessment of a station, academy, maintenance facility, District and Provincial Headquarters. The "IPFSR" is the Iraqi Police Facility/Station Report, which is the electronic database that stores all PSMRs and SINVs.


Figure 8-2. The assessment process.

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The PTTs use the PSMR to evaluate the areas depicted in Figure 8-3.

Figure 8-3. PSMR areas of evaluation.

- PSMR Checklists and Commander's Subjective Assessment

    – The PTT chief will first gather notes and resources, then drill down into all components of the PSMR questionnaire.

    – The PTT chiefs will then go through every question and apply a Go, No Go, or N/A to each assessment question.

    – By using the checklist (Figure 8-4), there is less chance that the results will be subjective rather than objective.

    – The current PSMR and checklist are web based using the Oracle system. The checklist can be downloaded and printed for use on site.

    – The questions themselves are generally very simple to ensure that there is little confusion about how to answer them.

    – The checklist will indicate which questions are applicable to each station type (Local Police Station, Provincial HQ, etc.) and type of report (Full PSMR's, Station Inventory (SINV's), etc.).

    – Not all the questions will appear to make sense independently, but when combined and taken in context with all the questions in the questionnaire and the weighted metrics for each category, the outcomes become relevant to the station's overall readiness in each category.

			GO	NOGO	N/A	PHQ	Other HQ (Not one of 18 PHQ, DHQ)	DHQ	Local (Police) Station	Patrol Station	Highway Station	Traffic Station	CID Station
Category	Measurement #	Measure or Checklist Item Description											
Systems - Operations	M33	Respond to a Complaint (6)					Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Ability to respond to the scene of a crime?					Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Ability to investigate a complaint?					Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Ability to determine if a crime has occurred?					Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
		Ability to complete a basic Police Report?					Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
		Does the report cover the essential information to initiate and investigation? (who, what, where, when, why, how)					Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
		Ability to interview victim/witness(s)					Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
Systems - Operations	M34	Investigations (15)					Y	Y	Y				Y
		Have investigators assigned to the station graduated from the Iraqi Police Service Basic Investigators Course?					Y	Y	Y				Y
		Ability to conduct a Criminal Investigation?					Y	Y	Y				Y
		Ability to conduct an Investigative Interview and Interrogation?					Y	Y	Y				Y
		Ability to process a crime scene in accordance to Iraqi Law?					Y	Y	Y				Y
		Identify evidence relevant to the case?					Y	Y	Y				Y
		Ability to preserve, collect, store, and track evidence?					Y	Y	Y				Y
		Complete a Crime Scene Sketch?					Y	Y	Y				Y
		Photograph the crime scene and evidence?					Y	Y	Y				Y
		Ability to properly assemble a case and present it to the Investigative Judge for review?					Y	Y					Y

Figure 8-4. PSMR Assessment checklist

- This provides a relatively quick reference and review of the entire checklist within a few pages by breaking down the total number of responses (Go, No Go, or N/A) within each category.

- Once the questionnaire is completed by the PTT chief, the results are compiled and annotated into the PSMR worksheet, which tabulates the total responses.

- The PSMR worksheet can also provide a shortcut to the questionnaire process if the PTT chief knows that an entire section may be N/A based on the station's responsibilities. The PTT chief can annotate the proper number of responses in the PSMR for that particular section.

- It is very important that PTT chiefs use the Assessment Checklist, not the raw data in the PSMR, to identify shortcomings and strengths. A Commander's Assessment Form can be used to provide written comments. An example is provided in Appendix D of the PTT TSP CD.

- Where applicable, an ISF Detention Facility inspection checklist (See Appendix D) is also used.

- The PSMR is the primary document and analytical tool for assessing the readiness, training, and overall capabilities of the Iraqi Police throughout theater.

  – The PSMR (Figure 8-5) is a quantifiable document that assesses the overall effectiveness of the Iraqi Police Service and provides the PTT with direction on the way ahead.

  – The document consists of hundreds of resource and systems questions to objectively assess the capabilities and capacities of the Iraqi Police. This document enables the PTTs to effectively determine station capabilities in their area of responsibility.

	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
Response Team / Guard Force Command and Control	2	1	0	DHQ or PHQ HQ has procedures for use of the ERF (if constituted)	2	1	0
Logistics & Maintenance	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
Equipment Accountability - Receipt Procedures	4	2	0	Maintain a Maintenance Tracking System	2	2	0
HHQ Command Supply Discipline Program - of Subordinates	0	2	0	Supervise Subordinate HQ / Stations Maintenance Programs	0	2	0
Communications	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
Voice Communications Network Plan	5	1	0	Voice Communications Maintenance Management	3	2	0
Computers	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
Computer & Automation Systems	4	7	0				
Operations	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
Respond to a Complaint?	0	0	5	Apprehend the Suspect?	2	0	1
Identify if a crime has occurred (dispute or crime?)?	0	0	3	Collect & Prepare Evidence (documentary, testimonial, forensic) for Trial?	0	0	7
Identify the suspect?	0	0	1	HQ - Ensure Subord. Performing Adeq. Shft Chg Opers & Police Proc	4	0	0
Information Operations	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
Operations - Information Operations (IO) Other than Public Affairs	7	1	0				
Personnel / Finance	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
Accurate Personnel Accountability?	5	1	0	HHQ Verifies Accuracy of Subordinate Station Payrolls?	4	0	0
Accurate payroll?	11	0	0	Are all Local, DHQ & PHQ Personnel Properly Trained?	4	0	0
Disciplinary Action Program For Station Personnel?	0	3	0	PHQ Ability to Recruit, Coordinate Training, & Predict Placement?	0	0	6
Personnel Records Maintenance?	5	0	0	Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period)?	0		
Are Station Personnel Properly Trained, Training Arranged?	2	0	0	Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period) - Received Pay?	0		
Staffing Adequate to Manage the Personnel & Finance Departments?	3	0	0	Total Personnel Receiving Pay (includes personnel not assigned)?	0		
HHQ Verifies Subordinate Personnel Accountability?	5	4	0				
Detention Operations	GO	NO-GO	N/A				N/A
	0	0	18			0	☑

Figure 8-5. PSMR

- – The PTT chief's comments on the PSMR can paint a clear picture of the actual inner workings of the police station. These comments allow PTT chiefs to address areas they feel are critical to the status of their stations but which they believe are not adequately or correctly covered by the questions in the PSMR. It provides emphasis on areas that require attention at the highest levels throughout the Operation Iraqi Freedom command structure.

- – The PTT chief may classify the station at the same assessment level as the PSMR or submit an upgrade or downgrade based on comments. This is valid when the Iraqi Police have limited resources but are effective in policing their community with what they have.

- – The subjective assessment also allows the PTT chief to take into account the intangibles that affect the readiness of the Iraqi Police but cannot be captured effectively in a metric-based program.

- – The PTT chief's comments and documentation are turned into the TRA for that station.

- **Commander's Subjective Assessment** is a classified report that includes Commanders comments and an overall TRA subjective assessment and will include in the near future a subjective operational effectiveness rating and reliability rating. (Figure 8-6)

ICOMMANDERS COMMENTS	
Date:	
Assessment Type (Provincial Overall, District Rollup, Key City): (INDICATE WHICH)	Projected Months to TRA Level 3:
Province:	Projected Months to TRA Level 2:
District:	Projected Months to TRA Level 1:
Key City:	#Station (District HQ/Station):
IPS IN THE LEAD:	YES NO
# PTT (by type):	

Overall Assessment Comments

Overall Personnel Assessment (AUTH/ASSIGNED/PRESENT FOR DUTY)

Leadership Assessment

Training Assessment

Sustainment and Logistics Assessment

Facilities & Force Protection Assessment

Effects Assessment

Figure 8-6. Commander's Assessment Form.

- ISF Detention Oversight. To take a proactive step towards identifying and preventing abuse MNC-I PMO created the monthly ISF Detention Oversight Inspection Program. This program evaluates and reports conditions at ISF pretrial facilities and assists the Government of Iraq (GOI) in taking corrective actions to meet international standards for the care and custody of pretrial detainees and respect for human rights.

  - Police Transition Teams (PTT), Military Transition Teams (MTT), and National Police Transition Teams (NPTT) use the checklist to input their data into the CIDNE database on SIPRNET at http://22.30.3.59/cidne/ (see Appendix C for instructions on navigating through the web based reporting system).

  - Physical abuse is an SIR reportable instance which should be recorded on the 'ISF Detention Oversight Assessment Checklist' provided in figure 8-7 ISF Detention Oversight Checklist. Physical abuse is defined as:

    - Physical abuse resulting in bodily harm from the use of unlawful force or violence such as beatings that leave marks, welts, bruises, burn marks or indications of electrical shock.

    - Unlawful coercion such as threats to inflict bodily harm or harm to a family member or acquaintance.

    - Exposure to humiliating, degrading, or inhumane treatment to include sexual assault.

  - Instance(s) of unacceptable living conditions should also be recorded on the checklist. Unacceptable living conditions are defined as violation or deprivation of the following standards:

    - Crowded Conditions. Each detainee must have the space to stand, sit, and lie down in a prone position. Detainees must be provided with matting or bedding. The matting or bedding must be in good repair and generally clean.

    - Medical Care. Each detainee must be provided medical care necessary to treat injuries, wounds, and illness that are likely to threaten loss of life, limb or eyesight. Illness includes communicable and chronic diseases.

    - Food. Each detainee must be provided a minimum of two (2) meals of nutritional value per day.

    - Water. Each detainee must have potable water available at all times.

    - Hygiene. Each detainee must be provided with basic hygiene articles that are necessary to maintain general cleanliness. Each detainee must bathe or shower, at a temperature suitable for the climate, once a week. Each detainee must be provided ready access to a sanitary location to urinate and defecate when needed. They will also be provided clean clothing.

    - Living Area. Each living area must have enough natural or artificial light to read. All living areas will be ventilated by fresh air and heated or cooled to a reasonable temperature as appropriate for the climate.

    - Adjudication. Every detainee must see an investigative judge within twenty-one (21) days. No detainee should be held beyond ninety (90) days in a pre-trial confinement.

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– The results of these inspections are used to synchronize the efforts of various organizations (DoJ/ICITAP/BOC/MNDs, MNC-I SJA/PMO) to assist the Iraqi Rule of Law process. MNC-I PMO uses this information to prioritize requests for Judicial resources and pretrial bed space in support of maneuver operations, abuse prevention, and overcrowding of ISF detention facilities. See Chapter 1-5 "Jumpstarting The Iraqi Rule of Law" for more detail on judicial resources and reducing overcrowding in ISF detention facilities.

ISF DETENTION OVERSIGHT ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST	Date of Assessment		
Version 3.0, 02 January 2007			
Location: Grid and Nearest Town or City	ISF Unit and Facility Name		
MTT___NPTT___PTT___	Inspectors Name/ Rank/ Contact Information	Page 1 of 1	
ITEM	YES	NO	N/A
Abuse: (If any area is marked "YES" report as CCIR 8)			
Does any detainee have marks, welts, bruises, or burn marks incurred at the detention facility?			
Were injuries incurred as a result of an application of unlawful force or violence such as beatings or torture while in custody?			
Is there any indication that the detainees have been subjected to unlawful coercion such as threats to inflict bodily harm or harm to a family member or acquaintance?			
Is it apparent that the detainees have been exposed to humiliating, degrading, or inhumane treatment including sexual assault?			
Living Conditions: (CCIR 8 is not necessary for below deficiencies)			
Crowded Conditions:			
All detainees have enough space to stand, sit, and lie down?			
Is each detainee provided with functional matting or bedding?			
Is the matting or bedding in good repair and generally free of dirt?			
Medical Care:			
Is each detainee provided with medical care necessary to treat injuries, wounds, and illness that are likely to threaten loss of life, limb or eyesight.			
Are detainees with communicable and chronic diseases kept away from the general population?			

Figure 8-7. ISF Detention Oversight Assessment Checklist.

- **The Transition Readiness Assessment** is the primary document used by the coalition to determine the readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces. It is calculated automatically by the IPFSR System, based on the results of the PSMRs submitted by the PTTs. (Figure 8-8)

  – The TRA is briefed by commanders to Multi-National Corps–Iraq and makes its way to the highest levels of the U.S. government to report the progress of the coalition's effort to establish a secure environment in Iraq.

Station Transition Readiness Assessment — Nasir Wa Salem Local Police Station — 15-Apr-06

Resources		Systems		Effects	
Resources Assessment	66%	Systems Assessment	80%	Effects Assessment	NA
Personnel	59%	Personnel	86%	Population Support	NA
Leadership	85%	Public Affairs	17%	Insurgency / Crime - Independent Oper	100%
Training	97%	Budget	52%	Insurgency / Crime - Adversary Activity	V High
Equipment	62%	Internal Affairs	80%		
Vehicles	79%	Medical	NA	Overall Assessment	
Uniforms / Protective Equipment	59%	Intelligence	70%	Objective Metrics Assessment	
ID Cards/Badges	81%	Investigations	94%	PTT Team Leader's Subjective Assessment	3
Weapons & Ammunition	57%	Command & Control	88%	PTT Team Leader's Comments - see the TRA Comments Sheet (page two of the TRA)	
Information Technology	8%	Operations	96%		
Communications -	64%	Detention Operations	98%	projected # of Months Until Station Transitions to:	
Facilities	60%	Information Operations	NA	Level 1 (≥85%) Capable	6
Force Protection	57%	Station Training	96%	Level 2 (≥70%) Capable w/ Support	3
Utilities	94%	Force Protection	80%	Level 3 (≥50%) Partially Capable	0
Habitability	84%	Logistics & Maintenance	62%	Level 4 (<50%) Incapable/Forming	N/A
Communications -	40%	Computers	60%		
Armory	100%	Communications	44%		

Figure 8-8. Example TRA Form.

- Once the PSMR worksheet is completed, it is submitted for processing through the PTTs' reporting chains and ultimately to CPATT, where the TRA levels are actually determined and rolled up by Provinces and key cities in the IPFSR database.

- These readiness levels directly correlate to the Iraqi government's readiness to transition to independent and then eventual provincial control.

- The TRA assesses the following areas:

  - Personnel: Station's requirement versus on-hand quality fir total police, first-line supervisors, mid-level supervisors and executives.

  - Leadership: Assesses the leadership capability of the station chief and station leadership to supervise the station.

  - Training: Assesses the level of training of the station including specialized training, in-service training and organizational training and the quality of on-hand academy trained personnel versus the requirement.

  - Equipping: Assesses the level of equipment in the station including: weapons, ammunition, vehicles, ID cards, badges, uniforms, protective equipment, communications equipment, computers, etc.

  - Facilities: Assesses the status of the station's utilities, habitability, infrastructure and holding cells.

  - Force Protection: Assesses the station's level of protection including station defense plans, entry control, stand-off distances, and response team and guard force operations.

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- Effectiveness: Assesses the local population's support of the station, insurgency and crime in the station's jurisdiction, militia influence levels and the station's ability to conduct independent operations

Figure 8-9 describes the TRA level definitions.

Figure 8-9. Transition Readiness Assessment Levels.

- **Police In-Service Training Plan** includes tasks that every Iraqi Police organization must be able to execute. See **Enclosure 3 of Appendix C**.

  - **The Police In-Service Training Program has replaced the Police Essential Task List**. The old program of instruction had 137 tasks. The new program has 79 tasks and is focused more on police tasks with fewer common tasks/leader tasks.

  - Once the PSMR is completed and deficiencies are identified, the PTT chief, the team's IPLO, and the Iraqi Police station chief can use the Police Essential Task List to find the tasks that are relevant to the station's identified deficiencies.

  - Once the tasks are identified, the PTT can drill down into the program of instruction and find completed classes and instructor notes for the required courses. The available classes and programs of instruction were designed by civilian police from CPATT to provide the most efficient law enforcement training for developing the Iraqi Police.

  - The classes embedded in the Police Essential Task List are mostly PowerPoint presentations that require projection systems and power to use the format properly. Many stations will be unable to support this training method; therefore, the PTT will need a hard copy of the courseware. The PTT may also need to modify the courses to complement the Iraqi Police and their cultural and legal systems.

- **Developing a training plan and correct deficiencies.** The PSMR provides the PTT with a method to assess the proficiency of the Iraqi Police they are charged with developing. *This assessment should drive and focus the training planning process* (Figure 8-11).

- Developing a training plan

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- New PTTs must build upon the training of the previous PTT instead of starting over as previous teams have done (for example, conducting skill level 1 tasks for three deployment cycles).


Figure 8-10. Planning process.

- PTTs should be familiar with the initial individual training that all Iraqi Police have received, which provides a basis of standardized training for all recruits. An individual who graduates from a regional academy should be capable of maintaining his assigned duty weapons; conducting traffic control operations; providing law enforcement services; arresting, searching, transporting, and processing violent suspects; conducting traffic stops; responding to alarms, suspicious devices, or hostage situations; searching personnel, vehicles, and facilities; and providing basic first aid.
- PTTs should enhance this knowledge base with collective skills taught at the Iraqi Police station to enable the Iraqi Police to function effectively as part of a team. These collective skills include
  - Critical site security and special events
  - Convoy operations
  - Cordon and search operations
  - Law enforcement raids
  - Military operations on urban terrain and close-quarters battle principles
  - Criminal intelligence
- Further specialization is possible for certain Iraqi Police with exceptional capabilities or unique skills (such as an explosive ordnance disposal specialist).

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- The cumulative effect of this training is an Iraqi policeman who is competent in basic law enforcement skills and capable of functioning as an integral team member in providing law enforcement and security for the civilian population.

– How to correct deficiencies

- PTTs will find that they are in the uncomfortable position of constantly correcting Iraqi Police who are often of higher rank or older. PTTs should always keep in mind that the Iraqi Police leadership is very proud. Dishonoring or embarrassing them in front of other Iraqi Police will quickly sour your partnership relationship.

- When correcting deficiencies, PTTs should be mindful of the "do's and don'ts" covered in Lesson 4 (Role of the Advisor).

- Do not treat Iraqi Police like U.S. Soldiers. PTTs must be culturally sensitive and frame advice as suggestions, not directives. The exception to this guideline is immediate actions taken to ensure the force protection or safety of the PTT members and violations of the Standing Rules of Engagement.

The use of after-action reports to correct deficiencies is a great tool for the PTT chief. After-action reports may be used after joint patrols or operations, arms room inspections, or training. Things to remember during the after-action report:

- Maintain a good relationship with the Iraqi Police; try to always have two or three good things to talk about for every bad thing.

- Ensure that your linguist understands the importance of the after-action report process and prepares beforehand.

LESSON 9
TRAINING FOR THE PTT MISSION

We lost 2 months of valuable training time trying to learn our mission.

U.S. Army MP 1SG

OVERVIEW

Training the Iraqi Police is the priority mission for Multi-National Force–Iraq. It is essential that we have our best-trained and best-resourced elements performing this mission. Given the situation in Iraq, every time a PTT leaves the forward operating base, it is a combat mission. So in addition to PTT-specific expertise aimed at improving the capabilities of the Iraqi Police, everyone on a PTT must be trained to standard in multiple military occupational specialty/branch-immaterial tasks that relate to survivability (basic shoot-move communication, reaction to contact, use of CREW systems, first aid, medevac procedures, etc.).

Making sure PTTs are trained to standard is commander's business; therefore, leaders at every level must be personally involved in every facet of PTT development. Leaders must routinely monitor the training readiness of their PTTs. Training and certification is essential for ensuring that MP units are ready and properly prepared.

Upon notification that a unit will deploy to conduct a police training mission, the leadership will plan and execute PTT training and certification and continue the training throughout the deployment process. On January 5, 2007, the military brigade in theater published a PTT Training and Certification Plan that was approved by the Multi-National Corps–Iraq Provost Marshal. This lesson will discuss the five phases of training and certification that PTTs will go through before assuming the PTT mission in theater.

9-1. PHASE I: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING

The first phase of PTT training will take place at the U.S. Army Military Police School, located at Fort Leonard Wood, MO.

- The U.S. Army Military Police School will conduct a five-day course for selected battalion- and company-level leaders using a train-the-trainer methodology and this training support package as the foundation for the course.

- The trainers who have completed this course will be given a compact disc that contains the text of this training support package, student presentation, instructors manual, supporting references, and useful links.

9-2. PHASE II: HOME-STATION OR MAIN OPERATING BASE SITE

The purpose of this phase is to address the unit's need to conduct training at its home station or main operating base site in preparation for assuming the role of a PTT in Iraq. During this phase, Soldiers will complete the following:

- **Critical task list.** The critical task list found in Appendix C, PTT Training and Certification Plan, Enclosure 2, MP Brigade Critical Task List, will help leaders attain the goal of ensuring that their MPs are ready and properly trained for their PTT mission. These tasks have been developed through the use of lessons learned by MP units through several Operation Iraqi Freedom rotations. These critical tasks should be trained continuously, prior to deployment, and during employment. Every Soldier should be proficient in all tasks and confident in the skill sets and weapons proficiency and ability to accomplish the mission.

  - The purpose of the critical task List is to help deploying units focus training on essential tasks directly supporting the current wartime mission.

  - The critical task list merges the DA PEO Soldier Warrior Task List and MACOM Pre-Deployment Training Requirements and MP Lessons Learned into one comprehensive document.

  - All units that are deploying should complete all tasks on the list prior to deployment.

  - Appendix C, Enclosure 6, includes a checklist to help units track their unit training plan in preparation for the PTT mission.

- **Police In-Service Training Tasks.** The Iraqi Police In-Service Training Program includes common tasks, police tasks and police leader tasks. The intent of the In-Service Training Program is to continue to reinforce critical tasks on a recurring basis in a guard-mount setting or other dedicated time for training at the Iraqi Police station. PTTs will initially teach the tasks to the Iraqi Police until they certify an Iraqi Police Training Officer at the station to teach the training. When possible, PTTs should observe this training.

  - The Police In-Service Task List of 79 tasks has replaced the Police Essential Task List that had 137 tasks.

  - The tasks in Appendix C, Enclosure 3, are the In-Service Training Program. The categories of tasks in the In-Service Training Program to include:

    - **Police-Specific Individual Tasks** (Process Offenders, Protect a Crime Scene, etc.) Total: 42 (53%)

    - **Common Tasks** (First Aid, Guard Duty, Employ Weapons, etc.) Total: 29 (37%)

    - **Police-Specific Leader Tasks** (Manage a Police Station) Total: 8 (10%)

  - Units may request a CD with the POIs and classes or download them from the 89th MP BDE SIPRNET Website. POIs and classes are in English and Arabic.

  - Units may use these programs of instruction or equivalent U.S. Army tasks to ensure proficiency before deployment. A checklist is provided in Appendix C to assist in tracking a unit's training plan.

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- Whenever possible, units should maximize the time Soldiers conduct garrison law enforcement support before deployment. The experience they receive in such missions is essential to successfully completing the PTT mission in Iraq.

- Units will conduct initial PSMR training in accordance with the PSMR in Appendix C, Enclosure 4, IPFSR (PSMR) Training Package. This training package is continually updated, so units should contact the MP battalion they will be aligned with in Iraq before beginning this part of their training to ensure they have the most current information. A self-teaching training support package to teach Soldiers the PSMR can be downloaded from https://spsan.iraq.centcom.smil.mil/C15/IPS%20Stuff/Training/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

- A sample In-Lieu-Of Training Plan is included in Appendix C, Enclosure 5, FORSCOM In-Lieu-Of Training Plan).

- Units will conduct escalation of force and counter-sniper training before deployment. Classes can downloaded at: https://spsan.iraq.centcom.smil.mil/C15/IPS%20Stuff/Training/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

9-3. PHASE III: CAMP BUEHRING, KUWAIT RECEPTION, STAGING, AND ONWARD MOVEMENT

The purpose of this phase is to ensure that Soldiers receive all training mandated by Multi-National Corps–Iraq, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, and the MP brigade commander before arriving in Iraq. This phase is conducted at Camp Beuhring.

- Details of reception, staging, and onward movement can be found at the Coalition Forces Land Component Command website, and the RSO Checklist can be found in Appendix C, Enclosure 8.

- Phase III training will generally focus on five areas:

  - Gunnery and LFXs (that is, weapon zero and test fire, CQM, counter–improvised explosive device-TM, etc.)

  - Acclimatization

  - M1114 and M1117 driver's training and licensing

  - Improvised explosive device/Warlock familiarization

  - CASEVAC procedures

9-4. PHASE IV: IRAQ (REPLACEMENTS IN PLACE AND TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY)

The purpose of this phase is to conduct reinforcement training and training that can be conducted only in Iraq as part of the 10- to 15-day process for replacements in place and transfer of authority. This is the integration portion of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. These tasks can be found in Appendix C, Enclosure 9.

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This phase addresses all tasks required to assume the tactical mission being conducted by PTTs in Iraq:

- Current tactics, techniques, and procedures unique to their battle space

- Medical evacuation and quick-reaction force procedures

- Landowner coordination

- Human intelligence source turnover

- Integration with IPLOs and linguists

9-5. PHASE V: CERTIFICATION AND REASSESSMENT

This phase outlines the procedures for certification of PTTs before they assume the mission, and it highlights the importance of continual reassessment. One of the most important components of this plan is that each company or unit commander will certify PTTs in accordance with this plan before a PTT will depart the forward operating base on an actual mission (following replacements in place and transfer of authority).

- Given the importance of the advisor mission, every trainer must execute training with a high level of precision and professionalism to instill confidence and ultimately competence and legitimacy in the PTTs' counterparts. Therefore, it is imperative that trainers be certified by their chain of command before execution of training.

- Training must be well planned, focused, and rehearsed.

- The trainer's responsibility does not end with instruction of the initial class but includes a complete understanding of the full execution of the task, the assessment, and after-action reporting.

- It also includes knowing how and when to assist during execution to prevent reinforcing mistakes.

- MP battalion commanders are the certification authority for their subordinate units and will brief the status of certification at company level to the MP brigade.

- The PTT mission-essential task list can be found in Appendix C, Enclosure 10, and will serve as a guide for final certification.

- Although the initial training and certification of PTTs in accordance with this plan is completed in this phase and before transfer of authority, battalion and company commanders will conduct random assessments and event-oriented assessments throughout the deployment. Some triggers for event-oriented assessments are these:

  - A station's TRA level drops

  - The TRA level does not change within 120 days

  - Significant PTT personnel turnover (for example, all of the IPLOs rotate, or there is a new squad leader)

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Lesson 10
Preparing for the PTT Mission

OVERVIEW

Besides training for the PTT mission as discussed in Lesson 9, PTTs must understand the command and control (C2) relationship within their area of operation. The PTT C2 structure may be a non-standard construct. This lesson will provide an overview of PTT C2 relationships and major PTT tasks each unit performs. Additionally, this lesson will discuss what to look for during the Pre-Deployment Site Survey, including the right questions to ask and how to task-organize for success.

10-1. UNDERSTANDING THE COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS

C2 relationships often present a challenge for MPs at all levels. While these relationships can be difficult, it is important that the PTT maintain unity of effort with all players on the battlefield. MP leaders must be actively engaged in support and dialogue.

The chain of command, logistical support, and reporting may be determined by the PTT location in theater. For example:

- In Baghdad, PTTs work for their organic MP unit chain of command and coordinate their movement with the landowner for that sector/area.

- In northern Iraq, a PTT may work directly for the supported landowner. The PTT may receive only administrative and logistical support from the organic chain of command.

However, in both examples, logistical support for Iraqi Police will be coordinated through the PTT chain of command to CPATT and/or MOI.

The interaction of the MP company and battalion commanders and staffs with their respective landowners can effectively streamline the entire system for C2, reporting, and resource allocation. Diplomacy is critical in making the system work. MP commands must work within the system to make it effective and efficient for their Soldiers.

- If MP commands are not actively engaged in demonstrating their support to the maneuver commanders, indicating how MPs are combat multipliers to the Iraqi Security Forces development process, the operations are certain to become stressed.

- Regardless of the C2 relationship, the most important thing to ensuring unity of effort is communication.

The MP brigade that is assigned the PTT mission provides ADCON for all MP units conducting the PTT mission, including RSOI, equipping, training and PTT certification. Currently the Brigade maintains OPCON of all MP units performing the PTT mission in MND-B's battlespace.

- The MP brigade also serves as the intermediary between the MP battalions and companies and the Brigade Combat Teams in MND-B.

- The MP brigades provide guidance to Multi-National Corps–Iraq on the PTT mission, status of the program, and ongoing efforts within the Police Training Academies and CPATT.

- Working with CPATT/MoI to facilitate resourcing issues.

- The brigade is also responsible for informing the corps of tasks that need to be executed in support of the PTT mission that require dissemination through a corps fragmentary order to the maneuver units. The ability of the MP brigade to influence the orders process at the corps level is essential to providing guidance and influence to PTTs' operations within the multi-national divisions.

The MP battalions' role and functions throughout Iraq vary depending on their area of operations and from one maneuver area to the next. These roles may be influenced largely by good inter-personal communication skills. Other aspects, such as the size and scope of the battalion's area of operation and the dispersion of their units, will also have an impact.

- The battalions operate fully functional staffs with oversight of the PTTs. Battalions also establish a PTT section that maintains responsibilities similar to those of the brigade.

- Currently, MP battalions normally command and control anywhere from 6 to 10 organic, inorganic, and in-lieu-of MP companies. This further complicates battalion commanders' operations and requires them to augment the staff with additional personnel and provide liaison officers to the multiple maneuver commanders they support. These are just some of the tasks that MP battalions may perform:

  - Providing PTT to maneuver forces
  - Coordinating with maneuver units for PTT operations and support
  - Tracking all PTTs and operations
  - Training all PTTs
  - Providing guidance on PTT training plans and operations
  - Receiving, reviewing, and forwarding all PTT debriefs
  - Conducting intelligence preparation of the battlespace for all PTT patrols (threat assessments, route conditions, etc.)
  - Collecting, reviewing, and consolidating all PSMR assessments
  - Conducting logistics, administrative, and personnel support functions
  - Providing some provincial-level PTT
  - Coordinating with the MP brigade, CPATT, and other organizations as required

MP companies and platoons. The majority of the PTTs in Iraq are sourced by MP companies. Companies and platoons designate the requirements and responsibilities for their PTTs within their area of operations. Companies may be responsible for up to 30 stations, or 2 to 5 stations per PTT.

- Company commanders, platoon leaders, and operation sections are responsible for ensuring that the platoons and squads are not affected by any C2 issues at the higher levels.

- It is also important at this level that the commanders and platoon leaders work closely with the maneuver units they support by attending key meetings and operational planning sessions to ensure that the MPs and Iraqi Police are integrated into the overall plan and properly used.

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- Platoon leaders and company commanders serve as PTT chiefs and are responsible for district through provincial Iraqi Police HQs and oversee the stations and PTTs at subordinate levels. This linkage ensures that the Iraqi Police are using the proper procedures and channels to conduct business, receive resources from MOI, and resolve issues.

- The higher HQ PTT chiefs must maintain regular communication with the PTTs in their area of responsibility to cross-check information flow internally and within the Iraqi Police system.

- If company commanders serve as PTT team chiefs, they still retain all responsibilities and requirements for their company in addition to the PTT responsibility and linkage with the maneuver and organic chain of command.

MP squads execute the PTT mission. The MP squad makes the PTT mission functional and practical. It is the squad's expertise, interpersonal communication skills, and professionalism that make PTTs successful.

- While the squads' higher headquarters plan the greater details of the PTT mission, it is the squad that executes the daily combat patrols, trains with the Iraqi Police, and evaluates and assesses the Iraqi Police readiness and level of training in accordance with the PSMR.

- The squad is responsible for establishing the trust and the effective relationships that make the program even possible.

- The PTTs continually train the Iraqi Police and assess deficiencies in training and infrastructure. They work with the station commanders to correct deficiencies.

- PTTs work with the station commander to submit work orders through their chains of command to the MOI.

- PTTs track these requests through the PTT chain of command at the district and provincial levels and submit requests to the maneuver commanders for resources for station functionality and force protection.

- Finally, the PTT chiefs will complete the PSMR as discussed in Lesson 8 to assess readiness and start the training planning process over.

Interacting with a BCT.

- PTTs must establish relationships and maintain open communications with all landowning battalions and brigade combat teams (BCT) within their IP area of operations. The PTT should be the single point of contact for IP support or issues.

- PTTs must notify the landowning BN/BCT TOC every time they enter and exit the landowner's AO. BCTs provide quick reaction force and attack aviation support in addition to synchronizing operations. Additionally, BCTs provide the fastest route status and threats occurring within their AO. This information can save lives and prevent fratricide.

- PTTs must report initial SIGACTs to the landowner as well as their MP CO TOC. This parallel reporting ensures landowners have visibility of operations and incidents that affect their AO.

- It is imperative that PTTs educate their BCT on the proper fuel procurement for IPS, IP recruiting, IP manning schedules, and IP law enforcement mission set (vs. COIN mission set).

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BCTs want to help however, they sometimes force the "American way of doing things" on the Iraqis. This usually results in an "Americanized System" that competes for funding and resources and is usually not adopted by Iraqis as the long term solution. Educate the BCT so they can help facilitate an "Iraqi solution."

- PTTs are critical in explaining daily IP functions and capabilities to BCTs and appropriately integrating the IP into BCT operations, ensuring their roles are aligned with their capabilities (TCPs, clearing operation follow-on force to do community policing/interacting with the population, on standby for crowd control, etc.)

- PTTs should be the primary link between their partnered IP stations and the other US forces in the AO. Operations, joint patrols, integration of IPS into BCT operations should be facilitated through the PTT.

- The PTT serves as the bridge between the BCT and the MP BN HQ/BDE HQ in addressing IP related issues and concerns in order to pursue answers through the correct IP chain of command.

Station, district, and provincial PTT structure. The local Iraqi Police chain of command will determine the method for partnership based upon the MP organizational structure available.

- The MP–Iraqi Police partnership will vary depending on the team's location in Iraq. Figure 10-1 shows the manner in which the MP forces and Iraqi Police forces are arrayed and partnered in Baghdad.


Figure 10-1. Iraqi Police and MP partnerships.

10-2. PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY AND INFORMATION COLLECTION

Predeployment site surveys are designed for the incoming unit leadership to receive an overview of the current mission profile. The items listed below can provide situational awareness for the incoming unit:

- Last PSMR

- Patrol distribution plans

- After-action reports from previous joint MP–Iraqi Police operations

- Station security plan and layout (if applicable)

- Pictures of the stations with the corresponding chain of command

- Station continuity books

- Standard operating procedures

Questions the PTT should ask include these:

- How does the local populace react to the use or threat of force? (Will they protest in response?)

- What is the historical relationship between Iraqi Police and the people in the community where the PTT will work? (Favorable or unfavorable?)

- What is the relationship between the Iraqi Police and other security elements?

- What infrastructure (transportation nodes, energy production and storage areas, cultural and religious icons, etc.) have or need specific or dedicated protection?

- What U.S., coalition, international, or nongovernmental organization formal agreements, treaties, or cooperation were in effect before PTT engagement? Are they still in effect?

- Has the station been attacked? How many times?

- Who are the reliable or go-to people in the station?

- What processes are in place for hiring and firing, rewarding and punishing, and promoting?

- How and when do pay activities occur at the station?

- How does the station conduct training?

- What is the biographical information on the police chief?

- What are the skills, knowledge, and capabilities of the IPLO?

- What are the skills, knowledge, and capabilities of the linguist?

- Is there an overall feeling of corruption or infiltration of the station?

- Are there any planned major police operations?

- Are there any informal relationships between the Iraqi Police and the local community?

- When was the last time the station took a casualty? How many? What caused the casualties?

10-3. TASK ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESS

As with any mission, the unit commander has to task-organize assets in order to accomplish the mission most efficiently. To properly match Soldiers to duty positions within the PTT, commanders should consider individual talents and traits. Some leaders are better suited temperamentally to deal with the complex, and often frustrating, socio-cultural and human relationship issues inherent in the PTT mission. Commanders should consider the following factors.

- Advisor qualities (see Lesson 4, The Role of the Advisor, for more information):
  - Mature
  - Professional
  - Competent and confident
  - Patient
  - Knowledgeable
  - Culturally effective
  - Situationally aware
  - Technical skills (military police investigation, traffic investigator, canine, etc.)
  - Tactical skills and the characteristics we look for in a leader or advisor
  - As mentioned in Lesson 9, when possible, this task organization should be established in the train-up before deployment so your PTTs can train the way they will fight
  - Task-organizing may present challenges with regard to team or squad integrity, but ultimately the commander must weigh the benefits and risks of reorganizing the unit

10-4. THE TOP TEN THINGS TO DO TO PREPARE—A COMPANY COMMANDER'S PERSPECTIVE

1. Understanding of the Shia/Sunni split and the influence on them from the predominant insurgent groups associated with these sects (JAM, Badr, AQI, etc.); must be covered in the S2 country briefs

2. IED Battle Drills

3. IP Station force protection augmentation when the PTT is on station

4. Know how to use the Blue Force tracker

5. Know how to properly employ the C-IED equipment

6. Know the proper flow of information within the IPS chain of command (Station to District to Directorate to Provincial to MoI)

7. Understand the different capabilities and missions of the various types of IPs (Local, Patrol, Traffic, IHP, and CID)

8. Understand the Iraqi Criminal Justice System

9. Understand the capabilities and missions of the Iraqi Army and the National Police and how they interact with the IPS

10. Understand Escalation of Force (EOF) procedures

LESSON 11
FORCE PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS

We were hanging out at the station after finishing up a joint patrol. Luckily I had placed my squad in a force protection posture (Roof security, Armored Security Vehicle guarding the main ECP) when the station came under mortar attack. The Soldiers were pretty well protected against incoming. We relayed direction and distance to the [Brigade Combat Team], and they fired counter mortar fire on the enemy position.

U.S. Army MP 1SG

OVERVIEW

PTT security and force protection is the most important consideration when conducting this mission. PTTs must understand the threat situation, conduct a thorough risk assessment, and use appropriate risk management techniques to mitigate risks before conducting any mission. Detailed procedures for force protection of existing police structures are found in FM 3.19-10, which provides information about protection in depth, standoff distances, access control measures, barriers, and blast mitigation. Force protection measures must continually be updated to mitigate the ever-changing threat of insurgent attack. This lesson will discuss force protection planning considerations, risk management techniques, and an example of force protection standard operating procedures.

An MP providing overwatch security over the main entry control point.

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11-1. PTT FORCE PROTECTION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

During the replacements in place and transfer of authority process, PTTs must ensure that existing force protection plans and scheduled improvements for Iraqi Police stations are discussed and understood. PTTs should consider the following force protection information when developing their protection plans:

- Operational security is paramount. Never reveal your movement schedule to the Iraqi Police, linguists, or anyone else without the need to know.

- Most entry control points (ECP) will have a rolling gate and/or a swing arm gate. Some will have a serpentine barrier system to mitigate the VBIED threat. Bunkers on the station roof are typically used for overwatch positions of the perimeter wall (if present) and ECP.

- Regardless of the physical structure or layout of the various police stations PTTs will occupy, basic protection measures need to be in place before operations begin. Protection measures include the following:

Protection in depth. PTTs must apply protection in depth to any protected facility in order to render an attack ineffective. Figure 11-1 illustrates the general layered-protection approach to protecting an Iraqi Police station.


PTTs must apply protection in depth to any protected facility in order to render an attack ineffective.

Figure 11-1. Protection in depth.

Standoff distance. The best protection from the effects of blasts (improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, etc.) is standoff distance—the distance maintained between the target and where a threat may be. The initial goal should be to make that distance as far from the target as practical. Most Iraqi Police stations are of common unhardened construction. These buildings will not withstand common blast effects. To mitigate blast threats to police stations, exclusive standoff distances must be established and enforced. Figure 11-2 illustrates a standoff

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distance chart that is nationally recognized and used by numerous federal, state, and local emergency response agencies.

Threat Description		Explosives Capacity (TNT Equivalent)	Building Evacuation Distance	Outdoor Evacuation Distance
	Pipe Bomb	5 LBS/ 2.3 KG	70 FT/ 21 M	850 FT/ 259 M
	Briefcase/ Suitcase Bomb	50 LBS/ 23 KG	150 FT/ 46 M	1,850 FT/ 564 M
	Compact Sedan	500 LBS/ 227 KG	320 FT/ 98 M	1,500 FT/ 457 M
	Sedan	1,000 LBS/ 454 KG	400 FT/ 122 M	1,750 FT/ 534 M
	Passenger/ Cargo Van	4,000 LBS/ 1,814 KG	640 FT/ 195 M	2,750 FT/ 838 M
	Small Moving Van/Delivery Truck	10,000 LBS/ 4,536 KG	860 FT/ 263 M	3,750 FT 1,143 M
	Moving Van/ Water Truck	30,000 LBS/ 13,608 KG	1,240 FT/ 375 M	6,500 FT/ 1,982 M
	Semi-trailer	60,000 LBS/ 27,216 KG	1,570 FT/ 475 M	7,000 FT/ 2,134 M

Figure 11–2. Standoff distance chart.

Access control. Local citizens should have access to police stations to report crime, seek assistance, or receive public safety information. However, access must be controlled and monitored to prevent insurgents, criminals, and terrorists from causing injury, death, or destruction to the police station and personnel.

- Specially trained access controllers provide the first line of defense to a facility and should be used at each entrance point. Initially, do not use only Iraqi Police to provide security or access control. Because of the possibility of infiltration, Iraqi Police must be monitored and supervised. PTTs should combine Iraqi Police security efforts with coalition or other Iraqi Security Forces. Combining security forces enhances capabilities and provides different styles and levels of control. Using different methods to apply control measures confuses would-be adversaries. (For further information on access control procedures, see TC 19-210.)

- Planning facility access control includes developing procedures for inspecting all incoming personnel, hand-carried items, and vehicles. Specific areas to be considered during access control operations include

  – The identification method to be used, such as photo ID or badges

  – Authority for access and identification confirmation

  – Criteria for access to the police facility for

    ▪ Assigned personnel

    ▪ Visitors

    ▪ Media

    ▪ Maintenance personnel

    ▪ Contractors

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- Delivery personnel
- Other emergency personnel
- Material control procedures (consider inspecting all hand-carried items and deliveries)
- Military working dog team employment
- Vehicle control (vehicle inspections, parking, emergency vehicle procedures, and other vehicle-related activities)
- Location of security overwatch and fighting positions
- Location of additional security measures such as
  - Protective barriers
  - Lighting (including emergency backup lighting)
  - Communications
- Response force operations (MP employ response force operations as described in FM 3-19.4 and TC 19-210)
- Contingency planning (responding to fire alarms, bomb threats, hostage situations, natural disasters, and other emergencies)

Barriers and blast mitigation. One of the most important measures used to protect personnel and facilities is barriers and blast mitigation.

- The detonation of vehicle bombs generates four primary hazards to personnel in fixed structures, shelters, and in the open:
  - Primary fragments
  - Secondary fragments from barriers and structures
  - Secondary debris in fixed structures
  - Blast
- Barriers capable of stopping moving vehicles include chain-link fences reinforced with cable, reinforced concrete Jersey barriers, ditches, and berms. Barrier materials may not be available in large quantities. Concrete barriers will need to be constructed locally and delivered to the site using large trucks and equipment. (For further information about barriers and their protection capabilities, see TC 19-210 at http://www.army.mil/usapa/)
  - When occupying a station with only one PTT consisting of 12 to 15 personnel, including the IPLO, medic, and linguist, only nine Soldiers remain for security. This can be a challenge on a site that covers more than an acre and includes a two- or three-story building. A good security plan that includes all avenues of approach is essential.
  - Security at the station is paramount. Upon entry, conduct a sweep of the exterior and interior. This should be accomplished in a manner that does not question the station commander's ability to provide security at his facility.
  - Be conscious of changes from the norm and take note of routines. Unexplained absences or unexplained or hurried departures may indicate pending insurgent activity.

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- Post security on site. The level of security depends on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations.

- Incorporate Iraqi Police into your Force Protection Plan. Coordinate with the station commander to ensure that his police secure the outer cordon and conduct thorough personnel and vehicle searches.

- Ensure that force protection does not render the station inaccessible to local citizens.

- PTTs must be aware of the most common threats and insurgent tactics, techniques, and procedures in their area of responsibility and maintain the capacity to receive updated threat intelligence while in the station.

- Plan, brief, and rehearse all movements.

- Ensure that all elements of the PTT know their security responsibilities en route, at the station, and during the return to the forward operating base.

- PTTs need to coordinate their movement and know the conditions of routes/areas, how to contact the QRF, and MEDEVAC procedures.

- Figure 11-3 is a sample force protection diagram.

Figure 11-3. Sample force protection diagram.

LESSON 12
MANAGING PTT RESOURCE CHALLENGES

When I arrived in country the Iraqi Police at my station had about 30 percent of their equipment, which included weapons, ammo, vehicles, uniforms and about 40 percent [of] personnel. We could not effectively accomplish our assigned mission with those resources. We had to coach and mentor the Iraqis to use established channels to request their shortages. This required us teaching the Iraqi Police Chief how to request the resources, or in some cases if that didn't work, physically driving the Iraqi Police to their higher headquarters to request the resources in person.

U.S. Army MP SFC

OVERVIEW

The Iraqi Police must be able to shoot, move, and communicate in order to accomplish their mission. This lesson will cover the Iraqi supply and maintenance process, how to account for authorized equipment, competing for limited resources, and overcoming shortages. The PTT will have to inventory equipment and supplies often and ensure that the Iraqi Police are executing a system that accounts for existing property and requests items to fill shortages from their higher HQ. The resources on hand are limited. Acquiring equipment authorized and repair parts are challenges for each PTT. Overcoming these shortages takes vigilance, persistence, and creativity.

The most significant shortcoming in both MOD and MOI forces' capabilities is in planning and executing logistics and sustainment requirements. Factors underlying this deficiency include inadequate levels of sustainment stocks and limited capacity of the MOD and the MOI to execute the planning/acquisition/sustainment cycle. DoD is reducing Iraqi reliance on U.S. support and assisting in the development of Iraqi support capabilities. Embedded civilian advisors are assisting senior MOD and MOI officials in developing their capacity to organize, train, equip, sustain, and upgrade their forces.

There have been modest improvements in the MOI ability to perform key ministry functions, such as developing and implementing plans and policies, intelligence, personnel management, logistics, communications, and budgeting. CPATT MOI Transition Team continues to work with the MOI on developing and assessing these capabilities.

12-1. UNDERSTANDING THE IRAQI SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE PROCESS

The supply process. MOI is responsible for all facets of Iraqi Police supply and manpower. MOI has allocated a certain number of weapons, vests, fuel, etc., to the Iraqi Police stations for their use and is responsible for the hiring, vetting, and background investigations of Iraqi Police candidates.

- The PTTs must mentor the leadership and logistic officers at the stations and district headquarters. There is an Iraqi system in place that is supposed to push equipment down from MOI and the supply warehouses to the provinces, directorates, districts, and stations. The main

problem is getting the Iraqi government to take ownership of the supply system and purchase the sustainment items needed.

- The PTT will conduct inventories routinely during visits to the stations to check weapons, ammo, body armor, radios, vehicles, and police gear. The shortages should be addressed by the logistics officer at the station to the station commander. If there are no appointed logistics officers at your station, then the PTT should recommend to the station commander that he appoint one.

- Everything in Iraq is handled by handwritten memos. The station commander should request supplies from the District HQ Logistics Officer and District Commander by way of a memo. If the supplies are on hand, the request is approved and the items are signed for by the station logistics officer. If the supplies are not available (most of the time they are not at the district level), the request is forwarded to the Provincial or Directorate Logistics Officer. The process is repeated, and if the supplies are not available, the request is forwarded to the MOI or local supply warehouse.

- The PTTs will have to make copies of the requests forwarded and send these through the respective PTT chain to ensure that the system is being tracked at all levels. The PTT at company level mentors Iraqi police stations and districts. The PTT at battalion level mentors the directorate or the province. Sending the requests through this chain should ensure that the paperwork is making it to the right people.

- Requests for supplies sent from district commanders are generally not acted upon in a timely manner, leaving the stations in dire need of supplies.

- The team chief should request that all memos for supplies be duplicated and provided to the team chief to allow tracking through parallel coalition channels.

- Ammunition supply and accountability is another area that PTTs will assess. On January 15, 2007, the responsibility for ammunition procurement, storage, and distribution for MOI forces was transferred from Coalition forces to MOI headquarters. The first of three ammunition deliveries to the MOI headquarters has occurred. Storage space, material handling equipment, and request quantities continue to be challenges. Future ammunition purchases through Foreign Military Sales will potentially resolve quantity issues.

12-2. THE MAINTENANCE PROCESS

There are many challenges with maintenance of Iraqi Police equipment at the stations. Most of the equipment authorized has already been issued to the Iraqi Police. Much of this equipment has already been stolen, lost, or broken. There is a system in the Iraqi government for maintenance, but it rarely works efficiently.

- The police have little ownership of their equipment and rarely will maintain it unless told to by the PTT. If a vehicle breaks down, it usually sits until the PTT finds a way to fix it.

- There are maintenance facilities at the directorate and some of the provincial levels, but the support to get the vehicles towed is still not efficient. There is also the sectarian issue of getting Iraqi Police to support or travel to areas that they feel are unsafe.

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- Weapons that are non–mission capable are supposed to be turned in to the maintenance facility for repairs or replacement. If the Iraqi Police are not from that area, they usually will not travel to the maintenance facility.

- Until there is a functional system to repair or replace weapons, the PTT needs to think out of the box. For example, have the Iraqi Police pay a local machinist to repair weapons or bring the weapon onto the forward operating base to be fixed by an armorer.

- Small repairs can be made by local nationals and paid for by the PTT with Transition Team Iraqi Funds, which were designed for immediate short-term fixes and should not be considered a permanent solution for when the Iraqi systems fail. The PTT must mentor the Iraqi Police logistics officer to implement a working system. The PTT draws the funds from finance on the forward operating base and purchases supplies for the Iraqi Police through local vendors.

- There is mandatory training and certification from the local finance office on the correct use of these funds. The proper use and accounting of Transition Team Iraqi Funds is the sole responsibility of the person who signed for the money.

- The challenge is to locate the local maintenance contracts and locations. Once locations and capabilities have been identified, the PTT can coordinate with the Brigade Combat Team (through the appropriate chain) for assistance in moving vehicles to the maintenance facilities.

- The MOI is initiating actions for oversight and policy for maintenance and vehicles (acquisition and distribution). To offset MOI headquarters' limited control over the provinces, the MOI plans to centralize the purchase of both vehicles and parts. Provincial independence; lack of trained mechanics, manuals, special tools, repair parts, and adequate maintenance facilities; and the current security situation have hampered this effort. The GOI is purchasing limited numbers of small non-American-manufactured vehicles with its own budget.

- Central Vehicle Maintenance Facilities are located throughout Iraq to support the various types if Iraqi Police stations. Their ability to service and repair vehicles varies widely.

- Shortfalls of adequate fuel continue to hinder mission performance. To correct this, the MOI established a Fuel Management Office under the Director of Vehicles. This office continues to refine fuel allocation, request, and distribution issues.

  – Fuel for the IPS is dispensed at what is called a "Public Company" or a "Middle Area" using a receipt booklet system. The Station Fuel POC submits an approved request for bulk fuel which goes up thru the District to the MOI and a copy goes to the Baghdad Police Headquarters. When the MOI Vehicle Director approves the request with an allocation of fuel, the Public Company issues the Fuel POC a receipt booklet to use. The process to obtain approval for bulk fuel can take several weeks.

Iraqi Police patrol vehicle not properly maintained.

Brand-new Iraqi Police vehicles about to be released to the Iraqi Police Service.

12-3. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR AUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT

PTTs are responsible for assisting CPATT and MOI in inventorying equipment issued to Iraqi Police stations. CPATT was tasked to distribute police and sustainment equipment to an agreed-upon level across Iraq. CPATT reports that this goal has been met. For Baghdad and nine other key cities, 100%

of authorized vehicles and weapons have been delivered to the police. The Iraqi Police Service has received over 80% of authorized critical equipment and is expected to receive 100% by the summer of 2007. Due to the immaturity of the MOI equipment accountability system, there are no reliable figures on how much of this equipment remains in service, nor is it known how much equipment the MOI has purchased for additional Iraqi Police Service staff and for staff authorized by provincial governors. The most accurate reports on equipment quantities and serviceability are provided by MNC-I through the Police Transition Teams (PTTs). MNSTC-I continues to work with the Iraqi Police Service to implement standardized reporting and tracking processes and mechanisms. In conjunction with MNSTC-I, the MOI is developing a comprehensive procurement plan to ensure that MNSTC-I funds and MOI equipping funds are spent coherently.

- CPATT is transitioning the responsibility for distribution of equipment to the Iraqi Police. Due to the initial lack of systems of accountability, much of the equipment that was issued by CPATT is missing and/or damaged.

- The responsibility for sustainment of these stations and any additional stations created above the agreed-upon initial number falls on the MOI.

- MOI has the funds to purchase this equipment, but the system is not functioning well enough to completely support the Iraqi Police.

- The amount of authorized equipment for each station is based on a police station modified table of organization and equipment that can be found in the IPFSR database. The PSMR is the primary tool for equipment accountability and reporting. It will show a history of what that particular station has had on hand for authorized equipment and ties into the overall TRA for that station.

A U.S. MP conducting an accountability check and inventory of weapons and ammo.

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- Accounting for equipment at the stations is a joint effort. The PTT will usually break down responsibilities at the station. An example would be a team leader taking inventory of the arms room, a team leader or IPLO discussing personnel and pay issues with the personnel officer, and another checking the vehicles for serviceability.

- Due to decentralized control and funding of elements that comprise the MOI, there is no standardized unit equipment accountability procedure. The responsibility for proper equipment accountability is delegated to the subordinate organizations, with most elements maintaining equipment accountability through the use of hand receipts and manual ledgers.

- The limited number of linguists available to a PTT makes it challenging to collect data from multiple sources simultaneously. These data must come together in order to complete the PSMR. This is usually done daily so as to identify problems immediately.

12-4. COMPETING FOR LIMITED RESOURCES

The limited amounts of resources in the Iraqi system are difficult to acquire. The PTTs will have to ensure that their stations are requesting supplies, following up, and distributing them properly. Iraqi Police tend to maintain minimal stocks on hand and not give them to the stations.

- The stations may be short of uniforms, ammo, weapons, office supplies, and vehicles.

- The PTT may have to escort the logistics officer or station commander to the next higher HQ to ensure that the requested supplies are issued properly. The requests routinely are never answered by the higher HQ, so it is imperative that the PTT mentor the logistics officer to be vigilant.

- The higher HQ may have the supplies on hand but never answer the request.

- Physically taking the logistics officer to the HQ may assist that station in getting the needed support. If this fails, the station PTT must contact the District PTT to work the issue at that level.

- The PTT will have to be creative to get resources. The Iraqi logistical system is new and may take a while to become an effective and efficient system.

- CPATT has been purchasing and distributing equipment to the Iraqi Police since the start of the operation. The importance of accounting for the equipment they do have is vital to the success of each station.

Iraqi Police inventory and account for new weapons at Boob Al Sham Iraqi Police station.

12-5. OVERCOMING SHORTAGES

Although most of the supply effort is supposed to go through the Iraqi system, supplies can also be ordered through the PTT chain of command to CPATT with a Logistical Supply Request (LSR).

- There are local warehouses throughout Iraq that have most of the sustainment items needed by the Iraqi Police. Three warehouses at the Baghdad Police College (BPC) transferred to the MOI Director of Logistics in January 2007. One warehouse has the capability to be used as an armory, providing the MOI headquarters with additional storage space for weapons and ammunition. The Director of Logistics has a staff prepared to assume responsibility for warehouse operations.

- Supplies can also be sent directly to the forward operating base, and the MP unit can transport the supplies to the stations. (This method of overcoming shortages is counterproductive to building and sustaining Iraqi Police systems.)

- Ensure that the PTT is tracking all equipment requested, received, and missing. If the Iraqi Police are short, there should be a request.

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- If there is property received from coalition forces, there should be a hand receipt for it. If you discover property missing, you must document and report it.

- A characteristic of a self-sustaining force is the ability to manage equipment throughout its life cycle while performing administrative support.

- It is absolutely imperative that the PTT teach, coach, and mentor the Iraqi Police chief to make the existing Iraqi Police logistical system work.

- There are several different funds that Commanders can use to address resource related challenges. Each comes with specific rules for dispersal. For example, there are monthly FOO funds ranging from $1000 per district to $2000 per province for the PTTs to purchase items for their mission. There are Transition Team Funds that the S4 can obtain for expenses related to the IPS. There are Quick Response Funds for force protection, facility repair, communications and other equipment for the ISF.

12-6. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

The security ministries continue to struggle with immature personnel management practices. Personnel strength reporting by Iraqi military and police units is assessed as weak. The primary shortfalls in the personnel management system are as follows.

- **Personnel accountability.** The MOI does not yet have accurate personnel accountability and reporting procedures, and it is unknown how many of the more than 306,000 employees on the ministry's payroll are present for duty on a given day. MNSTC-I estimates that, on an average day, less than 70% of MOI personnel are present for duty. This is a combination of authorized absences (leave, school, sickness) and unauthorized absences. The problem of personnel accountability is being addressed through the purchase of an automated human resources and payroll system. The equipment and software for this system were installed in January 2007, and training has begun. Full deployment of the system is expected to take 18 months. Once complete, the personnel management system will be integrated fully with employee biometrics, improving the accuracy of employment rosters and facilitating employee criminal background screening.

- **Pay Process.** The way it is supposed to work is that the Directorate or Provincial HQs (Finance, Legal and Personnel sections) produces a roster of IPs, civilians, and workers that should be paid and how much and issues a voucher. The Local Police Station then takes the voucher to Baghdad Police Headquarters and gets the money. On payday, the individual IP shows their ID and gets paid for the number of days they worked and signs by putting a thumb print on the roster. The system is not perfect but has improved.

- **Lack of Confidence in Retirement and Death Benefit Payments**. The GOI is formulating a Retirement/Pensions Law. Until this legislation is in place and effective, the security ministries will continue to pay pensions and martyr pay. The current system is based on an upfront lump sum payment and a pension of 80% of the total basic pay and allowances. This provided adequate financial support to families. These benefits have received significant attention from the MOI, and potential changes that would have undermined these initiatives have been strongly resisted. This effectively means that the MOI employment rolls are enlarged; this is currently seen as being the most effective means of "looking after their own."

- **Wounded Remaining on the Rolls**. The MOI and the MOD are in the process of developing an effective system to care for severely wounded soldiers and policemen. Like those killed in action, many wounded remain on the rolls in order to receive medical care and financial compensation. The MOD has created medical "follow-up" units across the country. These units are holding companies to which severely wounded soldiers are assigned. This allows soldiers who are physically incapable of conducting their duties to be dropped from their unit rolls while still retaining pay and benefits. A similar plan will be implemented in the MOI.

Current Manning Initiatives. The GOI, with Coalition support, is now executing several manning initiatives to replenish the force to allow units to be temporarily relieved to refit and retrain, and to increase present-for-duty levels in combat units. These initiatives will add more than 60,000 personnel to the ISF during 2007. MNF-I estimates that the MOI will require 32,000 new police annually to replenish the ranks. Training bases are established and fully functioning to achieve these replenishment goals.

- **Replenishment of 30,000.** MNSTC-I is funding the training and equipping of 30,000 soldiers to replace personnel losses and to increase the manning of combat units to 110% to improve present-for-duty strength.

- **Prime Minister's Army Expansion Initiative.** In consultation with the U.S. Government, the GOI decided to increase the size of the Army by approximately 24,000 soldiers. The additional forces will increase the MoD ability to command and control its forces, enhance its operational and tactical flexibility, and allow battle-weary units to be pulled off-line to retrain and refit. This GOI initiative also came with fiscal resources from the MOD budget.

- **Replenishment of National Police Brigades**. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) is working to replenish all National Police units with personnel and key pacing items of equipment in support of the Baghdad Security Plan and Phase II training at Numaniyah.

- **Expansion of National Police to 10 Brigades**. The CPATT is supporting the prime minister's initiative to build a multi-component (Iraqi Army and National Police) division-sized force to protect the Samarra Shrine reconstruction project. The team is generating a 10th National Police Brigade in support of this effort.

- **Establishment of Three Emergency Response Unit Battalions in Anbar.** The CPATT, in cooperation with the MOI and provincial authorities, is assisting with the training and equipping of three battalions of auxiliary policemen, to assist the Iraqi Police Service primarily in the greater Ramadi area. This is a very positive initiative to take advantage of increased Sunni participation in the police forces of Anbar Province.

LESSON 13
IRAQI POLICE OPERATIONS

During the summer of 2004 the new Baghdad Iraqi Police were preparing to conduct their first large scale police operation. I was very concerned that the Baghdad Chief of Police had not done the proper planning to execute the operation.

I was dismayed to observe on the morning of the operation the Chief of Police addressing 500 IPs with a bullhorn from the hood of a patrol car. I thought for sure the operation would fail. It turned out the operation was a huge success, resulting in the capture of several criminals and insurgents. Although the Iraqi Police did not conduct [the military decision-making process] in the manner for which I was accustomed, they still executed a successful operation.

It is one thing to mentor the Iraqis on accountability, acquiring resources, performing maintenance and teaching them force protection considerations. It is a completely different ball game teaching them how to plan and execute a tactical mission.

U.S. Army MP 1LTs and SSGs

OVERVIEW

This lesson addresses aspects of employing the Iraqi Police Service and setting the conditions for a fully functioning organization that is capable of providing safe and secure living conditions for the people of Iraq. This lesson begins with discussing the critical task of developing a self-sustaining police force. It addresses the importance of employing Iraqi Police in joint operations with the Iraqi military. It culminates with a review of some tactics, techniques, and procedures for collective training. Collectively, these areas are important to the overall objective of building a police force that has legitimacy, effectiveness, and the trust of the Iraqi people.

13-1. DEVELOPING A SELF-SUSTAINING POLICE FORCE

Establishing an operationally effective self-sustaining police force is a major challenge. As the PTT mission continues, it is important to capture the successes, even the small victories, of the Iraqi Police. This small action will go a long way in building local credibility.

- Our Soldiers must understand that their mission is to assist the Iraqi Police as they develop procedures and a wide variety of skill sets. These skills will enable police to serve and protect the people of Iraq, enforce a common rule of law, and partner with Iraqi Army and Iraqi National Police units to maintain order in a very hostile and dangerous environment.

- The task of establishing an operational police service is a challenge. The PTT must ensure at a minimum the following:

  – A system for planning

  – A system to conduct collective training

  – Systems for assigning and tracking tasks

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- A system to identify and act on threats

- A method to disseminate information

- A system to coordinate with adjacent Iraqi Security Forces (such as a JCC)

- A system to assess the effectiveness of the police operation. For example, when assessing or observing an Iraqi Police cordon and search, questions should include these:
  - Do they have standard operating procedures for cordon and search?
  - Do they have a plan?
  - Are personnel assigned tasks?
  - Did they conduct mission analysis (that is, a thought process to plan the operation)?
  - Was a rehearsal executed?

- If the system works and meets all the requirements, then the Iraqi Police are good to go. PTTs mustn't become too attached to the way MPs do business and expect the Iraqi Police mirror all US methods. The key is to develop effective Iraqi procedures that Iraqi leaders create and maintain. Success will breed success.

The results of a joint mission including the Iraqi Police, the Iraqi Army, and a U.S. Army PTT.

- The military and police must gain the upper hand from the insurgents, criminal and illegal sectarian militias in order to set the conditions for political reconciliation, reconstruction, and future economic growth. If they fail to establish order and security, the Iraqi government could

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collapse which would result in a failed state that would have terrible consequences for the Iraqi people and US interests in this region.

13-2. EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

The Iraqi Police mission profile will continue to grow as the force becomes better trained, more proficient, and viewed as a legitimate public-service organization.

- Consider using a "building block" approach or a "crawl/walk/run" approach for developing the capabilities of the Iraqi Police to perform a variety of missions.

- First and foremost, the Iraqi Police must be fully trained in force protection and the defense of their stations.

- As effectiveness improves, continue to work toward greater proficiency in:
  - Community policing (interpersonal communication skills)
  - First responder duties
  - Checkpoint and entry control point operations
  - Patrol Distribution Plans that support 24-hour operations
  - JCC Operations
  - Intelligence collection
  - Treatment of detainees
  - Crime Statistics Analysis
  - Synchronization, fusion, processing, and information
  - Working with other Iraqi Police stations, National Police, and the military
  - Logistics
  - Personnel
  - Training
  - Setting Priorities of Work
- Police and military joint operations
  - Before MP Soldiers execute a PTT mission, it is important to understand that Iraqi Police may have more of a paramilitary flavor than Western police forces, and as the country continues to work toward a stable democratic society, the Iraqi Police will, in some instances, play a critical role in internal security.
  - As the government gains legitimacy and the balance of power shifts from insurgents to the host nation security forces, both police and the military forces will have their own mission profiles. Although clearly different, they will be mutually supporting.
  - Ultimately, the Iraqi Police mission will be to counter the criminal element, and the mission of the military will be to counter external and insurgent threats.

- Throughout Iraq, poor communication among local, district, and provincial police agencies is not uncommon. Ineffective communications also plague operations within and between the Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army, National Police, and other public-service organizations.

- PTTs must impress upon the Iraqi Police that developing and cultivating solid relationships with the neighboring police stations, district headquarters, and Iraqi Army units will provide long-lasting benefits for all agencies and improve communication and information sharing. The following are also high-payoff missions for joint operations:

  - Criminal intelligence collection and reporting

  - Support to cordon and search

  - Joint patrols with the Iraqi Army, National Police, and other Iraqi Security Forces

- Within Baghdad, there are Joint Security Stations (JSS) that exercise command and control of coalition and ISF in an area of responsibility which is often called a security district. Bringing together elements the different security forces facilitates command and control and synchronization for security operations. IPS should be manning the JSS on a 24/7 basis.

Progress toward self-sufficiency continues on many fronts, for example:

- Establishing the rule of Law.

- MOI-led assessments.

- Large scale Police operations.

Good examples of how police and the Iraqi Army work together are Operation Shurta Nasi or Operation Black Eagle:

Iraqi Police Conduct Operation Shurta Nasir to Clear Hit of Insurgents

Hit, Iraq—Nearly 500 Iraqi Police from Hit recently conducted Operation Shurta Nasir (Police Victory) meant to clear the town of terrorists and identify new locations for new police stations. Iraqi police planned and led this large scale operation, the first this year in western Iraq, which included nearly 100 recent graduates from the Jordanian International Police Training Academy. A combined force of 1,000 soldiers from 1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 7th Iraqi Army Division and U.S. Army soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 7th Mechanized Infantry, also known as Task Force 2-7, cordoned off the area to assist the police during the operation. Hit Police captured 13 known terrorists and one large weapons cache in raids and targeted searches through the city of roughly 100,000 inhabitants. It is believed that a number of terrorists went into hiding once the operation began. With the assistance of Police Transition Teams, the Iraqi Police also began construction of two new police stations to meet the demands of the growing department.

March 2007 Iraqi Police Operation to Clear Ramadi of Insurgents

According to the MNF-I website, in late March 2007, the Western Ramadi District Police conducted a massive police operation to clear insurgents. Brig. Gen. Khalil Ibrahim Hamadi, chief of the Ramadi District Police, personally led more than 500 policemen from several stations in the district as they conducted house to house searches. Police detained over 45

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suspected insurgents, confiscated propaganda material, and discovered several weapons caches. An insurgent planted IED killed one civilian and injured five. The wounded were transported by local citizens to a nearby Joint Security Station and then evacuated to a Coalition medical facility for further treatment. Overall, the Operation was a success.

13-3. TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR COLLECTIVE TRAINING

Given the dangers in Iraq and facilities available, success in employing the Iraqi Police force requires Soldier creativity in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for collective training. In most cases, units will not have the luxury of deploying to a training area to conduct training for the police. The requirement for force protection has a heavy impact on both the location of training and the number of police available to train. There are just too few safe havens where Soldiers can train the Iraqi Police.

- The PSMR and Commanders Assessment described in Lesson 8 form a solid baseline for gauging the IP station ability to conduct collective training.

- The role of the police in the community policing effort is essential to gaining the trust and cooperation of the local populace.

- Expanding the police role from the standard walking and driving patrols to incorporate tasks such as first responder initiatives and support to cordon and searches will, without a doubt, make the police more visible in their communities and garner the needed faith and trust of all who live in those communities.

- In most cases PTTs will, initially, conduct joint patrols with the Iraqi Police. As the Iraqi Police become more proficient, they will ultimately operate independently.

Actual cordon and knock with Iraqi Police in the lead.

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- Besides their unilateral patrols, Iraqi Police must be able to perform joint operations with all Iraqi Security Forces. This teamwork is essential to the success of the citizens of Iraq, the military, and the Iraqi Police. With this combined effort, the balance of power should shift from the insurgents to the Iraqi Security Forces.

- It is absolutely necessary to the security of the Iraqi people that their police become a self-sustaining force. Of equal importance is MPs' ability to understand the difference between how U.S. forces execute a task and how the Iraqi Police choose to conduct the same task. Our Soldiers must remember that as long as the Iraqi system is functional, it is OK.

- IP Station Commander will likely ask the PTT to provide resources that the MOI or province is supposed to provide for training. Help them address these issues systematically so they can resolve them on their own in the future.

Iraqi Police assembling equipment before a mission.

- Iraqi Police training is developed through a systematic approach. They gain the basic skills and then learn to work as part of a team. When the police reach this level, they are ready to operate as a functioning unit.

- A tremendous obstacle our PTTs will face is the lack of space (infrastructure) to conduct collective training, as well as few Iraqi Police to train. Often, barracks, training areas, storage rooms, and other police facilities are either not available or do not provide the required force protection. These facilities, where Iraqi Police are honing their skills, are attractive targets to insurgents.

- There are several ways to mitigate the force protection risks associated with collective training for the police. One technique is to consolidate the Iraqi Police at a safe haven. There are two options:
  - The police could train at the district level, Iraqi Army training areas, or even the training areas and ranges located on coalition forward operating bases.
  - To ensure maximum participation of the Iraqi Police, establish a support relationship with other stations and Iraqi Security Forces in the area of responsibility. Police could work together and conduct force protection at other stations during collective training. This option ensures that all Iraqi Police conduct collective training and builds the teamwork among Iraqi Police, National Police, and Army units.

- Collective training events require clearly defined tasks, conditions, and unit performance standards. Ensure that the IP leader is involved in the planning for collective training.

- Encourage your Iraqi counterparts to plan ahead and take advantage of collective training opportunities at the district and provincial level.

- Training validation is the key to gauging the level of training and providing feedback to the Iraqi Police and their leaders.

- PTTs have used mass-casualty or first responder exercises to validate police training. These are a great tool for building the confidence of the Iraqi Police and showing the community their capabilities.

LESSON 14
BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

While it requires lots of patience and can be frustrating, you need to keep one thing in mind: Your life may depend on the Iraqi Police officer you have just trained.

U.S. Army MP SFC and 1LTs

OVERVIEW

This lesson on best practices will present information gleaned from conventional Soldiers, Special Forces, and MPs operating in a counterinsurgency environment. The information in this lesson summarizes some of the key learning objectives covered in the previous 13 lessons to enable the PTT to do its mission. Additionally, PTTs should access the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website and download the "First 100 Days" Soldier's Handbook, which is designed to help Soldiers survive and keep their fellow Soldiers alive during the first 100 days of their deployment.

14-1. THE FIRST 100 DAYS

The first 100 days of any deployment are the most dangerous because that is when you know the least about your new environment. During this time the PTT really comes together. However, the insurgents, criminals, and terrorists in Iraq will use this time to their advantage and try to hurt you and gain the momentum. The CALL handbook is full of tactics, techniques, and procedures that the PTT can use to survive the first 100 days in Iraq.

- In this initial period, Soldiers and units adjust to the tactical environment, the enemy, and one another. CALL examined these first few months of combat from the Soldiers' perspective to determine what factors contributed most to their survival.

- CALL surveyed Soldiers in August 2006 and collected over 1,700 responses. The survey asked respondents to identify why Soldiers become casualties in the first months after deployment. The material in the handbook came from what Soldiers considered important in training, skills, and knowledge for those first 100 days, so PTTs will find this information invaluable as they get ready to deploy.

- The lessons the Soldiers came up with are simple **rules—often dismissed as too simple— but key to soldiering:**

  - Perform tasks to standard every time.

  - Learn all you can from the outgoing unit (the one your unit is replacing) and from the veterans of previous deployments in your unit.

    - Whom to trust and whom not to trust in your area of operation.

    - Changes in the everyday environment that signal or indicate a potential enemy attack.

    - Changes the enemy has made in his tactics (knowing this helps you anticipate future changes).

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- Maintain faith in your skills as a Soldier, your leaders, your fellow Soldiers, and your equipment, even after contact with the enemy results in casualties.

- Avoid becoming complacent. Do not fall into a routine with predictable patterns. Complacency leads to predictability and vulnerability. Wear protective gear. Vary tactics.

- Be decisive but not overly aggressive; conduct yourself as a professional accomplishing the mission.

- Develop the interpersonal and cultural skills to work effectively with IP and Iraqi citizens.

- Take care of yourself and your buddy.

- Plan primary and secondary routes out of stations. Ask soldiers to back brief you on the plan.

- Rehearse force protection if there are co-located stations or security elements.

- Remember: IP are not MP. They are not military units and are not equipped for combat. The PTT mission is to develop their capability for policing effectively in their communities.

- The Soldier's Handbook is divided into four sections outlined below. Each section begins with a quotation taken from the August 2006 survey. Taken as a whole, these comments bring home a tried-and-true fact: good soldiering makes good Soldiers, and good Soldiers make good units that are effective in combat.

  - Threats
    - IEDs
    - Snipers
    - Small arms fire

  - The Soldier
    - Complacency
    - Safety

  - Skills
    - Pre-deployment training
    - Cross-training
    - Prior combat experience; learn from veterans
    - Battle buddy

  - Knowledge
    - Know the environment
    - Rules of engagement
    - Intelligence
    - Language and cultural awareness

14-2. BEST PRACTICES FROM PREVIOUS PTTS

Build Rapport with the Iraqi Police Station Commander

The station commander holds the key to making the police station work. The PTT chief needs to quickly establish a peer relationship with him. Do not send a private to discuss matters with the station commander; this would insult him. He expects the leader of the PTT Team to interact with him. Some ways to build a good relationship with the station chief:

- Drinking chai (tea) when offered (as policy permits)

- Never correcting him in public or around subordinates

- In public always supporting his decisions and ideas

- Always treating him with respect and dignity

Use PTT lessons from other units. See example in Appendix E.

Choose the Right People

- PTTs can conduct a skill survey to identify any specialty skills that may be helpful (effective with Reserve Component and National Guard units). Soldiers who have a training experience relevant to the Iraqi Police training tasks and day-to-day operations are best suited for the PTT. Besides the principal PTT members discussed in Lesson 8, commanders should consider these recommendations when choosing personnel for the following duty positions:

  - **Arms room:** has worked in an arms room or an armory, has working knowledge of arms room operations and accountability practices

  - **Administration**: has worked in a PAC office or in an S-1 capacity or has ability to work independently

  - **Detention cell**: has a background in detention facility operations

  - **Intelligence or investigations**: has a background in MP investigations or has worked in an S2; an IPLO is good for this position

  - **Motor pool operations**: is a company mechanic, has working knowledge of motor pool

  - **Force protection**: a Soldier with a tactical background in perimeter defense and physical security

  - **Classroom instructor**: has knowledge of the subject, has practiced the material, and has patience

Arms room inspection.

Training Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures that Work

- The PTT mission is not a sprint, but rather a marathon. In reality, the Iraqi Police will remain and continue to fight the enemy long after the PTTs tour is over. An effective method of training to standard is the crawl-walk-run method of teaching individual students tasks, battle drills, collective tasks, and staff training exercises. This method develops well-trained leaders and units. Examples of these methods are described below. A thorough assessment of each police station's current situation must be conducted to determine where in the sequence your training should begin. Remember, at all levels of training, the advisor must be prepared to teach, coach, and mentor his counterpart.

  - **Crawl phase.** The trainer talks the students through the collective task step by step, describing what each individual or unit must do. The trainer

    - Describes the task, its purpose, and its importance

    - Describes the initiating cue, command, and/or combat in the context in which the training occurs

    - Describes the performance standards

    - Demonstrates the subtasks by conducting a walk-through of the collective task

    - Describes the performance measures of each step of the task in detail

    - Discusses the role of the supporting individual student task within the collective task

    - Completes the crawl phase by soliciting and answering questions from the students

  - **Walk phase.** The unit executes the collective task slowly, step by step. The trainer

    - Produces the cue that initiates the task

    - Requires each student to perform actions for each step at a slow pace

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- Coaches and critiques performances during each practice run

- Stops training when required, provides corrections, and continues to train

- Concludes the walk phase by practicing the task until the unit can perform it to standard without coaching

– **Run phase.** This is the graded phase. The trainer requires his students to perform the collective task at full speed, as if in combat. The run phase training normally takes place under realistic, wartime conditions. During this training phase, the trainer

- Produces the cue that initiates the task

- Allows the students to perform the task without interruption

- Requires the students repeat the task until they can perform it well at full speed

- Reverts to the walk phase if the students cannot perform the task correctly

- Varies the conditions under which the task is performed, such as using different terrain or switching personnel between duty positions

- Incorporates opposing forces and live fire to assist in performance feedback

- Conducts an after-action report to conclude the training

Policemen from one of Baghdad's police stations react to a mock mortar attack during a validation exercise.

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How to Develop and Certify Iraqi Police Trainers

- The PTT chief will be tasked with several jobs within the police station. One of those is to identify, certify, and develop police trainers within the station. The PTT chief should use the IPLO to help execute this task.

  - The first thing is to identify the tasks that Iraqi Police need to learn and maintain over the course of time. The IPLO should be very involved throughout the entire training process and use the **Police In-Service Training** tasks.

  - Once Iraqi Police trainers are identified, the PTT must recommend that trainer to the station commander. If the station commander approves of that trainer, the PTT begins the process of certifying that trainer.

  - Training should emphasize the basics with minimal information on specific methods. Lesson plans should be clear concise and easily translated into Arabic and include practical exercises and hands-on training.

  - Training certification programs were being established in theatre at the Adnon Palace in Baghdad. PTTs should check with their chain of command in theater to identify the correct process.

    The first thing we did when we started the training was to identify the five strongest Iraqi policemen and put them in charge of the five training sections. The five sections include logistics, training, operations, investigations, intelligence and maintenance of the detention facilities. Once these sections were up and running, we started to train them in areas they never had training in. They learned protection, checkpoint and search techniques, as well as how to conduct curfew patrols. They now do all three very well. As the training progressed, and friends were made, the Iraqi police started to bring us food and to share family photos with us. They have come a very long way in a very short time. It was evident in the way they conducted their drill today. It was a great experience for all.

    Army Staff Sgt, a Police Transition Team member

Do's and Don'ts While Conducting Classroom Training

- These do's and don'ts come from actual experiences in conducting classroom and field instruction, often with the use of an linguist.

  - Position the linguist by the subject's side (or a step back). This keeps the subject or target audience from shifting their attention or fixating on the linguist rather than on the leader.

  - Always look at and talk directly to the subject or target audience. Guard against the tendency to talk to the linguist.

  - Speak slowly and clearly. Repeat as often as necessary. Speak to the individual or group as if they understand English.

  - Be enthusiastic and employ the gestures, movements, and voice inflections that would normally be used before an English-speaking group. Considerable nonverbal meaning can be conveyed through voice and body movements.

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- Encourage linguists to mimic the delivery. Periodically check the linguists accuracy, consistency, and clarity.

- Request that Category II or III linguists sit in on a lesson or interview to ensure that the translation is not distorted, intentionally or unintentionally.

- Check with the audience whenever misunderstandings are suspected and clarify them immediately. Explain why the training is important for the IPS.

- Using the interpreter, ask questions to elicit answers that indicate whether the point is clear. If it is not clear, rephrase the instruction and illustrate the point differently.

- Use repetition and examples whenever necessary to facilitate learning. If the target audience asks few questions, it may mean that the instruction is not understood or the message is not clear to them. Use hands on training when possible.

- Ensure that linguists understand that they are valuable members of the team. Recognize them commensurate with the importance of their contributions. Protect linguists, as they are invaluable assets that may be targeted by the insurgency and other criminal elements.

An IPLO conducting classroom instruction at an Iraqi Police station.

- PTT instructors should not
  - Address the subject or audience in the third person using the interpreter. For example, avoid saying, "Tell them I'm glad to be their instructor." Instead, address the subject or

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audience directly by saying, "I am glad to be your instructor." Make continual eye contact with the audience. Watch them, not the interpreter.

- Make side comments to the linguists that are not interpreted. This action is rude and discourteous and creates the wrong atmosphere for communication.

- Be a distraction while the linguist is translating and the subject or target audience is listening.

- Pace, write on the blackboard, teeter on the lectern, drink beverages, or carry on any other distracting activity while the linguist is translating.

Gender Issues on PTTs

- Females may experience initial difficulties when interacting with Iraqi Police due to Iraqi cultural bias. Ensure that there is a male-female buddy system in place.

  - The use of female Iraqi expatriates to train female PTT members may provide them with the cultural understanding they need to function credibly in Iraq.

  - Unit members need to be aware of this and to train and advise accordingly.

  - Do not let cultural biases impact on accomplishing the mission; work it out.

Situational Awareness

- PTT teams must be adaptable. The operating area may include both large cities and rural areas. The team's tactics must adjust to the environment. Ensure that the team is up to date on the latest IED practices, threats, and situational awareness of the local population. The threats of attack and abduction are always present; practice the buddy system. Individual IP may have tips and information to share with the PTT about what they have heard on the street or in the community but may be reluctant to talk in front of other IP. Be approachable and have rapport with individual IP not just the station leadership. Know the area where you will be operating.

Police Must Be Out Among the People

- PTTs must continuously reinforce to the Iraqi Police Service the importance of being visible in their community. This helps to disrupt, identify, and eliminate the local insurgent leadership and infrastructure. It also serves to improve communication and confidence between the police and the local community. The main effort must focus on the population.

Cop on the Beat

- Patrolling is a basic tenet of policing, and in the past 100 years, all successful counterinsurgency operations have employed this fundamental law enforcement practice.

Information Requirements

- In addition to the PSMR, there are numerous information requirements the PTT must answer (station rosters, badges, detainee lists, etc.) for higher headquarters. It may take several visits to an IP to get all the information needed. Allow enough time for the IPS to gather this information and verify the accuracy.

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District commander interacting in the local community (visiting a local elementary school).

Summary of Best Practices and Lessons Learned

- Use the CALL for the latest updates and information on lessons learned from Iraq.

- Strive to ensure that all equipment necessary for the mission is obtained before deployment.

- Task-organize early and practice as teams before deployment; cross train within the team.

- Designate a company operations NCO for the PTT. This NCO acts as the hub and base of knowledge for PTT operations and bridges the gap with all PTT operations (MP Battalion, MP Brigade, and Brigade Combat Team).

- Leadership provides task and purpose that apply to that specific Iraqi Police station—each station is organized separately and has its own strengths and weaknesses.

- Build rapport with the station commander and local leaders and with BCT, IA, and NP leaders.

- Be ready to adjust your role at various IP stations based on their specific situation.

- Create a continuity book for each station to learn from those who were there before you.

- Create a hand receipt book for tracking equipment issued to the Iraqi Police by the PTT.

- Maintain contact with the unit you will be replacing and learn from them.

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LESSON 15
PRACTICAL EXERCISES

OVERVIEW

This lesson provides five practical exercises that should be used before deployment by the PTTs to help them understand the role of the PTT in the Iraqi environment. These exercises should be viewed and used as way to enhance learning and training and should not be used as the way to train.

15-1. PRACTICAL EXERCISES

- Practical Exercise 1: Communicating with the Iraqi Police Command

- Practical Exercise 2: Establishing Force Protection through Persuasion

- Practical Exercise 3: Conducting a Joint Patrol

- Practical Exercise 4: Designing a Training Schedule Using the PSMR

- Practical Exercise 5: Conducting a Training Class

Practical Exercise 1: Communicating with the Iraqi Police Command

Items needed:

- Squad in full personal protective equipment

- 1 person to act as an interpreter

- 3 personnel to act as Iraqi Police

- A training facility for military operations on urban terrain

This exercise is geared to help the PTT chief and team better understand some of the difficulties that will face them as a team. Using your linguist, you need to introduce yourself to the station command. The parameters for this exercise are that you cannot talk directly to the personnel acting as the Iraqi police. All conversations must be directed through the translator and the translator only. This will help the team learn the intricacies of dealing with the language and cultural barriers. Teams should rehearse how to operate within the cultural differences and customs of the Iraqi culture.

Training note: Ensure that customs and courtesies are followed during this exercise.

Practical Exercise 2: Establishing Force Protection through Persuasion

Items needed:

- Squad in full personal protective equipment
- 1 person to act as an interpreter
- 3 personnel to act as Iraqi Police
- A training facility for military operations on urban terrain

Using the same scenario as above, the PTT chief should establish force protection for the station using the Iraqi forces available and U.S. forces. Ensure that areas of responsibility are understood and that the orders are clear and concise and are given to members of the PTT team as well as the Iraqis. This will emphasize persuading the Iraqi chain of command to employ their forces in the proper security posture. You must remember that you are there to teach, coach, mentor, and train the Iraqis, not to order them. Begin enhancing your skills as an advisor by using your powers of persuasion.

Training note: The team chief should use his position as an advisor to help guide the police in improving their security position.

Practical Exercise 3: Conducting a Joint Patrol

Items needed:

- Squad in full personal protective equipment
- 1 person to act as an interpreter
- 4 to 6 personnel to act as Iraqi Police
- 4 M1114's (if available)
- 2 pickup trucks
- Roadway, preferably through a populated area
- Starting point and end point

Many might think that conducting a joint patrol would be relatively easy. In some cases this is true, but as you prepare to go downrange you should prepare yourself for the difficulties that lie ahead. Many of the problems that you will face stem from the unprepared ranks of the police themselves. Learning now how you can overcome these will make your time spent in the Iraqi theater of operations a lot easier.

Prepare yourself by understanding the parameters that the police have. If they do not know how to react to contact on a joint patrol, then teach them before going out. All of the classes you have been teaching with the help of your IPLO have been leading up to this point. It is your responsibility to ensure that the personnel are properly prepared for the joint patrols.

Training note: Address problems such as no fuel, poor preparedness of the police, and unavailable vehicles due to lack of maintenance.

Conduct exercises while on joint patrol to demonstrate the difficulty of communicating from your vehicle to the police to maintain C2.

How do you control the force should contact be made?

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Practical Exercise 4: Design a Training Schedule Using the PSMR

Items needed:

- PTT chief, assistant chief, and platoon leader

- Completed PSMR for reference

- Police In Service Task List with classes

To create a proper training plan, you need to find out what the station is lacking. The PSMR will help you establish the baseline needs of your station. Referencing it will help you devise an adequate training schedule for the station and police. You must thoroughly understand the PSMR and what it means. Once you have established the shortcomings of the station, you should research the necessary classes in the PSMR and begin to develop your training plan from this. Involving the PTT chief, assistant chief, and platoon leader together will ensure that all areas of training are being considered. In time you may discover that not all personnel are needed to help establish the training plan, but in the beginning it will help.

Another area that needs to be given thought is where the IPLO will come into play with this process. By conducting practical exercises with the top three for the PTT, you will begin learning to listen to one another so that when the IPLO is there to assist you it will not be foreign. IPLOs will be an important piece of this process while in theater, if you allow them, and can offer great ideas and conduct a lot of the training onsite.

Practical Exercise 5: Conducting a Training Class

Items needed:

- PTT

- Any material chosen by the PTT to be taught

- 1 Soldier to act as an interpreter

- Any relevant training aids

This area requires proper emphasis by the PTT: How to conduct a training class for people of a completely different culture who speak a different language. Designate one Soldier to be the instructor and one to be the translator. This exercise is geared more to the Soldier teaching the class than to the Soldiers receiving it. Have the Soldier present the class, using all possible training methods and training aids. The Soldier who is instructing should concentrate on using the linguist correctly (talking slowly and in short sentences while facing the class and not the linguist) and take the time to ensure that the other Soldiers comprehend the material. The instructor should then conduct a practical exercise in the related subject matter, all while still using the linguist.

APPENDIX A
THE IRAQI CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The Iraqi Criminal Justice System v.final

LAST UPDATED 4 JUN 2006

Appendix A: The Iraqi Criminal Justice System is an electronic file located on the Training Support Package CD.

APPENDIX B
POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS GUIDEBOOK

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

APPENDIX C
POLICE TRANSITION TEAM TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION PLAN

Appendix C: Police Transition Team Training and Certification Plan is an electronic file located on the Training Support Package CD.

APPENDIX D
PSMR CHECKLISTS AND COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT FORM

ICOMMANDERS COMMENTS	
Date:	
Assessment Type (Provincial Overall, District Rollup, Key City): **(INDICATE WHICH)**	**Projected Months to TRA Level 3:**
Province:	**Projected Months to TRA Level 2:**
District:	**Projected Months to TRA Level 1:**
Key City:	**#Station** (District HQ/Station):
IPS IN THE LEAD:	YES NO
# PTT (by type):	

Overall Assessment Comments

Overall Personnel Assessment (AUTH/ASSIGNED/PRESENT FOR DUTY)

Leadership Assessment

Training Assessment

Sustainment and Logistics Assessment

Facilities & Force Protection Assessment

Effects Assessment

Appendix D: PSMR Checklists and Commander's Assessment are electronic files in the Training Support Package CD.

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APPENDIX E
INTRODUCTION TO THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE AND POLICE TRANSITION TEAMS

Appendix E: Introduction to the Iraqi Police Service and Police Transition Teams is an electronic file in the Training Support Package CD.

Appendix F

Biometrics and the PTT

Overview

This lesson will provide the PTT the needed understanding of how Biometrics and "mapping of the population" will provide unequaled results when conducting routine police operations or vetting IPs as they are the direct counterpart during daily operations. This lesson begins with discussing the overall view of Biometrics in the ITO and then transitions to the two pieces of equipment most readily used by the PTT.

F-1. Biometrics

The use of biometrics in the ITO was first introduced to help aid in the fight against the IED threat. Evidence that was left and or discarded at the crime scene was rich in clues that criminal investigators knew how to exploit. Trace evidence, in the form of latent fingerprints, was lifted off from the evidence and profiles were initiated. The latent fingerprints were and are digitally scanned and sent into various databases. The databases available for MNF-I/MNC-I forces are the Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS), Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), and the Iraqi Automated Fingerprint Identification System (I-AFIS). The vehicles used to get the latent finger print data to these systems are the Biometric Automated Tool Set (BATS) and its hand held counter-part the Handheld Interagency Identification Detection Equipment (HIIDE). The information that is provided by the PTT through the biometric databases is then analyzed by the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) for complete dossiers and targeting folders.

F-2. Tools available for the PTT

The Biometric Automated Tool Set (BATS) is an accurate, timely, and efficient automated personnel enrollment and tracking system that collects biometric data. The primary tools are the computer laptop, iris scanner, and tactical camera. It incorporates iris scan, fingerprints, photo, and biographical information of any individual and store the collected data onto a central server located on a secure network. The system components for the BATS include:

- CF-74 Toughbook (laptop)

- Crossmatch ID 442R (finger prints – detainee enrollment)

- Crossmatch 300 Verifier (fingerprints – ECP, TCP)

- Canon A520 Camera

- Pier 2.7 Iris Reader

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Handheld Interagency Identification Detection Equipment (HIIDE) is a portable, battery operated handheld multi-modal (iris, fingerprint, facial photo, biographic contextual information) biometric device that can support biometric identification tasks and biometric enrollment tasks. The HIIDE is interoperable with the BATS. The system components for the HIIDE include:

- HIIDE Series handheld device

- 2 Hot-Swappable Lithium ION rechargeable batteries

- Power Supply, external battery charger, spare battery

- Pelican transit case

- Pen / Stylus

F-3. Practical Use for the PTT

The PPT will have BATS at the company level for central management of all personnel they have enrolled into the system. The HIIDE can be uploaded with 9,000 dossiers from a specified watch list and has the capability to enroll 1,000 additional personnel. The PTT will travel with the HIIDE on daily operations with their counterparts in the IPS. Some of the operations that are directly linked to the PTT are IP screening, presence operations, local populace control (mapping the population) and seizure operations. Upon completion of the aforementioned operations the HIIDE can then be plugged into the BATS and the information uploaded in the database. If there are any new enrollees they are sent into the ABIS and will remain there for future reference.

- The biometric data gathered is stored for future incidents from either insurgents or IP that turn against coalition forces

- The systems will let the PTT on the ground identify recaptured detainees

F-4. Theater Integration and CONUS Reach back Capability

The PTT mission is just one component of the Biometrics and Forensics system that is available in the ITO. Biometrics is leveraged by the war-fighter, specified Task Forces, Detainee Operators, Criminal Investigations Division (CID), and the theater biometrics and forensics labs. The theater labs that will exploit the biometrics gathered from the PTT and the other units list are:

- The Law Enforcement (GS) Forensics Lab

- The Latent Print Lab – Camp Fallujah

- The Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell

- DTK CBRN Lab

The following figure graphically depicts the flow of biometrics and forensics throughout the theater that is centrally managed at the Corps level and supported by National Systems located in CONUS.

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Integration of Forensics and Biometrics

Legend

- Labs
- Theater Internment Facility
- Combat Arms
- Police Transition Teams
- Military Police
- Division Holding Area
- CID/Law Enforcement Program
- Task Forces

National Systems
- ABIS
- IAFIS
- NGIC

Theater Systems
- HIIDE
- BATS
- I-AFIS

Forensics Capabilities

- Ballistics Analysis
- Latent Print Analysis
- Forensics Databases
- DNA
- Collection Teams
- Document Exploitation

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ACRONYM LIST

ACAD	Academy
ADCON	Administrative Control
AIF	Anti Iraqi Forces
AO	Area of Operation
AQI	Al Qaida in Iraq
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BPC	Baghdad Police College
BPOCC	Baghdad Police Operations Coordination Center
BRT	Basic Recruit Training
BST	Border Support Team
BTT	Border Training Teams
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CCCI	Central Criminal Court of Iraq
CED	Criminal Evidence Dept.
CF	Coalition Forces
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COR	Council of Representatives
CMATT	Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPATT	Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
CP/M	CPATT/M
CQM	Close Quarters Movements
CRD	Central Records Dept.
CTSO	Counter Terrorism Special Operations
DA PEO	Department of the Army Program Evaluation Office
DBA	Data Base Administrator
DBE	Directorate of Border Enforcement
DCP	Detainee Collection Point
DETN	Detention Facility
DHQ	District HQ
ECD	Estimated Completion Date
ECP	Entry Control Point
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Detection

ERF	Emergency Response Force
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
ESAC	Enhanced Security Assistance Concept
FOC	Fully Operational Capable
FPS	Facility Protection Service
GC/C	Grand Crimes Chamber
GOI	Government of Iraq
HESCO	Type of Barrier
HPS	Highway Police Station
HR	Human Resources
I/R	Internment/Resettlement
IA	Iraqi Army
IAF	Iraqi Armed Forces
IAG	Iraqi Assistance Group
ICO	Iraqi Corrections Officer
ICS	Iraqi Correctional System
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGFC	Iraqi Ground Forces Command
IJ	Investigative Judge
IJF	Iraqi Joint Forces
IN/MP	Infantry/Military Police
INP	Iraqi National Police
IP	Iraqi Police
IPA	International Police Advisor (old IPLO)
IPFSR	Iraqi Police Facilities Station Report
IPLO	International Police Liaison Officer
IPS	Iraqi Police Services
IPT	International Police Trainer
IqAF	Iraqi Air Force
IRMO	Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces (IA, NP, & IPS)
ISOF	Iraqi Special Operations Forces
IT	Information Technology
JAM	Jaysh al-Mahdi
JCC	Joint Communication Facility
JHQAST	Joint Headquarters Advisory Support Team
JI	Judicial Investigator
JIPTC	Jordan International Police Training Center
L&O	Law and Order

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LE	Law Enforcement
LFX	Live Fire Exercise
LPS	Local Police Station
MACOM	Major Command
MCO	Major Combat Operations
MNC-I	Multi National Corps–Iraq
MND	Multi-National Division
MND-B	Multi-National Division Baghdad
MND-C	Multi-National Division Center
MND-CS	Multi-National Division Center South
MND-N	Multi-National Division North
MNF	Multi National Force
MNF-I	Multi National Force–Iraq
MNF-W	Multi-National Force West
MNSTC-I	Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOE	Measurement of Effectiveness
MOF	Minister of Finance
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MOITT	Ministry of Interior Transition Team
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MOUT	Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MSC	Major Subordinate Commands
MTT	Military Training Team
NCC	National Command Center
NCC	National Communication Center
NCTF	National Counter Terrorism Force
NJOC	National Joint Operations Center
NMC	Non-mission Capable
NP	National Police
NPTT	National Police Transition Team
OHQ	Other HQ
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
ONS	Operational Needs Statement
OPCON	Operational Control
OPT	Operational Planning Team
P3	Police Partnership Program
PAC	Personnel Administration Center
PBIED	Pedestrian-borne Improvised Explosive Device

PCO	Procurement Contract Office
PDOP	Provincial Director of Police
PDSS	Pre-deployment Site Survey
PEB	Provincial Emergency Battalion
PETL	Police Essential Task List
PFF	Police Function Facility
PHQ	Provincial HQ
PIC	Provincial Iraqi Control
PIO	Police Intelligence Operations
PJCC	Provincial Joint Operations Center
PMO	Provost Marshal Office
POC	Point of Capture
POE	Point of Entry
POI	Program of Instruction
PPS	Patrol Police Station
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSF	Police Support Facility
PSMR	Police Station Monthly Report
PTT	Police Transition Team
RSO	Regional Security Office
RSO	Reception Staging and Onward Movement
SA	Situational Awareness
SAF	Small Arms Fire
SCIRI	Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SOI	Signal Operating Instructions
SOI	Sphere of Influence
SPTT	Special Police Transition Team
TIP	Transition Integration Program
TPS	Traffic Police Station
TRA	Transition Readiness Assessment
TSP	Training Support Package
TT	Transition Team
USAMPS	United States Army Military Police School
VBIED	Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device

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ASSIST PROTECT DEFEND