

In the past few years ^a the spate of publications has lent

fuel to the fires of interest in intelligence and specifically ^{Books and articles} the work of ^{Contribution of the code breakers} ~~intelligence~~ in World War II. Some of the ^{books} publications

are David Kahn's, "The Code Breakers", Group ^{Captain's Winton} ~~captains Winton-~~ ^{Bottom's} ~~bottoms~~, "Ultra", and The Bodyguard of Lies by Cave Brown. As

a result of these ^{books} ~~publications~~ and stimulation of ^{the} interest of historians a question which is frequently asked is, "What part did radio intelligence, ^{code breaking} or, more specifically ~~ULTRA~~ play in the strategic decisions ~~of~~ controlling World War II as it was

fought in North Africa, Italy, and ~~the~~ ^{the} European theater of ~~operations~~

Obviously, for the historian at least, if it can be determined ^{radio intelligence or code breaking supplying information for} that ~~Ultra~~ played a significant part in ~~these~~ strategic decisions

then much of what we currently know ^{the} ~~as~~ history of World War

II and its major ^{decisions and} ~~battles and decisions~~ needs to be re-evaluated

in light of the role played by ^{this information} ~~Ultra or ultra~~ intelligence

^{the knowledge of which has} ~~heretofore been suppressed.~~

In December of 1976 the American Historical Association held its annual meeting. One of the seminars presented in that meeting dealt with codebreaking and intelligence in the European Theater in World War II. That session was chaired by Arthur L. Bunker, ~~and~~ a major paper, "The Significance of Code Breaking and Intelligence in Allied Strategy and Tactics", was presented by

David Kahn. Comment on ~~the~~ Mr. Kahns paper was presented by Telford Taylor, Dr. Harold C. Deutch, and Jürgen Rowher. ~~Rowher~~ also presented an additional paper on the effect of codebreaking on German submarine warfare. It was concluded by that forum

that the role of code breaking in intelligence in the European Theater during World War II was not of significance to dictate the ~~necessity for~~ rewriting the various histories of the War.

One of the participants of the panel, Telford Taylor, had much greater direct knowledge of the effect of code breaking on the War than did any of the other participants. Telford Taylor,

later Brigadier General Taylor, began an association with the Special Intelligence Branch of the War Department General Staff in 1942 after an earlier distinguished career as a lawyer with ~~various various departments and agencies such as the~~ Federal Communications Commission. The seminar which was earlier mentioned

was attended by a number of National Security Agency ~~and the~~ presence of General Taylor excited considerable interest in the seminar and planted the seed for further consultation with the

General on the role of ~~code breaking~~ in World War II. Consequently,

on April 7, 1977, Genral Taylor with an old friend, Brigader
Tiltman, UK Army, ^{ed} ~~was asked to~~ ^{of NSA} present a commentary on the
origins, organization, and use of Ultra with the ^{British and} United States
Forces in the ~~European~~ Theater during World War II. ^P General
Tiltman presented preliminary remarks to the commentary by
Genral Taylor based on his earlier experiences with Ultra
or the ~~ENIGMA~~ Enigma. It is also notable that ^{among} ~~attended~~ in-
dividuals attending the commentary were former members
of the US Army who had participated at Bletchley Park in
Hut Six ~~on~~ the examination and decryption of traffic enciphered
in ~~the~~ Enigma by the German forces. ~~Brigader Tiltman provided~~
~~background~~ in providing background for General Taylors remarks
described the Government Code and Cipher School and its fo-
mation in 1920 ^{by the British} from the Navy Cryptanalytic Section 40 OB.
Commander, later Sir Edwin ~~Heath~~ Travis, of Travis Trophy fame, ^{was one of its chief}
^{and} ~~became~~ chief ^{at} ~~of~~ Bletchley Park. ^{Bletchley Park} was largely concerned with the
military side of things. The largest part of the ^{BP} effort was
devoted to the solution of Enigma. ^{The} breaking of Enigma key
for Army and Air was carried out in Hut Six, while the Navy
was done in Hut Eight. What was derived from the decrypted
text was handled in Hut Three. Brigader Tiltman described
two notable events ^{in his memoirs}, the arrival of the large US Army con-
tingent in 1943, ^{for work in Hut Six} and the earlier visit of Sinkov, and Rosen
of the Army, and Currier and Weeks ^{Signal Intelligence Service of the Navy OP 20G} ~~from the~~ Navy who arrived
bringing the solution ^{of} ~~to~~ the Japanese PURPLE machine.

who then spent
~~Spending~~ a couple of months with the British at Bletchley Park
before
 a few months Pearl Harbor making " a magnificent gesture of
 cooperation". According to Brigader Tiltman, it was sometime
 before the British would reciprocate by giving the solution of
 the Enigma to the US. Their hesitation was primarily based
 on the fear of loss of the valuable intelligence source.

General Taylor dates his association with Special Intelligence
Branch
 from about October 1942 to June 1945. By way of preliminary
describe his association
 qualifications General Taylor ~~was~~ with the Federal Communications
 Commission as the General Counsel in his last assignment before
also was
 joining Special Branch. He had some contact with communications
 through organizations like the Federal Broadcast Monitoring Service
of the FCC
 which intercepted foreign broadcasts and prepared analyses of
 those broadcasts. He also served on the Law Committee of the
 Defense Communications Board, later the War Communications
 Board. He was aware *this is* in March 1942 *that* the Special Branch *existed*
of *was* composed of mostly lawyers of his acquaintance. *According to* Mr.
Secretary of War
 Stimson and his deputy Mr. McCloy, decided after Pearl Harbor
if *been*
 that more advantage had ~~to be~~ taken of the material being
from warning would have been ancient
 received from Arlington Hall. In order to achieve an organization
the better advantage
 which would assist in obtaining ~~those goals~~, Mr. McCloy's law
 partner ~~was~~, Mr. McCormick, was invited to Washington to study
Mr McCormick recommended a
 the situation. After a few months, Mr. McCloy agreed that the
Capable of intelligence collection
 best solution was an expanded Special Branch. The officer in-

was Colonel Carter Clarke, a Regular Army officer of long standing and Al McCormick acting as his deputy who had also been commissioned as a ~~Colonel~~ General. Carter Clarke, and Mr. McCormick were good fellows a strange pair. Carter Clarke was described as a hard nosed

army officer who "knew where the bodies were buried", and was very organized. McCormick on the other hand had a way of *from his Wall Street law practice* with words and much presence ~~and~~ was able to spend considerable amounts of time working on preparation of the intelligence summaries which presented materials from Arlington Hall. *to the upper echelons of the* Mr.

McCormack in his studies of the information being furnished ~~has narrowly~~ concluded the basic problem was the lack of analysis of the ~~information~~ ^e

information. Intercept was literally furnished on a message
text basis and no attempt was made to relate or fuse the in-

formation the various message with each other, or with other
information. And worse, from his viewpoint, of the special

~~branch~~ the information received from Arlington Hall was dis-

tributed from a source that had no prestige ~~or~~ carried little weight. ^{upper 8 C. C. McCormick} Mr. McCormick ~~said about~~ ^{set} ~~xxx~~ ^{set} about acquiring the

prestige and performing the analysis and summations of the

materials. These summaries came to be known as "MAGIC". Of

course the summaries at this point were exclusively based on

Japanese diplomatic traffic. General Taylor described officers

of the Special Intelligence Branch as ignorant of Arlington Hall

and its activities and clearly the most salient point to be

made about the then active situation was the enormous amount

of jealousy which existed between various segments of the Army

the Army and the Navy, and other ~~entities~~ ^{organizations} associated with intelligence. In illustration of the sort of difficulty which existed between services, General Taylor described his assignment by ~~XXXXX~~ Colonel Clarke to discover the "real" ~~XXXXXX~~ details of the Savo Island engagement between the Japanese, Australians, and American forces in the Pacific. After analysis of the various press communiques, he was able to determine that the US fleet had been sunk one and a half times, while the Japanese had been sunck three times. This delighted Colonel Clarke since it ~~proved~~ ^{threw} the lack of factual information and thereafter ~~Major~~ ^{the} Taylor's reputation was made. It was shortly after this that his assignment to England to study the English ~~work~~ ^{operation} was made shortly after New Years Day in 1943. ~~to~~ ^{From soon until} March of 1943, Major Taylor spent the time familiarizing himself with the activites going on at Arlington Hall. Not to become and ~~analyst~~ ^{to develop} but ~~have~~ an appreciation of the sort of work which went into the analysis of codes and ciphers. In April of 1943, General Taylor, William Friedman, and Al McCormick ~~went~~ ^{went} to England for the purpoe of establishing ~~liaison~~ ^{closer} and exchanging technical information ~~on a closer basis~~ ^{with the British}. Initially, a rather full orientation ~~was accomplished by~~ ^{as shown to} the three. After ~~three~~ ^{three} full weeks of orientation it was decided that Taylor would remain in England where he would be given full ~~acess~~ ^{access} to British materials being produced ~~and he would then~~ and he would then prepared the necessary analysis and send a commentary to Washington. Taylor was soon joined Reginald Randolph who

took over the task of analyzing traffic at Berkley Street whereupon Taylor then went out to Bletchley Park and from then until the Spring of 1944 the main task of the American unit

in Hut Three and at ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Berkly Street was to feed Washington with intelligence materials. *Hut Three was augmented with* A need also arose

and resulted in the supply of *assist* American officers who spoke German to the Hut Three operation. *the* *Ther*

Q Chief of Radio Intelligence in Europe. At the same time, Colonel Beecher and the Arlington Hall boys

arranged to have a detachment of Americans join at BP under

Major William Bundy to work in Hut Six. *in engine analysis* The main lesson

mel learned by Col McCormick and General Taylor while at

BP was the enormous amount of work involved in producing the information on which intelligence *was based* ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ the intelligence

~~needed from traffic intercepted.~~ Much credit in the production

of intelligence ~~from the analysis going on in Hut Six~~ was due

to the "backroom boys" who for example, helped in *often of C. A.* the reading

of certain messsages by producing the right ~~xxxx~~ grid information

for an understanding/ *for a translation key of the text.* At the same time some attention was payed

to intelligence value of messages which had previously been ~~en-~~

rypted in the enornous flow of information from Hut Six and

some decisions were made *the* *Study was needed* on priorities. *#* By the spring of 1944

it was evident that there was going to be a considerably larger

~~xxxx~~ number of headquarters requiring Ultra than heretofore. A

fact which made distribution correspondingly difficult was that

Both a all of the distribution for the Army/Air Force was on a direct

basis. Distribution in the case of the British went to officers

who had formerly served at BP to an Army and ^Air force level. They were use to that type of information and were aware of the certification of the information. The Americans on the other hand had not the same corps of officers and were un-^{my}aware of the source of the intelligence, and generally lacked knowledge of the authenticity of Ultra information. Consequently, ^athe decision was taken after consultation with the War Department, to have ^{an}officers assigned to each major US army and air force ~~a special intelligence officer~~ whose job it would be to brief the commander and his deputy and ~~the~~ G-2 on intelligence and to make sure that it did not sink into the swamp and that ^{the Ultra information} ~~it~~ was handled with ^{absolute} security. The decision to place officers at each of the major commands of the ~~American~~ Forces to handle Ultra resulted in a steady flow of officers both from the United States and England who were briefed ^{by} on the various aspects of ^{acutely} Ultra and its safety and ^{requirements} handling. It was ^{that} as this point Taylor recalls that he met Winterbottom ^{of control for Ultra} who performed the same functions on the British side.

~~★~~ Genral Taylor remarked on the point of whether Ultra had contributed to winning the War that he personnally could not think o of any single incident in which it made a strategic difference. He concluded that Ultra ~~that~~ had two significant values; the first was that it was of great value defensively, and the second was served as a major lubricant in the decision process. He also judged that the greater outpouring of Ultra information

came after the Germans had lost the strategic^{in Europe} and tactical^{of the} advantage. In extension "lubricant" thesis, General

Taylor called to mind the use of Ultra in various cover

plans and his strong conviction that if it had not been for

Ultra intelligence the Battle of the Atlantic would have been

a much closer thing than it was!

General Taylor concluded that while no single event could

be pointed to with any certainty as having been resolved

because of Ultra it certainly had made a general contribution

to much of the course of the War and had served a ^{very} useful purpose.