From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Caspar Bowden Date: Sun, 27 Oct 1996 04:46:46 -0800 (PST) Subject: ANNOUNCE: Scientists for Labour encryption and escrow conf, Nov 14th,"Liberty on the Line" Message-ID: <01BBC404.3894A6C0@qualia.dircon.co.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Full details: http://www.shef.ac.uk/~sfl/meetings/itconf.html PLEASE DISTRIBUTE AND LINK TO YOUR WEB-SITE: Scientists for Labour - IT & Communications Group Conference on Information Superhighway Policy --------------------------------------------------------------------- "Liberty on the Line : Opportunities and Dangers of the Superhighway" --------------------------------------------------------------------- Chaired by Geoff Hoon MP, Shadow Minister for IT Thursday 14th November 1996, 9am - 5:30pm MSF Centre, 33-37 Moreland Street, London EC1 (Angel tube) --------------------------------------------------------------------- For further details or to reserve a place contact: Caspar Bowden, SfL IT & Comms co-ordinator (qualia@dircon.co.uk) The debate over Internet regulation in the UK has focused mainly on censorship, but the standards for control of "encryption keys", currently being formulated nationally and internationally, will lay the permanent foundations on which the Information Society is built. The long-term implications for civil liberties have received little public attention outside the Internet community. Scientists for Labour is hosting a conference to look at the data protection and economic issues arising from the integration of digital signatures, electronic copyright management, and digital cash. What kind of regulatory apparatus will allow rapid growth of an information economy, but prevent misuse of personal data ? *) New government proposals on "Trusted Third Parties", which aim to preserve law enforcement and national security capabilities for warranted interception of communications (to fight crime and terrorism), place only procedural not technical limits on the scope of Superhighway surveillance. *) Super-computers have the potential to conduct random electronic "fishing expeditions" against the whole population. Telephone and letter interception cannot be automated : digital monitoring can. Will legal safeguards against abuse offer adequate protection in perpetuity, or can cryptographic protocols be designed which make Superhighway mass- surveillance impossible, while still allowing criminals to be targeted ? Computer and legal policy experts will explain the principles of the different technologies, and the international and commercial context, in a search for interdisciplinary solutions. The attendance fee is ?5 (?2 unwaged ; SfL members free) For press information please contact : Bobbie Nicholls, SfL Press Officer, Fax: 01235 529172 The Scientists for Labour home page (http://www.shef.ac.uk/~sfl/) has information on how to join SfL, or contact the Secretary : Dr Robin Walters (R.G.Walters@shef.ac.uk) Programme --------- 9.00-9.30 Registration SfL members free, non-members ?5 (?2 unwaged) 9.30-9.45 Geoff Hoon MP Introduction 9.45-10.45 Dr.John Leach Cryptography and developments in Trusted Third Party policy 10.45-11.45 Dr.Ross Anderson Some problems with the Trusted Third Party programme 11.45-12.00 Coffee 12.00-12.30 Simon Davies Escrow and the hidden threat to human rights and privacy 12.30-1.00 Elizabeth France (Data Protection Registrar) 1.00-2.00 Buffet lunch 2.00-2.45 Prof. Charles Public policy and legal aspects of Intellectual Oppenheim Property Rights 2:45-3.30 Alistair Kelman Electronic Copyright Management : Possibilities and Problems 3.30-3.45 Tea 3:45-4:45 Andrew Graham Will the Information Superhighway enhance or diminish democracy ? 4.45-5.30 Panel Session Discussion (inc. Robert Schifreen) --------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Adam Back Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 06:21:11 +0800 To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net Subject: LSE UK crypto politics conference Message-ID: <199705202203.XAA00956@server.test.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain I went to the conference in London on Monday organised by PI (Privacy Intl.) and GILC (Global Internet Liberty Campaign.) Speakers were DTI representatives, Whit Diffie, Phil Zimmermann, Ross Anderson, Carl Ellison, IBM UK representative, a few people from LSE (London School of Economics, who hosted the conference). I don't take notes, but here's a list of points I considered interesting. If you want details on any issues I can give more detail as required. If anyone else reading went and did take notes they might be able to attribute quotes a little more accurately. I understand there's supposed to be an audio transcript on the web http://www.privacy.org/pi/conference/dti might be a good place to look. Government Presentation of proposal 1) David Hendon and Nigel Hickson from DTI presented the DTIs arguments. They argued that this is a green paper only, the government has changed, the document was partly the views of the previous government and partly the views of the DTI. This I viewed as an attempt to deflect criticisms, as they could not specify what has changed, and were not planning to change the document. (The new government have not looked at the issue at all). The labour party had a much more reasonable policy they published before they got in power; but it remains to be seen whether they will stick to this or whether the CESG/GCHQ will lobby them to adopt GAK/TTPs etc., which are in the CESGs interests. They claimed to not want to escrow signature keys, but only to escrow encryption keys. (The wording in the document clearly states that they wish to escrow all keys as a condition of being a TTP). They said they had many comments on this issue. (Clearly the only use for escrowing signature keys is to allow forgeries. Why would the government want to forge messages from citizens? To provide law enforcement access they only need access to private encryption keys.) The DTI said much of licensing requirements for TTPs were modelled after banking regulations. Architectural and Technical 2) Ross Anderson gave the example of the health service's experience with CESG/GCHQ foisting flawed cryptography solution CASM on it (complete with key escrow and secret algorithm Red Pike). The BMA (British Medical Assoc), and even DoH (Dept of Health) rejected this `offer'. Ross is a computer security advisor to the BMA. He also debunked many of the lies spread by GAK proponents, and gave a potted history of the behind the scenes GAK activities in the UK and Europe. He also said that CASM was now the laughing stock of Europe in the crypto community, and that in response the CESG had allocated a new project manager and given CASM a cosmetic name change to CLOUD COVER. 3) Whit Diffie argued about the importance of privacy in the information society. Explained how PK crypto removed the previous problems with centralised key distribution services. 4) Phil Zimmermann gave his usual talk about the ethical case for free use of crypto. Civil rights workers, resistance fighters against governments with poor civil rights records, etc. Also made the point that the backdoor into crypto the DTI appeared to be pushing would allow the current government to abuse it's power to stay in government. Legal and Commercial 5) Peter Sommer, LSE made some points on legal topics digital signature legislation, etc. 6) Carl Ellison, Cybercash argued against the centralised trust model, and against X509. Arguing instead for distributed trust models particulary Rivest's SDSI and his own work on distributed trust. Carl argued that trust should represent permissions, and be administered by the interested parties. (eg your bank gives you a key with permission to draw money from your bank account, not some government licensed TTP). 7) IBM (in the form of Peter Dare, IBM UK) sold out to GAK. Peter Dare's presentation started with a list of things he liked about the DTI proposal, then a few minor criticisms (very respectfully put), and as a punchline to his talk presenting IBM GAKware (forget the product name) and his talk finished with a sales pitch for this product. At the end of which Whit Diffie shouted out from the audience can Carl Ellison have equal time for a cybercash sales pitch! International 8) John Dryden representing the OECD gave a presentation of the OECD guidelines. (T-shirt and jeans odd the rest of the government and business types wore suits.) He explained the guidelines as a significant relaxation. The guideline referring to key escrow was changed to a `may' escrow keys rather than a `should' escrow keys. Said most of the time spent during the OECD SOGIS discussions was spent arguing about key escrow. He considered the guidelines a significant step forward. The guidelines are non-binding recommendations. He said 28 countries signed up, which should indicate that their countries representatives found the guidelines consistent with national laws. 9) Alistair Kelman, visiting position at LSE Made the point (as several others had) that a general principle should be that trust should mirror existing user trust relationships. People do not trust government, nor the sort of large organisations the DTI is clearly envisaging as suitable TTPs. He argued that GPs (General Practitioners, family doctors) would be suitable candidates as trusted members of the local community. Kelman also seemed to be arguing that keys should handed to the user, and not generated by the user. I queried him about this afterwards, as it is clearly a bad security model, and he said he considered it a usability issue, generating keys being too difficult for the user. I don't agree, the usability is a matter to be solved by good software, not by centralising key generation. Civil Rights and Privacy 10) Simon Davies, PI argued that case for commonality of interests between business and privacy issues. 11) David Banisar, EPIC talked about the history of the US clipper series, and raised the topic of digital telephony bill (where the government requested access to first 1% and then reduced simultaneous wiretaps). Following up from this someone from the floor claimed that the telephone networks are tappable without the phone company (BT, British Telecom's) cooperation. Indeed the person making this claim (who claimed comprehensive experience and knowledge of phone routing hardware) said that BT would not even be aware that the tap had taken place. Several others in the audience confirmed this was the case. Whit Diffie said that he had not heard this claim, and that it was not the case to his knowledge in the US. The person making the claim said that he knew the switches used in the US were the same (and quoted the switch model), and so he didn't see why not. The question was raised as to why digital telephony was necessary at all with this type of phone switch being used in the US. Law Enforcement 12) The guy from NCIS (National Criminal Intelligence Service) didn't turn up because he had to go to hospital due to an eye problem. The chair, Prof Ian Angell, LSE suggested this might have been due to looking through too many keyholes :-) Panel and Open Discussion Panel: Carl Ellison, legal advisor to GLIC (forget name), Nigel Hickson DTI, someone from TIS (?) who spoke too quitely. Chair was Caspar Bowden, Scientists for Labour. Most of the panel session consisted of arguments directed at the DTI and questions for Nigel Hickson representing the DTI. Hickson had made jokes about the hostility he was expecting. He appeared quite competent at avoiding answering questions directly where this suited him. Each panelist was given the opportunity to summarise their position. Nigel Hickson claimed the main motivation for the proposal was to encourage user and business confidence in digital signatures for business purposes, and thereby to promote electronic commerce. He used this as justification for the banning of un-licensed TTPs. Several comments from the floor that it would be better to let the market decide, and to allow unlicensed certification authorities, key servers etc to continue unmolested, and in competition with GAKked government licensed services. Hickson also claimed key escrow was a small part of their consideration. (I'm sure it's true that this is the part they wish to downplay as this is the part which causes the majority of resistance.) The question was raised as to whether the DTI understood that the TTP system could be trivially bypassed by the criminals it was supposedly designed to catch. An example given was that anyone wishing to bypass could use the sigature key helpfully certified by the TTP to authenticate non escrowed keys they generated outside the TTP system. The point that there were many other subliminal channels was raised also. Nigel Hickson acknowledged this, but said in defence that some criminals are stupid, that criminals must talk to non-criminals. Someone put it to Hickson "What is the worst thing that could possibly happen if the government did nothing?" ie what if the government didn't legislate anything, ie why doesn't the government get the fuck out of the way so that business can get on with commerce unimpeded. Several business people put it to the DTI that they didn't need any `help', and that the regulations had held up electronic commerce for too long already. Several people argued that business is most interested in authentication, and not in confidentiality. So for business purposes (which what after all the DTI claim is the main reason for the paper, and the DTI being after all the `Department of Trade and Industry' and having a mandate to further the interests of UK businesses), they could achieve what they wanted without bringing escrow into the argument at all, as they have acknowledged that they will now not be requiring copies of secret part of signature keys. People argued against the high cost of becoming a TTP. The point was raised that it should be SME (Small to Medium-sized Enterprises) which are encouraged in electronic commerce. Also that many internet innovations start as small or even one man consultancies. Several asked whether the paper should be re-written as a result of comments before being presented to the new government, as the comments if listened to would remove most of the current content. Also the question was asked as to whether the deadline for comments could be extended beyond end of May. No substantive answer was given to either of these two questions. My conclusions The DTI didn't really clarify their position much, most of the contentious stuff (mandatory licensing, key escrow, financial barriers to becoming a TTP) there were no substantive replies to from the DTI, other than that they were collating the comments. They said they would present the Labour science minister/labour government with the green paper unmodified together with the comments. (And one presumes a few spooks from GCHQ/CESG will get the opportunity to present the four horsemen/spook special interest perspective). The only clear statement I noticed the DTI spokespersons make was that they wouldn't hold the private halves of signature keys. On the positive side, the labour statement on encryption prior to coming to office was no where near as draconian as the DTI paper. Anyway, we'll see. Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0 Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 15:48:53 +0800 To: Adam Back Subject: Re: LSE UK crypto politics conference In-Reply-To: <199705211857.LAA23752@comsec.com> Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.19970522182357.00ab9d80@cybercash.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain At 11:03 PM 5/20/97 +0100, Adam Back wrote: >Panel: Carl Ellison, legal advisor to GLIC (forget name), Nigel >Hickson DTI, someone from TIS (?) who spoke too quitely. Chair was >Caspar Bowden, Scientists for Labour. The person from TIS was Brian Gladman. BTW, he wrote an open letter response to the DTI proposal which is on the web from one of the standard Privacy sites. - Carl +------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme@cybercash.com http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |CyberCash, Inc. http://www.cybercash.com/ | |207 Grindall Street PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | |Baltimore MD 21230-4103 T:(410) 727-4288 F:(410)727-4293 | +------------------------------------------------------------------+ ----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Mon, 1 Jun 1998 11:26:58 -0700 (PDT) To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Foundation for Information Policy Research Message-ID: <199806011826.OAA15687@camel14.mindspring.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Source: http://www.ntk.net/fipr/ Subject: URGENT: press release - FIPR Date: Thu, 28 May 1998 16:52:16 +0100 From: Ross Anderson Title: New Independent Research Foundation Backed by Microsoft Embargoed until 11.00 Friday 29th May Too often, policy issues relating to information technology are seperately debated by two distinct grouups: technology experts and those focused on social concerns. Policy makers face the challenge of reconciling the seperate debates in areas where technology is often evolving very quickly. A new research foundation aims to provide clear advice that spans this gap and is independent of vested interests. The Foundation for Information Policy Research will fund research into how information technology affects society. It is launched at a press conference on Friday 29th May at 11.00 am. (1) Microsoft has contributed a six-figure sum to cover the launch costs. Internet service providers Poptel and Demon are also supporting the Foundation. Its independence will be guaranteed, however, by a board of trustees. (2) In the medium term it will be supported by subscriptions from a range of firms in commerce and industry. The goal of the Foundation is to promote research and understanding of the effects, and the likely future effects, of IT on society. Its areas of investigation include: (3) * the regulation of electronic commerce; * consumer protection; * data protection and privacy; * copyright; * law enforcement; * evidence and archiving; * electronic interaction between government, businesses and individuals; * the extent to which various information technologies discriminate against the less advantaged members of society; and * the new risks that computer and communication systems pose to life, health and economic well-being The Foundation will also provide a valuable resource for the press as it will be able to put journalists in touch with a wide range of experts who can explain IT issues as they arise. Contact: Caspar Bowden (Director of the Foundation) 0171 837 8706 Ross Anderson (Chair of the Foundation) 01223 334733 QUOTES The Director of the Foundation, Caspar Bowden, said: ``The IT policies (and failures) which the current government inherited, and the decisions which will be made by them in the future, will have far-reaching effects on who society's winners and losers will be. We have a duty to prevent technological innovation and development taking place at the expense of the poor, the old, the sick and the disabled. We believe that so long as we understand the social and policy implications of new technical innovations, we can make IT into a means to facilitate social inclusion. The Foundation's mission will be to achieve and to spread that understanding.'' The Managing Director of Microsoft UK, David Svendsen, said: ``It's important that we contribute to a broad and informed public discussion on these information society issues.'' The Chair of the Foundation, Ross Anderson of Cambridge University, said: ``We welcome this new source of funding for IT related research. An increase in the diversity of funding sources is almost always a good thing, and the Foundation will be particularly valuable as much of the available IT funding is directed to very short-term and narrowly technical agendas.'' NOTES (1) The press conference is at the "Scrambling for Safety" conference, at the Bloomsbury Theatre, University College, London. URL: (2) The Foundation's Director and full-time CEO, Caspar Bowden, has for the last three years been running Qualia, a consultancy business specialising in internet implementations. Before that he was a financial strategist with Goldman Sachs. He also researched IT and communications issues for Scientists for Labour. Its chair, Ross Anderson, is a faculty member at Cambridge University Computer Laboratory and has done extensive research on topics related to electronic commerce. BACKGROUND The "Millennium Bug" - the problem that many computers cannot deal correctly with the date roll-over from 1999 to 2000 - threatens to cause havoc with many systems and has been declared a national emergency by the Prime Minister. Another problem that has worried policymakers and concerned citizens is that new developments in IT may discriminate against the less well off members of society. For example, the current mechanisms for electronic commerce depend on consumers using their credit cards to order goods and services over the net. They often get a big discount for buying this way; but people without credit cards may lose out. The first task that the Foundation has set itself is to examine the underpinnings of electronic commerce. The European Commission has recently published a draft Directive on this subject and will launch a period of public consultation at the same conference at which the Foundation itself will be launched. (The draft directive is at [missing].) Other topics which the Foundation plans to investigate include: * the maintenance of public records in electronic form. We do not fully understand how to ensure that word processor files and other electronic documents created today can be safely stored for many years, and reliably made available in the future. This affects not just the new Freedom of Information Act, but also the work of future librarians and historians. * the development of copyright law. There are some industry proposals which would restrict the ability of libraries to lend out digital works. Will this mean the end of the public library, as more and more books, videos and other material become digital? What are the implications for schools and universities? What are the implications for the public, if all major sports events in future are pay-per-view? Are these developments inevitable, or is there something we can do about them? * the introduction of electronic communication between the citizen and the government has the potential to cut queues and the frustration of dealing with people on the phone. However, are these changes intrinsically more likely to favour the articulate, and to bring the most benefit to well-off people with their own computers? What technical developments are reasonably possible to ensure that all citizens get a fair deal? * the previous government's proposal for a "personal signature card" that would give access to all government services had a distinct flavour of an ID card. Are such developments necessary, or can we find workable alternatives? * the police are concerned about the spread of prepaid mobile phones, which are increasingly used by stalkers and extortionists. However, if they are banned, then how would people without credit cards obtain a mobile phone service? * there have been many disputes in the past over "phantom withdrawals" from bank cash machines, and banks have defended themselves by claiming that their computers cannot be wrong. How can this approach work when millions of merchants are selling services through a wide variety of computer systems? What will consumer rights amount to in the information age? * the failure of government computer systems - whether spectacular failure due to the millennium bug, or the continuing sporadic failures in the NHS - does most harm to pensioners, the disabled, single mothers, the unemployed and people on NHS waiting lists (who are typically elderly, female and working class). How can we encourage best engineering practice in the public sector? - - - ends - - Thanks to Danny O'Brien, UK Crypto Story: http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/12624.html Web site under construction: http://www.fipr.org ----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Sat, 5 Dec 1998 04:18:32 +0800 To: cypherpunks@EINSTEIN.ssz.com Subject: Wassenaar Addendum Message-ID: <199812041953.OAA18883@camel8.mindspring.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Caspar Bowden in the UK says by telephone that a Wassenaar spokesman told him today that the WA org will issue next week a detailed "template" which specifies terms of the recent agreement to control encryption. It will go well beyond what has been heretofore generally agreed to by the member states under which there was a good bit of latitude for each to determine its own policy. This is an unprecedented united front by the members, and the paper will be a first for detailed export controls issued by the Wassenaar org rather than by each nation. When ready it will be put on the Wassenaar Web site: http://www.wassenaar.org. We've made a request to DoC for elaboration of the press release yesterday which featured David Aarons' general claims, but no response yet. The USG may not comment until the WA paper is issued. Caspar posted a capsule of his infor on UK Crypto: From: "Caspar Bowden" To: Subject: News from Wassenaar Secretariat Date: Fri, 4 Dec 1998 16:23:58 -0000 Message-ID: <000101be1fa2$9da127e0$dc77e4d4@cpsb> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal Just talked to Dirk Weicke, Senior Adviser to Wassenaar Organisation. (Tel:+43 1 516360) No written details will be issued until next week, but gist is: *) No alteration to question of whether Wassenaar covers intangible exports. Up to signatory states to interpret and legislate. *) mass-market software, symmetric key length limited to 56-bits *) software generally available, but with other restrictive tests on end-user re-configurability, symmetric key length limited to 64-bits *) Assymetric key lengths (not sure how relates to above) limited to: RSA & Digital logarithm: 512 bits Elliptic curve : 112 bits -- Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 ---------- ----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1998 23:57:14 +0800 To: cypherpunks@EINSTEIN.ssz.com Subject: Wassenaar News Message-ID: <199812071515.KAA26956@smtp2.mindspring.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain We spoke with Igor at the WA today to ask about the implementation report Caspar Bowden said would be coming shortly. It seems that Dirk Weicke, the person preparing it (whom Caspar queried), is out sick and won't return to work until Thursday. Another person working on the report, a Mr. Sidbitt (?) is also out sick but should be back at work tomorrow. At the moment there is no plan to offer the report on the WA Web site. Each member will decide how to publicize it. Igor, a friendly, reminded that the WA staff has no authority, indeed has an evanescent existence, and is subject to vanishing without explanation. The paranoid WA members, my words, cut no slack, cut-throat control of perfidious news is their modus operandi. Still, Igor chuckled at my reporting that the perfidious USG will not anwser my inquiries, being unable to trust its terrifying citizenry. He refused my plea to send a purloined report, a report which, on the evidence, appears to be quite sickening. ----- From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: John Young Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1998 00:37:51 +0800 To: cypherpunks@EINSTEIN.ssz.com Subject: Wassenaar/Crypto News Message-ID: <199812091532.KAA16119@dewdrop2.mindspring.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain A BXA spokesperson said today that the text of the recent Wassenaar agreement had been received yesterday and it is now being prepared for release on the BXA website (www.bxa.doc.gov) maybe by the end of the week but maybe not until next week. She said she expected the US to be the first to publish the doc, after I cited the WA message below from Caspar Bowden. She also said that the Practising Law Institute (www.pli.edu) session on encryption controls yesterday was taped and inquiries should be made to PLI (a continuing legal ed org; ) 1-(800) 260-4PLI. And that Bill Reinsch did not participate in the session, only gave the speech on Dec 7 noted here yesterday: http://jya.com/war120798-2.htm An inquiry to PLI (Betty Gray) has not been returned. >From UK Crypto: From: "Caspar Bowden" To: "Ukcrypto (E-mail)" Subject: More from Wassenaar Secretariat Date: Wed, 9 Dec 1998 09:19:09 -0000 Message-ID: <000401be2355$07529ec0$dc77e4d4@cpsb> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal -----Original Message----- From: Wassenaar Secretariat [mailto:secretariat@wassenaar.org] Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 1998 16:54 To: Caspar Bowden Subject: Re: Attn: Dirk Weicke Mr. Weicke is still away, however, I can assure you that the Secretariat has been recently authorized by all member states to publish the new Lists on the web site. This will be done as soon as possible. Please be patient, we are a very small Secretariat. Glenn Sibbitt Special Advisor WA Secretariat Caspar Bowden wrote: > Dear Mr.Weicke, > > We spoke by telephone on Fri afternoon. > > You mentioned that the text and details of the new agreement would be > published on the Wassenaar website this week. > > I understand that you have been away sick for a few days (my > commiserations), but there have been reports from your colleagues > that there will in fact be no publication on your Website. > > I'd be most grateful if you could just confirm when publication of > details will take place, in particular the "Cryptography Note" detailing > key-length limits, and definitions of categories. > > Kind regards > -- > Caspar Bowden http://www.fipr.org > Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research > Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333 Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534 -----