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Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear FOIA Officer,

I request a copy of the 1975 report by CIA official Bronson Tweedy on the activities of James Jesus Angleton and Anatoliy Golitsyn, reportedly 80-pages long, as described in the book *Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter*, by Tom Mangold, 1991, pp. 332-334 (paper). Copies of the book's pages are enclosed.

This material will be published on the public education website Cryptome.org of which I am the administrator.

I agree to pay for costs associated with this request.

Thank you.

Sincerely,



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Enc 2 pages (showing 4 book pages)

ment," he told his surprised aide. "It's Anatoliy Golitsyn, and he's all yours. You handle him, and see him whenever he likes and for as long as he wants. But then you see me *only* when you think there's something important from him that I should know. And I want that information from you in three minutes flat. Otherwise, you go and see McCoy about it."

Tiskerdanos, who had known nothing about Golitsyn or his dealings with Kalaris, left the office baffled. On two subsequent occasions when he went back to see his chief with a digest from Golitsyn—after conducting copious debriefings with his new charge—Kalaris politely and firmly showed him the door.

But Kalaris remained troubled by the dominant role Golitsyn had played within the Counterintelligence Staff, and he began to make discreet inquiries about the Ukrainian. When he first contacted the British, they were classically cagey. No opinion was forthcoming until Kalaris first indicated that he thought Golitsyn was without any counterintelligence value.

"Jim thinks Anatoliy is very good," remarked the British liaison man, stalling cautiously. Kalaris indicated otherwise. Noting the change, the Brit quickly owned up. "We've considered him worthless for some time," he admitted with relief.

Kalaris next went to see his boss, DDO William Nelson, and urged, as forcefully as he could, that the CIA conduct an official investigation into the intelligence value and worthiness of Angleton's most prized defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn. Kalaris also wanted to resolve once and for all the doubts about whether Golitsyn was a Soviet-controlled agent sent intentionally by the KGB to disrupt the CIA—the question first raised by Ed Petry. Nelson agreed and called up Bronson Tweedy, former chief of the Africa Division, station chief in London, and executive assistant to DCI Dick Helms, whom the CIA refused to leave alone in retirement.

"Just one last favor," pleaded Nelson.

Tweedy's work was conducted with maximum efficiency and secrecy. He was given two retired senior officers to assist him: Richard Snowden, a former Soviet Division analyst, and Cordelia Hood (then the wife of former Counterintelligence Staff officer William Hood and herself a former Soviet Division and Counterintelligence Staff analyst, held in great respect within the agency). Tweedy traveled first to London, where he researched Golitsyn's 1963 visit in considerable detail. He commissioned a study from MI5, which, when it was delivered, ran to twenty-seven pages of sharply drawn criticisms of Golitsyn. In the words of one officer who has read it, the British report lambasted Golitsyn with "pure gold" evidence of his errors and dis-

credited theories.¹³ Tweedy also visited Paris to explore the "SAPPHIRE" debacle, and then went on to Ottawa to retrace Golitsyn's dealings with the RCMP.

At Langley, the Tweedy investigators were given uncensored access to all files related to Golitsyn. They carefully read through the mountain of paperwork from Golitsyn's debriefings that had been allowed to accumulate inside the Counterintelligence Staff, including his contributions to HONETOL, the Sino-Soviet split, the molehunt . . . everything. The CIA's highly negative psychological assessments of him were not forgotten. They noted—and later cited in their final report—that Golitsyn had been asked by Allen Dulles in 1962, after the defector had first arrived in Washington, whether or not there was a KGB penetration of the CIA, and that he had answered that there was none.

The investigation into Golitsyn ran from March until July 1975. The eighty-page report produced by Tweedy was unequivocally hostile to the Soviet defector's long record as Angleton's counterintelligence guru.

Broadly, Tweedy confirmed that Golitsyn was definitely a "bona fide" defector, who had *not* been deliberately sent by the KGB—but that his actual value to the CIA had been mediocre and his information had been limited.

Tweedy also found that Golitsyn had what he tactfully described as an active imagination and a personality that was "paranoid" with "megalomaniac tendencies." In particular, Golitsyn viewed all other Soviet defectors as threats to himself, his credibility, and his theories.

The Tweedy Report determined that Golitsyn's value had dropped off as early as his first year in the United States. Initially, some of Golitsyn's information had been of considerable assistance to the CIA. However, after 1962, he began to run dry. In an effort to avoid being discarded as a source, reported Tweedy, he tried to enhance his status by becoming a unique counterintelligence analyst. He did this by developing theories based on his knowledge of the CIA and foreign files he was shown (although he would maintain that he had seen this material at Moscow Center).

Out of the total of 173 so-called serials (leads) that Golitsyn had provided relating to Europe and Canada, the report judged that only two very early ones had been of real value (that is, leading to the arrest and prosecution of a spy). These two viable clues had eventually led investigators to Georges Pâques, the French NATO spy; and to John Vassall, the homosexual British Admiralty clerk (although Nosenko had actually provided the final identification in this case).

In two other cases in Canada, Golitsyn had offered imprecise information which was correct but did not immediately lead to arrests.

One suspect was John Watkins, the Canadian diplomat who had served in Moscow in the 1950s; but he had died of a heart attack before he could be prosecuted. The other was the Canadian university professor Hugh Hambleton, a KGB agent who was not arrested until twenty years later, after another defector had fingered him.

The report determined that Golitsyn also deserved partial credit for the discovery of microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, even though this lead had been imprecise and was confirmed only with Nosenko's help.

With respect to the molehunt which had so divided and hurt the agency, Golitsyn was judged to have provided *no clear leads* to the penetration of U.S. intelligence by active agents. (The original SASMA, Igor Orlov, was judged to have been inactive by 1960.)

The Ingeborg Lygren case in Norway had been a huge mistake for which Golitsyn was held to be originally responsible.

Finally, Tweedy found that Anatoliy Golitsyn and James Angleton had caused "great damage" to the CIA by breaking down relations between the Counterintelligence Staff and the rest of the Directorate of Operations—particularly the Soviet Division.¹⁴

Tweedy's report burned its way into William Nelson's in-tray. Orders were then given that the bigot (distribution) list for the document was to be severely limited. Besides Tweedy and his staff, less than a dozen people were allowed access to its contents, including Nelson himself (as DDO), David Blee (then Assistant DDO), Bill Colby, George Kalaris, Leonard McCoy, and Larry Sternfeld (Kalaris's other top deputy, and Miller's replacement as Chief of Operations).¹⁵

One member of the bigot list, who requested anonymity in discussing the Tweedy Report, says that "it was pure dynamite. I'm not surprised the distribution was limited. Tweedy really tore into Anatoliy. He concluded that the Counterintelligence Staff had grossly exaggerated Golitsyn's contributions over the years. By convincing everyone that the Soviet Division had been penetrated, the balance between Staff and Division had become badly distorted. Tweedy established that anything which contradicted Golitsyn's theories was treated by Angleton as bad information. This, in turn, had led to the division cutting off the CI Staff, which led to *their* isolation.

"Tweedy expressed amazement that Golitsyn had been given the CIA files and at the whole 'Monster Plot' nonsense. He concluded there was no evidence to support any of Golitsyn's deception theories—and he specifically discredited the Sino-Soviet split theory. Basically, it was as much a report on Angleton's stewardship of the Counterintelligence Staff as it was on Golitsyn. Tweedy also noted that Golitsyn had been paid hundreds of thousands of dollars.

"After I read it, I phoned Bronson. He said to me, 'My God, if we had only known this was going on, we could have stopped it years ago. We just didn't know; the seventh floor didn't pay close attention to what Angleton was doing.'"¹⁶

Scotty Miller remains unsympathetic toward Tweedy's conclusions and his methodology. "That report was symptomatic of the times," Miller argues. "Remember, it was 1975, and many of the people Tweedy talked to didn't understand enough about Golitsyn to give an objective view. Many of the mid-level CIA officers felt it was time to sink Jim and get rid of Golitsyn. I was interviewed by Tweedy. The whole thing had a kind of evening-up-of-the-score approach to it."¹⁷

While Golitsyn's true intelligence value was now being formally assessed and placed on the CIA record, there was still one outstanding problem that Kalaris had to resolve. He urgently needed to assemble a small task force to retrieve the secret files that Angleton had so generously lavished upon his defector.

Embarrassment already hung over the Counterintelligence Staff about this extremely sensitive issue. Golitsyn had neither the right nor the official permission to be in physical possession of classified CIA records. Angleton did not have the authority to take these files out of the building. The Kalaris team had learned that Golitsyn had files with him, but how many, where, how they were kept, and how they could be retrieved was another matter. Angleton's staff had left behind no record of which files Golitsyn had been given over the years. The new staff was also well aware that if this story were leaked to the press, there certainly would be a public firestorm, especially since congressional investigations into the alleged improprieties of Operations CHAOS and HT-LINGUAL were slated to take place. Furthermore, the reaction of Soviet Division officers who learned that their personnel and operational files were in Golitsyn's hands would be mutinous.

Leonard McCoy had begun the retrieval operation by having some discreet inquiries made of Golitsyn, who rather nonchalantly admitted to possessing twelve large boxes of files and records. Golitsyn claimed that was "everything" he had. McCoy arranged for these papers to be returned immediately.¹⁸ He quickly discovered, to his astonishment, that the documents included case files and personnel records—the most super-secret documents an intelligence organization possesses. Among these case records were original Penkovskiy files (Angleton and Golitsyn had not given up trying to rewrite the history of that case); and among the personnel records McCoy was intrigued to discover his own personnel file. Golitsyn was in possession of it because he had been investigating the loyalty of every officer within the Soviet Divi-