



## Look Out For Falling Redactions

[Der Spiegel](#) published 54 documents this week, and [Information](#), in cooperation with [The Intercept](#) published five more. This was a remarkable disclosure of new and important information regarding the NSA. Some of the redactions were unsuccessful, the primary reason they failed is that existing information had been published previously. Though not always, in one case a person who had seen the undredacted document [told](#) his followers what had been hidden. The one real technical failure was the target list, most of the images remained quite identifiable, even sans face.

Wait, you thought Der Spiegel released only 53 documents? So did they. It turns out there is an Easter Egg, a nine page listing of German SIGADs. I'd recommend saving [this link](#) before they realize. Or maybe they just forgot to link to it.

For further reading, see: <http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf>



# PRISM Slides

TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON//NOFORN

(TS//SI//NF) PRISM (US-984XN) Based Reporting: June 2011 – May 2012  
Sorted By # of PRISM-Based Reports Per OPI

OPI - Top Producers Issuing	PRISM-Based Reports	% Increase in PRISM-Based Reports Compared to June 2010 - May 2011	% of All OPI Reporting Which is PRISM-Based	% Points Change From June 2010 - May 2011 period	All Reports By OPI	Single-Source to PRISM	% of PRISM-Based Reports Which are Single Source
SCS (FP*, US-96*, US-97*, US-3219)	3723	Up 67%	20	+7 (up 54%)	18640	3040	82
S2I - Counterterrorism	3493	Up 5%	42	-2 (down 5%)	8242	2074	60
S2E - Middle East & Africa	2574	Up 47%	16	+2 (up 14%)	16537	1959	76
S2G - Combating Prof	2092	Up 49%	30	+3 (up 11%)	6972	1395	67
NSAT (USJ-783*)	1690	Up 20%	30	+3 (up 11%)	5713	1319	78
S2A - <b>South Asia</b>	1389	Up 8%	11	-1 (down 8%)	12445	1196	86
NSAG (USJ-800*)	1255	Down 8%	11	0 (no change)	11741	893	70
ECC (ESOC) (USJ-753*, USM-44)	1147	Up 6%	52	+2 (up 4%)	2217	922	80
S2C - Inf Sec Issues	1147	Up 75%	13	+5 (up 83%)	8989	861	75
S2D - Countering Fign Intel	862	Up 40%	12	-5 (down 29%)	7089	545	63
S2F - Int Crime & Narc	666	Up 41%	16	+2 (up 14%)	4122	497	75
S2B - <b>China, Korea &amp; Taiwan</b>	634	Down 10%	13	-3 (down 19%)	4842	452	71
NTOC (V*)	456	Up 237%	21	+8 (up 62%)	2195	355	78
S2D	310	Down 15%	4	0 (no change)	7511	256	95
NSAH (USJ-750*)	237	Down 10%	2	+1 (up 50%)	12023	155	65
S2J - Weapons and Space	225	Up 221%	33	+11 (50%)	692	186	83
GCHQ	197	Up 137%	2	+1.9 (up 190%)	11257	170	86
S2H - <b>Russia</b>	176	Up 159%	5	+3 (up 150%)	3353	155	88
ISSG	16	Up 60%	17	-19 (down 52%)	92	14	88
Utah Regional Ops Ctr (USJ-755)	12	Up 20%	6	-17 (down 74%)	207	12	100

Source: PLUS - 11-13 June 2012

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
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In the latest batch of PRISM slides, the functions of three OPIs (Office of Primary Interest) were redacted. The reason for the redaction is as mystifying as it is futile, as their functions are already known from multiple public sources. S2A focuses on South Asia, S2B is China, Korea and Taiwan, and S2H is for Russia, all of whom are rival nations, it is not a secret that we spy on them, nor that they spy on us too.



Excerpt from Marc Ambinder's NSA Mind Map



## Document Describing Cooperation Between the BND and NSA

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

(TS//REL TO USA, FVEY) The primary stakeholders for CT exchanges with the Germans are the European Cryptologic Center (ECC) and the S21 Deployed Analyst (DA) in Berlin. NSA's CT meets with the BND and BfV quarterly and with the BND every six months at SISECT. The latest analytic exchange was on 4-5 December 2012 in Berlin. Although previous discussions focused on extremists traveling to Germany and Central Asia, this latest exchange focused heavily on North African CT topics, including key presentations from both sides on [REDACTED] CT European targets remain the focus of the relationship with BfV; however, it is likely that CT North African targets will have an expanded focus with BND and BfV as North Africa continues to serve as a magnet for aspiring jihadists from Europe. In addition, future discussions will likely expand to Europeans traveling to [REDACTED] to fight in the ongoing [REDACTED] and the threat they may pose upon return to Europe.

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Image courtesy of *Electrospace.net*

In a recent [blog post](#), Matthew M. Aid described curious deletions from this document. It is worth noting that he claims to have seen the unredacted original. Germany is worried about Europeans traveling to Syria and joining the Jihad.

## US Sites with NSA Personnel in Germany

K. (S//SI//REL) NSA Presence - For the following locations, the fact of NSA personnel assigned to these sites/activities is UNCLASSIFIED. It is therefore UNCLASSIFIED, for example, to display plaques from these organization/locations. However, the fact that SIGINT may have been performed at these sites or that they may have been former A5 sites is CLASSIFIED.

(U) Augsburg, Germany (USASAFS Augsburg)  
(U) Bad Aibling, Germany  
(U) Baumholder, Germany (11th U.S. ASA Field Station)  
(U) Berlin, Germany  
(U) Bremerhaven, Germany (Freedom through Vigilance USAF Security Service)

(U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123  
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123 81  
(U) [REDACTED] (A Remote Operations Facility)

(U) Herzogenaurach, Germany ((Strength through knowledge) 16th USASA Field Station)

(U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]

(U) NSA Europe, Frankfurt, Germany  
(U) NSA Europe, Stuttgart

(U) Naval Security Group Activities (NSGAs) at Bremerhaven, Germany; [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

(U) Rothwesten, Germany  
(U) [REDACTED]

Deleted sites include:

- U.S. Navy listening post at Todendorf on the Baltic Sea
- U.S. Army HF direction-finding site at Flensburg in Schleswig-Holstein
- U.S. Army listening post at the Gablingen Kaserne outside the city of Augsburg
- U.S. Air Force ELINT station at Hof located at the nexus of the German and Czech borders
- NSA MAROON ARCHER remote intercept site at Bad Aibling Station

Matthew M. Aid's [blog](#) continues listing some of the deleted sites, and points out that they are unclassified.



2014, Paul Dietrich (Twitter: @paulmd199)

## Excerpt from NSA-BND Information Paper

- (TS//SI//NF) What the partner provides to us: NSA is provided access to FORNSAT communications supporting CN, CT, ██████ and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) missions and is an important source of information on drug trafficking and force protection in Afghanistan. The BND provides Igbo language support by translating NSA collection of a high-value, time-sensitive ██████ target. NSA is seeking the proper approvals to accept BND language support in ██████. In addition to the day-to-day collection, the Germans have offered NSA unique accesses in high interest target areas.

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The answer is always terrorism. Igbo is spoken primarily in Nigeria, and claims some 25 million speakers, it was not mentioned in the [Black Budget](#) as a language the NSA had employed a large number of speakers of, therefore it is reasonable to accept help from governments who are capable. Nigeria is the home to several terrorist groups, including the infamous Boko Haram group (their target is probably some other terrorist). This is from a 2013 information [paper](#) describing NSA/BND cooperation.

## NSA Presentation on the Work of Nymrod

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108 Human Language Technology

### Top 10

Most Frequent Mentions in Anchory Reports for the Previous Week

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108

One of the [presentations](#) released by Der Spiegel list some of the targets of surveillance who have wound up in reports. Despite the redactions of faces, many targets are still quite identifiable. [Hugo Chavez](#) (#1) is [recognizable](#) by his shirt and watch, Wikipedia was using the same photo of [Raul Reyes](#) (#4) on his page, and of course #3 is [Kim Jong-il](#). All of the above are dead. The 2<sup>nd</sup> row probably includes [Vladimir Putin](#) (cleverly disguised as [Vlad the Impaler](#)), [Alexander Lukachenko](#) and [Silvio Berlusconi](#), though there is some uncertainty.

I'd like to thank [George Mashke](#) and "Rufo" for their help with these. If anybody has further ideas on the remainder, especially if they can locate the actual images, [drop me a line](#).



# BOUNDLESSINFORMANT FAQ

**UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**  
**BOUNDLESSINFORMANT – Frequently Asked Questions**  
**09-06-2012**

- 8) **What is the technical architecture for the tool?**
- Click [here](#) for a graphical view of the tool's architecture
  - (U//FOUO) DNI metadata (ASDF, DNR metadata (FASCIA) delivered to Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) on GM-PLACE
  - (U//FOUO) Use Java MapReduce job to transform/filter and enrich FASCIA/ASDF data with business logic to assign organization rules to data
  - (U//FOUO) Bulk import of DNI/DNR data (serialized Google Protobuf objects) into Cloudbase (enabled by custom aggregators)
  - (U//FOUO) Use Java web app (hosted via Tomcat) on MachineShop (formerly TurkeyTower) to query Cloudbase
  - (U//FOUO) GUI triggers queries to Cloudbase – GXT (ExtGWT)
- 9) **What are some upcoming features/enhancements?**
- (U//FOUO) Add technology type (e.g. JUGGERNAUT, LOPER) to provide additional granularity in the numbers
  - (U//FOUO) Add additional details to the Differential view
  - (U//FOUO) Refine the Site Specific view
  - (U//FOUO) Include CASN information
  - (U//FOUO) Add ability to export data behind any view (pddg,sigad,sysid,casn,tech,count)
  - (U//FOUO) Add in selected (vs. unselected) data indicators
  - (U//FOUO) Include filter for sustained versus survey collection
- 10) **How are new features or views requested and prioritized?**  
(U//FOUO) The team uses [Flawmill](#) to accept user requests for additional functionality or enhancements. Users are also allowed to vote on which functionality or enhancements are most important to them (as well as add comments). The **BOUNDLESSINFORMANT** team will periodically review all requests and triage according to level of effort (Easy, Medium, Hard) and mission impact (High, Medium, Low). The team will review the queue with the project champion and government steering committee to be added onto the **BOUNDLESSINFORMANT** roadmap.
- 11) **Why are record counts different from other tools like ASDF and What's On Cover?**  
(U//FOUO) There are a number of reasons why record counts may vary. The purpose of the tool is to provide

BOUNDLESSINFORMANT – FAQ  
Page --3-3

Version published by [Der Spiegel](#)

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BOUNDLESSINFORMANT – FAQ

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Version published by [The Guardian](#)

Sometimes I wonder why they bother, the FAQ was released June 8 of last year, fully unredacted. What's the pressing need to redact the word "here?" It's an image, the link doesn't go anywhere. The second redaction is also puzzling, FLAWMILL is apparently some internal bug-reporting tool, it doesn't sound like it'd be super sensitive. On second thought, maybe it lists all the unpatched vulnerabilities of all the NSA's stuff.



2014, Paul Dietrich (Twitter: @paulmd199)