Cincinnatus Public Key (Edward Snowden?)

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17 May 2014. On May 15, 2014, an unknown person sub-signed the Cincinnatus@lavabit.com PK. This overwrote the previous sub-sign dated 2 Septemer 2012. On May 14, 2014, apparently after seeing this file, a new PK was generated (Key ID - 0x7F12EEFF3EBB602C) for this purpose:

PGPdump Results

Old: Public Key Packet(tag 6)(1037 bytes)
        Ver 4 - new
        Public key creation time - Sun Sep  2 00:21:58 UTC 2012
        Pub alg - RSA Encrypt or Sign(pub 1)
        RSA n(8192 bits) - ...
        RSA e(17 bits) - ...
Old: User ID Packet(tag 13)(43 bytes)
        User ID - Cincinnatus (Tor) <cincinnatus@lavabit.com>
Old: Signature Packet(tag 2)(540 bytes)
        Ver 4 - new
        Sig type - Generic certification of a User ID and Public Key packet(0x10).
        Pub alg - RSA Encrypt or Sign(pub 1)
        Hash alg - SHA512(hash 10)
        Hashed Sub: signature creation time(sub 2)(4 bytes)
                Time - Thu May 15 01:06:24 UTC 2014
        Sub: issuer key ID(sub 16)(8 bytes)
                Key ID - 0x7F12EEFF3EBB602C
        Hash left 2 bytes - ba 59 
        RSA m^d mod n(4095 bits) - ...
                -> PKCS-1
Old: Signature Packet(tag 2)(1080 bytes)
        Ver 4 - new
        Sig type - Positive certification of a User ID and Public Key packet(0x13).
        Pub alg - RSA Encrypt or Sign(pub 1)
        Hash alg - SHA1(hash 2)
        Hashed Sub: signature creation time(sub 2)(4 bytes)
                Time - Sun Sep  2 00:21:58 UTC 2012
        Hashed Sub: key flags(sub 27)(1 bytes)
                Flag - This key may be used to certify other keys
                Flag - This key may be used to sign data
                Flag - This key may be used to encrypt communications
                Flag - This key may be used to encrypt storage
                Flag - This key may be used for authentication
        Hashed Sub: preferred symmetric algorithms(sub 11)(5 bytes)
                Sym alg - AES with 256-bit key(sym 9)
                Sym alg - AES with 192-bit key(sym 8)
                Sym alg - AES with 128-bit key(sym 7)
                Sym alg - CAST5(sym 3)
                Sym alg - Triple-DES(sym 2)
        Hashed Sub: preferred hash algorithms(sub 21)(5 bytes)
                Hash alg - SHA256(hash 8)
                Hash alg - SHA1(hash 2)
                Hash alg - SHA384(hash 9)
                Hash alg - SHA512(hash 10)
                Hash alg - SHA224(hash 11)
        Hashed Sub: preferred compression algorithms(sub 22)(3 bytes)
                Comp alg - ZLIB <RFC1950>(comp 2)
                Comp alg - BZip2(comp 3)
                Comp alg - ZIP <RFC1951>(comp 1)
        Hashed Sub: features(sub 30)(1 bytes)
                Flag - Modification detection (packets 18 and 19)
        Hashed Sub: key server preferences(sub 23)(1 bytes)
                Flag - No-modify
        Sub: issuer key ID(sub 16)(8 bytes)
                Key ID - 0x4C74380AF72D80B3
        Hash left 2 bytes - bb 86 
        RSA m^d mod n(8192 bits) - ...
                -> PKCS-1

14 May 2014

Cincinnatus Public Key (Edward Snowden?)

Glenn Greenwald writes in No Place to Hide that he was first contacted by Edward Snowden in late 2012 who used the pseudonym of "Cincinnatus."

On December 1, 2012, I received my first communication from Edward Snowden, although I had no idea at the time that it was from him.
The contact came in the form of an email from someone calling himself Cincinnatus, a reference to Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, the Roman farmer who, in the fifth century BC, was appointed dictator of Rome to defend the city against attack. ...
The email began: “The security of people’s communications is very important to me,” and its stated purpose was to urge me to begin using PGP encryption so that “Cincinnatus” could communicate things in which, he said, he was certain I would be interested. ...
In this email, “Cincinnatus” said he had searched everywhere for my PGP “public key,” a unique code set that allows people to receive encrypted email, but could not find it. From this, he concluded that I was not using the program and told me, “That puts anyone who communicates with you at risk. I’m not arguing that every communication you are involved in be encrypted, but you should at least provide communicants with that option.” ...
C.’ s email did not move me to action. Because I had become known for covering stories the rest of the media often ignores, I frequently hear from all sorts of people offering me a “huge story,” and it usually turns out to be nothing. And at any given moment I am usually working on more stories than I can handle. So I need something concrete to make me drop what I’m doing in order to pursue a new lead. Despite the vague allusion to “people out there” I “would like to hear from,” there was nothing in C.’ s email that I found sufficiently enticing. I read it but did not reply. ...
After the “BOUNDLESS INFORMANT” article was published , Laura and I planned to meet at Snowden’s hotel. But before leaving my room, out of nowhere, as I sat on my hotel bed, I remembered Cincinnatus, my anonymous email correspondent from six months earlier, who had bombarded me with requests to install PGP so that he could provide me with important information. Amid the excitement of everything that was happening, I thought that perhaps he, too, had an important story to give me. Unable to remember his email name, I finally located one of his old messages by searching for keywords.
“Hey: good news,” I wrote to him. “I know it took me a while, but I’m finally using PGP email. So I’m ready to talk any time if you’re still interested.” I hit “send.”
Soon after I arrived at his room, Snowden said, with more than a small trace of mockery, “By the way, that Cincinnatus you just emailed, that’s me.”
It took me a few moments to process this and regain my composure. That person, many months earlier , who desperately tried to get me to use email encryption … was Snowden. My first contact with him hadn’t been in May, just a month earlier, but many months ago. Before contacting Laura about the leaks, before contacting anyone, he had tried to reach me.

Cincinnatus (Tor) <cincinnatus@lavabit.com> generated a PK on 2 September 2012. The PK 8192 bits were unusally high.

A Google listing shows <cincinnatus@lavabit.com> (but more under <cincinnatus(.a.)lavabit.com>) was used as a contact for a CryptoParty in Honolulu, HI, on December 11, 2012 at which many of the comsec tools later used by the Snowden team were to be discussed:

https://github.com/hicapacity/hicapacity-site/blob/master/_posts/2012-12-03-cryptoparty.markdown

[Excerpt]

End of Year CryptoParty @ the HNL hackerspace

Date: 11 December 2012

Time: 6PM-9PM HST

Location: HICapacity, 307a Kamani St, Honolulu, HI 96813

Format: Relaxed conference / Greek chorus: we'll start with a casual agenda, but slot-in additional speakers in as desired. If you've got something important to add to someone's talk, please share it (politely). When we're out of speakers, we'll do ad-hoc tutorials on anything we can.

NOTE: Space very limited (20 people), PLEASE RSVt too long, we may not physically be able to fit you in the room. Attendance preference will be given to people willing to speak or demo something. [Balance of article below.]

http://sks.pkqs.net/pks/lookup?search=cincinnatus&fingerprint=on&op=index&exact=off

Search results for 'cincinnatus'

Type bits/keyID     Date       User ID

pub  8192R/F72D80B3 2012-09-02 Cincinnatus (Tor) <cincinnatus@lavabit.com>
	 Fingerprint=D07A 8DC4 11C6 3232 ED86  CCAB 4C74 380A F72D 80B3 

________________________________________________________________________

Search results for '0x4c74380af72d80b3'

Type bits/keyID     cr. time   exp time   key expir

pub  8192R/F72D80B3 2012-09-02            
	 Fingerprint=D07A 8DC4 11C6 3232 ED86  CCAB 4C74 380A F72D 80B3 

uid Cincinnatus (Tor) <cincinnatus@lavabit.com>
sig  sig3  F72D80B3 2012-09-02 __________ __________ [selfsig]

________________________________________________________________________

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: SKS 1.1.4+
Comment: Hostname: sks.pkqs.net

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u0aOHozaqQk=
=W7Ka
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
_______________________________________________________________


Old: Public Key Packet(tag 6)(1037 bytes)
        Ver 4 - new
        Public key creation time - Sun Sep  2 00:21:58 UTC 2012
        Pub alg - RSA Encrypt or Sign(pub 1)
        RSA n(8192 bits) - ...
        RSA e(17 bits) - ...
Old: User ID Packet(tag 13)(43 bytes)
        User ID - Cincinnatus (Tor) <cincinnatus@lavabit.com>
Old: Signature Packet(tag 2)(1080 bytes)
        Ver 4 - new
        Sig type - Positive certification of a User ID and Public Key packet(0x13).
        Pub alg - RSA Encrypt or Sign(pub 1)
        Hash alg - SHA1(hash 2)
        Hashed Sub: signature creation time(sub 2)(4 bytes)
                Time - Sun Sep  2 00:21:58 UTC 2012
        Hashed Sub: key flags(sub 27)(1 bytes)
                Flag - This key may be used to certify other keys
                Flag - This key may be used to sign data
                Flag - This key may be used to encrypt communications
                Flag - This key may be used to encrypt storage
                Flag - This key may be used for authentication
        Hashed Sub: preferred symmetric algorithms(sub 11)(5 bytes)
                Sym alg - AES with 256-bit key(sym 9)
                Sym alg - AES with 192-bit key(sym 8)
                Sym alg - AES with 128-bit key(sym 7)
                Sym alg - CAST5(sym 3)
                Sym alg - Triple-DES(sym 2)
        Hashed Sub: preferred hash algorithms(sub 21)(5 bytes)
                Hash alg - SHA256(hash 8)
                Hash alg - SHA1(hash 2)
                Hash alg - SHA384(hash 9)
                Hash alg - SHA512(hash 10)
                Hash alg - SHA224(hash 11)
        Hashed Sub: preferred compression algorithms(sub 22)(3 bytes)
                Comp alg - ZLIB <RFC1950>(comp 2)
                Comp alg - BZip2(comp 3)
                Comp alg - ZIP <RFC1951>(comp 1)
        Hashed Sub: features(sub 30)(1 bytes)
                Flag - Modification detection (packets 18 and 19)
        Hashed Sub: key server preferences(sub 23)(1 bytes)
                Flag - No-modify
        Sub: issuer key ID(sub 16)(8 bytes)
                Key ID - 0x4C74380AF72D80B3
        Hash left 2 bytes - bb 86 
        RSA m^d mod n(8192 bits) - ...
                -> PKCS-1

Introduction

From the CryptoParty article by Parker Higgins P with (cincinnatus (.a.) lavabit.com PGP if desired) or directly with HICapacity ASAP -- if you waiof the EFF

"...a set of global get-togethers where more experienced users can teach beginners how to use the commonly available tools that tap into the incredibly powerful technology of cryptography. I hope that a beginner walks away from a #CryptoParty with an understanding of not just PGP, OTR, and the like, but with an idea of why threat models are important, what attack vectors she ought to consider, and — most importantly — a network of people and resources she can contact for even more knowledge." Recorded #cryptoparty benedictions from notable people.

Planning

We have a location. We have a time. We need people - that means you.

We have people willing to do hands-on workshops. Want to do a workshop or give a talk? Please add it to this list. You don't have to put your name down, but please ping the organizer privately so we can keep everything straight.

HICapacity has WiFi and a projector. Food and drink is okay and welcome.

Potential Workshops for 12/11 Cryptoparty

Note: if you cannot attend the 12/11 cryptoparty, please remove yourself from this list and add to the "generally available" list below along with contact info.

Tor & Tor Browser Bundle - Runa S. from the Tor team

Painlessly setting up your own fast exit - Cincinnatus

PGP and GnuPG - PLEASE VOLUNTEER

Key generation

Integrating GnuPG into Windows

Integrating GnuPG into Thunderbird

Configuring Thunderbird to sign, encrypt and decrypt mail

Verifying digital signatures and integrity of downloaded files

Truecrypt - Cincinnatus (can cover something else if this is all someone can talk on -- don't be afraid to slot your name in here instead)

LUKS - PLEASE VOLUNTEER

OTR / Secure IM - PLEASE VOLUNTEER

SSL and authentication - PLEASE VOLUNTEER

VPNs - PLEASE VOLUNTEER

I2P - PLEASE VOLUNTEER

TAILS (The Amnesiac Incognito Live System) - PLEASE VOLUNTEER

Password length - PLEASE VOLUNTEER

ssh and other pki stuff (*nix admin stuff) - PLEASE VOLUNTEER

If you'd like to volunteer, please contact (cincinnatus (.a.) lavabit.com PGP if desired) as soon as you can. Remember: you're not limited to the talks above -- add your own!

https://cryptoparty.org/wiki/Oahu

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