



21 Sept 2012

### Initial Contact

A beautiful woman rings my doorbell at about 0810. Having just rolled out of bed 10 minutes earlier, I throw on some clothes and answer the door. She introduces herself as Olga and confirms my name as Robert Hoffman several times, then tells me that she has a gift from my friend in Minsk. I was excited as I thought that my friend Ira had finally sent my ring and necklace. I notice the large white envelope only has a "to" address and it is in Russian. I ask Olga, who has a very slight accent, which girl the gift is from, Ira, Kristina, Ana, or Olga. She looks at me confused and says "No, it is a male friend". Aware that I have no male friends in Minsk, I accept the envelope, shake her hand, thank her, and wish her a wonderful day. As she departs I add "It has been a pleasure meeting you". She responds with a smile and says "Maybe we meet again. Das vidanya."

### Description of "Olga":

- Gender: Female
- Height: About [a specific height]
- Weight: About [a specific weight]
- Hair: [A specified color, with certain highlights, having a certain length]
- Face: Beautiful, Subtle Eastern Europe features, Slightly rounded
- Dress: Business casual, Turquoise top with ruffled low-cut V-neck, Knee length black business skirt, Black Shaw, Black High heels (mid length maybe 3 inches)
- Jewelry: Minimal. Business basics, was too focused on her face, then the package, then her cleavage, then her face again.
- Vehicle: My distance vision was still a bit sleepy, so I could not make out a plate or clearly discern a make or model. It was a silver sedan that resembles a Prius, but was clearly larger.

I open the envelope and find a very beautiful military medal inside a large jewelry box. (files Medal01.jpg, and Medal02.jpg) The award turns out to be an Order of the Red Banner fifth award. Very rare and very prestigious. It also has a serial number engraved on the back 308. This number becomes the Rosetta stone for decrypting future correspondence. The envelope also included a letter (file Introduction.pdf). This letter provided an email address to contact "my new friend." After returning from the gym, I drafted up an email based on the guidelines provided in the letter and sent it off (file email01).

23 Sept 2012

### Introduction

I received a reply to email01 from "Vladimir". This email provided additional information and instructions as to how to proceed (file: email02). I promptly replied to the questioned asked in email02 (file email03).

26 Sept 2012

### Procedure

I received an email from Vladimir (file emal04). It was basic password instructions for accessing the encrypted PDF file attached to the email (file phpByVzyB.dat (Password: 2275)). This file provides primary and secondary drop instructions and locations for future contact. It also gave me a series of questions to answer regarding my work history, information I might be willing to provide, and what I would like as compensation. I also included a document explaining how to decode any future passwords I will be using and a txt document explaining how to access the files on the flash drive. Email05 is just me confirming my acceptance of continued contact. (files: email05, Doc1.docx(PW: robhof3179), Special information.docx(PW: 52arkivna@gmail.com), and Passwords.txt).

I've opted to use a Verbatim flash drive. The security software is excellent and if it falls into the wrong hands, cannot be hacked, only reformatted. Flash Drive PW: tiegod@cox.net. I'll change it for the next drop as per the instructions in Special information.docx.

27 Sept 2012

### Sightseeing

I went to scout the drop locations. I was unable to locate the secondary drop. I will look again on Sunday. I will say that if they expect me to drive out there every weekend, they better be paying for my gas.

I took Suzanne with me. It makes for a better cover. Psychologically speaking, people a) remember more details about a solo male than if he was in a group or with a woman, b) remember more details about a woman than the man if they are traveling together. I do worry about involving her (or anyone for that matter), but she only knows that we went for a hike. I wandered down every side trail to mask the specific trail I needed to wander down. Suzanne is a smart woman and knows me well. She can easily pick up on when I am acting suspicious even if I think I am not. I will only use her sparingly to avoid her getting to suspicious.

As for the drop location, it is suspiciously close to residential lodgings. This would make for a good escape path.

30 Sept 2012

Delivery

Conducted the drop. I had no idea finding small black or green trash bags would be so difficult. Had a minor snag. As I was getting ready to leave, Colette asked me where I was going. I told her for a hike. She became excited and insistent on coming along. My initial plan was just a quick in and out through the nearest residence, but with her along we just went for a short hike. I used the bathroom excuse to go down a few trails. She probably thinks I have a tiny bladder now. I definitely do not want her involved in any of this, being current active duty.

Still could not locate the secondary drop point.

01 Oct 2012

Oops!

I received an email from Vladimir (file: emal06). They are unable to access the flash drive. I am positive I tested it, but I may have fat fingered it the last time. He asked me to either send correcting instructions for accessing the flash drive or email the encrypted files to him. I am not comfortable emailing those files, knowing that all the bits and pieces needed to access the files are out there. It isn't worth the risk. In my reply (file: email07), I told him that I would drop off a new flash drive this weekend and if he wants, he can drop off the old one so I can take a look at it. I am glad he noticed that there is no way to access the files without destroying them. If I see their trigger, I will drop off the new drive while retrieving the old one.

I am considering purchasing one of those wildlife cameras that preservation societies use to remotely monitor animal activity. I could easily hide it or them, near the trigger and/or drop points. Given my very limited finances, I doubt I will be able to do such a thing anytime soon.

I have been putting things together to discretely contact both the FBI and CIA regarding my activities. I need to establish myself with the RSS first though. No reason to play all sides when I have nothing to offer anyone at this point. Once contact has been established with the US agencies, I think it will be smooth sailing, but until that point, I will have to tread lightly. I will detail my plans for contact at a later date.

While I do understand that these games can have dire consequences, I'm at such a point in my life, that even if I get killed, I don't really care. I plan to have fun with this until someone

does kill me or I have enough money to disappear. Being in the position that I am, I have come to realize that no one should live without fear of death. It is a hell of a thing to care about everyone and everything, yet not care about anything. Trust me, if you think reading that was confusing, try living it. I think I just need to get laid. That or ice cream.

02 Oct 2012

WTF!?

My thought that Vladimir is an idiot, or new at this espionage thing, is growing well on the mound of evidence he provides me. Or this whole thing could be a setup against me and they suck at it. Either way the situation stinks of foul play. If he gets any more obvious in his emails, I may be forced to break contact until another handler can be arranged. Please read email08. First he re-explains that they cannot access the device. As if I hadn't understood that from the previous email. I replied with basic instructions on how to access the encrypted file I sent with the email (file: email09, Doc2.docx (PW: 2583)). Doc2.docx contains the backdoor password for the flash drive, corrected instructions for the passwords to access the files on the device, and a mild tongue lashing to Vladimir.

He listed the officers travel restrictions and how they wish to engage me further. Come on! It isn't that hard to put all that into an encrypted file. The icing on the cake? Telling me that a special naval intelligence Admiral has been assigned to me. I'm not sure if this was an attempt to tease me, tempt me, or impress me. Regardless, it was unnecessary information that puts all of us at risk. If his previous emails haven't already raised red flags with US intel, I'm certain that this one has. I may have to expedite my contacting the FBI and CIA.

04 Oct 2012

Rinse and repeat

I made the second drop at "hillside" this afternoon. The documents were the same as drop one, but did list the passwords backwards on the password description text file. So I corrected it. I had to go solo, since no one was available to accompany me. Suspicion peaked regarding the park ranger at the entrance point off 64<sup>th</sup> street. He sees probably hundreds of people a day, but easily recognized me. Nothing untoward about the drop. I was hesitant to make the drop, given that I had not heard back from Vladimir, but I went ahead and did it anyway. I feel pretty secure with my current security codes.

10 Oct 2012

Boil the brew

I began outlining the plan to slowly bring the FBI into the fold. I'm uncertain about the CIA. They have a pretty bad track record of subtlety. The FBI is only slightly better in that respect, but their people fall more into the "average Joe" category vice the "elitist jerks" typically associated with the CIA and Secret Service.

The day ended with good news. Got a call from an old friend. He says a mutual friend has a job that has to be filled. Given the background of those involved, it has to be related to submarine operations. Most likely the job is out of DC. This presents a problem if the pay isn't that significant. I simply can't afford to pay for this house and rent or buy a house up in the DC area. This would put me in a wonderful position to "assist" the Russians. I'd have to tread very lightly and take extra care as to what information I provide. I have to appear legitimate, but keep US operations safe at the same time. Reminds me of when Churchill had to make that fateful call. The lives of a city verse possible victor in the war. Most likely the job offer will be a dud, like the others. Time will tell.

11 Oct 2012

The ball rolls on

I received an email from Vladimir letting me know that they are leaving me a package (file: email10). It also provides more proof that Vladimir is an idiot. He used my code name in the greeting. Sent from the same email that he normally uses, to the same email he normally sends to. Anyone monitoring our email traffic would now have both names. If I ever meet this guy/girl, I'm going to smack him/her upside the head.

I'm unclear as to the date of the drop. I'll have to go back and review previous instructions. Sunday is the typical day of the week that they said drops would occur, but he also mentions something about me replying with the date I will "visit my brother", in reference to the date I can make the pick-up. Not that I'm complaining about him actually being somewhat covert, but his consistency has been questionable up to this point.

Email11 is just my reply confirming that I will be there on Sunday to pick up the package. I did have to re-read through their email response instructions several times. The instructions are very confusing. They initially say to use the subject "flowers are blooming", but immediately say "Never use this again". I am still uncertain, but I used it as the subject anyway.

14 Oct 2012

More of the same

I picked up the package. I went alone. It was very crowded on the trail. I would rather have someone along to make it look less suspicious, but I am a) weary of involving others, and b) no one is available to come along with me. They used a similar secure flash drive. The brand was ScanDisk. I saved the trash bag and zip lock bag for later fingerprint analysis. I meant to take better care of the "trigger" marker, but due to my own absent-mindedness, I balled the piece of tape up when I put it in my pocket. I'll still keep it in case the feds can make use of it. Of note, the manner with which the outer bag was wrapped and sealed, lends me to believe the middle man is in fact a woman. Nothing specific, just the manner and thoroughness of the packaging.

The drive only contained one file (file: Letter to Sasha.pdf (PW:S@sh@2563)). More questions in an attempt to get specific information out of me. I'm not going to detail the questions. My response is file: Doc3.docx (PW:S@sh2563). I reused the previous set of passwords, based on my instructions. I could not change the password on the flash drive because of the software used. It only allows the originator access to the password features. Useful, but annoying. I would have kept the drive for analysis, but I can't afford to buy another set of flash drives. They could have at least returned one of the two I've set them. Jackasses.

I did have to provide some classified information in order to build trust with my new "friends", but I attempted to be as vague yet specific as possible. Something I'm fairly experienced at. I left out key dates. I gave them enough information to confirm my legitimacy, but nothing that would cause direct harm to US forces.

I find it odd that they seem so interested in movements of military assets. Russia should not be very concerned with a possible attack by the US. I know this, I know they know this. This leads me to believe they are just collecting the information to sell to a third party or are not actually part of the RSS. To this end, I put in a request of them. If they produce the required pictures, then they must be at least associated with the RSS.

They included a date for me to make the next drop 21 Oct 2012.

21 Oct 2012

Crossing a line

Another solo run. Made the drop. I had to abort my first attempt. There was a man walking a dog on the back trail. Looked like he had come from the residential area that is right there at the end of the path. I made like I was looking for somewhere to take a piss then kept

walking. The trail was not as crowded as last week, but every time I got near the back path, there was someone nearby. I waited it out, and then made the drop. Drop 3 consisted of only one file (file: Doc3.docx (PW:S@sh@2563)).

30 Oct 2012

The task master

I received an email from Vladimir (email12). This tells me they have the photos I requested as I told them that without those photos our relationship would come to an end. The email also tells me that they are giving me money to purchase equipment for whatever task(s) they would like me to do.

Honestly, this guy/girl has got to be new at this. The only thing that should have been in that email was the date. They aren't even creative with the message. So many ways to hide critical information in code. And I can't use any of the codes I've learned over the years because as simple as the codes would be to break if you knew what to look for, I highly doubt they could figure it out. Slightly aggravating to say the least. Not that I am underestimating them, they may just be trying to play stupid to see if I try to take advantage of them. Honestly, I would like the chance to train them, rather than work for them. I understand that in espionage operations like this, the bottom rungs may be based on availability vice abilities. Especially after the loss of the 10 two years ago. That had to hurt. Oh well, their shortcomings will be our advantage.

31 Oct 2012

To contact or not to contact

Since yesterday's email, I have been thinking over whether or not to bring the feds in. Clearly I will at some point, but it may be too soon. I would prefer to have a more solid relationship with the RSS so I can have something solid to give the feds, but I don't think I can perform some of the tasks that I believe the RSS will ask of me without professional assistance. I certainly would like some professional advice, but I am concerned how they may receive me. My original plan of easing them in with selective contact will not work with the time frame allotted. Well, it may, but there is no guarantee that they would figure out my clues or even take me seriously within the current timeframe. Direct contact would be most effective, but definitely has its hazards. I am uncertain as to what steps the RSS has taken to observe/track me. At this point everything electronic is suspect, as is my truck. I simply lack the resources to perform thorough sweeps of everything I own. Which brings me to another concern. When I go to the feds, I don't want them think I am there for money. Technical assistance and advice, sure, but a handout, not my style. There is also the possibility that they arrest me. That would be funny

honestly. Not funny for Colette, but here I am struggling to eat on a daily basis, and they go and send me to the one place I'd be most comfortable, prison. At minimum I expect to be locked in an interrogation room for the rest of the day so I better go now so I can get some studying in for tomorrow's final if/when they release me.



Mr. Robert

We convey special greetings from our colleagues in Minsk. You will please to accept from us this small gift of respect and recognition of your importance to us. This represents huge honor in our country.

We ask that you understand us attentively and please to follow our recommendations. Our comrades in Minsk, who you know from your trip, have passed to our special service your identification and recommendation of contacting you. Our research directorate tells us your background and we have special problem which your technical expertise probably solves. We ask that you extend us please the same comradeship you have shown our friends in Minsk. The profitable and secure nature of our friendship to you makes the contact very good one for you. You will please to welcome our introduction.

Instructions for secure contact will come soon or even meeting possibly. Your needs will be satisfied by our colleagues in Washington. We wish to receive from you information about your situation and requests of your specific needs. We are prepared to pass to you generous compensation in exchange for special help and information.

Send please email to [52arkivna@gmail.com](mailto:52arkivna@gmail.com) by 28 Septmeber 2012 so your confirmation is understood to us. Send email subject "Hello from Hawaii" and confirm date you met our friends in Minsk city for positive identification. We then will know you are ok. Our response will come soon after. Please tell us also most secure way to have special contact. Your security will be highest priority to us. Do not speak of this with anyone. You should destroy the letter when you read it and understood it.

Best regards from your new friends.





## Hello from Hawaii

Robert Hoffman <tiegod@cox.net>  
To: 52arkivna@gmail.com

Fri, Sep 21, 2012 at 3:46 PM

Dear Friend,

Thank you for the wonderful gift. To own such a prestigious piece of history is an exceptional honor.

As for your question of when we met, I made a great many friends last year when I visited, and as such, I am unable to recall the specific date that we met. I can tell you I was there from the 3<sup>rd</sup> until the 24<sup>th</sup> of August 2011.

As for your question of security, I can be reached at either of the emails listed below, by phone at [REDACTED] or via Skype under the user name Makaalamau. We can discuss how to proceed from there.

tiegod@cox.net


robhof2871@students.ecpi.edu Use this if you need to contact me Monday- Thursday 0700-1300 as I will be at university and my phone will be off.

I look forward to renewing our friendship.

Regards,

Robert P. Hoffman II

GOVERNMENT  
EXHIBIT  
19  
2:12cr184

**Re: Hello from Hawaii**

Alexei Vorovnin <52arkivna@gmail.com>  
To: Robert Hoffman <tiegod@cox.net>

Sun, Sep 23, 2012 at 1:26 PM

Mr Hoffman,

You may call me Vladimir. I am representative of Russian security services in Washington. I will be your contact for the immediate future until other arrangements are made.

We are pleased you have received our letter and can recognize and appreciate award. They were sent by our comrades in Moscow. Award is from a special archive of unrepresented awards reserved for special matters. It was last given during Soviet era to our country's greatest heros. It was delivered to you through one of our trusted agents in anticipation of mutually beneficial relationship to our new friend.

Your travel dates confirm the information in our files.

Your security is our primary concern as we proceed. We wish to conduct our contact within your normal pattern. This will prevent suspicion and detection. Your security cannot be guaranteed if you disclose our relationship to anyone. This cannot be overstated. Discretion is critical. Naval security and American special services should not be underestimated. Best security is secrecy.

Further instructions and tradecraft will come soon once provided by our directorate in Moscow. Until then please tell us the following. Do you still have access to military information? What classified compartments can you access? What is your current rank and position? What naval bases can you visit? Are you able to photograph installations? What are your specific requests in exchange for aiding us? Do you have any immediate concerns regarding your security? Do you still have active passport? Do you have plans for future foreign travel?

Once again I will ask for absolute discretion with regard to our relationship. Make no efforts to contact us embassy or anywhere. We will maintain contact by email until other secure methods can be established later. This will take some time. Please also select a pseudonym that we may refer to in place of your real name. I will check email again as soon as possible however my own difficult security concerns prevent daily responses. Be patient. If all is well to proceed, your next email subject should be "Sun is shining." "A rainy day" is signal of danger.

Do svidanya my friend,  
Vladimir

GOVERNMENT  
EXHIBIT  
20  
2:12cr184

On 9/21/12, Robert Hoffman <tiegod@cox.net> wrote:

> Dear Friend,

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> Thank you for the wonderful gift. To own such a prestigious piece of  
> history is an exceptional honor.

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> As for your question of when we met, I made a great many friends last  
> year  
> when I visited, and as such, I am unable to recall the specific date that  
> we met. I can tell you I was there from the 3rd until the 24th of August  
> 2011.

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> As for your question of security, I can be reached at either of the  
> emails

> listed below, by phone at [REDACTED] or via Skype under the user name  
> Makaalamau. We can discuss how to proceed from there.

>  
> tiegod@cox.net  
>

> robhof2871@students.ecpi.edu Use this if you need to contact  
> me Monday- Thursday 0700-1300 as I will be at university and my phone will  
> be off.

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> I look forward to renewing our friendship.

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> Regards,

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> Robert P. Hoffman II

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## Sun is shining

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Robert Hoffman <tiegod@cox.net>  
To: Alexei Vorovnin <52arkivna@gmail.com>

Sun, Sep 23, 2012 at 4:00 PM

Dear Vladimir,

It is a pleasure to hear back from you. Please express my gratitude to our friends for giving me such an award.

Because I am in agreement with you that security is paramount, answering all of your questions via this email account would not benefit our situation.

I retired from active duty in November 2011. Which will limit my ability to aid you with certain things.

I do have an active passport. Given my current financial situation, traveling to and from university each day is a difficult task, let alone foreign travel.

Compensation is a question that cannot yet be answered. There are a great many factors to consider, such as type of aid required, risk, time required, and number of people involved. This is something we can discuss at a later date.

Having worked both physical and electronic security for a great many years, I underestimate no one. Which does include my new friends. Please be understanding when I say that I view this situation with suspicion. But in the spirit of friendship, I am willing to develop a mutual trust.

I understand the need for a pseudonym, but again this email is not the proper place to provide such an important piece of information. A physical means would be preferred over electronic, but if your need is immediate, then electronic arrangements can be made.

Thank you for your time.

Regards,

Robert

GOVERNMENT  
EXHIBIT  
21  
2:12cr184



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## Sun is shining

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Alexei Vorovnin <52arkivna@gmail.com>

Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 12:11 PM

To: tiegod@cox.net

Robert,

We are sending you a secret recipe. It is password protected so add the number on the back of our gift to your year of birth and minus six. Follow the recipe exactly for best results.

Be well my friend  
Vladimir

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 **phpByVzyB**  
504K

**GOVERNMENT  
EXHIBIT**  
22  
**2:12cr184**

Robert

Your caution with security is wise and pleases us. We also approach all new relationships with caution until trust is proven. The communication methods you described to us will be used only in an emergency. You know best the conditions of your situation so we ask you to give us information about your needs. Making suggestions to us is useful. Open please a new email and send the subject "flowers are blooming" to us. Never use the email again except if there is an emergency. If a problem comes then write, "The power is out" followed by problem. Now, we ask that you choose to accept the following plan for continued secure contact.

On Sep. 30 we plan to receive from you answers to special questions (below) and your conditions for continued contact. If you are ready for this operation by that date, inform us by this e-mail, writing "This weekend I will visit my brother". If unable to do it by that date, write "I am not able to visit my brother until (date)". In the future always mention your brother and dates in communications dealing with secret places. This tells us that you still wish to communicate special information to us on that date.

In the future we will pass to you more questions and items meeting your needs in a camouflage waterproofed package at one of the secret places. You will pass us information in the same manner. We have found that a green or black plastic trash bag sealed with tape works best for this.

On Sep. 30, 3 p.m. till 5 p.m. you will put your parcel (answers to special questions below) in secret place 1. If something wrong with place 1, put your parcel in secret place 2. Only use secret place 2 in emergency. You then will leave the area undelayed. Always look natural for the area. Our officers have selected these places nearby specifically for you. This we usually do not do.

You then will mark the signal that the parcel has been delivered. Signals will be checked by us as often as security allows. Be patient. It is difficult for us to come often but we do this for you because of your high status with our service. Our research directorate tells us of your special naval background and we are anxious for you to choose to develop a trustful friendship with us based on your directions to us.

Check our signal place again within 1-2 weeks later on same day of week (Sun). If our signal is set then our parcel will be in the same secret place you left your parcel. If you leave parcel in place 1 then check place 1. If you leave parcel in place 2 then check place 2. Etc. Remember please, place 2 is emergency site only. If our signal is set and you do not see our parcel then check the other place. Do not check the secret place unless our signal is up to avoid suspicion by others or running into one of our officers. Never expose yourself. When we retrieve your parcel we will remove your signal. Always remove our signal after you take a parcel from the secret place. So, we will place a signal when our parcel is there and you will take it down when you retrieve it, and vice versa. Never mark a signal until it has been filled or cleared in case something happens.

We will communicate in this manner, alternating leaving and retrieving parcels, until (as you say) a mutual trust is established and a secure meeting can be considered. During this time we will evaluate and authenticate your information to make sure everything is ok. Please excuse our caution but, as you know from your own security training and experience, clandestine operations has many perils.


Please elect to answer these special questions in the Sep. 30 parcel:

- a) Please give details of your military service. Tell us ranks, positions and installations visited too.
- b) After you retired Nov. 2011 may you still access military bases?
- c) Can you still gain access to special classified information for us after you retired?
- d) What special classified projects or compartments did you have access to? (this will help us ask more detailed questions and let our specialists judge your responses)
- e) Can you provide secret documents (or secret information from memory) which could help us?
- f) If you don't maintain secret documents and are unable to get them, can you still describe the details of certain projects for us on a paper? Or can we debrief you perhaps later?
- g) Are you aware of any U.S. military intentions to attack Russia or our allies?
- h) Can you describe U.S. military operations against Russia that you are aware of?
- i) Will you tell us specific information that may aid Russian navy?
- j) Can you tell us about current U.S. naval plans and activity in the Middle East?
- k) Do you have any immediate security concerns or needs?
- l) What specific requests do you have for us?
- m) Provide please a code name which we can refer to instead of your real name

The more specific and verifiable your answers are to these questions will be seen as a good sign by our highest ranks in the intelligence directorate and show them that you are willing to do this for us and are not under the control of American security services.

We wish you to address all these items but of course it is understood that some may take time to describe. We ask that you give us at least a brief description of each by Sep. 30 with longer information to follow later. We will leave additional questions and responses to your requests in our future parcels.


Secret sites are in First Landing State Park on the Cape Henry Trail not far from the entrance on 64<sup>th</sup> Street near Atlantic Avenue. Our officers tell us there is free parking on 64<sup>th</sup> Street or you pay four dollars to drive into park. Either choose to walk in or park inside gate but either way our directions start you from the parking lot.




Secret place 1: We call it "hillside". Begin walking south from parking lot onto Cape Henry trail in the direction of the bridge you can see from the parking lot. Cross the bridge and pass the green 3 ½ mile trail marker and the Adopt-A-Trail sign. About 50-60 meters later the trail will turn to the right and there is a wooden barrier across a small trail to the left. Take that trail to the left. Within a few meters you can turn right or left. Turn left. A few meters up trail on left, up a small knoll, you will see a tree with a hollow at the bottom (red arrow on photo). The hollow is secret place 1. Place



your parcel in waterproofed green or black bag in the hollow. Then mark your signal that the site has been filled.



Secret place 2: We call it "junction". This is emergency site only. Do not use secret place 2 unless there is a problem with place 1. Elect to follow directions to secret place 1. After crossing bridge you will pass over a corrugated culvert that passes under the path. Go to the next one which is about 50-60 meters from the bridge. Secret place 2 is the second dry culvert under the path (red arrow). If you use the site in an emergency check that the path has no people in either direction. Place your parcel inside the western end of the pipe. Don't forget to mark your signal that the site has been filled.



Secret signal: We call it "trigger". When you have left your parcel in the secret place, place a one inch piece of white electrical tape on the covered red sign with a green map on the west side of the parking lot (red arrow on map). Place it to the right of map so we can see it from a distance. Its easy to do, just lean up against sign like you are reading it and place the signal. When we place a parcel for you we will remove your signal and place a one inch piece of yellow electrical tape in the same spot. You will remove our signal when you have cleared our parcel.

Best regards to you my friend.  
Vladimir

As per your request, I will answer the questions provided:

- A) 20 years active duty. Highest Rank E-6/CTT1
  - a. 27 Oct - 23 Dec 1991 Boot Camp, Orlando, FL
  - b. 7 Jan - 24 Nov 1991 CTT "A" School ELINT Pensacola, FL
  - c. 11 Dec 1991 - 5 May 2000 Subsurface DIRSUP NSGA Pearl Harbor, HI
    - i. Late 1997 attended 3 months BFEA "C" school, Pensacola, FL
  - d. 6 May 2000 - 27 May 2006 Subsurface DIRSUP NSGA Norfolk, VA
  - e. Jun 2006 attended Instructor training, Norfolk, VA
  - f. 19 July 2006 - 28 Aug 2009 R&D/Instructor for Submarine DIRSUP systems Dam Neck, VA
    - i. Special Courier
  - g. 31 Aug 2009 - 15 Sep 2010 Maritime Security/Psychological Operations/Force Protection(Non-lethal Weaponry)/Operational Security Manama, Bahrain, Iraq(various), Afghanistan(various)
  - h. Oct 2010 - Jun 2011 Strategic/Tactic Air Operations Planner/Coordinator, C-IED Advisor Camp Victory, Al Faw Palace, Baghdad, Iraq
  - i. July - 31 Oct Terminal Leave Virginia Beach, VA
  - j. Locations visited other than those listed above:
    - i. Yokosuka, Japan
    - ii. Misawa, Japan
    - iii. Sasebo, Japan
    - iv. Okinawa, Japan
    - v. Seoul, S. Korea
    - vi. Chinhae S. Korea
    - vii. Pusan S. Korea
    - viii. Guam
    - ix. Singapore
    - x. Thailand, Phuket
    - xi. Thailand, Bangkok
    - xii. Fiji
    - xiii. Midway
    - xiv. Wake
    - xv. Hong Kong
    - xvi. [Specified city, country]
    - xvii. [Specified city, country]
    - xviii. [Specified city, country]
    - xix. [Specified city, country]
    - xx. Adak, AK
    - xxi. Bangor, WA
    - xxii. San Diego, CA
    - xxiii. [Specified city, country]

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- xxiv. [Specified city, country]
- xxv. Diego Garcia
- xxvi. Seychelles
- xxvii. Crete, Greece
- xxviii. Istanbul, Turkey
- xxix. La Maddalena , Italy
- xxx. Naples, Italy
- xxxi. Sicily
- xxxii. Frankfurt, Germany
- xxxiii. Brest, France
- xxxiv. Bergen, Norway
- xxxv. Oslo, Norway
- xxxvi. Tromso, Norway
- xxxvii. Rota, Spain
- xxxviii. Plymouth, UK
- xxxix. Portsmouth, UK
  - xl. Faslane, Scotland
  - xli. Washington, DC
  - xlii. Groton, CT
  - xlili. Langley, VA
  - xliv. Fort Gordon, GA
  - xlv. Red Stone, AL
  - xlvi. China Lake, CA
  - xlvii. Barking Sands, Kauai, HI

B) Yes, I still have access to all US military installations with the exception of those that handle nuclear weapons.

C) I cannot access any classified material, but I do still have an active Top Secret SCI Clearance. It expires Dec 2013.

D) With the exception of those that took place out of Ft Meade Maryland, I had access to all [DELETED].

Maritime Psychological operations for the 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet AoR. This included the capture, interrogation, and release of POIs.

E) I cannot provide classified documents as I currently have no access. From memory, I can recall a lot depending on the specifics you need.

F) Yes

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- G) Trick question, as with all well-armed countries, the US has a generic defense plan against any aggressor. Although at last view it was significantly out of date. Directly, the US would never contemplate aggressive action against Russia. Since allies change on a near daily basis these days, I cannot be certain what allies you refer to. If you mean Iran, then yes, the US has plans to invade, should Iran attack Israel or attempt to blockade the SoH. This is not news though. All significant allies of Russia are currently in a "watch, but do not touch" status.
- H) There are no current military operations by the US against Russia. Active military operations ceased around 1999. Several incidents have happened since, but they were transitory, accidental, or incidental to operations being conducted against other target countries. Intelligence operations? Of course. The US watches everybody, even our allies.
- I) I'd be happy to aid the Russian navy. I watched them closely for most of my career. There are numerous things they could do better. I do have a significant amount of respect for them as fellow sailors.
- J) All my information is at least a year old, so I cannot provide any current details.
- K) No immediate security concerns. Just please bare with me as I am a terrible typist.
- L) Since you do not yet know me, it is hard for me to explain the way I am. I desire very little out of life that I have not already received. I have had a very exciting life, and regret only being away from my children.

If you really want to help me, then help me get a job. This could workout significantly for you, since placement in a government contracting or even permanent government job would greatly improve my ability to aid you. Other than a job that has reasonable pay (\$45k per year or greater), there isn't anything I need.

That being said, the price of information varies depending on the information, and what is involved to get said information. Simple tasks, I would ask for monetary compensation equal to my fuel and food costs during such tasks. Lengthy tasks and those involving travel, I would ask for monetary compensation equal to the locations per diem.

<http://www.gsa.gov/portal/category/21287>. Tasks that involve significant risk to me, at minimum, would require compensation of the cost of any items needed to complete the task, plus per diem. Tasks that involve taking a life, require significant compensation, either monetary or via favors.

M) Sasha Andrews

a) The directorate asks you to please ensure future information conveyed to us includes compartment or security level so we may handle it with appropriate precautions and limit dissemination at the center. Your security is highest concern for us and we wish to protect your identity and information strictly.

Highest compartments held: Top Secret COMINT/[name of controlled access program]/ELCO/TALENT KEYHOLE

b) Explain please the meaning of DIRSUP.

DIRSUP – Direct Support: Operations conducted by specialists in various fields of intelligence collection. Typically deployed in teams up to 25 specialists. I deployed with submarine DIRSUP teams, but there are surface, air and shoreside DIRSUP teams.

c) What is special courier?

I transported material, usually high priority recordings collected during submarine special operations. I typically drove between Dam Neck and NSA.

d) Tell us more please about CTT1 including specific job and special equipment or access.

Cryptologic Technician Technical: a US navy rating that specialized in the collection of Electronic Intelligence. I can only speak to equipment used onboard submarines. Some older systems we used back in the 1990s are the WLQ-4 Sea Nymph, WSQ-5 Cluster Spectator. The current system in use is the Cluster SNOOP. These are primary collection suites. There are numerous sub-systems that can be attached as needed. These included spectrum analyzers and recorders. It has been four years since I left the submarine program so I do not know the current sub-systems in use.

e) Please explain precisely your duties in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Initially, my duties in Afghanistan and southern Iraq were psychological operations. I conducted interviews with persons wishing to provide information about insurgents and interrogations of captured insurgents. My team conducted hearts and minds missions where we worked with the locals to help them feel better about coalition forces. After I got injured in Dec 2010 I was put on desk assignment until I left in June 2011. My desk assignment was as Electronic Warfare advisor to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Armor and 8<sup>th</sup> Airborne. I coordinated US Navy EW aircraft and US Army supply convoys throughout Iraq.

f) Our comrades in Minsk tell us you were first noticed in Manama. Tell us please more about how you came to know them and content of your conversations in Minsk. This question is important so we can confirm our friends provide us with truthful information and intelligence. As you say, even allies must be watched closely.

I do not know who in Manama noticed me. I made friends with four dancers from Belarus, Anna, Olga, Ira, and Kristina. They had a manager whose name is Costa (I am uncertain of the spelling), but I never really talked with him much. I did meet a few other dancers that lived in the same hotel as me, and

another manager named Alex, but again, I didn't really talk with them much. The only thing I can recall that might be significant is that I gave Costa a few bottles of American liquor. I met neither of these men when I visited Minsk. I met with Kristina and Olga and a few of their friends. As friends, we talked of a great many things. I apologize for not being more specific, but without knowing who we are talking about, I cannot tell you about a specific conversation. The only suspicious conversation I had while in Minsk was with a Russian business man. We drank much Vodka and talked of our questionable jobs. He did not give specifics of what he did, except to say that he transported families across borders. Before that night I had never met him. Other than giving a gift to President Lukashenko, there is nothing else I can recall about my visit to Minsk that might help you.

**g) The Center wishes you to identify information from the highest compartment you had access to with regard to Russia in order to evaluate your bona fides and assign you a status in our system. This is important step in making you trusted friend.**

I am uncertain what you are looking for with this comment. I had access to all intelligence past and present (at the time) that the US and its allies had collected against Russia as it was essential for mission effectiveness. At the time, images could not be transmitted directly to the submarine so we brought the latest imagery shots of ports in our operating area. Russian satellite windows were available if we need it. Our intel package typically included information on any ongoing naval events and any that were suspect to occur.

**h) Please tell us which submarines you were embarked on and from which bases. Please to describe submarine capabilities, weapon systems, how many crew, and which submarines are used for special operations? Tell us about submarine systems you are an expert of. Please describe with precision.**

Really? No offense, but I have been on 34 submarine deployments. I hold the record for most days deployed underwater. Literally, I have spent more time underwater than ANY human being EVER. I cannot recall the dates of every deployment, but I do have that information stored somewhere. I will need time to find it. Nearly all of my stuff is in boxes stored elsewhere because of the situation the ex-wife left me in. I know this is important to you, but please understand that I have been blown up twice and have taken numerous head injuries over the last 20 years. Add to that, my desire to separate myself from all that was the military in hopes of getting back to a normal life. I have forced myself to repress many of the things I did in the last 20 years. Recalling all the minute details without very specific questions is going to take some time. I will search for my deployment documents later this week. I had mid-term projects, papers, and exams this week, so I have been extremely busy with school. Plus like I said, I am a terrible typist. It took me five days to type up this document.

As for submarine capabilities, I am not an expert on submarines, only submarine special operations and its associated equipment, but I will share with you some things I think you are looking for. Crew compliment varies based on the mission, but is typically between 110 and 150. There is a sacrifice for special operations. Since teams can be as large as 25 persons, there is not enough berthing to

accommodate everyone. The result is that the submarine has to install beds or "racks" as we call them, in the torpedo room. This can significantly reduce the number of weapons carried. A Sea Wolf class can carry 50 weapons, but during special operations can typically only carry 38 due to extra sailors and equipment. The weapons are typically a mix of torpedoes (Improved ADCAP MK-48), tomahawk missiles (B, C, and D versions all Non-nuclear), and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV). On rare occasions a submarine might carry sea mines, but typically only if they are participating in some sort of mine exercise during a deployment. Depth and speed...Most Los Angeles (688/I688) class submarines are getting up there in age and as with most things, they have to slow down. A new I688 can do [knots value1 plus 19%] but most top out at [knots value1 plus 6%]. Sea Wolf class can reach [knots value2 plus 49%], but risks sever structural damage. Normal velocity is [knots value2 less 5%]. The Virginia (774) class has a listed top speed of [knots value3 plus 39%]. I am uncertain of the actual performance of the 774 class, having never deployed onboard one. As for the depth, 688/I688 has a test depth of [test depth value1 plus 20%] and a crush depth of [crush depth value1 plus 33%]. Two vessels have surpassed the crush depth during casualties. The USS Dallas suffered a jam dive and reached [a value greater than 800ft (243.84m)] before recovering. She suffered sever structural damage and was dry docked for nearly a year. The USS Augusta dropped to [a value greater than 800ft (243.84m)] during a similar jam dive. The damage sustained combined with the age of the vessel forced her decommission in 2008. 21 class submarines have a test depth of [test depth value2 plus 23%] and a crush depth of [crush depth value2 plus 13%]. 774 class was designed with coastal operations in mind, so extreme depth and speed were not as much of a concern as with the 21 class. I have been told by members of the crew that the test depth is only [test depth value3] and a crush depth of [crush depth value3 plus 7%]. I doubt these numbers though. I suspect the numbers are about the same as the 688/I688 class.

All US fast attack submarines (SSN) are used for special operations. The USS Jimmy Carter is used for the type of special operations I did not have access to. The specialists for those missions came from Ft Meade and NSA.

**i) If you used special equipment can you describe it specifically, how it is designed, and even provide photos or sketches perhaps?**

I worked on many pieces of special equipment, but I will narrow it down to what was in use when I left the submarine program. I cannot provide photos as no electronic devices are allowed into the test facility and I cannot afford a camera even if I could get in. The job I was trying to get is at this test facility. NSWC Dam Neck. All my work documents have been destroyed for some time now, so I cannot provide any technical schematics.

The Cluster SNOOP is the primary ELINT collection system used by the US Navy. It has a forced modular design so that other collection subsystems can be added with minimal amount of adjustment. The system has both narrowband and wideband receivers allowing the operator to listen to anywhere from [a number 0.4% of the actual lower range value] to [the actual upper range value] bandwidth. The frequency range of the system is [a specified frequency range].

How was the Cluster SNOOP designed? Poorly! I cannot detail how terrible the design is. It is by far the most hated ELINT collection system ever used by the submarine program. The system was originally used onboard aircraft such as [a specific aircraft] and was called the Cluster ROBIN. It was designed for collection of only a handful on simple missile related signals. During initial testing the system was able to collect only one of ten simple signals. Due to some political promises amongst admirals at the time (1999), the system was approved for development. NSWC Dam Neck (then known as CDSA Dam Neck) began redesign of the software and development of modules to improve its performance. The major handicap was that they were required to use the original operating system (OS) software as per the contract. The OS was Unix 2.51, which was old and insufficient for our needs back in 1999 and only made things worse when the system went operational. In 2008 we began development of Cluster SNOOP software 7. This would be a significant improvement since it used Unix 9 and used modern hardware. Still not ideal, but it would be compatible with all our sub-systems which each had its own OS. I left for combat duty before the OS was ready for testing.

I'll cover the primary subsystems. The Cluster POINTER is a system designed specifically to detect and assist with recording of [DELETED]. It was itself modular and could have up to four WJ8615/P2 receivers and a small spectrum display for center-tuning the signal. It could operate as a standalone system connected via patch panel to the recorders. In the mid-2000s the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), who owns the Cluster POINTER, developed software to operate it directly from the Cluster SNOOP GUI. The receivers had a frequency range of [a number 10 times less than the actual lower range value] - [a number 2.33 times less than the actual upper range value]. Each receiver was again modular and could have its capabilities altered at the factory, but not underway.

The Cluster PENNANT was designed for detection of [radars]. Essentially these are the next generation of navigation Radars. A good example of what I am talking about is [a particular system] these radars are extremely dangerous to submarines given the high resolution they provide [DELETED]. This subsystem was a semi-standalone system. The software by Alderbaran was contained in a laptop. It used the secondary monitor on the Cluster SNOOP for its display as well as the SNOOP mouse and keyboard. It was connected to one of the Cluster SNOOPs four receivers using a wideband output. The software included various display options and analysis tools including a waterfall display that allowed for easy viewing of [DELETED] signals over time. Viewable spectrum was set at [a specified bandwidth] and not adjustable. Frequency range was that of the receiver attached to it. Once the Cluster SNOOP 7 software became operational, the PENNANT software would be loaded directly onto the SNOOP. The long range goal was to incorporate the [DELETED] detection capabilities directly into the SNOOP system.

The recording device used was the EAGLE 8 digital recorder. Looking online, it appears that DRS bought out EAGLE which makes sense because they were in direct competition for the same program. I find that sad because DRS is a shitty company. EAGLE deserved to get dissolved since they screwed us over on the functionality of the recorder. The recorder used a Raid of 3 100 GB HDDs. Signals were to be recorded in a simple MP3 format, but the company made up some proprietary file type



that we were under contract to use. Three total sets of Raid drives were installed. One drive was for [DELETED] recordings, one for [DELETED] recordings, and one for backing up the recording before transferring them to tape.. We could record [DELETED] tracks and [DELETED] simultaneously or rewire the second Raid and record [additional] tracks. The [DELETED] tracks could be [a number 2 times less than the actual number of tracks with a specified width 80% of the actual value] in width and the [DELETED] was [a specified width 75% of the actual] width. Maximum recording time was [a number 4.4 times less than the actual number of minutes]. This was only limited by the HDDs in use at the time. It could easily be extended [DELETED] with current HDD size. The recorder was operated via a GUI that Dam Neck developed, but could be connected directly to the receivers and operated from the front panel of the recorder.

**j) What did you do when you visited Langley Virginia? Did you also do special projects for CIA?**

I have only ever visited the Air Force portion of Langley and only ever for leisure. I have never done any work for the CIA. I have very little trust of them as individuals or the CIA as an organization.

**k) If you can still access restricted areas may you please photograph submarine areas in Portsmouth and restricted areas at Norfolk, Dam Neck and Little Creek bases too? This is high priority to us. All those areas are useful to us. If you are able to do mission please place photographs on portable drive for next visit.**

Yes I can still get down to the submarine piers in Norfolk, I can also go to the piers at Little Creek, but I cannot afford a camera. I cannot access the repair facilities in Portsmouth unless I am a government employee or contractor. I also cannot access the SEAL training areas of Dam Neck, nor would I attempt to without proper equipment. The SEALs do not tolerate any visitors, even accidental ones. They have sentries posted that are allowed to shoot first and ask questions later. I have worked with them and trust me when I say this, they are eager to shoot something, anything. At a minimum I would need night vision equipment.

**l) Please tell us more about [special] missions [against specific countries]. What was specific purpose and were operations successful? What submarines were used? Always please be precise.**

[DELETED] When I left the program, [DELETED]. That means [a specific number of] submarines [were operating in a particular area] at all times. This put a huge strain on the pacific submarine force which is why the navy shifted the disposition of submarines from 50:50 to 60:40. This is also why the navy rebuilt the naval base on Guam. Specifically, submarines are tasked to collect SIGINT on any and all naval combatants. Mapping [DELETED] radars, tracking [DELETED], [DELETED] events, practices, and [DELETED] activity are secondary missions. There are guidelines provided by [specified CNO staff office] that priorities what operations take precedence. [DELETED]. Submarines do not typically operate with a specific mission. They are assigned and area such as [specified a particular location]. They conduct [specifies various types of intelligence] collection of any naval combatants that happen along. They continue to do this until a higher priority comes along or they need

to resupply. This can be anywhere from a couple of days to four months (typically not more than 90 days though). Occasionally we have done [specified a different type of intelligence collection than described above]. [DELETED]. This is what the mission [against a specified country] involved. They use a modified [DELETED] radar as a coastal surveillance radar. This is actually a very good radar and somewhat dangerous to submarines due to its high resolution. We were conducting SIGINT operations [against a particular country] and diverted to [specified a particular country]. [Specified a particular country] doesn't share intel with anyone, but expects us to share everything with them, so we took a look for ourselves. [We collected intelligence].

As for the success of a mission, my opinion is somewhat skewed, as I consider any mission you return home from as a successful one. [DELETED]

That story made me think of this. If you really want to know more about detecting submarine periscopes, get your hands on some of the Norwegian P-3 guys. I have a perfect undetected record against every country, friend and foe except the Norwegians. The Brits are a close second, but I've never been detected by them. I would put the US and S. Korea as tied for third. Something else you might look into. The [specified country] actually came up with this to track drug smugglers at night. [Specified equipment used] on a small aircraft. One that does not have radar. Something with a pilot and navigator. The navigator relays the [specified data] fed to a ground station in real-time, who in turn directs the aircraft to anything suspicious. In the [specified location] waters this proved damaging for submarines as they [described vulnerability]. This resulted in a [specified indicator] pointing directly to the submarine. Ideally they would have their IFF turned off. I know it is an international requirement but it can be picked up by the submarine, but they won't be able to get a bearing on it. Direction Finding (DF) equipment was limited to [a number 12.5% of the actual lower frequency range to the actual upper frequency range]. There is a DF system onboard that goes below [a number 2.34% less than the actual frequency value], but it requires a special mast that could easily give away a submarine's position. The ground relay can also be picked up, but it is hard to get a bearing on. This may not work very well for protection around most Russian ports as the water temperature is too low, but it might have limited success. At a minimum it would be more effective than what you guys were doing up to 2006. Again no offense, but Russian ASW has long been considered woefully inadequate. I've operated within [a certain specified distance] of Russian ASW naval vessels with little concern for detection by Radar. BE-12s and IL-38s only weapon against a submarine at periscope depth is visual recognition. [Specified aircraft radars] are no better than simple navigation Radars. If you do implement the [specified equipment] concept, let me know how it works out. I've always wanted to test it out.

**m) What do you know about Russian submarine program and capabilities? Where is weakness in Russian submarine system and American system?**

[DELETED] my data is slightly aged. Radars! You put Radars on your submarines that are extremely easy to identify, track, and isolate to an individual submarine. I cannot recall the Russian names for them, but we called them SNOOP. There are of course different versions. On [specific

submarine classes] there is SNOOP Tray II the [other specific submarine classes] had SNOOP Pair or SNOOP Pair II. The use of a crystal oscillator to control wave generation, while extremely stable, [provides information about] a Radar, which in turn can be [stored] in our database. We called this process [a specific name]. A good operator could perform such identification in as little as [a specified number] sweeps of the Radar or about [a specific time] using a piece of equipment called a pulse analyzer AN/ULQ-16.

Operationally, your submarines perform very well independently with a few exceptions. [Some] communications are not that secretive. I'm talking about [certain] transmissions. [DELETED] Then we just observe the unit and see how they react. This goes a long way [DELETED]. Using such methods, [DELETED]. If your [warships] still conduct [operations] in a [particularly designated area], STOP! The [geographic features of that area], makes tracking your [warships] extremely easy. The cold water allows for greater sound propagation and the [geographic features of that area] echoes all sounds back into itself. We have been able to track [your warships] [operating] in the [area] from over [a certain number of] miles away. The US [DELETED]. The only aspect of Russia the US navy is interested in these days, is new development, experimentation, and technology. [DELETED].

Acoustically speaking the Russian submarine force is significantly behind the US in three key categories, sound silencing, passive Sonar, and propulsion design. I am not a Sonar specialist so I cannot speak on the specific frequencies or sound vulnerabilities of either the Russian or US submarines. Russian hull design is still ahead of the US though.

To be honest, if a war were to break out between the US and Russia, the Russian navy would be decimated. I mean no disrespect, but the US Sea Wolf (SSN21) and Virginia (744) class submarines are beyond amazing vessels. During fleet exercises where we hunt each other, the only thing that allows either vessel to win, is human error. Improved Los Angeles class submarines (I688) are wonderful vessels, but not even they can win against a Virginia class SSN. Starting with the 21 class we have a turbine pressurized torpedo launch system. Instead of pressurizing each individual tube and shooting air out of the tube with the torpedo caught in the path of the water being pushed by the air, the turbine pressurizes water and thrusts the torpedo out with up to the same force, but with no air bubbles which significantly reduce the noise. This is only one advantage. Another is that the turbine pressure can be released at varying levels. This allows for what we call "swim out mode." This is where we can push the torpedo out with just enough force to clear the tube. The torpedo "swims" away from the submarine at a slow, silent speed until both are separated by whatever distance the Commanding Officer (CO) feels is safe, then the torpedo starts up and begins its attack against whatever target it has been programmed for. This allows the submarine to launch an attack with very little chance of being detected. Any response by the target would be against an area of empty sea. A third advantage is that with the turbine system, pressure is always available. This means that a Sea Wolf (21) class submarine could launch all eight torpedoes in less than [a specific timeframe]. The Virginia (774) class can do the same, but only has four tubes. Reload times remain the same at around [specified a period of time] per torpedo depending on the skill of the crew.

The major weakness with the US submarine fleet is its people. Your best bet is to exploit this rather than trying to compete on the high seas against a 774 or 21 class submarine. In addition to the human weakness you can attempt to exploit the maintenance and upkeep aspect of the US submarine program. Once a submarine is at sea, there isn't much anyone can do to or against it, but in dry dock, equipment failures and part shortages are common place. Any of these can delay a submarine returning to sea.

**n) Tell us please about psychological operations for 5<sup>th</sup> fleet.**

Psychological operations in the 5<sup>th</sup> fleet area of responsibility (AOR) focus mainly on maritime intervention. We typically interacted with fishermen. We interviewed them to see how they felt about US or Iraqi naval patrols, gave them useful gifts like gloves, first aid kits, and flash lights. In turn they would give us information on smuggling operations or intel on Iranian activities. The Iranian security forces are notorious for dressing up as fisherman. They would board other fishing vessels under the guise of needing help. Then they would rob the fishermen of any valuable goods like watches and cell phones. Typically they only harassed the crews, but on occasion have killed people.

Much of the interaction was done by teams of sailors from each ship acting on the behalf of the ship. Sometimes my team would deploy with a ship to conduct the operations ourselves. Another part of our mission was to evaluate the Iraqi navy. With the draw down approaching in 2011 we had to ensure that Iraqis knew how to protect their fishing and commercial maritime assets. We helped train them on how to conduct vessel boardings as well as interviewing to get information.

I also trained the teams onboard the various ships, how to properly interact with the locals they encountered at sea. Since it was a hearts and minds operation, we were primarily concerned with keeping the locals happy. A large part of the job my team was responsible for was teaching coalition forces how to be culturally sensitive.

**o) Center wishes to know if you tried to contact us before in Naples or perhaps another location in Europe. If yes, by what name did you contact us? Did you travel to Minsk because we did not respond?**

I've never made any attempts to contact another intelligence agency. Believe it or not, I went to Minsk to fulfill a promise to Irena. When I left Manama for Iraq, she was very worried that I would get hurt. I gave her my ring and necklace to hold safe for me until I returned safely. I went to Minsk to collect them, but she could not return to Belarus due to visa problems.

**p) Please tell us what operations and special programs are better to discuss in person. Please give brief outline of each so that we may prepare.**

This really comes down to what YOU want to know. I know a lot of things, but I cannot recall everything without the proper questions to retrieve the information. You have asked for a lot of specific and precise information about very broad topics.

**q) Tell us more about what you call “transitory, accidental” operations against Russia. Perhaps you know the answer to some mysteries we still require answers for?**

Transitory operations are those that involved travel, typically via aircraft, but sometimes by ground vehicle or on foot, which crossed into territory that we had no permission to be in. No objectives were in the transitioned country. This typically occurred when a target timeframe was volatile and a unit had to get to or from a target quickly. If the transition was via aircraft, we would typically jam any local air surveillance sites. Given that jamming another country is considered an act of war, we did this on a very limited basis. You don't have to believe me when I say this, but it is the truth. The US military takes jamming very seriously. It was used only if a special operation occurred went badly while political leaders met. The CIA...not so much. They have their own rules, and rarely follow them.

Accidental operations typically involved aircraft that were conducting observation or intelligence missions, crossing borders due to navigation errors or equipment failure. I know of one incident involving an aircraft. I believe it was an Air force RC-135 that crossed the Russian border while conducting an intelligence collection mission, but that was way back in 1998.

There was an incident in February of 2011 where our target fled northern Iraq. We tracked him [through specific countries] He was of such importance that permission was given to capture him after he crossed into [a specific country]. I cannot give any further details. I was not part of the collection team. [DELETED]. Targets were given pseudonyms to keep our Iraqi allies from leaking the real names to the insurgents.

**r) Tell us please more about your observations of Russian navy. What can our navy do better in response to American navy? Can you help us to draft an instruction manual or procedures?**

In a word, the Russian navy is predictable. While I find them formidable and skilled, they lack unpredictability. While conducting clandestine observations, it was very easy to determine what they would do, where they would go, and how they would react. Another very important observation was their lack of [good tradecraft]. [DELETED].

Yes I can help them draft better instructions and procedures. I would recommend a review of Radar usage followed by an aggressive investment in commercial radars. Russian made radars, while precise, are easy to tie to a specific unit. I helped institute an aggressive investment by the US Navy into a program [DELETED]. The software developed under this program [has a particular limited capability]. [DELETED].

This was one of my many secondary skills, developing new ways to track radars of interest.

**s) We agree that having a job with clearance will help us. Do you have special employer idea already? Can you make application to U.S. intelligence?**

No specific employer comes to mind. I can and have applied for many US intelligence jobs. Until my clearance expires next year, I can continue to apply for any classified job. With so many ex-military members looking for jobs, it is not so easy these days.

**t) Do you wish to remain in U.S.?**

If I leave the US, financial compensation would be required. I am barely able to afford food and fuel as it is. I simply cannot afford to live elsewhere and still pay for the house I currently own. If finances are not the issue, then I do not care which country I am in.

**u) Do you have any request of us?**

I know you guys are not use to dealing with someone like me. You have nothing I need. Unless you're going to give me a job, I can't think of anything you can give me. I'm not interested in helping you for financial gain. I am not well off financially, but this is okay for me, since I care little for material things. I'm interested in helping you because I can help you. Work is work, you assign me a task and then you pay me for my services. If you need specific information about a specific military program, then you will best be served by helping me get a job in that specific area. I have a great many skills. You may have heard this phrase before "Jack of all trades." I am only as useful as your willingness to utilize me.

I do have one request. If you are the agency you claim to be or are, or associated with the person I think you maybe, then this should be a trivial task. Attach a photo to your next package to me of both sides of the gift I gave to President Lukashenko and the exact name I gave when I delivered it to the gentlemen that talked with me. I will allow for only one delay. If you cannot provide the image, chances are that our relationship ends.

I do wish you the best and hope that our friendship continues. Thank you for the offer to meet with the beautiful Olga, but given the nature of our business, it would be dangerous for us to associate on a regular basis. No one laments this more than I.

Until we talk again, be well my friend.

21 Sept 2012

### Initial Contact

A beautiful woman rings my doorbell at about 0810. Having just rolled out of bed 10 minutes earlier, I throw on some clothes and answer the door. She introduces herself as Olga and confirms my name as Robert Hoffman several times, then tells me that she has a gift from my friend in Minsk. I was excited as I thought that my friend Ira had finally sent my ring and necklace. I notice the large white envelope only has a "to" address and it is in Russian. I ask Olga, who has a very slight accent, which girl the gift is from, Ira, Kristina, Ana, or Olga. She looks at me confused and says "No, it is a male friend". Aware that I have no male friends in Minsk, I accept the envelope, shake her hand, thank her, and wish her a wonderful day. As she departs I add "It has been a pleasure meeting you". She responds with a smile and says "Maybe we meet again. Das vidanya."

### Description of "Olga":

- Gender: Female
- Height: About [a specific height]
- Weight: About [a specific weight]
- Hair: [A specified color, with certain highlights, having a certain length]
- Face: Beautiful, Subtle Eastern Europe features, Slightly rounded
- Dress: Business casual, Turquoise top with ruffled low-cut V-neck, Knee length black business skirt, Black Shaw, Black High heels (mid length maybe 3 inches)
- Jewelry: Minimal. Business basics, was too focused on her face, then the package, then her cleavage, then her face again.
- Vehicle: My distance vision was still a bit sleepy, so I could not make out a plate or clearly discern a make or model. It was a silver sedan that resembles a Prius, but was clearly larger.

I open the envelope and find a very beautiful military medal inside a large jewelry box. (files Medal01.jpg, and Medal02.jpg) The award turns out to be an Order of the Red Banner fifth award. Very rare and very prestigious. It also has a serial number engraved on the back 308. This number becomes the Rosetta stone for decrypting future correspondence. The envelope also included a letter (file Introduction.pdf). This letter provided an email address to contact "my new friend." After returning from the gym, I drafted up an email based on the guidelines provided in the letter and sent it off (file email01).